Satyawati Pandurang Nandivkar And Ors. vs The Bombay Hsg. And Area Development Authority And 3 Ors.

CNR No : HCBM020237562007

2026:BHC-OS:24040-DB
WP-100-2008.doc

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 100 OF 2008
1. Satyawati Pandurang Nandivkar (deceased)
2. Mangesh Pandurang Nandivkar (deceased)
3. Rajendra Pandurang Nandivkar (deceased)
through Legal Representatives
3a. Rajshree Rajendra Nandivkar
Age 35 years, Hindu India Inhabitant
3b. Prasad Rajendra Nandivkar,
Age 12 years, Minor Through Natural
Guardian Smt. Rajshree Rajendra Nandivkar.
4. Meena Pandurang Nandivkar,
Age _ 40 years, Hindu Inhabitant,
5. Dhananjay Pandurang Nandivkar
Age – 35 years, Hindu Inhabitant
All are residing at Indira Nagar
Zopadpatti, Near Shukla Garage,
.....Petitioners
Thakkar Bappa Colony, Bombay – 71.
Versus
1. The Bombay Housing and Area
Development Authority, Griha Nirman
Bhavan, Bandra East, Bombay – 400051.
2. The Estate Manager No.1,
The Bombay Housing & Area
Development Board, Griha Nirman
Bhavan Bandra East, Bombay 400051.
3. Harish K. Bhandari (since deceased)
3(a). Mrs.Vimla Harish Bhandari,
Age 69 yrs., widow
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Digitally signed
by RUPALI
RAJESH
WAKODIKAR
Date:
2026.11.05
10:35:06 +0530
RUPALI
RAJESH
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3(b). Mr. Jayaraj Harish Bhandari,
Age 47 yrs, son
Both R/a B/603, Neelsplender Apt., Sec.6,
Plot No.17, Khanda colony, New Panvel 410 206,
Navi Mumbai.
3(c). Mr. Raviraj Harish Bhandari,
Age 45 yrs, son
R/a F/204, Gokul Park Bldg. Vrindavan Township,
Dist. Palghar, Virar (West) 401 303.
3(d). Mr. Amitraj Harish Bhandari, age 43 yrs. Son
R/a Flat No.202, Bldg.No.4, Amarante C.H.S. Ltd.
Kalamboli, Navi Mumbai 401218.
4. Secretary,
Rajanigandha Co-operative Housing
Society Ltd., Nehru Nagar, Kurla (East),
Mumbai 400024. .....Respondents
.....
Mr. Chandrakant Chavan, for the Petitioners.
Smt. Varsha Sawant, A.G.P, for the Respondent-State.
Mr. Murlidharan Kalathil i/b Mr. P.G.Lad for the Respondent Nos.1
and 2 – MHADA.
Mr. Mohan A. Dharmaraj for the Respondent Nos.3(a) to 3(d).
..…
CORAM : M. S. KARNIK &
SANDESH D. PATIL, JJ.
th
RESERVED ON : 8 OCTOBER, 2026
th
PRONOUNCED ON : 29 OCTOBER, 2026
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JUDGMENT (PER SANDESH D. PATIL, J.)
1. By the present writ petition, the petitioners are seeking
directions against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to implement order dated
25/5/1993, and further seeking to quash and set aside the order
dated 12/10/1989, order dated 19/9/1994, 17/9/1994, and
21/8/1974.
2. The petitioners and respondent No. 3 are having a dispute in
respect of the tenement No. 78/2688, Rajnigandha Co-operative
Housing Society Limited, Nehru Nagar, Kurla (East), Mumbai –
400024 (‘the said tenement’ for short).
3. The petitioner's case is that Pandurang S. Nandivkar
(deceased) was an industrial worker and was allotted the said
tenement on 16/1/1967 on tenancy basis by respondent No. 1, as the
deceased was an industrial worker. In view of the mill strike all over
Mumbai, the deceased, for the purpose of survival of his family, was
constrained to give the said tenement on Leave and Licence basis to
respondent No. 3 for eleven months commencing from 28/6/1981.
