Sh. Sanjay Pratap Singh vs Union Of India Through Secretary
- Court
- Delhi High Court
- Case type
- Not found
- Decided on
- 01-04-2026
<div> <br /> <br /> $~ <br /> <b>* </b> <b>IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI </b><br /> % <b><i>Judgment reserved on: 12.02.2026 </i></b><br /> <b><i> Judgment pronounced on: 01.04.2026 </i></b><br /> <b><i>Judgment uploaded on: 01.04.2026 </i></b><br /> + W.P.(C) 6699/2018 <br /> UNION OF INDIA & ORS .....Petitioners <br /> Through: Mr. Sanjay Jain, Sr. Adv. with <br /> Mr. Ruchir Mishra, Mr. Sanjiv <br /> Kumar Saxena, Mr. Mukesh <br /> Kumar Tiwari, Mr. Nishank <br /> Tripathi, Ms. Harshita Sukhija, <br /> Ms. Reba Jain Mishra, Ms. <br /> Poonam Shukla, Ms Rishika <br /> Agrawal and Ms. Priya Tyagi, <br /> Advs. <br /> versus <br /> PADMA JAISWAL IAS (AGMUT:2003) .....Respondent <br /> Through: Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, Sr. Adv. <br /> with Mr. Tarun Gupta, Adv. <br /> <br /> + W.P.(C) 12072/2018, CM APPL. 46771/2018 and CM APPL. <br /> 14354/2019 <br /> SH. SANJAY PRATAP SINGH .....Petitioner <br /> Through: Mr. A. K. Thakur, Mr. Rishi <br /> Raj, Mr. Sujeet Kumar and Mr. <br /> Ningthem Oinam, Advs. <br /> versus <br /> UNION OF INDIA THROUGH SECRETARY .....Respondent <br /> Through: Ms. Nidhi Raman, CGSC with <br /> Mr. Akash Mishra and Mr. <br /> Arnav Mittal, Advs. for UOI <br /> <br /> + W.P.(C) 12083/2018, CM APPL. 14344/2019 and CM APPL. <br /> 18093/2019 <br /> SH. SANJAY PRATAP SINGH .....Petitioner <br /> Through: Mr. A. K. Thakur, Mr. Rishi <br /> Raj, Mr. Sujeet Kumar and Mr. <br /> Ningthem Oinam, Advs. <br /> versus <br /> <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 1 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> UNION OF INDIA THROUGH SECRETARY AND ANR <br /> .....Respondents <br /> Through: Ms. Nidhi Raman, CGSC with <br /> Mr. Akash Mishra and Mr. <br /> Arnav Mittal, Advs. for <br /> R1/UOI. <br /> <br /> + W.P.(C) 14025/2025 and CM APPL. 57369/2025 <br /> UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Petitioners <br /> Through: Mr. Shashank Dixit, CGSC <br /> with Mr. Kunal Raj, Adv <br /> versus <br /> RINKU DHUGGA .....Respondent <br /> Through: Mr. Ankur Chhibber, Adv. <br /> <br /> <b>CORAM:</b> <br /> <b>HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL</b> <br /> <b>HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN </b><br /> <b>J U D G M E N T </b><br /> <b>ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.: </b><br /> 1. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, W.P.(C) <br /> 6699/2018 and W.P.(C) 14025/2025, which involve an identical <br /> question of law concerning the competence of the disciplinary <br /> authority in respect of officers borne on the AGMUT (Arunachal <br /> Pradesh, Goa, Mizoram and Union Territories) Joint Cadre of the <br /> Indian Administrative Service [hereinafter referred to as „IAS‟], were <br /> heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. <br /> 2. The singular and determinative issue which arises for <br /> consideration in the present Petitions is whether the Ministry of Home <br /> Affairs acting as a delegatee of the Joint Cadre Authority, was <br /> competent in law to initiate disciplinary proceedings and impose <br /> penalty upon a member of the IAS borne on the AGMUT Joint Cadre? <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 2 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <b>FACTUAL MATRIX: </b><br /> 3. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the present <br /> Petitions, it would be apposite to briefly notice the relevant factual <br /> background. <br /> 4. The Respondents herein are members of the AGMUT Joint <br /> Cadre of the IAS. At the material time, they were posted in the State <br /> of Arunachal Pradesh, which is one of the constituent States forming <br /> part of the Joint Cadre Authority [hereinafter referred to as „JCA‟]. <br /> 5. In W.P.(C) 6699/2018, disciplinary proceedings initiated <br /> against the concerned officer culminated in the passing of a final order <br /> of penalty by the Ministry of Home Affairs [hereinafter referred to as <br /> „MHA‟]. However, the said order was not implemented in view of <br /> interim directions passed during the pendency of the challenge before <br /> the learned Central Administrative Tribunal [hereinafter referred to as <br /> „Tribunal‟]. In W.P.(C) 14025/2025, the disciplinary proceedings had <br /> not reached finality. A Memorandum of Charges was issued seeking <br /> to initiate proceedings under the All India Services (Discipline & <br /> Appeal) Rules, 1969 [hereinafter referred to as „1969 Rules‟]. The <br /> Tribunal, following its earlier decision which is the subject matter of <br /> challenge in W.P.(C) 6699/2018, quashed the initiation of the <br /> disciplinary proceedings by applying the same reasoning. <br /> 6. Since the central issue in both Petitions pertains to the <br /> competence of the MHA, acting as a delegatee of the JCA, to initiate <br /> and conclude disciplinary proceedings against members of the <br /> AGMUT Joint Cadre, the factual differences between the two matters <br /> do not materially alter the legal question involved. Nevertheless, for <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 3 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> completeness of narration, the facts as noticed in the Order dated <br /> 22.03.2018 [hereinafter referred to as „Impugned Order‟] passed in <br /> W.P.(C) 6699/2018 are extracted hereunder. <br /> <i>“4. It is deemed necessary to refer to some necessary facts. The </i><br /> <i>applicant is a 2003 Batch IAS officer. She was assigned the AGMU </i><br /> <i>cadre. She was posted in Arunachal Pradesh as Deputy </i><br /> <i>Commissioner, West Kameng District w.e.f. February, 2007. She was </i><br /> <i>transferred from the said position vide order dated 23.02.2008. Some </i><br /> <i>preliminary inquiry was conducted on the basis of a complaint against </i><br /> <i>the applicant. The applicant was placed under suspension vide </i><br /> <i>Ministry of Home Affairs letter dated 15.04.2008 and shifted to </i><br /> <i>Itanagar. The applicant continued under suspension till it was revoked </i><br /> <i>on 08.10.2010. The preliminary inquiry and the suspension was on the </i><br /> <i>basis of a complaint dated 22.02.2008 by some locals of District </i><br /> <i>Kameng regarding misappropriation of Government revenue and </i><br /> <i>misuse of official position. This complaint was communicated to the </i><br /> <i>applicant vide letter dated 04.09.2008 by Secretary (Personnel), </i><br /> <i>Government of Arunachal Pradesh seeking the views/explanation of </i><br /> <i>the applicant. She submitted her reply dated 05.09.2008. The </i><br /> <i>applicant was, however, served with a memorandum dated 08.04.2009 </i><br /> <i>by the Ministry of Home Affairs for initiating disciplinary proceedings </i><br /> <i>under rule 8 of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, </i><br /> <i>1969. The memorandum was accompanied with the articles of charge, </i><br /> <i>statement of imputations, list of witnesses and documents etc. The </i><br /> <i>applicant submitted her reply to the charge memorandum on </i><br /> <i>15.06.2009, after asking for some documents etc. An additional reply </i><br /> <i>dated 27.11.2009 was submitted to the questionnaire dated </i><br /> <i>20.11.2009 served upon her. The respondents instituted a </i><br /> <i>departmental inquiry on 13.08.2009. While these proceedings were </i><br /> <i>pending, another charge memorandum dated 14.05,2010 was served </i><br /> <i>upon the applicant. It is alleged that the second charge memorandum </i><br /> <i>was based upon the earlier charges, as contained in the first </i><br /> <i>memorandum dated 08.04.2009. The applicant submitted another </i><br /> <i>reply dated 07.06.2010. The inquiring authority on completion of the </i><br /> <i>inquiry, submitted the inquiry report dated 19.09.2010. The </i><br /> <i>disciplinary authority obtained the CVC advice, and copy of the CVC </i><br /> <i>advice dated 16.12.2010 was also served upon the applicant. The </i><br /> <i>applicant submitted representation dated 22.02.2011 against the </i><br /> <i>inquiry report and the CVC advice. The disciplinary authority </i><br /> <i>obtained UPSC's advice, which was rendered on 29.04.2014. UPSC </i><br /> <i>recommended penalty of removal from service. Copy of the UPSC's </i><br /> <i>advice was served upon the applicant. She submitted interim reply </i><br /> <i>dated 25.08.2014 against the UPSC advice to MHA. She also </i><br /> <i>submitted a letter dated 15.09.2014 to the Home Minister. Some </i><br /> <i>further representations were submitted by the applicant. The applicant </i><br /> <i>filed OA No.1228/2016 before this Tribunal seeking a direction to </i><br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 4 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <i>supply copy of the fresh advice of UPSC, which appears to have been </i><br /> <i>obtained by the respondents later, with further direction to consider </i><br /> <i>the representation of the applicant against the subsequent advice of </i><br /> <i>UPSC. This OA was disposed of with the following order: </i><br /> <i>“Having heard the learned counsel for the applicant, having </i><br /> <i>gone through the record with his valuable assistance, the main </i><br /> <i>OA is disposed of with a direction to respondent no.2 to supply </i><br /> <i>the copy of advice of UPSC to the applicant as per instructions </i><br /> <i>of G.I., Dept of Per. Trg., OM No.11012/8/2011-Estt.