Bharti vs Delhi Cantonment Board
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~72
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 23.07.2026
+ W.P.(C) 10073/2026, CM APPL. 46865/2026 and CM APPL.
46866/2026
BHARTI .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Priyanka Goswami, Ms.
Kinjal Agerwal and Ms. Khyati
Gulati, Advocates.
versus
DELHI CANTONMENT BOARD .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Ankur Mishra and Mr.
Devendra Rao Madhav,
Advocates for Respondent No.
1.
Mr. Tarveen Singh Nanda and
Mr. Gaurav Aggarwal,
Advocates for Respondent No.
2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (Oral)
1. The present Writ Petition has been filed under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India assailing the Order dated
1
08.07.2026 passed by the learned Estate Officer, Delhi Cantonment
Board, whereby the Petitioner‟s claim that the premises, being 24
Qtrs., Jhuggi, Sadar Bazar, Delhi Cantonment, New Delhi -
1
Impugned Order
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:27.07.2026
17:24:32
W.P.(C) 10073/2026 Page 1 of 17
2 3
110010 , formed part of a notified “jhuggi jhopri cluster ” came to be
rejected and consequential directions were issued. The Petitioner also
seeks protection against coercive action as well as rehabilitation under
the provisions of the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board Act,
4
2010 .
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner, at the
outset, submits that there exists no bona fide requirement warranting
the acquisition of the subject premises. It is contended that the action
initiated by the Respondents appears to have been occasioned solely
on account of the proximity of the Petitioner‟s dwelling unit to the site
where staff quarters are proposed to be constructed, and it is only for
such reason that the Respondents have sought to proceed against the
Petitioner.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner assails
the Impugned Order primarily on two grounds, viz. , firstly, that the
learned Estate Officer has erroneously concluded that the Petitioner‟s
dwelling unit does not form part of a JJ Cluster; secondly , that the
Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of rehabilitation under the DUSIB
Act as interpreted by the Division Bench of this Court in Ajay Maken
5
v. Union of India .
4. Elaborating upon the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel
submits that although the Petitioner‟s dwelling unit is separated from
an existing JJ Cluster by a road approximately ten metres in width,
2
Subject premises
3
JJ Cluster
4
DUSIB Act
5
2019 SCC OnLine Del 7818
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BHATIA
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W.P.(C) 10073/2026 Page 2 of 17
such separation cannot by itself disentitle the Petitioner from being
treated as part of the cluster.
5. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submits that it
remains unclear whether the Petitioner‟s dwelling unit falls within any
of the 675 notified JJ Cluster recognised by DUSIB. It is submitted
that the burden of establishing that the Petitioner‟s premises do not
form part of a notified JJ Cluster lies upon DUSIB and not upon the
Petitioner.
6. Learned counsel further submits that the Petitioner had placed
several documents before the learned Estate Officer, inter alia , the
ration card, Aadhaar Card, Election Identity Card and Electricity bills
to demonstrate long-standing occupation of the premises.
7. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submits that the
Petitioner is a person of limited means and that her husband is
6
employed as a sweeper with the Delhi Cantonment Board and that
two other members of the Petitioner‟s family are engaged on a
contractual basis with the Ministry of Defence.
8. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further places reliance upon
the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Ajay Maken
(supra) to contend that the protection contemplated under the DUSIB
Act is not confined merely to JJ Cluster situated on lands owned by
the Government of NCT of Delhi, but is equally applicable to lands
belonging to the Central Government. It is submitted that, since the
Subject premises, admittedly, falls within the jurisdiction of the DCB,
which is an instrumentality of the “Central Government”, the
Petitioner‟s claim for rehabilitation cannot be rejected merely on the
6
DCB
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BHATIA
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W.P.(C) 10073/2026 Page 3 of 17
ground that the land belongs to the Cantonment Board.
9. It is, therefore, submitted that the Petitioner‟s claim is required
to be considered under the rehabilitation framework envisaged under
the DUSIB Act and the policy governing rehabilitation of eligible
jhuggi dwellers.
10. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further places reliance upon
the observations of the Division Bench, particularly in Paragraph No.
170, in Ajay Maken (supra) to contend that, before any eviction or
demolition action is undertaken, the competent authority is under an
obligation to determine whether a person claiming to be a jhuggi
dweller is entitled to rehabilitation in terms of the extant law and
policy.
“ 170. The decision in Sudama Singh governs the law in relation to
slums and slum dwellers in the NCT of Delhi. This is true whether
the slums are those under the management of the DUSIB or are
located on land owned by other agencies including the central
Government. The decision in Sudama Singh requires a Court
approached by persons complaining against forced eviction not to
view them as „encroachers„ and illegal occupants of land, whether
public or private land, but to ask the agencies to first determine if
the dwellers are eligible for rehabilitation in terms of the extant law
and policy.”
11. Per contra , Mr. Ankur Mishra, learned counsel on behalf of the
DCB, who enters appears on advance service, supports the Impugned
Order.
12. Learned counsel for the DCB submits that no protection can be
claimed under the DUSIB Act, unless the Petitioner‟s dwelling unit
satisfies the statutory definition of a “jhuggi” as under Section 2(f) of
the DUSIB Act and particularly, forms part of a “ jhuggi jhopri basti”
within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the DUSIB Act.
13. Learned counsel for DCB further submits that the scope and
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BHATIA
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W.P.(C) 10073/2026 Page 4 of 17
applicability of the decision in Ajay Maken (supra) in the context of
jhuggi dwellers residing outside notified JJ bastis came to be
specifically considered by this Court in Vaishali (Minor) Through
7
Next Friend v. Union of India . Placing reliance upon Paragraph Nos.
11 and 12 thereof, he submits that the said decision clarifies that Ajay
Maken (supra) cannot be construed as dispensing with the statutory
requirements contained in Section 2(g) of the DUSIB and that the
protections contemplated under the Act are available only where the
statutory prerequisites are duly satisfied. The relevant paragraphs are
reproduced herein under for ready reference:
“ 11. A reading of the above provision would clearly show that
DUSIB has to declare a group of jhuggis as “Jhuggi jhopri basti”
by way of notification. One of the conditions to be fulfilled by such
a group of jhuggis is that it must be inhabited, at least by fifty
households, as existing on 01.01.2006. Section 9 of the Act
empowers the DUSIB to make a survey of any jhuggi basti. Section
10 of the Act provides for preparation of a scheme for removal of
any JJ basti and for resettlement of the residents thereof. Section 12
of the Act provides for the re-development of the JJ basti. The
above provisions are applicable only with respect to “Jhuggi Jhopri
basti”, that is, inter-alia a group of fifty households as existing
01.01.2006 and duly declared by DUSIB as such by way of a
Notification.
12. As noted by the learned Single Judge, the appellants have been
unable to produce any such notification under Section 2(g) of the
Act. Even in appeal, no such Notification has been produced by the
appellants. The appellants are, therefore, not entitled to any
protection under the Act.”
14. Learned counsel for DCB also places reliance upon the
subsequent decision of the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court in
8
Dinesh Singh v. Delhi Development Authority , particularly
paragraphs 11 and 12 thereof, to contend that the Court has reiterated
7
2022 SCC OnLine Del 2086
8
W.P.(C) 12384/2022 (Delhi High Court)
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BHATIA
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the principles enunciated in Vaishali (supra) and held that, in the
absence of a notification under Section 2(g) of the DUSIB Act or
proof that the concerned settlement answers the statutory definition of
a “Jhuggi Jhopri Basti” , no right to rehabilitation or protection under
the Act can be claimed. The relevant paragraphs thereof are
reproduced herein under for ready reference:
“ 11. From the decisions aforenoted, it is manifest that a cluster in
order to be eligible for extension of benefits under the
Rehabilitation Policy must necessarily meet the qualifying criteria
as specified in Section 2(g) of the Act. Consequently, it must be a
notified cluster comprising of not less than 50 jhuggis. The
aforesaid cluster must additionally form part of the 675 clusters
which had been identified by the DUSIB. The recitals and recordal
of facts of the present case leads the Court to the inescapable
conclusion that the cluster in question would not meet those
requirements. In view of the aforesaid, the reliefs as claimed cannot
possibly be granted.
