Delhi Development Authority vs S K Singla & Anr.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 29.10.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 03.11.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 03.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010518552026
+ FAO(OS) (COMM) 292/2026, CM APPL. 74557/2026, CM
APPL. 74558/2026 & CM APPL. 74559/2026
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Kailash Vasdev, Sr. Adv.
and Ms. Shobhana Takiar, SC
along with Mr. Kuljeet Singh,
Ms. Anushka Mamgain, Ms.
Shivani Sethi, Mr. Umrao
Singh Rawat and Ms. Neoma
Vasdev, Advs.
versus
S K SINGLA & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Harish Malhotra, Sr. Adv.
along with Mr. Rajinder
Aggarwal, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BHARAT PARASHAR
J U D G M E N T
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.:
1
1. The present Appeal, preferred under Section 37(1)(c) of the
2
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 , assails the judgment dated
3
17.02.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in O.M.P. (COMM.)
4
175/2020, whereby the petition preferred by the Appellant-Delhi
1
Hereinafter, the „Section 37‟
2
Hereinafter, the „A&C Act‟
3
Hereinafter, the „Impugned Judgment‟
4
Hereinafter, the „Section 34 Petition‟
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
Signing Date:03.11.2026
17:12:18
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5 6
Development Authority under Section 34 of the A&C Act ,
7
challenging the arbitral award dated 21.12.2010 , came to be
dismissed. The Appellant also assails the Award. The subsequent
order dated 03.09.2026, passed in the review proceedings initiated by
the Appellant in respect of the issue of pecuniary jurisdiction, is
referred to herein only to place the subsequent procedural history on
record. The said order is not independently under challenge in the
present Appeal.
2. The challenge to the Impugned Judgment is founded principally
on the following grounds: first , that the learned Single Judge lacked
the requisite commercial and pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the
Section 34 Petition; second , that the learned Arbitral Tribunal
proceeded on an erroneous factual premise that Plot No. E-265, Amar
8
Colony, Lajpat Nagar-IV, New Delhi was not included in the layout
plan of the area; third , that the directions issued by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal travel beyond the contractual arrangement between
the parties and impermissibly trench upon the statutory planning
framework; and, lastly , that the learned Single Judge failed to consider
material documents which DDA sought to introduce by way of I.A.
No. 8004/2013, including the subsequent sanction of the building
plan.
FACTUAL MATRIX:
3. The relevant facts, necessary for adjudication of the present
Appeal, may be briefly noticed.
5
Hereinafter, the „DDA‟
6
Hereinafter, the „Section 34‟
7
Hereinafter, the „Award‟
8
Hereinafter, the „Plot‟
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NARAYAN
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4. DDA conducted an open auction on 23.09.1996 in respect of
the Plot, on an „as is where is‟ basis. The Respondents emerged as the
highest bidder with a bid of Rs.60,05,000/- and, on the same day,
deposited 25% of the bid amount, amounting to Rs.15,01,250/-. DDA
accepted the bid on 09.10.1996 and, vide demand notice dated
18.11.1996, called upon the Respondents to deposit the balance 75%
of the bid amount, along with documentation charges, by 15.12.1996.
The Respondents thereafter deposited a sum of Rs.45,03,795/- with
DDA. A further sum of Rs.30,303/- was deposited towards stamp duty
in January 1997.
5. In the interregnum, the Respondents received a letter dated
02.12.1996 from one Raj Rani Khanna, claiming ownership of the
Plot on the basis of adverse possession and intimating the
Respondents about pending proceedings concerning the Plot. It is
stated that the Respondents were also impleaded in the said
proceedings. The Award, however, records that a writ petition bearing
CW-(C) 2991/1997, filed by the said claimant, came to be dismissed
by this Court vide order dated 24.02.1999.
6. Thereafter, in anticipation of execution of the lease deed, DDA,
vide letter dated 09.06.1997, called upon the Respondents to take
possession of the Plot on 01.07.1997. Accordingly, possession was
handed over to the Respondents on the said date. However, upon
taking possession, the Respondents noticed the existence of a stone
boundary wall and chain-link fencing on the Plot, which allegedly
impeded its use. The Respondents brought the encroachment to the
notice of DDA and asserted that ground rent would not be payable
until the Plot was made available for construction.
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NARAYAN
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7. DDA, vide letter dated 18.01.1999, informed the Respondents
that the departmental files relating to the Plot were not traceable and
called upon the Respondents to furnish documents to enable
reconstitution of the records. The Respondents thereafter furnished a
copy of the Perpetual Lease Deed, duly stamped by the Collector of
Stamps, and reiterated its request for removal of the encroachment.
Meanwhile, DDA, vide letter dated 17.09.1999, raised a demand of
Rs.4,26,129.50 towards ground rent from 01.07.1997, along with
interest. The Respondents disputed the demand, contending that
ground rent would be payable only from the date on which the Plot
became available for construction. The encroachment was eventually
removed by DDA on 14.10.1999.
8. The Respondents also claimed to have subsequently discovered
that the Plot had not been included in the layout plan of the area, as a
result of which no building plan could be sanctioned in respect
thereof. The Respondents approached the National Consumer
9
Disputes Redressal Commission , claiming, inter alia , compensation
of Rs.91,27,143/- on account of the alleged delay in handing over
effective possession and the demands raised by DDA. The NCDRC,
vide order dated 01.03.2004, held DDA liable for deficiency in
service, observed that the possession handed over on 01.07.1997 was
ineffective in view of the encroachment and that ground rent could not
have been demanded from that date. The NCDRC also directed DDA
to execute the lease deed in respect of the Plot within eight weeks.