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4. The respondent No. 3, as is the case of the petitioner,
malafidely, even before expiry of the Leave and Licence agreement,
filed a declaratory suit bearing R.A.D. Suit No. 2301 of 1982 against
the deceased before the Small Causes Court. On 23/11/1983, he
obtained an ex-parte decree against the petitioners. Respondent
No.3 also filed criminal proceedings against the petitioners, whereby
they were restrained from going into the property in question. On
27/8/1982, the deceased made an application to the Board to restore
possession to him of the suit premises, as the respondent No. 3
continued to occupy the same.
5. The respondent No.3 preferred an application for transferring
the suit property in his name. The same was denied as NOC was not
given by the petitioners. On 25/5/1993, the Chief Officer of the
respondent No.1 passed an order, thereby directing the authority to
take possession of the suit premises from respondent No. 3 and hand
over the same to the petitioner. It is this order which the petitioner is
claiming to be enforced. The possession was never handed over by
respondent No. 3 to the petitioner inspite of the order dated
25/5/1993.
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6. Surprisingly, the Deputy Chief Officer of the respondent No.1
wrote a letter to the society as to why the society is not consenting or
giving NOC to transfer the suit premises in the name of respondent
No. 3. On 19/9/1994, the Estate Manager of respondent No. 1
passed an order, thereby transferring the tenement in favour of
respondent No. 3. It is this order which the petitioner is seeking
quashing of.
7. On 19/1/1995, the petitioner filed a writ petition bearing No.
855 of 1995 before the Division Bench of this Court. In view of the
office objection of maintainability of a writ petition before the
Division Bench, the same was converted into a petition before the
Single Judge. After hearing both sides, on 9/11/2001, this Court
(Coram: P.V. Kakade, J.) allowed the petition.
8. The appeal which was filed by respondent No. 3 bearing
Appeal No. 1190 of 2001 before the Division Bench of this Court was
disposed of with a direction that the writ petition before the Single
Judge was not maintainable, and consequently the judgment passed
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by the learned Single Judge was set aside. Hence, the present writ
petition is filed.
9. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner made the
following submissions :
Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view
of the order dated 25/5/1993, it was obligatory on the part of
respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to implement the order of the Chief
Officer of respondent No.1 and hand over the possession of
the tenement to the petitioner after recovering the same from
the unauthorized trespasser, namely respondent No.3. The
Society had given a letter dated 17/11/1993 (Exhibit-E) which
specified the reason for not accepting the respondent No. 3 as
a member of the Society. Inspite of the said letter, the Deputy
Chief Officer of respondent No.1 on 29/12/1993 sought
clarification from the Society to enable them to take proper
decision.
The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 thereafter suddenly
transferred the tenement in favour of respondent No. 3 and
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directed him to pay Rs. 57 towards monthly rent from
1/11/94 to the Housing Board. The petitioner was under
impression that there was certain appeal which was filed by
the respondent No. 3 against the order dated 25/5/1993.
However, it was found that there was no appeal preferred.
He submitted that the ex-parte order of the Housing
Board by regularising the tenement in favour of the
respondent No. 3 from 19/9/1994 and not recording the same
in the name of petitioners is bad in law. He submitted that the
petition which was preferred by the petitioners bearing Writ
Petition No. 855 of 1995 was allowed by the learned Single
Judge.
The petitioner No. 1, who was the widow of original
allottee, had the first and only claim on the tenement after the
death of her husband. He submitted that vide order dated
7/6/2002 passed in Appeal No. 1190 of 2001, this Court
(Coram: A.P. Shah & Smt. Nishita Mhatre, JJ.) had held that
the orders of allotment made in favour of the respondent No.