(A), dated </i><br /> <i>5-3-2014 (Annexure-A/25) before passing the final order in </i><br /> <i>disciplinary proceedings against her.” </i><br /> 7. Pursuant to the aforesaid directions issued by the learned <br /> Tribunal in OA No.1228/2016, the advice subsequently tendered by <br /> the Union Public Service Commission [hereinafter referred to as <br /> „UPSC‟] was furnished to the Respondent, who submitted further <br /> representation in opposition thereto. Thereafter, the MHA purporting <br /> to act as the disciplinary authority in respect of the Respondent, <br /> proceeded to pass the final order imposing the penalty of removal <br /> from service. <br /> 8. Aggrieved by the initiation as well as culmination of the <br /> disciplinary proceedings at the instance of the MHA, the Respondent <br /> approached the Tribunal by way of the Original Application being <br /> O.A. No.1528/2016, <i>inter alia</i> , contending that the MHA was not the <br /> competent disciplinary authority in respect of a member of the IAS <br /> borne on the AGMUT Joint Cadre. It was asserted that the JCA, <br /> constituted in terms of the relevant cadre rules, alone was vested with <br /> the jurisdiction to exercise disciplinary control, and that the MHA <br /> could not have assumed such authority in the absence of a valid and <br /> lawful delegation in accordance with the statutory framework <br /> governing the All India Services. <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 5 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 9. The principal contention urged before the Tribunal was that the <br /> impugned disciplinary proceedings stood vitiated at their inception for <br /> want of jurisdiction, inasmuch as the charge memorandum itself had <br /> been issued by an authority lacking competence in law. It was further <br /> contended that the subsequent steps in the proceedings, including the <br /> conduct of the inquiry, the consultation with the Central Vigilance <br /> Commission [„CVC‟] and the UPSC, and the passing of the final order <br /> of penalty, were all rendered <i>non est</i> in the eye of law, being founded <br /> upon an invalid assumption of authority. <br /> 10. On the other hand, the Petitioners [Respondents before the <br /> Tribunal], defended the action of the MHA by contending that, in <br /> respect of the AGMUT Joint Cadre, the Central Government, acting <br /> through the MHA, was empowered to exercise disciplinary control, <br /> either in its own right or as a validly authorised delegate of the JCA. It <br /> was urged that the scheme of the All India Services Act, 1951 <br /> [hereinafter referred to as „Act of 1951‟] and the rules framed <br /> thereunder contemplated such an arrangement, particularly having <br /> regard to the special nature of the AGMUT Cadre, which comprises <br /> multiple States and Union Territories. <br /> 11. The Tribunal, upon consideration of the rival submissions and <br /> the relevant statutory provisions, proceeded to examine the legal <br /> framework governing the constitution of Joint Cadres and the exercise <br /> of disciplinary powers in respect of members of the All India Services. <br /> The Tribunal adverted to the provisions of the Act of 1951, the Indian <br /> Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 [hereinafter referred to as <br /> „1954 Rules‟], and the 1969 Rules, in order to determine the locus of <br /> disciplinary authority in the context of the AGMUT Joint Cadre. <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 6 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 12. Ultimately, by the Impugned Order, the Tribunal came to the <br /> conclusion that the MHA could not have assumed the role of <br /> disciplinary authority in respect of the applicant in the absence of a <br /> legally sustainable delegation by the JCA in terms of the applicable <br /> statutory provisions. Consequently, the Tribunal allowed the Original <br /> Application and set aside the disciplinary proceedings, including the <br /> final order of penalty, on the ground of lack of competence. <br /> 13. It is this determination of the Tribunal, holding that the MHA <br /> was not competent to initiate and conclude disciplinary proceedings <br /> against a member of the AGMUT Joint Cadre, which forms the <br /> subject matter of challenge in W.P.(C) 6699/2018. As noticed <br /> hereinabove, the subsequent Petition, W.P.(C) 14025/2025, arises in a <br /> similar factual backdrop, where the initiation of disciplinary <br /> proceedings by issuance of a Memorandum of Charges by the MHA <br /> was interdicted by the Tribunal, following its earlier decision <br /> embodied in the Impugned Order. <br /> 14. The above narration encapsulates the factual backdrop relevant <br /> for adjudication of the core legal issue arising in the present batch of <br /> Petitions. The controversy thus centres not upon the merits of the <br /> allegations levelled against the concerned officers, but upon the <br /> anterior and foundational question of jurisdiction, namely, whether the <br /> MHA, purporting to act as a delegatee of the JCA, was vested with the <br /> requisite statutory competence to initiate and carry forward <br /> disciplinary proceedings under the 1969 Rules against members of the <br /> AGMUT Joint Cadre. <br /> The correctness of this conclusion must be tested against the statutory <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 7 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> scheme governing Joint Cadres. <br /> <b>STATUTORY FRAMEWORK:</b> <br /> 15. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it is necessary to <br /> examine the constitutional and statutory scheme governing the <br /> creation of services and the disciplinary control exercisable over <br /> members of the All India Services. <br /> 16. The Constitution of India contemplates two distinct categories <br /> of public services under the scheme of Schedule VII, namely: <br /> a. Services of Union (Entry 70, List I, Schedule VII); and <br /> b. Services of State (Entry 41, List II, Schedule VII). <br /> 17. In addition to the aforesaid, Article 312 of the Constitution of <br /> India empowers Parliament to create one or more All India Services <br /> common to the Union and the States. It is in exercise of this <br /> constitutional mandate that Parliament enacted the Act of 1951, which <br /> constitutes the principal legislation regulating recruitment and <br /> conditions of service of members of the All India Services. <br /> 18. Section 3 of the Act of 1951 confers power upon the Central <br /> Government, after consultation with the Governments of the States <br /> concerned, to make rules for the regulation of recruitment and <br /> conditions of service of persons appointed to an All India Service. <br /> 19. In exercise of the powers under Section 3 of the Act of 1951, <br /> the Central Government has framed, <i>inter alia</i> : <br /> a. the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954; <br /> b. the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969; <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 8 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> c. the All India Services (Joint Cadre) Rules, 1972. <br /> 20. In the 1954 Rules, the concept of a JCA was introduced by way <br /> of amendment in the year 1972. Clause (d) was inserted in Rule 2, <br /> which provides as under: <br /> <i>“2(d) State Government concerned, in relation to a Joint cadre, </i><br /> <i>means the Joint Cadre Authority.”</i> <br /> 21. The significance of the aforesaid insertion cannot be <br /> understated. By virtue of this statutory substitution, wherever the <br /> expression “State Government concerned” occurs in the context of a <br /> Joint Cadre under the 1954 Rules, the same stands replaced by the <br /> JCA. The provision effects a statutory substitution whereby the JCA <br /> steps into the shoes of the State Government for purposes referable to <br /> a Joint Cadre. <br /> 22. Rule 3 of the 1954 Rules deals with the constitution of cadres. <br /> Sub-rule (2) thereof enables the constitution of a Joint Cadre and reads <br /> as under: <br /> <i>“3. Constitution of Cadres – 3(1) There shall be constituted for each </i><br /> <i>State or group of States an Indian Administrative Service Cadre. </i><br /> <i> 3(2) The Cadre so constituted for a State or a group of States is </i><br /> <i>hereinafter referred to as a „State Cadre‟ or, as the case may be, a </i><br /> <i>„Joint Cadre‟.” </i><br /> 23. Thus, the statutory scheme clearly contemplates that a cadre <br /> may either be State-specific or common to a group of States. In the <br /> latter eventuality, the cadre assumes the character of a Joint Cadre, <br /> necessitating a mechanism for collective decision-making on matters <br /> concerning its administration and control. <br /> 24. The disciplinary framework governing members of the All India <br /> Services is contained in the 1969 Rules. Rule 2(e) thereof defines <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 9 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> “State Government concerned” in relation to a Joint Cadre in the <br /> following terms: <br /> <i>“2(e) „State Government concerned‟ in relation to a joint cadre, </i><br /> <i>means the Government of all the States for which the joint cadre is </i><br /> <i>constituted and includes the Government of a State nominated by the </i><br /> <i>Government of all such States to represent them in relation to a </i><br /> <i>particular manner.” </i><br /> 25. A plain reading of Rule 2(e) of the 1969 Rules makes two <br /> aspects clear. First, in relation to a Joint Cadre, the disciplinary <br /> authority is not an individual State Government, but the collective <br /> Governments of all constituent States. Second, the Rule expressly <br /> contemplates nomination, that is to say, the Governments of all such <br /> States may authorise one among them to represent them “in relation to <br /> a particular manner”. The statutory text itself, therefore, recognises <br /> and permits authorisation for the purpose of exercising disciplinary <br /> functions. <br /> 26. The All India Services (Joint Cadre) Rules, 1972 [hereinafter <br /> referred to as „the 1972 Rules‟] were framed to operationalise the <br /> concept of Joint Cadres. Rule 2(a) defines the JCA as the Committee <br /> of Representatives referred to in Rule 4. The relevant provisions read <br /> as under: <br /> <i>2. Definitions - In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires,- </i><br /> <i>a) “Joint Cadre Authority” means the Committee of </i><br /> <i>Representatives referred to in rule 4. </i><br /> <i>b) “Constituent States” means the States in respect of which a </i><br /> <i>Joint Cadre is formed. </i><br /> 27. Rule 3 of the 1972 Rules assumes particular importance. It <br /> provides: <br /> <i>“3. Application of rules under the All India Services Act to members </i><br /> <i>of All India Services borne on, and posts included in Joint Cadres. - </i><br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 10 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <i>Subject to the amendments made by rule 6, all rules made under the </i><br /> <i>All-India Services Act, 1951 (61 of 1951) and for the time being, in </i><br /> <i>force, shall apply in relation to the members of the All-India Services </i><br /> <i>borne on the Joint Cadres of these Services and in relation to the </i><br /> <i>posts under the control of the Constituent States.” </i><br /> 28. The effect of Rule 3 is that, save and except for specific <br /> amendments contemplated under Rule 6, the entire body of rules <br /> framed under the Act of 1951, including the 1969 Rules, applies <br /> <i>proprio vigore</i> to members borne on a Joint Cadre. There is no <br /> amendment under Rule 6 curtailing the disciplinary powers otherwise <br /> available under the 1969 Rules. <br /> 29. Rule 4 of the 1972 Rules provides for the constitution of the <br /> JCA as a Committee consisting of representatives of each of the <br /> Governments of the Constituent States. Rule 5 delineates the duties <br /> and functions of the JCA, primarily in relation to allocation of officers <br /> and determination of periods of service in connection with the affairs <br /> of each Constituent State. Rules 4 & 5 of the 1972 Rules are <br /> reproduced as under: <i> </i><br /> <i>“4. Committee of representatives – </i><br /> <i>1) There shall be a Committee consisting of a representative of </i><br /> <i>each of the Governments of the Constituent States, to be called the </i><br /> <i>Joint Cadre Authority. </i><br /> <i>2) The representatives of the Governments of the Constituent States </i><br /> <i>may either be members of an All-India Service or Ministers in the </i><br /> <i>Council of Ministers of the Constituent States, as may be specified </i><br /> <i>by the Governments of the Constituent States. </i><br /> <i>5. Duties and functions of the Joint Cadre Authority.