Bajrang Lal vs State of Chhattisgarh

Digitally signed
by YOGESH
TIWARI
Date: 2026.11.05
15:24:08 +0530
YOGESH
TIWARI
1

CGHC010003552022 2026:CGHC:46846
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 283 of 2022
Order Reserved on : 06.10.2026
Order Delivered on : 05.11.2026
Bajrang Lal S/o Late Shri Jaganath Prasad Agrawal, Aged About 72
Years R/o Opposite Bhagat Complex, Dhabra Road, Kharsia, Police
Station - Kharsia, District - Raigarh Chhattisgarh.
--- Petitioner
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - Secretary Revenue And Disaster
Management Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar,
Nava Raipur, District - Raipur Chhattisgarh
2 - Collector, Raigarh District - Raigarh Chhattisgarh
3 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Cum Land Acquisition Officer
Kharsia, District - Raigarh Chhattisgarh
4 - Executive Engineer Water Resources Department Hasdeo Bango
Project Canal, Brahmapali - Branch, Kharsia, District - Raigarh
Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
WPC No. 573 of 2022
1 - Bajrang Lal S/o Late Shri Jaganath Prasad Agrawal Aged About 72
Years R/o Opposite Bhagat Complex, Dhabra Road, Kharsia, Police
Station Kharsia, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh
2 - Shrinivas S/o Late Shri Jaganath Prasad Agrawal Aged About 70
Years R/o Opposite Bhagat Complex, Dhabra Road, Kharsia, Police
Station Kharsia, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh
3 - Subhas Chand S/o Late Shri Jaganath Prasad Agrawal Aged About
68 Years R/o Opposite Bhagat Complex, Dhabra Road, Kharsia, Police
Station Kharsia, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh

2
4 - Chedilal S/o Late Shri Jaganath Prasad Agrawal Aged About 55
Years R/o Opposite Bhagat Complex, Dhabra Road, Kharsia, Police
Station Kharsia, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioners
Versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Revenue Department
Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District
Raipur Chhattisgarh
2 - Collector Raigarh, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh
3 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Cum Land Acquisition Officer
Kharsia, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh
4 - Executive Engineer Water Resources Department Hasdeo Bango
Project Canal, Brahmapali Branch, Kharsia, District Raigarh
Chhattisgarh
--- Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioners : Mr. S.P. Kale assisted by Mr. Abhishek
Singh, Advocates
For Respondents-State : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Government Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge
CAV Order
1. Since common questions of law and fact arise for consideration in
both the present writ petitions, and the challenge in both the
matters is directed against the order dated 27.09.2021 passed by
the Collector, Raigarh, rejecting the respective claims of the
petitioners for return of the unutilised portions of their lands
acquired for construction of a canal under the Hasdeo Bango
Project, both the writ petitions have been clubbed together, heard
analogously and are being decided by this common order.

3
2. For the sake of convenience, the pleadings and documents in
W.P.(C) No. 283 of 2022 are being referred to as the lead case,
unless the context otherwise requires.
3. By filing these writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, the petitioners assail the legality, validity and propriety of
the common order dated 27.09.2021 passed by the Collector,
Raigarh, in the respective revenue proceedings, whereby their
applications seeking return of the unutilised portions of the lands
acquired for construction of the canal under the Hasdeo Bango
Project have been rejected. The principal grievance of the
petitioners is that, although the acquisition proceedings were
initiated and the awards were passed for a specified public
purpose, namely, construction of the canal, the canal construction
has since been completed, and substantial portions of the
acquired lands have allegedly remained unutilised for the purpose
for which they were acquired. According to the petitioners, the
revenue authorities, upon conducting demarcation and enquiry
proceedings, recorded findings regarding the portions of the
acquired lands that had not been affected by the canal
construction. Despite the availability of such reports, the Collector
rejected their claims by referring to public and governmental
interest, without adequately disclosing the legal or factual basis
for retaining the unutilised portions of the lands. The petitioners,
therefore, seek quashing of the impugned order and a

4
consequential direction to the respondent authorities to restore
the unutilised lands to them.
4. For the sake of completeness, the reliefs sought in W.P.(C) No.
283 of 2022, which is being treated as the lead case, are
extracted hereinbelow:
“ 10.1 Hon'ble High Court may kindly be
pleased to call the entire records pertaining to
the case of petitioner for return the unutilised
land of petitioner.
10.2 Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
quash the order dated 27/09/2021
(ANNEXURE-P/1).
10.3 Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
direct the respondent authorities to return the
unutilised land of petitioner, acquired by
respondents.
10.4 Any other relief, which Hon'ble Court
deems fit and proper may also kindly be
granted to the Petitioner in the interest of
justice.
10.5 Cost of the Petition be also awarded.”
5. The reliefs sought in W.P.(C) No. 573 of 2022 are substantially
similar. The petitioners therein seek quashing of the order dated
27.09.2021 passed by the Collector, Raigarh, whereby their
application for return of the unutilised portions of the acquired land
was rejected. They further seek a direction to the respondent
authorities to restore the unutilised land acquired from them,

