PARDEEP AMBEDKARI vs UT OF J AND K TH COMMISSIONER SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT HOME DEPARTMENT, JAMMU AND OTHERS

HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH

AT JAMMU

HCP No. 169/2025


Reserved on: 31.07.2026
Date of pronouncement: 29.08.2026
Date of uploading : 29.08.2026

Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced Full


Pardeep Ambedkari, Aged 41 years,
S/o Sh. Sansar Singh,
R/o Ward No. 07,
Village Chack Desa Singh, Kathua
Tehsil and District Kathua.
A/p lodged in
District Jail, Udhampur.

….. Petitioner(s)/Appellant(s)


Through: Mr. K. S. Johal, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Supreet Singh Johal, Advocate.

q
vs


01.UT of Jammu and Kashmir,
through Principal Secretary to Govt.
Home Department,
J&K Civil Secretariat, Jammu.

02 . District Magistrate, Kathua.

03 . Senior Superintendent of
Police, Kathua.

04 . Superintendent/In-charge,
District Jail,
Udhampur.
.…. Respondent(s)

Through: Mr. Suneel Malhotra, GA.


CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SEKHRI, JUDGE




JUDGMENT




01. Petitioner has invoked writ jurisdiction of this court for the
quashment of detention order No. PSA/176 dated 08.12.2025, passed
by respondent No. 2-District Magistrate, Kathua, [“the detaining

authority”] whereby he came to be detained under Section 8 of The
Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 ( for short, PSA).
FACTUAL MATRIX
02. Background facts of the case are that on 30.10.2025, respondent No.
3-Senior Superintendent of Police, Kathua [“the sponsoring
authority”] submitted a dossier to the detaining authority, whereby he
submitted a list of following crimes against the petitioner:
(i) FIR No. 334/2024 under Sections 126(2)/191(2) BNS of P/S Kathua.
(ii) FIR No. 37/2025 under Sections 126(2)/191(2)/270 BNS of P/S
Kathua.
(iii) FIR No. 95/2025 under Sections 126(2)/191(2)/ 351(2) and 352 BNS
of P/S Kathua.
(iv) FIR No. 486/2025 under Section 299 BNS of P/S Kathua.
(v) DDR No. 17 dated 13.10.2025 of P/S Kathua.
(vi) DDR No. 30 dated 28.10.2025 of P/S Kathua.
03. According to the sponsoring authority, in addition to the aforesaid
criminal cases and legal action against the detenue, there were several
provocative video clips made by him, those were being circulated and
becoming viral in public at large and pose a threat to communal
harmony.
04. It is allegation of the sponsoring authority that petitioner is a history
sheeter and he is known for delivering inflammatory and provocative
speeches to incite public sentiments and create disharmony and
disturbance in the public order. He has been continuously indulging in
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 2

such activities prompting and propagating feelings of enmity on
religious and caste lines to spread hatred in the area and despite
repeated warnings and legal actions, he continued to disseminate
hateful and inflammatory content through social media. Therefore, in
order to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner detrimental
to the public order and avert future law and order problem or ethno
religious violence, it was necessary to detain him under the provisions
of PSA.
05. On the basis of this recommendation, the detaining authority has
come to conclude that liberty of a citizen is required to be balanced
with communal harmony, especially when a person questions the
religious beliefs of a particular community by making derogatory
comments against “Lord Ram”. It is alleged that petitioner has shared
a video on his Facebook account in which he openly made mockery
of Hindu women observing fast on Karwachauth festival, thereby
promoting and propagating feelings of hatred and disharmony on the
ground of religion. According to the detaining authority, activities of
the petitioner are highly prejudicial to the maintenance of public order
because by delivering inflammatory speeches and spreading hatred
against revered Hindu deities and religious practices, he has created
deep resentment among members of the community. His utterances
are likely to incite disharmony, disrupt public tranquillity and
provoke violence. Actions of the detenue demonstrate and exhibit a
consistent pattern of behaviour, whereby he intentionally and
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 3

