Totalenergies Gas And Power Limited vs Western Concessions Private Limited

Court
Bombay High Court

CNR No : HCBM020366132025
2-IA-8094-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
IN ITS COMMERCIAL DIVISION
INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 8094 OF 2025
IN
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 1110 OF 2025
Total Energies Gas & Power Limited …Applicant
In the matter between:
Total Energies Gas & Power Ltd. …Petitioner
Versus
Western Concessions Private Limited …Respondent
_______
Mr. Zubin Behramkamdin, Senior Advocate a/w Mr. Abhileen Chaturvedi, Mr.
Akhil Mahesh, Ms. Anjali Kumari and Ms. Prachurya Sahu i/b. Cyril Amarchand
Mangaldas, for the Applicant/Petitioner.
Mr. Aspi Chinoy, Senior Advocate a/w Mr. Zarir Bharucha, Senior Advocate a/w
Mr. Chandrasekhar Haridh, Mr. Rishi Thakur, and Ms. Dhwani Gala i/b. Bimal
Rajasekhar, for the Respondent.
_______
CORAM : ARIF S. DOCTOR J.
th
SEPTEMBER 2026
RESERVED ON : 10
th
NOVEMBER 2026
PRONOUNCED ON : 19
JUDGMENT:
1. The present Petition is filed under the provisions of Sections 47 and 49 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Arbitration Act”) and seeks
rd
April 2025 (“the Final Award”)
enforcement of a Final Arbitral Award dated 23
passed in a London seated arbitration between the Petitioner and the Respondent
conducted under the ICC Rules 2021. The Petitioner was the Claimant in the
arbitration.
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Brief Facts:
th
October 2017, the Petitioner, as “Service Provider”, and one H-
2. On 18
Energy Gateway Private Limited, i.e., now the Respondent, as “Terminal Owner”,
entered into a Binding Agreement for Regasification Services (“Binding
Agreement”). The Service Provider had undertaken, under the Binding
Agreement to provide the Respondent with the services of a Floating Storage and
Regasification Unit (“FSRU”), called the “Cape Ann”, which was to be moored at
the Jaigarh Port, Maharashtra, operated by JSW Jaigarh Port Limited (“JSW”) for
receiving, regasifying and delivering regasified natural gas to the onshore gas
grid as part of the LNG storage and regasification terminal project being
developed by the Respondent at Jaigarh Port pursuant to a Sub-Concession
Agreement entered into with JSW. Section 14(a)(vi) of Exhibit A to the Binding
Agreement (“Section 14(a)(vi)”) required the FSRU to have, either on board or
promptly available electronically, the certificates, documents and equipment
required by applicable law. Clause 8 of the Binding Agreement provided for
arbitration in the event of any disputes arising between the Parties thereto.
3. Subsequently, in 2019, GDF Suez LNG Supply S.A. was absorbed into
Global LNG S.A.S. (“GLNG”), and by a Deed of Novation and Amendment (“Deed
th
March, 2020, all rights and obligations of GLNG
of Novation”) effective from 13
as the Services Provider stood novated in favour of the Petitioner.
4. Disputes then arose between the Petitioner and the Respondent with
regard to the Conditions of Use Agreement (“COU”), which JSW required to be
executed for permitting the Vessel to enter and operate at Jaigarh Port. The COU
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was to be executed between JSW and SRV Joint Gas Two Ltd., the Vessel Owner,
with the Petitioner and Respondent facilitating negotiations on their respective
behalves. The proposed COU governed, inter alia, the allocation of liabilities
arising from the Vessel's use of the Port. JSW proposed liability limits of USD 1
billion for oil pollution and USD 350 million for other accidents or occurrences,
whereas the Petitioner maintained that the Vessel’s liability should not exceed
USD 150 million. Consequently, despite negotiations between the Petitioner and
the Respondent from the latter half of 2018 to April 2020, no agreement was
reached on the terms of the COU.
5. Section 14(a)(vi) of Exhibit A to the Binding Agreement required the FSRU
to have, either on board or promptly available electronically, the certificates,
documents and equipment required by applicable law. The Respondent
contended that the COU fell within this requirement and that the failure to
conclude the same constituted a material breach of the Binding Agreement. It
further contended that the Vessel’s consequent inability to enter Jaigarh Port and
perform its fundamental contractual obligations amounted to a repudiatory
breach. The Petitioner disputed that the COU was a document required under
Section 14(a)(vi).
th
March 2020, the Vessel arrived outside Jaigarh Port and tendered
6. On 15
a Notice of Arrival. However, in the absence of an agreed COU, the Vessel could
th
April 2020, the Respondent issued a notice
not enter the Port. Thereafter, on 9
terminating the Binding Agreement. The Petitioner disputed this termination on
the same day.
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7. The Petitioner thereafter called upon the Respondent to furnish proof of
maintenance of the Terminal Owner insurance required under the Binding
Agreement and separately drew down USD 10,445,035.93 in May 2020 from
Standby Letters of Credit (“Letters of Credit”) issued by the Respondent on
account of unpaid invoices, which the Respondent failed to replenish, and hence
th
June, 2020, issued a notice terminating the Binding
the Petitioner, on 30
Agreement and invoked arbitration under Clause 8.8 of the Binding Agreement
th
November, 2021.
by a Request for Arbitration dated 4
8. A three-member Arbitral Tribunal (“Tribunal”) was then constituted under
the ICC Rules, the seat of arbitration being London and the governing law of the
Binding Agreement being the law of England and Wales.
9. The Respondent raised a jurisdictional objection in arbitration, which was
th
April 2023 (“the Partial Award”). The
rejected by a Partial Final Award dated 14
rd
April 2025, upholding the
Tribunal published the Final Award on 23
Petitioner's termination and directing the Respondent to pay the following
amounts to the Petitioner within twenty-one days:
(i) a termination fee of USD 24,750,000
(ii) an outstanding invoice balance of USD 67,305
(iii) interest of USD 5,172,132.45 up to December 6, 2024, and USD
4,369.59 per day thereafter until payment
(iv) GBP 2,579,409.54 towards legal costs and expenses
(v) USD 445,000 towards costs of the arbitration.
10. The Respondent has admittedly not challenged either the Final Award or
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the Partial Award under the provisions of the English Arbitration Act, 1996 (“the
English Arbitration Act”), which would govern any such challenge. Also, the
th
April 2025
Respondent, despite being called upon by communications dated 28
th
May 2025 to make payments in accordance with the Final Award, has
and 13
not done so.
11. Thus, the present Petition.
Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner:
12. Mr. Behramkamdin, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Petitioner, at the outset, submitted that the Final Award arose from a commercial
legal relationship between the parties, pursuant to a written arbitration
agreement governed by English law, and was rendered in the United Kingdom, a
territory notified by the Central Government as a reciprocating territory under
the New York Convention, pursuant to the Central Government Notification
th
October 1976. He therefore submitted that the Final Award satisfied
dated 25
the requirements of Section 44 of the Arbitration Act, and was a Foreign Award
which was capable of being recognised and enforced in India.
13. He also pointed out that the Petitioner had complied with the
requirements of Section 47 of the Arbitration Act since the Petitioner had
produced (i) a duly authenticated copy of the Final Award and (ii) a certified copy
of the Binding Agreement, which contained the arbitration clause, both of which
were in English and hence did not require any translation or any further
evidence under Section 47(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act.