5
along with such other reliefs, including costs, as this Court may
deem fit and proper. Since the precise wording and numbering of
the prayer clauses in the two petitions are not identical in the
material presently available, the foregoing statement records the
substantive reliefs without purporting to reproduce the prayer
clauses of W.P.(C) No. 573 of 2022 verbatim.
6. The brief facts, as pleaded by the petitioners in both the writ
petitions, are that the petitioners are owners of agricultural lands
situated at Village Brahmanpali, Patwari Halka No. 15, Tehsil
Kharsia, District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh. The lands were acquired
by the State authorities for construction of a canal under the
Hasdeo Bango Project, also referred to in the pleadings as the
Minimata Bango Canal Project. In the lead case, the acquired
lands comprise Khasra Nos.18/2, 18/3- , 18/3- , 18/4- , 18/4- ,
क ख ख ड
18/4- and 18/5, admeasuring a total area of 0.598 hectare. In the
च
connected writ petition, the lands comprise Khasra Nos.4/5, 5/1,
16/2 and 18/9, admeasuring a total area of 0.356 hectare. The
acquisition proceedings culminated in an award dated 28.02.2004
passed by the Land Acquisition Officer-cum-Sub Divisional Officer
(Revenue), Kharsia, with the requisite approvals stated to have
been accorded by the competent authorities. The petitioners
further plead that they had raised objections to the proposed
acquisition on 15.01.2004. Their case is that, although the lands
were acquired for the specific public purpose of constructing the

6
canal, the acquisition did not result in utilisation of the entire
acquired area, as substantial portions remained unaffected by the
canal alignment and construction. It is also their grievance that the
compensation payable in respect of the acquired lands has not
been received, as asserted in their pleadings.
7. The petitioners further plead that the construction of the canal was
completed more than a decade ago and that, thereafter, they
approached the revenue authorities for demarcation of their
respective lands to ascertain the precise areas actually affected
by the canal and those which remained unutilised. Pursuant to
their requests, the Revenue Inspector and the concerned Patwari
conducted demarcation proceedings and submitted reports to the
Tehsildar, Kharsia. In the lead case, the petitioner relies upon the
demarcation and enquiry proceedings to contend that 0.121
hectare of Khasra No. 18/3- was affected, while the remaining
क
0.121 hectare was not utilised, and that 0.055 hectare of Khasra
No. 18/3- was affected, while a further area of 0.030 hectare
ख
remained unutilised. According to him, the other acquired khasra
lands were likewise not affected by the canal construction. In the
connected writ petition, the demarcation report dated 23.05.2016,
along with the panchnama, is relied upon to contend that only
0.040 hectare out of Khasra No. 16/2 and 0.090 hectare out of
Khasra No. 18/9 were affected by the canal, while the remaining
areas, namely, 0.081 hectare and 0.080 hectare respectively,

7
were not affected or utilised for the canal construction. The
petitioners further assert that the other acquired khasra lands
were also not utilised for the said purpose. These particulars are
relied upon to demonstrate that the claims for restoration were not
founded merely on the petitioners' assertions but were supported
by reports prepared during the revenue enquiry.
8. It is further pleaded that, upon the petitioners approaching the
Collector, Raigarh, for return of the unutilised portions of their
acquired lands, the Collector registered the relevant proceedings
on 01.10.2018 and directed the Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue),
Kharsia, to conduct an enquiry and submit a report. The Tehsildar,
Kharsia, submitted an enquiry report dated 14.08.2020 recording
the areas stated to have been affected by the canal and the
remaining portions which had not been utilised for the purpose of
construction. The petitioners also rely upon the public notice
dated 28.05.2019 issued during the enquiry and the subsequent
proceedings culminating in the forwarding of the matter by the
Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) on 10.12.2020 for further action.
According to the petitioners, the revenue record thus contained
material demonstrating that substantial portions of the acquired
lands had remained unaffected by the canal construction. They
contend that, notwithstanding such material, the Collector, by the
impugned order dated 27.09.2021, rejected their applications by
referring to public and governmental interest, without identifying
the specific public purpose for which the unutilised portions were

8
required to be retained or indicating the statutory provision
authorising such retention. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have
approached this Court seeking interference with the impugned
order and restoration of the unutilised lands.
9. Mr. S.P. Kale, learned counsel, assisted by Mr. Abhishek Singh,
learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in both the writ
petitions, submits that the impugned order dated 27.09.2021 is
unsustainable in law as it suffers from non-application of mind and
fails to consider the material collected during the enquiry
conducted by the revenue authorities. According to learned
counsel, the acquisition of the petitioners' lands was undertaken
for a specific and identifiable public purpose, namely, construction
of a canal under the Hasdeo Bango Project. Once the canal
construction had been completed and the lands were no longer
required for that purpose, the authorities were required to
consider the claims for restoration in accordance with the
applicable statutory framework. Learned counsel submits that the
petitioners do not seek to question the acquisition merely because
their lands were acquired for a public purpose; rather, their
grievance is confined to the retention of those portions which,
according to the official demarcation and enquiry reports, were
never utilised for the purpose underlying the acquisition.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that the
revenue reports assume particular significance because the

9
demarcation was undertaken by the Revenue Inspector and the
concerned Patwari, and the findings were thereafter considered in
the proceedings before the Tehsildar and the Sub Divisional
Officer (Revenue). It is contended that the reports specifically
identify the portions of the lands affected by the canal and
distinguish them from the remaining areas which were found to be
unaffected or unutilised. The Collector, therefore, could not have
rejected the petitioners' claims by making a general reference to
public and governmental interest while leaving the material
findings in the enquiry reports unaddressed. According to learned
counsel, if the respondent authorities intended to retain the
remaining lands for any other public purpose, it was incumbent
upon them to disclose the nature of that purpose and the legal
basis on which such retention was considered permissible. The
absence of any reasoned consideration of the demarcation
reports, it is urged, renders the impugned order arbitrary and
contrary to the settled principles governing the exercise of
administrative and quasi-judicial powers.
11. Learned counsel also places reliance upon Section 101 of the
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short,
‘Act, 2013’), which provides for the return of unutilised land,
acquired under the Act, 2013, where such land remains unutilised
for a period of five years from the date of taking over possession,
either to the original owner or owners or their legal heirs, as the