Aggrieved by the said order, both parties preferred cross-appeals
before the Supreme Court, being Civil Appeal No. 3474/2004 filed by
9
Hereinafter, the „NCDRC‟
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NARAYAN
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the Respondents and Civil Appeal No. 661/2005 filed by DDA. The
Supreme Court, vide order dated 24.01.2010, referred the disputes
between the parties to arbitration and appointed a Sole Arbitrator.
9. During the arbitral proceedings, the Respondents contended that
the Plot had not been included in the layout plan of the area and,
consequently, no building plan could be sanctioned in respect thereof.
The learned Arbitral Tribunal accepted the said contention and held
that the Plot had been auctioned by DDA despite not being included in
the layout plan. It further observed that an auction purchaser would
ordinarily proceed on the assumption that the plot being auctioned was
included in the layout plan and was free from encumbrances. The
learned Arbitral Tribunal also rejected DDA‟s contention that the
Respondents ought to have undertaken due diligence before
participating in the auction, observing that the responsibility to
prepare the master plan, zonal plan and layout plan rested with DDA
10
under the Delhi Development Act, 1957 .
10. Accordingly, vide the Award, the learned Arbitral Tribunal
directed DDA to take steps for inclusion of the Plot in the layout plan
within three months and to intimate the Respondents of such
inclusion. It further directed that no ground rent would be payable
until such inclusion and intimation, and that ground rent would
become payable thereafter. The learned Arbitral Tribunal also
awarded interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the sum of
Rs.15,01,250/- from 23.09.1996 and on the sum of Rs.45,03,795/-
from 18.12.1996. The interest accrued up to 23.12.2010 was
10
Hereinafter, the „DDA Act‟
Signature Not Verified
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NARAYAN
Signing Date:03.11.2026
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quantified at Rs.76,00,134/-, with further interest at the same rate,
subject to the condition stipulated in the Award. Costs of
Rs.1,50,000/- were also awarded in favour of the Respondents.
11. Aggrieved by the Award, DDA preferred a Section 34 Petition.
During the pendency of the said proceedings, DDA also filed I.A. No.
8004/2013 seeking permission to place additional documents on
record, including documents concerning the alleged inclusion of the
Plot in the layout plan in 1984.
12. The learned Single Judge, vide the Impugned Judgment,
dismissed the Section 34 Petition, holding that the findings of the
learned Arbitral Tribunal did not suffer from perversity or patent
illegality. The learned Single Judge also declined to permit reliance
upon the additional documents sought to be placed on record by DDA,
taking into consideration the varying stands adopted by DDA before
the NCDRC, the learned Arbitral Tribunal and the Court.
13. It is further relevant to note that, upon the pronouncement of the
Impugned Judgment, DDA invoked the review jurisdiction of this
Court, inter alia , raising the issue concerning the pecuniary
jurisdiction of the learned Single Judge. The said review proceedings
came to be disposed of vide order dated 03.09.2026. The said
subsequent order is not the subject matter of challenge in the present
Appeal and is noticed only to record the procedural history and the
steps taken by DDA in pursuing its objection to the jurisdiction of the
learned Single Judge.
14. Aggrieved thereby, DDA has preferred the present Appeal.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
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CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
15. Heard learned senior counsel representing the parties at length
and with their able assistance, perused the paper book.
16. Learned senior counsel representing the Appellant has made the
following submissions:
i. Learned Arbitral Tribunal proceeded on an erroneous
factual premise in holding that the Plot was not included in the
layout plan. It was contended that the Plot had been handed over
to the DDA by the Department of Rehabilitation/Settlement
Wing on 18.01.1984, along with the layout plan. However, the
relevant departmental records could not be traced despite efforts
undertaken by the DDA and were, therefore, not available during
the arbitral proceedings. The documents subsequently sought to
be placed on record before the learned Single Judge, including
those relating to the sanction of the building plan, were stated to
substantiate that the Plot was already included in the layout plan.
ii. In this regard, learned senior counsel fairly
acknowledged that the scope for permitting additional evidence
in proceedings under Section 34 is limited. However, it was
submitted that the present case falls within the exceptional
circumstances warranting consideration of such evidence.
Reliance was placed on Fiza Developers and Inter-Trade P. Ltd.
11
v. AMCI (I) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. ; Alpine Housing Development
12
Corporation Pvt. Ltd. v. Ashok S. Dhariwal & Ors. ; and
11
(2009) 17 SCC 796
12
(2023) 19 SCC 629
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
Signing Date:03.11.2026
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13
Emkay Global Financial Services Ltd. v. Girdhar Sondhi . It
was contended that the documents sought to be brought on record
were material to the controversy and could not be produced
earlier for reasons beyond the DDA‟s control. The learned Single
Judge, therefore, should have considered whether the
circumstances pleaded by the DDA justified the reception of such
evidence, instead of declining the application for additional
documents.
iii. It was further submitted that, in the absence of execution
of the Perpetual Lease Deed, the Plot could not have been
included in the layout plan, and that the execution of the Lease
Deed was itself impeded by the Respondents‟ failure to discharge
its liability towards ground rent. The Respondents, having
purchased the Plot on an “as is where is” basis and having taken
possession thereof, could not avoid its liability to pay ground rent
from the date of handing over possession. The learned Arbitral
Tribunal, therefore, erred in suspending the liability to pay
ground rent until the inclusion of the Plot in the layout plan and
in awarding interest on the amounts paid by the Respondents.
iv. Learned senior counsel also assailed the direction issued
by the learned Arbitral Tribunal requiring the DDA to take steps
for inclusion of the Plot in the layout plan. It was contended that
such a direction travels beyond the contractual arrangement
between the parties and, in effect, trenches upon the statutory
framework governing planning and development under the DDA
13
(2018) 9 SCC 49
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Signed By:JAI
NARAYAN
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Act. The DDA could not be directed to secure an alteration or
inclusion in a layout plan contrary to the procedure contemplated
under the applicable statutory framework.
v. On the question of jurisdiction, learned senior counsel
submitted that the dispute arose out of the allotment of a
residential Plot and did not constitute a commercial dispute
within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial
14
Courts Act, 2015 . It was further contended that the pecuniary
value of the dispute could not be determined merely on the basis
of the claims raised before the learned Arbitral Tribunal,
particularly when such claims were stated to travel beyond the
proceedings before the NCDRC and the reference made by the
Supreme Court. It was, therefore, urged that the learned Single
Judge lacked the requisite commercial and pecuniary jurisdiction
to entertain the Section 34 Petition.