14. He submitted that it was an admitted position that neither the Partial
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Award nor the Final Award had been challenged by the Respondent before the
Courts in England under the provisions of the English Arbitration Act, which
governed any such challenge. In support of his contention, he placed reliance
nd
October, 2025, of Mr. Mark Howel Wash, an English
upon the affidavit dated 2
solicitor and Partner of Clyde & Co. LLP, which confirmed that no proceedings
had been initiated to challenge either the Partial Award or the Final Award. He
accordingly submitted that the Final Award had become binding and enforceable
st
May, 2025, in accordance with Clause 8 of the Binding Agreement and
on 21
Article 35(6) of the ICC Rules.
15. Mr. Behramkamdin further submitted that none of the grounds for
refusing enforcement of the Final Award under Section 48 of the Arbitration Act
were applicable to the facts of the present case. He submitted that the arbitration
agreement was valid under English law and that the Tribunal was constituted in
accordance with the agreement of the parties and the ICC Rules and that the
matters determined by the Tribunal fell within the scope of the reference to
arbitration. He also submitted that the Final Award was neither induced nor
affected by fraud or corruption, nor was its enforcement contrary to the public
policy of India. He therefore submitted that there was no statutory impediment to
the enforcement of the Final Award and hence prayed that the present Petition be
allowed.
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent:
16. Mr. Chinoy, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent, opposed the Petition on the ground that the Tribunal had completely
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failed to consider, let alone adjudicate upon, the Respondent’s case of repudiatory
breach. He submitted that the Respondent had specifically pleaded repudiatory
breach, in the alternative to its case of material breach, as was plainly evident
from the following viz.
th
April 2020 to the Petitioner,
i. The Respondent’s communication dated 14
th
April
following the Respondent’s termination of the Binding Agreement on 9
2020, in which the Respondent had specifically reiterated that the absence of a
valid COU and the Vessel’s consequent inability to commence operations at the
Jaigarh Port constituted a repudiatory breach of the Petitioner’s fundamental
obligations under the Binding Agreement.
st
January
ii.
The Respondent’s Answer to the Request for Arbitration dated 21
2022, particularly paragraphs 43 to 45, wherein the Respondent expressly
alleged both material breach and repudiatory breach.
iii. The Terms of Reference, particularly Issues 38.3 to 38.6 and 38.8, thereof,
which addressed the parties’ respective obligations concerning the COU and
whether the Respondent was entitled to terminate the Binding Agreement on
Section 26(a)(vii) of Exhibit A to the Binding Agreement or otherwise.
st
iv. The Respondent’s Statement of Defence and Counterclaim dated 21
August 2023, particularly paragraphs 13 and 52, in which the Respondent
pleaded that the Vessel’s inability to enter the Jaigarh Port deprived the
Respondent of substantially the whole benefit of the Binding Agreement and
thereby constituted a repudiatory breach of the Petitioner’s fundamental
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obligation, which the Respondent accepted by terminating the Binding
Agreement.
th
September
v.
The Petitioner’s Reply and Defence to Counterclaim dated 25
2023, particularly paragraph 5(viii), which expressly addressed the Respondent’s
plea of repudiatory breach, albeit while disputing it.
th
17. Mr. Chinoy submitted that the parties’ opening submissions, filed on 25
October 2024, demonstrated that repudiatory breach remained squarely in play
th
November 2024. He pointed out that the
when the hearing commenced on 4
Petitioner’s Opening Submissions recorded the Respondent’s case that the
Petitioner's failure to enter into the COU was fundamental, since it deprived the
Respondent of substantially the whole benefit of the Binding Agreement and was
therefore repudiatory in nature. He pointed out that in paragraphs 9 and 67 of
the Petitioner’s Opening Submissions the Petitioner had acknowledged the
Respondent’s case of repudiatory breach.
18. He submitted that the Respondent’s opening submissions were equally
explicit on the issue of repudiatory breach and pointed out that the Respondent
had specifically, in paragraph (II) of the opening submissions, framed the
following issue, viz.
"Was WCPL entitled to terminate for material or repudiatory breach?”
He also pointed out that in paragraph 100.3 of the opening submissions, the
Respondent had submitted that the failure to obtain the COU constituted “a
fundamental failure of performance under the Binding Agreement”, since, without
the COU, “the Cape Ann could not and did not enter the Port, and the Vessel could
not be used for the primary purposes agreed under the Binding Agreement". He thus
submitted that the Respondent had specifically pleaded a case of repudiatory breach.
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19. He pointed out that even the Petitioner’s closing submissions, in the
th
November 2024, expressly acknowledged that the
speaking note dated 8
Respondent’s case included repudiation and pointed out that in paragraph 85
thereof, the Petitioner had stated as follows, viz.
“whatever might have later been said about a repudiatory breach and a common
law right to terminate… what matters for the purposes of Clause 26 of the
Binding Agreement is the specific breach which is said to give rise to the
contractual right of termination.”
Mr. Chinoy submitted that this was a clear acknowledgement of the fact that at
the closing stage of the hearing, the Respondent had advanced a case of
repudiatory breach in addition to material breach.
20. Mr. Chinoy then pointed out that the Tribunal itself, in paragraphs 51 and
53 of the Final Award, expressly recorded that the Respondent had pleaded in its
Statement of Defence and Counterclaim that the Petitioner’s failure to have a
COU in place amounted to both a material breach of Section 14(a)(vi) and a
repudiatory breach of the Binding Agreement. He also pointed out that the
Petitioner’s Reply and Defence to the Counterclaim had likewise acknowledged
the Respondent’s plea of repudiatory breach, which he pointed out the Petitioner
had described as embarrassing in paragraph 5(viii).
21. He submitted that the Tribunal, despite having recorded the Respondent’s
plea of repudiatory breach, had proceeded to determine only the issue of material
breach, i.e., whether the COU was a document required by Indian law to be
available on the Vessel within the meaning of Section 14(a)(vi). He submitted that
the Tribunal had not decided the issue of whether the Petitioner’s refusal to
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conclude the COU and the Vessel’s consequent inability to enter Jaigarh Port
amounted to a repudiatory breach of the Petitioner’s fundamental contractual
obligations. He pointed out that the Tribunal only held that the COU was merely
a contractual licence granted by JSW and was not a requirement of Indian law. It
was solely on that basis that the Tribunal held that there had been no breach by
the Petitioner of Section 14(a)(vi) and accordingly held that the Respondent’s
termination under Section 26(a)(vii) of the Binding Agreement was invalid.
22. Mr. Chinoy further pointed out that, at paragraphs 210 to 212 of the Final
Award, the Tribunal had expressly identified certain other grounds which had
not been pursued further by the Respondent and therefore did not require
determination. He was, however, at pains to point out that no similar finding was
made by the Tribunal in respect of the Respondent’s case of repudiatory breach.
He therefore submitted that there was nothing in the Final Award to show that
the Tribunal had even considered the Respondent’s case of repudiatory breach,
much less rejected the same despite the fact that the Respondent had not
withdrawn or abandoned the case of repudiatory breach.