10
case may be, or to the Land Bank of the appropriate Government,
in the manner prescribed by the appropriate Government. It is
submitted that the provision embodies the legislative concern that
land acquired for a public purpose should not remain unutilised
indefinitely without consideration of the consequences
contemplated by law. According to learned counsel, the Collector
was required to examine the petitioners' claims in the light of the
applicable statutory provisions and the factual findings recorded
during the enquiry, rather than reject them by invoking an
unspecified public interest. Learned counsel contends that the
long period which has elapsed since the acquisition, coupled with
the alleged completion of the canal and the official reports
identifying unutilised portions, warranted a reasoned
determination of the petitioners' entitlement.
12. Learned counsel lastly submits that the impugned order has the
effect of depriving the petitioners of the benefit of their land
without disclosing any legally sustainable justification for retaining
the portions which, according to the enquiry reports, were not
utilised for the acquired purpose. It is urged that the mere
expression of public or governmental interest cannot substitute for
a reasoned decision founded upon relevant facts and the
applicable law. The Collector was required to consider whether
the lands in question had in fact remained unutilised, whether the
statutory provision relied upon by the petitioners applied to the
acquisition in question, and what consequences followed under

11
the governing legal framework. Learned counsel, therefore, prays
that the impugned order dated 27.09.2021 be quashed and the
respondent authorities be directed to restore the unutilised
portions of the acquired lands to the petitioners. In the alternative,
it is submitted that, at the very least, the matter deserves
reconsideration by the competent authority after due examination
of the demarcation reports, the acquisition records and the
applicable statutory provisions, by passing a reasoned order in
accordance with law.
13. Per contra, Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned Government Advocate
appearing for the State/respondents, vehemently opposes the
submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners and
submits that both the writ petitions are devoid of merit and
deserve to be dismissed. He submits that the lands in question
were acquired in accordance with the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act of 1984’), pursuant to a
proposal dated 08.07.2003 submitted by the Executive Engineer,
Minimata Bango Canal Project Division, Kharsia, for construction
of the Minimata Bango Canal, which is a linear irrigation project.
The land acquisition proceedings were registered as Land
Acquisition Case No. 139/A-82/2002-03, wherein a total area of
7.549 hectares belonging to 61 landholders was acquired for the
said public purpose. The notification under Section 6 of the Act of
1894 was published in the Gazette on 17.10.2003 and in the
concerned village on 23.10.2003, and, after completion of the

12
requisite proceedings, the award was passed on 28.02.2004.
Learned State counsel submits that the petitioners did not raise
their objections within the prescribed period, which, according to
the respondents, expired on 03.11.2003, and the objections
subsequently submitted on 15.01.2004 were belated. He further
submits that the petitioners did not challenge the acquisition
proceedings at the relevant time and cannot, after the lapse of
nearly two decades, seek to reopen a concluded acquisition under
the guise of seeking return of the alleged unutilised portions of the
acquired lands.
14. Learned Government Advocate further submits that upon
completion of the acquisition proceedings and taking possession
of the acquired lands, the same vested absolutely in the State
Government, free from all encumbrances, in terms of the
applicable provisions of the Act of 1894. He contends that such
vesting is not affected merely because the landowners have not
withdrawn or accepted the compensation determined under the
award. In support of his submissions, learned counsel places
reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Satendra
Prasad Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1993) 4 SCC 369 , and
Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC
129. He further submits that the Act of 1894 does not contain any
provision corresponding to Section 101 of the Act, 2013, providing
for the return of land on the ground of non-utilisation for a
specified period. Since the acquisition in the present cases was

13
completed under the Act of 1894 and the award was passed on
28.02.2004, the petitioners cannot, according to learned State
counsel, invoke Section 101 of the Act, 2013, i.e. the subsequent
enactment to claim restoration of the acquired lands. He submits
that this legal position was also communicated by the competent
revenue authority through its letter dated 18.06.2021, which forms
part of the respondents' documents and was relied upon while
rejecting the petitioners' claims. Learned counsel further contends
that directing the return of the acquired lands in the present cases
would have wider implications for the remaining landholders
whose lands were acquired under the same acquisition
proceedings and would create an unwarranted precedent
affecting the implementation and administration of public
infrastructure projects.
15. Learned State counsel next submits that the petitioners have
incorrectly proceeded on the assumption that the portions of land
not submerged in the canal water or not visibly occupied by the
canal structure must necessarily be treated as unutilised land.
According to him, the Minimata Bango Canal is a linear irrigation
project, and the acquisition of land for such a project necessarily
involves technical assessment of the alignment, width, depth,
gradient, topography, soil conditions and other engineering
requirements. The land acquired for the project is not confined
merely to the portion through which water flows but also includes
areas required for excavation, inspection, supervision,

14
maintenance and other allied operational requirements. Learned
counsel submits that the canal has already been constructed and
has been providing irrigation since 2005–06. The land situated
along its banks is required to facilitate inspection and
maintenance, while the remaining portions may be required for
future operational and public purposes. He places reliance upon
the opinion dated 01.12.2020 issued by the Executive Engineer,
Water Resources Department, and the communication dated
31.05.2021 issued by the Sub Divisional Officer, Minimata Bango
Canal Sub Division No. 6, Kharsia, in which the departmental
authorities recorded that excavation work had been carried out on
the acquired land and that the remaining portions could be utilised
in the interest of the public and the State in future. Learned
counsel, therefore, submits that the opinion of the beneficiary
department, based upon the technical requirements of the
irrigation project, could not have been displaced merely by a
report prepared by a Revenue Inspector during the revenue
proceedings, particularly when the Water Resources Department
had not effectively participated in those proceedings. He
accordingly submits that the Collector, Raigarh, after considering
the departmental opinion and the relevant circumstances, rightly
declined the petitioners' request for return of the acquired lands.
16. Learned Government Advocate lastly submits that the writ
petitions suffer from delay and laches, as the acquisition
proceedings culminated in the award dated 28.02.2004, whereas

