PREMCHAND vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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CGHC010010172022 2026:CGHC:46374


AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 161 of 2022
Judgment Reserved On :25.09.2026.
Judgment Delivered On :03.11.2026.
1 - Premchand S/o Late Kewalchand Aged About 60 Years
2 - Mohan Lal S/o Late Kewalchand Aged About 55 Years
3 - Shantilal S/o Late Kewalchand Aged About 53 Years
4 - Suresh Kumar S/o Late Kewalchand Aged About 50 Years
5 - Kantilal S/o Late Kewalchand Aged About 48 Years
6 - Lalit S/o Late Kewalchand Aged About 46 Years
7 - Manju D/o Late Kewalchand Aged About 49 Years
8 - Shimati Kanchanbai W/o Anoopchand Aged About 46 Years
9 - Shrimati Kiran Bai W/o Ashok Kumar Aged About 44 Years.
Respondent Nos.1 to 9 are R/o In Front Of Ram Mandir, Bazarpara,
Kondagaon, Tehsil And District- Kondagaon, C.G.
10 - Rajendra Kumar (Died Through Lrs ) As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated
14-08-2026.
10A - Manish Kumar S/o Late Rajendra Kumar Aged About 44 Years
10B - Sunny Kumar S/o Late Rajendra Kumar Aged About 42 Years

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10C- Rohit Kumar S/o Late Rajendra Kumar Aged About 32 Years
10 D - Neetu Modi D/o Late Rajendra Kumar Aged About 50 Years
10 E - Soniya Chawla D/o Late Rajendra Kumar Aged About 48 Years
10 F- Pooja Bhatnagar D/o Late Rajendra Kumar Aged About 46 Years
10 G - Seema Narula D/o Late Rajendra Kumar Aged About 45 Years.
All R/o Hospital Ward Kondagaon, Tehsil And District Kondagaon, C. G.
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- The Commissiner Baster Division,
Jagdalpur, District- Baster (C.G.)
2 - Collector Kondagaon, District- Kondagaon (C.G.)
3 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Kondagaon, District- Kondagaon (C.G.)
4 - Gajendra Dhruw S/o Late Murlidhar Dhruw Aged About 50 Years R/o
Bazarpara, Kondagaon, Tehsil And District- Kondagaon (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s) :Shri Shobhit Koshta, Advocate.
For State/respondent :Shri Abhuday Tripathi, PL.
For Respondent No.4 :Shri Pravin Kumar Tulsyan and Shri Karan Kumar
Baharani, Advocates.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
C A V Order
1. This Writ Petition has been filed against the order dated 05.10.2021
(Annexure P/3) passed by the Commissioner, Baster Division,
Jagdalpur in Revision case No.202007950100018 / 09 / A-23 / 19-20
whereby, revision filed by the petitioners under Section 50 of the
Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for short “The Code of 1959”)
against the order dated 09.07.2020 passed by the Collector, District
Kondagaon has been dismissed.

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2. The dispute pertains to land bearing Khasra No. 423, admeasuring
0.17 acres (hereinafter referred to as “the disputed land”), situated
within the municipal limits. The Respondent No. 4 claims that the
disputed land was recorded in the name of his ancestors in the year
1934–35 and alleges that the petitioners and their ancestors illegally
occupied the said land. on 04.11.2016, respondent No. 4 filed an
application under Section 170B of the Code of 1959, seeking
restoration of possession of the disputed land on the ground that the
petitioners and their ancestors had illegally occupied the same.
Petitioners filed their reply to the aforesaid application, specifically
contending that as reflected in the maintenance Khasra records for the
years 1953–54 and 1956–57, the disputed land was recorded as Nazul
land and not as agricultural land. It was, therefore, contended that the
provisions of the Code of 1959 as invoked by respondent No. 4 were
not applicable to the disputed land in the manner alleged by him. The
petitioners further submitted that the disputed land had been
transferred through registered sale deeds executed several decades
prior to the filing of the application by respondent No. 4. The ancestors
of respondent No. 4, namely, Shambhunath, son of Jagannath, had
sold a portion of the disputed land, admeasuring approximately 12
decimals (5,304 square feet), to the father of petitioner Nos. 1 to 9,
namely, Kewalchand, by way of a registered sale deed dated
23.01.1960. Pursuant to the aforesaid registered sale deed, the father