- </i><br /> <i>1) The Joint Cadre Authority shall determine the names of the </i><br /> <i>members of the All-India Services, who may be required to serve </i><br /> <i>from time to time in connection with the affairs of each of the </i><br /> <i>Constituent States and the period or periods for which their </i><br /> <i>services shall be available to that Government. </i><br /> <i>2) Where there is a disagreement on any matter among the </i><br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 11 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <i>members of the Joint Cadre Authority, the matter shall be referred </i><br /> <i>to the Central Government for decision and the Governments of the </i><br /> <i>Constituent States shall give effect to the decision of the Central </i><br /> <i>Government. </i><br /> 30. It is necessary to appreciate that Rule 5 of the 1972 Rules does <br /> not purport to be an exhaustive enumeration of all statutory powers <br /> that may be exercised by the JCA once it stands substituted as the <br /> “State Government concerned” under the 1954 Rules and the 1969 <br /> Rules. Rule 5 delineates certain cadre-management functions. <br /> Whether disciplinary competence flows independently from the 1969 <br /> Rules, by virtue of the definitional framework, is an issue which will <br /> be examined in the analysis. <br /> 31. The historical context in which the 1972 Rules were framed <br /> also assumes relevance. In the year 1972, the State of Meghalaya was <br /> carved out from the territory of Assam, and the Union Territories of <br /> Manipur and Tripura were elevated to the status of States. These <br /> structural changes necessitated the formalisation of Joint Cadre <br /> arrangements and corresponding amendments in the 1954 Rules. <br /> 32. It is also pertinent to note that, prior to 1969, there was no Joint <br /> Cadre of two full-fledged States. The only Joint Cadre arrangement <br /> existed between two Union Territories, namely the Himachal Pradesh, <br /> Delhi Joint Cadre, which was dissolved in 1967 and substituted with <br /> effect from 01.01.1968 by the Union Territories Cadre. Himachal <br /> Pradesh attained full statehood in 1971, whereas Delhi continues to be <br /> a Union Territory (now the National Capital Territory of Delhi). <br /> 33. The AGMUT Cadre, comprising Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, <br /> Mizoram and various Union Territories, represents a unique and <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 12 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> composite Joint Cadre arrangement. Over time, its composition has <br /> undergone change, including the merger of the erstwhile Jammu & <br /> Kashmir Cadre pursuant to the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation <br /> Act, 2019. The multiplicity of constituent units underscores the <br /> necessity of a coordinated mechanism for exercising disciplinary <br /> control. <br /> 34. In exercise of the powers under the 1954 Rules as amended, the <br /> Government of India constituted the JCA by Notification dated <br /> 03.04.1989. The composition was subsequently reconstituted in 1995. <br /> The JCA thus comprises representatives of the Constituent States as <br /> well as representatives of the Union Territories through the MHA. The <br /> same reads as under: <br /> <i>a)</i> <i> </i> <i>Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs (representing Union Territories </i><br /> <i>in respect of the Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police </i><br /> <i>Service) </i><br /> <i>b)</i> <i> </i> <i>Chief Secretary, Arunachal Pradesh </i><br /> <i>c)</i> <i> </i> <i>Chief Secretary, Goa </i><br /> <i>d)</i> <i> </i> <i>Chief Secretary, Mizoram </i><br /> <i>e)</i> <i> </i> <i>Chief Secretary, Delhi </i><br /> <i>f)</i> <i> </i> <i>Inspector General of Forests, Ministry of Environment and Forests </i><br /> <i>(representing Union Territories in respect of the Indian Forest </i><br /> <i>Service) </i><br /> <i>g)</i> <i> </i> <i>Joint Secretary. (Union Territories Division) Ministry of Home </i><br /> <i>Affairs (Convener in respect of the Indian Administrative Service </i><br /> <i>and Indian Police Service)/ Joint Secretary (in charge of Indian </i><br /> <i>Forest Service Cadre Management), Ministry of Environment and </i><br /> <i>Forests (Convener in respect of Indian Forest Service)</i><br /> <i> </i><br /> 35. In October, 1989, having regard to practical and administrative <br /> difficulties in convening meetings of the JCA for every vigilance and <br /> disciplinary matter, a Resolution was passed authorising the Ministry <br /> of Home Affairs to take decisions in matters pertaining to vigilance <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 13 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> cases and departmental proceedings concerning members of the <br /> AGMUT Cadre. This arrangement was reiterated by Notification <br /> dated 22.11.2017, recording the decision of the JCA to continue the <br /> nomination of the MHA to function in such capacity. <br /> <b>CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:</b> <br /> 36. Contentions of the Petitioner/Union of India: <br /> 36.1 Learned counsel for the Petitioner/ Union of India assailed the <br /> Impugned Order passed by the Tribunal on the ground that the <br /> Tribunal has proceeded on an erroneous interpretation of the statutory <br /> framework governing the All India Services and, in particular, the <br /> scheme relating to Joint Cadres under the Act of 1951 and the Rules <br /> framed thereunder. <br /> 36.2 It was contended that the dispute before the Tribunal arose in <br /> the context of the AGMUT Cadre, to which the Respondent officer <br /> belongs. The principal contention raised by the Respondent before the <br /> Tribunal was that since the alleged incident occurred while she was <br /> serving in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, only the Government of <br /> Arunachal Pradesh could have initiated disciplinary proceedings <br /> against her, and that the MHA lacked competence to do so. <br /> 36.3 It was submitted that the core issue requiring determination was <br /> whether a joint decision of all the constituents of the AGMUT Joint <br /> Cadre, namely Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Mizoram and the Union <br /> Territories (represented through MHA in terms of the Allocation of <br /> Business Rules), to nominate MHA as the disciplinary authority in <br /> respect of members of the entire AGMUT Cadre suffers from any <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 14 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> illegality or lack of authority. <br /> 36.4 Challenge to the Tribunal‟s Findings- It was contended that the <br /> Tribunal erred in holding that the powers of the JCA are confined to <br /> the functions expressly enumerated in Rule 5 of the 1972 Rules, and <br /> that since disciplinary proceedings are not specifically mentioned <br /> therein, the JCA lacks authority in such matters. The Tribunal further <br /> held that the JCA is not authorised under the 1969 Rules to initiate <br /> disciplinary proceedings and, therefore, could not delegate such power <br /> to MHA. Consequently, MHA was held to be an unauthorised <br /> delegatee. <br /> 36.5 It was further held that in the absence of any amendment in the <br /> Joint Cadre Rules or the Discipline & Appeal Rules pursuant to the <br /> formation of the AGMUT Cadre, no delegation in favour of MHA <br /> could be sustained and that disciplinary proceedings must necessarily <br /> be initiated by the Government of the State where the officer was <br /> posted at the relevant time. Accordingly, it was submitted that the <br /> aforesaid reasoning proceeded on an unduly restrictive reading of the <br /> statutory framework. <br /> 36.6 Constitutional and Structural Context- It was urged that the <br /> Tribunal failed to appreciate the constitutional position that there <br /> exists no independent category of “services of Union Territories.” <br /> Officers serving in Union Territories function in connection with the <br /> affairs of the Union under Article 309 of the Constitution. Union <br /> Territories are represented through the MHA under the Government of <br /> India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961. In the context of a <br /> composite Joint Cadre such as AGMUT, the Union Territories <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 15 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> constitute one of the constituent units, represented through MHA. <br /> Consequently, MHA participates in the JCA not as an external <br /> authority, but as a constituent representative. <br /> 36.7 Evolution of the Joint Cadre Concept- It was submitted that the <br /> concept of JCA was formally introduced in the 1954 Rules in the year <br /> 1972 by insertion of Rule 2(d), whereby the expression “State <br /> Government concerned” in relation to a Joint Cadre was defined to <br /> mean the JCA. It was contended that even prior to 1972, the 1969 <br /> Rules contemplated a Joint Cadre of Union Territories and recognised, <br /> under Rule 2(e), the power of constituent Governments to nominate <br /> one among them to represent them in relation to a particular matter. <br /> 36.8 It was submitted that although the 1972 Rules excluded the <br /> erstwhile Joint Cadre of Union Territories from their application, Rule <br /> 2(e) of the 1969 Rules continued to remain on the statute book and <br /> thereby retained the principle of nomination inter se constituent <br /> Governments of a Joint Cadre. It was further submitted that the <br /> proviso inserted in Rule 7 of the 1969 Rules in 1972, <br /> contemporaneously with the introduction of the Joint Cadre Rules, <br /> recognised the role of the JCA in disciplinary matters concerning <br /> members borne on a Joint Cadre. <br /> 36.9 Constitution and Composition of AGMUT Cadre- It was <br /> submitted that upon formation of the AGMUT Cadre in 1987, the <br /> erstwhile singular Union Territories Cadre merged as one constituent <br /> unit along with three newly elevated States, namely Arunachal <br /> Pradesh, Goa and Mizoram. By virtue of Rule 2(d) of the 1954 Rules, <br /> in relation to a Joint Cadre, the “State Government concerned” stands <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 16 