12. The Court deems it apposite to observe further that neither
Sudama Singh nor Ajay Maken mandate a rehabilitation measure
being adopted and coverage under the Rehabilitation Policy being
extended without the cluster otherwise conforming to the
requirements as placed under the Act. The Court also bears in mind
that the undisputed fact that the Rehabilitation Policy which was
placed in the shape of a protocol in Ajay Maken was neither
interfered with nor any adverse observation in respect thereof
entered.”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Learned counsel for DCB further relies upon the judgment of
9
the learned Coordinate Bench in Aftab Alam v. DUSIB , to submit
that the expression “nearby areas” occurring in the proviso to Section
2(g) of the DUSIB Act has been interpreted to mean only those
jhuggis or clusters which are contiguous or immediately adjacent to an
identified and recognised JJ basti, so as to constitute, in substance, an
extension or adjunct thereof. The relevant paragraphs, being
9
2022 SCC OnLine Del 4604
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BHATIA
Signing Date:27.07.2026
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Paragraph Nos. 4 and 5 thereof, are reproduced herein under for ready
reference:
“ 4. Ld. Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the term “nearby
areas” would required to be interpreted in the present petition. She
submits that the Petitioner‟s jhuggi is less than 1 km away from the
Goshia slum colony covered under the DUSIB‟s list of jhuggis
eligible for rehabilitation. She submits that since the distance is so
less, the Petitioners‟ jhuggi should also be eligible.
5. On the other hand, Mr. Chauhan, ld. Counsel appearing for
DUSIB, submits that the matter is covered by order dated 19th
October, 2022, passed in W.P.(C) 14781/2022 titled Manoj Kumar
& Ors. v. DUSIB & Ors . He submits that in the said order, the
Court has clearly defined the expression “nearby areas” to mean
areas “either contiguous or adjacent to an identified cluster”, which
criteria would not be satisfied by the present jhuggi .”
6. Heard. The relevant extract of the order dated 19th October,
2022 in W.P. (C) 14781/2022 reads as under:
“4. It becomes pertinent to note that Section 2(g) of the
Act contemplates the Board attaching any jhuggi jhopri
cluster scattered in the nearby areas of any jhuggi jhopri
basti. The phrase “nearby areas”cannot possibly be
interpreted to extend to include a cluster which is, as per
the petitioners own showing, situate at least 3 kilometres
away from a recognised cluster For the purposes of
attachment of a cluster under the DUSIB Act, it would
have to be established that the cluster though standing
independently is either contiguous or adjacent to an
identified cluster. The expression “nearby areas” would
have to be interpreted to mean a cluster which is in the
nature of an extension or an adjunct to an identified
huggi jhopri basti. It would also have to be additionally
established that the separate cluster was in existence
along with the identified jhuggi jhopri basti from prior to
the recognised cut-off date of 01 January 2006. Viewed
in that light, it is manifest that the arguments addressed
on lines noted above, would not sustain.”
7. Considering the above, this Court is of the opinion that the
impugned order does not deserves to be interfered with.”
16. Learned counsel for DCB, therefore, submits that tested on the
aforesaid principles, the Petitioner fails to satisfy the statutory
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:27.07.2026
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W.P.(C) 10073/2026 Page 7 of 17
requirements governing attachment of an independent jhuggi or
cluster to a recognised JJ basti . According to learned counsel, the
material on record does not establish that the Petitioner‟s jhuggi is
capable of being treated as an extension or adjunct of any notified JJ
basti within the meaning of the proviso to Section 2(g) of the Act.