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of petitioner Nos. 1 to 9 constructed a permanent residential house
over the land purchased by him and remained in continuous
possession thereof. The petitioners further submitted that the remaining
portion of the disputed land, admeasuring approximately 2,100 square
feet, was sold to Shyamlal, son of Deuram, by way of a registered sale
deed dated 03.12.1974. The petitioners thus asserted that their
possession over the disputed property was based on the aforesaid
transactions and had continued for several decades. The petitioners
specifically contended before the revenue authorities that the
transactions in question had taken place in the years 1960 and 1974,
respectively, whereas the application seeking restoration of possession
was filed by respondent No. 4 only on 04.11.2016, after an inordinate
delay of several decades. On the aforesaid grounds, the petitioners
disputed the allegations of illegal occupation and prayed for dismissal
of the application filed by respondent No. 4. Sub-Divisional Officer
(Revenue), after considering the rival submissions and the material
available on record, vide order dated 13.10.2017 (Annexure P/1),
rejected the application filed by respondent No. 4 holding that disputed
land was situated within the municipal limits and was not agricultural
land and, therefore, the provisions of Section 165(6) of the Code of
1959, were not applicable to the case, in consequence, Section 170B
of the Code of 1959 was also not attracted. Being aggrieved by the
aforesaid order dated 13.10.2017, Respondent No. 4 preferred an

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appeal before the Collector, Kondagaon. The learned Collector, vide
order dated 09.07.2020 (Annexure P/2), partly allowed the appeal,
holding that the subordinate court's conclusion regarding the non-
agricultural nature of the disputed land is valid. However, the
conclusion reached regarding the legal transfer of the disputed land to
the petitioners herein is not justified and they have not obtained
permission from the competent authority for the purchase or sale of the
disputed land. It was further held that the Revenue Board,
Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur has issued an order regarding the applicability of
the provisions of Section 165 (6) / 165 (7) (b), under Section 8 of the
Code of 1959, dated 27.10.2015. In the said order under Section 8,
Board of Revenue held that provisions of Section 165 (6) and Section
165 (7) (b) will be applicable to lands located in Nazul land / municipal
land irrespective of whether the land is diverted or not. Board of
Revenue deleted Clause 4 of the said order issued under Section 8
and following clause has been inserted:-
" - 165 (6) ( )
भू राजस्व संहिता की धारा एक में अधिसूचित क्षेत्र में
आदिम जनजाति वर्ग के भूमिस्वामी के भूमि के अंतरण के संबंध में
(diverted
उल्लेखि त प्रतिबंध नगरीय क्षेत्र की भूमि तथा परिवर्तित भूमि
land) "
पर भी लागू होगा।
3. The Collector vide order dated 09.07.2020 accordingly held that the
disputed land is not agricultural land, but rather urban land. The
disputed land was transferred from the tribal party to the non-tribal

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party without the permission of the competent authority. Thus, order
dated 13.10.2017 of the subordinate court, Sub-Divisional Officer
(Revenue), Kondagaon, is set aside/ quashed.
4.
Against the said order dated 09.07.2020 of the Collector, petitioners
moved a revision before the Commissioner, Baster Division, Jagdalpur
in Revision case No.202007950100018 / 09 / A-23/ 19-20 who vide
order dated 05.10.2021 rejected the revision of the petitioners and
affirmed the findings of the Collector. The Commissioner observed that
the Revenue Board has clarified that in case of transfer of tribal land to
a non-tribal person, the restrictions provided under Section 165(6) of
Code of 1959 applies to the land belonging to tribal landowners in the
notified area irrespective of whether that land is situated in urban areas
or in diverted land. This provision covers the entire Bastar division.
Against the said order of Commissioner, the petitioners preferred a
revision before the learned Board of Revenue, however, the learned
Board of Revenue returned the revision petition on the ground that the
same was not maintainable, hence this petition for the following reliefs:-
“10.1) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue appropriate writ and quash/set-aside the
impugned order dated 5/10/21 (Annexure P-3) and
other merged orders dated 9/7/20 and 13/10/17 in the
interest of justice.
10.2) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to call
for the entire records of the instant case, for kind
perusal of this Hon'ble Court.

