Vayuu Propmart Pvt. Ltd. vs Uba Realtech Pvt. Ltd. And Ors.

Court
Delhi High Court

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
th
Date of decision: 18 NOVEMBER, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
# CNR No. DLHC010317392026
+ W.P.(C) 9954/2026 & CM APPL. 46369/2026
VAYUU PROPMART PVT. LTD. .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anil K. Airi, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Abhishek Batra, Mr. Vishnu
Anand, Ms. Aansi Pathak, Mr. Harsh
Gautam, Mr. Vishal Tyagi, Advs.
versus

UBA REALTECH PVT. LTD. AND ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Pallav Saxena, Mr. Apoorv
Agarwal Ms. Saloni Singh, Advs for
R-1.
Mr. Rajinder Wali and Ms. Shivani
Gupta, Advs for R-4.

# CNR No. DLHC010316942026
+ W.P.(C) 9969/2026 & CM APPL. 46416/2026
VAYUU PROPMART PVT. LTD. .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anil K. Airi, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Abhishek Batra, Mr. Vishnu
Anand, Ms. Aansi Pathak, Mr. Harsh
Gautam, Mr. Vishal Tyagi, Advs.
versus

NURAY REALTECH PVT. LTD .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Pallav Saxena, Mr. Apoorv
Agarwal Ms. Saloni Singh, Advs.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
W.P.(C) 9954/2026 etc. Page 1 of 19

JUDGMENT
1. The present Writ Petitions have been filed under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of India against the Common Order dated 14.07.2026
passed by the learned Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi
[“ DRAT ”], in the applications bearing I.A. Nos. 119/2026 and 124/2026
filed by the Respondent No.1/Appellants in Appeals No. 52/2026 and
58/2026 [“ Impugned Order ”].
2. The challenge of the Petitioner herein against the Impugned Order is
limited, to the extent it prays for the setting aside of that portion of the
Impugned Order, wherein the learned DRAT has directed the pre-deposit to
be made on the amount mentioned in the Demand Notice dated 05.02.2014
[“ Demand Notice ”], i.e., Rs. 32,17,65,461.23/-. Additionally, the Writ
Petitioner has also prayed that the Respondent No. 1 be directed to comply
with the provisions of Section 18 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
[“ SARFAESI Act ”], and make a pre-deposit of 50% on the amount due
from it, as claimed by the Respondent No. 4-Bank.
3. A brief factual background into the disputes between the parties is
given as under:
(i) The Respondent No. 2 approached the Respondent No. 4-Bank in
and around January 2013 to seek Term Loan Facility of Rs. 30
crores for strengthening networking capital and to overcome
liquidity mismatch faced by the Respondent No. 2.
(ii) The Respondent No.4-Bank sanctioned a Term Loan of Rs. 30
crores in favour of the Respondent No. 2 vide Sanction Letter dated
13.12.2012.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
W.P.(C) 9954/2026 etc. Page 2 of 19