maliciously disseminate hate speeches to create disharmony and
enmity among different castes and religions. Assessment of the
detaining authority thus, leads him to conclude that it was highly
unlikely that petitioner will dissuade from anti-social activities.
Therefore, with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner
detrimental to public peace and communal harmony, impugned order
came to be passed.
GROUNDS OF CHALLENGE
06. Petitioner has assailed the impugned order inter alia on the following
grounds:
(i) That the impugned order is contrary to the basic foundation of
law and has the consequence of depriving the petitioner of his
right to life and personal liberty in a manner unknown to law.
The same, therefore, is violative of Article 14/21 of the
Constitution of India and deserves to be set aside.
(ii) That from the perusal of the impugned order and the grounds of
detention, it appears that the same is passed on the
recommendation of the District Screening Committee and the
dossier of Respondent No. 3. Perusal of the dossier would show
that the FIRs on the basis of which the petitioner is detained in
terms of Section 8 (3) of the J & K Public Safety Act are not
only vague but also stale in nature. They have no live and
proximate link with the need to pass the impugned order. In the
absence of any live and proximate link in the allegations
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 4

leveled in the FIR and the need to impose immediate detention
of the petitioner, the detention order deserves to be set aside
and quashed.
(iii) That the position of law is trite that the detention under the
draconian provisions of the Public Safety Act cannot be supper
imposed on the basis of stale allegations without establishing
the need to detain on the basis of such allegations. In the
grounds of detention, the last known FIR against the petitioner
is registered on 30.10.2025. In the said FIR, the allegations
against the petitioner are that of commission of offence under
Section 299 of the BNS. He is alleged to have outraged
religious feeling of a particular community by making
derogatory and defamatory expressions/language against “Lord
Ram”. The expression so used are alleged to have hurt the
religious sentiments of every member of Hindu community, as
such, the FIR came to be registered.
Additionally, the basis on which the detention order is
passed appears to be incorrect inasmuch as the grounds of
detention state that the petitioner is evading arrest in the FIR
and as such, it has become of utmost necessity to detain the
petitioner under the provisions of the Public Safety Act. This,
as a matter of fact, is not correct. The petitioner had
approached this Hon’ble Court by means of application for
grant of anticipatory bail being Bail App No. 326/2025. In the
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 5

said bail application, this Hon’ble Court by means of its order
dated 04.12.2025 protected the petitioner by grant of
anticipatory bail. Copy of the order dated 04.12.2025 is
enclosed herewith for facility of reference and marked as
Annexure-III .
Perusal of the order (supra) reveals that the same came to
be passed in the presence of learned counsel for the
respondents. The detaining authority thus was required to have
been aware of the said order. The very fact that the grounds of
the detention and dossier reflect that the petitioner is evading
arrest in the said FIR is incorrect premise on the basis of which
the impugned order is passed. Hence, the same deserves to be
set aside and quashed.
(iv) That otherwise too, the last known FIR registered on
30.10.2025 is stale in nature and the detaining authority with
complete non-application of mind has passed the order after the
period of two months from the last alleged FIR. In this period
of two months, what record came before the detaining authority
to compel it to pass the detention order is not coming forth.
However, the vague and unspecific DDR entries being DDR
No. 17 dated 13.10.2025 and DDR No. 30 dated 28.10.2025 are
used to source the detention order and to defeat the legal
requirement of passing the detention order on the basis of live
and proximate link of the last alleged incident. A perusal of the
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 6

DDR entries would further show that the allegations in the
DDR entries are absolutely unspecific, baseless and vague,
without there being any iota of culpability or evidence
collected to advance such culpability of the detenue. The DDR
extracts are thus not in the cogent reason to pass the order of
detention. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment passed
by this Hon’ble Court in case titled “ Kewal Krishan Vs.
Finance Commissioner ACS (Home Department)”, [ 2023 SCC
Online J & K 941 ] wherein the position, that the detention
order on the basis of unspecific and vague DDR is legally
unsustainable, is reiterated. Copy of the judgment is enclosed
herewith for facility of reference and marked as Annexure-IV .
Viewing thus, the impugned order deserves to be set aside
and quashed.
(v) That further perusal of the detention order, grounds of
detention and the dossier would show that though in certain
FIRs, the grant of bail to the detenue is reflected, however, the
bail orders are never made a part of the record and not even
referred to in the impugned order. The detaining authority was
thus neither aware of the stage of investigation nor the order of
grant of anticipatory bail to the detenue. In the absence of such
material being placed before the detaining authority much less
considered by it, the detention order deserves to be set aside
and quashed. Reliance in this regard has been placed upon the
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 7