15
the petitioners sought return of the lands after the canal had
already been constructed and had been functioning for several
years. He contends that the extraordinary and discretionary
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India ought not to be exercised to unsettle a long-concluded
acquisition or interfere with the functioning of an established
public irrigation project on the basis of claims raised after an
inordinate lapse of time. Learned counsel also disputes the
petitioners' allegations regarding buildings and rice mills allegedly
standing upon acquired land, submitting that the constructions
depicted in the photographs filed as Annexure P/11 are situated
on khasra numbers which, according to the State, were not
acquired for the canal project. He further submits that the
allegations concerning other constructions are vague and
unsupported by the acquisition records. In view of the acquisition
having been completed under the Act of 1894, the vesting of the
acquired lands in the State Government, the continuing utility of
the lands for the canal and its allied purposes, the absence of a
statutory provision under the Act of 1894 providing for return of
the acquired lands, and the delay in approaching this Court,
learned Government Advocate prays that both the writ petitions be
dismissed.
17. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record with utmost circumspection.

16
18. Vide order dated 15.06.2026, this Court directed respondent No. 4
to file an affidavit specifically disclosing whether the lands claimed
by the petitioners to be unutilised were, in fact, unutilised and
whether the same were not required for any purpose in the near
future, as asserted by the petitioners. This Court observed that
the question as to whether the acquired lands had remained
unutilised and whether the same would be required for any future
purpose could not be determined merely on the basis of the
petitioners' assertions; rather, such determination required
verification by the competent technical authority, namely, the
concerned Engineer of the Water Resources Department.
Accordingly, respondent No. 4 was directed to place its
considered opinion on record. The Court further directed
respondent No. 2, namely, the Collector, Raigarh, District Raigarh,
Chhattisgarh, to file a detailed affidavit explaining the necessity of
retaining the lands in question, supported by the relevant
drawings, maps and other technical documents indicating the
proposed and existing utilisation of the acquired lands. The
aforesaid directions were issued to enable this Court to examine
the rival contentions in the light of the technical requirements of
the canal project and to ascertain whether the portions claimed by
the petitioners to be unutilised were, in fact, required for the
existing or future purposes of the project.
19. In pursuance of the order dated 15.06.2026, respondent No. 2,
namely, the Collector, Raigarh, has filed an affidavit stating that

17
the acquisition proceedings were initiated pursuant to the
requisition dated 08.07.2003 submitted by the Executive
Engineer, Minimata Bango Canal Project Division, Kharsia, for
acquisition of private lands measuring 7.549 hectares belonging
to 61 landholders, including the petitioners, for construction of the
Minimata Bango Canal Project. It has been stated that the
acquisition proceedings culminated in the passing of the award
dated 28.02.2004 and that, following the acquisition, the Sub-
Distributary Major Canal was constructed over the acquired lands.
The Collector has further stated that open spaces have been left
along both the left and right banks of the canal for inspection
pathways, maintenance, supervision and other operational
requirements of the Water Resources Department. According to
the affidavit, the acquired lands are, therefore, being utilised for
the purposes of the canal project and cannot be treated as
unutilised merely because every portion of the acquired area is
not occupied by the canal structure or submerged under water.
The Collector has also asserted that the remaining portions of the
acquired lands have been earmarked or reserved for future
departmental requirements, including the construction of
hutments, storerooms and site offices. In support of the aforesaid
stand, respondent No. 2 has placed reliance upon the drawing
and map annexed to the affidavit as Document-A, purportedly
depicting the utilisation of the acquired lands and the portions
reserved for the future requirements of the Water Resources

18
Department. The Collector has accordingly sought to justify the
retention of the acquired lands on the ground that the same
continue to be associated with the functioning, maintenance and
future operational requirements of the canal project.
20. Likewise, in pursuance of the order dated 15.06.2026, respondent
No. 4, namely, the Executive Engineer, Water Resources
Department, Minimata Bango Canal Division No. 5, Kharsia,
District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh, has filed an affidavit placing on
record the technical stand of the beneficiary department in relation
to the lands in question. In the said affidavit, the Executive
Engineer has reiterated that the acquisition proceedings were
initiated pursuant to the departmental requisition dated
08.07.2003 and culminated in the award dated 28.02.2004 in
respect of lands belonging to 61 landholders. It has further been
stated that the Sub-Distributary Major Canal has been constructed
over the acquired lands and that the open spaces along its left
and right banks are necessary for inspection, maintenance and
supervision of the canal. The Executive Engineer has specifically
asserted that the lands claimed by the petitioners to be unutilised
are, in fact, required for the operational and allied purposes of the
irrigation project and that the remaining portions have been
earmarked or reserved for future departmental requirements,
including the construction of hutments, storerooms and site
offices. On this basis, respondent No. 4 has disputed the
petitioners' contention that the acquired lands have become

