SITARAM vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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CGHC010332482026 2026:CGHC:38291-DB
Digitally signed
by SAGRIKA
AGRAWAL
Date:
2026.09.01
10:28:58
+0530
NAFR
SAGRIKA
AGRAWAL
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPCR No. 506 of 2026
Sitaram S/o Shri Chaitram @ Rambagas Yadav, Aged About 59 Years (About
26 Years At The Time Of Entry Into Jail), R/o Village -Bandha, Police Station -
Takhatpur, District -Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through -The Secretary, Home (Jail) Department
Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Raipur (C.G.)
2 - The Under Secretary, State Of Chhattisgarh, Jail Department, Mantralaya,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Raipur (C.G.)
3 - The Director General, Prisons And Correctional Services Chhattisgarh,
Head Quarter- Prisons And Correctional Services Chhattisgarh, Raipur (C.G.)
4 - The Jail Superintendent, Central Jail Bilaspur (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
(Cause title taken from CIS)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Soumya Rai, Dy. Govt. Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
31.08.2026
1. Heard Mr. Rishi Rahul Soni, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also
heard Mr. Soumya Rai, Dy. Govt. Advocate for the Respondent/ State.

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2. The petitioner has filed the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India seeking following relief(s):-
“10.1 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for
entire records pertaining to the case of the petitioner for it's
kind perusal;
10.2 The Hon,ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a
suitable writ, order or direction and quash/set-aside the order
dated 12.06.2026 (Annexure P/1) issued/passed by the
respondent no.2;
10.3 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a
suitable writ, order or direction commanding the respondent
authorities to grant the petitioner remission under 473 of
Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita 2023/432 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure 1973 and under Rule 358 of C.G. Prisons
Rule 1968 and to release the petitioner by granting remission
of rest part of the sentence imposed upon the petitioner vide
judgment of conviction and sentence dated 15.10.1999
passed by the Learned 2nd Additional Session Judge Bilaspur
in Session Trial No. 200/1997; and
10.4 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit
and proper looking to the facts and circumstances of the case,
may also kindly be granted in favour of the petitioner.”
3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is a convicted prisoner
presently lodged in Central Jail, Bilaspur (C.G.), having been convicted
under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced to
imprisonment for life by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge,
Bilaspur, vide judgment dated 15.10.1999 passed in Sessions Trial No.
200/1997. His criminal appeal was dismissed by this Court on
29.08.2016 and the Special Leave Petition filed before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court was also dismissed on 20.05.2022. The petitioner has
undergone actual incarceration for more than 16 years and 05 months
and, as on 29.07.2026, has earned remission of 05 years, 07 months
and 21 days, thereby completing more than 22 years of imprisonment

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including remission. The petitioner applied for premature
release/remission of the unexpired portion of his sentence, pursuant to
which the opinion of the sentencing Court was obtained, wherein no
objection was expressed to granting remission considering his conduct
and good behaviour. Thereafter, the requisite jail reports and other
documents were prepared and the petitioner’s case was processed
under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. However,
vide order dated 12.06.2026, the respondent No.2 rejected the
petitioner’s case for premature release, mainly on the basis of the
negative recommendation/opinion of the State Sentence Review
Board. Hence, the present petition has been preferred challenging the
said order and seeking appropriate relief in respect of his premature
release.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the
impugned order dated 12.06.2026 (Annexure P/1), whereby the
petitioner’s case for premature release by way of remission of the
unexpired portion of sentence has been rejected, is arbitrary,
mechanical, non-speaking and suffers from complete non-application of
mind, as the respondent authority has merely relied upon the negative
recommendation of the State Sentence Review Board without
independently considering the relevant facts and circumstances of the
petitioner’s case. It is submitted that the petitioner has already
undergone more than 16 years of actual incarceration and, together
with earned remission of 05 years, 07 months and 21 days as on
29.07.2026, has completed more than 22 years of imprisonment; his
conduct in jail has remained satisfactory, the Jail Superintendent has
recommended his premature release, and even the learned sentencing