17. Per contra , learned senior counsel representing the
Respondents submits that the DDA had taken inconsistent and
mutually contradictory stands at different stages of the proceedings. It
was pointed out that, in the Section 34 Petition, the DDA itself had
contended that the Plot could not be included in the layout plan in the
absence of execution of the Perpetual Lease Deed, which, according to
the DDA, had not been executed on account of the Respondents‟
alleged failure to pay ground rent. The DDA had also sought to
attribute the responsibility for obtaining sanction of the layout plan to
the Respondents. Having taken such a stand, the DDA could not now
14
Hereinafter, the „CC Act‟
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NARAYAN
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contend that the Plot had already been included in the layout plan in
1984.
18. It is further submitted that the application seeking to place
additional documents on record was rightly declined by the learned
Single Judge. The DDA had failed to furnish any satisfactory
explanation for not producing the documents before the learned
Arbitral Tribunal. The subsequent sanction of a building plan, in any
event, could not retrospectively establish that the Plot formed part of
the layout plan at the time of its auction. It was submitted that the
learned Arbitral Tribunal had considered the pleadings, evidence and
contemporaneous correspondence exchanged between the parties
before arriving at the finding that the Plot was not included in the
layout plan. The said finding was a plausible view based on the
material available on record and did not warrant interference under
Section 34.
19. It was lastly submitted that the grounds urged by the DDA
essentially seek a re-appreciation of the evidence and a
reconsideration of the factual findings returned by the learned Arbitral
Tribunal, which is impermissible within the limited scope of
interference under Sections 34 and 37.
20. No other submission has been advanced by learned senior
counsel representing the parties.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:
21. This Court has considered the submissions advanced by learned
senior counsel representing the parties and examined the Impugned
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NARAYAN
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Judgment, the Award and the material placed on record. Before
adverting to the specific grounds urged in the present Appeal, it would
be apposite to delineate the scope of interference available to this
Court under Section 37.
22. The jurisdiction exercised by a Court under Section 34 is
supervisory and limited in nature. It does not permit the Court to sit in
appeal over an arbitral award or to undertake a fresh appraisal of the
evidence and contractual provisions merely because a different view
may also be possible. The interpretation of the contract, in the first
instance, falls within the domain of the learned Arbitral Tribunal. An
award cannot, therefore, be set aside merely because the Court would
have arrived at a different conclusion on the facts or adopted another
interpretation of the contract. Interference is permissible only where a
ground contemplated under Section 34 is made out.
23. In this regard, the Supreme Court, in Ssangyong Engineering
and Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of
15
India , has explained that the scope of interference on the ground of
public policy of India has been narrowed by the amendments to the
A&C Act. It has further clarified that patent illegality under Section
34(2A) must go to the root of the matter and cannot be equated with
every erroneous application of law. A mere erroneous interpretation of
the contract or re-appreciation of evidence would not furnish a ground
for setting aside an award. At the same time, an award may be
vulnerable where the learned Arbitral Tribunal has arrived at a finding
based on no evidence, disregarded vital evidence in a manner that
15
(2019) 15 SCC 131
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NARAYAN
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goes to the root of the matter, or adopted an interpretation which no
fair-minded or reasonable person could have arrived at. The principles
16
laid down in Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority ,
must accordingly be understood in the context of the statutory limits
clarified in Ssangyong Engineering (supra) .
24. The limits of scrutiny under Section 37 are narrower still. The
present proceedings do not constitute an appeal against the Award on
its merits. The enquiry of this Court is confined to examining whether
the learned Single Judge, while exercising jurisdiction under Section
34, acted within the bounds of that provision. In MMTC Ltd. v.
17
Vedanta Ltd. , the Supreme Court emphasised that the jurisdiction
under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions imposed by
Section 34. The relevant observations are as follows:
“14. As far as interference with an order made Under Section 34, as
per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be disputed that such
interference Under Section 37 cannot travel beyond the restrictions
laid down Under Section 34. In other words, the court cannot
undertake an independent assessment of the merits of the award, and
must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the court Under
Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the provision. Thus, it is
evident that in case an arbitral award has been confirmed by the
court Under Section 34 and by the court in an appeal Under Section
37, this Court must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb such
concurrent findings. ”
( Emphasis supplied )
25. The same position was reiterated by the Supreme Court in
18
Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills ,
wherein it was held that the appellate power under Section 37 is
confined to examining whether the Court exercising jurisdiction under
16
(2015) 3 SCC 49
17
(2019) 4 SCC 163
18
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2632
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Section 34 has acted within the limits prescribed by that provision.
The appellate Court cannot reassess the evidence or substitute its own
view on the merits of the dispute as though it were exercising ordinary
appellate jurisdiction. The relevant observations are as follows:
“20. In view of the above position in law on the subject, the scope of
the intervention of the court in arbitral matters is virtually
prohibited, if not absolutely barred and that the interference is
confined only to the extent envisaged under Section 34 of the Act.