(iii) The Respondent No.1 in WP (C) No. 9969/2026, being the
guarantor, had mortgaged the land measuring 2.86 acres situated at
Khewat No. 381, Khata No. 499, Mustil No. 51, Killa Nos. 2/2(3-
15), 9/1(5-0), 12/2(6-0), 13/1(7-2) and 2/1(1-0) situated in Village
Daulatabad, Tehsil and District Gurgaon, conveyed vide Sale Deed
dated 11.04.2011, while the Respondent No. 1 in WP (C) No.
9954/2026, also the guarantor, had mortgaged the land measuring
2.128 acres comprising of Khewat No. 341 min, 344 rectangle no.
41, Killa No. 18/2(0-9) and 19/2(0-8) situated at Village
Daulatabad, Tehsil and District Gurgaon to secure the loan.
(iv) The loan account of the Respondent No. 2 was declared as a Non-
Performing Asset on 31.12.2013.
(v) The Respondent No. 4-Bank issued a Demand Notice dated
05.02.2014 for payment of Rs. 32,17,65,461.23/- as outstanding
dues to the Respondent No. 2.
(vi) Subsequently, Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process [“ CIRP ”]
was initiated against the Respondent No. 2 vide Company Petition
bearing CP (IB) 190/2017 under Section 7 of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016 [“ IBC ”]. The National Company Law
Tribunal, Delhi [“ NCLT ”] vide Order dated 08.05.2018 allowed
the said petition for initiation of CIRP against the Respondent No.
2.
(vii) Subsequently, the Resolution Plan of the Respondent No. 2 was
approved by the Committee of Creditors on 11.06.2024 and the
claim of the Respondent No. 4-Bank was also dealt with as per the
Resolution Plan.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
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(viii) It is pertinent to note that the Respondent No. 4-Bank also issued a
Sale Notice dated 06.02.2023, wherein the Respondent No. 4-Bank
claimed an amount of Rs. 126.20 crores as outstanding amount. In
another Sale Notice dated 24.03.2023 , the Respondent No. 4-Bank
claimed a sum of Rs. 127.67 crores as outstanding dues, while in
the last Sale Notice dated 07.09.2023, the Respondent No. 4-Bank
claimed a sum of Rs. 137.78 crores as the outstanding dues.
(ix) The above Sale Notice dated 07.09.2023 as well as the Demand
Notice issued by the Respondent No. 4-Bank were the subject
matter of Securitization Applications bearing S.A. No. 527/2023
and 528/2023 filed by the Respondent No. 1 before the learned
Debts Recovery Tribunal, Delhi [“ DRT ”], which came to be
dismissed vide Order dated 09.01.2026.
(x) Against the dismissal of the Securitization Applications by the
learned DRT, the Respondent No. 1 in the present Writ Petitions
preferred the appeals before the learned DRAT, along with
applications seeking reduction of the pre-deposit amount to 25%
under Section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act.
4. Material on record indicates that the case of the Appellants before the
learned DRAT (i.e., Respondent No. 1 before this Court) was that the Order
dated 09.01.2026 passed by the learned DRT was illegal and unsustainable,
as being contrary to Section 13(1) of the SARFAESI Act, which expressly
exempts agriculture land from the purview of the legislation. The Appellants
had further pleaded that the Order dated 09.01.2026 passed by the learned
DRT was vitiated by non-compliance of the SARFAESI Act and Rules 8 and
9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
W.P.(C) 9954/2026 etc. Page 4 of 19

5. The Appellants had further argued before the learned DRAT that the
Demand Notice was contrary to Section 31(1) of the SARFAESI Act.
Additionally, it was also pleaded that the Appellants, being only the
mortgagors, are facing serious financial hardship and in these circumstances,
the learned DRAT has the power to reduce the pre-deposit to a minimum of
25% of the debt due.
6. Perusal of the Impugned Order indicates that the learned DRAT first
took note of the fact that the Sale Notice dated 07.09.2023 was issued after a
period of nearly nine (9) years from the issuance of the Demand Notice
under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act and no explanation for this gap of
nine (9) years was furnished by the Respondent No. 4-Bank. It was opined
that the Respondent No. 4-Bank cannot be allowed to take advantage of its
own omission in issuance of the Sale Notice dated 07.09.2023 after a lapse
of nine (9) years from the date of the Demand Notice under Section 13(2) of
the SARFAESI Act.
7. The learned DRAT ruled that the Respondent No. 4-Bank was not
within its legal rights to take benefit of the judgment of the Apex Court in
Sidha Neelkanth Paper (P) Ltd. v. Prudent ARC Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine SC
12 , by pleading that the Appellants, who are only the mortgagors, are
required to make the pre-deposit on the amount as mentioned in the Sale
Notice dated 07.09.2023, as the Appellants cannot be allowed to suffer due
to the unexplained delay of the Respondent No. 4-Bank in issuance of the
sale notice.
8. Perusal of the Impugned Order further shows that the learned DRAT
rejected the argument advanced on behalf of the Petitioner, that the
Respondent No.1/Appellants, being the guarantor and mortgagor, have joint,
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
W.P.(C) 9954/2026 etc. Page 5 of 19