3 was illegal and bad in law and therefore set aside the orders
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dated 12/8/1994 and 19/9/1994, the Vice-President of the
Housing Board was directed to decide the appeal filed by the
respondent No.3 within a stipulated time. He submitted that
the Vice-President of the MHADA ultimately passed an order
thereby not issuing any direction by plainly stating that the
matter was sub-judice before the High Court.
10. Mr. Dharmaraj learned Counsel appearing for the respondent
No. 3a to 3d, opposed the petition. He made the following
submissions:
The petition is not maintainable. The rights of the
petitioner were already forfeited inasmuch as, during the
lifetime of the deceased tenant, way back in the year 1974, an
order was passed by the competent authority in Case No. E-
236 of 1974 thereby forfeiting the tenancy. The said order
was never challenged till the filing of the present writ petition.
He submitted that this material fact was suppressed by the
petitioner from this Court. This fact was brought out in the
order dated 29/6/2002 passed by the Vice-President and CEO
of MHADA in pursuant to the order dated 7/6/2002 passed in
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Appeal No. 1190 of 2001. Neither the petitioners nor the
family members of the petitioners had ever occupied the
tenement in question; instead, the tenement was always used
by the respondent No.3.
Learned Counsel further submitted that the respondent
No.3 applied for regularisation and his possession was
ultimately correctly regularised. Although the case of the
petitioner that 1974 order was stayed, no documents were
filed. He stated that the petition, thus, deserves to be
dismissed on this ground only.
11. Heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner as well
as the respondents. Perused the documents on record.
12. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it is worthwhile to
notice that this is a second round of litigation before this Court. This
matter was admitted by this Court on 29/08/2008. In the first round
of litigation, Writ Petition bearing No. 855 of 1995 was filed by the
present petitioner. That petition was allowed by the order passed by
this Court (Coram: P.V. Kakade, J.) on 9/11/2001. By that order, the
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Court had allowed the Writ Petition in terms of prayer clauses (b),
(D-1) and (D-2). Prayer clauses (b), (D-1) and (D-2) reads thus :
“(b) The Record and Proceedings in respect of the or der
dated 18-5-1993 (Issued on 25-5-1993) bearing No.
Υ ۱
NI.V. ./ / Mumbai Mandal/2765 by the Bombay Housing
and Area Development Board and further order dated 19-
9-1994 issued by the Estate Manager regarding the
regularisation No. 78/2688 in of No. 1 tenement East,
Nehrunagar, Kurla Bombay-24 in favour of Respondent
No.3 may be called or and after perusing the same the
said order may be quashed and set aside. And after
quashing and setting aside the said order the respondent
No.1 and 2 may please be directed to implement the order
dated 18-5-1993 issued on 25-5-1993 by the Chief Officer,
Housing Board by the order No.M.I.G.I.-1/Mumbai
Mandal/2766 in favour of the Petition No.1 and
regularising the tenement No.78 or recording the name of
the Petitioner No.1 in the said premises in the place of her
husband Late Shri Pandurang Sakharam Nandivkar.
(D-1) Case That the order dated 12-10-1989 No. 192. T.
No.78/2688, a in Nehru Nagar No.CA/I/may be quashed
and set aside and the Petitioners may be restored the
possession of the tenement No.78/2680 Nehru Nagar,
Kurla (E), Mumbai-24 after removing the Respondent
No.3;
(D-2) That the delay in filing the present amendment
Application in view of Appeal may kindly be condoned.”
13. The respondent No.3 preferred an appeal against that order
before the Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench set
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aside the order dated 9/11/2001 passed by the Single Judge and
held that the said order was without jurisdiction. However, it did not
grant any liberty to the petitioner to file a petition once again. All
that was done was an observation that the order passed by the
Division Bench would not come in the way of the petitioner in
adopting appropriate remedy for enforcement of any rights as the
petitioner may have. The petitioner claims that pursuant to the
direction given by the Division Bench, the present petition is filed.