19
surplus or are no longer required for the public purpose for which
they were acquired. The affidavit, therefore, seeks to establish
that the retention of the lands is justified by the technical and
administrative requirements of the canal project and that the
question of their utilisation cannot be determined solely by
reference to whether a particular portion is presently occupied by
the canal or directly affected by the flow of water.
21. The undisputed facts emerging from the record are that the lands
in question, situated at Village Brahmanpali, Patwari Halka No.
15, Tehsil Kharsia, District Raigarh, were acquired for the
Minimata Bango Canal Project under the Act of 1894, pursuant to
the proposal dated 08.07.2003, culminating in the award dated
28.02.2004. In W.P.(C) No. 573 of 2022, the petitioners claim
return of land bearing Khasra Nos. 4/5, 5/1, 16/2 and 18/9,
admeasuring 0.356 hectare, whereas in W.P.(C) No. 283 of 2022,
the claim concerns Khasra Nos. 18/2, 18/3- , 18/3- , 18/4- ,
क ख ख
18/4- , 18/4- and 18/5, admeasuring 0.598 hectare. Their
ड च
grievance is that certain portions of the acquired lands have
allegedly remained unutilised, as reflected in the demarcation
reports and revenue proceedings, and ought, therefore, to be
restored by invoking Section 101 of the Act, 2013. The
respondents oppose the claim, contending that the acquisition
was completed under the Act of 1894, the canal has been
constructed and is operational, and the adjoining spaces are
required for inspection, maintenance, supervision and future

20
departmental purposes. Pursuant to the order dated 15.06.2026,
the Collector, Raigarh, and the Executive Engineer concerned
have filed affidavits reiterating the departmental requirements and
placed a drawing/map on record regarding the use and proposed
use of the acquired land. Further, the absence of the canal
structure on a particular portion does not necessarily establish
that the land is surplus to the requirements of the project. The
petitioners have not challenged the original acquisition or the
award dated 28.02.2004, and their claim must stand or fall on the
existence of an applicable statutory right to restoration. In the
absence of such an established right, the alleged non-utilisation of
certain portions, by itself, cannot warrant a direction for return of
the acquired land.
22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Govt. of A.P. and another v.
Syed Akbar, (2005) 1 SCC 558, while considering the issue of
restitution of acquired land on the ground of its subsequent non-
utilisation, has reiterated the settled legal position that once the
land has been acquired and has vested in the Government free
from all encumbrances, mere non-utilisation of the acquired land
for the purpose for which it was initially acquired does not confer
any right upon the erstwhile owner to seek restitution or
reconveyance of such land. Referring to its earlier decisions,
including Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State of
Maharashtra, (1996) 6 SCC 405 and Northern Indian Glass
Industries v. Jaswant Singh, (2003) 1 SCC 335 , the Hon’ble

21
Supreme Court observed that land acquired for a public purpose
may be utilised for any other public purpose and that mere non-
utilisation does not entitle the erstwhile owner, who has already
received adequate compensation, to seek restitution of the
acquired land. The relevant observations are extracted
hereinbelow:-
“12. In the case Chandragauda Ramgonda
Patil v. State of Maharashtra [(1996) 6 SCC
405] claim of the petitioner for restitution of
the possession of the land acquired pursuant
to the resolution of the State Government was
rejected. In para 2, this Court observed thus:
(SCC p. 406)
“2. … We do not think that this Court
would be justified in making direction for
restitution of the land to the erstwhile
owners when the land was taken way
back and vested in the Municipality free
from all encumbrances. We are not
concerned with the validity of the
notification in either of the writ petitions. It
is axiomatic that the land acquired for a
public purpose would be utilised for any
other public purpose, though use of it was
intended for the original public purpose. It
is not intended that any land which
remained unutilised, should be restituted
to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate
compensation was paid according to the
market value as on the date of the

22
notification. Under these circumstances,
the High Court was well justified in
refusing to grant relief in both the writ
petitions.”
13. Yet in another recent decision, this Court
in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant
Singh [(2003) 1 SCC 335] referring to the
case of Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil
[(1996) 6 SCC 405] and other cases held
that: (SCC p. 340, para 12)
“12. If the land was not used for the
purpose for which it was acquired, it was
open to the State Government to take
action but that did not confer any right on
the respondents to ask for restitution of
the land.”
Paras 10 and 11 of the said judgment
read thus: (SCC p. 340)
“10. In Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v.
State of Maharashtra [(1996) 6 SCC 405]
it is stated that the acquired land
remaining unutilised was not intended to
be restituted to the erstwhile owner to
whom adequate compensation was paid
according to the market value as on the
date of notification.
11. Yet again in C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to
the Govt. of T.N. [(1997) 2 SCC 627] it is
held that acquired land having vested in
the State and the compensation having
been paid to the claimant, he was not

23
entitled to restitution of possession on the
ground that either original public purpose
had ceased to be in operation or the land
could not be used for other purpose.”
14. From the position of law made clear in the
aforementioned decisions, it follows that (1)
under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act,
the land acquired vests in the Government
absolutely free from all encumbrances; (2) the
land acquired for a public purpose could be
utilised for any other public purpose; and (3)
the acquired land which is vested in the
Government free from all encumbrances
cannot be reassigned or reconveyed to the
original owner merely on the basis of an
executive order.”
23. The aforesaid legal position has been further reiterated and
authoritatively explained by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Indore Development Authority (supra), while
considering the scope and applicability of Section 101 of the Act,
2013. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after examining the scheme of
the Act, 2013, has categorically held that Section 101, which
provides for return of unutilised land, operates only in respect of
land acquired under the Act, 2013 and cannot be invoked in
relation to an acquisition made under the Act of 1894. The
relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are extracted
hereinbelow:-

24
“ Return of Unutilised Land under the 2013
Act
363. It was submitted that Section 101
provides for return of unutilised land under
the 2013 Act. Section 101 provides that in
case land is not utilised for five years from the
date of taking over the possession, the same
shall be returned to the original owner or
owners or their legal heirs, as the case may
be, or to the Land Bank of the appropriate
Government by reversion in the manner as
may be prescribed by the appropriate
Government. Section 101 reads as under:
“ 101. Return of unutilised land. —When
any land, acquired under this Act remains
unutilised for a period of five years from
the date of taking over the possession,
the same shall be returned to the original
owner or owners or their legal heirs, as
the case may be, or to the Land Bank of
the appropriate Government by reversion
in the manner as may be prescribed by
the appropriate Government.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this
section, “Land Bank” means a
governmental entity that focuses on the
conversion of Government-owned vacant,
abandoned, unutilised acquired lands and
tax-delinquent properties into productive
use.”