23. He therefore submitted that the Tribunal’s complete failure to consider the
Respondent’s specifically pleaded case of repudiatory breach rendered the Final
Award contrary to the public policy of India within the meaning of Section 48(2)
(b), read with Explanation 1(iii) thereof, this he submitted was because the
Tribunal had proceeded to allow the Petitioner’s claim despite the fact that, from
th
March 2020, when the Vessel tendered its Notice of Readiness, until the
15
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th
April 2020, the Vessel was admittedly
Respondent’s Termination Notice dated 9
unable to enter Jaigarh Port, where it was required to perform its services.
24. Mr. Chinoy then placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
1
which he pointed
Court in the case of Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL
out approved the decision of the Delhi High Court in Campos Brothers Farms v.
2
which held that a foreign award which fails
Matru Bhumi Supply Chain Pvt. Ltd
to determine a material issue which goes to the root of the matter or fails to
adjudicate a claim or counterclaim in its entirety may be resisted on the ground
that the award is contrary to the public policy of India since such an award
would shock the conscience of the Court and offend a most basic notion of
justice.
25. Mr. Chinoy further submitted that, in Campos Brothers Farms, the Delhi
High Court held that where an arbitrator had ignored a party’s submissions in
their entirety irrespective of the merits of those submissions, the resulting award
could not be enforced since such an award would be contrary to the public policy
of India under Section 48(2)(b), read with Explanation 1(iii) of the Arbitration
Act. He also pointed out that the Delhi High Court, in paragraphs 56 and 76 of
Campos Brothers, held that where an arbitrator was not alive to certain material
issues that arose for determination and had returned no reasons in respect
thereof, the award was a non-speaking award.
(2020) 11 SCC 1.
1
2 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8350.
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26. Mr. Chinoy then placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
3
to submit that a
Court in I-Pay Clearing Services Pvt. Ltd. v. ICICI Bank Ltd.,
complete failure to return a finding on a vital issue specifically pleaded by a party
was fundamentally different from a mere inadequacy or insufficiency of reasons.
He submitted that, although the decision in the case of I-Pay was rendered in the
context of a challenge to a domestic arbitral award under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, paragraph 10 thereof was significant because it recorded that the
arbitrator had awarded a substantial sum without determining the specific issue
pleaded by the parties. This principle he submitted would apply equally when
considering enforcement of a foreign award in which the Tribunal had similarly
omitted to determine a specific issue. He pointed out that the Hon’ble Supreme
Court had in paragraph 41 of the decision in I-Pay Clearing Services Pvt. Ltd.,
held as follows, viz.
“41. Under the guise of additional reasons and filling up the gaps in the reasoning,
no award can be remitted to the arbitrator, where there are no findings on the
contentious issues in the award. If there are no findings on the contentious issues
in the award …….. the same are acceptable grounds for setting aside the award
itself. Under the guise of either additional reasons or filling up the gaps in the
reasoning, the power conferred on the Court cannot be relegated to the arbitrator.
In absence of any finding on contentious issue, no amount of reasons can cure the
defect in the award.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. Mr. Chinoy also pointed out that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had, in
paragraphs 78-79 of Vijay Karia, approvingly referred to the decisions of the
3 2022 SCC OnLine SC 4.
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4
and BAZ v. BBA,
5
which held that
Singapore Court of Appeal in AKN v. ALC
failure to consider an important pleaded issue would constitute a breach of
natural justice. He fairly accepted that the inference of such failure must be clear
and virtually inescapable and could not be drawn merely because the Tribunal
had misunderstood a party’s case, committed an error of law or considered it
unnecessary to address a particular argument. He, however, submitted that the
facts of the present case satisfied the threshold of a complete absence of any
determination of repudiatory breach, despite its express inclusion in the
pleadings and issues.
28. He also placed reliance upon the decisions of the Singapore High Court in
6
and BTN v. BTP
7
in
the case of JVL Agro Industries v. Agritrade International
support of the contention that an issue raised in the pleadings remains ‘in play’
throughout the arbitration unless expressly withdrawn, regardless of the vigour
with which the party ultimately advances it. That principle, he submitted, applied
directly to the facts of the present case since nothing in the Final Award suggested
that the Respondent had withdrawn or abandoned its case of repudiatory breach.
29. Mr. Chinoy then pointed out that Section 68(2)(d) of the English
Arbitration Act recognises that a Tribunal’s failure to deal with all issues put to
the Tribunal is a serious irregularity. He then placed reliance upon the decision of
4 [2015] SGCA 271.
5 [2018] SGHC 275.
[2016] SGHC 126.
6
7 [2021] SGHC 271.
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8
, which held
the Privy Council in RAV Bahamas Ltd & Anr. v. Therapy Beach Club
that an arbitrator must determine an issue that is essential or crucial to the
resolution of a claim or defence where fairness demands its determination. He
pointed out that this decision referred to the observations of Toulson J in Ascot
9
which also recognised that failure to
Commodities NV v. Olam International Ltd.,
address an important issue was inherently capable of causing substantial
injustice.
30. He then took pains to point out that the Respondent need not establish that
had such an issue been considered, the outcome would necessarily or even
probably have been different. He submitted that it was sufficient to show that the
outcome might have been different had the issue been determined. He further
submitted that an issue need not necessarily appear in a formally settled list of
issues, provided that the pleadings and submissions sufficiently drew the
Tribunal’s attention to it.
31. Mr. Chinoy also placed reliance upon the decision of the English
10
to
Commercial Court in World Trade Corporation Ltd v. Czarnikow Sugar Ltd.
submit that the relevant test for determining whether an issue that the Tribunal
had not dealt with, was an essential issue was whether such a dispute had been
litigated before a Court, the issue that the Tribunal had not dealt with, would
have formed part of an agreed list of issues before the Court. Applying this test, he
submitted that repudiatory breach was plainly a material issue requiring
8 [2021] AC 907 (PC).
[2002] CLC 277.
9
10 [2004] EWHC 2332 (Comm).
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independent adjudication since it went to the root of the matter. He reiterated
that repudiatory breach had been expressly pleaded, repeatedly addressed in the
parties’ submissions, and directly affected the Respondent’s right to terminate the
Binding Agreement. He therefore submitted that the Tribunal was required to
determine the said issue and reiterated that the Tribunal’s failure to adjudicate
upon the same constituted a fundamental defect in the Final Award rendering it
unenforceable under Section 48(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act.
S ubmissions on behalf of the Petitioner in Rejoinder:
32. Mr. Behramkamdin submitted that the Respondent’s contention that the
Tribunal had failed to determine the issue of repudiatory breach was entirely an
afterthought and a desperate attempt by the Respondent to resist enforcement of a
Final Arbitral Award which was binding and enforceable in every sense.
33. He submitted that the case of repudiatory breach had not been argued
before the Tribunal and, therefore, if pleaded, had been abandoned. Alternatively,
and without prejudice, he submitted that the case of repudiatory breach had been
pleaded with such vagueness that the question of considering the same did not
arise. He then submitted that, in any event, the Tribunal’s determination of the
breach of Section 14(a)(vi) had effectively disposed of the issue of repudiatory
breach.
Repudiation was never argued and, even if pleaded, was abandoned.
