The Union Of India vs T.S.Anklesaria ,A Private Trust

Court
Bombay High Court

CNR No : HCBM010007221987

2026:BHC-AS:45630
1-SA-15-1987.docx


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
rrpillai
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO. 15 OF 1987
WITH
SECOND APPEAL NO. 16 OF 1987
1. The Union of India,
Secretariat New Delhi,
Summons to be served on the Secretary
Ministry of Defence, Secretariat South Block

New Delhi.
2. The Military Estate Officer,
Pune Circle, Rajendra Singhji
Road, Pune-1 … Appellants
Vs.
1. T. S. Anklesaria, a Private Trust,
Having its office at
No. 19, Right Flank Lines,
Pune No-40 by its sole Trustee.
2. Shri P. T. Anklesaria, age 58
years, residing at 19 Right
Flank Lines, Pune-40 Trustee.
(since deceased through its
Legal heirs)
2(a) Mrs. Ashish Dinyar Devitre
Daughter, No. 2 Prince of
Wales Road, Pune
2(b) Mrs. Kalomare Phiroze Anklesaria
(son) address at No. 6, Elliot
Digitally
signed by
RAJESHWARI
RAMESH
PILLAI
Date:
2026.11.18
12:30:56
+0530
Lines, Pune.
RAJESHWARI
RAMESH
PILLAI
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2(c) Mr. Mahyar Phiroze Anklesaria
(son) address at No. 17, Right
Flank Lines, Pune.
2(d) Mr. Tehmurasp Phiroze Anklesaria
(son) address at No. 19,
Right Flank Lines, Pune.
2(e) Mr. Tehmuraap Phiroze Anklesaria
(son) – Deleted as per Courts order
rd
Dated 3 February 2012 passed in
CA/611/09
2(f) Mrs. Nawaz Subhendum Sanyal
(daughter) R/at. Castellino Road
Pune.
2(g) Mrs. Mahyar Phiroze Anklesaria
(son) (No. 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) having address at
Castellino Road, Pune)
3. Mrs. Roshan Phiroze Anklesariya
Age 57, residing at 19, R.P.L.
Pune-50
4. Mrs. Ashish Dinyar Devitre
Age 34 yrs., Occupation : Household
residing at No. 19, R.F.L.
Pune-40 … Respondents
Mr. Atul Damle, Senior Advocate a/w. Mr. Rui Rodrigues, Ms.
Payal Vardhan and Mr. Jainendra Sheth for the Appellants.
Mr. R. D. Soni a/w. Mr. Sandeep Parikh, Ms. Dhanashree
Gaikaiwari and Mr. Ayaz Bilawala i/b. M/s. Bilawala & Co. for
Respondents.
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CORAM: GAURI GODSE, J.
th
RESERVED ON: 16 JULY 2026
th
PRONOUNCED ON: 18 NOVEMBER 2026
JUDGMENT :
QUESTIONS OF LAW:
th
1. The second appeals were admitted on 20 February
1987 by passing the following order :
“Admit. Notice on points 3-4-5 framed for
determination by the lower appellate court in
paragraph no. 6 of its judgment”
2. The points for determination framed in paragraph 6 of
the impugned judgment of the first appellate court read as
under :
3. Whether the suit should be brought under
Bombay Rent Act or under T.P. Act ?
4. Whether the Plaintiffs have served valid notice
on the defendant ?
5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to possession?
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BASIC FACTS:
2. The appellants are the original defendants.
Respondent No. 1 is the original Plaintiff No. 1 and is the
Trust formed by Plaintiff No. 2. The remaining respondents
are heirs and legal representatives of the original Plaintiff No.
2. By the Trial Court’s judgment and decree impugned in
these second appeals, the plaintiffs' suit is decreed, thereby
directing the defendants to hand over vacant and peaceful
possession of the suit property, and the defendants are
directed to pay Rs.8000/- by way of damages. The Trial
Court rejected the prayer for recovery of the arrears of rent.
The District Court dismissed the defendants' first appeal.
3. The plaintiffs had also filed a first appeal against the
dismissal of their prayer for arrears of rent for the period from
th th
29 December 1972 to 30 November 1980. The plaintiffs'
first appeal was partly allowed. The Trial Court’s decree, to
the extent of dismissal of the plaintiffs’ prayer for arrears of
rent, was set aside, and the plaintiffs are granted set-off from
the amount they have already received under protest
pursuant to the order of resumption passed by the
defendants. Hence, the original defendants have filed the two
separate second appeals.
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SUIT PROPERTY:
4. Land situated at Survey No. 742, admeasuring 0.85
acres, in the Pune Cantonment Area at Pune, together with
all construction, including the bungalow.
PLEADINGS IN THE PLAINT:
5. T.S. Anklesaria was the absolute owner of the suit
property. The defendants first took the suit property on hire
under The Cantonments (House Accommodation) Act, 1923
(“The Cantonments Act”), and thereafter entered into a lease
deed from time to time with the original owner. The last such
th
lease was styled as “Repairing Lease” executed on 19 April
st
1940 for a period of five years commencing from 21
February 1938. The agreed rent was Rs.167.11 per month.
st
The said lease expired on 21 February 1943. After expiry of
the said lease, the defendants became monthly tenants
under the prevailing law at that time, and monthly tenancy
nd
commenced from the 22 day of each calendar month. Thus,
the defendants continued to hold over the suit premises as
monthly tenants.
6. While the defendants were holding over the suit
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property as monthly tenants, Defendant No. 1 issued a notice
th
dated 29 January 1972, informing Plaintiff No. 2 that the
land admeasuring 0.85 acres was granted to the
predecessor in title of Plaintiff No. 2 on old grant terms and
was liable to be resumed. The defendants declared the
resumption amount for the structure and paid Rs. 29,596/-,
which the plaintiffs received under protest. After the
resumption order, the defendants stopped paying monthly
rent. The plaintiffs had challenged the said resumption notice
by filing Special Civil Application No. 1286 of 1972. The
Division Bench of this Court decided the said Special Civil
Application and held that the defendants could not act on the
resumption notice, and thus declared the resumption notice
to be without any authority of law. Therefore, the defendants
are not owners of the land.
7. The plaintiffs constructed the structure standing on the
said land, and the building was let out to the defendants on a
repairing lease. Thus, the plaintiffs are absolute owners of
the land and the structure standing thereon. By issuing the
th
resumption notice dated 29 January 1972, the defendants
renounced their original character as lessees and thus
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sought to claim a superior title. Thus, the defendants' action
amounted to a denial of the plaintiffs’ title. The plaintiffs
therefore were entitled to forfeit the amount issued under the
resumption notice and were thus entitled to recover
possession of the suit property. The plaintiffs issued a notice
th
dated 5 June 1980 forfeiting the defendants’ tenancy, calling
upon them to hand over possession of the suit property.
8. The suit structure was not maintained in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the Repairing Lease, and
the defendants' negligence and willful default caused part of
the property to collapse and be substantially damaged. The
plaintiffs therefore estimated the loss and damage caused by
the defendants' negligence. The defendants were in arrears
st
of rent of Rs. 18,536/- up to 21 August 1980, and the
plaintiffs initiated proceedings to recover possession of the
suit property, arrears of rent, and damages quantified at Rs.
12000/-. The defendants entered the property under the
Cantonments Act, and thus the provisions of the Bombay
Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
(“Rent Act”) did not apply to the defendants' tenancy. Hence,
the plaintiffs filed a suit for possession and recovery of
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arrears of rent and compensation before the civil court.
PLEADINGS IN THE WRITTEN STATEMENT:
9. The defendants filed the written statement and denied
the suit claim. They contended that, as per the General Land
Register (GLR) maintained by the defendants, the land in
question belonged to the Government (i.e., the Union of
India), and the plaintiffs were the occupancy holders of the
land. The suit property was resumed under the old grant
terms vide Government of India Ministry of Defence letter
th
dated 29 January 1972 on payment of compensation for the
structure. Further, the defendants contended that, following
the Division Bench's decision in the Special Civil Application
filed to challenge the resumption notice, they were restrained
from resuming the property; however, no decision was taken
on ownership of the land or restoration of possession. They
filed an appeal before the Apex Court, which was pending.