The appellate power of Section 37 of the Act is limited within the
domain of Section 34 of the Act. It is exercisable only to find out if
the court, exercising power under Section 34 of the Act, has acted
within its limits as prescribed thereunder or has exceeded or failed to
exercise the power so conferred. The Appellate Court has no
authority of law to consider the matter in dispute before the arbitral
tribunal on merits so as to find out as to whether the decision of the
arbitral tribunal is right or wrong upon reappraisal of evidence as if
it is sitting in an ordinary court of appeal. It is only where the court
exercising power under Section 34 has failed to exercise its
jurisdiction vested in it by Section 34 or has travelled beyond its
jurisdiction that the appellate court can step in and set aside the
order passed under Section 34 of the Act. Its power is more akin to
that superintendence as is vested in civil courts while exercising
revisionary powers. The arbitral award is not liable to be interfered
unless a case for interference as set out in the earlier part of the
decision, is made out. It cannot be disturbed only for the reason that
instead of the view taken by the arbitral tribunal, the other view which
is also a possible view is a better view according to the appellate
court.”
( Emphasis supplied )
26. The distinction between the limited jurisdiction under Section
34 and the still narrower appellate scrutiny under Section 37 was also
affirmed by the Supreme Court in UHL Power Co. Ltd. v. State of
19
Himachal Pradesh . The Court observed:
“15. This Court also accepts as correct, the view expressed by the
appellate court that the learned Single Judge committed a gross error
in reappreciating the findings returned by the Arbitral Tribunal and
taking an entirely different view in respect of the interpretation of the
relevant clauses of the implementation agreement governing the
parties inasmuch as it was not open to the said court to do so in
19
(2022) 4 SCC 116
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NARAYAN
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proceedings Under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, by virtually
acting as a court of appeal.
16. As it is, the jurisdiction conferred on courts Under Section 34 of
the Arbitration Act is fairly narrow, when it comes to the scope of an
appeal Under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction of an
appellate court in examining an order, setting aside or refusing to set
aside an award, is all the more circumscribed. ”
( Emphasis supplied )
27. The supervisory character of the Court‟s jurisdiction in arbitral
matters was also explained in McDermott International Inc. v. Burn
20
Standard Co. Ltd. . The Supreme Court observed that the Court‟s
role is to ensure fairness in the arbitral process and not to correct
errors by substituting its own interpretation of the contract for that of
the learned Arbitral Tribunal. It further recognised that the
construction of a contract is ordinarily within the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator and that the conduct of the parties and the correspondence
exchanged between them are relevant considerations in undertaking
such construction. The relevant observations are as follows:
“ 52. The 1996 Act makes provision for the supervisory role of courts,
for the review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness.
Intervention of the court is envisaged in few circumstances only,
like, in case of fraud or bias by the arbitrators, violation of natural
justice, etc. The court cannot correct errors of the arbitrators. It can
only quash the award leaving the parties free to begin the arbitration
again if it is desired. So, the scheme of the provision aims at keeping
the supervisory role of the court at minimum level and this can be
justified as parties to the agreement make a conscious decision to
exclude the court's jurisdiction by opting for arbitration as they
prefer the expediency and finality offered by it .
*
112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or implied.
The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor in the
matter of construction of a contract. The construction of the contract
agreement is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators having regard to
the wide nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement and
they cannot be said to have misdirected themselves in passing the
award by taking into consideration the conduct of the parties. It is also
20
(2006) 11 SCC 181
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trite that correspondences exchanged by the parties are required to be
taken into consideration for the purpose of construction of a contract.
Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the arbitrator to determine,
even if it gives rise to determination of a question of law. (See Pure
Helium India (P) Ltd. v. ONGC [(2003) 8 SCC 593] and D.D.
Sharma v. Union of India [(2004) 5 SCC 325] .)
113. Once, thus, it is held that the arbitrator had the jurisdiction, no
further question shall be raised and the court will not exercise its
jurisdiction unless it is found that there exists any bar on the face of
the award.
114. The above principles have been reiterated in Chairman and MD,
NTPC Ltd. v. Reshmi Constructions, Builders & Contractors [(2004) 2
SCC 663] , Union of India v. Banwari Lal & Sons (P) Ltd. [(2004) 5
SCC 304] , Continental Construction Ltd. v. State of U.P. [(2003) 8
SCC 4] and State of U.P. v. Allied Constructions [(2003) 7 SCC 396]
.”
(Emphasis supplied)
28. The aforesaid principles, also reflected in the decisions of the
Supreme Court in Vedanta Ltd. v. Shenzhen Shandong Nuclear
21
Power Construction Co. Ltd. ; ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco
22
International Ltd. ; Numaligarh Refinery Ltd. v. Daelim Industrial
23
Co. Ltd. ; Tata Hydro-Electric Power Supply Co. Ltd. v. Union of
24 25
India ; and National Highways Authority of India v. M. Hakeem ,
make it clear that the Court‟s interference with an arbitral award is
confined to the grounds and limits prescribed under Section 34.
29. Consequently, this Court, in the present Appeal, is required to
examine whether the learned Single Judge applied the correct
statutory standard while considering DDA‟s objections to the Award
and whether the Impugned Judgment discloses any failure to exercise,
or exercise beyond, the jurisdiction conferred under Section 34. This
21
(2019) 11 SCC 465
22
(2014) 9 SCC 263
23
(2007) 8 SC 466
24
(2003) 4 SCC 172
25
(2021) 9 SCC 1
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Court cannot undertake a fresh assessment of the evidence or the
contractual provisions merely because another view may be possible.
Equally, the limited scope of appellate scrutiny would not preclude
interference if the learned Single Judge has failed to examine an
objection falling within the statutory grounds under Section 34 or has
otherwise acted contrary to the limits of that provision. Keeping in
view the aforementioned legal framework, this Court now adverts to
the issues in the present case.