25
364. Section 24 deals with lapse of
acquisition. Section 101 deals with the return
of unutilised land. Section 101 cannot be said
to be applicable to an acquisition made under
the 1894 Act. The provision of lapse has to be
considered on its own strength and not by
virtue of Section 101 though the spirit is to
give back the land to the original owner or
owners or the legal heirs or to the Land Bank.
Return of lands is with respect to all lands
acquired under the 2013 Act as the
expression used in the opening part is “When
any land, acquired under this Act remains
unutilised”. Lapse, on the other hand, occurs
when the State does not take steps in terms
of Section 24(2). The provisions of Section
101 cannot be applied to the acquisitions
made under the 1894 Act. Thus, no such
sustenance can be drawn from the provisions
contained in Section 101 of the 2013 Act. Five
years' logic has been carried into effect for
the purpose of lapse and not for the purpose
of returning the land remaining unutilised
under Section 24(2).”
24. Very recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of
Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority represented by
its Member Secretary v. Dharmalingam and others, 2026 SCC
OnLine SC 485 , while dealing with the similar issue, has held as
under :-
“6. It may be observed that Section 16-B
addresses a situation where land acquired

26
has been allocated for a specific 'public
purpose but has not actually been used for
the said purpose. It emphasises an enabling
power given to the State to forfeit the land as
a penalty, after which the-land shall vest in
the State free from all encumbrances.
7. Section 48-B, which was similarly
introduced into the LA Act through a State
Amendment, allows for the transfer of the
land to the original owner and reads as
follows:
"48-B. Transfer of land to original
owner in certain cases .-Where the
Government are satisfied that the land
vest in the Government under this Act is
not required for the purpose for which it
was acquired, or for any other public
purpose, the Government may transfer
such land to the original owner who is
willing to repay the amount paid to him
under this Act for the acquisition of such
land inclusive of the amount referred to
in Sub-section (1A) and (2) of Section
23, if any, paid under this Act."
8. On a plain reading of Section 48-B. we find
that the State Government must, at the
outset, be satisfied that the land vested in it
"is not required for the purpose for which it
was acquired, or for any other public
purpose". This satisfaction on the part of the
State is a sine qua non for any action of the
Government under this provision, and only

27
thereafter the Government 'may' decide to
revert such land to the willing original owner.
The scheme of Section 48-B of the LA Act, in
our considered opinión, does not envisage
any enforceable right in favour of the
expropriated landowner to seek transfer of
the acquired land. Rather, it confers a
discretion upon the State to permit re-
conveyance of the land to the original
landowner in certain circumstances, being
that the acquired land can neither be utilised
for the original purpose of acquisition nor for
any other public purpose. Unless this two-
pronged condition is fulfilled, the question of
exercise of the State's discretion does not
arise.
*
14. It is trite law that no timeline can be
imposed on the Government or its beneficial
agencies for putting the acquired land to use
for the public purpose once acquisition is
lawfully completed. Perhaps the only
exception in such a case would lie in
situations where the urgency provision under
Section 17 of the LA Act has been invoked.
15. The above postulate is a reflection of the
general circumspection that Constitutional
Courts ought to undertake when exercising
their extraordinary jurisdiction to direct the
release of lawfully acquired land. This
principle was also recognised by a two-Judge
bench of this Court. including one of us

28
(Surya Kant, J., as he then was), in a case
titled Nandkishor Babulal Agrawal v. The
State of Maharashtra, the relevant extract of
whereof is reproduced below:
“11. In our considered view, the High
Court would be extremely circumspect
to issue a mandamus in the exercise of
its extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution, directing
to release a lawfully acquired land only
on the premise that such land has not
been utilized for the public purpose for
which it was acquired. There is no
gainsaying that once the land vests in
the State or its authorities, the 'public
purpose of its acquisition can be
changed at a later stage. All that is
required is that such land should be
utilized for public purposes only. In fact,
there cannot be a time limit within which
the authorities are expected to utilize
the acquired land. The Municipalities or
such other agencies are expected to
have long-term plans for regulated
development of urban areas and for that
purpose, certain pockets of land are
required to be kept vacant as reserve
pool to cater the future needs."
[Emphasis supplied]
16. Adverting to the facts of the instant case,
we may first notice that the acquisition for the
truck-cum-bus depot was not initiated under

29
Section 17 of the LA Act. Furthermore, it is
undisputed that the acquisition was made for
a bona fide public purpose, and all procedural
necessities were also duly completed. There
is also no question about the genuineness of
the submission of the authorities that the land
would be used for building a truck parking
yard. That being the case. we do not find any
ground whatsoever on the basis of which the
actions of the State or the Appellant-Authority
can be faulted or which would justify the
reversion of the acquisition. Merely the
acquisition having not resulted in the land
being utilised within a particular period of time
is no reason for the Court to direct the land to
be released to the landowners.
17. In the same breath, we are constrained to
observe that the two judgments relied upon
by the Division Bench of the High Court,
extracted in paragraphs 40 and 41 of the First
Impugned Judgment. are based upon an
incorrect interpretation of the law. To buttress
the directions issued by it, the Division Bench
has cited those judgments to hold that it is not
open for the State or the acquiring agency to
change its mind after a request for re-
conveyance of the acquired land under
Section 48-B is made. This interpretation of
the law, in our considered acquisition opinion,
is entirely disjointed from the text of the
provision and displays unfounded reasoning.
Similarly. jurisprudence is the submission that
if the land is not put to use for a specified long