17. Learned counsel consequently submits that the Petitioner cannot
claim the benefit of the proviso to Section 2(g), inasmuch as the
jhuggi in question is admittedly neither contiguous nor adjacent to any
identified or notified JJ basti . On the contrary, it is situated at a
substantial distance therefrom and is separated by a major public road,
thereby rendering the concept of attachment under the proviso wholly
inapplicable.
ANALYSIS:
18. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties, and
appreciates the manner in which the matter was presented by the
learned counsel. This Court has, with their able assistance, also
perused the material available of record and the Judicial precedents
passed across the bar.
19. The principal challenge raised by the Petitioner is to the finding
returned by the learned Estate Officer that the Subject premises
neither form part of a notified Jhuggi Jhopri Basti nor satisfy the
statutory requirements so as to entitle the Petitioner to claim the
benefit of rehabilitation under the DUSIB Act.
20. Since the controversy essentially turns upon the applicability of
the provisions of the DUSIB Act, it would be apposite to first advert
to the statutory scheme.
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:27.07.2026
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W.P.(C) 10073/2026 Page 8 of 17
21. Section 2(f) of the DUSIB Act defines a “jhuggi” , while
Section 2(g) defines a “Jhuggi Jhopri Basti” to mean a group of
jhuggis which the Board may, by notification, declare as such, subject
to the conditions prescribed therein. The proviso to Section 2(g)
further empowers the Board to attach any jhuggi or jhuggis situated in
the nearby areas to a notified Jhuggi Jhopri Basti , whereupon such
jhuggi or jhuggis would be deemed to form part of the notified basti .
Section 2(f) and 2(g) of the DUSIB Act reads as under:
“ Section 2. Definitions .-In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires,-
*
(f) "jhuggi " means a structure whether temporary or pucca, of
whatever material made, with the following characteristics,
namely:-
(i) it is built for residential purpose;
(ii) its location is not in conformity with the land use of
the Delhi Master Plan;
(iii) it is not duly authorized by the local authority
having
jurisdiction; and
(iv) it is included in a jhuggi jhopri basti declared as
such
by the Board, by notification;
(g) “jhuggi jhopri basti” means any group of jhuggis which the
Board may, by notification, declare as a jhuggi jhopri basti in
accordance with the following factors, namely:-
(i) the group of jhuggis is unfit for human habitation
(ii) it, by reason of dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty
arrangement and design of such jhuggis, narrowness
or faulty arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation,
light or sanitation facilities, or any combination of
these factors, is detrimental to safety, health or
hygiene; and
(iii) it is inhabited at least by fifty households as
existing on 31st March, 2002:
Provided that the Board may, by order, attach any jhuggi or jhuggis
scattered in the nearby areas to any jhuggi jhopri basti and such
jhuggi or jhuggis shall be deemed to be part of such jhuggi jhopri
basti;”
22. The submission advanced on behalf of the Petitioner is that,
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:27.07.2026
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W.P.(C) 10073/2026 Page 9 of 17
notwithstanding the fact that the subject premises are separated from
an existing JJ Cluster by a road, the same ought to be treated as
forming part of the said cluster and, consequently, the Petitioner
would be entitled to the protection contemplated under the DUSIB Act
and the Rehabilitation Policy.
23. This Court is unable to persuade itself to accept the aforesaid
submission.
24. The learned Estate Officer has undertaken a detailed
examination of the aforesaid issue. Upon considering the statutory
provisions as well as the material placed on record, the learned Estate
Officer has categorically found that the Subject premises do not form
part of any of the 675 notified JJ Clusters and that there exist only
three unauthorised structures at the site. Consequently, the minimum
statutory requirements prescribed under Section 2(g) of the DUSIB
Act are admittedly not fulfilled. The relevant findings in this regard
read as under:
21. Notwithstanding the above reasoning, the Respondent has
failed to show that premises in question is located in the list of 675
JJ Cluster. For the sake of discussion, it is held that even if the
premises was part of the list of JJ Cluster, then also it was not ipso
facto entitled for the protection. The Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi
in catena of judgments has clarified the legal position regarding the
applicability of DUSIB policy on any premises, which is discussed
in the succeeding paragraphs.