judgment passed by this Hon’ble Court in case titled “ Manzoor
Ahmad Bhat Vs. UT of J & K & Ors .” decided on 03.05.2024
as also upon the plethora of judgments passed by Hon’ble
Supreme Court.
(vi) That the Hon’ble Supreme Court is clear that the requirement
to impose the detention order under the Public Safety Act
should be super impelling and only in such cases where the
ordinary law has shown to have failed for preventing the
detenue from acting in a manner which is otherwise prejudicial
to the maintenance of public order. In the instant case, the
detaining authority and the respondents herein without taking
recourse to the ordinary law have super imposed the detention
order. What was expected of the detaining authority and the
State functionary is that in case where the petitioner has shown
to have jumped the bail if granted or breach the bail conditions,
such orders of grant of bail was necessarily required to have
been cancelled on allegations made by the respondents before
the competent courts. In the absence of any such recourse taken
by the respondents, the imposition of the detention order under
the provisions of the Public Safety Act cannot by pass the
provisions of ordinary law. Reliance in this regard can be
placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in case titled “ V Shanta Vs. State of Telangana ” [2017
Supreme (SC) 568].
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 8

A foretari, the respondents have not even considered the
grant of anticipatory bail much less satisfied itself materially
for the grant of bail before passing the impugned order. The
impugned order, therefore, deserves to be set aside and
quashed.
(vii) That the impugned order is an exercise of complete non-
application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. The
reasoning given by the detaining authority for forming the basis
to pass the impugned order appears to one isolated incident
where alleged derogatory comments are made by the detenue
against “Lord Ram”. Allegedly, the detenue has said that “ Lord
Ram was a human and not a God. Had he been a God, Mata
Sita would have not been abducted and kidnapped by Ravan ”.
This appears to be the basis which has been captured in Video
Graphy and have allegedly caused unrest and hurt the religious
on the sentiments of a particular community. No evidence of
such religious upstream created by such statement
found/allegled against the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the
freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 (1) (a) of
the Constitution of India is a fundamental right. What had
impelled the detaining authority not to take recourse under the
ordinary law and imposing detention under the provisions of
the Public Safety Act is not coming forth. As a matter of fact,
the petitioner since is a figure of growing popularity in District
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 9

Kathua, his political rivalries including the political parties in
power have orcastrated the passing the impugned order on the
basis of unsustainable legal principles. Hence, the impugned
order deserves to be set aside and quashed.
(viii) That otherwise too, the detaining authority in terms of Section
13 of the Public Safety Act was required to disclose the
grounds of detention and explain the same to the petitioner in
the language he understands. The requirement of Section 13 is
not fulfilled by the detaining authority inasmuch as the
information of detention order is delegated by the Respondent
No. 2-District Magistrate Kathua to the Respondent No. 3-
Senior Superintendent of Police, Kathua for execution without
completely providing the material relied by it. As such, the
impugned order deserves to be set aside and quashed.
(ix) That the petitioner has though filed a representation before the
Home Department, yet, no order has been passed to the
knowledge of the petitioner much less conveyed to him
deciding the representation. The order of decision of
representation and its rejection, if any, is also assailed by
means of the present petition. The representation is made on
basis of the material which is shared with the petitioner. The
same does not qualify substantial compliance of Article 22 (5)
of the Constitution of India. Since, no order on such
representation is passed much less communicated to the
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 10