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> substituted by the JCA. Accordingly, disciplinary authority in relation <br /> to a Joint Cadre cannot be read as confined to an individual State <br /> Government acting in isolation. <br /> 36.10 Power of Nomination and the 1989 Resolution- It was <br /> submitted that there is nothing in the Act of 1951 or in the Rules <br /> framed thereunder that prohibits the constituent Governments of a <br /> Joint Cadre from nominating one among them to act on behalf of all in <br /> relation to a particular matter. Reliance was placed upon Rule 2(e) of <br /> the 1969 Rules, which expressly includes within the expression “State <br /> Government concerned” the Government of a State nominated by all <br /> such Governments to represent them in relation to a particular matter. <br /> In this background, it was submitted that in October 1989, the four <br /> constituents of the AGMUT Cadre, acting through the JCA, passed a <br /> Resolution authorising MHA (UT Division) to deal with matters <br /> pertaining to vigilance cases and departmental proceedings, in the <br /> interest of maintaining uniformity in decision-making and morale of <br /> service officers. <br /> 36.11 It was contended that although the expression “delegation” <br /> appears in parts of the Resolution, the arrangement is in substance one <br /> of nomination inter se constituent members and not delegation to an <br /> external authority. MHA, being one of the four constituents <br /> representing Union Territories, cannot be regarded as a stranger to the <br /> Cadre. The said arrangement, it was submitted, was reaffirmed by <br /> Notification dated 22.11.2017, recording the decision of the JCA to <br /> continue the nomination of MHA to function as disciplinary authority <br /> in respect of IAS and IPS officers of the AGMUT Cadre. <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 17 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 36.12 Interpretation of Rule 5 of the 1972 Rules- It was submitted that <br /> the Tribunal has given an unduly narrow construction to Rule 5 of the <br /> 1972 Rules by treating it as an exhaustive enumeration of the powers <br /> of the JCA as Rule 5 delineates certain duties and functions but does <br /> not constitute the sole source of power of the JCA. The powers of the <br /> JCA must be read collectively from Rules 2(a), 3, 4 and 5 of the 1972 <br /> Rules, along with the 1954 Rules and the 1969 Rules. Particular <br /> emphasis was placed on Rule 3 of the 1972 Rules, which makes all <br /> Rules framed under the Act of 1951 applicable to members borne on a <br /> Joint Cadre. It was submitted that the disciplinary powers traceable to <br /> the 1969 Rules apply equally to Joint Cadres. <br /> 36.13 Interpretation of the Discipline & Appeal Rules, 1969- It was <br /> submitted that Rule 2(c) of the 1969 Rules identifies the Government <br /> with which a member is associated based on his posting, whereas Rule <br /> 2(e) addresses the collective identity of Governments constituting a <br /> Joint Cadre and expressly permits nomination in favour of one among <br /> them. It was contended that there is no conflict between Rule 2 and <br /> Rule 7 of the 1969 Rules. Rule 7(1)(b)(i) employs the expression <br /> “Government of that State” for purposes of identifying the <br /> Government under whose affairs the officer was serving, whereas <br /> Rule 2(e) governs the collective disciplinary authority in relation to a <br /> Joint Cadre. <br /> 36.14 In the context of AGMUT, it was submitted that MHA, <br /> representing the Union Territories, is as much a “State Government <br /> concerned” as the Governments of Arunachal Pradesh, Goa and <br /> Mizoram. It was further submitted that the proviso to Rule 7, requiring <br /> consultation with the JCA, would apply only in a situation where no <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 18 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> nomination has been made. Once the constituent Governments have <br /> nominated MHA to act on behalf of all in disciplinary matters, no <br /> further consultation is warranted. <br /> 36.15 Response to Allocation of Business Argument- It was submitted <br /> that reliance placed on the Allocation of Business Rules of the State of <br /> Arunachal Pradesh is misplaced. Those Rules merely distribute <br /> business internally among departments of the State Government and <br /> cannot override a specific decision taken by the State in its capacity as <br /> a constituent member of the JCA to nominate MHA in disciplinary <br /> matters. <br /> 36.16 Concluding Submission- In sum, it was submitted that the <br /> nomination of MHA by all constituent Governments of the AGMUT <br /> Cadre is consistent with the statutory framework under the Act of <br /> 1951, the 1954 Rules, the 1972 Rules and the 1969 Rules, and that the <br /> Impugned Order, in holding otherwise, suffers from a fundamental <br /> misappreciation of the scheme of Joint Cadre administration. <br /> 37. Contentions of the Respondent: <br /> 37.1 <i>Per contra</i> , learned counsel for the Respondent supported the <br /> Impugned Order passed by the learned Tribunal and submitted that the <br /> Tribunal has correctly appreciated the statutory framework governing <br /> disciplinary control over members of the All India Services borne on a <br /> Joint Cadre. It was contended that the initiation of disciplinary <br /> proceedings by the MHA was wholly without jurisdiction and <br /> contrary to the express scheme of the All India Services Act, 1951 and <br /> the Rules framed thereunder. <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 19 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 37.2 Core Jurisdictional Objection- It was submitted that the <br /> Respondent, an officer of the AGMUT Cadre of the IAS, was at the <br /> relevant time serving in connection with the affairs of the State of <br /> Arunachal Pradesh, and the alleged misconduct pertains to that tenure. <br /> In terms of Rule 7(1)(b)(i) of the 1969 Rules, the Government under <br /> whose affairs the member was serving at the time of commission of <br /> the alleged act or omission “shall alone” be competent to institute <br /> disciplinary proceedings. It was emphasised that the use of the <br /> expression “shall alone” in Rule 7 is explicit, mandatory and <br /> exclusionary. It leaves no scope for substitution of the disciplinary <br /> authority by way of executive arrangement or inter se understanding <br /> between constituents of a Joint Cadre. <br /> 37.3 The principal issue, as framed by the Respondent, was whether <br /> in the absence of an express statutory amendment to the 1969 Rules, <br /> the disciplinary authority prescribed therein can be substituted by a <br /> Resolution or minutes of the JCA. It was submitted that the answer <br /> must be in the negative. <br /> 37.4 No Disciplinary Power Conferred upon the JCA- It was <br /> submitted that while the Discipline and Appeal framework existed <br /> since 1955 (and subsequently under the 1969 Rules), the concept of a <br /> JCA was introduced only in 1972 through the 1972 Rules. Attention <br /> was drawn to Rule 5 of the 1972 Rules, which defines the duties and <br /> functions of the JCA. A plain reading of Rule 5 shows that the only <br /> power conferred upon the JCA is to determine the names of members <br /> required to serve in connection with the affairs of each constituent <br /> State and the period of such service. No disciplinary power is either <br /> expressly or impliedly conferred. <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 20 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 37.5 It was submitted that upon the introduction of the 1972 Rules, <br /> the Rule-making Authority undertook a series of consequential <br /> amendments across various All India Service Rules to align them with <br /> the newly introduced Joint Cadre framework. It was pointed out that <br /> amendments were carried out in as many as 27 sets of Rules <br /> governing members of the All India Services. In 12 of those Rules, the <br /> definition of the expression “State Government concerned” was <br /> specifically amended so as to mean “Joint Cadre Authority” in relation <br /> to a member borne on a Joint Cadre. It was emphasised that such <br /> express textual substitution demonstrates that wherever the Rule-<br /> making Authority intended the JCA to step into the position of the <br /> “State Government concerned”, it did so by explicit amendment. <br /> Significantly, however, no corresponding amendment was made in the <br /> 1969 Rules. The deliberate omission to amend the 1969 Rules, despite <br /> amending several other Rules contemporaneously, was argued to be <br /> indicative of legislative intent not to confer disciplinary powers upon <br /> the JCA. <br /> 37.6 Limited Role of JCA under the 1969 Rules- It was submitted <br /> that the only amendment introduced in the 1969 Rules following the <br /> 1972 Joint Cadre framework was the insertion of a proviso to Rule <br /> 7(3), which mandates consultation with the JCA before imposition of <br /> any penalty upon a member borne on a Joint Cadre. According to the <br /> Respondent, this requirement of consultation indicates that the JCA <br /> was not intended to function as the disciplinary authority. It was <br /> contended that if the JCA were itself the disciplinary authority, there <br /> would be no occasion for the “punishing Government” to consult it, as <br /> that would amount to an authority consulting itself. On this basis, it <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 21 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> was urged that construing the JCA as the punishing or disciplinary <br /> authority would render the proviso otiose and would be contrary to <br /> settled principles of statutory interpretation that no provision of a <br /> statute ought to be rendered redundant. <br /> 37.7 Legislative Intent Reflected in the 1975 Amendments- Detailed <br /> reliance was placed upon the amendments carried out in 1975 to Rule <br /> 2(c) and Rule 7 of the 1969 Rules. It was submitted that by GSR No. <br /> 872 dated 19.07.1975, the legislature introduced a comprehensive <br /> definition of “Government” in Rule 2(c) and bodily incorporated the <br /> same phraseology in Rule 7. The post-amendment position makes it <br /> clear that where an officer is serving in connection with the affairs of a <br /> State, “the Government of that State” alone is competent to initiate <br /> proceedings. It was argued that the deliberate use of identical language <br /> in Rule 2(c) and Rule 7 demonstrates legislative clarity and removes <br /> any ambiguity as to disciplinary competence. <br /> 37.8 Distinction between “Government of that State” and “State <br /> Government concerned”- Learned counsel emphasised the distinction <br /> between the expressions “Government of that State” and “State <br /> Government concerned” used in different parts of the 1969 Rules. <br /> Rule 7 uses the expression “Government of that State”, whereas Rule <br /> 2(e) defines “State Government concerned” in relation to a Joint <br /> Cadre. The two expressions are distinct and consciously employed. It <br /> was submitted that settled law holds that where the legislature uses <br /> different expressions in the same statute, they must be presumed to <br /> have different meanings. Reliance was placed on decisions including: <br /> i. <b><i>DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. </i></b><br /> <b><i>State of Haryana</i></b> ; (2003) 5 SCC 622; <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 22 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> ii. <b><i>Bipinchandra Parshottamdas Patel v. State of Gujarat</i></b> ; (2003) <br /> 4 SCC 642; and <br /> iii. <b><i>CCE v. Amrital Chemaux Ltd.