10. The compensation paid by the defendants was much
higher than the rent amount. The defendants were monthly
tenants of the structure, and the plaintiffs were required to
maintain the property. The defendants denied the allegation
of causing any damage and denied the claim for damages.
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The defendants contended that they owned the land and,
given the monthly tenancy of the structure, the civil court had
no jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit.
FINDINGS BY BOTH COURTS:
11. The trial court held that the civil court had jurisdiction to
try and entertain the suit and that the suit was maintainable.
The trial court further held that the defendants could not
prove that the suit land was held by the plaintiffs under the
old grant. It was held that T.S. Anklesaria was the absolute
owner of the suit property and the plaintiffs were entitled to
recover the rent. The trial court held that the defendants were
not entitled to resume the suit land on the ground that it was
situated in the cantonment area. Since the defendants
denied title and had set up a superior title, the plaintiffs were
entitled to recover possession. It held that the defendants
were to maintain the suit property under the terms and
conditions of the lease, and the plaintiffs were entitled to
recover damages. The Trial Court held that the plaintiffs
proved that the defendants first hired the suit property under
the Cantonment Act and that the Rent Act was not
applicable. The trial court held that the plaintiffs were entitled
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to recover rent, damages and possession.
12. Both parties filed separate civil appeals, which the
District Court decided by a common judgment. The learned
District Judge partly allowed the plaintiffs’ appeal, holding
that they were also entitled to arrears of rent for the period
refused by the trial court; however, it held that the amount
would stand adjusted by the compensation paid by the
defendants under the resumption notice. The First Appellate
Court held that the suit was maintainable under the Transfer
of Property Act, 1882 (“TP Act”), and that, in view of the
notice issued by the plaintiffs, the tenancy rights/leasehold
rights in favour of the defendants were terminated. The First
Appellate Court rejected the defendants’ contention
regarding their rights under the Cantonment Act, and
dismissed their appeal, confirming the trial court’s decree.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS:
13. Learned senior counsel for the appellants
(“defendants”) submitted that the suit property is situated in
the cantonment area and, under the Government General
th
Order (“GGO”) dated 6 January 1827, the land belongs to
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the Government, and the grantee had rights in the
superstructure. Thus, the suit property was held by the
plaintiffs under the Old Grant. The Grantee, Jiwajee Sooltan
th
Alee, applied on 14 February 1885 for permission to
th
construct an additional room. On 15 August 1918, T. S.
Anklesaria applied for permission to purchase the suit
bungalow from Abdul Kadar Abdul Taiyab. The plaintiffs have
th
produced the sale deed dated 6 September 1918. The
Cantonment Magistrate intimated T. S. Anklesaria that only
occupancy rights in the land had been transferred, and that
such occupancy rights were subject to the conditions
applicable to all lands in the cantonment. Thus, only
occupancy rights were transferred to the original grantee
through whom T. S. Anklesaria claimed a right in the suit
property. The defendants obtained the suit structure under a
th
five-year lease on 19 October 1929 and thereafter on a
th
monthly tenancy commencing on 4 May 1935. The structure
th
was hired under a Repairing Lease on 19 April 1938 on a
st
monthly tenancy commencing from 21 February 1938.
14. Learned senior counsel for the appellants relied upon
th
clause 5 of the Deed of the Repairing Lease dated 19 April
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1940, which provided for handing over possession to the
lessee on termination by Resumption Notice. Accordingly, a
th
resumption notice dated 29 January 1972 was issued
offering compensation. The plaintiffs had challenged the
th
notice in this High Court. By Order dated 5 February 1979,
the Division Bench declared the notice unlawful and held that
the appellants could not act on it. However, the Division
Bench did not formally quash and set aside the resumption
notice. The appellants filed a Special Leave Petition (“SLP”),
and the respondents (plaintiffs) also preferred an SLP
seeking possession. During the pendency of the appeals
before the Apex Court, the Trial Court decreed the suit,
relying on the Division Bench's findings and observations.
This Court admitted the second appeals, and they were
thereafter transferred to the Supreme Court.
th
15. By Order dated 20 July 1988, the Supreme Court
retransferred these second appeals to this Court, directing
that they be decided in accordance with the law,
uninfluenced by the findings and observations of the Division
Bench in the order deciding the challenge to the resumption
notice. The Supreme Court also retransferred the connected
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First Appeals arising out of four similarly situated separate
suits between the same parties, which had also been
transferred to the Apex Court. The Apex Court granted liberty
to lead additional evidence. Pursuant to a common order
th
dated 19 April 1991 passed by the Division Bench in the
connected First Appeals and these Second Appeals, the
appellants were permitted to lead additional evidence, and
the proceedings were transferred to the Trial Court for
recording evidence. Accordingly, the appellants led separate
additional evidence in all the first appeals and these second
appeals.
th
16. The Apex Court, by Order dated 25 March 1992,
disposed of all the appeals arising out of the Division Bench’s
th
Order as infructuous in view of the Order dated 20 July
1988. The Union of India filed a review petition, which was
th
disposed of on 13 January 1995, confirming the Order
th
dated 25 March 1992 pertaining to the present second
appeals; the said order pertaining to the other appeals was
recalled, and the appeals were directed to be listed for
th
hearing. Those appeals were disposed of on 4 August 1998
by recording the statement of the learned Solicitor General of
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India on behalf of the Union of India that it would seek
dispossession of the occupants in accordance with law. By
recording the statement, the Apex Court clarified that if such
steps were taken, the Division Bench's observations would
not stand in the way of the Union of India. In the connected
First Appeals, the plaintiffs (occupants) were in possession of
the respective properties; hence, they withdrew the
respective suits and the First Appeals were disposed of.
17. According to learned senior counsel for the appellants,
th
in view of the Order dated 20 July 1988 passed by the Apex
Court, this Court cannot rely on the Division Bench's decision
for considering the issue of title to the land in the present
second appeals. The pleadings in the written statement
regarding the applicability of the Government Grants Act,
1885, are relevant in deciding the issue of ownership over
the land and the plaintiffs’ entitlement to seek possession of
the land. In view of Sections 2 and 3 of the Government
Grants Act, 1885, the suit was not maintainable.
18. Learned senior counsel for the appellants relied upon
the Apex Court’s decision in Union of India and Another vs.
1
Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari and Others (“ Dinshaw
1 (2014) 14 SCC 204
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Shapoorji Anklesari ”), pertaining to a similar bungalow, where
the appellants had relied upon a similar entry in the GLR
showing that the land was granted under the Old Grant under
th
the GGO dated 6 January 1827. The Apex Court relied on
its decision in Chief Executive Officer vs. Surendra Kumar
2
Vakil and Others (“ Surendra Kumar Vakil ”) and held that the
Grants of land situated in the cantonment area were under
the Old Grants, which form a self-contained provision
prescribing the procedure for the grant and resumption of
land; hence, recourse to the Civil Procedure Code or the
Specific Relief Act was not applicable. The Apex Court
th
observed that in the Order dated 4 August 1998 (in the
appeals before the Apex Court arising out of the connected
First Appeals) the Apex Court had clearly indicated that the
decision of the Division Bench of this High Court holding that
the suit premises did not belong to the Union of India was not
acceptable to the Apex Court. It was held that the land
belonged to the Union of India and it had the right of
resumption.
