SMT SAMSHAD vs SRI MUNIRAJU
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 18 DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR
REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.1595 OF 2026 (DEC/INJ)
BETWEEN:
1. SMT. SAMSHAD,
W/O LATE. SADIQUE,
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS,
2. SMT. GULSHAN,
D/O LATE.SADIQUE,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
BOTH ARE RESIDING AT
SY.NO.13, OF THANISANDRA VILLAGE,
NOW CALLED AS SADIQUE LAYOUT,
D.S.R.K.NAGAR POST,
BANGALORE - 560 077.
…APPELLANTS
Digitally
signed by N
UMA
Location:
HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
(BY SRI. B.S.JEEVAN KUMAR., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SRI. MUNIRAJU,
S/O LATE. VENKATAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
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2. SMT.RAJAMMA,
W/O SRI.MUNIRAJU,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
3.
SRI.RAVI KUMARI,
D/O SRI.MUNIRAJU,
AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS,
4. SRI.PRASHANTH,
S/O SRI. MUNIRAJU,
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
5. SRI.VENKATAPATHI,
S/O SRI.MUNIRAJU,
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS,
6.
SRI.MUNIKALA,
S/O LATE. VENKATAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
7. SMT.SHANTHAMMA,
W/O SRI.MUNIKALA,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
8. SRI.GAGAN,
S/O SRI.MUNIKALA,
AGED ABOUT 20 YEARS,
9. KUM.VYSHNAVI,
D/O SRI.MUNIKALA,
AGED ABOUT 18 YEARS,
10.
SMT.LALITHA,
D/O LATE. VENKATAPPA,
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AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
11. SRI.YETHIRAJ,
S/O. LATE. VENKATAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
12.
SMT.AMBUJA,
W/O SRI. YATHIRAJU,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
13. SRI.MADAN,
S/O SRI. YETHIRAJU,
AGED ABOUT 19 YEARS,
14. KUM.SANDHYA,
D/O SRI.YATHIRAJ,
AGED ABOUT 18 YEARS,
15. SMT.MUNITHAYAMMA,
D/O LATE.MADDURAMMA,
AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS,
16.
SMT.RAMAKKA,
DAUGHTER-IN-LAW OF
LATE.MADDURAMMA,
W/O SRI.MUNIYAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS,
17. SMT.KAVITHA,
DAUGHTER-IN-LAW OF
SMT. RAMAKKA,
W/O LATE.VIJAYAKUMAR,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
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ALL ARE RESIDING AT
DR.B.R.AMBEDKAR COLONY,
S.R.K.NAGAR POST,
THANISANDRA VILLAGE,
K.R.PURAM HOBLI,
BANGALORE - 560 077.
18. SRI.ABBAS SHARIFF,
S/O ZAFARULLA SHARIFF,
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.9,
J.P.NAGAR, 6TH PHASE,
OPP. HOLLY MOTHER
ENGLISH SCHOOL,
PUTTENAHALLI POST,
BANGALORE - 560 077.
19. SRI.EHSAN SHARIFF,
S/O LATE.K.NAZEER AHMED,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
20.
SRI.SUHAIL KHAN,
S/O LATE. MOHMED
YOUNUS KHAN,
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,
21. SRI.JAMALUDDIN,
S/O LABAL AHMED,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
DEFENDATS NO.19, 20, 21 ARE
RESIDING AT NO.176,
DHARMARAJA KOIL STREET,
SHIVAJI NAGAR,
BANGALORE - 560 051.
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22.
SRI.MUJIB AHMED,
S/O LATE. MAQBOOL AHMED,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.7/5, 1ST CROSS,
4TH MAIN ROAD,
PADARAYANAPURA,
BANGALORE- 560 026.
23. SRI.ANSAR KHAN,
S/O LATE.ABBAS KHAN,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.4/3,
1ST CROSS, 5TH MAIN ROAD,
PADARAYANAPURA,
BANGALORE - 560 026.