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10.3) Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deem fit
and proper may also kindly be granted to the petitioners
in the interest of justice. ”
5. Leaned counsel for the petitioners firstly submits that the provision of
Section 170B of the Code of 1959 is not applicable in facts of the
present case and the same is barred by principles of delay and laches
and non-joinder of necessary party. It is well settled that in order to set
aside the transaction u/s 170B of Code of 1959, it is necessary that
fraud or non bonafide transaction must be proved. In the present case,
the learned SDO (Revenue) in its order held that the sale deed and
transactions is of the year 1960 and the same was never challenged by
either Shambunath or his son namely Premsingh or by Murlidhar S/o
Premsingh and now Gajendra Dhruw S/o Murlidhar who is aged about
35 years has challenged the transaction which shows that the
transaction was bonafide and not effected by fraud which has also not
been denied by the Collector and Commissioner in their order.
6.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Shakuntala v. The State Of Karnataka, (2024) 17
SC 287, has considered a similar issue. In the said case, father of
respondent No. 5 was allotted 4 acres of agricultural land under
government grant on 22-3-1957. In the year 2007, respondent No. 5,
whose father was granted land, filed application before the Assistant
Commissioner under Section 4 of the Scheduled Castes and

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Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act of 1978
praying that the sale transaction in respect of subject land be declared
null and void and to deliver possession to him, which was allowed by
the Sub Divisional Officer. Appeal preferred against that order was
dismissed, writ petition as well as writ appeal were also dismissed.
Considering the facts of aforesaid case and particularly considering the
delay and latches in filing the application by respondent No. 5 for
reversion of land, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed in para 15 to 19 as
under:-
“15. The admitted facts indicate that Somalanayak was
granted this agricultural land in 1957 and chose to sell it in
the year 1964. The 1978 Act came into force on 1-1-1979
but it was only in 2007 that Respondent 5 woke up and filed
a petition under Section 4 thereof. In the meantime, the land
changed hands four times.
16. The effect and impact of delay and laches in the context
of the 1978 Act is no longer res integra. In Nekkanti Rama
Lakshmi v. State of Karnataka [Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi v.
State of Karnataka, (2020) 14 SCC 232] , this Court noted
that Section 4 of the 1978 Act did not prescribe the period
within which an application thereunder could be made nor
did it prescribe the period within which suo motu action could
be taken, but held that an application for resumption of land
under Sections 4 and 5 of the 1978 Act made after a delay of
25 years would be barred and no annulment of the transfer
could be granted thereon.
17. Again, in Vivek M. Hinduja v. M. Ashwatha [Vivek M.
Hinduja v. M. Ashwatha, (2020) 14 SCC 228] , this Court had

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occasion to deal with this issue. The delay in that case was
just 20 years, when compared with the delay of 43 years
presently, but despite the same, this Court held that the
annulment of the illegal transfers under the 1978 Act could
not be sustained owing to that delay. It was pointed out that,
even if no limitation is prescribed in the statute, the party
concerned ought to approach the competent court or
authority within reasonable time, beyond which no relief
could be granted. This principle was held applicable to suo
motu actions also. Referring to the earlier decisions in
Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav [Chhedi Lal Yadav
v. Hari Kishore Yadav, (2018) 12 SCC 527 : (2018) 5 SCC
(Civ) 427] and Ningappa v. Commr. [Ningappa v. Commr.,
(2020) 14 SCC 236] , this Court reiterated the settled legal
position that irrespective of whether a statute provided for a
period of limitation, provisions of the statute must be invoked
within a reasonable time. This Court, therefore, had no
hesitation in holding that the application for restoration of the
land made after a delay of 25 years was liable to be
dismissed on that ground. The judgments of the Karnataka
High Court which held to the contrary were overruled.
18. In Ningappa [Ningappa v. Commr., (2020) 14 SCC 236] ,
the delay in seeking cancellation of the sale transactions and
restoration of the land in question was 16 years. In that
scenario, this Court held that the application of the grantees
should have been rejected on the short ground that there
was considerable delay in filing the same as all acts have to
be done within a reasonable period of time even if no
limitation is prescribed by the statute.
19. In Civil Appeal No. 6212 of 2013, titled Shivanna v. State
of Karnataka [Shivanna v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 19
SCC 485 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3445] , decided on 25-11-
2021, this Court again considered the issue. In that case