19. As per the plaintiffs’ pleadings, the defendants last held
th
the suit bungalow under the Repairing Lease dated 19 April
2 (1999) 3 SCC 555
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st
1940 for a period of five years commencing from 21
February 1939. The said lease was not extended further, and
according to the plaintiffs, the defendants continued as
monthly tenants. The plaintiffs have therefore also prayed for
recovery of rent. Learned senior counsel for the appellants
submitted that the Rent Act was extended to the Pune
th
cantonment area by notification dated 27 December 1969
under the provisions of The Cantonments (Extension of Rent
Control Laws) Act, 1957. Hence, based on the plaintiffs'
pleadings, the dispute was between the landlord and the
tenants relating to recovery of rent and possession. Hence,
the dispute, as pleaded by the plaintiffs, falls within the
purview of Section 28 of the Rent Act, which confers
exclusive jurisdiction on courts established under the said
Act. Accordingly, the civil court’s jurisdiction is barred, and
the provisions of the TP Act do not apply to the present suit
for maintaining the suit in the Civil Court.
th
20. The Trial Court referred to the letter dated 28 October
1927 to hold that the suit property was first hired under the
provisions of the Cantonment Act; however, the letter does
not refer to that Act. Plaintiff No. 2, in his cross-examination,
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admitted that the suit was filed based on the Repairing Lease
and not a lease under the Cantonment Act. Learned senior
counsel for the appellants relied upon the terms and
conditions of the Repairing Lease, which does not refer to
the Cantonment Act. Hence, he submitted that the trial
court's finding that the Rent Act would not apply was
erroneous and that, in the absence of any prayer for a
declaration of title, the suit simpliciter for possession and
arrears of rent was not maintainable.
21. According to the learned senior counsel for the
appellants, the first appellate court has wrongly held that
there was no dispute that the defendants, under the powers
vested under the Cantonment Act, entered into
communication with the plaintiffs. However, the plaintiffs
failed to prove that the property was taken under the
provisions of the Cantonment Act. The plaintiffs have not
challenged the appellate court's finding that the TP Act would
apply. However, under Section 2 of the Government Grants
Act, 1895, the TP Act cannot be applied to the suit property.
Hence, in view of these findings, the first question of law
must be answered in favour of the appellants, and the suit
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deserves dismissal.
22. On the point of service of valid notice to the
defendants, learned senior counsel for the appellants
th
submitted that the plaintiffs relied on the notice dated 5 June
1980 issued under Section 80 of the CPC and Sections 106
and 111 of the TP Act. However, the TP Act would not apply
to the suit property in view of the Government Grants Act,
1885. Without prejudice to the appellants’ contentions, if the
plaintiffs’ case is admitted, the subject matter of the suit falls
within the scope of the Rent Act. Hence, the notice issued
under the provisions of the TP Act cannot be accepted as
valid notice for maintaining the suit.
23. The first appellate court erroneously held that the
notice was also given under section 111(g) of the TP Act and
the Court was concerned with the notice under Section 106
of the TP Act; hence, the defendants’ possession was that of
a tenant holding over the property. Learned senior counsel
for the appellants, however, submitted that, since the initial
lease was under the Repairing Lease and not under the
Cantonment Act, the provisions of the Rent Act would apply,
and the question of seeking possession by relying on the TP
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Act would not arise. Hence, the second question of law must
also be answered in favour of the appellants by holding that
no valid notice was issued to maintain the suit.
24. As regards the third question of law on the plaintiffs’
entitlement to possession of the suit property, learned senior
counsel for the appellants submitted that the land belongs to
the Central Government and was granted on the Old Grant
terms, with occupancy rights granted only to the grantee, i.e.,
the predecessor-in-title of plaintiff no. 2. To establish the
ownership, learned senior counsel for the appellants relied
upon the GLR entry stating that the landlord is the Central
Government and the property is managed by the Military
Estate Officer. The Cantonment Land Administration Rules,
1937 (“Cantonment Rules”) provide that the General Land
Register is maintained of all the lands in the cantonment.
Thus, according to the learned senior counsel for the
appellants, the trustees of the T.S. Anklesaria Trust hold only
occupancy rights. In view of the nature of the occupancy
rights under the old grants, the plaintiffs were not entitled to
maintain the suit on the ground of termination of lease.
25. As to the structure, the documents on record establish
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that the plaintiffs constructed it only based on the occupancy
rights granted by the Central Government. To support his
submissions, learned senior counsel for the appellants relied
on the extract of the GLR at Exhibit 55, which records the
suit land as ‘Class B-3’ and the plaintiffs’ names as holders of
occupancy rights and the nature of holding on Old Grant
th
conditions of GGO dated 6 January 1827 (Exhibit 226). The
th
application dated 14 February 1885 by the original grantee
seeking permission to construct an additional room, and the
order passed below it at Exhibit-139, also refer only to the
occupancy rights in the land and the Government’s right of
resumption. Learned senior counsel for the appellants
interpreted Exhibit-139 to mean that the Government
retained the power of resumption on one month’s notice and
on the condition that the structure could not be transferred
without the Government's permission. Hence, according to
learned senior counsel for the appellants, the original grantee
could have sold only the right of occupancy, and the Union of
India's ownership rights were not affected, as the occupancy
rights were the only rights granted to the original holder.
26. Learned senior counsel for the appellants further relied
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upon four documents produced during the recording of the
additional evidence. He submitted that the documents
produced while recording additional evidence would support
the appellants’ contention that the Central Government owns
th
the land. The additional documents are a letter dated 15
August 1918 by T. S. Anklesaria informing the Cantonment
Committee of his willingness to purchase the suit bungalow,
along with the necessary undertaking, a letter by the
Cantonment Magistrate, informing that only an occupancy
right in the land has been transferred subject to conditions to
all lands in the Cantonment, a release deed between the
predecessor-in-title of T. S. Anklesaria and his sister which
also stated that only occupancy right in the land has been
transferred subject to the conditions applicable to all lands in
the Cantonment.
27. Learned senior counsel for the appellants also relied on
the cross-examination of plaintiff no. 2, regarding admissions
that the notices and letters issued by the defendants do not
show that they were issued under the Cantonments Act.
According to learned senior counsel for the appellants, the
plaintiffs never applied to correct the entries in the GLR.
Hence, in view of the entries in the GLR, the other
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documents and the plaintiffs' admission in cross-examination,
would squarely show that the land belonged to the Central
Government and that the structure was constructed by the
original holder, i.e., the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-title, under
the occupancy rights granted by the Central Government.
28. In view of the orders passed by the Apex Court,
learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that the
findings recorded by both courts on the resumption notice
cannot be considered, and this Court needs to examine the
evidence and the additional evidence regarding the
ownership rights claimed by the appellants. With reference to
the challenge to the resumption notice, he relied upon the
th
order passed by the Apex Court on 20 July 1988. By the
said order, the Apex Court had transferred back the second
appeals with a direction that, while considering the second
appeals, the findings recorded by both the courts based on
the order passed by the Division Bench shall not be
considered, and the appeals are required to be decided
uninfluenced by the observations made by the Division
Bench. Hence, learned senior counsel for the appellants
submitted that, in the present second appeals, the issue of
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ownership needs to be considered independently of the
Division Bench's observations relied upon by both courts.
29. As to the land, the defendants have retained ownership
rights, and the plaintiffs were not entitled to seek possession
of the land. As to the structure, the plaintiffs took no action
under the Rent Act; thus, in the civil suit claiming absolute
ownership rights in respect of the land and the structure, the
plaintiffs would not be entitled to seek possession in the
absence of any supporting title documents. Both courts have
th
relied upon the sale dated 6 September 1918 (Exhibit 137)
entered into between T. S. Anklesaria and the original
grantee. However, the evidence would show that T. S.
Anklesaria was informed that only occupancy rights in the
land had been transferred. He thus submitted that the said
sale deed would not confer any ownership rights in the land
on the plaintiffs, as it does not record any source of title of
the predecessor-in-title of T. S. Anklesaria. Learned senior
counsel for the appellants therefore submitted that the
questions of law be answered in favour of the appellants and
both the second appeals be allowed by dismissing the
respondents’ suit.
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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS:
30. Learned counsel for the respondents (“plaintiffs”)
interpreted the order passed by the Apex Court to mean that
the resumption notice stands cancelled in view of the order
passed by the Division Bench of this Court and confirmed by
the Apex Court. Hence, so far as the issue of ownership of
the land is concerned, the appellants are not entitled to
reagitate the same. In view of the Apex Court’s directions,
the present second appeals are to be decided independently
of the findings recorded by both courts, which relied on the
Division Bench's observations.
31. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the suit
is filed for eviction under the provisions of the T. P. Act. The
plaintiffs pleaded that they own the suit property and
th
acquired their rights by a registered sale deed dated 6
September 1918 from one Abdulkadar Bohri. The sale deed
is produced at Exhibit 137, which supports the plaintiffs’ case
of absolute ownership. The plaintiffs have further pleaded
that they leased out the suit property to the defendants under
the provisions of the Cantonment Act. Hence, the civil court
had jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit. The plaintiffs
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th
issued the notice of termination dated 5 June 1980 under
Section 106 read with Section 111 of the TP Act. Thus, in
view of the determination of tenancy under the said notice,
the defendants were not entitled to retain possession of the
suit property.
32. To support his submissions on the applicability of the
Cantonment Act, he relied upon the definition of (“house”)
and the conditions under which the lease document was
executed in respect of the structure. The learned counsel for
the plaintiffs relied on the procedure described under Section
7 of the Cantonment Act to support the execution of the lease
th
document under the Cantonment Act. By letter dated 18
July 1929, the Authority, exercising powers under Sections 6
and 7 of the Cantonment Act, called upon the plaintiffs to
execute a lease of the suit bungalow for five years. He
submitted that a comparison of the contents of the Repairing
Lease and the provisions of the Cantonment Act would show
that the agreement executed in favour of the defendants falls
within the purview of Sections 6 and 7 of the said Act, read
with the definition under Section 2.
33. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs further submitted that
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the suit land admittedly is situated within the Cantonment
area and comes within the jurisdiction of the Union of India,
Ministry of Defence. Hence, the Central Government has
exclusive rights to deal with the cantonment areas.
th
Accordingly, by notification dated 27 December 1969, it was
notified that the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Cantonment
Act stood substituted in respect of the cantonment areas
under the control of the Ministry of Defence, Government of
India. Hence, the provisions of the Rent Act were not
applicable to the suit property.
34. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs further submitted that
the defendants never pleaded that the provisions of the Rent
Act would apply. However, the defendants pleaded that the
suit was not maintainable under the provisions of the TP Act
in view of the Repairing Lease executed in favour of the
defendants. Thus, even as per the defendants' pleadings,
the source of the defendants' possession was the Repairing
Lease, which clearly appears to have been executed under
the provisions of the Cantonment Act.
35. To support his submissions that the defendants'
authority to occupy the suit property was only a Repairing
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Lease, learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied on three lease
deeds produced on record. The last and third lease deed
th
dated 19 April 1940 contained the same terms and
conditions as the first two deeds, except for the title of the
deed as a Repairing Lease. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs
therefore submitted that the change in the nomenclature of
the title of the document would not change the relationship
between the parties as landlord and tenant. All three lease
deeds produced on record were in accordance with the
procedural terms and conditions prescribed under the said
Cantonment Act. Hence, there is no question of applicability
of the provisions of the Rent Act. Learned counsel for the
plaintiffs submitted that the lease term expired by efflux of
time and was not renewed. Hence, the plaintiffs were entitled
to seek possession on the ground of termination of the lease
in favour of the defendants.
36. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs further submitted that
the defendants have relied upon the resumption notice and
claimed a superior title to the land. The defendants
contended that the land was granted under the old grant to
the plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-title; however, they have not
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proved this by producing any documentary evidence. The
defendants would therefore forfeit their rights under the lease
deed in view of Section 111(g)(2) of the TP Act. Learned
counsel for the plaintiffs therefore submitted that the GLR
relied upon by the defendants would not change the original
character of the land which was always owned by the
plaintiffs’ predecessors in title. In the absence of specific
pleadings and supporting evidence, the defendants are not
entitled to rely on the documents for the first time in the
second appeal to contend that the land belonged to the
defendants as absolute owners. He submits that the plaintiffs
had purchased the property in 1918 by way of a registered
sale deed. The defendants did not produce the entries in the
GLR for the period from 1918 to 1932. Learned Counsel for
the plaintiffs referred to the cross-examination of the
defendants’ witness while recording additional evidence. He
submitted that the witness admitted that the entries prior to
1932 were not available to support the defendants’ title.
Thus, the defendants’ claim based on the entries in the GLR
prior to the title document in favour of the plaintiffs would not
be consequential.
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37. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied upon Section
18 of the Cantonment Act. According to him, the Government
Grants Act, 1885 is repealed, and the savings clause would
not help the appellant, as the Union of India has not filed any
suit. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied on Section 116
of the Evidence Act and submitted that a tenant in
possession of the demised premises is estopped from
questioning the landlord's title as long as the tenant does not
surrender possession of the demised premises. In the
present case, the defendants must first surrender possession
and then file a suit for declaration of title. To support his
submissions, learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied upon the
Apex Court’s decision in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs D.
3
Raghukul Pershad (Dead) by Lrs. And Others (“ D.
Raghukul Pershad ”). The Apex Court held that no relief of
declaration of title can be sought in a suit for eviction, and the
lessee must first surrender possession and then file a suit for
declaration of title.
38. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs therefore submitted
that, irrespective of the efforts made pursuant to the
resumption notice and assuming, without admitting, that the
3 (2012) 8 SCC 584
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resumption notice subsists as on date, the same would not
confer any absolute title on the defendants in the absence of
any title document. He therefore submitted that, in the
absence of any right, title, or interest pleaded and proved by
the defendants in respect of the land and the structure
standing thereon, the findings recorded by both courts in
favour of the plaintiffs would not warrant any interference in
these second appeals.
39. The findings of fact in respect of the plaintiffs’ title,
recorded concurrently, cannot be reappreciated in the
second appeals, except for the additional documents
produced on record pursuant to the Apex Court’s order. To
support his submissions, learned counsel for the plaintiffs
relied upon the Apex Court’s decision in Santosh Hazari vs.
4
Purushottam Tiwari (“ Santosh Hazari ”). He further submitted
that none of the documents produced by way of additional
evidence supports the defendants’ contention of absolute
ownership. Hence, the questions of law framed by this Court
regarding the points for determination framed by the first
appellate court must be answered in favour of the appellants.
40. The findings recorded by both courts are not based
4 (2001) 3 SCC 179
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solely on the observations of the Division Bench while
deciding the challenge to the resumption notice. Hence,
irrespective of those findings, the plaintiffs have proved
absolute title to the suit property. Once the defendants’ rights
under the Repairing Lease come to an end by efflux of time
and the lease is not renewed, the defendants are not entitled
to retain possession of the suit property.
41. Learned Counsel for the plaintiffs submitted that the
defendants had challenged the order passed by the Division
Bench in the connected first appeals. However, a statement
was made on behalf of the defendants and the appeals were
disposed of. Thus, the Apex Court recorded no finding on the
merits. The connected first appeals and the present second
appeals were retransferred to this court for decision on
merits without considering the observations of the Division
Bench, in the order deciding the challenge to the resumption
th
notice. The final order dated 4 August 1998 passed by the
Apex Court in the connected appeals clearly recorded the
learned Additional Solicitor General’s statement that the
Union of India would take possession of the subject premises
by initiating appropriate proceedings. However, no
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proceedings have been initiated in respect of the similarly
situated premises.
42. The provisions of the Cantonment Land Administration
Rules, 1937, and the Military Land Manual would be relevant
for adjudication of the issue of title. Section 18 of the Act
provides for issuing notice of devolution of interest in a house
in a cantonment. From these provisions of the said Act, it is
clear that only a notice is required to be given to the
Cantonment Authority of any transfer in respect of the
property situated in the Cantonment area. The Military Land
Manual states that land classified as B3 is not Crown
property. Hence, the entries in the GLR do not support the
defendants’ contention of absolute ownership in the suit land.
43. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied upon the Apex
Court’s decision in Kaikhosrou (Chick) Kavasji Framji and
5
Anr. Vs Union of India and Anr. (“ Kaikhosrou ”). The Apex
Court held that the Union of India could not resort to a
summary procedure for eviction in view of the statement
made by the learned Additional Solicitor General before the
Apex Court. The Apex Court also observed that the question
of declaration of ownership can be decided by the civil court
5 (2019) 20 SCC 705
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alone and not in summary proceedings. The decision of
Dinshaw Shapoorji relied upon by the learned counsel for
the appellants pertains to distinct facts and therefore would
not apply to the present case. In that decision, the Apex
Court considered the terms of the lease deed and the
lessor's admission certificate, and, on the facts, held against
the lessor and in favour of the Union of India. Even
otherwise, in view of the subsequent decision in Kaikhosrou,
the issue is settled regarding the fact that the Union of India
is required to file a suit for declaration of title and the lessor
cannot be dispossessed in summary proceedings.
44. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied upon the
sequence of orders passed by this Court and the Apex Court.
He submits that despite the additional evidence produced by
the defendants, they cannot prove absolute title over the land
and the structure thereon. He therefore submits that the
questions of law must be answered in favour of the plaintiffs
and the impugned judgments and decrees must be
confirmed by dismissing the second appeals.
CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS:
45. A perusal of the pleadings shows that the suit is filed on
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the ground of absolute ownership of the land and the
bungalow constructed thereon. According to the plaintiffs, the
defendants occupied the suit property in view of the
leasehold rights created under the provisions of the
Cantonment Act. Hence, according to the plaintiffs, the Rent
Act is not applicable to the defendants’ tenancy. Hence, the
civil court had the jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit.
The plaintiffs pleaded the cause of action, stating that the
monthly tenancy was terminated by a statutory notice dated
th
5 June 1980. Because the defendants failed to comply with
nd
the notice, the cause of action arose on 22 August 1980 for
seeking possession, arrears of rent, and damages.
46. The defendants claim absolute ownership of the suit
land and contend that only occupancy rights in the suit land
were granted on an old grant basis to the predecessor-in-title
of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-title constructed
the structure, and the defendants were granted possession
of the structure on the terms and conditions of the lease
agreement. Thus, the defendants claim absolute ownership
over the suit land and rights under the lease agreement in
the suit bungalow. In view of the payment of compensation of
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Rs. 29,596/- under the resumption notice, the defendants
contended that no cause of action arose on the ground of
non-payment of the building's monthly rent.
47. The first question of law is “ Whether the suit should be
brought under Bombay Rent Act or under T.P. Act ? ”. To
decide the first question of law, it is necessary to examine the
pleadings in the plaint. According to the plaintiffs, the first
th
lease dated 19 October 1929 was executed under the
provisions of the Cantonment Act. In paragraph 4 of the
plaint, it is pleaded that the last lease document styled as the
st
repairing lease, which commenced on 21 February 1938 for
st
five years, ended on 21 February 1943. It is further pleaded
that no fresh lease was entered into, and thereafter the
defendants became monthly tenants of the plaintiffs; hence,
the defendants continued to hold over the property as
monthly tenants. The plaintiffs have described the suit
property as the land and the bungalow. The pleadings
regarding the lease documents relate to the entire suit
property, that is, the land and the bungalow. Hence, on a
plain reading of the plaint, the plaintiffs claim a landlord-
tenant relationship between the parties. However, the
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plaintiffs claimed that, as the defendants entered into the suit
property under the provisions of the Cantonment Act, the
Rent Act did not apply and, therefore, the civil court had
jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit.
48. Section 3 of the Cantonment Act provides for the
Central Government to issue a notification declaring the
operation of the said Act in any Cantonment or part of the
Cantonment. In the present case, it is undisputed that the
Cantonment Act is applicable to the area where the suit
property is situated. Chapter III of the Cantonment Act
provides for appropriation of houses. Under Section 5, when
a military officer cannot secure suitable accommodation in
the cantonment on reasonable terms by private agreement, a
house situated in a Cantonment shall be liable to
appropriation by the Central Government on a lease, in the
manner and subject to the conditions provided under the Act.
Section 6 sets out the conditions under which houses may be
appropriated to enforce the liability under Section 5 and,
accordingly, requires notice to be served on the owner of a
suitable house for occupation by a military officer or a military
mess, as the case may be, within the Cantonment. Section 7
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provides for the procedure for taking the house on lease. The
th
letter dated 18 July 1929, at Exhibit 64, is a notice to the
owner calling upon him to execute a five-year lease deed.
th
The lease document dated 19 October 1929 at Exhibit 127
contains the conditions contemplated under Section 7 of the
Cantonment Act. Thus, the plaintiffs' submissions that the
th
lease document dated 19 October 1929 at Exhibit 127
between the parties was executed as prescribed under
Sections 6 and 7 of the Cantonment Act have substance.
49. However, nothing is on record to show that the
th
subsequent agreements dated 10 August 1935 at Exhibit
th
130 and the Repairing Lease document dated 19 April 1940
at Exhibit 62 were executed in accordance with the
procedure prescribed under Sections 6 and 7 of the
Cantonment Act. Therefore, the said subsequent agreements
appear to have been privately executed.
50. In exercise of powers conferred by Section 3 of the
Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act 1957, the
th
Central Government, by notification dated 27 December
th
1969, published in the Gazette on 29 December 1969,
extended the Rent Act to all the cantonments in the State of
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Maharashtra, except the Cantonments of Aurangabad and
Kamptee, with modifications to Sections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of
the Rent Act. The exemption provision contained in Section
4(1) of the Rent Act was substituted as under;
“(1) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to –
(i) any premises within a cantonment belonging to
the Government or Cantonment Board;
(ii) any tenancy or other like relationship created by
a grant from the Government in respect of
premises within the Cantonment, taken on lease
or requisitioned by the Government; or
(iii) any house within a cantonment, which is, or may
be, appropriated by the Central Government on
lease under the Cantonments (House-
Accommodation) Act 1923, (6 of 1923)” .
51. Thus, in view of the substituted Section 4(1)(ii) of the
Rent Act, nothing contained in the Rent Act shall apply to any
tenancy or like relationship in respect of premises within the
Cantonment taken on lease by the Government. Accordingly,
in view of the substituted exemption clause, the Rent Act
does not apply to the suit property.
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52. It is necessary to discuss the second part of the first
question of law regarding the TP Act, together with the
second question of law, that is, “ Whether the Plaintiffs have
served valid notice on the defendant?”, and the third question
of law, that is, “ Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
possession?”.
53. As far as ownership of the land is concerned, both
parties claim absolute ownership. The plaintiffs have filed the
suit based on absolute ownership of the land and the suit
th
bungalow. The plaintiffs rely on the sale deed dated 6
September 1918 at Exhibit 137 to claim absolute ownership
of the land and the structure. However, the sale deed does
not refer to any source of title to the suit land in favour of the
plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-title. Even if the sale deed records
that the vendor is the owner of the suit land and the suit
bungalow, the sale deed would transfer only the vendor's
valid title and nothing more.
54. The extract of the GLR at Exhibit 55 refers to the suit
land as Class B-3 and the names of the plaintiffs are entered
as holders of occupancy rights. The holders’ rights are
th
described as an old grant under conditions of GGO dated 6
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th
January 1827. The GGO dated 6 January 1827 is also
produced at Exhibit 226, which provides that any permission
to erect a house on the ground within the military
Cantonment confers no right of property in the ground
allotted for that purpose, and that the property continues to
be the property of the State and is resumable at the pleasure
of government.