34. Mr. Behramkamdin pointed out that the transcripts of the oral submissions
advanced on behalf of the Respondent demonstrated that the Respondent’s case
was confined only to the alleged breach of Section 14(a)(vi). He invited my
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attention to the said transcript to point out that the first heading therein was
“whether WCPL was entitled to terminate for material breach”. He then pointed
out that the Respondent’s counsel had advanced three principal reasons as to why
the COU was a document required under Section 14(a)(vi), together with
practical and commercial considerations supporting that construction. He then
pointed out from the said transcripts that no distinct case of repudiatory breach
was ever argued or developed by Respondent’s Counsel.
35. He then submitted that it was well settled that an issue which was pleaded
but not argued is deemed to have been abandoned. In support of his contention,
11
,
he placed reliance upon the decisions in Daman Singh v. State of Punjab
12
and Mohd. Akram Ansari v. Chief Election
Common Cause v. Union of India
13
He further placed reliance upon the decision in Vijay Karia v.
Officer.
Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL, particularly paragraphs 91, 92 and 96, wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering objections to the enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award, held that the Tribunal could not be faulted for failing to
determine a case which had not been properly pleaded or advanced before it, and
that such an objection could not constitute a ground for refusing enforcement
under Section 48 of the Arbitration Act.
36. Mr. Behramkamdin, without prejudice to the above, submitted that, even
accepting the contention that the case of repudiatory breach had been pleaded, it
had been pleaded with such vagueness and lack of particulars that the Petitioner
11 (1985) 2 SCC 670.
(2004) 5 SCC 222.
12
13 (2008) 2 SCC 95.
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could not reasonably have been expected to meet such a case. On the other hand,
he pointed out that the Respondent’s case of material breach under Section 14(a)
(vi) was pleaded in great detail, as was plainly evident from the Reply to the
Request for Arbitration, Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, Opening and
Closing Submissions and hearing transcripts, whereas reference to repudiatory
breach was merely fleeting and devoid of any detail.
37. Mr. Behramkamdin pointed out that the relevant pleadings and
submissions demonstrated that the Respondent’s case was consistently advanced
on the basis of material breach, and not on repudiatory breach. This he
submitted, as was evident from the following:
i. In the Reply to the Request for Arbitration, paragraphs 18 and 23 set out the
Respondent’s case on material breach, while paragraph 45, which referred to
repudiatory breach, substantially reiterated the Respondent’s case on material
breach without developing any distinct case of repudiation, simply stating that “it
was also a repudiatory breach”.
ii. In the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, paragraphs 9, 42, 50,51, 53
and 69 dealt exclusively with material breach and the Respondent’s entitlement
to the contractual termination fee under Section 26(E) of the Binding Agreement.
Repudiatory breach was referred to, only in paragraph 13 and, by way of an
avoidance-of-doubt qualification, in paragraph 52. Neither paragraph set out
any independent factual particulars in support of a case of repudiatory breach.
iii. In the Respondent’s Opening Submissions, Mr. Behramkamdin fairly
acknowledged that paragraph II, under the heading of issues, referred to the
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question of whether the Respondent was entitled to terminate the Binding
Agreement for material or repudiatory breach. He, however, submitted that
repudiatory breach was never developed into a substantive argument and pointed
out that paragraphs 3, 4, 9, 81 and 104 in particular addressed only the
interpretation of Section 14(a)(vi) and the requirement of materiality, without
advancing any distinct case based on repudiatory breach.
iv. All references to repudiatory breach completely disappeared from the
Respondent’s Closing Submissions. He pointed out that Paragraphs 69 to 71, 121,
151, 156, and 165 to 167 addressed the Respondent’s case exclusively in respect
of material breach, with reference to Section 14(a)(vi). He further submitted that
although Issues 38.4, 38.6 and 38.8 in Appendix I referred to the Respondent’s
entitlement to terminate the Binding Agreement, including under Sections 26(a)
(vii) of Exhibit A or otherwise, no distinct case of repudiatory breach had been
developed or urged by the Respondent in support of such entitlement. He
submitted that all the above references, when taken together, demonstrated that,
notwithstanding the isolated references to repudiatory breach in the pleadings
and the opening submissions, the Respondent’s case was in substance confined
only to material breach of Section 14(a)(vi) by the Petitioner. He submitted that
the progression from an incidental reference to repudiatory breach in the earliest
pleading to a bare reference in the heading of the Opening Submissions and
ultimately to complete silence in the Closing Submissions demonstrated that the
Respondent had never seriously urged the case of repudiatory breach as an
independent ground of termination and, if pleaded, had abandoned the same.
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38. He submitted that the Petitioner had, in any event, addressed the case of
repudiatory breach to the extent it was stated by the Respondent. He pointed out
that the Petitioner had, in the Reply and Defence to the Counterclaim filed by the
Respondent, stated that it was “unclear whether there is a breach being alleged
which is different to that alleged in relation to Section 14(a)(vi)”. He also
submitted that the Respondent had not identified any contractual provision other
than Section 14(a)(vi) as having been breached and that the Respondent had not
identified any correspondence communicating acceptance of the alleged
repudiation. He also pointed out that the Petitioner had described the
Respondent’s claim of repudiatory breach as “embarrassing” and had reserved its
rights to address such a claim if necessary. He submitted that the Respondent did
not thereafter meet or develop the case of repudiation, which further
demonstrated that the Respondent did not seriously pursue the case of
repudiatory breach.
The purported repudiation case was, in any event, unsustainable.
39. Mr. Behramkamdin submitted that, had the Respondent properly pleaded
and pursued a case of repudiatory breach, the Petitioner would have met that
case on merits. He submitted that the Respondent’s case of repudiatory breach
was plainly untenable since (i) there was no contractual obligation under the
Binding Agreement to execute a COU; (ii) there was no refusal by the Petitioner
to facilitate the execution of a COU in respect of the Cape Ann, as was borne out
by the admission of the Petitioner’s own witness in cross-examination; (iii) the
execution of the COU was subject to the vessel owner’s P&I Club approval, and
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under the Head Charter Agreement, the COU was required to be acceptable to the
vessel owner’s P&I Clubs which requirement was also expressly recorded by the
Tribunal in the Final Award; (iv) the Respondent was itself aware of the
requirement for P&I Club approval, which was admitted by the Respondent’s
witness in the cross-examination; (v) that the Petitioner was actively engaging
with the proposed COU arrangements immediately before termination, despite
which the Respondent proceeded to terminate the Binding Agreement just two
th
April 2020; and (vi) the parties continued negotiating for the
days later, on 9
COU for over a month after the notice of termination issued by the Respondent.
40. Basis the above, he submitted that the essential ingredients to sustain a
case of repudiatory breach were wholly absent in the facts of the present case
since there was no evidence whatsoever of any intention on the part of the
Petitioner to refuse performance of its obligations or to renounce the Binding
Agreement. He placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
14
in support of his contention
in Claude-Lila Parulekar v. Sakal Papers (P) Ltd.,
that in order to sustain a case of repudiation, there must be a clear renunciation
of the intention to perform the contract in question.
41. He also placed reliance on the decision in Eminence Property
15
to point out that the English Court of Appeal had
Developments Ltd. v. Heaney,
applied the following threefold test for determining repudiation (i) the party who
was alleged to have broken the contract must have clearly evinced an intention to
(2005) 11 SCC 73.
14
15 [2010] EWCA Civ 1168.