several and co-extensive liabilities with that of the principal borrower (i.e.,
the Respondent No. 2 herein) and securitization measures can be proceeded
against the Respondent No.1/Appellants even if a Resolution Plan qua the
Petitioner stood approved by the NCLT. The reasons given by the learned
DRAT for rejecting this line of argument was firstly, the unexplained,
inordinate delay on part of the Respondent No. 4-Bank in the issuance of the
Sale Notice dated 07.09.2023 as well as the fact that the claim of the
Respondent No. 4-Bank qua the Respondent No. 2/Borrower stood
addressed in the Resolution Plan.
9. Thus, while disposing of I.A. Nos. 119/2026 and 124/2026,the learned
DRAT concluded that the Respondent No. 4-Bank, without any reason,
allowed the outstanding dues to accumulate and viewed the said conduct as
unjustified, unreasonable, illogical and without any basis. Further taking into
consideration inter alia the fact that the Respondent No. 1/Appellants are
only mortgagors and the claim of the Respondent No. 4-Bank stood
addressed in the Resolution Plan, the learned DRAT directed the Respondent
No. 1/Appellants to make a pre-deposit of 30% of Rs. 32,17,65,461.32/- as
mentioned in the Demand Notice. It is against this direction passed by the
learned DRAT that the present Writ Petition has been filed.
10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner has argued as
under:
(i) It is submitted that the Petitioner is an „aggrieved person‟ and has
locus to challenge the Impugned Order as the learned DRAT, while
deciding the issue of pre-deposit under I.A. Nos. 119/2026 and
124/2026, also gave a finding on the merits of the appeal by
holding that the Respondent No. 1 is merely a mortgagor and its
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
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W.P.(C) 9954/2026 etc. Page 6 of 19

debts stand addressed in the Resolution Plan of the Respondent
No. 2.
(ii) It is stated that the above observation forms a primary part of the
defence of the Respondent No. 1, which ought to have been
decided by the learned DRAT at the time of final hearing of the
appeal and not at the stage of pre-deposit, when even notice was
not issued in the appeal. As such, if this observation is allowed to
subsist, the Petitioner would be gravely prejudiced at the time of
hearing of the appeal before the learned DRAT.
(iii) The present Writ Petition is maintainable in law also for the reason
that the Petitioner has invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and it is well
settled that the power of superintendence so conferred on the High
Courts is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person
even suo moto . As such, it is submitted that since the learned
DRAT has travelled beyond its jurisdiction and discretion allowed
under the SARFAESI Act and reduced the amount of pre-deposit
to less than 25% of the debt due as claimed by the secured creditor,
interference of this Court is warranted. Reliance in this regard is
placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai v.
Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 .
(iv) It is submitted that the learned DRAT travelled beyond its
jurisdiction and discretion by reducing the amount of pre-deposit
to less than 25% of the debt due as claimed by the secured creditor,
by directing the Respondent No. 1 to make a pre-deposit of only
30% of the amount mentioned in the Demand Notice.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
19:37:56
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(v) Keeping in mind the definition of „debt‟ as defined under Section
2(ha) of the SARFAESI Act, which has the same meaning assigned
to it in Clause 2(g) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act,
1993 [“ RDB Act ”], it is submitted that „debt‟ means any liability
inclusive of interest which is claimed as due from a borrower,
which is legally recoverable on the date of Securitization
Application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act filed by an
aggrieved person, i.e., the guarantor and mortgagor.