55. The Military Lands Manual defines the Class B lands in
Rule 8. The Class B-3 is defined as under:
“Class “B” (3) land .- Land, hereinafter called Class “B” (3)
land, which is granted to any private person under the
provisions of these rules, or which has been granted in the
past to any private person, or may be presumed to have
been so granted, under the provisions of the Cantonment
Code of 1899 or 1912 or under any executive orders,
previously in force, subject to conditions under which the
Government of India reserve, or have reserved to
themselves the proprietary rights in the soil”
56. Rule 8 (ii) of the Manual further explains the reason for
the classification as under:
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“(ii) It must be clearly understood that the mere classification
of land in Class ‘B’ (3) does not prove that the land is the
property of the Crown. The definition of Class ‘B’ (3) land
has been so drafted as to enable the Military Estate Officer,
in conformity with the legal presumption quoted in the
introduction to the commentary, to place provisionally in that
Class all land the title to which is disputed by private parties,
provided that there are any grounds for presuming that it
originally formed the subject of a Government grant under
the terms of which the Government retained proprietary
rights in the soil. In certain cantonments there are areas of
admittedly private land. In such circumstances, and in the
exceptional cases where it is definitely known that the
Government of India can claim no proprietary rights, the land
must be classed as ‘private’; but Military Estate Officers will
naturally be careful not to class land as private, except upon
the fullest and most careful consideration of all the facts of
the case.”
57. In the present case, the plaintiffs never challenged the
entry in the GLR classifying the land as Class B(3). Rule 8(ii),
as reproduced in the above paragraph, clearly explains that
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where it is definitely known that the Government of India can
claim no proprietary rights, the land must be classed as
‘private’. In the present case, the land is not seen classified
as private, and the GLR entry classifies the land as Class
B(3). Learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that since
the GLR extract prior to the date of the plaintiffs’ sale deed is
not on record, the subsequent extract would not prove that
the land was not owned by the plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-title.
There is no substance in such argument, inasmuch as the
sale deed relied upon by the plaintiffs does not refer to a
source of valid title to the land that confers absolute
ownership on the plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-title. Hence, a
mere reference in the sale deed that the vendor, that is, the
plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-title, was the absolute owner of the
land would not confer a valid title on the plaintiffs.
58. The plaintiffs’ title to the land cannot be accepted as
absolute without any valid title document. Even after the sale
in favour of the plaintiffs, the entry in the GLR recorded the
nature of the holder's right as under the old Grant, subject to
th
the conditions of the GGO dated 6 January 1827. Thus, it is
clear that no document of title over the land in favour of the
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plaintiffs or their predecessor-in-title was produced at any
time when an application was made to make an entry in the
GLR.
59. In the present case, there is no dispute that the
plaintiffs' predecessor-in-title constructed the suit bungalow.
The permission letter at Exhibit 139 in favour of the plaintiffs’
predecessor-in-title for construction of an additional room
also refers only to the right of occupancy, which can be sold
only with the Government's sanction. The permission letter
clarifies that the Government retains the power of
resumption. The lease agreement also provides an option to
issue a resumption notice, and the lessor, i.e., the plaintiffs,
agreed to hand over possession upon expiry of the
resumption notice. The lease agreements also clarify that it
shall not affect any grant or license under which the land is
held from the Crown, including the right of resumption, if any,
under such grant.
60. I have also perused the additional documents, that is,
th
the letter dated 15 August 1918 by T. S. Anklesaria
informing the Cantonment Committee of his willingness to
purchase the suit bungalow, along with the necessary
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undertaking, a letter by the Cantonment Magistrate,
informing that only an occupancy right in the land has been
transferred, and a release deed between the predecessor-in-
title of T. S. Anklesaria and his sister, which also stated that
only occupancy right in the land has been transferred. Thus,
all these documents on record show that the land was not
privately owned and it was given on an old grant basis.
61. In Surendra Kumar Vakil , the appeals before the Apex
Court pertained to a property in Sagar Cantonment, at
Jabalpur. As per the GLR maintained under the Cantonment
Land Administration Rules of 1925, the said property was
shown as held on “old grant” terms and was described as B-
3 land. The purchaser’s construction application was
rejected, and thereafter the purchaser filed a suit for
uninterrupted use of the property and for a declaration of title.
The trial court decreed the suit, and the High Court
dismissed the appeal. Hence, the defendants filed an appeal
before the Apex Court. The question before the Apex Court
was whether the land was held on an old grant basis. The
cantonment area was governed by the general order of the
Governor-General-in-Council bearing No. 179 of the year
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1836, known as the Bengal Regulations of 1836. The Apex
Court in paragraph 10 reproduced the extract from the book
on Cantonment Laws from the High Court’s judgment, which
read as under;
“10. The High Court in its impugned judgment has
reproduced extracts from the book on Cantonment Laws by
J.P. Mittal, 2nd Edn., at p. 3, which may well be reproduced
here:
“Besides municipal administration, another subject that
has always loomed large on the cantonment horizon, is
the question of provision of necessary accommodation for
military officers near the place of their duty. This led to the
issue, from time to time, of certain rules, regulations, and
orders by the Governments of Bengal, Madras and
Bombay Presidencies between the years of 1789 and
1899. The regulations were mostly of an identical nature.
They had a twofold object in view, that of ensuring
sufficient accommodation for military officers; and that of
regulation of the grant of land sites. Some of these
regulations are published in this book. These rules,
regulations and orders continue to be the law in force in
India even after the enforcement of the British statutes
(Application to India) Repeal Act, 1960, (Raj
Singh v. Union of India[AIR 1973 Del 169] , Mohan
Agarwal v. Union of India [AIR 1979 All 170 : 1979 All LJ
304] ).
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Under these regulations and orders, officers not
provided with government quarters were allowed to erect
houses in the cantonment. For this purpose ground was
allotted to them with the condition that no right of property
whatever in the ground was conferred on them and the
ground continued to be the property of the State, was
resumable at the pleasure of the Government by giving
one month's notice and paying the value of the structures
as may have been authorised to be erected. The houses
or other property built on such grounds were allowed to
be transferred by one military officer to another without
restrictions. To civilians these could be transferred only
with the prior permission of the officer commanding the
station.
With the lapse of time civilians were also encouraged
to build bungalows on the government land in the
cantonment on the same condition of resumption of the
ground as given above and with a further condition that
they may be required to rent or sell the same to any
military officer. In case of disagreement about the rent or
the sale price, the same was to be fixed by a committee of
arbitration. These tenures under which permission was
given to occupy government land in the cantonments for
construction of bungalows came to be known as ‘old
grant’. Such permission was given mostly on payment of
no rent. This is how a large number of bungalows in the
cantonments all over India came in the hands of civilians.”
62. The Apex Court referred to the Cantonment Land
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st
Administration Rules, 1925, as amended up to 21
December 1935, framed under Section 280 of the
Cantonments Act, 1924, which govern the purpose of
maintaining the GLR and the classification of land as Class
A, Class B, and Class C. The Apex Court held that the
administration of lands in cantonment areas is regulated by
the Cantonments Act, 1924 and the Cantonment Land
Administration Rules of 1925, and the 1836 Regulations,
which expressly provided that the title to the land in
cantonment areas cannot be transferred and only occupancy
rights can be given in respect of the land which remains
capable of being resumed by the Government in the manner
set out therein. The Union of India did not produce the terms
of the old grant on the ground that they were misplaced.
However, based on the other material on record, the Apex
Court held that no document showed that the
purchaser/occupier was the absolute owner of the said land.
The Apex Court held that the Regulations and the GLR
clearly indicated that the land was held on an old grant basis;
therefore, the government was entitled to resume the land in
accordance with law. Hence, the decree was set aside.
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63. In Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari , the dispute related to a
property in Pune Cantonment, and the appellants before the
Apex Court contended that the plot was initially granted to
one Nusserwanji Sorabji Anklesaria, who erected a
superstructure and bequeathed it to his son Maneckji, whose
name was registered in the GLR. The GLR entry described
th
the property as an old grant under GGO dated 6 January
1827. No requisition under the Cantonments Act was made
to acquire the house accommodation. By executing a
repairing lease, the structure was given to the Governor-
General in Council in possession on a monthly payment.
Subsequently, an indenture of sale was executed between
the said Maneckji and two others and the plaintiffs, that is,
the respondents before the Apex Court, and it was agreed to
sell and purchase the leasehold rights being the perpetual
grant under the old grant over the suit premises, including
the bungalow, with full ownership rights of the building.