</i></b> ; (2016) 13 SCC 509 <b><i> </i></b><br /> It was thus contended that Rule 2(e) cannot be read into Rule 7 so as <br /> to substitute the expressly designated authority. <br /> 37.9 No Sub-Delegation Permissible- Without prejudice, it was <br /> argued that even assuming the JCA possessed disciplinary power <br /> (which is though denied), the alleged delegation to MHA <i>vide</i> minutes <br /> of October 1989 would constitute impermissible sub-delegation. It <br /> was submitted that neither the 1969 Rules nor the 1972 Rules confer <br /> any power of sub-delegation upon the JCA. The maxim <i>delegatus non </i><br /> <i>potest delegare </i> squarely applies. It was further contended that there <br /> can be no ratification of an ultra vires act, placing reliance upon <br /> <b><i>1</i></b><br /> <b><i>Marathwada University v. Shesrao Balwant Rao Chavan</i></b> . <br /> 37.10 Infirmities in the 1989 Minutes and 2017 Notification- Learned <br /> counsel submitted that the minutes of October 1989 are undated, <br /> unsigned by all constituents, and were not followed by any statutory <br /> notification. Two constituents had not signed the minutes, and not all <br /> had participated. It was further submitted that similar reliance on the <br /> said minutes was rejected by the Central Administrative Tribunal, <br /> <b><i>2</i></b><br /> Bombay Bench in <b><i>Atma Ram Deshpande v. Secretary, MHA</i></b> . The <br /> Notification dated 22.11.2017 was argued to be merely declaratory of <br /> the earlier arrangement and lacking statutory foundation. <br /> 37.11 Appeal Structure under Rule 16- It was submitted that Rule 16 <br /> of the 1969 Rules provides a statutory appeal to the Central <br /> <br /> 1<br /> (1989) 3 SCC 132 <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 23 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> Government against penalties imposed by the State Government. If <br /> MHA (representing the Central Government) were to exercise original <br /> disciplinary authority, the statutory right of appeal would be rendered <br /> illusory. Such deprivation of a substantive right is impermissible. <br /> 37.12 Consistent Administrative Practice and Business Rules- It was <br /> submitted that the Business of the Government of Arunachal Pradesh <br /> (Allocation) Rules, 1998, framed under Article 166 of the <br /> Constitution, vest disciplinary control over IAS/IPS/IFS officers <br /> serving the State in the Vigilance Department of the State <br /> Government. The continued exercise of such powers by the State <br /> demonstrates that no delegation to MHA ever took effect. Reference <br /> was also made to Office Memoranda dated 09.06.1995 and <br /> 13.02.2014 issued by DoPT clarifying that disciplinary proceedings <br /> are to be initiated by the Government in connection with whose affairs <br /> the officer was serving. <br /> 37.13 Comparative Practice in Other Joint Cadres- It was submitted <br /> that in the Assam-Meghalaya Joint Cadre, disciplinary proceedings are <br /> initiated by the Government of the State where the officer was <br /> serving, and not by all constituent Governments collectively. This <br /> administrative practice, it was contended, reinforces the interpretation <br /> that Rule 7 operates with reference to the Government of the State <br /> concerned at the relevant time. <br /> 37.14 Distinction between Joint Cadre and Joint Cadre Authority- <br /> Even assuming Rule 2(e) were attracted, it was argued that the <br /> definition refers to “Joint Cadre” and not “Joint Cadre Authority.” The <br /> <br /> 2<br /> O.A.No. 450/2013 <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 24 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> two are distinct in notification, constitution and source of power. The <br /> Petitioners themselves had submitted before the Tribunal that Joint <br /> Cadre and Joint Cadre Authority should not be conflated. <br /> 37.15 Constitutional Balance- Reliance was placed upon <b><i>Government </i></b><br /> <b><i>3</i></b><br /> <b><i>of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India</i></b> , to submit that federal balance <br /> mandates that the Union does not usurp powers falling within the <br /> exclusive domain of the States. <br /> 37.16 Concluding Submission- In sum, it was submitted that: <br /> i. The 1969 Rules expressly vest disciplinary power in the <br /> Government of the State under whose affairs the officer was serving; <br /> ii. No statutory amendment confers such power upon the JCA; <br /> iii. The JCA cannot assume such power by implication; <br /> iv. Sub-delegation to MHA is impermissible; <br /> v. The 1989 minutes lack statutory force; and <br /> vi. Acceptance of the Petitioners‟ contention would render multiple <br /> statutory provisions otiose and destroy the appellate framework. <br /> It was therefore submitted that the Tribunal rightly held that MHA <br /> lacked jurisdiction to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the <br /> Respondent and the Impugned Order warrant no interference. <br /> <b>ANALYSIS & FINDINGS: </b><br /> 38. This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions <br /> <br /> 3<br /> (2018) 8 SCC 501 <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 25 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> advanced on behalf of the parties, perused the material placed on <br /> record and examined the statutory scheme governing the Indian <br /> Administrative Service in relation to Joint Cadres. <br /> 39. From a perusal of the Impugned Order dated 22.03.2018, which <br /> constitutes the lead decision in the present batch of Petitions, the <br /> following principal reasons weighed with the Tribunal in holding that <br /> the MHA lacked competence to initiate and conclude disciplinary <br /> proceedings in respect of members of the AGMUT Joint Cadre: <br /> i. That the duties and functions of the JCA, as prescribed under <br /> Rule 5 of the 1972 Rules, do not expressly include the power to <br /> initiate disciplinary proceedings, and therefore such power falls <br /> beyond its statutory purview; <br /> ii. That the Resolution dated October, 1989 authorising the MHA <br /> to take decisions in vigilance and departmental matters was signed <br /> only by two members and could not be treated as a valid decision of <br /> the JCA; <br /> iii. That the JCA is not contemplated or empowered under the 1969 <br /> Rules to act as a Disciplinary Authority in the absence of an <br /> independent conferment of such power under the 1972 Rules; <br /> iv. That in view of the proviso to Rule 7 (read with Rule 3) of the <br /> 1969 Rules, the only restriction upon the State Government in <br /> imposing a penalty upon a member of a Joint Cadre is consultation <br /> with the JCA, and not substitution by it; <br /> v. That the functions of a Joint Cadre and those of the JCA operate <br /> in distinct spheres and for different purposes; <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 26 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> vi. That in the absence of a substantive statutory source of <br /> authority, any resolution or notification purporting to confer <br /> disciplinary power upon the JCA would be ultra vires; <br /> vii. That the decision dated 11.07.2014 in O.A. No. 4293/2012 ( <b><i>J.K. </i></b><br /> <b><i>Sharma v. Union of India & Ors.</i></b> ) was distinguishable, whereas <br /> reliance was placed upon the decision in O.A. No. 450/2013 ( <b><i>Atma </i></b><br /> <b><i>Ram Deshpande v. Secretary, MHA</i></b> ); <br /> viii. That if the MHA were to function as the Disciplinary Authority, <br /> the statutory right of appeal to the Central Government would stand <br /> rendered illusory. <br /> 40. In order to examine the correctness of the aforesaid conclusions, <br /> it becomes necessary to undertake a conjoint and harmonious reading <br /> of Rule 2(d) of the 1954 Rules and Rule 2(e) of the 1969 Rules. <br /> 41. As noticed hereinabove, Rule 2(d) of the 1954 Rules stipulates <br /> that the expression “State Government concerned”, in relation to a <br /> Joint Cadre, shall mean the JCA. The device employed is one of <br /> definitional substitution rather than mere consultation. Wherever the <br /> rules governing cadre administration refer to the “State Government <br /> concerned” in the context of a Joint Cadre, the JCA stands statutorily <br /> interposed in its place. Rule 2(e) of the 1969 Rules, which governs <br /> disciplinary proceedings, defines “State Government concerned” in <br /> relation to a Joint Cadre as the Government of all the States for which <br /> the Joint Cadre is constituted, and further includes the Government of <br /> a State nominated by all such Governments to represent them in <br /> relation to a particular matter. <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 27 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 42. A conjoint reading of the two provisions yields two distinct but <br /> complementary consequences. First, in the case of a Joint Cadre, <br /> disciplinary authority cannot be understood as vesting exclusively in <br /> an individual constituent State acting independently of the Joint Cadre <br /> framework, but in the collective Governments of all the constituent <br /> States. Second, the statute itself contemplates authorisation, that is to <br /> say, the collective Governments may nominate one among them to <br /> represent the others in relation to a specified matter. <br /> 43. Once Rule 2(d) of the 1954 Rules substitutes the JCA in place <br /> of the “State Government concerned” in relation to a Joint Cadre, and <br /> Rule 2(e) of the 1969 Rules recognises the power of nomination by <br /> the collective Governments, the statutory scheme reveals that the JCA <br /> operates as the institutional embodiment of the collective will of the <br /> constituent States. It would, therefore, be doctrinally incorrect to treat <br /> Rule 5 of the 1972 Rules as the source of disciplinary power. Rule 5 <br /> merely enumerates certain cadre-management functions of the JCA. <br /> The source of disciplinary power lies in the 1969 Rules, which apply <br /> <i>proprio