24. SRI.IBRAHIM AHMED,
S/O LATE. ABDUL AHMED,
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.41,
RAJUNAGAR 1ST STAGE,
2ND CROSS,
MYSORE - 570 019.
25. SRI.AMJAD AHMED,
S/O LATE.AHMED KHAR,
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.182,
BANI MANTAPA,
MYSORE - 570 015.
26. SRI.THOUSIF PASHA.H.K.,
S/O. H.A.KHALEEL,
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AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.41,
CANARA BANK INSTITUTION LAYOUT,
B.K.MAIN ROAD, HAROHALLI,
KANAKAPURA TALUK,
RAMANAGARAM DISTRICT.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.BASAVARAJU P., ADVOCATE FOR C/R17 IN CP
12400/26)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF CPC,
AGAINST THE ORDER AND DECREE DATED 23.04.2026 PASSED
ON I.A.NO.25 IN OS.NO.8366/2016 ON THE FILE OF THE XIX
ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU
CITY (CCH-18), ALLOWING THE I.A.NO.25 FILED UNDER
ORDER VII RULE 11(a) AND (d) R/W SEC.151 OF CPC FOR
REJECTION OF PLAINT.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR
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ORAL JUDGMENT
Though the matter is listed for admission, with the
consent of both the learned counsel for the parties, the same is
taken up for final disposal.
2. This regular first appeal is filed by the plaintiffs
calling in question the order passed in O.S.No.8366/2016 dated
23.04.2026 on I.A.No.25 filed under Order VII Rule 11(a) and
(d) read with Section 151 of CPC, whereby the plaint is rejected
by allowing I.A.No.25.
3. Heard Sri. B.S.Jeevan Kumar, learned counsel for
the appellant and Sri. Basavaraju.P., learned counsel for the
caveator/respondent No.17.
4. For the sake of convenience, the parties are
referred to, as per their rankings before the trial Court.
5. It is the case of the plaintiffs, as per the plaint
averments that the defendants are owners of the suit schedule
property and plaintiffs have entered into an agreement of sale
dated 14.05.1988 and 09.04.1990 and shara undertaking to
execute sale deed is dated 04.10.1991 and 10.12.2013.
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But when the defendants failed to come forward to execute the
sale deed, despite entering into an above said agreement of
sale, the plaintiffs were constrained to file suit for specific
performance of contract.
6. The defendant No.17 has filed an application-
I.A.No.25 under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of CPC, praying
to reject the plaint as there is no cause of action and also suit
is barred by limitation as per Section 5(3) and Section 7A of the
Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (for short ‘KVOA
Act’) and under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and
also as per Section 3 and Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
The trial Court has allowed I.A.No.25 and rejected the plaint on
the reason that the alleged agreements of sale were in
contravention of the non-alienation clauses contained in
Sections 5(3) and 7A of the KVOA Act and were also contrary to
Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Therefore, rejected the
plaint.
7. Being aggrieved by the rejection of the plaint by
allowing I.A.No.25, the plaintiffs have preferred this appeal by
raising various grounds and learned counsel for the appellants
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argued in consonance with the grounds raised, that an
agreement of sale does not complete the sale transaction and
therefore, there is no prohibition under Sections 5(3) and 7A of
the KVOA Act, to enter into agreement of sale. Therefore, the
said sale is not forbidden by law. Further sub-section (3) of
Section 5 came into force from the year 2003. Therefore, such
prohibition is not applicable for sale transaction in the present
case. Therefore, submitted that this could all be considered
during the course of trial in adjudication of suit. But at
threshold, rejecting the plaint is not correct.