Under the old grant terms, the Union of India issued a notice
of resumption by offering compensation. Thereafter, the
respondents before the Apex Court, that is, the plaintiffs, filed
a special civil application before the Bombay High Court
challenging the resumption notice.
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64. In Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari , the Apex Court
referred to the Division Bench’s order in the present case,
which declared the resumption notice unlawful. Based on the
decision of the Division Bench, in the present case, the
special civil application in the case of Dinshaw Shapoorji
Anklesari was also allowed by the Division Bench of this
Court. Hence, the Union of India approached the Apex Court.
The Apex Court has referred to the present second appeals
and the connected first appeals transferred to the Apex Court
th
and the order dated 20 July 1988, by which the present
second appeals and the connected first appeals were
retransferred to this Court with a clarification that the issue of
title must be decided, influenced by the observations of the
Division Bench.
65. In Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari , the Apex Court also
th
referred to the Order dated 25 March 1992 disposing of the
appeals before the Apex Court as infructuous in view of the
th th
order dated 20 July 1988 and the order dated 13 January
1995, allowing the review petition, thereby modifying the
th
order dated 25 March 1992. The review order set aside the
dismissal of the civil appeals as infructuous, maintaining the
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disposal order only in respect of the civil appeals pertaining
to the present case, that is, the appeal of P. T. Anklesaria.
66. In Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari, the plaintiffs filed an
application before the Bombay High Court for possession of
the suit premises, and the Union of India was directed to
hand over symbolic possession. After the review order, the
Apex Court disposed of the appeals filed by the Union of
th
India on 4 August 1998, recording the learned Solicitor
General's statement that the Union of India would seek
dispossession of the occupants in accordance with law. The
Apex Court thus clarified that if the Union of India took such
steps, the Division Bench's observations (in the order
declaring the resumption notices unlawful) would not defeat
the Union of India's remedies. Thereafter, the respondents
before the Apex Court in Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari had
filed a suit in the Small Causes Court for possession, arrears
of rent and damages on the same grounds as are raised in
the present second appeals.

67. In Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari’s case, the trial court
held that the plaintiffs therein were only holders of occupancy
rights in respect of the land and were owners of the
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superstructure. It held that the defendants were tenants;
hence, the suit was between landlord and tenant, and the
Small Causes Court had jurisdiction to entertain, try, and
decide it. The trial court further held that merely exercising
the right of resumption did not mean the defendants had
denied the plaintiff's lease rights over the land and ownership
of the superstructure. The defendants were held entitled to
protection under Section 12 of the Rent Act, and it was held
that they were not in arrears of rent on the date of hearing of
the suit. However, the suit was decreed for possession on
the ground of breach of the terms and conditions of tenancy,
i.e., non-repair of the suit premises. The Appellate Court
confirmed the possession decree, and the Bombay High
Court dismissed the Civil Revision Application by confirming
the decree. Hence, the Union of India approached the Apex
Court in Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari.
68. In Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari, the Apex Court
allowed the Union of India's appeal and set aside the
impugned decree by dismissing the suit. The Apex Court
referred to and relied upon the decision in Surendra Kumar
Vakil and, on the available record, including the extract of the
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GLR describing the suit premises as on an old grant basis,
held that the land belonged to the Union of India and was
leased out by way of grant to the original occupier under the
th
conditions of GGO dated 6 January 1987. The Apex Court
further held that the TP Act is made inapplicable to the
Government Grants, but Section 3 of the Government Grants
Act 1895 makes it clear that the Government Grants are to
take effect according to their tenor, notwithstanding any rule
of law, statute, or enactment of the legislature to the contrary.
The Apex Court further held that the Government has
unfettered discretion and, under Section 3, may impose any
condition, limitation or restriction in its grants, and the rights,
privileges and obligations of the grantee would be regulated
only according to the terms of the grant itself, though they
may be inconsistent with the provisions of any statute or
common law. The Apex Court thus held that grants of lands
situated in cantonment areas under old grants form a self-
contained provision prescribing the procedure for the grant
and resumption of the land, and hence recourse to the Civil
Procedure Code or the Specific Relief Act will not be
applicable.
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69. With reference to the order passed by the Apex Court,
in the review petition, modifying the order, disposing of the
appeals as infructuous (in appeals challenging the Order of
the Division Bench declaring the resumption notices
unlawful), the Apex Court in Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari,
held that the liberty given to the Union of India to dispossess
the plaintiffs (occupants) clearly indicated that the decision of
the Division Bench (declaring the resumption notices
unlawful) that the premises do not belong to the Union of
India was not acceptable to the Apex Court. The Apex Court
accordingly concluded in paragraph 51 as under:
“51. The land of the suit premises belongs to the Union of
India, the appellants herein. Therefore, they cannot be held
to be the tenants of the suit premises comprising of an area
of 0.90 acres together with structure consisting of main
bungalow, servant quarters and garage. The respondent-
plaintiffs have only the right with regard to the structure built
on the suit premises. The appellant Union of India have a
right for resumption of the suit premises, as is evident from
the evidence on record as discussed above. This issue was
not properly appreciated by the trial court, the appellate court
and the High Court which also failed to notice the appellants'
right under Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act,
1895. ”
emphasis applied by me
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70. In the present case, the appellants first obtained the
th
suit bungalow under a lease agreement dated 19 October
1929 at Exhibit 127, executed under Sections 6 and 7 of the
Cantonment Act for a period of five years. Thereafter, a
th
private agreement dated 10 August 1935 was executed on
th
a monthly tenancy commencing from 4 May 1935. This
agreement specified no lease period and could be terminated
by either party on one month’s notice. The third agreement,
th
styled as a repairing lease and dated 19 April 1940, was
th
executed for a five-year term commencing on 19 April 1938
st
and ending on 21 February 1943. This agreement provided
for termination at the end of the five-year term or at the end
of any subsequent completed year of the tenancy upon
giving 6 months’ prior written notice. However, no such notice
was issued and the defendants continued in possession. The
agreement also permitted the lessee, that is, the appellants,
with an option to issue a notice of resumption. The
agreement further clarified that it would not affect the
provisions of any grant or license under which the land is
held from the Crown, including the right of resumption. Thus,
a conjoint reading of the termination clause, which requires 6
months' written notice and the option of issuing a resumption
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notice, shows that the appellants’ right to resume the suit
property, that is, the land and the structure, is protected.
71. Therefore, in view of the similar facts, as in Dinshaw
Shapoorji Anklesari , the legal principles settled by the Apex
Court squarely apply to the present case. As held by the
Apex Court, the appellants cannot be held as tenants of the
suit premises, that is, the land and the structure thereon and
that the respondents, that is, the plaintiffs, have only the right
with regard to the structure built on the suit land. The Division
Bench of this Court has declared the resumption notice dated
th
5 February 1979 unlawful on the ground that no authority
was shown to resume the property. In these second appeals,
there is no issue regarding the validity of any other
resumption notice. While retransferring the second appeals,
the Apex Court directed that the issue of title be decided,
uninfluenced by the Division Bench's observations. The Apex
Court, in Dinshaw Shapoorji Anklesari , after discussing the
order passed by the Division Bench as well as the Apex
Court in the appeals challenging the order of the Division
Bench, held in similar facts, that the Union of India cannot be
held to be a tenant and has a right to resume the suit
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property.
72. Therefore, in the similar facts of the present case, as
discussed in the above paragraphs, the material on record
shows that the land was granted on old grant terms and the
lease agreements provide an option for resumption. Since
the Union of India cannot be held as a tenant, there is no
question of terminating the tenancy by issuing notice under
Section 106 read with Section 111(g) of the TP Act. The
second part of the first question of law on the provisions of
the TP Act is therefore accordingly answered in favour of the
appellants.
th
73. The plaintiffs issued a notice dated 5 June 1980,
produced at Exhibit 59, under Section 80 of the CPC and
under Sections 106 and 111(g) of the TP Act, by alleging
non-payment of rent and termination by efflux of time. The
trial court did not address the validity of the suit notice under
Section 106 read with Section 111(g) of the TP Act. The trial
court recorded only that the notice complied with Section 80
of the CPC. The first appellate court framed a point for
determination on the validity of the suit notice and held that
after the five-year term of the repairing lease expired, the
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defendants continued as holding over under Section 111(g)
of the TP Act; hence, the 15-day notice under Section 106 of
the TP Act was valid.