30
period of time, it is liable to be reverted to the
landowners under Section 48-B. Suffice it to
say that there is no legal prohibition under the
said provision against keeping a portion of the
acquired land vacant for future development.
18. At the cost of repetition, we reiterate that
Section 48-B of the LA Act does not clothe an
expropriated owner with any right to seek re-
conveyance of the land. Therefore, even if
such a landowner has made an application
purportedly under Section 48-B of the LA Act,
that does not take away the power of the
State to revisit the original public purpose or
to divert the land for any other bona-fide
public use. In the absence of a positive right,
what the Court ought to examine, while
undertaking judicial review over the
action/inaction under Section 48-B, is whether
the exercise of discretion is founded upon
mala fide or arbitrary reasons or if the
decision-making is tainted by a colourable
exercise of power.”
25. Reverting to the facts of the present cases in the light of the
aforesaid discussion, it is evident that the lands in question were
acquired for the Minimata Bango Canal Project pursuant to the
acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the Act of
1894. The acquisition proceedings were initiated on the basis of
the proposal dated 08.07.2003 submitted by the Executive
Engineer, Minimata Bango Canal Project Division, Kharsia, for
acquisition of a total area of 7.549 hectares belonging to 61

31
landowners. The requisite notification under Section 6 of the Act
of 1894, was published in the Official Gazette on 17.10.2003 and
at the village level on 23.10.2003, and the proceedings ultimately
culminated in the award dated 28.02.2004. The lands forming the
subject matter of the present writ petitions, situated at Village
Brahmanpali, Patwari Halka No. 15, Tehsil Kharsia, District
Raigarh, formed part of the aforesaid acquisition. In W.P.(C) No.
573 of 2022, the petitioners seek restoration of land bearing
Khasra Nos. 4/5, 5/1, 16/2 and 18/9, admeasuring a total area of
0.356 hectare, whereas in W.P.(C) No. 283 of 2022, the claim
concerns land bearing Khasra Nos. 18/2, 18/3- , 18/3- , 18/4- ,
क ख ख
18/4- , 18/4- and 18/5, admeasuring a total area of 0.598
ड च
hectare. The petitioners’ principal contention is that,
notwithstanding the acquisition, certain portions of the acquired
lands have allegedly remained unutilised after construction of the
canal and, therefore, ought to be returned to them. The
respondents, however, have consistently maintained that the
acquisition proceedings were duly completed under the statutory
regime then prevailing and that the acquired lands are required for
the canal project, including for inspection, maintenance,
supervision and other operational and future departmental
requirements. It is also material that the petitioners have not
sought to invalidate the original acquisition proceedings or the
award dated 28.02.2004; their challenge is essentially directed
against the order dated 27.09.2021 passed by the Collector,

32
Raigarh, rejecting their claim for return of the alleged unutilised
portions of the acquired land.
26. The question that arises for consideration is whether the
petitioners can claim restoration of the acquired lands merely on
the ground that certain portions thereof are allegedly not
physically occupied by the canal structure, particularly when the
acquisition proceedings had culminated in an award under the Act
of 1894. In this regard, the legal position is well settled that, upon
completion of acquisition and vesting of the land in the State in
accordance with the applicable statutory provisions, the erstwhile
landowner does not retain an automatic right to reclaim the
acquired land merely because the land is subsequently alleged to
be unutilised or is not being used for the principal physical
structure for which it was acquired. The principle underlying the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad Jain (supra)
Indore Development Authority (supra) and Chennai
Metropolitan Development Authority represented by its
Member Secretary (supra) is that the legal consequences
flowing from a completed acquisition and statutory vesting cannot
be displaced merely on the basis of subsequent circumstances,
unless a right to such relief is established under an applicable
provision of law. In the present cases, the acquisition was
undertaken for a canal project, the nature of which necessarily
involves not only the land occupied by the canal itself but also
land required for access, inspection, maintenance, supervision

33
and allied operational purposes. Consequently, the absence of a
permanent physical structure upon every part of the acquired land
cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that such land has
become surplus or that its restoration to the erstwhile owners is
legally mandated. The petitioners were, therefore, required to
establish not merely that certain portions were not physically
occupied by the canal, but also that they possessed an
enforceable statutory right to seek return of those portions
notwithstanding the completed acquisition under the earlier
enactment.
27. The petitioners have placed reliance upon demarcation reports
and revenue proceedings to substantiate their contention that
certain portions of the acquired khasra numbers have remained
unutilised. In W.P.(C) No. 573 of 2022, reliance has been placed
upon the demarcation report dated 23.05.2016, according to
which portions of Khasra Nos. 16/2 and 18/9 were allegedly not
utilised for construction of the canal, apart from the assertion that
certain other acquired khasra numbers were not affected by the
canal. Similarly, in W.P.(C) No. 283 of 2022, the petitioner relies
upon the revenue material to contend that portions of Khasra Nos.
18/3- and 18/3- remained unutilised and that certain other
क ख
acquired khasra numbers were not affected by the canal. This
Court, taking note of the nature of the controversy, passed an
order dated 15.06.2026 requiring the concerned authorities to
clarify whether the land claimed by the petitioners to be unutilised