Objection concerning the jurisdiction of the learned Single Judge
30. DDA has questioned the commercial and pecuniary jurisdiction
of the learned Single Judge on the ground that the dispute arose from
the auction of a residential Plot and, therefore, did not constitute a
commercial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the
CC Act, 2015. It is further contended that the valuation of the
proceedings before the NCDRC should have governed the
determination of the specified value and that the claims subsequently
raised before the learned Arbitral Tribunal could not be relied upon to
confer jurisdiction.
31. The objection concerning pecuniary jurisdiction was also raised
by DDA in the Review Petitions filed after the Impugned Judgment.
The learned Single Judge, while dismissing the Review Petitions vide
order dated 03.09.2026, examined the claim statement and the
counterclaim filed before the learned Arbitral Tribunal. It was noticed
that the Respondents had raised monetary claims exceeding Rs.2
crores and that DDA had also preferred a counterclaim. Having regard
to Section 12(2) of the CC Act, which provides that the aggregate
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value of the claim and counterclaim in an arbitration of a commercial
dispute would determine the specified value, the learned Single Judge
held that the combined value exceeded the prescribed threshold.
32. The contention that the original claim before the NCDRC
should have been the sole basis for determining the pecuniary
jurisdiction was specifically considered and rejected in the review
proceedings. The learned Single Judge held that the present
proceedings arose from a challenge to an arbitral award and that the
determination of specified value was consequently governed by
Section 12(2), rather than Section 12(1), of the CC Act. The said order
has not been independently assailed in the present Appeal.
33. In these circumstances, DDA cannot secure an indirect
reconsideration of the determination rendered in the review
proceedings merely by reiterating the same objection in the present
Appeal. The claims and counterclaims forming the subject matter of
the arbitral proceedings, rather than the valuation of the earlier
consumer proceedings alone were relevant to the determination under
Section 12(2). The learned Single Judge has considered the objection
and returned a reasoned finding that the aggregate value exceeded
Rs.2 crores. No material has been placed before this Court to warrant
a contrary conclusion. The objection concerning pecuniary
jurisdiction, therefore, does not furnish a ground for interference.
34. As regards the contention that the dispute did not possess the
character of a commercial dispute, the fact that the Plot was residential
in nature is undoubtedly a relevant consideration while examining the
applicability of Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the CC Act. However, DDA has
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not demonstrated how, in the facts of the present case and in the face
of the subsequent determination in the review proceedings, the
Impugned Judgment is liable to be set aside on this ground. The order
dated 03.09.2026, which specifically dealt with the objection to the
jurisdiction of the learned Single Judge, remains undisturbed. This
Court, therefore, finds no reason to interfere with the Impugned
Judgment on this count.
Whether the finding regarding non-inclusion of the Plot in the
layout plan is perverse
35. The principal controversy between the parties concerns the
status of the Plot in the layout plan of the area. DDA auctioned the
Plot on 23.09.1996 for a consideration of Rs.60,05,000/-. The
Respondents deposited the earnest money and thereafter the balance
consideration. Possession was handed over on 01.07.1997. The
possession receipt and the subsequent correspondence also reflected
the existence of a stone boundary wall and chain-link fencing on the
Plot. Although the encroachment was eventually removed on
14.10.1999, the Respondents maintained that the Plot could not be put
to use for construction as it had not been included in the layout plan of
the area.
36. The learned Arbitral Tribunal considered the rival positions
concerning the handing over of possession, removal of the
encroachment, demands for ground rent and the Respondents‟
inability to obtain sanction for construction. It noticed that DDA was
insisting upon payment of ground rent while, at the same time, relying
upon the alleged default in payment of ground rent as a reason for not
executing the Perpetual Lease Deed. The learned Arbitral Tribunal
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also considered DDA‟s defence that the auction had been conducted
on an “as is where is” basis and that the Respondents should have
undertaken due diligence before participating in the auction.
37. Upon consideration of the material before it, the learned
Arbitral Tribunal concluded that the Plot had not been included in the
layout plan and that, in the circumstances obtaining in the case, the
Respondents could not be called upon to pay ground rent until the Plot
was included in the layout plan and such inclusion was duly intimated.
The learned Single Judge, upon examining the arbitral record, found
no perversity or patent illegality in the aforesaid conclusion.
38. This Court finds no basis to hold that the aforesaid finding was
one based on no evidence. The contention that the Respondents failed
to establish the absence of the Plot from the layout plan, or that the
learned Arbitral Tribunal should have drawn a different inference
from the auction documents and the terms of possession, essentially
invites this Court to reassess the evidentiary material. The fact that the
Plot was identifiable and was offered for auction does not, by itself,
establishes that it formed part of the approved layout plan. These are
distinct matters. The learned Arbitral Tribunal was required to
consider whether the Plot, as offered and handed over, could be put to
the use contemplated by the transaction and whether the Respondents‟
liability to pay ground rent could be enforced in the circumstances.
39. It is also material that DDA‟s own case before the learned
Single Judge, as pleaded in the Section 34 Petition, was not that the
Plot had already been included in the layout plan in 1984. Rather,
DDA contended that the Plot could not be included in the layout plan
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without execution of the Perpetual Lease Deed, the Lease Deed could
not be executed because the Respondents had allegedly failed to pay
ground rent and that it was for the owner to obtain sanction of the
layout plan from the Municipal Corporation.
40. The aforesaid stand assumes significance when considered
alongside the case now sought to be advanced by DDA. Having
defended the Award on the footing that the layout plan was yet to be
sanctioned and that the Respondents were responsible for taking steps
in that regard, DDA sought, through I.A. No. 8004/2013, to place on
record documents to advance a materially different factual case,
namely, that the Plot had already been handed over to DDA in 1984
along with the layout plan. The learned Single Judge was, therefore,
justified in examining the application in the context of the stand taken
by DDA before the learned Arbitral Tribunal as well as in the Section
34 Petition.
41. DDA seeks to explain the two positions as consistent,
contending that the documents sought to be introduced merely
demonstrate the historical inclusion of the Plot in the layout plan. This
Court is unable to accept that the issue can be resolved merely by
looking at the description of the documents. If the Plot had already
formed part of the approved layout plan in 1984, DDA was required to
explain why, in the proceedings under Section 34, it maintained that
inclusion in the layout plan was yet to be secured and that the
Respondents were required to take steps in that regard. The
inconsistency is not merely one of terminology. It goes to the very
factual foundation on which DDA sought to defend the Award before
the learned Single Judge.