petitioner. The detention order therefore deserves to be set
aside and quashed.
07. Petitioner has prayed for the issuance of appropriate writs for the
quashment of impugned order and his consequent release from the
detention.
RESPONDENT’S COUNTER
08. Respondent No. 2-the detaining authority has opposed the present
petition, primarily on the ground that none of the legal, constitutional
or statutory right of the petitioner has been violated because
impugned order of detention was passed strictly in accordance with
law after due application of mind and upon careful consideration of
the dossier submitted by SSP, Kathua. It is reiterated that petitioner is
known for delivering inflammatory and provocative speeches, thereby
inciting public sentiments and fomenting disturbances which resulted
in serious law and order problems, prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order and tranquillity of district Kathua. Despite repeated
warnings, he has shown no inclination towards reformation and
continued to spread hatred through his speeches and social media
posts. The impugned order came to be passed after proper satisfaction
based on cogent material including multiple FIRs and relevant record,
demonstrating a consistent pattern of conduct on the part of the
petitioner to threaten public order and communal harmony.
09. It is contended that grounds of detention, detention warrant and
relevant documents, comprising 40 leaves, were not only read over
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 11

and explained to the detenue in the language which he understood,
but his signatures were obtained as a token of receipt. Petitioner and
his father namely Sansar Singh were duly informed about his
detention as also the grounds on which detention order was issued. He
was afforded a full and fair opportunity to make representation
against his detention order to the Government within the stipulated
time period. In response, he represented against his detention before
the competent authority and the Home Department vide its
communications dated 29.12.2025 and 06.01.2026 has intimated that
his representation was found without merit. The said communication
was also endorsed to Superintendent District Jail, Udhampur with a
direction to inform the detenue regarding disposal of his
representation and the Superintendent concerned vide his office letter
No. 07.01.2026 informed the detenue regarding disposal of his
representation.
10. It is contention of the detaining authority that an objective and
dispassionate assessment of criminal activities of the petitioner leads
to inescapable conclusion that there is little to no likelihood of his
being dissuaded from engaging in similar activities because he has
been actively promoting and propagating feelings of enmity and
hatred and disharmony amongst the public on the grounds of religion
and caste and he has been instigating unrest which has the potential to
culminate in riots and large scale disturbance of public order.
According to the detaining authority, petitioner has deliberately
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 12

questioned and ridiculed religious beliefs of a particular community
by making derogatory remarks against “Lord Ram” and by circulating
a video on his Facebook account, whereby he openly mocked Hindu
women observing fast on the occasion of “Karwachauth”. It is, thus
contention of the respondents that such acts of the petitioner are not
only highly provocative in nature but have the tendency to inflame
communal passions, thereby posing a grave threat to public order and
communal harmony. According to the respondents, legal action taken
against petitioner in the past under substantive laws has not proved
fruitful in deterring him from indulging in anti-social activities.
11. Respondents have prayed for dismissal of the petition.
12. Having heard learned counsels for the parties, I have gone through the
detention record.
13. Though petitioner has assailed his detention on multiple grounds
urged in the memo of petition, Mr. Johal, learned Sr. Counsel
appearing for the petitioner has restricted the challenge on the
following two grounds:
(I) Delay on the part of the detaining authority in making the order
of detention from the date of recommendation of the
sponsoring authority; and
(II) Suppression of material fact on the part of the detaining
authority that petitioner had already been admitted to pre-arrest
bail in the last criminal activity attributed to him.

HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 13

RIVAL CONTENTIONS
14. Mr. Johal, learned senior counsel at the foremost has taken a dig on
38 days delay on the part of the detaining authority in passing the
impugned order of detention from the date proposal for petitioner’s
detention was made by the sponsoring authority. Mr. Johal in his
usual vehemence would submit that such inordinate and unexplained
delay by itself is sufficient to vitiate the impugned order because the
‘live and proximate link’ between the criminal activities attributed to
the petitioner and the imperative need for his detention was snapped.
He has predominantly relied upon Sushanta Kumar Banik vs. State
of Tripura and Ors.; AIR 2022 SC 4715.
15. Mr. Suneel Malhotra, learned Government Advocate, per contra, has
relied upon Olia Mallick @ Oliruddin Mallick vs. The State of
West Bengal; (1974) 1 SCC 594 to oppose the plea. According to
Mr. Malhotra, mere delay in making the order of detention from the
date of proposal of the sponsoring authority by itself would not vitiate
the detention order.
DELAY IN THE ORDER OF DETENTION
16. Constitutional Courts of the country have consistently maintained that
prevention detention is meant to address an immediate ongoing threat
to the public order and it is not punitive in nature. It no longer
remains res integra now that the foundational legal principle to
evaluate the validity of preventive detention orders is the doctrine of
“live and proximate link”, which means that there is unbroken, logical
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 14