74. In the present case, the lease agreement separately
regulates the termination at the end of the term or at the end
of any subsequent completed year of the tenancy, upon
giving at least six months' previous written notice of the
intention to determine the same. However, the plaintiffs did
not issue such notice, and the defendants continued to
occupy the suit property. In view of the right of resumption
under Clause 5, determination under Section 111(g)(2) does
not arise. The Division Bench declared the resumption notice
th
dated 29 January 1972 unlawful. However, in view of the
Apex Court’s order, the issue of title must be decided in the
present second appeals independently of the Division
Bench's observations and findings. Hence, even if the
resumption notice is declared unlawful by the Division Bench
of this Court, the terms and conditions of the lease
agreement providing the option for issuing a resumption are
interpreted, for the purpose of the validity of the suit notice
and the plaintiffs’ entitlement to seek possession on the
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ground of termination of the lease.
75. Although the plaintiffs contend that they accepted the
compensation without prejudice to their rights and
contentions, non-payment of monthly rent after receiving the
compensation amount does not amount to a breach of the
terms of the agreement or a valid ground to determine the
lease. The ground of efflux of time is not available, as after
the lease period expired, the defendants continued to occupy
th
the premises. The plaintiffs issued a 15-day notice dated 5
st
June 1980 and filed the suit on 1 December 1980, that is,
before expiry of the six-month period provided in the
agreement. Since the suit was filed before expiry of the six-
month period as agreed in the lease agreement, the notice
issued by relying upon Sections 106 and 111 of the TP Act
cannot be termed valid for seeking possession. Accordingly,
the second question of law is answered in favour of the
defendants by holding that the suit notice issued by the
plaintiffs is not valid.
76. In Kaikhosrou, the impugned order by the Bombay
High Court dismissed the writ petition and upheld the
st
issuance of notice dated 31 July 2001 under the Public
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Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.
The Apex Court observed that the said notice was issued
after the Apex Court passed the review order in the appeals
challenging the Division Bench’s order declaring the
resumption notices unlawful. The Apex Court referred to all
the orders mentioned in the above paragraphs pertaining to
the appeals challenging the Division Bench’s order (declaring
the resumption notices unlawful). The Apex Court also
referred to the order recording the statement of the learned
Solicitor General of India regarding taking recourse, in
accordance with law, to dispossess the occupants. Hence,
the Apex Court held that the Union of India cannot be
permitted to go back on its statement and take recourse to
summary procedure under the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act. The Apex Court held that the
th
Division Bench’s Order dated 6 February 1979 (declaring
the resumption notices unlawful) would not merge in the
th
Apex Court’s order dated 4 August 1998 (recording the
learned Solicitor General of India’s statement that recourse in
accordance with law would be taken to dispossess the
plaintiffs/occupants). Thus, this decision does not apply to
the present case, where the Apex Court directed that these
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second appeals be decided independently of the Division
Bench's observations and findings (in the order declaring the
resumption notices unlawful).
77. In D. Raghukul Pershad , the respondents before the
Apex Court filed a suit for eviction, which was decreed on the
ground that the appellants, i.e. the State Government, did not
prove title to the land. The first appellate court held that the
State Government was estopped from setting up title so long
as it had not surrendered possession of the land to the
lessees, that is, the plaintiffs, and further held that it had not
been able to establish its title to the land. The High Court
dismissed the second appeal, holding that the State
Government cannot be permitted to deny the plaintiff’s title
under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The Apex Court set
aside the findings on title; however, it held that the State
Government shall vacate the suit land and may file for
declaration of title and consequential relief. In this context,
the Apex Court held that a tenant let into possession by the
landlord cannot deny the landlord’s title, however defective it
may be, so long as the possession is not surrendered. In the
present case, the theory of estoppel would not be applicable
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as the plaintiffs have filed the suit for possession on the
ground of absolute ownership of the land and structure and
determination of lease under Section 111(g) of the TP Act in
view of the resumption notice issued by the Union of India. In
the present case. However, the appellants’ right of
resumption is protected under the terms of the agreement.
Hence, the decision in D. Raghukul Pershad would not apply
in the present case.
78. In Santosh Hazari , the Apex Court held that the
paramount overall consideration is the need for striking a
judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do
justice at all stages and the impelling necessity of avoiding
prolongation in the life of any lis. In the present case, in view
of the Apex Court’s order, directing that these second
appeals be decided uninfluenced by the findings and
observations of the Division Bench and to ignore the findings
in the impugned judgments based on the Division Bench’s
observations and also granting liberty to lead additional
evidence, I have carefully examined the entire documentary
and oral evidence as well as the additional evidence. Hence,
to decide the substantial questions of law framed in these
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second appeals, the entire evidence was required to be
appreciated. Therefore, the respondents' submissions that, in
view of the legal principles settled in Santosh Hazari, this
court cannot appreciate the evidence have no substance.
79. The suit property is described as both the land and the
suit bungalow. As to the land, there is no satisfactory
evidence to show the plaintiffs’ absolute ownership. The suit
is seeking possession of the land and the bungalow and
recovery of rent and damages. Even if the terms of the old
grant are not on record, this will neither defeat the appellants’
case nor enure to the plaintiffs’ benefit in seeking absolute
ownership. The construction of the bungalow by a grantee
will only create a right in the structure but not convert the
occupancy right into an ownership right and will not confer
absolute title. The GLR entries create a strong presumption
in favour of the appellants and create doubt on the plaintiffs’
claim of absolute ownership. The Division Bench declared
the resumption notice unlawful, as the Union of India could
not show any right governing resumption. However, the court
did not decide the title. The plaintiffs have not prayed for any
declaration of title. Hence, the plaintiffs would not be entitled
to seek possession of the suit property as prayed in the
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present suit. Accordingly, the third question of law is
answered in favour of the defendants by holding that the
plaintiffs are not entitled to seek possession.
80. It is, however, clarified that the plaintiffs’ right, if any,
under the terms of the lease agreements to seek possession
of the suit bungalow is kept open.
81. No question of law is framed as regards the prayer for
arrears of rent, set-off and damages. In view of the
compensation amount paid along with the resumption notice,
which the plaintiffs accepted, the First Appellate Court rightly
set aside the Trial Court’s decree to the extent of refusing
arrears of rent and granted set-off from the compensation
amount received by the plaintiffs. Accordingly, the claim for
additional damages is also correctly dismissed. Therefore,
the impugned judgments and decrees would warrant an
interference only in respect of the decree for possession.
82. Therefore, the second appeals are partly allowed by
passing the following order:
th
(i) The Judgment and Decree dated 30 April 1986
th
passed by the 7 Additional District Judge, Pune, in
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the plaintiffs’ Civil Appeal No. 90 of 1985, is
confirmed.
th
(ii) The Judgment and Decree dated 30 April 1986
th
passed by the 7 Additional District Judge, Pune, in
the defendants’ Civil Appeal No. 945 of 1985 is
quashed and set aside.
(iii) Civil Appeal No. 945 of 1984 is partly allowed, and
th
the Judgment and Decree dated 27 April 1984
passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune, in
Special Civil Suit No. 477 of 1980 is quashed and
set aside to the extent of the decree in favour of the
plaintiffs to recover possession of the suit property,
directing inquiry on mesne profits and costs.
th
(iv) The Judgment and decree dated 27 April 1984
passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Pune, in
Special Civil Suit No. 477 of 1980 accordingly
stands modified in the aforesaid terms.
(v) There will be no order as to costs.
[GAURI GODSE, J.]
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