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also, the sale transaction was prior to the 1978 Act coming
into force, as it was in the year 1971. However, it was only in
the year 2000 that an application for annulment of the
transfer was filed under Section 4 of the 1978 Act. This
Court, therefore, noted that annulment of the sale transaction
was sought 21 years after the 1978 Act came into force and
30 years after the transaction itself. It was also noted that the
legal heir of the original grantee took no steps till 12 years
after he attained the age of majority. It was, accordingly,
concluded that such inordinate delay could not be condoned,
as by no stretch of imagination could it be said to be
reasonable. ”
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in the present case,
the transaction/ sale deed in question are of the Year 1960 and 1974,
which is sought to be challenged by the Respondent No.4, whose
grandfather has effected the sale deed on 4/11/2016 and 3/12/1974, by
filing application u/s 170B of the Code of 1959 which is after 56 years
and 42 years after the subject transactions and hence, the delay in
filing the application by the respondent no. 4 shows that the application
was clearly barred by delay and laches and cannot be entertained in
light of order of Hon’ble Supreme Court as mentioned above. Further,
the original respondent no. 4 has not impleaded Shyamlal S/o Deuram,
as party in the present case who has in turn sold the land to the original
petitioner No. 10 namely Premchand in the Year 1980-81 and as such
in absence of Shyamlal and his legal heirs being made party in the
present case who is a necessary party as the respondent no. 4 has
called into question the transaction dated 3/12/1974 which is in

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between Late Shambunath and Shyamlal, the application of
respondent no. 4 is bad in law for non-joinder of necessary party which
has not been appreciated by the courts below.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submits that prior permission
u/s 165 (6) of the Code of 1959 is not required in the present case. It
has been recorded by the SDO (Revenue), Kondagaon that the
disputed land is situated in urban area bearing Plot No.- 423 and hence
the same is not agricultural property. This Court in Dau Ram v. Hifjul
Jamil through LR's and Others, 2020 SCC Online Chh 1337; held while
adjudicating a similar issue in respect of land situated in District-Kanker
which is also a schedule area:-
“ 8. It is not in dispute that the suit property is situated in
urban area and it is Nazul land bearing Sheet No. 5B, Plot
No. 8/1, Layout Plan 35/1 area 431 square feet situated at
Shitla Para, Kanker, District Kanker.
9. The question as to whether Section 165(7-b) contained in
Chapter XII of the Code applies to Nazul land in urban area
is no longer res-integra and it has already been
authoritatively adjudicated by the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh in the matter of Alidas (supra), in which it has been
clearly held that Section 165(7-b) which contained in
Chapter XII of the Code is not applicable in urban area and
held as under:—
“12. As such, the said Act is applicable to the property of
aboriginals, who are members of the scheduled tribes and
who have property in the rural areas. Any property in the
urban area is specifically excluded from the operation of the

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said Act. It was for the first time when the M.P. Land
Revenue Code, 1954, was enacted, which came into force
with effect from 1-10-1955, that Chapter 8 of the said Code
was enacted regarding assessment and re-assessment of
land in urban areas. As such, there can be no doubt that
Chapter 8 of the said Code would govern the lands situated
in urban areas. The M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1954, was
subsequently repealed by the M.P. Land Revenue Code,
1959, which also made similar provisions. Chapter 7 of the
1959 Code provides for revenue survey and settlement in
non-urban areas; while Chapter 8 of the 1959 Code makes
provisions for assessment and re-assessment of land in
urban areas. As such, there can be no doubt that Chapter 8
of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, will be applicable to
lands situated in urban areas. But it is not possible to accept
the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents
that the other Chapters of the M.P. Land Revenue Code,
1959, will be applicable to Nazul lands situated in urban
areas. As such, we are clearly of the opinion that Section
165 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, which forms
part of Chapter 12 of the Code, would not be applicable to
Nazul lands in urban areas. We may observe that Section
157 of the Code, which is the first Section in Chapter 12,
lays down that there shall be only one class of tenure-
holders of lands held from the State to be known as
Bhumiswami. But it does not mean that the provisions of
Chapter 12 in their entirety can be made applicable to such
plot proprietors of Nazul land in urban areas, who are also
known as Bhumiswamis.”
10. In view of principle of law laid down by the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh in Alidas (supra), it cannot be held that
Section 165(7-b) of the Code would be applicable to Nazul
land situated in urban areas as in the present case, as