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Court expressed no objection to grant of remission considering his
good conduct and behaviour. It is further submitted that the adverse
opinions of the District Magistrate, Superintendent of Police and State
Sentence Review Board have primarily proceeded on the nature and
gravity of the offence, without properly examining the petitioner’s post-
conviction conduct, reformation, possibility of recurrence, present
circumstances, and the other factors governing premature release as
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rohit Chaturvedi v. State
of Uttarakhand & Others, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 865 . Learned
counsel would further submit that the nature or gravity of the offence
cannot, by itself, constitute the sole ground for denial of remission,
particularly when the petitioner has undergone a substantial period of
incarceration and there is no adverse material regarding his conduct
while in custody. Reliance is also placed upon Rajo @ Rajwa @
Rajendra Mandal v. State of Bihar & Others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1068 and Rajkumar v. State of U.P., (2024) 9 SCC 598 , to contend
that remission has to be considered in accordance with the applicable
policy, uniformly, transparently and on relevant considerations, keeping
in view the reformative object of punishment. It is also submitted that
similarly situated prisoners, including persons convicted in multiple
murder cases, have been granted premature release, whereas the
petitioner has been denied the same on the basis of irrelevant and
extraneous considerations. The petitioner has also availed parole on
two occasions without any complaint regarding his conduct during such
period. Thus, having regard to the petitioner’s prolonged incarceration,
satisfactory jail conduct, earned remission, recommendation of the Jail
Superintendent, favourable opinion of the sentencing Court and the

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reformative principles governing remission, the impugned order dated
12.06.2026 deserves to be quashed and the petitioner’s case for
premature release deserves to be reconsidered/granted in accordance
with law.
5. Learned State counsel, opposing the petition, would submit that the
petitioner has been convicted for the serious offence punishable under
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to
undergo imprisonment for life, and therefore, the mere completion of a
particular period of incarceration or earning of remission does not
confer any indefeasible right upon the petitioner to seek premature
release. It is submitted that remission or premature release is a matter
falling within the discretion of the competent authority and is required to
be considered in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions,
rules and remission policy, after taking into account the nature and
gravity of the offence, its impact on society and the possibility of
recurrence of crime. Learned State counsel would further submit that
the petitioner’s case was duly considered by the competent authorities
and the State Sentence Review Board, after considering the relevant
reports and materials, including the opinion/report of the District
Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police, did not recommend his
premature release. The impugned order dated 12.06.2026 has,
therefore, been passed after due consideration of the material available
on record and cannot be said to be arbitrary or mechanical merely
because the decision is adverse to the petitioner. It is further submitted
that a favourable jail conduct report or the opinion of the sentencing
Court does not create an absolute right in favour of the petitioner, as
the ultimate decision regarding remission rests with the competent

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authority. The fact that some other prisoners may have been granted
premature release in their respective cases also cannot entitle the
petitioner to claim parity, as each case has to be examined on its own
facts, including the nature of the offence, antecedents, conduct and
other relevant circumstances. It is thus submitted that there is no
illegality or perversity in the impugned order warranting interference by
this Court and, accordingly, the petition deserves to be dismissed.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have carefully
perused the pleadings, annexures and the material available on record.
7. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the
material available on record, this Court finds that the impugned order
dated 12.06.2026 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The petitioner
has undergone a substantial period of incarceration, having completed
more than 16 years of actual imprisonment and more than 22 years of
imprisonment together with earned remission, and his case for
premature release was duly processed under the applicable provisions
of law. It is also evident from the record that the Jail Superintendent
had furnished a favourable recommendation in favour of the petitioner
and the learned sentencing Court had also expressed no objection to
grant of remission, having regard to his conduct and good behaviour.
However, the competent authority, while rejecting the petitioner’s case,
has principally relied upon the negative recommendation/opinion of the
State Sentence Review Board, which in turn was founded upon the
reports of the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police,
without demonstrating any independent, objective and meaningful
consideration of the relevant factors governing premature release. The
petitioner’s conduct during incarceration has been reported to be