8. Further, learned counsel submitted that the suit is
not barred by limitation on the reason that there is an
endorsement on 10.12.2013 extending limitation period and
that is agreed by the defendants. When such being the agreed
terms and conditions as agreement of sale by putting an
endorsement to agreement is nothing but extending the period
for performance of contract. Therefore, referring the date of
executing a shara dated 10.12.2013, it is submitted that the
suit filed is within the period of limitation, which is not correctly
appreciated by the trial Court. Hence, prays to allow the appeal
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and remand the matter to the trial Court for fresh consideration
of the suit upon adjudication.
9. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent
No.17 submitted that the suit is barred by limitation as the date
of agreement of sale are dated 14.05.1988, 09.04.1990 and
shara is dated 04.10.1991 and 10.12.2013 and therefore, the
suit filed is barred by limitation. Further, it is submitted that
the shara dated 04.10.1991 and 10.12.2013 cannot extend the
limitation period for performance of contract. Therefore, by
mere putting sharas/endorsements, the performance of
contract shall not be extended for long time stretching to
uncertain period. Hence, this endorsement on the agreements
cannot save the limited period. Therefore, submitted that the
suit is barred by limitation.
10. Further, learned counsel submitted that the order of
re-grant was made in the year 1982 whereas the agreement of
sale is dated 14.05.1988 and 09.04.1990 and it is certainly
within the prohibition of 15 years as ensued under Sections
5(3) and 7A of the KVOA Act and agreement of sale are
contrary to Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Thus, the
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transaction of agreement of sale is forbidden by law. Hence,
submitted that rejection of the plaint is correct.
11. Further, learned counsel for the
respondent/defendant No.17 places reliance on the judgment of
this Court, are as follows:
•
RSA.No.1597/2013 dated 02.04.2024 in the case of
Sri T Annayappa vs Smt. Chinnamma.
•
W.P.No.2613, and connected writ petitions of 1979
dated 03.07.1980 in the case of Lakshmana
Gowda and others vs. State of Karnataka by its
Secretary to Government .
•
MSA.No.100012/2025 dated 17.06.2025 in the case
of Mustaf S/o. Goususab vs. Gangadhar.
12. Upon hearing submissions of both learned counsels,
following points would arise for consideration:
1) Whether under the facts and circumstances involved in
the case, defendant No.17 proved that the suit is
barred by limitation as per Article 54 of the Limitation
Act?
2) Whether under the facts and circumstances involved in
the case, defendant No.17 proved that the agreement
of sale dated 14.05.1988 and 09.04.1990 are contrary
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to the Section 5(3) of KVOA Act. Thus, agreement of
sale is forbidden by law?
3) Whether the order of rejection of plaint passed by the
trial Court requires interference by this Court?
Answer to point Nos.1 and 2 would be in the 'Affirmative'
and answer to point No.3 would be in the 'Negative' for the
following reasons:
13. The suit filed by the plaintiffs is for specific
performance of contract. In the pleading, it is stated that the
defendants are owners of the suit schedule property and
plaintiffs have entered into an agreement of sale dated
14.05.1988 and 09.04.1990. Further, it is pleaded that there is
an endorsement on the agreement of sale which are dated
04.10.1991 and 10.12.2013. Therefore, based on this, the
plaintiffs have filed suit for specific performance of contract. It
is not the disputed fact that the order of re-grant of the suit
land in question was passed on 12.04.1982 as per provisions of
KVOA Act. All these facts are not under dispute and these facts
are emerged from the plaint averments itself. Now the question
is, on reading the pleadings made in the plaint on its face
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value, whether defendant No.17 makes out sufficient grounds
to reject the plaint, is to be considered. It is an admitted fact
that the order of re-grant was made on 12.04.1982 under the
provisions of KVOA Act. Admittedly, the agreement of sale was
executed on 14.05.1988 and 09.04.1990. It is further pleaded
that on agreement of sale, there are endorsements dated
04.10.1991 and 10.12.2013 by making extra payment of sale
consideration to the defendants. These all are admitted facts
stated in the plaint. Therefore, Court is constrained to rely on
the pleadings made in the plaint alone. Admittedly, the
defendants being owners of the suit schedule property have
obtained order of re-grant under Section 5 of the KVOA Act.
