Hasa Nand And Co. vs Trilok Chand Goenka

Court
Delhi High Court

$~17
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 01.09.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010328722026
+ RC.REV. 245/2026, CM APPL. 47499/2026 (Stay) & CM
APPL. 47500/2026 (Ex. From filing the certified copies of the
annexures)

HASA NAND AND CO. .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Tanisha Verma and Mr.
Raghav Saluja, Advocate.
versus

TRILOK CHAND GOENKA .....Respondent
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (Oral)
1. The present Petition, filed under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi
1
Rent Control Act, 1958 , seeks to assail the Order dated
2
22.04.2026 , passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller-02,
3
Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi , in Eviction Petition
4
being RC-ARC 63/2026 , titled “Shri Trilok Chand Goenka v. Hasa
Nand & Co.” .

2. By way of the Impugned Order, the learned ARC dismissed the
5
Application seeking condonation of delay in filing the Application

1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Order
3
learned ARC
4
Eviction Petition
5
Condonation of Delay Application
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 245/2026 Page 1 of 10

6
seeking leave to defend and, consequently, an Eviction order came
to be passed in favour of the Respondent, in respect of an Almirah
shop No.4866-A, Ward No. III, Ganesh Bazar, Cloth Bazar,
7
Fatehpuri, Delhi-110006 .

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, at the
outset, submits that the Petitioner does not seek to assail the finding
returned by the learned ARC in the Impugned Order insofar as it
pertains to the dismissal of the Condonation of Delay Application.
4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner, however, submits that,
notwithstanding the aforesaid finding, the position in law, as
8
enunciated by this Court in in Ramesh Basandara v. Moti Ram ,
requires the learned ARC, even where an Application seeking leave to
defend has been declined on the ground of delay, to independently
satisfy itself as to whether the bona fide requirement pleaded by the
Landlord is, in fact, made out.
5. It is, therefore, submitted by the learned counsel for the
Petitioner that, in the present case, the learned ARC has failed to
undertake the aforesaid requisite examination of the bona fide
requirement pleaded by the Respondent, and that such failure goes to
the legality and sustainability of the Impugned Order, thereby
warranting interference by this Court.

ANALYSIS:
6. This Court has heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

6
Leave to Defend
7
Subject premises
8
2003 SCC OnLine Del 570
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 245/2026 Page 2 of 10

Petitioner, and, with her able assistance, perused material available on
record, including the relevant documents as well as the Impugned
Order.
7. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
8. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
9
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
10 11
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua ,
has consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
9. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
12
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
13
Grover .
10. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,

9
(1998) 8 SCC 119
10
(2014) 9 SCC 78
11
(2022) 6 SCC 30
12
2024:DHC:9322
13
2025:DHC:11285
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 245/2026 Page 3 of 10

therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”

11. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
12. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-
B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 245/2026 Page 4 of 10

undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
13. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
14. In order to appreciate the challenge raised by the Petitioner, it
would be appropriate to examine the findings returned by the learned
ARC in the Impugned Order. The relevant observations are extracted
herein below:
“As such in view of settled proposition of law, this court
does not have any jurisdiction to condone the delay as prayed by
the respondent. Moreover, non-filing of leave to defend within 15
days of service is also admitted by the applicant/respondent.
Hence, present application under section 5 of The Limitation
Act read with section 151 of CPC filed on behalf of respondent
is hereby dismissed and disposed of accordingly .
Present is a petition under Section 14(1)(e) r/w Section 25B
of DRC Act. Even though leave to defend has not been filed within
prescribed period, court is still ought to satisfy itself that all
ingredients of section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act have been made out.
Reliance is placed upon case titled as Ramesh Basandara Vs.
Moti Ram, 2003 RLR 539 .
Heard. Record has been perused.
Briefly stated, the facts of petition are such that petitioner
has purchased tenanted premises through registered sale deed dated
12.09.2018 from Sh. Sanjay Kumar Jain and Sh. Rajiv Kumar Jain,
having 2/3rd share and also through registered sale deed dated
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 245/2026 Page 5 of 10

16.12.2019 from Sh. Shashi Kumar Jain having 1/3rd share in said
premises. Letter of attornment was sent on 28.01.2021 by
petitioner after purchasing the same and same was duly served
upon respondent. That petitioner requires tenanted premises
bonafidely. Petitioner is also owner of shop no. 4866 however
petitioner is not in a position to use said shop as it is very narrow.
Hence, petitioner wants to get tenanted premises/ almirah/ 4866-A,
vacated. Petitioner wants to demolish the same to open the
passage/way for shop no. 4866 so that petitioner can run said shop
easily.
Petitioner has placed on record site plan, copy of sale deed
dated 12.09.2018 and sale deed dated 24.11.2019, copy of letter of
attornment dated 28.01.2021 along with copy of postal receipt and
copy of legal notice dated 11.02.2022 along with copy of postal
receipt.
Section 25B (4) of DRC Act provides that,
“The tenant on whom the summons is duly served
(whether in the ordinary way or by registered post) 'in the
form specified in the Third Schedule shall not contest the
prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an
affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest
the application for eviction and obtains leave from the
Controller as hereinafter provided; and in default of his
appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining
such leave, the statement made by the landlord in the
application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by
the tenant and the applicant shall be entitled to an order for
eviction on the ground aforesaid.”
Hence, respondent is deemed to have admitted the
relationship of landlord and tenant between petitioner and
respondent. He is also deemed to have admitted that the petitioner
requires tenanted premises for his bonafide need and that no other
reasonably suitable accommodation is available to petitioner.
In the case titled as Ragavendra Kumar Vs Firm Prem
Machinery AIR 2000 SC 534 , it was observed as under: -
“It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge
of his requirement for residential or business purpose and
he has got complete freedom in the matter, (See: Prativa
Devi (Smt.) v. T.K Krishnan, [1996] 5 SCC 353. In the
case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the
tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it
was suitable and it cannot be faulted.”
Hence, as a consequence thereof, an eviction order is
passed under Section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act in favour of petitioner
and against the respondent in respect of Almirah shop No.4866-A,
Ward No.III, Ganesh Bazar, Cloth Bazar, Fatehpuri, Delhi-
110006 admeasuring 12’X1’ , as shown in red colour in the site
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 245/2026 Page 6 of 10