We, however, are unable to satisfy ourselves as to the fact that liberty
was given to file the present petition. Be it as it may, since the
petition was admitted by this Court on 29/08/2008, we propose to
decide the same on merits.
14. At the outset, it is worthwhile to note that even before Writ
Petition No. 855 of 1995 was filed before the learned Single Judge in
the year 1995, which marks the first round of litigation, there was
already an eviction order dated 21/8/1974 passed by the competent
authority of the respondent No.1. The petitioner has not mentioned
about the same in the petition. This order was, for the first time,
brought on record by the respondent No.3 in his affidavit-in-reply. In
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rejoinder, the explanation given by the petitioner was that taking into
consideration the financial condition of the industrial workers in
view of the mill strike, there was a general direction not to
implement such order.
15. The petitioner, by way of amendment which was carried out for
the first time in January 2012, sought relief that the order dated
21/8/1974 passed by the competent authority is inoperative, invalid
and not binding upon the petitioner and the respondent No. 1 was
stopped from executing the same. The said order dated 21/8/1974
is at page No. 133 of the paper-book. On plain reading of the said
order, it is clear that the competent authority, MHADA, has observed
that the original tenant was not staying in the tenement along with
his family members. The accommodation was occupied by one Shri
Kutty. Therefore, the final order of eviction was passed against the
tenant. This order was passed on 21/8/1974. In the said order, it is
clearly mentioned that on 30/6/1973, original tenant i.e. Pandurang
Nandkishor remained present for hearing and his statement was
recorded. Thus, the petitioner was very well aware of this order.
Having failed to challenge this order right from 21/8/1974, there is
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no cogent explanation and justification given by the petitioner to
challenge the said order by making an amendment for the first time
in the petition in January 2012. This aspect attains more significance
particularly in light of the fact that it is not the petitioner who has
disclosed about this order in the petition, but it is the respondent
No.3 who has raised the said objection for the first time in his written
statement. Thus, the petitioner is not only guilty of delay and laches,
but is also guilty of approaching this Court with tainted hands.
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dalip Singh V/s.
1
State of U.P. & Ors. , held as under:
“2. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped
up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect
for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical
means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the
challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts
have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now
well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the
stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice
with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or
final.
4. In Welcom Hotel v. State of A.P. [(1983) 4 SCC 575 : 1983
SCC (Cri) 872 : AIR 1983 SC 1015] the Court held that a
party which has misled the Court in passing an order in its
1 (2010) 2 SCC 114
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favour is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the case.
6. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1
: JT (1993) 6 SC 331] the Court held that where a
preliminary decree was obtained by withholding an
important document from the court, the party concerned
deserves to be thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
8. In A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P. [(2007) 4 SCC 221 :
AIR 2007 SC 1546] the Court held that Article 136 does not
confer a right of appeal on any party. It confers discretion on
this Court to grant leave to appeal in appropriate cases. In
other words, the Constitution has not made the Supreme
Court a regular court of appeal or a court of error. This Court
only intervenes where justice, equity and good conscience
require such intervention.”
17. We, therefore, refuse to exercise our writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioner on
the ground of not approaching the Court with clean hands, the
petitioner does not have any subsisting right to maintain the petition,
precisely because his own rights were already terminated/forfeited
by the MHADA in the year 1974.
18. There is yet another facet to the matter. The petitioner is
seeking to challenge the order passed by the competent authority,
MHADA, passed on 21/8/1974 for the first time, as stated above, in
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January 2012.
19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment of N.D.M.C. V/s Pan
2
Singh , has held that although there is no time limit prescribed for
filing the writ petition, however, it has to be filed in a reasonable
time. Relevant paragraphs are reproduced as under :
“16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost
sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17
years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time.
They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17
workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not
implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by
the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that
after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were
recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said
scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ
petitions could not have been entertained even if they are
similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction
may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the
court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors
for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B. v.