(vi) It is submitted that the applicability of the proviso to Section 18 of
the SARFAESI Act would be only on the date of filing of an
appeal, as the borrower/guarantor/mortgagor would be required to
make a pre-deposit for the appeal to be admitted. Therefore, a
combined reading of the proviso to Section 18 read with Section
2(ha) of the SARFAESI Act and Section 2(g) of the RDB Act
makes it clear that the amount of debt due as mentioned in the
proviso to Section 18 would necessarily mean the debt due as
claimed by the secured creditor inclusive of interest till the date of
filing of the appeal.
(vii) The Petitioner‟s case is covered by the ratio of the Apex Court in
Sidha Neelkanth (Supra), wherein it has been held that in a case
where the borrower challenges both, the steps taken under Section
13(4) of the SARFAESI Act as well as the auction sale of the
secured assets, the „debt due‟ shall mean any liability, inclusive of
interest, which is claimed as due from any person, whichever is
higher. Reference in this regard is also made to judgment passed
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
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by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Golden NetsoftPvt. Ltd.
versus HDFC Bank Ltd., 2024 SCC Online Del 2124 .
(viii) It is argued that the learned DRAT failed to consider that the
judgment of the Apex Court in Sidha Neelkanth (Supra) does not
confer any benefit but merely interprets the SARFAESI Act and as
such, ought not to be deviated from. For this reason, conclusion of
the learned DRAT that the Respondent No. 4-Bank itself delayed
its SARFAESI actions cannot be given the benefit of the Sidha
Neelkanth (Supra) judgment, is erroneous and cannot be sustained.
(ix) In any event, it is submitted that there was no delay at all on part of
the Respondent No. 4-Bank in seeking recovery of its dues. Rather,
the Respondent No. 4-Bank has availed the remedies available to
its under law to recover public money. This is substantiated by the
fact that the first three auction notices dated 18.07.2014,
06.02.2023 and 24.03.2023 were all stalled due to the filing of
securitization applications by the Respondent No. 1 against them.
Even against the last auction notice dated 07.09.2023, the
Respondent No. 1 filed a securitization application, which
ultimately came to be dismissed by the learned DRT vide the Order
dated 09.01.2026. Therefore, it is submitted that rather than
holding the Respondent No. 4-Bank responsible for delays, the
learned DRAT should have considered that it was the Respondent
No. 1 who derailed proceedings at every step by filing frivolous
applications before the learned DRT.
11. Per contra , learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent No. 1 has
argued as under:
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
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(i) It is submitted that the Petitioner, who is the auction purchaser, has
no locus to challenge the Impugned Order, which merely decides
the issue of pre-deposit. It is stated that the issue of pre-deposit
under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act is a matter strictly between
the Respondent No. 1-Mortgagor and the learned DRAT, and is
prescribed for the protection of the secured creditor and for this
reason, the Petitioner has no right, title, or interest in the quantum
of the pre-deposit, no entitlement to receive it and consequently, no
cause of action to complain of its quantum.
(ii) It is trite law that locus standi to invoke Article 226 of the
Constitution of India requires the existence of a legal right in the
Petitioner and a corresponding legal injury. Reliance, in this
regard, is placed on the Judgment of the Apex Court in
JasbhaiMotibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 1 SCC 671 .
(iii) The present Writ Petition is not maintainable also for the reason
that by way of the Impugned Order, the learned DRAT has merely
exercised the statutory discretion vested in it and there is no
jurisdictional error whatsoever. Further, it is settled law that in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court does
not sit in appeal over discretionary orders passed by statutory
tribunals. Judicial review is confined to examining jurisdictional
errors, patent illegality, perversity, violation of the principles of
natural justice, or manifest arbitrariness. The Petitioner has failed
to demonstrate that the Impugned Order suffers from any such
infirmity.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
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(iv) It is submitted that the learned DRAT exercised its jurisdiction
under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act and has given reasons to
fix the pre-deposit at 30% above the statutory minimum. Perusal of
the Impugned Order further clearly indicates that the Petitioner
was heard, there is no denial of natural justice, exercise of
jurisdiction beyond its authority, or failure to exercise jurisdiction.
As such, the Petitioner is essentially seeking a fresh assessment of
the banking calculations and substitution of its preferred figure for
the amount determined by the statutory appellate forum.
(v) It is submitted that the Impugned Order passed by the learned
DRAT is limited to the issue of fixing the pre-deposit required for
hearing of the appeal, and does not in any manner decide the final
matter on merits of the mortgage or auction.
(vi) It is further submitted that the judgment of the Apex Court in Sidha
Neelkanth (Supra) is distinguishable on facts as well as law, as the
principal controversy therein concerned the adjustment of auction-
sale proceeds towards the statutory pre-deposit under Section 18 of
the SARFAESI Act, while the present case concerns the legality of
the Demand Notice itself as well as the computation of interest.
(vii) The second question of law in Sidha Neelkanth (Supra) was as to
whether „debt due‟ under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act would
include liability as well as interest. It is submitted that even this
aspect cannot be applied to the present case, because in Sidha
Neelkanth (Supra), there was no contention that the notice under
Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act itself was illegal for want of
particulars of the exact applicable rate of interest. It is further
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
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stated that in the appeal before the learned DRAT, the first and
foremost contention of the Respondent No. 1 was that the notice
under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act failed to disclose the
exact applicable rate of interest and the Respondent No. 4-Bank,
after a lapse of nine (9) years, took advantage of the vague interest
rate given in the notice under Section 13(2), applied an exorbitant
rate of interest and then proceeded to claim a huge and inflated
amount of „debt due‟ from the Respondent No. 1.