plan annexed with petition. However, the petitioner would not be
entitled to initiate execution proceedings for recovery of the
possession of the tenanted premises before expiration of six months
from today in view of provisions given in Section 14 (7) of the Act.
In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no
order as to costs.
File be consigned to Record Room .”
(Emphasis supplied)

15. A perusal of the aforesaid observations leaves no manner of
doubt that the learned ARC was conscious of the statutory
consequences flowing from the Petitioner’s failure to seek leave to
defend within the period prescribed under Section 25-B(4) of the DRC
Act. The learned ARC had, at the outset, recorded that the Application
seeking condonation of delay stood dismissed and that the Petitioner
had admittedly failed to file the Application seeking leave to defend
within the prescribed period.
16. Significantly, however, the learned ARC did not rest the
Impugned Order merely on such default. The learned ARC expressly
recognised that, notwithstanding the failure to file the leave to defend
Application within the prescribed time, it was incumbent upon the
Court to satisfy itself that the ingredients of Section 14(1)(e) of the
DRC Act stood made out.
17. The learned ARC specifically invoked the decision of this Court
in Ramesh Basandara v. Moti Ram (supra) in this regard, and
thereafter proceeded to examine the case set up by the
Respondent.The aforesaid approach is also consistent with the scheme
of Section 25-B(4) of the DRC Act, which is reproduced in the
Impugned Order extracted herein before.

18. While the failure of a duly served tenant to obtain leave to
defend entails the statutory consequence that the statements contained
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 245/2026 Page 7 of 10

in the Eviction Petition are deemed to be admitted, the learned ARC is
nevertheless required to satisfy itself that the statutory ingredients
necessary for passing an Order of eviction on the ground pleaded
stand fulfilled. The statutory consequence of deemed admission,
therefore, cannot be equated with an automatic or mechanical
entitlement to an Eviction Order divorced from the statutory
requirements governing the ground of eviction.
19. In the present case, the learned ARC undertook such an
exercise. The Impugned Order records the case pleaded by the
Respondent, including his acquisition of the Subject premises through
registered sale deeds, the issuance and service of the letter of
attornment, the assertion of bona fide requirement.The learned ARC
also took note of the site plan and the other documents placed on
record and, upon consideration thereof, proceeded to apply the settled
principle governing the assessment of a Respondent’s bona fide
requirement and the suitability of the premises sought to be recovered.
20. Further, the learned ARC, in particular, considered the
Respondent’s assertion that although he was also the owner of the
existing shop bearing No. 4866, Ward No.III, Ganesh Bazar, Cloth
Bazar, Fatehpuri, Delhi-110006, the passage to the said shop was too
narrow to be conveniently utilised and that the Subject premises were
required to be vacated and demolished so as to provide access to and
facilitate the use of his shop. The learned ARC, upon considering the
aforesaid circumstances, accepted the bona fide requirement pleaded
by the Respondent and proceeded to pass the Eviction Order under
Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 245/2026 Page 8 of 10

21. The submission advanced on behalf of the Petitioner, therefore,
that the learned ARC failed to undertake the requisite satisfaction
contemplated by Ramesh Basandara v. Moti Ram (supra) is not
borne out from the record. On the contrary, the Impugned Order
expressly records the legal requirement of such satisfaction and
thereafter proceeds to examine the material placed before the learned
ARC before arriving at a conclusion that the ingredients of Section
14(1)(e) stood satisfied.

22. Once the learned ARC had undertaken the requisite exercise,
the mere fact that the Petitioner may seek a different appreciation of
the material, or may contend that the bona fide requirement ought to
have been assessed differently, cannot by itself furnish a ground for
interference in the present proceedings. The jurisdiction of this Court
under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and does not permit a re-appreciation of the
evidence or substitution of the view taken by the learned ARC merely
because another view may be possible.
23. In view of the foregoing discussion, no jurisdictional error,
material irregularity, perversity or manifest illegality is discernible in
the approach adopted by the learned ARC. The finding returned in
respect of the bona fide requirement is founded upon the pleadings
and material placed before the learned ARC and cannot be
characterised as one which is so unreasonable or unsustainable as to
warrant the exercise of the limited revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

DECISION:
24. This Court, therefore, finds no merit in the present Petition. The
Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 245/2026 Page 9 of 10

25. The present Petition, along with the pending Application(s), if
any, stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.


HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
SEPTEMBER 01, 2026/tk/DJ


Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:02.09.2026
13:37:56
RC.REV. 245/2026 Page 10 of 10