Tarun K. Roy [(2004) 1 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 225] , U.P.
Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh [(2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1
SCC (L&S) 500 : (2006) 12 Scale 347] and Karnataka Power
Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan [(2006) 4 SCC 322 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 791] .)
17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for
filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
2 (2007) 9 SCC 278
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India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a
reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India
[(1994) 6 SCC 524] and M.R. Gupta v. Union of India [(1995)
5 SCC 628 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1273 : (1995) 31 ATC 186] .)”
Delay of thirty eight years in seeking relief against the order
passed in the year 1974 is definitely not a reasonable time in our
humble opinion. Hence, the petition does not deserve to be
entertained even on the ground of gross delay and latches.
20. As far as implementation of the order dated 25/5/1993 passed
by the Chief Officer of the Board is concerned, it is important to note
that there are several orders passed by MHADA, more particularly,
the order dated 19/9/1994 passed by the respondent No. 1
regularising the tenement No. 78/2688 in favour of the respondent
No.3. Although this order dated 19/9/1994 is challenged before us
by filing the present writ petition, the question of right of the
petitioner to the said tenement needs to be considered at the outset.
21. The petitioner was having knowledge of the fact that there was
a RAD Suit No. 2301 of 1982 filed by the respondent No.3 against
deceased Pandurang for a declaration before the Small Causes Court.
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That suit was decreed on 23/11/1983. Although it was an ex-parte
decree, still the petitioner has not taken any pains to challenge the
same. We are conscious of the fact that the petitioner contends that
the said decree was without jurisdiction. The petitioner cannot
merely take a contention that the said decree is not binding upon
him without challenging the same. By virtue of the said decree, the
rights of the petitioner in the premises in question are already
extinguished.
22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Board of Trustees
3
of Port of Kandla vs. Hargovind Jasraj , held in para Nos.27, 28, 29
and 30 as under:
“ 27. The termination of the lease deed was by an order
which the plaintiffs ought to get rid of by having the same set
aside, or declared invalid for whatever reasons, it may be
permissible to do so. No order bears a label of its being valid
or invalid on its forehead. Anyone affected by any such order
ought to seek redress against the same within the period
permissible for doing so. We may in this regard refer to the
following oft-quoted passage in Smith v. East Elloe Rural
District Council [1956 AC 736 : (1956) 2 WLR 888 : (1956)
1 All ER 855 (HL)] . The following are the observations
regarding the necessity of recourse to the Court for getting
the invalidity of an order established:
3 (2013) 3 SCC 182
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“… An order, even if not made in good faith, is
still an act capable of legal consequences. It
bears no brand of invalidity on its forehead.
Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at
law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get
it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as
effective for its ostensible purpose as the most
impeccable of orders.' (Smith case [1956 AC 736
: (1956) 2 WLR 888 : (1956) 1 All ER 855 (HL)]
, AC pp. 769-70)
(emphasis supplied)
This must be equally true even where the brand
of invalidity is plainly visible: for there also the
order can effectively be resisted in law only by
obtaining the decision of the court. The
necessity of recourse to the court has been
pointed put repeatedly in the House of Lords
and Privy Council without distinction between
patent and latent defects.” [Ed.: Wade and
Forsyth in Administrative Law, 7th Edn., 1994.]
28. The above case was approved by this Court in
Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia v. Bombay Environmental
Action Group [(2011) 3 SCC 363] , wherein this Court
observed: (SCC pp. 369-70, para 19)
“19. Thus, from the above it emerges that even if
the order/notification is void/voidable, the party
aggrieved by the same cannot decide that the said
order/notification is not binding upon it. It has to
approach the court for seeking such declaration.
The order may be hypothetically a nullity and even
if its invalidity is challenged before the court in a
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given circumstance, the court may refuse to quash
the same on various grounds including the standing
of the petitioner or on the ground of delay or on
the doctrine of waiver or any other legal reason.