and timely connection between an offender’s past actions and the
proposed legal consequences. This doctrine operates on two core
principles that; (i) when State proposes to detain a citizen without
prosecution or trial with a view to prevent him from acting in any
manner detrimental to the public order and avert future law and order
problem, there must be a strong immediate connection between his
past activities and the imperative need to detain him and (ii) there is
no staleness in his past connections which is being used to justify his
detention. In other words, if a detaining authority delays too long in
passing or executing a detention order the “live and proximate link”
to the immediate threat is severed.
17. A three Judges’ Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Olia Mallick
having noticed that activities of the petitioner were extremely
dangerous and marked him out as a member of a gang indulging
systematically held that mere delay in making the order of detention
is not sufficient to hold that District Magistrate must not have been
satisfied about the necessity of the detention order. Later Supreme
Court in Rajendra Kumar Natvarlal Shah vs. State of Gujarat and
Ors.; 1988 SCC (3) 153 held that the rule as to unexplained delay in
taking action is not inflexible in respect of cases like The
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling
Activities, enacted for the purpose of effectively dealing with persons
engaged in smuggling and Foreign Exchange racketeering who,
owing to the large resources and influence have been posing a serious
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 15

threat to the economy and security of the Nation. The Apex ruled that
courts should not merely on account of delay in making of an order of
detention in such cases should assume that such delay if not
satisfactorily explained, must necessarily give rise to an inference that
there was no sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority or that subjective satisfaction was not genuinely
reached.
18. The necessity of securing arrest of a detenue immediately after the
order of detention came to be discussed in Sk. Nizamuddin vs. The
State of West Bengal; (1975) 3 SCC 395 , whereby it was held by
Supreme Court that each case depends on its own peculiar facts and
circumstances. The detaining authority may have a reasonable
explanation for the delay that might be sufficient to dispel the
inference that its satisfaction was not genuine.
19. Again, Supreme Court in Suresh Mahato vs. The District
Magistrate Burdwan and Ors.; (1975) 3 SCC 554 ruled that if there
is unreasonable delay between the date of the order of detention and
date of arrest of the detenue, such delay, unless satisfactorily
explained would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the
subjective satisfaction of the district magistrate.
20. Further, Supreme Court in Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji vs. State of
Tamil Nadu and Anr.; (1979) 1 SCC 465 observed that where delay
is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 16

recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenue in evading arrest,
there is warrant to consider the “link” not snapped but strengthened.
21. The common thread running through all the afore-quoted decisions is
that, whether delay in securing the arrest of the detenue from the
order of detention is unreasonable depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sushanta
Kumar Banik (supra) following the conspectus of its judicial
precedents rendered from time to time cautioned the detaining
authorities and the executing authorities that it was imperative on
their part to remain vigilant in passing the detention orders and
executing the same at the earliest from the date of proposal by the
sponsoring authorities because any indifferent attitude on their part
would defeat the very purpose of preventive action.
Relevant excerpt contained in para 14 of the judgment, for the ease of
reference is reproduced below:
“14. In view of the above object of the preventive detention, it
becomes very imperative on the part of the detaining authority as
well as the executing authorities to remain vigilant and keep their
eyes skinned but not to turn a blind eye in passing the detention
order at the earliest from the date of the proposal and executing
the detention order because any indifferent attitude on the part of
the detaining authority or executing authority would defeat the
very purpose of the preventive action and turn the detention order
as a dead letter and frustrate the entire proceedings.”