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abandon the contract and altogether refuse performance thereof; (ii) the inquiry
must be fact-sensitive, and an innocent or obvious mistake would not suffice to
establish repudiation; and (iii) all the surrounding circumstances must be
considered objectively. Mr. Behramkamdin submitted that the chronology of
events in the present case made evident the fact that the Respondent had failed to
satisfy any of these three requirements.
42. He then, without prejudice to the above, submitted that the Respondent’s
alleged case of repudiatory breach was, in substance, subsumed within and was
determined by the Tribunal’s finding on the issue of material breach. He
submitted that from the Respondent’s pleadings, written submissions and
transcripts, it was clear that the Respondent had consistently anchored
repudiatory breach to Section 14(a)(vi). He submitted that the alleged failure to
execute the COU was the factual basis for both the material-breach and
repudiatory breach. He also submitted that the Respondent’s contention that
execution of a COU was “standard, customary and market practice” had
subsequently been abandoned, as recorded by the Tribunal in the Final Award.
43. He submitted that once the Tribunal had found that there had been no
breach of Section 14(a)(vi), the substance of the Respondent’s case of repudiatory
breach necessarily dissipated. He pointed out that the Respondent had not
identified any separate act or omission constituting repudiation beyond the very
conduct that the Tribunal had found did not constitute a breach of Section 14(a)
(vi).
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44. Mr. Behramkamdin then placed reliance upon the decisions in the case of
16
and Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E
Santa Sila Devi v. Dhirendra Nath Sen
Sistemi SRL to submit that an award must be read as a whole and that an Arbitral
Tribunal is not required to deal separately with every contention raised by a
party.
45. He pointed out that the Respondent had failed to avail of the remedies
under Section 57(3) and (4) of the English Arbitration Act, which allows a party
to apply to the Tribunal for an additional award for any claim made but not dealt
with by the Tribunal. He also pointed out that Section 58 of the English
Arbitration Act clearly provides that an award made under an arbitration
agreement is final and binding on the parties unless otherwise agreed and does
not affect the statutory rights of challenge or any right of challenge under the
English Arbitration Act.
46. He submitted that Section 68(1) and (2)(d) of the English Arbitration Act
permit a challenge to an arbitral award on the ground of serious irregularity,
including the Tribunal’s failure to deal with all issues put to it, subject to the time
limit under Section 70(3) of the English Arbitration Act. He submitted that the
Respondent had admittedly invoked neither Section 57(3) nor Section 68(2)(d) of
the English Arbitration Act to challenge the Final Award He then placed reliance
17
upon the decisions in the case of Neilan International Co. Ltd. v. Powerica Ltd.,
18
and Naval Gent Maritime
Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. Sheikh Salah Al-Hejailan
16 1963 SCC OnLine SC 149.
2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3654.
17
18 [2004] EWHC 1625 (Comm).
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19
to submit that the Respondent not having
Ltd. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain (I) Ltd.
challenged the Final Award had consequently attained finality and become
binding upon the parties, and that the Respondent could not, at the stage of
enforcement, seek to reopen matters which it had failed to challenge before the
Courts at the seat of arbitration.
47. Mr. Behramkamdin placed reliance upon Section 73 of the English
Arbitration Act to point out that a party participating in arbitral proceedings
without raising an objection to an irregularity within the prescribed time may
not subsequently raise that objection before the Tribunal or Court, unless it did
not know and could not with reasonable diligence have discovered the grounds
for the objection. He submitted that the Respondent had never raised the issue of
non-determination of the Respondent’s allegedly pleaded case of repudiatory
breach before the Tribunal or the English Courts and had thus lost the right to
object and was precluded by Section 73 of the English Arbitration Act from
raising the issue at the enforcement stage. In support of his contention, he placed
reliance upon the decisions in POL India Projects Ltd. v. Aurelia Reederei Eugen
20
and Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi S.R.I. v. Vijay Karia
21
.
Friederich GmbH
48. Mr. Behramkamdin further submitted that a party who elects not to
challenge a foreign award before the appropriate Court cannot subsequently
resist enforcement on the ground of alleged non-determination of the
Respondent’s case of repudiatory breach. In support of his contention, he placed
19 2009 SCC OnLine Del 2961.
2015 SCC OnLine Bom 1109
20
21 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 19.
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reliance upon the decisions in Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings v. Unitech
22
Nagaraj V. Mylandhu v. PI Opportunities Fund-I,
23
Mitsui OSK Lines
Limited,
24
and HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd. v.
Ltd. v. Orient Ship Agency (P) Ltd.
25
Avitel Post Studioz Ltd.
The narrow scope of Section 48 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
49. Mr. Behramkamdin concluded by submitting that the grounds for refusing
enforcement of a foreign award must be construed narrowly. He submitted that
the grounds enumerated in Section 48 were exhaustive and that a party resisting
enforcement must necessarily meet the very high threshold set out therein. He
pointed out that the Court’s inquiry under Section 48 did not extend to a review
of the merits of the foreign award. In support of his contention, he placed
reliance upon the decisions in Gemini Bay Transcription Private Limited v.
26
Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI Holdings
Integrated Sales Service Limited,
27
Union of India v. Vedanta Ltd.,
28
Shri Lal Mahal Limited v.
(Mauritius) Limited,
29
Nagaraj V. Mylandhu and Vijay Karia.
Progetto Grano SPA,
Submissions on behalf of the Respondent in Sur-Rejoinder:
50. Mr. Chinoy, in response to the Petitioner’s contention that repudiatory
breach had not been advanced before the Tribunal, submitted that the plea had
22 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7810.
23 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1218.
24 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 158.
25 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 102
26 (2022) 1 SCC 753.
27 (2024) 7 SCC 197.
(2020) 10 SCC 1.
28
29 (2014) 2 SCC 433
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been expressly raised in the arbitral pleadings, incorporated into the Terms of
Reference and addressed in the parties’ opening submissions. He submitted that
the mere absence of any reference to repudiatory breach in the Respondent’s oral
closing submissions did not amount to the abandonment of the issue. He
reiterated that an issue once pleaded remained ‘in play’ unless expressly
withdrawn, as held in JVL Agro Industries v. Agritrade International and BTN v.
BTP.
51. Mr. Chinoy then submitted that the decisions in the case of Daman Singh,
Mohd. Akram Ansari, Common Cause and Vijay Karia, upon which the Petitioner
had placed reliance, would not apply since those decisions were rendered in the
context of Writ Petitions, Election Petitions or proceedings for clarification or
review. He submitted that these decisions did not govern the obligation of an
Arbitral Tribunal to determine material issues placed before such Tribunal. He
further submitted that in the cases cited by the Respondent, the aggrieved party
had avenues of review or clarification which were unavailable once a foreign
arbitral award had been rendered. This distinction, he submitted, was reinforced
in the case of I-Pay Clearing Services, where the Supreme Court made clear that a
matter could not simply be remitted to the arbitrator for want of a finding.
52. As regards Vijay Karia, Mr. Chinoy submitted that paragraphs 91, 92, 95
and 96 thereof did not support the broader proposition advanced by the
Petitioner. He pointed out that in paragraphs 91 and 92, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court had rejected the Appellant’s case concerning breach because it had “never
been pleaded” and was raised only at the “fag end” of the proceedings. Similarly,
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he pointed out that paragraphs 95 and 96 concerned the Appellants’ grievance
that the Tribunal had failed to determine the Counterclaim. He submitted that the
Tribunal had held that the disputes relating to the Trade Mark Licence Agreement
and Technical Assistance Agreement were outside its jurisdiction and that any
dispute under Clause 9 of the JVA was not the case advanced by the Respondent
in their pleadings. He therefore submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court had
noted that the transcripts also disclosed that no argument had been advanced on
the said issue. This he submitted was unlike the present case, where repudiatory
breach had been expressly pleaded and put in issue.