(viii) It is submitted that the Apex Court in Transcore v. Union of India
&Anr., (2008) 1 SCC 125 , recognized that the notice under
Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act is a substantive demand
notice and Section 13(2) requires disclosure of the particulars of
the amount payable. It is stated that the failure to furnish the
material particulars of the interest claimed deprives the
Respondent No. 1 of a meaningful opportunity to contest the
demand under Section 13(3-A). A subsequent inflated demand
cannot, by itself, cure the deficiencies in the original notice or
justify its adoption for calculating the pre-deposit.
(ix) It is stated that CIRP was initiated against the Respondent No. 2
before the NCLT, which was admitted on 08.05.2018. It is a matter
of record that the Respondent No.4-Bank duly submitted its claim
and participated in CIRP as a financial creditor and later, the
Resolution Plan stood approved on 11.06.2024, thereby binding
the Respondent No.4-Bank under Section 31 of IBC. Further, as
recorded by the NCLT in its Order dated 21.10.2024, the
Resolution Plan stood fully implemented. As such, the entire claim
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
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of the Respondent No. 4-Bank stood settled in terms of the
Resolution Plan through upfront payments, issuance of non-
convertible debentures and conversion of balance into equity.
Since the Respondent No. 4-Bank has itself issued a No-Dues
Certificate dated 27.01.2025 thereby acknowledging satisfaction of
its dues, no liability now survives.
12. Heard the learned Counsels for the Parties and perused the material on
record.

13. The challenge to an order passed by the DRAT, which is a Tribunal,
has been placed before the Division Bench of this Court in light of the
Judgment passed by the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India
and Others, (1997) 3 SCC 261 . The general scope and limits of the High
Courts‟ powers and discretion under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
of India has been summarized by the Apex Court in M.S. Sanjay v. Indian
Bank, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 368 . The relevant paragraphs of the said
judgment are extracted below:
“ 9. It is well settled that interference by the Writ Court
for mere infraction of any statutory provision or norms,
if such in-fraction has not resulted in injustice is not a
matter of course. In the case of Shiv Shanker Dal Mills
v. State of Haryana, (1980) 2 SCC 437, the dealers in
that case had paid market fees at the increased rate of
3%, which was raised from the original 2 per cent
under Haryana Act 22 of 1977. The excess of 1 per
cent over the original rate was declared ultra vires by
this Court in the case of Kewal Krishna Puri v. State of
Punjab, (1980) 1 SCC 416. The excess of 1 per cent
over the original rate having been declared ultra vires,
became refundable to the respective dealers from
whom they were recovered by the Market Committee
concerned. The demand for refund of the excess
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
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amounts illegally recovered from them not having been
complied with, the dealers filed Writ Petitions under
Article 32 and Article 226 of the Constitution for a
direction to that effect to the Market Committee
concerned. The Market Committees contended that
although the refund of the excess collections might be
legally due to the dealers, many of them had in turn
recovered this excess percentage from the next
purchasers. While disposing of the petition and laying
down guidelines, this Court held as under:
“Article 226 grants an extraordinary remedy, which is
essentially discretionary, although founded on legal
injury. It is perfectly open for the court, exercising this
flexible power, to pass such order as public interest
dictates and equity projects. Courts of equity may, and
frequently do, go much further both to give and
withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than
they are accustomed to go where only private interests
are involved. Accordingly, the granting or withholding
of relief may properly be dependent upon
considerations as of public interest.”