Sub-Sections (3) and (4) of Section 5 of the KVOA Act, reads
as follows:
"(3) The occupancy or the ryotwari patta of the
land, as the case may be, re-granted under sub-section
(1) shall not be transferable otherwise than by partition
1
among members of Hindu Joint Family [for a period of
fifteen years from the date of regrant made on or after
the date of commencement of the Karnataka Village
Offices Abolition (Amendment) Act, 2003.]
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2
[Provided that such occupancy or the ryotwari
patta in respect of land granted to the holder of a village
office in an enfranchised inam shall be transferable with
the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner which
shall be granted on payment of an amount equal to
fifteen times the amount of full assessment of the land.]
3
[(4) Any transfer of land in contravention of sub-
section (3) shall be null and void and the land so
transferred shall, as penalty, be forfeited to and vest in
the State Government free from all encumbrances and
any person in possession thereof shall be summarily
evicted therefrom by the Deputy Commissioner and the
land shall be disposed of in accordance with the law
applicable to the disposal of unoccupied unalienated
lands:
Provided that if the person who has transferred
the land in contravention of sub-section (3) is not alive,
while disposing of such land preference shall be given to
the heirs of such person.
Explanation.—For removal of doubts it is hereby
declared that in sub-section (3), and in this sub-section
transfer includes creation of a lease."
14. There is an amendment by substitution of sub-
section (3) of Section 5 of the KVOA Act, reads as "for a
period of fifteen years from the date of regrant made on
or after the date of commencement of the Karnataka
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Village Offices Abolition (Amendment Act), 2003" .
Therefore, there is a prohibition for transfer of properties
except by making arrangement in the family as per partition.
Except partition in respect of the said transactions, conveyance
of property is prohibited under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of
the KVOA Act, so also sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the KVOA
Act, simplifies any transfer of land in contravention of sub-
section (3) shall be null and void and if any such transfer is
made, the same shall be vested with the State Government.
These are the spirit of law enacted under sub-sections (3) and
(4) of Section 5 of the KVOA Act.
15. When this being the fact, if any agreement of sale is
made within the prohibitory period of 15 years, then such
agreement is forbidden by law as per Section 23 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872. Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act
stipulates as follows:
" 23. What consideration and objects are
lawful, and what not.— The consideration or object of
an agreement is lawful, unless—
1
it is forbidden by law; or
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is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would
defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent;
or
involves or implies, injury to the person or property
of another; or
the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to
public policy.
In each of these cases, the consideration or object
of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement
of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void."
16. Though agreement of sale is not a complete
transaction of sale, but agreement of sale is intended to
commence sale transaction and therefore, such commencement
of sale transaction also comes within the transactions as
enumerated in sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 5 of the
KVOA Act. Therefore, any such commencement of sale
transaction even as against sale, is prohibited under sub-
sections (3) and (4) of Section 5 of the KVOA Act. Therefore,
when such being the prohibition clause under law as discussed,
it attracts Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Therefore,
even agreement of sale within the prohibitory period, the same
are null and void. This Court in the case of Mustaf S/o.
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Goususab (supra) at Para - 14, 15, 16 and 17 has held as
follows:
"14. While making allotment of site/plot, a condition
is stipulated for prohibiting making alienation to third
parties, which is a public policy in the interest of allottee.
Here, in the present case the Bagalkote Town Development
Authority has allotted the site to the land losers, who have
lost their land due to Upper Krishna Project. Therefore,
such condition is put in the interest of allottee and their
family members. This prohibition is as per public policy to
give security to the family. Therefore, when this being the
public policy, then whatever agreement entered as in the
present case is opposed to the public policy. Hence, it
attracts section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.