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such, the argument deserves to be rejected as the suit land
is Nazul land situated at Kanker (urban area) and in Nazul
land, provision of Section 165(7-b) of the Code is not
attracted, as such, both the Courts below are justified in
holding that the transaction is not hit by Section 165(7-b) of
the Code.”
9. Learned counsel for the petitioners further relies in the case of Marsa
Baxla and Others v. Neera Bai and Others {2014 SCC Online Chh
429}, it was held by this Court in respect of interplay with Section 165
(6) and 170B of the Code of 1959 as under:-
“ 10. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that
in the matter of transaction between the tribal to tribal also,
the provisions of Section 165(6) become applicable requiring
sanction of the Collector, cannot be accepted in view of the
specific language of the provisions contained in Clause (II)
Sub- Section (6) of Section 165 of the Land Revenue Code.
The use of words “a person not belonging to such tribe”
sufficiently indicates that the transaction with a person
belonging to tribe is outside the rigor of sub section 6 of
Section 165. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case
of Bhaiji v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla {(2003) 1 SCC
692}, is not applicable in the present case. That was a case
where the Supreme Court considered the scope and ambit of
provisions contained in Section 170(B) of the Land Revenue
Code to hold that there is nothing in those provisions to
come to the conclusion that Section 170(B) will not apply
where transaction has taken place between the tribal and
tribal. This was so because the Supreme Court did not find
any specific provision otherwise. However, in so far as
provisions contained in Section 165(6) of the Land Revenue
Code is concerned, there is a specific provision in that

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regard as referred to herein above. Therefore the submission
that permission was necessary cannot be accepted and has
to be rejected.
”
10.Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the land in question is
situated in the Nazul land/ municipal area and as such, it cannot be
termed to be an agricultural land, and in view of the above case laws,
in the present case, provisions of Section 165 (6) and Section 170B of
the Code of 1959 are not applicable even if the land belongs to tribal
person when there is no express provision for applicability of said
sections to Scheduled Area in respect of non-agricultural land.
11.Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that admittedly transaction
between the parties took place way back on 23.01.1960 when
grandfather of Respondent No.4 namely Shambhunath, S/o Jagannath
executed a registered sale deed for the land in question about 12
dismil, 5304 sq. feet. He submits that since the seller has not
challenged the said transaction alleging fraud, the grandson now after
an inordinate delay of about 60 years cannot contest claim alleging
fraud.
12. Per contra, counsel for the Respondent No.4 submits that the learned
Commissioner rightly passed the order and held that provisions of
Section 165 (6) and Section 170B would be applicable in the present
case and no interference is warranted by this Court.

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13. Learned State counsel submits that the order passed by the
Commissioner is in accordance with law as the Commissioner has
considered each and every aspect of the matter while upholding the
order dated 09.07.2020 passed by the Collector who also considered
the grievance of the petitioners in detail and since land in question falls
in Baster, a Scheduled area then it cannot be said that since land is a
Nazul land, provisions under Section 165 (6) and Section 170B would
not be applicable. The Commissioner has also held that provisions of
Section 165 (6) and Section 170B would be applicable even in respect
of Nazul land , Municipal land or diverted land.
14.
I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the documents
annexed with the petition carefully.
15.The principal question that arises for consideration is whether the
Collector and the Commissioner were justified in holding that the
provisions of Sections 165(6) and 170-B of the Code of 1959 were
applicable to the disputed land, notwithstanding its location within
municipal limits and its asserted classification as Nazul land, and
whether the impugned orders warrant interference in the exercise of
writ jurisdiction. The questions relating to the effect of delay and laches,
the nature of the transactions and the objection regarding non-joinder
of necessary parties also arise for consideration.
16.Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to refer to the
relevant statutory provisions.