53. In dealing with the contention that the case of repudiatory breach was
vaguely pleaded, Mr. Chinoy submitted that paragraphs 13 and 52 of the
Statement of Defence and Counterclaim set out sufficient particulars with regard
to the Respondent’s case of repudiatory breach. He submitted that these
paragraphs identified the alleged breach, namely the Petitioner’s failure to
conclude the COU, its consequence, namely the Vessel’s inability to enter the Port
and perform its fundamental obligations, and the Respondent’s acceptance of that
repudiation by terminating the Agreement. He also pointed out that the Tribunal
had not held that the case of repudiatory breach was vaguely or inadequately
pleaded. He then, from the decision in Campos Brothers Farms v. Matru Bhumi
Supply Chain Pvt. Ltd., further pointed out that the alleged insufficiency of a plea
does not justify the Tribunal’s failure to determine it.
54. Mr. Chinoy then addressed the contention that the Tribunal’s finding
under Section 14(a)(vi) necessarily disposed of the case of repudiatory breach. He
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submitted that while the former, i.e., material breach, concerned whether the
COU was required by Indian law, the latter, i.e., repudiatory breach, concerned
whether the vessel's inability to enter the port and perform the services
contemplated by the Binding Agreement constituted a fundamental breach of the
Petitioner’s obligations, which would entitle the Respondent to terminate the
Binding Agreement under common law, irrespective of whether the COU was a
statutory requirement under Indian law. He pointed out that the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in paragraph 83 of Vijay Karia, held that the failure to determine
a material issue that goes to the root of the matter would, in an appropriate case,
shock the conscience of the Court.
55. He also placed reliance upon the decision in Santa Sila Devi v. Dhirendra
Nath Sen to point out that, while ordinarily, silence on a claim amounts to an
adjudication against such a claim, the Court recognised the exception that this
was so only when “the matter so set up from its nature requires to be specifically
adjudicated upon”. He submitted that repudiation, being an independent and
alternative ground for termination, clearly fell within this exception.
56. Mr. Chinoy then submitted that the Petitioner’s reliance upon Sections
57(3)(b) and 73 of the English Arbitration Act was misplaced. He placed reliance
30
to submit that
upon the decision of Torch Offshore LLC v. Cable Shipping Inc.
Section 57(3)(b) of the English Arbitration Act permitted an additional award in
respect of a claim that had not been decided by a Tribunal. He, however,
submitted that the issue at hand was entirely distinct from the failure of a
30 [2004] EWHC 787 (Comm).
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Tribunal to consider as an issue arising within a claim or defence, the latter being
separately addressed by Section 68(2)(d) of the English Arbitration Act. He
submitted that since repudiatory breach was an issue concerning the validity of
the Respondent’s termination and not an independent claim, recourse to Section
57(3)(b) of the English Arbitration Act was unavailable to the Respondent, and he
also submitted that Section 73 of the English Arbitration Act was equally
inapplicable, since the Respondent could not reasonably have known, before the
Final Award was rendered, that the Tribunal would have failed to determine the
issue of repudiatory breach.
57. Mr. Chinoy submitted that the contention that the Respondent’s failure to
challenge the Final Award before the English Courts precluded the Respondent
from resisting its enforcement was entirely untenable. He placed reliance upon
the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Government of India v. Vedanta
Limited to point out that (i) enforcement is a subsequent and distinct proceeding
from proceedings to set aside an award at the seat; (ii) the enforcement Court
exercises a “secondary” or “enforcement” jurisdiction to determine recognition
and enforceability of the Award; and (iii) an enforcement court independently
examines objections under Section 48 and is not constrained by the findings of
the Courts at the seat.
58. He therefore submitted that even where the seat Court had upheld an
award, the Courts in India can independently determine whether enforcement
would offend the public policy of India. Mr. Chinoy submitted that the decision of
Nagaraj V. Mylandhu v. PI Opportunities Fund-I, relied upon by the Petitioner, in
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fact supported the Respondent. He pointed out that while paragraph 57 of the
said decision held that a party could not reopen, before the enforcement Court,
factual issues argued on merits which had been determined by the seat Court,
paragraph 76 made specifically clear that such transnational issue estoppel did
not extend to objections founded upon public policy. He submitted that such
objections, following the approach of the Singapore Court of Appeal in Republic
of India, remained open to consideration by the enforcement Court
notwithstanding a decision of the seat Court upholding the award. He submitted
that this was also the approach adopted by this Court in Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi
S.R.I. v. Vijay Karia.
59. Mr. Chinoy submitted that the other authorities relied upon by the
Petitioner, namely POL India Projects Ltd. v. Aurelia Reederei Eugen Friederich
GmbH, Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd. v. Orient Ship Agency (P) Ltd. and HSBC PI
Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. were all distinguishable since
all those cases concerned jurisdictional objections relating to the existence or
scope of the arbitration agreement or the composition of the Tribunal. He
submitted that such objections were governed by the law of the seat and were
materially different from an objection founded upon public policy.
60. He submitted that this distinction between jurisdictional and public-policy
objections was recognised in Vijay Karia, which held that a prior challenge before
the seat Court was not a precondition for resisting enforcement in India on
public-policy grounds. He pointed out that the decision of Cruz City 1 Mauritius
Holdings v. Unitech Limited also did not assist the Petitioner since the Delhi High
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Court in that case held that failure to challenge an award before the Court of the
seat did not, by itself, preclude a party from resisting enforcement in India. In any
event, Mr. Chinoy submitted that the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Vedanta, recognised that the enforcement Court exercises an independent
jurisdiction in determining whether a foreign award is enforceable in India.
61. Finally, Mr. Chinoy submitted that the decision of this Court in Neilan
International Co. Ltd. v. Powerica Ltd., was rendered in the context of a partial
award which determined the issue of jurisdiction and not a final award as in this
case. He pointed out that the decision in Naval Gent Maritime Ltd. v. Shivnath Rai
Harnarain (I) Ltd. concerned whether an award had become final and binding in
its Country of Origin. He therefore submitted that neither of the said decisions
dealt with a Tribunal’s failure to determine a material issue placed before it,
particularly one going to the validity of a party’s termination of the contract. He
therefore submitted that neither authority had any application to the
Respondent’s objection in the present case, namely, that the Final Award failed to
determine a material issue going to the validity of the Respondent’s termination.
62. Basis this, Mr. Chinoy submitted that the Respondent’s case of repudiatory
breach was a distinct and material issue which had been specifically pleaded and
placed before the Tribunal, and that the Respondent had neither abandoned it nor
had the Tribunal adjudicated upon it. He submitted that such failure went to the
root of the matter and rendered the Final Award contrary to the public policy of
India within the meaning of Section 48(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act. He thus
reiterated that the enforcement of the Final Award ought to be refused.
