Indira Gandhi National College, Ladwa vs Union Of India & Others

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court

108

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH


LPA-2392-2026 (O&M)
Reserved on :14.10.2026
Pronounced on : 30.10.2026
Uploaded on : 30.10.2026


INDIRA GANDHI NATIONAL COLLEGE, LADWA

...Appellant

Versus
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
…Respondents

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUVIR SEHGAL
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH GAUR

Present : Mr. Hemen Aggarwal, Advocate
for the appellant.

Mr. Deepak Vashisth, Deputy Advocate General, Haryana.

RAJESH GAUR, J.
1. In the present Letters Patent Appeal preferred against the order
dated 06.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP-6226-2026 ,
the following two issues arise for consideration:-
Firstly , whether the statutory appeal preferred under Section 7-I
of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") was
barred by limitation and, if so, whether the Central Government
Industrial Tribunal was vested with the jurisdiction to condone
the delay beyond the statutorily prescribed outer limit of
120 days?
GURPREET KAUR
2026.10.30 15:09
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LPA-2392-2026 (O&M) -2-

Secondly , whether the statutory appeal was maintainable in
view of the period of limitation prescribed under Section 7-I of
the Act, which requires an appeal against an order passed under
Section 7-A of the Act to be preferred within the stipulated
period, subject to the permissible extension provided therein?
2. Before proceeding to adjudicate upon the aforesaid issues, it
would be apposite to briefly advert to the relevant facts of the case.
3. The assessment order under Section 7-A of the Act was passed
on 25.04.1994. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant instituted Civil
Writ Petition No. 6700 of 1994 before this Court. The said writ petition was
ultimately disposed of vide order dated 31.08.2013, whereby the appellant
was granted liberty to avail the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 7-I
of the Act against the assessment order dated 25.04.1994 within a period of
two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the said order.
4. The appellant preferred the statutory appeal under Section 7-I
of the Act on 05.03.2018 along with an application seeking condonation of
delay. Thus, the appeal was filed after a lapse of approximately four and a
half years from the date of the order dated 31.08.2013 passed by this Court.
The explanation furnished by the appellant was that the aforesaid order came
to its knowledge upon receipt of the demand notice dated 18.07.2017 and
that a certified copy of the order was received on 28.07.2017. The appellant
sought exclusion of the period consumed in obtaining the certified copy
while computing the period of limitation and, consequently, condonation of
the delay in filing the statutory appeal.
5. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the
material available on record.
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LPA-2392-2026 (O&M) -3-

6. During the course of arguments, when queried as to the reasons
for the delay of approximately four and a half years in preferring the
statutory appeal, learned counsel for the appellant was unable to furnish any
satisfactory explanation. The appellant has, therefore, failed to justify the
delay in filing the appeal beyond the period prescribed under the applicable
statutory provision.
7. Upon perusal of the material on record and the relevant
statutory provisions, we find that Rule 7(2) of the Tribunal (Procedure)
Rules, 1997 prescribes a period of 60 days for preferring an appeal before
the Tribunal. The proviso thereto empowers the Tribunal to extend the said
period by a further period of 60 days, provided it is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the
prescribed period. Consequently, the maximum permissible period for filing
the appeal, including the period of extension, is 120 days.
8. It is a settled proposition of law that the Appellate Authority
lacks jurisdiction to condone a delay in filing an appeal beyond the
maximum permissible period of 120 days prescribed under the aforesaid
statutory provisions.
9. The aforesaid legal position finds support from the judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU,
Kakinada and others v. M/s. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care
Limited, 2020 AIR (SC) 2819 . While considering the effect of a statutory
provision prescribing a limitation period along with a restricted power to
condone delay, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the appellate authority
cannot condone delay beyond the maximum period expressly permitted by
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LPA-2392-2026 (O&M) -4-


the statute. It was further observed that the statutory prescription
of limitation is binding and cannot be circumvented by invoking general
equitable considerations. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court are reproduced here-in-below:-
“Going by the text of this provision, it is evident that the
statutory appeal is required to be filed within 30 days from the
date on which the order or proceeding was served on the
assessee. If the appeal is filed after expiry of prescribed period,
the appellate authority is empowered to condone the delay in
filing the appeal, only if it is filed within a further period of not
exceeding 30 days and sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal within prescribed time is made out. The appellate
authority is not empowered to condone delay beyond the
aggregate period of 60 days from the date of order or service of
proceeding on the assessee, as the case may be...”
9.1 Further reliance can be placed upon the judgment of Hon’ble
the Supreme Court in Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission and others, 2010(5) SCC 23 , wherein it
was held that provisions of Limitation Act cannot be invoked to condone
delay beyond the maximum period prescribed under a special statute, for the
reasons as elucidated in the relevant paragraph reproduced here-in-below :-
“11…Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any
decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this
Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the
decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125
empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a
further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was
sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of
60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for
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LPA-2392-2026 (O&M) -5-



filing appeals under Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially
different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act
for filing suits etc. The use of the expression 'within a further
period of not exceeding 60 days' in Proviso to Section 125
makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120
days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court
can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of
the Tribunal after more than 120 days. The object underlying
establishment of a special adjudicatory forum i.e., the Tribunal
to deal with the grievance of any person who may be aggrieved
by an order of an adjudicating officer or by an appropriate
commission with a provision for further appeal to this Court
and prescription of special limitation for filing appeals under
Sections 111 and 125 is to ensure that disputes emanating from
the operation and implementation of different provisions of the
Electricity Act are expeditiously decided by an expert body and
no court, except this Court, may entertain challenge to the
decision or order of the Tribunal...”
9.2 The principle laid down in the aforesaid judgments squarely
supports the proposition that the Tribunal could not have condoned the delay
beyond the maximum period of 120 days prescribed under Rule 7(2) of the
Rules of 1997.
10. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no ground to
interfere with the findings recorded by learned Single Judge. Accordingly,
the present Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to
costs.
11. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stands

GURPREET KAUR

2026.10.30 15:09
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LPA-2392-2026 (O&M) -6-

disposed of.


[SUVIR SEHGAL] [RAJESH GAUR]
JUDGE JUDGE
October 30, 2026

gurpreet

Whether Speaking/Reasoned Yes/No

Whether Reportable Yes/No

GURPREET KAUR
2026.10.30 15:09
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integrity of this document