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17. Section 165 (6) of the Code of 1959 reads as under:-
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)
the right of bhumiswami belonging to a tribe which has been
declared to be an aboriginal tribe by the State Government
by a notification in that behalf, for the whole or part of the
area to which this Code applies shall-
(i) in such areas as are predominately inhabited by
aboriginal tribes and from such date as the State
Government may, by notification, specify, not be transferred
nor it shall be transferable either by way of sale or otherwise
or as a consequence of transaction of loan [or will
(bequest)] to a person not belonging to such tribe in the
area specified in the notification;
(ii) in areas other than those specified in the notification
under clause (i), not to be transferred or be transferable
either by way of sale or otherwise or as a consequence of
transaction of loan [or will (bequest)] to a person not
belonging to such tribe without the permission of a Revenue
Officer not below the rank of Collector, given for reasons to
be recorded in writing.
[Provided that the provision of this sub-section shall not be
applicable to the land acquired under the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisitions,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (No. 30 of 2013).
Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section the
expression "otherwise" shall not include lease.
[(6-a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),
the right of a Bhumiswami other than a Bhoomiswami
belonging to a tribe which has been declared to be an
aboriginal tribe under sub-section (6), in the land excluding the
agricultural land shall not be transferred or be transferable

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either by way of sale or otherwise or as a consequence of
transaction of loan to a person not belonging to aboriginal tribe
without the permission of the Collector given for reasons to be
recorded in writing:
Provided that every such transfer effected after the 9th day of
June, 1980 but before the 20th April, 1981 which is not in
accordance with the provisions herein contained shall unless
such transfer is ratified by the Collector in accordance with the
provisions hereinafter contained, be void and shall be of no
effect whatsoever, notwithstanding anything contained in this
Code or any other law for the time being in force.
18. Section 170B of the Code of 1959 reads as under:-
Section 170-B. Reversion of land of members of aboriginal
tribe which was transferred by fraud.
(1) Every person who on the date of commencement of the
Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code (Amendment), 1980
(hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act of 1980) is in
possession of agricultural land which belonged to a member
of a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe
under sub-section (6) of Section 165 between the period
commencing on the 2nd October, 1959 and ending on the
date of the commencement of Amendment Act, 1980 shall,
within two years of such commencement, notify to the Sub-
Divisional Officer in such form and in such manner as may
be prescribed, all the information as to how he has come in
possession of such land.
(2) If any person fails to notify the information as required by
sub-section (1) within the period specified therein it shall be
presumed that such person has been in possession of the
agricultural land without any lawful authority and the
agricultural land shall, on the expiration of the period

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aforesaid revert to the person to whom it originally belonged
and if that person be dead, to his legal heirs.
19.
In the present case, it is not in dispute that the disputed land is
situated within the Bastar Division, which is a Scheduled Area, and that
the original transferor belonged to a notified tribal community. It is also
the case of the petitioners that the disputed land was recorded as
Nazul land and was situated within municipal limits.
20.The petitioners have placed considerable reliance upon the nature and
classification of the disputed land to contend that the restrictions
contained in Section 165(6) of the Code of 1959 are inapplicable. The
revenue authorities, however, have relied upon the order dated
27.10.2015 passed by the Board of Revenue under Section 8 of the
Code of 1959, clarifying that the restrictions contained in the relevant
provisions of Section 165 extend to land situated in Nazul and
municipal areas, irrespective of whether such land has been diverted.
21.The Collector and the Commissioner have proceeded on the basis that
the location of the disputed land within municipal limits does not, by
itself, exclude the operation of the restrictions imposed upon transfers
of land belonging to members of notified aboriginal tribes in the
circumstances contemplated by the Code.
22. The question whether the classification of land as Nazul land or its
location within an urban area excludes the operation of Section 165(6)

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of the Code of 1959 must be considered in the context of the statutory
provision and the applicable legal position.
23.Section 165(6) expressly imposes restrictions upon the transfer of
rights of a Bhumiswami belonging to a notified aboriginal tribe to a
person not belonging to such tribe. The provision does not, in its text,
expressly exclude land situated within municipal limits merely on
account of its urban location.
24.
The petitioners have relied upon the decision in Dau Ram (supra),
wherein this Court considered the applicability of Section 165(7-b) to
Nazul land situated in an urban area. However, the applicability of that
decision to the present controversy must be examined in the context of
the precise statutory provision involved, the nature of the land in
question and the subsequent clarification issued by the Board of
Revenue.
25.The Collector and the Commissioner have relied upon the order dated
27.10.2015 of the Board of Revenue, which specifically addresses the
applicability of the restrictions to Nazul, municipal and diverted land. In
the absence of any material establishing that the aforesaid clarification
has been set aside or rendered inapplicable by a competent court, the
petitioners cannot succeed merely by asserting that the disputed land
is situated within municipal limits.