22. Section 2(g) of DUSIB Act, 2010 stipulates that there is a
minimum requirement of fifty household to be covered under the
definition of „Jhuggi Jhopri Basti‟. The relevant provision of
Section 2(g) of DUSIB Act, 2010 is reproduced hereunder:
(g) “jhuggi jhopri basti” means any group of
jhuggis which the Board may, by notification,
declare as a jhuggi jhopri basti in accordance
with the following factors, namely:-
(iv) the group of jhuggis is unfit for human
habitation
(v) it, by reason of dilapidation,
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BHATIA
Signing Date:27.07.2026
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W.P.(C) 10073/2026 Page 10 of 17
overcrowding, faulty arrangement and design of
such jhuggis, narrowness or faulty arrangement
of streets, lack of ventilation, light or sanitation
facilities, or any combination of these factors, is
detrimental to safety, health or hygiene; and
(vi) it is inhabited at least by fifty households
as existing on 31st March, 2002:
Provided that the Board may, by order, attach
any jhuggi or jhuggis scattered in the nearby
areas to any jhuggi jhopri basti and such jhuggi
or jhuggis shall be deemed to be part of such
jhuggi jhopri basti;”
The Counsel for Department has specifically pointed out that there
exist only three illegal structures at the site in question. Therefore,
the question of applicability of policy framed by DUSIB does not
arise in the present case as the premise does not form the part of list
of 675 clusters and number of structures is less than 50. This view
is supported by the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Delhi High
Court in LPA No. 271/2022 titled as, “Vaishali Through Next
Friend and Others Vs. Union of India and Others” [2022 SCC
OnLine Del 2086] . The relevant portion of the judgment is
reproduced below:
“ 11. A reading of the above provision would clearly show
that DUSIB has to declare a group of jhuggis as “Jhuggi
jhopri basti” by way of notification. One of the conditions
to be fulfilled by such a group of jhuggis is that it must
be inhabited, at least by fifty households, as existing on
01.01.2006. Section 9 of the Act empowers the DUSIB to
make a survey of any jhuggi basti. Section 10 of the Act
provides for preparation of a scheme for removal of any
JJ basti and for resettlement of the residents thereof.
Section 12 of the Act provides for the re-development of
the JJ basti. The above provisions are applicable only
with respect to “Jhuggi Jhopri basti”, that is, inter-alia a
group of fifty households as existing 01.01.2006 and duly
declared by DUSIB as such by way of a Notification. ”
23. The Hon'ble High Court in W.P.(C) No. 12384/ 2022 titled as
„Dinesh Singh & Ors. Vs. Delhi Development Authority & Ors.‟
vide order dated 26.08.2022 laid down-three conditions to be
satisfied for a cluster in order to be eligible for extension of
benefits under the rehabilitation policy. The relevant portion of the
judgment is reproduced below:
“11. From the decisions aforenoted, it is manifest that a
cluster in order to be eligible for extension of benefits
under the Rehabilitation Policy must necessarily meet the
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:27.07.2026
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W.P.(C) 10073/2026 Page 11 of 17
qualifying criteria as specified in Section 2(g) of the Act.
Consequently, it must be a notified cluster comprising of
not less than 50 jhuggis. The aforesaid cluster must
additionally form part of the 675 clusters which had been
identified by the DUSIB. The recitals and recordal of facts
of the present case leads the Court to the inescapable
conclusion that the cluster in question would not meet
those requirements. In view of the aforesaid, the reliefs as
claimed cannot possibly be granted.