vigore</i> to members borne on a Joint Cadre by virtue of Rule 3 <br /> of the 1972 Rules. <br /> 44. The absence of an express reference to “disciplinary <br /> proceedings” in Rule 5 of the 1972 Rules cannot be construed as a <br /> prohibition. The 1972 Rules were framed to provide a structural <br /> mechanism for administration of Joint Cadres. They do not create or <br /> extinguish substantive disciplinary jurisdiction, which is governed <br /> exclusively by the 1969 Rules framed under Section 3 of the Act of <br /> 1951. Thus, once the expression “State Government concerned” <br /> stands replaced, in relation to a Joint Cadre, by the JCA, and once the <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 28 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 1969 Rules confer disciplinary powers upon the “State Government <br /> concerned”, it necessarily follows that, in the context of a Joint Cadre, <br /> such powers are exercisable through the JCA. <br /> 45. Further, Rule 2(e) of the 1969 Rules expressly contemplates <br /> that the Governments of all constituent States may nominate one <br /> among them to represent them in relation to a particular matter. The <br /> statutory framework, therefore, itself envisages authorisation and <br /> representation in the exercise of disciplinary functions. <br /> 46. In that backdrop, the Resolution of October, 1989 and the <br /> subsequent Notification dated 22.11.2017 must be understood not as <br /> conferring an otherwise non-existent power, but as operationalising <br /> the statutory scheme by designating the MHA to act on behalf of the <br /> collective authority in vigilance and disciplinary matters pertaining to <br /> the AGMUT Joint Cadre. <br /> 47. Rule 7 Objection- The principal textual objection urged on <br /> behalf of the Respondent rests upon the language employed in Rule 7 <br /> of the 1969 Rules. It is contended that Rule 7 refers to the <br /> “Government of that State” and not to the expression “State <br /> Government concerned”. According to the Respondent, since Rule <br /> 2(e) defines only “State Government concerned”, the definitional <br /> substitution cannot extend to Rule 7, and consequently the Joint Cadre <br /> Authority cannot be read into that provision. <br /> 48. The submission, though attractive at first blush, does not <br /> withstand a closer examination of the scheme of the Rules. <br /> 48A. Learned counsel for the Respondent placed reliance upon <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 29 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> decisions of the Supreme Court in <b><i>DLF Qutab Enclave</i></b> (supra), <i> </i><br /> <b><i>Bipinchandra Parshottamdas Patel </i></b> (supra) and, <i> </i> <b><i>Amrital Chemaux </i></b><br /> <b><i>Ltd.</i></b> (supra), to contend that where the legislature employs different <br /> expressions within the same statutory instrument, it must be presumed <br /> that such expressions are used deliberately and are intended to bear <br /> different meanings. <br /> 49. There can be no quarrel with the aforesaid proposition. It is a <br /> settled canon of statutory interpretation that legislative variation in <br /> phraseology ordinarily signals variation in meaning, and courts must <br /> be slow to treat distinct expressions as interchangeable. However, the <br /> application of that principle is not mechanical. The presumption <br /> operates subject to context and the internal structure of the statute. <br /> Where the statutory scheme contains an overarching definitional <br /> clause, particularly one opening with the expression “unless the <br /> context otherwise requires”, the meaning of expressions used in <br /> different provisions must be gathered harmoniously and not in <br /> isolation. <br /> 50. In the present case, Rule 2(e) of the 1969 Rules furnishes the <br /> interpretative key in relation to a Joint Cadre. The expression “State <br /> Government concerned” is defined in relation to such cadre as the <br /> collective Governments of the constituent States, including a <br /> Government nominated to represent them in relation to a particular <br /> matter. The scheme therefore contemplates structured and <br /> representative exercise of authority. The expression “Government of <br /> that State” in Rule 7 cannot be construed as denoting a wholly distinct <br /> and insulated authority divorced from the definitional framework of <br /> the Rules. The provision does not purport to create a new category of <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 30 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> authority; it merely identifies the Government competent in relation to <br /> the cadre to which the officer is borne. In the case of a Joint Cadre, <br /> that competence must necessarily be understood through the structural <br /> mechanism recognised by the Rules. <br /> 51. The decisions relied upon by the Respondent were rendered in <br /> materially different statutory contexts and did not concern a composite <br /> cadre structure governed by interlocking definitional and substitution <br /> clauses. They do not lay down that distinct expressions must <br /> invariably be interpreted in isolation even where such construction <br /> would defeat the operational coherence of the statutory scheme. The <br /> principle, therefore, does not advance the Respondent‟s contention in <br /> the present case. <br /> 52. The 1969 Rules are a self-contained code governing <br /> disciplinary control over members of the All India Services. Rule 2 <br /> opens with the expression “In these rules, unless the context otherwise <br /> requires”. Clause (e) thereof defines “State Government concerned”, <br /> in relation to a Joint Cadre as meaning the Governments of all the <br /> States for which the Joint Cadre is constituted and includes the <br /> Government of a State nominated by all such Governments to <br /> represent them in relation to a particular matter. The identity of the <br /> competent authority under Rule 7 must therefore be understood in the <br /> light of this definitional framework. <br /> 53. The expression “Government of that State” occurring in Rule 7 <br /> cannot be read in isolation. In service jurisprudence, particularly in <br /> relation to All India Services, the Government of a State acts through <br /> the authority designated under the governing statutory scheme. Where <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 31 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> the cadre is a Joint Cadre constituted under the Indian Administrative <br /> Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, disciplinary control is necessarily <br /> exercised in accordance with the structural arrangement created for <br /> such cadre. <br /> 54. It is significant that Rule 7 does not purport to create an <br /> independent source of disciplinary authority. It merely identifies the <br /> authority competent to institute proceedings in respect of a member <br /> serving in connection with the affairs of a State. The identity of that <br /> authority must, therefore, be gathered from the definitional and <br /> structural provisions of the Rules read harmoniously with the Cadre <br /> Rules. <br /> 55. Considerable reliance was placed by the Respondent upon the <br /> first proviso to Rule 7(3) of the 1969 Rules, which stipulates that in <br /> relation to members borne on a Joint Cadre, the “punishing <br /> Government shall consult the JCA” before imposing any penalty. A <br /> careful reading of Rule 7(3), however, reveals that the main provision <br /> itself operates only in a specific contingency, namely where the <br /> punishing Government is not the Government on whose cadre the <br /> member is borne. The obligation of consultation arises in that limited <br /> inter-governmental situation. The first proviso does not create an <br /> independent source of authority, nor does it define the identity of the <br /> disciplinary authority. It merely regulates the procedural requirement <br /> of consultation in the event that one Government proposes to impose a <br /> penalty upon a member borne on a Joint Cadre. The existence of such <br /> a consultative requirement cannot, by itself, be read as excluding the <br /> operation of the definitional framework under Rule 2(e), nor as <br /> conclusively establishing that the JCA is incapable of functioning as <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 32 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> the disciplinary authority within the statutory scheme. <br /> 56. If the Respondent‟s construction were to be accepted, the <br /> definitional clause in Rule 2(d) of 1954 Rules would stand rendered <br /> otiose in its application to Joint Cadres. The 1969 Rules would create <br /> serious practical and structural incongruities in the administration of a <br /> Joint Cadre for disciplinary control over officers borne on a Joint <br /> Cadre, unless each constituent State were to act separately, a <br /> consequence plainly inconsistent with the very concept of a Joint <br /> Cadre. <br /> 57. The expression “Government of that State” in Rule 7 must, <br /> therefore, be understood as referring to the Government competent to <br /> act in relation to the cadre to which the officer belongs. In the case of <br /> a Joint Cadre, that competence stands channelised through the Joint <br /> Cadre Authority constituted under the 1954 Rules and recognised by <br /> the 1969 Rules through the definitional framework. <br /> 58. This construction does not amount to rewriting Rule 7. It <br /> merely gives effect to the internal coherence of the statutory scheme <br /> and preserves the operational viability of the Rules in the context of <br /> Joint Cadres. The amendments introduced in 1975, relied upon by the <br /> Respondent, do not alter this conclusion. The amendments clarified <br /> the identification of the Government under whose affairs the officer <br /> was serving. They did not displace the definitional structure applicable <br /> in the case of a Joint Cadre, nor did they exclude the operation of Rule <br /> 2(e) in relation to Joint Cadres. <br /> 59. On Sub-Delegation- The next limb of challenge proceeds on the <br /> doctrine encapsulated in the maxim <i>delegatus non potest delegare</i> . It <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 33 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> is urged that even if the Joint Cadre Authority were to be treated as the <br /> disciplinary authority, it could not further delegate that power to the <br /> MHA in the absence of an express enabling provision. <br /> 60. The submission proceeds on an assumption that what has <br /> occurred, is a case of sub-delegation of statutory power. The Court is <br /> unable to accept that characterisation. <br /> 61. Rule 2(e) of the 1969 Rules defines the expression “State <br /> Government concerned” in relation to a Joint Cadre as meaning the <br /> Governments of all the States for which the