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42. The learned Single Judge also noticed that, if the additional
documents sought to be introduced by DDA were to be considered,
the documents sought to be relied upon by the Respondents, which
according to the Respondents, demonstrated that the Plot was not
included in the layout plan at the time of auction, would also require
consideration. In this regard, the learned Single Judge referred to the
communication dated 15.03.2004 issued by the Senior Town Planner
to the Joint Director of DDA, bearing the subject “Incorporation of P.
No. E-265 in the approved layout plan of Lajpat Nagar, Amar Colony,
New Delhi”. The date of this communication was subsequently
corrected from 15.03.2024 to 15.03.2004 by the order dated
03.09.2026. The learned Single Judge considered the said
communication along with the other material and found that the
conclusion that the Plot was not included in the layout plan at the
relevant time was not perverse.
43. This Court is unable to find any error in the approach adopted
by the learned Single Judge. A party invoking Section 34 cannot be
permitted to recast its factual case by introducing a materially
different position and thereafter contend that the Award is perverse
because the learned Arbitral Tribunal did not consider that position.
The statutory grounds under Section 34 must be established on the
basis of the case pleaded and the material which can lawfully be
considered for that purpose. The jurisdiction under Section 34 is not
intended to provide a fresh opportunity to a party to reconstruct its
case after an Award has been rendered.
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Additional evidence in proceedings under Section 34
44. This Court now turns to the principal contention that the learned
Single Judge should have considered the documents tendered by DDA
through I.A. No. 8004/2013. DDA submits that the relevant layout-
plan records were not available during the arbitral proceedings despite
due diligence and that their non-production prevented DDA from
effectively presenting its case. It is contended that the present case
falls within the exceptional circumstances in which additional material
may be received in proceedings under Section 34.
45. In Fiza Developers (supra) , the Supreme Court considered
whether issues, as contemplated under Order XIV Rule 1 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908, were required to be framed in proceedings
under Section 34. The Court explained that proceedings under Section
34 are summary in nature, having regard to the limited grounds on
which an award may be set aside and the legislative objective of
expeditious resolution of arbitral disputes. It held that the procedure
applicable to regular civil suits cannot be mechanically imported into
proceedings under Section 34. The decision, therefore, primarily
addresses the nature and procedure of Section 34 proceedings and
does not lay down an unrestricted right to introduce additional
evidence after the conclusion of arbitration.
46. The position was subsequently clarified in Emkay Global
(supra) . The Supreme Court held that an application under Section 34
would ordinarily be decided on the basis of the record before the
learned Arbitral Tribunal. However, where matters not forming part of
that record are relevant to the determination of a ground under Section
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34(2)(a), they may be brought to the notice of the Court by way of
affidavits. The Court also cautioned against permitting a mini-trial or
routine cross-examination, emphasising that such recourse should be
permitted only where absolutely necessary.
47. The principle emerging from Fiza Developers (supra) and
Emkay Global (supra) is, therefore, that while the Court is not
invariably precluded from considering material beyond the arbitral
record, such consideration is exceptional and must remain tethered to
the statutory grounds under Section 34. The mere fact that a document
may have a bearing on the factual controversy or may persuade the
Court to take a different view is not sufficient. The party seeking to
introduce such material must demonstrate its relevance to a specific
ground under Section 34 and explain why it could not be placed
before the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
48. DDA has also placed reliance on Alpine Housing (supra) . In
that case, the Supreme Court considered a situation where, after the
passing of the Award, the competent authority had refused permission
for amalgamation of plots, which had a direct bearing on the
enforceability and legality of the relief of specific performance
granted by the learned Arbitral Tribunal. The event was subsequent to
the Award and, therefore, could not have formed part of the arbitral
record. The Supreme Court found that the subsequent refusal raised a
substantial issue concerning the statutory permissibility of the relief
granted and constituted a strong exceptional circumstance warranting
permission to place additional material on record. Significantly, the
proceedings before the learned Arbitral Tribunal in that case were ex
parte and no evidence had been led on behalf of the parties seeking to
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introduce the subsequent material.
49. The decision in Alpine Housing (supra) does not lay down that
additional evidence must be permitted whenever a party seeks to place
a document which it considers material to the dispute. The exceptional
circumstances in that case arose from a subsequent development,
which was not and could not have been part of the arbitral record, and
which directly raised a question concerning the statutory
permissibility of the relief granted under the Award. The Supreme
Court also preserved the right of the opposite party to cross-examine
and lead contrary evidence. The decision thus recognises a carefully
circumscribed exception, rather than diluting the summary character
of proceedings under Section 34.
50. Tested against the aforesaid principles, the present case does
not stand on the same footing. The documents which DDA sought to
introduce through I.A. No. 8004/2013 principally concern the alleged
handing over of the Plot in 1984 along with the layout plan. These are
historical records relating to a transaction and a statutory authority‟s
own records, which existed well before the commencement of the
arbitral proceedings. The documents do not concern a subsequent
event which arose after the Award or a statutory prohibition which
came into existence thereafter. DDA was, therefore, required to
provide a satisfactory explanation as to why such records could not be
traced or produced during the arbitral proceedings.