34
was, in fact, unutilised and whether the same would be required
for the project in the near future. The Court also directed
respondent No. 2, the Collector, Raigarh, to file a detailed
affidavit, accompanied by relevant drawings or maps, indicating
the necessity for the acquired land. In compliance with the said
directions, the Collector, Raigarh, as well as the Executive
Engineer concerned, filed their respective affidavits asserting that
the canal had already been constructed on the acquired land and
that the spaces adjoining its left and right banks were required for
inspection, maintenance and supervision. It was further stated
that the remaining portions had been earmarked for future
departmental requirements, including hutments, storerooms and
site offices, and a drawing/map was placed on record to indicate
the utilisation and proposed use of the land. The respondents
have thus disputed the petitioners’ assertion that the land in
question is surplus or no longer required for the project. The
material brought on record, considered in the context of the nature
and requirements of the canal project, does not furnish a sufficient
legal basis for directing restoration of the acquired lands to the
petitioners. In any event, even assuming, for the sake of
argument, that certain portions are not presently occupied by the
physical structure of the canal, such circumstance alone would
not create an enforceable right in favour of the petitioners to
reclaim land which was acquired and vested in accordance with
law.

35
28. The next question concerns the applicability of Section 101 of the
Act, 2013. The petitioners seek to rely upon the said provision as
the basis for claiming return of the allegedly unutilised land. The
respondents, however, have opposed the claim on the ground that
the acquisition proceedings in the present cases were initiated
and concluded under the Act of 1894, and that the subsequent
enactment of the Act, 2013 does not, by itself, confer a right to
reopen a completed acquisition undertaken under the earlier
statutory regime. The applicability of Section 101 of the Act, 2013
must necessarily be determined with reference to the language
and scheme of the Act, 2013 and the circumstances in which the
acquisition was completed. In the present cases, the acquisition
proceedings culminated in the award dated 28.02.2004, whereas
the Act, 2013 came into force subsequently. The petitioners have
not demonstrated any statutory provision which, in the facts of the
present cases, confers upon them an enforceable right to obtain
restoration of the acquired land merely on the allegation of
subsequent non-utilisation. Section 101 of the Act, 2013 cannot
be invoked as an automatic mechanism for reopening every
acquisition completed under the Act of 1894, without first
establishing that the provision applies to the acquisition in
question and that the statutory conditions governing the return of
land stand fulfilled. The mere assertion that the land has remained
unutilised, without establishing the applicability of the provision
relied upon and the corresponding legal entitlement, is insufficient

36
to warrant a direction for restoration. Accordingly, the petitioners
have failed to establish that Section 101 of the Act, 2013 furnishes
a legally sustainable basis for the relief sought in these writ
petitions.
29. It is equally important to bear in mind that the petitioners have not
challenged the validity of the acquisition proceedings or the award
dated 28.02.2004 on any independent ground warranting
interference by this Court. Their grievance is confined to the
alleged subsequent non-utilisation of certain portions of the
acquired land and the rejection of their claim for return of those
portions by the Collector, Raigarh, vide order dated 27.09.2021.
The acquisition proceedings have remained unchallenged for a
considerable period, and the petitioners have not established any
defect in the original acquisition which would justify unsettling the
legal consequences flowing therefrom in the present proceedings.
The fact that the petitioners may regard certain portions as
unnecessary for the canal does not, in itself, entitle them to
question the continued retention of such land by the acquiring
authority. The determination of the operational requirements of an
irrigation project involves consideration of factors extending
beyond the physical footprint of the canal, including the need for
inspection pathways, access for maintenance, supervision, safety
and other ancillary requirements. The competent departmental
authorities have asserted that the disputed land is required for
such purposes and for future departmental use. In the absence of

37
a demonstrated statutory right to restoration, this Court cannot
direct reconveyance merely on the basis of the petitioners’
assertion that some portions of the acquired land are not
presently being used for the main canal structure. The acceptance
of such a claim, without an applicable statutory foundation, would
effectively permit a concluded acquisition to be reopened solely
on the basis of subsequent allegations concerning the manner or
extent of utilisation of the acquired land.
30. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the petitioners in both writ petitions have failed to establish
any enforceable statutory right to seek restoration of the lands
acquired for the Minimata Bango Canal Project. The acquisition
proceedings were initiated and completed under the Act of 1894,
and culminated in the award dated 28.02.2004. The petitioners
have not challenged the acquisition itself on any legally
sustainable ground, nor have they established that Section 101 of
the Act, 2013 is applicable to the acquisitions in question in a
manner that entitles them to the relief sought. Further, the
allegation that certain portions of the acquired land are not
physically occupied by the canal does not, by itself, establish that
the land is surplus to the requirements of the project or that the
petitioners are entitled to its return.
31. The affidavits filed by the Collector, Raigarh, and the Executive
Engineer concerned, pursuant to the order dated 15.06.2026,

38
indicate that the respondents maintain that the land is required for
inspection, maintenance, supervision and other departmental
requirements associated with the canal project. In these
circumstances, no ground has been made out for issuing a writ
directing restoration of the acquired land or for interfering with the
order dated 27.09.2021 passed by the Collector, Raigarh.
32. Accordingly, W.P.(C) No. 283 of 2022 and W.P.(C) No. 573 of
2022 are dismissed . There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh

39
Head-Note
Mere non-utilisation of the acquired land does not confer any
enforceable right upon the erstwhile landowners to seek its restoration
or reconveyance, particularly when the land has vested absolutely in
the State pursuant to acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
and continues to be required for the original or other allied public
purposes.