The order may be void for one purpose or for one
person, it may not be so for another purpose or
another person.”
29. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Pune
Municipal Corpn. v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 5 SCC
211] wherein this Court discussed the need for
determination of invalidity of an order for public purposes:
(SCC pp. 225-26, paras 36 & 38-39)
“36. It is well settled that no order can be ignored
altogether unless a finding is recorded that it was
illegal, void or not in consonance with law. As Prof.
Wade states:
‘The principle must be equally true even where the
“brand of invalidity” is plainly visible: for there
also the order can effectively be resisted in law
only by obtaining the decision of the court’
[ H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law (6th Edn.,
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1988) 352] .
He further states:
‘The truth of the matter is that the court will
invalidate an order only if the right remedy is
sought by the right person in the right proceedings
and circumstances. The order may be
hypothetically a nullity, but the court may refuse
to quash it because of the plaintiff's lack of
standing, because he does not deserve a
discretionary remedy, because he has waived his
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rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such
case the “void” order remains effective and is, in
reality, valid. It follows that an order may be void
for one purpose and valid for another; and that it
may be void against one person but valid against
another.’ [ H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law (6th
Edn., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1988) 352-53]
*
38. A similar question came up for consideration
before this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev
Singh [(1991) 4 SCC 1 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1082 :
(1991) 17 ATC 287 : (1992) 1 LLJ 283] . …
39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the
courts and referring to several cases, this Court
held that if the party aggrieved by invalidity of the
order intends to approach the court for declaration
that the order against him was inoperative, he
must come before the court within the period
prescribed by limitation. ‘If the statutory time of
limitation expires, the court cannot give the
declaration sought for.’”
(emphasis supplied by us)
30. Reference may also be made to the decisions of this Court
in R. Thiruvirkolam v. Presiding Officer [(1997) 1 SCC 9 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 65] , State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan
Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth [(1996) 1 SCC 435] and
Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd.
[(1997) 3 SCC 443] , where this Court has held that an order
will remain effective and lead to legal consequences unless
the same is declared to be invalid by a competent court.”
23. In lieu of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it
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was necessary for the petitioner to assert his title over the property in
question. Not challenging the said decree passed by the Small
Causes Court clearly stares on the face of the petitioner and his right
to the property itself does not survive.
24. In view of this fact, the challenge to the order dated 19/9/1994
cannot be disturbed and that too at this late stage. In light of the
subsequent order dated 19/9/1994 and in light of what is stated
above, we do not wish to unsettle the things which are settled for
such a long time.
25. Thus, taking overall view of the matter, the petitioner’s title had
extinguished for the first time in the year 1974, that is nearly about
52 years ago. Further, the same was extinguished by virtue of a
decree passed by the Small Causes Court on 23/11/1983. The
respondent No.3 is thus in possession of the said property since last
45 years.
26. In light of the aforesaid, we do not find it proper to interfere in
the impugned orders, nor do we find any justification to enforce the
order dated 25/5/1993 passed in favour of the petitioner. We
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accordingly dismiss the petition with no orders as to costs.
27. We make it clear that by passing the said order, we have only
decided the rights of the petitioner qua the property and qua
respondent No.3. We, however, make it clear that we have not gone
into the legality of the title or the possession of the respondent No.3
qua respondent No.1. Hence, the following order :
ORDER
(i) Writ Petition No. 100 of 2008 is dismissed.
(ii) Rule is discharged.
(SANDESH D. PATIL, J.) (M. S. KARNIK, J.)
28. After the Judgment was pronounced, Mr. Chavan, learned
Counsel appearing for the petitioner prays for extension of the ad-
th
interim relief which was granted by order dated 29 August, 2008
and which is in force till today.
29. At his request, ad-interim relief, already in operation, is
extended by a period of eight weeks from today.
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(SANDESH D. PATIL, J.) (M. S. KARNIK, J.)
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