51. The plea of due diligence has to be examined in the context of
the fact that DDA is a statutory authority and the dispute concerns a
Plot auctioned by it. The records relating to the transfer, planning and
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auction of the Plot would ordinarily be expected to form part of the
official records maintained by the concerned authority. DDA‟s letter
dated 18.01.1999, informing the Respondents that the departmental
file was not traceable, may explain the difficulty in locating the file at
that point in time. However, it does not, by itself, establish that the
relevant records could not have been traced or produced during the
subsequent arbitral proceedings, particularly when the issue
concerning the layout plan was central to the dispute. No sufficient
explanation has been demonstrated to show the efforts undertaken by
DDA during the arbitral proceedings to retrieve the specific records
now sought to be relied upon.
52. More importantly, the documents cannot be examined in
isolation from the position adopted by DDA in the earlier proceedings.
As noticed hereinabove, DDA‟s case before the learned Single Judge
was that the Plot could not be included in the layout plan without
execution of the Perpetual Lease Deed and that the Respondents were
required to take steps for obtaining the necessary sanction. The
attempt to now rely upon the 1984 documents to assert that the Plot
had already been included in the layout plan raises a factual case
materially different from the one previously advanced. The learned
Single Judge was justified in taking this circumstance into account
while considering whether the documents should be received.
53. The contention that the additional documents merely
supplement the existing case of DDA does not adequately address this
difficulty. The question is not whether the documents are relevant in
the abstract, but whether their introduction at the Section 34 stage is
necessary for deciding a statutory ground of challenge and whether
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DDA has furnished a satisfactory explanation for their non-production
before the learned Arbitral Tribunal. The learned Single Judge
considered the nature of the documents, the explanation offered for
their non-production and the inconsistent positions taken by DDA.
The decision to decline their reception was, therefore, not founded on
an absolute prohibition against additional evidence in proceedings
under Section 34.
54. This Court is also unable to accept that the present case is
comparable to Alpine Housing (supra) . Unlike the subsequent refusal
by the competent authority in that case, the documents relied upon by
DDA here relate to facts and records which existed before the arbitral
proceedings. Nor has DDA demonstrated that the Award has become
statutorily incapable of implementation on account of any subsequent
event. The present application essentially seeks to introduce historical
material to displace the factual conclusion reached by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal on the basis of the material then available. The
distinction is material. The exception recognised in Alpine Housing
cannot be extended to permit a party to introduce, at the Section 34
stage, an alternative factual case which it could have placed before the
learned Arbitral Tribunal but failed to do so.
55. The reliance on Fiza Developers (supra) and Emkay Global
(supra) also does not advance the Appellant‟s case. Those decisions
recognise that additional material may be considered where it is
relevant to a statutory ground under Section 34 and its reception is
necessary for adjudicating that ground. They do not dispense with the
requirement of establishing the circumstances warranting its
introduction.
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Subsequent sanction of the building plan
56. DDA has also placed reliance on the fact that, during the
pendency of the Section 34 proceedings, the Respondents were
permitted to submit the building plan before the South Delhi
26
Municipal Corporation and that, by its communication dated
07.11.2017, SDMC informed the Court that the building plan had
been sanctioned in favour of the Respondents. It is contended that this
subsequent development establishes that the Plot formed part of the
recognised layout and that the foundational premise of the Award was
consequently incorrect.
57. The sanction of a building plan at a later point in time does not,
without more, conclusively establish the precise status of the Plot in
the layout plan as on the date of auction in 1996. The subsequent
sanction may establish that the Respondents were ultimately able to
obtain permission for construction. It does not, by itself, establish that
such permission could have been obtained at the time when the Plot
was auctioned or that the factual position considered by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal was incorrect.
58. The distinction between the subsequent ability to obtain a
building sanction and the historical position of the Plot at the time of
auction is material. The Award was rendered on the basis of the
circumstances which prevailed when the Plot was offered for auction,
possession was handed over and ground rent was demanded. A
subsequent development cannot, merely because it may affect the
present utility of the Plot, retrospectively alter the rights and liabilities
26
Hereinafter, the „SDMC‟
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which had accrued between the parties during the relevant period.
59. Further, the subsequent sanction of the building plan cannot be
treated as a substitute for the layout-plan document itself. DDA has
not demonstrated that the communication dated 07.11.2017
conclusively records that the Plot had formed part of the approved
layout plan in 1996. In the absence of such material, the said
communication cannot be regarded as demolishing the factual basis of
the Award. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, justified in not
treating the subsequent sanction as conclusive of the controversy
adjudicated by the learned Arbitral Tribunal.
Statutory framework and jurisdiction of the learned Arbitral
Tribunal
60. DDA has next contended that the learned Arbitral Tribunal
exceeded its jurisdiction by directing it to take steps for inclusion of
the Plot in the layout plan. It is submitted that the preparation,
sanction and modification of layout plans are governed by the DDA
Act and the statutory planning framework, and that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal could not have directed a statutory authority to
exercise its powers in a particular manner.
61. There can be no dispute with the general proposition that an
arbitral tribunal cannot direct a statutory authority to act contrary to
the governing statute or dispense with a statutory procedure. Equally,
an arbitral tribunal cannot confer upon itself a power which the parties
have not conferred upon it under the arbitration agreement. However,
the Award has to be examined in the context of the dispute referred to
arbitration and the precise nature of the directions issued.
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62. The dispute referred to the learned Arbitral Tribunal arose out
of the auction of the Plot by DDA, the handing over of possession, the
alleged encroachment, the non-execution of the Perpetual Lease Deed
and the demand for ground rent. The Respondents‟ case was that the
Plot could not be put to the use for which it had been auctioned
because it was not included in the layout plan. The relief sought was,
inter alia , for directions to DDA to take steps for inclusion of the Plot
and for consequential relief concerning ground rent and the amounts
deposited towards the auction consideration.