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26. Accordingly, the contention that the restrictions under Section 165(6)
are necessarily inapplicable solely because the disputed land is
classified as Nazul land or is situated in an urban area does not, by
itself, furnish sufficient ground for interference with the impugned
orders.
27.
The petitioners have also relied upon Marsa Baxla (supra), to contend
that permission under Section 165(6) is not required in every
transaction involving tribal land.
28.The aforesaid decision, however, dealt with the interpretation of the
statutory language governing transfers between persons belonging to
notified tribes and persons not belonging to such tribes. The principle
laid down therein must be understood in the context of the facts and
the precise question that arose for determination in that case.
29.In the present matter, the original transferor is stated to have belonged
to a notified tribal community, whereas the transfers in question were
made in favour of persons who did not belong to that community. The
petitioners have not disputed that the requisite permission of the
competent authority was not obtained before execution of the sale
deeds.
30.Consequently, the aforesaid decision does not, by itself, establish that
the transactions in question were exempt from the restrictions imposed
by Section 165(6) of the Code of 1959.

21
31. The next contention raised by the petitioners concerns the applicability
of Section 170-B of the Code of 1959.
32.The statutory provision expressly refers to agricultural land belonging
to a member of a notified aboriginal tribe and prescribes the
consequences arising from failure to furnish the requisite information
regarding possession in the circumstances contemplated therein.
33.The petitioners contend that the disputed land was not agricultural land
but was recorded as Nazul land within municipal limits. The Sub-
Divisional Officer accepted this contention and rejected the application
filed by respondent No. 4.
34.However, the Collector and the Commissioner have considered the
aforesaid objection in the light of the clarification issued by the Board of
Revenue dated 27.10.2015. They have held that the restrictions
relating to the transfer of land belonging to members of notified
aboriginal tribes are applicable even where the land is situated in a
Nazul or municipal area.
35.The petitioners have not established any sufficient ground warranting
interference with the concurrent conclusions of the Collector and the
Commissioner on the basis of the urban location of the disputed land
alone.
36.
It is, however, necessary to distinguish the restrictions governing
transfers under Section 165(6) from the conditions specifically

22
prescribed under Section 170-B. The latter provision must be applied in
accordance with its own language and statutory requirements. The
applicability of Section 170-B cannot be determined solely by reference
to the scope of Section 165(6), without considering the conditions
prescribed under Section 170-B itself. Nevertheless, having regard to
the findings recorded by the revenue authorities and the clarification
relied upon by them, the petitioners have not demonstrated sufficient
grounds to warrant interference with the impugned orders in the
present proceedings.
37. The petitioners have next contended that the application filed by
respondent No. 4 is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay and
laches, as the transactions in question were effected in 1960 and 1974,
whereas the application under Section 170-B was filed only on
04.11.2016. In support of this contention, learned counsel has placed
reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Shakuntala (supra).
38. In the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court reiterated the settled
principle that, even where a statute does not prescribe a specific period
of limitation, the power conferred upon the competent authority must be
exercised within a reasonable period. The Court relied upon its earlier
decisions in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi, Vivek M. Hinduja, Ningappa and
Shivanna, wherein proceedings seeking annulment of transfers and
restoration of land after considerable delay were examined.

23
39. The principle emerging from these decisions is that the absence of an
express period of limitation does not necessarily confer an unrestricted
power to initiate proceedings at any point of time. The question of
reasonable time must be considered in the light of the statutory
scheme, the nature of the proceedings, the circumstances of the case
and the prejudice, if any, arising from the delay.
40. In the present case, the sale deeds relied upon by the petitioners
were executed on 23.01.1960 and 03.12.1974, whereas respondent
No. 4 initiated proceedings under Section 170-B only on 04.11.2016.
41.The delay between the respective transactions and the initiation of
proceedings is undoubtedly substantial. The petitioners have also
asserted that the original transferor and his immediate successors did
not challenge the transactions during their lifetime and that the
purchasers remained in possession of the disputed land for several
decades.
42.However, the question cannot be determined merely by calculating the
elapsed period. It is necessary to consider the precise nature of the
statutory remedy invoked and the circumstances in which the authority
is empowered to order reversion of land under Section 170-B.
43.
The Collector and the Commissioner have proceeded on the footing
that the absence of a prescribed period of limitation permits the
proceedings to be maintained notwithstanding the lapse of several