Joint Cadre is constituted <br /> and includes the Government of a State nominated by all such States <br /> to represent them in relation to a particular matter. The definitional <br /> clause thus contemplates a structured and representative exercise of <br /> authority in the case of a Joint Cadre. When Rule 7 refers to the <br /> “Government of that State”, the expression must, in the case of a Joint <br /> Cadre, be understood as referring to the Government competent under <br /> the statutory scheme governing that cadre. In the case of a Joint Cadre, <br /> such competence is structured collectively through the mechanism <br /> recognised by Rule 2(e). The Rules therefore contemplate coordinated <br /> action rather than isolated individual State action. <br /> 62. The definitional structure thus recognises that disciplinary <br /> power under the 1969 Rules may be exercised by the authority <br /> identified in the Rules, including an authority nominated or authorised <br /> in accordance with the definitional framework. The Rules themselves, <br /> therefore, contemplate authorised exercise of disciplinary power by an <br /> identified authority within the statutory framework. <br /> 63. In the context of a Joint Cadre, the Joint Cadre Authority is not <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 34 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> a single natural person but an institutional mechanism representing the <br /> collective will of the participating Governments. Where such <br /> institutional authority resolves that vigilance and disciplinary matters <br /> shall be processed and handled through the MHA, which, in the case <br /> of the AGMUT cadre, functions as the nodal coordinating Ministry, <br /> the arrangement is one of structured authorisation within the <br /> governmental framework, and not a private or unauthorised transfer of <br /> power. <br /> 64. The maxim <i>delegatus non potest delegare</i> applies where a <br /> statutory delegate purports to create a new delegate without statutory <br /> sanction. It has no application where the statute itself recognises <br /> exercise of power through an authorised authority within the same <br /> statutory scheme. The present arrangement, traceable to the <br /> definitional provisions of the 1969 Rules and the structural scheme of <br /> Joint Cadres under the 1954 Rules, does not involve the creation of an <br /> extraneous authority but the channelisation of power through an <br /> identified organ of the Union Government. In the present case, the <br /> authorisation flows from the definitional inclusion under Rule 2(e), <br /> and not from an independent executive act divorced from the Rules. <br /> 65. Reliance placed by the Respondent upon <b><i>Shesrao Balwant Rao </i></b><br /> <b><i>Chavan</i></b> (supra) is misplaced. The said decision concerned a situation <br /> where a statutory authority, in the absence of enabling provision, <br /> sought to delegate its essential functions to another body, and the <br /> Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that such sub-delegation was <br /> impermissible. The present case does not involve creation of a new <br /> delegate <i>dehors</i> the Rules. The authority of the Ministry of Home <br /> Affairs is traceable to the definitional framework under Rule 2(e) of <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 35 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> the 1969 Rules read with the structural scheme of the Joint Cadre. <br /> What is involved is structured authorisation within the statutory <br /> framework, and not delegation of a primary statutory function to an <br /> extraneous authority. The ratio of the aforesaid decision is therefore <br /> inapplicable to the present controversy. <br /> 66. It is also material to note that members of the AGMUT cadre <br /> serve in connection with Union Territories as well as States. The <br /> Ministry of Home Affairs is the administrative Ministry for Union <br /> Territories. The designation of the Ministry as the nodal authority for <br /> vigilance and disciplinary matters is thus consistent with <br /> administrative coherence and does not transgress the statutory <br /> framework. <br /> 67. The Respondent has not been able to demonstrate that the <br /> exercise of power by the Ministry of Home Affairs is <i>dehors</i> the 1969 <br /> Rules or contrary to any express prohibition therein. In the absence of <br /> such prohibition, and in view of the definitional framework under <br /> Rule 2(e) that disciplinary authority includes an authority competent <br /> under the Rules, the plea of impermissible sub-delegation cannot be <br /> sustained. <br /> 68. On Business Rules and DoPT Office Memoranda- The <br /> Respondent also relied upon the Business of the Government of <br /> Arunachal Pradesh (Allocation) Rules, 1998 framed under Article 166 <br /> of the Constitution, as well as Office Memoranda dated 09.06.1995 <br /> and 13.02.2014 issued by the DoPT, to contend that disciplinary <br /> proceedings are to be initiated by the Government in connection with <br /> whose affairs the officer was serving. The submission cannot be <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 36 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> accepted. The Business Rules framed under Article 166 regulate the <br /> internal distribution of business within a State Government; they do <br /> not and cannot determine the identity of the competent disciplinary <br /> authority under statutory rules framed under Section 3 of the Act of <br /> 1951. Similarly, executive instructions or clarificatory memoranda <br /> cannot override, curtail or redefine the scope of authority as structured <br /> under the 1954 Rules and the 1969 Rules. The question of competence <br /> must be resolved on a construction of the statutory framework, and not <br /> on the basis of internal allocation rules or administrative circulars. To <br /> the extent that administrative practice has proceeded on a particular <br /> understanding, such practice cannot prevail over the statutory scheme <br /> where the latter admits of a different construction. <br /> 69. On Comparative Practice in Other Joint Cadres- Reliance was <br /> further placed upon the alleged practice prevailing in the Assam-<br /> Meghalaya Joint Cadre, where disciplinary proceedings are stated to <br /> be initiated by the Government of the State in which the officer was <br /> serving. Comparative administrative practice, however, cannot control <br /> the interpretation of statutory provisions. The competence of the <br /> disciplinary authority must be determined with reference to the text <br /> and structure of the governing Rules. Even assuming that in another <br /> Joint Cadre a different administrative modality has been followed, <br /> such practice would neither amend nor dilute the statutory framework <br /> applicable to the cadre presently under consideration. Variations in <br /> administrative handling cannot be elevated to a principle of statutory <br /> construction, particularly where the Rules themselves provide the <br /> interpretative key through definitional and substitution clauses. <br /> 70. On Constitutional Balance and Federal Structure- The reliance <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 37 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> placed by the Respondent on the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme <br /> Court in <b><i>Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India</i></b> (supra), to <br /> contend that the federal balance mandates that the Union does not <br /> usurp powers falling within the exclusive domain of the States, is <br /> misplaced. Members of the IAS are governed by a central legislation, <br /> namely the Act of 1951, and by rules framed thereunder. The <br /> disciplinary control over such officers is regulated by that statutory <br /> regime, which embodies a coordinated federal structure rather than a <br /> rigid compartmentalisation of authority. The interpretation adopted <br /> herein does not result in the Union arrogating to itself a power dehors <br /> the statute; it merely recognises the structured mechanism <br /> contemplated under the Cadre Rules and the 1969 Rules in relation to <br /> a Joint Cadre. The principle of federal balance is not offended where <br /> authority is exercised in accordance with a statutory framework <br /> enacted by Parliament and applicable uniformly to members of an All <br /> India Service. <br /> 71. On the Appellate Structure- The Respondent further contended <br /> that if the MHA is treated as the disciplinary authority in respect of <br /> officers borne on the Joint Cadre, the appellate structure contemplated <br /> under Rule 16 of the 1969 Rules would stand rendered nugatory. It is <br /> urged that an interpretation which dilutes the statutory right of appeal <br /> must be eschewed. <br /> 72. The submission cannot be accepted. <br /> 73. Rule 16 of the 1969 Rules provides an appellate remedy against <br /> an order imposing any of the penalties specified in Rule 6. The Rule <br /> identifies the appellate authority with reference to the authority that <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 38 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> has imposed the penalty. The structure is hierarchical and functional; <br /> it does not predicate that the disciplinary authority and appellate <br /> authority must belong to entirely distinct governmental entities. What <br /> is contemplated is a superior authority within the statutory framework. <br /> 74. In the case of members of a Joint Cadre, the disciplinary power, <br /> as discussed hereinabove, stands channelised through the institutional <br /> arrangement recognised under the Cadre Rules and the 1969 Rules. <br /> The fact that the Ministry of Home Affairs processes or issues <br /> disciplinary orders does not efface the existence of an appellate <br /> authority designated under Rule 16. The appellate power remains <br /> vested in the authority specified by the Rules and continues to be <br /> exercisable in accordance with the statutory hierarchy. <br /> 75. The Respondent has not demonstrated that, in the present case, <br /> the statutory right of appeal was either denied or rendered unavailable. <br /> The mere circumstance that both the disciplinary and appellate <br /> authorities function within the broader framework of the Union <br /> Government does not, by itself, vitiate the appellate mechanism. <br /> Service jurisprudence recognises numerous instances where both <br /> original and appellate authorities operate within the same <br /> governmental structure, provided the hierarchy prescribed by the <br /> Rules is maintained. <br /> 76. An interpretation that invalidates the disciplinary process on the <br /> speculative assumption that the appellate structure may be diluted <br /> would amount to reading into the Rules a limitation not borne out by <br /> their