22. Carrying the enunciation forward, Supreme Court applied the same
principle, regarding delay between the order of detention and arrest of
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 17

the detenue, to the cases of delay in passing the order of detention
from the date of the proposal.
Relevant abstract captured in para 15 is extracted below:
“15. The adverse effect of delay in arresting a detenu has been
examined by this Court in a series of decisions and this Court has
laid down the rule in clear terms that an unreasonable and
unexplained delay in securing a detenu and detaining him vitiates
the detention order. In the decisions we shall refer hereinafter,
there was a delay in arresting the detenu after the date of passing
of the order of detention. However, the same principles would
apply even in the case of delay in passing the order of detention
from the date of the proposal. The common underlying principle
in both situations would be the “live and proximate link” between
the grounds of detention & the avowed purpose of detention.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

23. If present case is approached with the aforesaid principles enunciated
by the Apex Court, there is no doubt that there is unexplained delay
of 38 days on the part of the detaining authority in making the
impugned order of detention from the date SSP, Kathua sponsored
and recommended detention of the petitioner, which undoubtedly
severed the “live and proximate link” between his alleged criminal
activities of the past and the imperative need to detain him now.
24. The recommending officer-SSP Kathua proposed detention of the
petitioner on 30.10.2025, whereby he furnished a list of 04 FIRs and
02 DDRs against him. It is intriguing to note that the detaining
authority sat over these recommendations of the sponsoring authority
and woke up from deep slumber to pass the impugned order,
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 18

recommending detention of the petitioner on 08.12.2025. There is no
explanation worth the name forthcoming from the counter affidavit
filed by the respondents or the detention record with respect to
admitted delay of 38 days on the part of the detaining authority.
25. It is contention of the respondents that petitioner has been
continuously indulging in unlawful and anti-social activities,
prompting and propagating feelings of enmity on religious and caste
lines and spreading hatred in the area. Allegation against the
petitioner is that he is known for delivering inflammatory and
provocative speeches, thereby inciting sentiments of a particular
community to erode social harmony and create divisions within the
community. He made derogatory comments against “Lord Ram” and
also shared a video on his Facebook account in which he openly made
mockery of the Hindu women observing fast on Karwachauth
festival, whereby he promoted and propagated feelings of hatred and
disharmony on the ground of religion.
26. No doubt allegations against the petitioner are serious in nature,
however, if activities of the petitioner were so highly prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order and District Magistrate was actually
and genuinely concerned, he was expected to act with greater
promptitude in making the order of detention immediately after it was
brought to his notice and a proposal for his detention was made by the
sponsoring authority. The petitioner in such a case would not have
been allowed to remain at large for 38 days to carry on with his anti-
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 19

social activities. The detaining authority instead slept over the matter
for a considerable period and turned a blind eye in passing the
detention order against the petitioner at the earliest from the date
recommendation for his detention was made by SSP, Kathua. The
unreasonable and unexplained delay on the part of the detaining
authority to order immediate detention of the petitioner following the
proposal of the sponsoring authority, as such does not commensurate
to the fact situation of the present case. It throws a considerable doubt
not only on the genuineness of the requisite satisfaction of the
detaining authority but also on his credibility in passing the impugned
order of detention after a considerable period, which results in
snapping the “live and proximate link” between the grounds of
detention and purpose of detention. Thus, impugned order stands
vitiated and deserves to the quashed on this ground alone.
Suppression of material facts
27. Another ground urged by Mr. Johal, learned senior counsel to assail
the impugned order is that sponsoring authority is guilty of
suppression of material facts from the detaining authority that
petitioner was already admitted to pre-arrest bail by this Court on
04.12.2025 in the last FIR No. 486/2025, i.e., four days before the
impugned order came to be passed on 08.12.2025.
28. Mr. Malhotra, learned GA has vehemently argued that pre-arrest bail
order passed by this Court on 04.12.2025 was not mentioned in the
impugned order because screening committee of the district had
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 20

already submitted its report to the sponsoring authority on
30.10.2025, who on the same day made recommendation for the
detention of the petitioner.
29. It is settled proposition of law that withholding material documents
like bail applications, bail orders or bail rejection orders not only
prevents the detaining authority from applying its mind fairly but also
denies the detenue his right to make an effective representation,
which is violative of Article 22(5) the Constitution of India. Courts
have consistently maintained that preventive detention cannot be used
as a convenient shortcut to bypass the standard legal procedures like
opposing a bail plea or petitioning a Court for cancellation of an
existing bail order.
30. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sushanta Kumar Banik (supra) in a
similar fact situation has held that if relevant facts which would have
weighed the satisfaction of the detaining authority is withheld by the
sponsoring authority or ignored by detaining authority before issuing
the detention order, the requisite subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority, the formation of which is a condition precedent to
the passing of the detention order gets vitiated.
Relevant observation contained in para 26 reads as below:
“26. From the above decisions, it emerges that the requisite
subjective satisfaction, the formation of which is a condition
precedent to passing of a detention order will get vitiated if
material or vital facts which would have bearing on the issue and
weighed the satisfaction of the detaining authority one way or the
other and influence his mind are either withheld or suppressed by
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 21

the sponsoring authority or ignored and not considered by the
detaining authority before issuing the detention order.”