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satisfactory and there is no material on record indicating any adverse
conduct on his part during the period of imprisonment or during the two
occasions when he was released on parole. The mere gravity of the
offence, for which the petitioner has already been convicted and
sentenced by the competent criminal Court, cannot by itself constitute
the sole basis for denying the benefit of remission, particularly when
the question at the stage of premature release is required to be
examined from the standpoint of the petitioner’s present conduct,
reformation, likelihood of recurrence, prospects of rehabilitation and
other relevant factors. The apprehension expressed by the authorities,
without reference to any specific and cogent material demonstrating the
likelihood of recurrence of the offence or disturbance of public peace,
cannot be treated as conclusive. Thus, the rejection of the petitioner’s
case merely on the basis of adverse opinions, without proper
consideration of his prolonged incarceration, satisfactory jail conduct,
earned remission, favourable recommendation of the Jail
Superintendent and opinion of the sentencing Court, reflects non-
application of mind and warrants interference by this Court.
8. It is well-settled that while exercising powers under Sections 432 and
433 CrPC, the appropriate Government is required to take a holistic
and reasoned decision. The law on the subject has been succinctly laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxman Naskar v. Union of
India , (2000) 2 SCC 595, wherein the Court identified the guiding
factors for grant of premature release. The relevant portion reads:
“The following factors are required to be
considered: (i) whether the offence is an individual
act of crime without affecting the society at large;

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(ii) whether there is any chance of future recurrence
of committing crime; (iii) whether the convict has
lost his potentiality in committing crime; (iv) whether
any fruitful purpose is being served by keeping the
convict in prison; and (v) socio-economic condition
of the convict’s family.”
9. In the present case, there is no discussion whatsoever of the aforesaid
parameters in the impugned order. The authority has failed to evaluate
the petitioner’s conduct during incarceration, his reformation, or the
likelihood of recidivism.
10. Further, in Ram Chander v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. , AIR 2022
SC 2017 : (2022) 4 SCR 1103, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
emphasized that the opinion sought under Section 432(2) CrPC. must
be based on objective assessment and not merely on the nature of the
offence. The Court observed:
“The opinion of the Presiding Judge must reflect
due application of mind to the relevant factors and
cannot be a mere reiteration of the nature of the
offence or the findings recorded at the time of
conviction.”
11. Similarly, in Rajo v. State of Bihar , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1068, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the opinion of the Presiding
Judge or other authorities is only one of the inputs and cannot be
treated as determinative. It was held:
“The appropriate Government is required to take an
independent decision based on all relevant
considerations including post-conviction conduct;
the opinion of the Presiding Judge cannot be given
primacy if it merely reiterates the circumstances of

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conviction.”
12. In the present case, the impugned order reflects a mechanical reliance
on adverse opinions without independent evaluation. Such an
approach defeats the very purpose of remission, which is rooted in the
reformative theory of punishment.
13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Jagdish , (2010) 4
SCC 216 has held:
“The policy of remission is a reformative measure
and should be applied in a fair and reasonable
manner. The decision must not be arbitrary but
based on relevant considerations.”
14. Likewise, in Union of India v. V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors. , (2016)
7 SCC 1, it has been observed:
“Though the power of remission is discretionary, it
must be exercised in a just, fair and reasonable
manner, and cannot be exercised arbitrarily or on
extraneous considerations.”
15. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is
evident that the respondent authorities have failed to discharge their
statutory obligation. The impugned order is cryptic, non-speaking, and
suffers from non-application of mind, as it does not reflect consideration
of the petitioner’s long incarceration, jail conduct, reformation, or other
relevant factors.
16. It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner has undergone more than
the requisite period of incarceration. There is nothing on record to
indicate any adverse conduct during incarceration or any likelihood of
threat to society upon release.
17. In view of the foregoing analysis and the settled legal position, this

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Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated
12.06.2026 (Annexure P/1) is arbitrary, unsustainable and liable to be
set aside.
18. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed . The impugned order dated
12.06.2026 is hereby quashed .
19. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has undergone a
substantial period of incarceration, has earned remission and
maintained satisfactory conduct during his custody, coupled with the
fact that he has been acquitted in the main case in which the deceased
had appeared as a witness and deposed against him, and there being
no material on record indicating any likelihood of recidivism or
disturbance of public peace upon his release, this Court deems it
appropriate to direct the respondent authorities to reconsider and grant
the benefit of premature release to the petitioner in accordance with the
applicable remission policy and law.
20. The respondents are, therefore, directed to release the petitioner
forthwith , if not required in any other case, in accordance with law.
21. No order as to costs.

Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
sagrika