15. Therefore, in this context, the agreement of
sale made in this case dated 21.09.2004 is opposed to
public policy. Hence, as per Section 23 of the Indian
Contract Act, the agreement would not be said to be lawful,
since it is within the prohibitory period of 10 years as
opposed to public policy.
16. In the similar circumstances, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Narayanamma and
another Etc. Etc., V/s Govindappa and others Etc.
1
Etc., has held at paragraph Nos.23 to 25 as under:
“23. The transaction between the late
Bale Venkataramanappa and the plaintiff is not
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disputed. Initially the said Bale
Venkataramanappa had executed a registered
mortgage deed in favour of the plaintiff. Within
a month, he entered into an agreement to sell
wherein, the entire consideration for the
transfer as well as handing over of the
possession was acknowledged. It could thus be
seen, that the transaction was nothing short of
a transfer of property. Under Section 61 of the
Reforms Act, there is a complete prohibition on
such mortgage or transfer for a period of 15
years from the date of grant. Sub-section (1) of
Section 61 of the Reforms Act begins with a
non-obstante clause. It is thus clear that, the
unambiguous legislative intent is that no such
mortgage, transfer, sale, etc. would be
permitted for a period of 15 years from the date
of grant. Undisputedly, even according to the
plaintiff, the grant is of the year 1983, as such,
the transfer in question in the year 1990 is
beyond any doubt within the prohibited period
of 15 years. Subsection (3) of Section 61 of the
Reforms Act makes the legislative intent very
clear. It provides, that any transfer in violation
of sub-section (1) shall be invalid and it also
provides for the consequence for such invalid
transaction.
24. Undisputedly, both, the
predecessorin-title of the defendant(s) as well
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as the plaintiff, are confederates in this
illegality. Both, the plaintiff and the
predecessor-intitle of the defendant(s) can be
said to be equally responsible for violation
of law.
25. However, the ticklish question that
arises in such a situation is:“the decision of this
Court would weigh in side of which party”? As
held by Hidayatullah, J. in Kedar Nath Motani
[AIR 1960 SC 213 (supra)], the question that
would arise for consideration is as to whether
the plaintiff can rest his claim without relying
upon the illegal transaction or as to whether the
plaintiff can rest his claim on something else
without relying on the illegal transaction.
Undisputedly, in the present case, the claim of
the plaintiff is entirely based upon the
agreement to sell dated 15-5-1990, which is
clearly hit by Section 61 of the Reforms Act.
There is no other foundation for the claim of the
plaintiff except the one based on the agreement
to sell, which is hit by Section 61 of the Act. In
such a case, as observed by Taylor, in his “Law
of Evidence” which has been approved by
Gajendragadkar, J. in Immani Appa Rao [AIR
1962 SC 370 (supra)], although illegality is not
pleaded by the defendant nor sought to be
relied upon him by way of defence, yet the
Court itself, upon the illegality appearing upon
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the evidence, will take notice of it, and will
dismiss the action ex turpi causa non oritur
actio i.e. no polluted hand shall touch the pure
fountain of justice. Equally, as observed in
Story's Equity Jurisprudence, which again is
approved in Immani Appa Rao (supra), where
the parties are concerned with illegal
agreements or other transactions, courts of
equity following the rule of law as to
participators in a common crime will not
interpose to grant any relief, acting upon the
maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio
defendantis et possidentis.”
17. In the above said case also, occupancy right
was be granted by the land Tribunal and there was a clause
of non-alienating the land for a period of 15 years, which is
as per Section 61 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961
(for short, ‘the Act’). Therefore, if any transaction takes place
within a period of 15 years, the same will be hit by Section 61
of the Act. Section 61 of the Act is enacted in the public
interest as a matter of public policy that whoever is granted
occupancy rights, shall not alienate the land to any other
third parties within fifteen years. This is law declared by
legislature as a matter of public policy to give social security
to the farmers. In the same way, in the present case, the
defendant has lost the lands. Therefore, compensating him,
the suit schedule property was allotted to defendant to give
security to the family of the defendant. Therefore, when such
prohibitory clause is imposed in the grant order, which is
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matter of public policy, any transactions including agreement
of sale is contrary to the public policy which is hit by Section
23 of the Contract Act."