63. The learned Arbitral Tribunal, while adjudicating the inter se
rights and obligations of the parties, directed DDA to take steps for
inclusion of the Plot in the layout plan. The direction was issued
against DDA in the context of its obligations arising from the auction
and the subsequent dealings with the Respondents. It did not purport
to amend the Master Plan or the Zonal Development Plan, nor did it
direct the Municipal Corporation to sanction a building plan or
dispense with any statutory requirement. The direction, therefore,
cannot be read as an adjudication binding upon a statutory planning
authority which was not a party to the arbitration.
64. Significantly, DDA‟s own case before the learned Single Judge
was that it was not the sanctioning authority of the layout plan and
that the Respondents were required to fulfil the requirements for
obtaining such sanction from the Municipal Corporation. The
Appellant cannot rely upon the statutory planning framework in the
abstract, without demonstrating how the direction issued by the
learned Arbitral Tribunal necessarily required DDA to act in breach of
any identified statutory provision. No such statutory prohibition has
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been established before this Court.
65. The learned Arbitral Tribunal was required to determine
whether DDA, having auctioned the Plot and received the entire
consideration, could insist upon payment of ground rent in
circumstances where the Respondents were asserting that the Plot
could not be utilised for construction on account of its absence from
the layout plan. That controversy arose from the contractual and
transactional relationship between the parties and was capable of
adjudication in arbitration. The fact that the dispute required
consideration of the statutory planning framework does not, by itself,
render the dispute non-arbitrable or establish that the learned Arbitral
Tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction.
66. DDA has also referred to Section 21 of the DDA Act and the
broader statutory scheme governing planned development in Delhi.
However, a mere reference to the statutory framework does not
establish that the Award is in conflict with the fundamental policy of
Indian law. The Appellant was required to identify the specific
statutory provision which the Award violates and demonstrate how the
directions issued by the learned Arbitral Tribunal compel DDA to act
contrary to that provision. Such a case has not been made out.
Contractual obligations, ground rent and interest
67. The next submission is that the learned Arbitral Tribunal has
effectively rewritten the auction and lease arrangement by making the
Respondents‟ liability to pay ground rent contingent upon inclusion of
the Plot in the layout plan. DDA contends that the auction was
conducted on an “as is where is” basis, possession was handed over on
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01.07.1997 and ground rent was payable in accordance with the
auction conditions. It is argued that the learned Arbitral Tribunal
could not have suspended the Respondents‟ contractual obligation
merely because the Respondents were dissatisfied with the status of
the Plot.
68. The submission overlooks the basis on which the learned
Arbitral Tribunal proceeded. The dispute was not confined to the
physical handing over of the Plot. The Respondents‟ case was that the
Plot was affected by an encroachment and, even after removal of the
same, could not be put to the use for which it had been auctioned
because it was not included in the layout plan. The learned Arbitral
Tribunal considered the effect of these circumstances on the
Respondents‟ liability to pay ground rent.
69. The expression “as is where is” cannot be read in isolation or as
an absolute exclusion of every obligation which may arise from the
conduct of the authority auctioning the property. The learned Arbitral
Tribunal was entitled to examine the nature of the property offered,
the circumstances surrounding the auction, the subsequent handing
over of possession and the conduct of the parties. The conclusion that
the Respondents‟ liability to pay ground rent would arise upon
inclusion of the Plot in the layout plan was reached in the context of
the findings recorded by the learned Arbitral Tribunal. Whether
another interpretation of the auction conditions was possible is not a
matter which can be re-examined in the present proceedings.
70. It is also relevant that DDA‟s own case before the learned
Single Judge was that the Perpetual Lease Deed could not be executed
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because the Respondents had failed to pay ground rent, whereas the
Respondents‟ case was that the Plot could not be utilised because of
the absence of the layout-plan approval. The learned Arbitral Tribunal
considered this interdependent position and found against DDA. The
conclusion may not be the one which DDA would have preferred, but
that is not sufficient to establish that the Award is dehors the contract
or suffers from patent illegality.
71. As regards interest, the learned Arbitral Tribunal awarded
interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the earnest money of
Rs.15,01,250/- from 23.09.1996 and on the balance amount of
Rs.45,03,795/- from 18.12.1996. The interest was quantified at
Rs.76,00,134/- up to 23.12.2010, with further interest directed in
terms of the Award. The grant of interest was consequential to the
findings recorded by the learned Arbitral Tribunal concerning the
Respondents‟ inability to obtain effective use of the Plot and the
liability of DDA in the circumstances of the case.
72. DDA has not demonstrated that the grant of interest at the rate
of 9% per annum is prohibited by the contract or any statutory
provision. Nor has it established that the learned Arbitral Tribunal
lacked the power to award interest in accordance with Section 31(7) of
the A&C Act. The challenge to the interest component is substantially
premised on the contention that the foundational finding concerning
the layout plan is erroneous. Once that contention is not accepted, the
consequential challenge to the award of interest and costs also does
not survive.
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CONCLUSION:
73. The jurisdiction under Section 37 cannot be invoked to
undertake a fresh examination of the merits of the arbitral dispute.
Unless the decision of the learned Single Judge suffers from an error
falling within the permissible grounds of interference under Section
34, this Court would not be justified in substituting its own view
merely because another interpretation of the record or the contract
may be possible. DDA has failed to make out any such ground in the
present case.
74. Accordingly, the present Appeal is dismissed. The Impugned
Judgment dated 17.02.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in
O.M.P. (COMM.) 175/2020 is affirmed. The order dated 03.09.2026
passed in Review Petition Nos.122/2026 and 123/2026 is not
independently under challenge and, therefore, no separate order is
called for in respect thereof.
75. The pending applications also stand closed.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
BHARAT PARASHAR, J.
NOVEMBER 03, 2026
jai/shah
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