12. The Court deems it apposite to observe further that
neither Sudama Singh nor Ajay Maken mandate a
rehabilitation measure being adopted and coverage under
the Rehabilitation Policy being extended without the
cluster otherwise conforming to the requirements as
placed under the Act. The Court also bears in mind that
the undisputed fact that the Rehabilitation Policy which
was placed in the shape of a protocol in Ajay Maken was
neither interfered with nor any adverse observation in
respect thereof entered.”
As per the law laid down in the aforementioned judgment for
eligibility to seek rehabilitation under the policy framed by DUSIB,
the following three conditions have to be satisfied:
i. Firstly, the cluster in question should meet the
requirements specified under Section 2(g) of the
DUSIB Act, 2010.
ii. Secondly, it must be a notified cluster comprising of
not less than 50 Jhuggis.
iii. Thirdly, the cluster must additionally form part of
675 clusters which had been identified by the DUSIB.
24. In the facts of the present case, none of the conditions
mentioned above are satisfied due to which the Respondent is
neither protected by the policy of the DUSIB nor entitled for
rehabilitation under the policy framed by the DUSIB.
25. Therefore, the fourth issue is decided by laying down herein
that the premises in question is not covered in JJ Cluster list and
further since Department is not covered by the DUSIB policy
2015.”
25. This Court finds no infirmity in the aforesaid reasoning. The
Division Bench in Vaishali (supra) has categorically held that the
protections available under the DUSIB Act are attracted only in
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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W.P.(C) 10073/2026 Page 12 of 17
respect of a Jhuggi Jhopri Bast i which satisfies the requirements of
Section 2(g) and stands notified by the Board. In the absence of such
notification, no statutory protection under the Act can be claimed.
26. The aforesaid principle has thereafter been reiterated by the
learned Coordinate Bench in Dinesh Singh (supra) wherein it has
been held that a cluster seeking the benefit of rehabilitation must
satisfy the qualifying criteria prescribed under Section 2(g), comprise
not less than fifty jhuggis and additionally form part of the notified list
maintained by DUSIB. The Court further clarified that Ajay Maken
(supra) does not dispense with the statutory requirements contained in
the DUSIB Act.
27. Equally unmerited is the submission founded upon the proviso
to Section 2(g) of the DUSIB Act. The expression “nearby areas”
occurring in the proviso has already been interpreted by this Court in
Aftab Alam (supra) It has been held that the said expression cannot
receive an expansive interpretation so as to include every jhuggi
situated within a short geographical distance from a recognised
cluster. Rather, it contemplates only such jhuggis or JJ Clusters as are
contiguous or immediately adjacent to a notified JJ Basti and which
are, in substance, an extension or adjunct thereof.
28. In the present case, the subject premises are admittedly
separated from the notified cluster by a major public road. This Court,
therefore, finds no error in the conclusion arrived at by the learned
Estate Officer that the benefit of the proviso is unavailable to the
Petitioner.
29. Much emphasis was laid by learned counsel for the Petitioner
upon the decision of the Division Bench in Ajay Maken (supra) to
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BHATIA
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W.P.(C) 10073/2026 Page 13 of 17
contend that the Petitioner was entitled to rehabilitation
notwithstanding the fact that the subject premises are situated on land
belonging to the DCB, which in turn, falls under the Central
Government‟s ambit.
30. The reliance placed upon Ajay Maken (supra) is, however,
misplaced. The said decision undoubtedly recognises that
rehabilitation obligations are not confined merely because the land
belongs to the Central Government and emphasises that eligibility for
rehabilitation ought to be determined in accordance with the
applicable law and policy before eviction is undertaken.
31. However, the said judgment cannot be read as dispensing with
the statutory requirements engrafted under the DUSIB Act. As noticed
hereinabove, this position now stands authoritatively clarified by the
subsequent decisions in Vaishali (supra) and Dinesh Singh (supra),
which hold that the entitlement to protection under the DUSIB Act
continues to remain governed by the statutory conditions contained in
Section 2(g).
32. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has also placed reliance upon
Paragraph No. 170 of the decision in Ajay Maken (supra) to contend
that, before undertaking any eviction or demolition action, the
competent authority is required to determine whether a person
claiming to be a jhuggi dweller is entitled to rehabilitation under the
extant law and policy. There can be no quarrel with the aforesaid
proposition.
33. However, the said principle does not advance the Petitioner‟s
case. In the present case, the learned Estate Officer has specifically
examined the Petitioner‟s entitlement under the DUSIB Act,
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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W.P.(C) 10073/2026 Page 14 of 17
considered the statutory requirements as well as the decisions in
Vaishali (supra ) and Dinesh Singh (supra), and thereafter concluded
that the subject premises neither form part of a notified JJ Cluster nor
satisfy the conditions for claiming rehabilitation. Thus, the exercise
contemplated in Ajay Maken (supra) stands duly undertaken, and
merely because the determination has gone against the Petitioner
would not furnish a ground for interference in exercise of jurisdiction
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
34. Further, the Petitioner‟s reliance upon the documents
evidencing long-standing occupation, including the ration card,
Aadhaar Card, Election Identity Card and electricity bills, also does
not advance her case. At best, such documents may establish
occupation of the premises, but not establish that the premises form
part of a notified JJ Basti or satisfy the statutory requirements
prescribed under the DUSIB Act so as to confer an enforceable right
to rehabilitation.
35. This Court also finds no infirmity in the conclusion of the
learned Estate Officer that the Petitioner has failed to establish any
independent legal right in the subject premises. The learned Estate
Officer has examined the Petitioner‟s plea from the standpoint of
adverse possession as well and has found that the requisite ingredients
for claiming any such right against Government land are
conspicuously absent. No material has been placed before this Court
to demonstrate that the said finding suffers from perversity or patent
illegality. The relevant portion of the finding in this regard, after
discussion of catena of judgements, is reproduced herein under:
“ 16. Further, during the hearing, the counsel of Respondent has not
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:27.07.2026
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W.P.(C) 10073/2026 Page 15 of 17
raised the issue of adverse possession. In view of the above
discussion with respect to the third issue, it is held that the
Respondent is a mere trespasser having no title or authority to
occupy the premises. The occupation of the premises does not
confer to the Respondent any rights in the premises and does not
give any protection from demolition of the structure erected
unauthorizedly on the premises. It is needless to mention that the
claim of financial hardship of the Respondent does not justify
commission of offence of encroachment on public land and if
permitted it would lead to more such incidents undermining the
public welfare policy of the state to utilize its land for the public
purposes. The issuance of notice under Section 5A of the Public
Premises Act, 1971 is in accordance with the facts of case and also
is in consonance with the purpose of the said enactment which is to
safeguard public interest by making available for public use
premises belonging to Government in which the Government or
Corporations has substantial interest, owned or controlled by the
Government and certain autonomous bodies and to prevent misuse
of such premises as observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and Others Vs. Punjab National
Bank and Others [(1990) 4 SCC 406] .”
36. It is trite that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court does not sit in appeal
over findings of fact returned by the competent statutory authority.
Interference would be warranted only where the decision-making
process is shown to suffer from jurisdictional error, manifest
arbitrariness, perversity or patent illegality.
37. In the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the learned
Estate Officer has considered each of the objections raised by the
Petitioner, analysed the statutory framework, adverted to the binding
precedents governing the field and thereafter returned findings which
cannot be said to be either perverse or contrary to law. The Petitioner
has failed to demonstrate any ground warranting interference in
exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.
38. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present Writ Petition is
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:27.07.2026
17:24:32
W.P.(C) 10073/2026 Page 16 of 17
dismissed.
39. The present Writ Petition, along with pending Application(s), if
any, stands disposed of in above terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JULY 23, 2026/ v/DJ
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:27.07.2026
17:24:32
W.P.(C) 10073/2026 Page 17 of 17