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Reasons and Conclusion:
63. After hearing Learned Senior Counsel for the Parties and having
considered the rival contentions and the extensive case law upon which reliance
has been placed, I find that the Petition deserved to be allowed. I say so for the
following reasons, viz.
A. It is well settled that the grounds for refusing enforcement of a foreign
award, as enumerated in Section 48 of the Arbitration Act, are exhaustive
and must be construed narrowly. Therefore, a party resisting the
enforcement of a foreign award is required to meet a very high threshold.
It is equally well settled that, when considering objections to the
enforcement of a foreign award, the Court cannot undertake a review of
the merits of such an award. In this regard, I find the Petitioner’s reliance
upon the decisions in Gemini Bay Transcription Private Limited v.
Integrated Sales Service Limited, Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI
Holdings (Mauritius) Limited, Union of India v. Vedanta Ltd., Shri Lal
Mahal Limited v. Progetto Grano SPA, Nagaraj V. Mylandhu and Vijay
Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL, to be apposite.
B. In the present case, the sole ground on which the Respondent has resisted
enforcement of the Final Award is that the Arbitral Tribunal has failed to,
in any manner, deal with the Respondent’s case of repudiatory breach,
which, according to the Respondent would go to the root of the matter. It
is thus that the Respondent has contended that the Final Award is
contrary to the public policy of India within the meaning of Section 48(2)
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(b) of the Arbitration Act and one that would shock the conscience of the
Court. Given this, in my view, three principal questions would therefore
arise for determination. First, was repudiatory breach an issue which the
Tribunal was required to determine? Second, if so, was the issue of
repudiatory breach really distinct from the issue of material breach under
Section 14(a)(vi), which the Tribunal did determine conclusively, or did it
stand or fall with the Tribunal’s finding on material breach? Third, even if
the first two questions are answered in the Respondent’s favour, would the
Tribunal’s failure to consider repudiatory breach satisfy the test for
resisting enforcement of the Final Award under Section 48(2)(b) of the
Arbitration Act.
I. Was repudiatory breach an issue which the Tribunal was required to
determine?
C. While there can be little doubt that the expression ‘repudiatory breach’
finds mention in the Respondent’s Answer to the Request for Arbitration
and the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, what really has to be seen
is whether the Tribunal was required to have specifically addressed or
returned a finding on what the Respondent now claims was its pleaded
case of repudiatory breach. In my unhesitating view, the Tribunal was not
required to do either. I say so because (i) the pleadings are entirely bereft
of any particulars or details as to what, according to the Respondent,
constituted a repudiatory breach; (ii) the issues framed by the Tribunal
make no specific reference to repudiatory breach, while specifically
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referring to material breach; (iii) the transcripts of the Respondent’s
closing arguments make it abundantly clear that no case of repudiatory
breach was even advanced before the Tribunal; (iv) if it was indeed the
Respondent’s case that repudiatory breach had been pleaded and had not
been adjudicated upon, it was open to the Respondent to have sought an
additional award from the Tribunal under Section 57(3)(b) of the English
Arbitration Act; and (v) if the Respondent’s grievance was that the
Tribunal had failed to deal with all the issues submitted to it, the
appropriate recourse was then to challenge the Final Award under Section
68(2)(d) of the English Arbitration Act, 1996. In these circumstances, it is,
in my view, wholly untenable for the Respondent to contend that the Final
Award is contrary to the public policy of India or that the Tribunal’s
failure to return a finding on repudiatory breach is such that it would
shock the conscience of this Court.
D. Additionally, even during the course of oral arguments in the present
Petition and in the Written Submissions filed to oppose the present
Petition, the Respondent has not identified any argument or case on
repudiatory breach that was advanced before the Tribunal and which,
according to the Respondent, was not considered. This, in my view, is also
telling since, if the Respondent’s case of repudiatory breach was indeed
‘alive’ and was as compelling a case as the Respondent has in these
proceedings urged it to be, surely some details of what the Tribunal had
omitted to consider would have been pointed out to this Court.
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E. I find that apart from the fact that the words repudiatory breach have
been stated in the Respondent’s pleadings and the parties’ opening
submissions, there is no submission or contention with respect to
repudiatory breach that the Tribunal has failed to consider. On the
contrary, the undisputed transcripts of the arguments before the Tribunal
are copiously silent with regard to any submission by the Respondent on
“repudiatory breach”. In fact, a perusal of the transcripts would make it
clear beyond the pale of doubt that the Respondent’s entire case before the
Tribunal was based solely on the aspect of material breach and not on
repudiatory breach as now contended.
F. Hence, for the reasons set out in (C) and (D) above, I find that a plain
reading of the decisions of JVL Agro Industries vs. Agritrade International
or BTN vs. BTP, upon which reliance was placed by the Respondent, would
show that those decisions concerned issues which had, at some stage, been
the subject of arguments before the Tribunal but were subsequently
contended to have been abandoned by reason of their omission at a later
stage. The facts of the present case are materially different. Since although
the Respondent had referred to repudiatory breach in its pleadings, the
case which was substantively developed and urged before the Tribunal
was one of material breach. The plea of repudiatory breach was neither
developed as a distinct case nor independently urged before the Tribunal.
In these circumstances, the question of the Respondent having to expressly
withdraw such a plea did not arise. I am therefore unable to accept the
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contention that the issue of repudiatory breach continued to remain “in
play” merely because it had not been expressly withdrawn.
G. If the Respondent’s case of repudiatory breach was as compelling as the
Respondent has now urged it to be, it is baffling why it was not pleaded in
detail or pressed before the Tribunal with the same seriousness as has been
done in these proceedings. Also, if the issue of repudiatory breach was
indeed so crucial to the Respondent’s case, then, in my view, it was
incumbent upon the Respondent to have sought a specific issue in that
regard to be framed by the Tribunal. It is not even the Respondent’s case
that the Tribunal was called upon to frame a specific issue of repudiatory
breach and had failed to do so.
H. In my view, the decisions in the case of RAV Bahamas Ltd. v. Therapy
Beach Club and World Trade Corporation Ltd v. Czarnikow Sugar Ltd.,
upon which reliance was placed by the Respondent would in fact assist the
Petitioner and not the Respondent. A careful reading of the said decision
would show that the relevant inquiry is whether the Tribunal’s attention
was “sufficiently clearly drawn” to the issue of repudiatory breach. This
test, in my view, would operate against the Respondent in the facts of the
present case since, although repudiatory breach was mentioned in the
pleadings and the Opening Submissions, the manner in which the
Respondent ultimately advanced its case before the Tribunal makes clear
that its arguments were confined only to the alleged material breach of
Section 14(a)(vi) and not a repudiatory breach.
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I. Equally, I find that the Respondent’s reliance upon the decisions in the
case of Vijay Karia, approving AKN v. ALC and BAZ v. BBA, to be
misplaced. The said decisions hold that the inference that an Arbitral
Tribunal has overlooked an issue must be “clear and virtually inescapable”.
The Court must be cautious in drawing such an inference where the facts
are equally consistent with the conclusion that the Tribunal did not
overlook the issue but instead regarded a different and narrower
question/issue as constituting the operative dispute and accordingly
decided the same. This is precisely what appears to have been done in the
facts of the present case since the oral arguments of both the parties
proceeded on the basis of the Respondent’s case of material breach, and
the dispute turned upon whether the requirement of a COU fell within the
ambit of Section 14(a)(vi).