17. Further, the Division Bench of this Court in the
case of Lakshmanagowda and others (supra) referring to
sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 5 of the KVOA Act, has held
at Para-87, reads as follows:
"87. In the light of the above principles of
statutory construction, we hold that sub-section (4) of
Section 5 of the Principal Act should be construed as
being applicable only to transfers made subsequent to
7-8-1978 and not to transfer which had taken place prior
to that date and that sub-section (3) occuring in that
Section should be construed as having reference to
amended sub-section (3) and not to original sub-section
(3) of that Section.
18. Therefore, the prohibitory clause as enunciated
under sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 5 of the KVOA Act,
came into force from 07.08.1978 but not from 2003 as
contended by learned counsel for the appellants.
19. Therefore, under these circumstances, the
agreement of sale entered between plaintiffs and defendants is
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contrary to law as it is forbidden by law as per KVOA Act.
Therefore, such sale is null and void. Therefore, trial Court is
correct in rejecting the plaint as barred by law.
20. Also considering the pleadings of the plaint on the
ground that as the suit is barred by limitation and considering
its legal propriety/entity, the admitted dates in the plaint are
relevant to be mentioned here. The plaintiffs themselves
admitted in the plaint that the order of re-grant of the land was
passed on 12.04.1982 as per the provisions of the KVOA Act.
The admitted fact made in the plaint is that the agreement of
sale are dated 14.05.1988 and 09.04.1990 but the suit is filed
in the year 2016. Considering these periods, there is 26 years
of delay in instituting the suit for specific performance of
contract. Further, it is submitted that the another
question/point that arise for consideration is that there were
endorsements dated 04.10.1991 and 10.12.2013 upon making
of further payment and the defendants knew this payment is
made and admitted. Therefore, contended such endorsements
extends the period of limitation for specific performance.
Therefore, contended to consider the date 10.12.2013, that the
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RFA No. 1595 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010521202026
suit is filed within limitation as per Limitation Act, the said
contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellants,
cannot be accepted for the reason that mere making
endorsement on the agreement of sale upon making certain
payments cannot extend the limitation of specific performance
of contract. At the most, what these subsequent payments
shows is that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform
their part of contract but that does not save the limitation as
per Article 54 of the Limitation Act. The plaintiffs cannot
stretch the length of period of contract according to whims and
fancies by making certain payments and endorsement. If at
all, the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of
contract, they ought to have paid entire sale consideration
amount and had taken recourse for getting sale deed but
without doing so, mere paying some part amount and getting
endorsements on agreement of sale cannot stretch the period
of specific performance of contract for such a long time
according to the convenience of the plaintiffs. According to the
convenience of the plaintiffs, the law cannot be interpreted.
Therefore, considering these, the endorsements dated
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HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC:52317
RFA No. 1595 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010521202026
04.10.1991 and 10.12.2013, cannot save the limitation period
for the purpose of filing the suit. What the date reckoned at
earliest point of time for specific performance of contract, that
alone is to be considered and the same should be reckoned for
performance of contract and for the limitation as per Article 54
of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is apparently clear on the
face of the plaint that the endorsements made on the
agreement dated 04.10.1991 and 10.12.2013 cannot extend
the limitation period to defeat Article 54 of the Limitation Act.
Thus, considering these aspects as apparently found out from
the pleadings in the plaint itself, the suit is barred by limitation
as well as barred by law.
21. As above discussed at length, accordingly, I answer
point Nos.1 and 2 in the 'Affirmative' and point No.3 in the
'Negative' and thus the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
Accordingly, appeal is dismissed .
Sd/-
(HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR)
JUDGE
SMJ
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 32