10. It has been rightly observed that legal formulations
cannot be enforced divorced from the realities of the
fact situation of the case. While administering law it is
to be tempered with equity and if the equitable
situation demands after setting right the legal
formulations not to take it to the logical end, the High
Court would be failing in its duty if it does not notice
equitable consideration and mould the final order in
exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. Any other
approach would render the High Court a normal Court
of Appeal, which it is not. It is a settled principle of law
that the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India is discretionary in nature and in a given case,
even if some action or order challenged in the petition
is found to be illegal and invalid, the High Court while
exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction thereunder can
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
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refuse to upset it with a view to doing substantial
justice between the parties. ”

14. It is settled law that while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, this Court does not substitute its own
conclusion to the one arrived at by the Tribunal. This Court only sees as to
whether the decision making process adopted by the Tribunal was correct or
not and unless the Order is exceedingly perverse and completely
contradictory to law, the writ courts will refrain from interfering with such
orders.
15. For examining the controversy arising in the present Writ Petition,
reference is apposite to Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, which is being
reproduced to read as under:
“ 18. Appeal to Appellate Tribunal. —(1) Any person
aggrieved, byany order made by the Debts Recovery
Tribunal [under section 17, may prefer an appeal
along with such fee, as may be prescribed] to an
Appellate Tribunal within thirty days from the date of
receipt of the order of Debts Recovery Tribunal.

[Provided that different fees may be prescribed for
filing an appeal by the borrower or by the person other
than the borrower : ] [Provided further that no appeal
shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited
with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent. of the amount
of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured
creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery
Tribunal, whichever is less:

Provided also that the Appellate Tribunal may, for the
reasons to be recorded in writing, reduce the amount to
not less than twenty-five per cent. of debt referred to in
the second proviso.]

Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
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(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the
Appellate Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of
the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the
Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (51 of
1993) and rules made thereunder. ”

16. Reading of Section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act indicates that the said
provision confers a statutory right on a person aggrieved by any order made
by the DRT under Section 17 to prefer an appeal to the DRAT. However, the
right conferred under Section 18(1) is subject to the condition laid down in
the second proviso thereto. The second proviso postulates that no appeal
shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the DRAT fifty
per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured
creditors or determined by the DRT, whichever is less. Further, under the
third proviso to the sub-section, the Appellate Tribunal has the power to
reduce the amount, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, to not less than
twenty-five per cent of the debt, referred to in the second proviso.
17. Further reference is pertinent to the following discussion undertaken
by the Apex Court in Sidha Neelkanth (Supra):
“ 33. As per Section 2(ha) of the SARFAESI Act, “debt”
shall have the same meaning assigned to it in clause
(g) of Section 2 of the Act, 1993. As per section 2(g) of
the Act, 1993, “debt” means any liability inclusive of
interest which is claimed as due from any person…..,
by a bank or a financial institution during the course of
any business activity undertaken by the bank or the
financial institution, in cash or otherwise, whether
secured or unsecured, or assigned, or whether payable
under a decree or order of any civil court or any
arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage
and subsisting on, and legally recoverable on the date
of the application. That the “debt” means any liability
inclusive of interest.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:RAHUL
SINGH
Signing Date:18.11.2026
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34. As per Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, any person
aggrieved, by any order made by the DRT under
section 17, may prefer an appeal within thirty days to
an appellate Tribunal (DRAT) from the date of receipt
of the order of DRT. Second proviso to section 18
provides that no appeal shall be entertained unless the
“borrower” has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal
fifty percent of the amount of “debt due” from him, as
claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the
DRT, whichever is less and only and only then, an
appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act is
permissible against the order passed by the DRT under
Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. Under Section 17, the
scope of enquiry is limited to the steps taken under
Section 13(4) against the secured assets. Therefore,
whatever amount is mentioned in the notice under
Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, in case steps taken
under Section 13(2)/13(4) against the secured assets
are under challenge before the DRT will be the „debt
due‟ within the meaning of proviso to Section 18 of the
SARFAESI Act. In case of challenge to thesale of the
secured assets, the amount mentioned in the sale
certificate will have to be considered while determining
the amount of pre-deposit under Section 18 of the
SARFAESI Act. However, in a case where both are
under challenge, namely, steps taken under Section
13(4) against the secured assets and also the auction
sale of the secured assets, in that case, the “debt due”
shall mean any liability (inclusive of interest) which is
claimed as due from any person, whichever is higher.