J. I also find merit in the Petitioner’s contention that the principle that an
issue pleaded but not argued is one which may be treated as having been
abandoned, as held in the case of Daman Singh v. State of Punjab, Mohd.
Akram Ansari v. Chief Election Officer and Common Cause v. Union of
India. Though these  decisions were not rendered in the context of
arbitration proceedings, I see no reason why the principle laid down
therein should not apply to arbitration proceedings. An Arbitral Tribunal
cannot be faulted for not deciding an Issue which was neither adequately
pleaded nor pressed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, in the case of Vijay
Karia, in fact, held that the principle that a plea which is not pressed may
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be treated as having been abandoned would apply to arbitration
proceedings.
K. Thus, I find that the repudiatory breach was only vaguely stated and was
not adequately pleaded, nor was it even urged in the arguments advanced
on behalf of the Respondent before the Tribunal. In these facts, it cannot be
said that the Tribunal failed to consider a material issue that would shock
the conscience of this Court or that the Final Award is contrary to the
public policy of India.
II. Was repudiation, in any event, an issue distinct from Section 14(a)(vi)?
L. Even otherwise, I am not satisfied that the Respondent’s case of
repudiatory breach was genuinely independent of its case of material
breach under Section 14(a)(vi). This is, in my view, clear from the
Respondent’s own pleadings. I say so because in Answer to the Request for
Arbitration, the Respondent has alleged that the Petitioner had committed
several “fundamental repudiatory breaches”, including, apart from the
Petitioner’s failure to conclude the COU, the failure to obtain certain
statutory and customs clearances and to maintain credit support in terms
of Section 22(d) of the Binding Agreement. However, by the time the
Statement of Defence and Counterclaim were filed, these additional
grounds had been completely abandoned, and a perusal of the said
pleadings makes clear that the Respondent’s case of repudiatory breach, as
pleaded in paragraphs 13 and 52 of the Statement of Defence and
Counterclaim, rested entirely upon material breach under Section 14(a)
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(vi), namely, the failure to conclude the COU and the consequent inability
of the Vessel to enter the Jaigarh Port.
M. For the reasons set out above, I am unable to accept that a claim which, in
the Respondent’s operative pleading, has been reduced to the same
underlying factual basis as its claim of material breach under Section
14(a)(vi), can properly be characterised as a distinct case or as an issue
that required separate adjudication. Hence, in the facts of the present case
I find that the decision in the case of Torch Offshore LLC v. Cable Shipping
Inc., upon which the Respondent has placed reliance, would not apply. The
Tribunal’s findings in paragraphs 120, 257 to 262 and 267 make it
evident that it went beyond a mere determination that the COU was not a
document “required by law”. The Tribunal further found that the COU was
a contractual licence granted by JSW, to which the Petitioner was, in
substance, a stranger. Once this finding is accepted, as the Respondent
infact has, then it is not open to challenge the correctness of such finding
in the present enforcement proceedings. It therefore becomes difficult to
see how the Respondent could sustain a case of repudiatory breach on the
part of the Petitioner in respect of an obligation which, on the Tribunal’s
findings, as accepted by the Respondent, the Petitioner never owed to the
Respondent in the first place.
N. Also, in my view, the Respondent’s reliance upon the decisions in Santa
Sila Devi v. Dhirendra Nath Sen and Harrison v. Cresswick is entirely
misplaced. The former decision, inter alia, holds that, although silence in
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an award on a particular claim may ordinarily be construed as its
rejection, a separate adjudication may be necessary where the nature of
the matter so requires. This would, however, not apply since, in the
present case, both the material breach and repudiatory breach were
founded on the same underlying fact, in respect of which the Tribunal
returned a considered finding rejecting any wrongdoing on the part of the
Petitioner, leaving no separate issue requiring specific adjudication. Hence,
I accept the Petitioner’s reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Vijay Karia, which makes clear that an arbitrator is not required
to address every claim seriatim and that an award must be read as a
whole.
O. There is, in addition, a further difficulty with the Respondent’s case of
repudiatory breach, as is evident from the chronology of events which
shows that the parties continued to negotiate the terms of the COU for
more than a month after the conduct which, according to the Respondent,
constituted the basis for termination. This conduct is difficult to reconcile
with the Respondent’s assertion that the Petitioner had clearly and
unequivocally repudiated the contract. In the context of these facts, the
Petitioner has relied upon the decisions in Claude-Lila Parulekar v. Sakal
Papers (P) Ltd. and Eminence Property Developments Ltd. v. Heaney, which
lay down that repudiation requires a clear and unequivocal indication of
an intention not to be bound, which is clearly not borne out by the
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Petitioner’s conduct in the present case and is thus entirely apposite to the
facts of the present case.
III. Would the omission, in any event, meet the threshold for refusal under
Section 48(2)(b)?
P. In light of my findings on the first two questions, although it is strictly
unnecessary to determine this issue, I nevertheless consider it appropriate
to address it briefly. The Respondent has placed reliance upon the
decisions in Campos Brothers Farm v. Matru Bhumi Supply Chain Pvt. Ltd.
and I-Pay Clearing Services Pvt. Ltd. v. ICICI Bank Ltd., for the proposition
that a complete failure to determine a material issue renders an award
unenforceable, irrespective of the merits of that issue.
Q. As a matter of principle, the above proposition may be correct. The same
would not arise in the facts of the present case. The decision of Campos
Brothers concerned circumstances in which the arbitrator, on an
erroneous and factually incorrect basis, refused to consider a party’s
evidence and submissions at all in an arbitral procedure conducted solely
on written submissions and without an oral hearing. I-Pay Clearing, in
turn, concerned a challenge to a domestic award under Section 34, where
the arbitrator had awarded a substantial sum without making any finding
whatsoever on the central question of whether termination of the
underlying contract was lawful. That question could not, in any view, be
regarded as having been subsumed within another finding actually made
by the arbitrator. Neither case is comparable to the present circumstances.
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Here, the Tribunal permitted and heard full oral argument. More
importantly, for the reasons already set out, the issue said to have been
overlooked was, in substance, encompassed within and answered by the
Tribunal’s finding.
Conclusion:
64. Therefore, in light of the reasons set out from (A) to (Q) above, I find that
the Respondent has failed to establish that the Final Award is contrary to the
public policy of India within the meaning of Section 48(2)(b) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996.
ORDER
i. The Petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a) of the
Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 1110 of 2025.
ii. In view of the disposal of the Commercial Arbitration Petition,
Interim Application No. 8094 of 2025 does not survive and is
accordingly disposed of.
iii. There shall be no orders as to costs.
[ ARIF S. DOCTOR , J.]
After Pronouncement:
65. Mr. Bharucha has prayed for a stay of the operation of this Order for a
period of eight weeks. Mr. Behramkamdin has submitted that if the Court is
inclined to grant any stay, then the same would have to be in terms of the
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statement made by the Respondent as recorded in the Order of this Court dated
th
May 2026, which reads this. Mr. Bharucha submits that the statement as
4
th
May 2026 shall continue for a
recorded in paragraph 2 of the Order dated 4
period of eight weeks. His statement is accepted. Accordingly, the operation of
this Order shall remain stayed for a period of eight weeks from today.
[ARIF S. DOCTOR J.]
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