31. Back to the case on hand, the last activity attributed to the petitioner
is FIR No. 486/2025 with respect to an incident dated 03.10.2025.
The petitioner in the said case, in bail application No. 326/2025 came
to be granted anticipatory bail by this Court on 04.12.2025. The
impugned detention order dated 08.12.2025 is ominously silent about
this vital aspect of the matter that petitioner had already been enlarged
on bail by this Court in anticipation of arrest in the last FIR attributed
to him.
32. The sponsoring officer is legally and constitutionally obligated to
keep the detaining authority updated and informed of fresh or
subsequent developments that occur after his initial proposal and
before the detention order. Failure on his part to disclose vital new
facts that affect the grounds of detention is sufficient to vitiate the
entire preventive detention order because subjective satisfaction of
the detaining authority to curtail an individual’s liberty must be based
on a comprehensive, accurate and up to date understanding of the
facts. Detaining authority cannot legally pass a valid detention order
if it is kept in dark about some crucial events those happened after
initial proposal of the sponsoring officer.
33. Petitioner has also been branded a history sheeter in the grounds of
detention. Learned GA, during the course of arguments produced a
communication bearing No. 2124/5-1/PSK dated 28.10.2025 of SHO
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 22

Police Station, Kathua to indicate that history sheet against petitioner
came to be opened on 28.10.2025 i.e., two days before the sponsoring
authority recommended his detention.
34. A perusal of the record reveals that neither the order of pre-arrest bail
passed by this Court on 04.12.2025 nor the relevant record with
respect to opening of history sheet against the petitioner has been put
up before the detaining authority, which prevented it from applying
its mind fairly and denies the petitioner his right to make an effective
representation which amounts to infringement of Article 22(5) of the
Constitution of India.
35. There is another aspect of the matter which needs attention. This
Court while granting pre-arrest bail to the petitioner in the last FIR
attributed to him, recorded in explicit terms that “there appears to be
no necessity of the petitioner/accused in custody in connection with
investigation in the FIR” and petitioner came to be enlarged on bail
subject to various terms and conditions embodied in the order. Before
ordering preventive detention of an individual enlarged on bail on the
same allegations, the detaining authority is obliged to consider as to
whether the terms and conditions contained in the bail order were
sufficient to avoid preventive detention or insufficient to restrain him
from further involvement in similar activities and then enter any
satisfaction, howsoever subjective it is.
36. In the circumstances of the case, I find legal force in the argument of
Mr. Johal, learned Sr. Counsel that timing of the impugned PSA
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 23

detention of the petitioner just four days after he was admitted to pre-
arrest bail by this Court suggests a colourable exercise of power by
the detaining authority designed to circumvent the effect and
consequence of the bail order.
37. Thus viewed, this Court is of the considered opinion that
concealment of vital fact of a bail order by the sponsoring authority
from the detaining authority, invalidates preventive detention order
for the simple reason that this omission not only disables the
detaining authority from making a legally sound “subjective
satisfaction”, but also violates constitutional rights of the detenue. If
sponsoring authority suppresses the fact that accused was released on
bail in a previous case or in the same case the resulting detention
order is rendered illegal and is liable to be quashed.
38. Viewed from any angle the impugned order does not sustain in the
eyes of law. Hence, present petition is allowed and impugned order is
quashed. Respondents are directed to immediately release the
petitioner from detention, provided he is not involved in any other
offence.
39. Detention record be returned.





HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 24

40. Disposed of .

(Rajesh Sekhri)
Judge

Jammu
29.08.2026

Sushant

Whether the judgment is speaking? Yes
Whether the judgment is reportable? Yes
HCP No. 169/2025 Page No. 25