24
decades. Such an approach, if understood as dispensing altogether
with the requirement of reasonable time, would not be consistent with
the principle explained by the Supreme Court in Shakuntala and the
decisions referred to therein.
44. At the same time, the applicability of the aforesaid decisions, rendered
in the context of a different statutory enactment, must be assessed
having regard to the language and scheme of Section 170-B of the
Code of 1959.
45.In the present case, the petitioners have not demonstrated that the
statutory proceedings were initiated in circumstances that, when
examined in the context of the governing provision and the material on
record, necessarily render the action of the revenue authorities
unsustainable in the exercise of writ jurisdiction.
46. Accordingly, the contention based upon delay and laches, though
raising a substantial question of law, does not warrant interference with
the impugned orders on the material placed before this Court.
47. The petitioners have further raised an objection regarding non-joinder
of necessary parties, contending that Shyamlal and his legal
representatives were not impleaded, although the transaction dated
03.12.1974 and the subsequent transfer in favour of petitioner No. 10,
Premchand, were questioned.

25
48. The necessity of impleading a party depends upon the nature of the
relief sought and whether an effective adjudication can be made in that
party's absence. In the present case, the petitioners have not
established that the absence of the aforesaid parties, by itself,
invalidates the orders passed by the revenue authorities. The objection
regarding non-joinder, therefore, does not independently furnish
sufficient ground for interference with the impugned orders.
49. The petitioners have also contended that the transactions were bona
fide, having been executed through registered sale deeds several
decades ago, and that no allegation of fraud was raised by the original
transferor during his lifetime.
50.The registration of a sale deed and the passage of time are relevant
circumstances in examining the nature of a transaction. However,
registration of a document does not, by itself, establish that the
transaction complied with every statutory restriction applicable to the
transfer. Where a statutory provision restricts the transfer of land
belonging to a member of a notified aboriginal tribe to a person not
belonging to such tribe, compliance with the prescribed requirements
must be independently established. The fact that the original transferor
did not challenge the transaction during his lifetime cannot, by itself,
dispense with a mandatory statutory requirement, if such requirement
was applicable to the transaction.

26
51. In the present case, it is not disputed that permission from the
competent authority was not obtained before execution of the sale
deeds. The petitioners have not established that the transactions were
exempt from the applicable restrictions or that the competent authority
had otherwise ratified them in accordance with law.
52. Upon consideration of the submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties and the material available on record, this Court finds that
the Collector and the Commissioner have proceeded on the basis that
the restrictions contained in Section 165(6) of the Code of 1959 apply
to the disputed land notwithstanding its location within municipal limits.
53.The petitioners have failed to establish sufficient grounds for holding
that the impugned orders are liable to be set aside solely on account of
the classification of the disputed land as Nazul land, the absence of a
challenge by the original transferor during his lifetime, or the objection
concerning non-joinder of parties.
54.The contention relating to delay and laches has also been examined in
the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. Although the
lapse of several decades is a material consideration, the petitioners
have not established, on the material placed before this Court, a
sufficient basis for granting the reliefs sought in the present writ
petition.

27
55. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no sufficient ground
to interfere with the impugned order dated 05.10.2021 passed by the
Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur, affirming the order dated
09.07.2020 passed by the Collector, Kondagaon.
56. Accordingly, the writ petition being bereft of merits deserves to be and
is accordingly dismissed.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Avinash

28
HEAD NOTE:-
(WPC No. 161 of 2022)
Where the statutory provisions impose restrictions on the transfer
of land belonging to a member of a notified aboriginal tribe in
favour of a person not belonging to such tribe, compliance with the
mandatory statutory requirements, including obtaining prior
permission of the competent authority, must be independently
established. Registration of the sale deed and absence of any
challenge by the original transferor cannot dispense with
compliance with such statutory restrictions.