35. As observed hereinabove and as per the second
proviso to Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, it is the
“borrower” who has preferred an appeal before the
Appellate Tribunal and the “borrower” who shall have
to deposit 50% of the amount of “debt due” from him.
If the words used in the second proviso to Section 18 of
the SARFAESI Act are “borrower has to deposit”, it is
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not appreciable how the amount deposited by the
auction purchaser on purchase of secured assets can be
adjusted and/or appropriated towards the amount of
predeposit, to be deposited by the borrower. It is the
“borrower” who has to deposit the 50% of the amount
of “debt due” from him. At the same time, if the
borrower wants to appropriate and/or adjust the
amount realised from sale of the secured assets
deposited by the auction purchaser, the borrower has
to accept the auction sale. In other words, the
borrower can take the benefit of the amount received
by the creditor in an auction sale only if he
unequivocally accepts the sale. In a case where the
borrower also challenges the auction sale and does not
accept the same and also challenges the steps taken
under Section 13(2)/13(4) of the SARFAESI Act with
respect to secured assets, the borrower has to deposit
50% of the amount claimed by the secured creditor
along with interest as per section 2(g) of the Act, 1993
and as per section 2(g), “debt” means any liability
inclusive of interest which is claimed as due from any
person. ”

18. The case set up by the Petitioner before this Court strongly rests on
the above interpretation of the Apex Court into what comprises the “…debt
due from him… ” for the purpose of determining the amount of pre-deposit
under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. Learned Senior Counsel for the
Petitioner contends that since the Respondent No. 1, in its appeal before the
learned DRAT, has challenged the Demand Notice, Possession Notice, Sale
Notice as well as Sale Certificate, the amount mentioned in the Sale
Certificate shall have to be considered while determining the amount of pre-
deposit under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, in light of the ratio in Sidha
Neelkanth (Supra). However, this Court is not persuaded by the said
contention, as it is trite law that a mere wrong decision, without anything
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more, is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227
of the Constitution of India [Ref: Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim & Ors.,
(1983) 3 SCC 566 ].
19. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Article 227
of the Constitution of India is limited to seeing than an inferior Court or
Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and not to correct an
error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. Perusal of
the Impugned Order depicts that the learned DRAT acted completely within
its jurisdiction and exercised the discretion made available to it under the
third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.
Question as to whether or not the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court in
Sidha Neelkanth (Supra) was followed in its letter and spirit cannot be
entertained by this Court, keeping in view the limited scope of interference
granted to this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
20. In any event, the Impugned Order passed by the learned DRAT only
decides the interim applications filed by the Appellant therein, and in no way
the observations contained in an interim order be construed as a final
expression on the merits of the appeal, even against the Petitioner herein.
21. In view of the above, the present Writ Petitions stand dismissed, along
with pending Application(s), if any.

SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J


RENU BHATNAGAR, J
NOVEMBER 18, 2026
AP
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SINGH
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