text. So long as Rule 16 remains operative and the designated <br /> appellate authority is distinct in rank and competence from the <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 39 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> disciplinary authority, the statutory safeguard stands preserved. <br /> 77. The contention that the appellate structure becomes illusory is, <br /> therefore, without merit. <br /> 78. On the 1989 Arrangement / Executive Resolution- The Tribunal <br /> has also proceeded on the premise that the decision taken in 1989, <br /> whereby vigilance and disciplinary matters concerning officers of the <br /> Joint Cadre were to be dealt with by the MHA, was in the nature of an <br /> executive arrangement unsupported by statutory authority. <br /> 79. The reasoning, with respect, rests upon an unduly <br /> compartmentalised reading of the statutory scheme. <br /> 80. As discussed hereinabove, the competence of the disciplinary <br /> authority in respect of a Joint Cadre does not originate in the 1989 <br /> decision. Its source lies in the combined operation of the Indian <br /> Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 and the All India Services <br /> (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969. The definitional framework of the <br /> 1969 Rules, read in the context of a Joint Cadre constituted under the <br /> 1954 Rules, recognises that the authority competent to act in relation <br /> to such cadre is not an individual State Government acting in <br /> isolation, but the institutional mechanism created for the Joint Cadre. <br /> 81. The 1989 decision did not purport to amend the statutory Rules. <br /> Nor did it create a new disciplinary authority dehors the Rules. It <br /> merely operationalised the manner in which the powers, otherwise <br /> traceable to the statutory framework, would be exercised in practice. <br /> Administrative channelisation of statutory power, so long as it does <br /> not transgress the parent Rules, cannot be equated with assumption of <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 40 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> jurisdiction where none exists. <br /> 82. The contention that the minutes of October 1989 were undated, <br /> unsigned by all constituent Governments, or not followed by a formal <br /> statutory notification does not alter the legal position. The source of <br /> disciplinary competence in relation to a Joint Cadre is traceable to the <br /> statutory framework under the 1954 and 1969 Rules, and not to the <br /> minutes as an independent instrument of delegation. The minutes <br /> merely record the manner in which the constituent Governments <br /> agreed to operationalise the existing statutory scheme. Even assuming <br /> procedural irregularity in the form of recording or endorsement, such <br /> circumstance would not, by itself, nullify an arrangement otherwise <br /> consistent with the governing Rules. The validity of the exercise of <br /> power must be tested on statutory conformity and not on the format of <br /> the administrative record. <br /> 83. The Tribunal appears to have proceeded on the footing that, in <br /> the absence of a formal amendment expressly inserting the Joint Cadre <br /> Authority into each provision of the 1969 Rules, disciplinary <br /> competence could not be recognised. Such an approach overlooks the <br /> role of definitional clauses and contextual substitution within a <br /> statutory code. Where the Rules themselves provide the interpretative <br /> key through Rule 2, a further textual amendment is not a precondition <br /> for giving effect to the statutory scheme. <br /> 84. It is trite that executive instructions cannot override statutory <br /> rules. Equally, however, executive decisions that operate within and in <br /> furtherance of statutory rules are not invalid merely because they are <br /> not themselves framed as statutory instruments. The validity of the <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 41 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 1989 arrangement must therefore be tested on whether it is <br /> inconsistent with, or contrary to, the 1954 and 1969 Rules. No such <br /> inconsistency has been demonstrated. <br /> 85. The Tribunal‟s conclusion that initiation of disciplinary <br /> proceedings by the Ministry of Home Affairs was without jurisdiction, <br /> solely on the ground that the 1969 Rules were not formally amended, <br /> does not accord with a harmonious and contextual reading of the <br /> statutory framework governing Joint Cadres. <br /> 86. The reliance placed by the Tribunal upon the decision in <b><i>Atma </i></b><br /> <b><i>Ram Deshpande</i></b> (supra) does not advance the Respondent‟s case. The <br /> said decision turned upon its own factual matrix and did not undertake <br /> a comprehensive examination of the conjoint operation of the 1954 <br /> Rules, the 1972 Rules and the 1969 Rules and therefore cannot be <br /> treated as laying down any binding proposition on the construction of <br /> the conjoint statutory framework presently under consideration. The <br /> present matter requires a harmonised construction of these <br /> interlocking statutory instruments, which was not the focal issue in the <br /> decision, relied upon. <br /> 87. Final Determination- The controversy in the present case is <br /> essentially jurisdictional. The question is not whether the charges are <br /> sustainable on merits, but whether the disciplinary proceedings were <br /> initiated by an authority competent in law. <br /> 88. Upon a conjoint and harmonious reading of the Indian <br /> Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, the All India Services <br /> (Joint Cadre) Rules, 1972, and the All India Services (Discipline & <br /> Appeal) Rules, 1969, this Court is unable to concur with the view <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 42 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> taken by the Tribunal. <br /> 89. The 1969 Rules constitute a self-contained code governing <br /> disciplinary control over members of the All India Services. Rule 2, <br /> which opens with the expression “unless the context otherwise <br /> requires”, provides the interpretative framework for the Rules. In <br /> relation to a Joint Cadre constituted under the 1954 Rules, the <br /> authority competent to act cannot be confined to an individual State <br /> Government acting independently of the Joint Cadre structure. <br /> 90. The expression “Government of that State” occurring in Rule 7 <br /> must be read in the context of the cadre to which the officer belongs. <br /> In the case of a Joint Cadre, disciplinary competence stands structured <br /> through the institutional mechanism recognised under the Cadre <br /> Rules. To read Rule 7 in isolation, detached from the definitional and <br /> structural provisions of the Rules, would render the Joint Cadre <br /> framework administratively unworkable and defeat the scheme of <br /> coordinated control contemplated under the statutory regime. <br /> 91. The nomination or authorisation of the Ministry of Home <br /> Affairs to process and issue disciplinary orders in respect of officers <br /> borne on the Joint Cadre does not amount to impermissible sub-<br /> delegation. The 1969 Rules themselves contemplate exercise of <br /> disciplinary power by the authority competent under the Rules. The <br /> arrangement in question operates within, and not outside, the statutory <br /> framework. <br /> 92. The existence of an appellate remedy under Rule 16 remains <br /> unaffected. The mere fact that both the disciplinary and appellate <br /> authorities function within the broader structure of the Union <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 43 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> Government does not, in itself, invalidate the statutory hierarchy <br /> prescribed by the Rules. <br /> 93. The 1989 decision, viewed in its proper perspective, did not <br /> create a new source of power but merely channelised authority already <br /> traceable to the statutory scheme. In the absence of any demonstrated <br /> inconsistency with the governing Rules, the Tribunal was not justified <br /> in treating the initiation of proceedings as without jurisdiction solely <br /> for want of a formal textual amendment. <br /> 94. For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the initiation of <br /> disciplinary proceedings by the MHA, in respect of a member of the <br /> Joint Cadre, cannot be said to be without authority of law. The <br /> contrary conclusion reached by the Tribunal on the question of <br /> jurisdiction is unsustainable. The Tribunal‟s interference at the <br /> threshold on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was therefore <br /> unwarranted. <br /> <b>CONCLUSION AND OPERATIVE PORTION:</b> <br /> 95. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the <br /> considered opinion that the Tribunal erred in holding that the initiation <br /> of disciplinary proceedings by the Ministry of Home Affairs, in <br /> respect of a member of the Joint Cadre, was without jurisdiction. <br /> 96. The interpretation adopted by the Tribunal proceeds on an <br /> isolated and fragmented reading of the 1969 Rules and fails to give <br /> due effect to the definitional framework and structural provisions <br /> governing a Joint Cadre under the 1954 Cadre Rules and the 1972 <br /> Joint Cadre Rules. The conclusions regarding absence of statutory <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 44 of 45 </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> competence, impermissible delegation, and invalidity of the 1989 <br /> arrangement are unsustainable in law. <br /> 97. Accordingly, the Impugned Order passed by the Tribunal is set <br /> aside to the extent it holds the initiation of disciplinary proceedings to <br /> be without jurisdiction. The disciplinary proceedings shall stand <br /> restored to the stage at which they were interdicted by the Tribunal <br /> and shall proceed in accordance with law. <br /> 98. W.P.(C) 6699/2018 and W.P.(C) 14025/2025 are allowed and <br /> disposed of in the above terms. <br /> 99. In view of order dated 31.01.2026, the Registry is directed to <br /> list W.P.(C) 12072/2018 and W.P.(C) 12083/2018 on 12.05.2026 for <br /> consideration. <br /> 100. It is clarified that this Court has expressed no opinion on the <br /> merits of the disciplinary proceedings, which shall be dealt with in <br /> accordance with law. <br /> 101. All the pending applications in W.P.(C) 6699/2018 and W.P.(C) <br /> 14025/2025 shall stand closed. <br /> <br /> <b>ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.</b> <br /> <b>AMIT MAHAJAN, J.</b> <br /> <b>APRIL 01, 2026 </b><br /> <i>jai/pal</i> <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Signed By:JAI<br /> NARAYAN<br /> Signing Date:01.04.2026<br /> 12:25:22<br /> <i>W.P,(C) 6699/2018 and connected matters Page 45 of 45 </i></div>