SHANAJI KALUJI BAMANIYA vs DEPUTY COLLECTOR AND SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
- Court
- Gujarat High Court
C/FA/1952/2026 (GJHC240680762025) JUDGMENT DATED: 25/08/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 1952 of 2026
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SHANAJI KALUJI BAMANIYA
Versus
DEPUTY COLLECTOR AND SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER &
ANR.
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Appearance:
MS MAHIMA H BRAHMBHATT(11279) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MS SACHI H BAROT(13081) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MS KINJAL VYAS GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the Defendant(s) No. 1,2
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
Date : 25/08/2026
JUDGMENT
1. Heard, learned advocate, Ms. Brahmbhatt, appearing
for the appellants-claimants and learned AGP, Ms. Pandya,
for the defendants.
2. By way of the captioned appeal, the appellant - original
claimant has challenged the judgment and order dated
01.10.2024, passed by the learned Additional Senior Civil
Judge, Bayad, District: Arvalli (hereinafter referred to as,
the ‘Reference Court’) in Land Reference Case No. 195 of
2024.
3. The brief facts of the case are that the land of the
original claimant, situated at village Rambhoda, came to be
acquired for ‘Vatrak Jalagar Yojna’ by the Dy. Collector and
Land Acquisition Officer in the year 1973-1974 and the
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award was passed for the same on 16.09.1975.
3.1 From the record, it emerges that the land owner –
original claimant filed an application, raising objections
against the said award, before the Land Acquisition Officer
on 30.11.1988, i.e. after the delay of about 4833 days, from
the date of passing of the award. Further, the concerned
Land Acquisition Officer made reference in the year 2024
only, i.e. after the delay of about 12942 days.
3.2 Under the circumstances, since, the objections were
raised after the delay of about 4833 days, from the date of
passing of the award and as, the Reference Court found that
the reference was time barred, since the same was
forwarded after the delay of almost 12942 days, it dismissed
the reference of the original claimant vide order dated
01.10.2024. Hence, the present appeal.
4. Learned advocate, Ms. Brahmbhatt, appearing for the
appellants in this matter placed reliance on the decision of
the Coordinate Bench of this Court, Dated: 05.02.2026,
passed in First Appeal No. 248 of 2026 and submitted that,
in similar set of facts, the matter was remanded to the
concerned Reference Court, with a direction to decide the
same on merits and as expeditiously as possible. She,
therefore, prayed that this Court may also pass the similar
order in this matter.
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5. Learned AGP appearing on behalf of the defendants, in
view of the decision of the Coordinate Bench of this Court,
prayed that the appropriate orders may be passed.
6. Having heard the learned advocates on both the sides,
it would be profitable to recapitulate the observations made
by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Paragraphs – 4 to
7 of its order dated 05.02.2026, which reads thus;
“4. To determine the above point, this Court referred the
decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Raja
Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs Dy. Land Acquisition Officer
reported in AIR 1961 SC 1500. The relevant paragraphs are
reproduced herein below:
“5.In the dealing with this question it is relevant to bear in
mind the legal character of the award made by the Collector
under S. 12. In a sense it is a decision of the Collector
reached by him after holding an enquiry as prescribed by the
Act. It is a decision, inter alia, in respect of the amount of
compensation which should be paid to the person interested
in the property acquired; but legally the award cannot be
treated as a decision; it is in law an offer or tender of the
compensation determined by the Collector to the owner of the
property under acquisition. If the owner accepts the offer no
further proceeding is required to be taken; the amount is paid
and compensation proceedings are concluded. If, however,
the owner does not accept the offer, S. 18 gives him the
statutory right of having the question determined by Court,
and it is the amount of compensation which the Court may
determine that would bind both the owner and the Collector.
In that case it is on the amount thus determined judicially
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that the acquisition proceedings would be concluded. It is
because of this nature of the award that the award can be
appropriately described as a tender of offer made by the
Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the
property for his acceptance. In Ezra v. Secretary of State, ILR
30 Cal 36 at p. 86, it has been held that "the meaning to be
attached to the word "award" under S. 11 and its nature and
effect must be arrived at not from the mere use of the same
expression in both instances but from the examination of the
provisions of the law relating to the Collector's proceedings
culminating in the award. The consideration to which we
have referred satisfy us that the Collector acts in the matter
of the enquiry and the valuation of the land only as an agent
of the Government and not as judicial office; and that
consequently, although the Government is bound by his
proceedings, he persons interested are not concluded by his
finding regarding the value of the land or the compensation
to be awarded”
Then the High Court has added that such tender once made
is binding on the Government and the Government cannot
require that the value fixed by its own officer acting on its
behalf should be open to question at its own instance before
the Civil Court. The said case was taken before the Privy
Council in Ezra v. Secretary of State, ILR 32 Cal 605 (PC),
and their Lordship have expressly approved of the
observations made by the High Court to which we have just
referred. Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in
law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government
to the owner of the property then the making of the award as
properly understood must involve the communication of the
offer to the party concerned. That is the normal requirement
under the contract law and its applicability to cases of award
made under the Act cannot be reasonably excluded. Thus
considered the date of the award cannot be determined solely
by reference to the time when the award is signed by the
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Collector or delivered by him in his office: it must involve the
consideration of the question as to when it was known to the
party concerned either actually or constructively. If that be
the true position then the literal and mechanical construction
of the words "the date of the award occurring in the relevant
section would not be appropriate.
6.There is yet another point which leads to the same
conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative
decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation
of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said
decision ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the
property and in that sense, like all decisions which affect
persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said decision
should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of
the party affected by such a decision, either actual or
constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied
before the decision can be brought into force. Thus
considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in
the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even
filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the
communication of the said award to the party concerned
either actually or constructively. If the award is pronounced
in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it it
can be said to be made when pronounced. If the date for the
pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party
and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously
announced the award is said to be communicated to the said
party even if the said party is not actually present on the date
of its pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the date
of its pronouncement, an award is pronounced and a party is
not present the award can be said to be made when it is
communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the party
affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an
essential requirement of fairplay and natural justice the
expression "the date of the award" used in the proviso must
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mean the date when the award is either communicated to the
party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In
our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe
the words "from the date of the Collector's award" used in
the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.
7.In this connection it is material to recall the fact that under
Section 12(2) it is obligatory on the Collector to give
immediate notice of the award to the persons interested as
are not present personally or by their representatives when
the award is made. This requirement itself postulates the
necessity of the communication of the award to the party
concerned. The legislature recognised that the making of the
award under Section 11 followed by its filing under Section
12(1) would not meet the requirements of justice before
bringing the award into force. It thought that the
communication of the award to the party concerned was also
necessary, and so by the use of the mandatory words an
obligation is placed on the Collector to communicate the
award immediately to the person concerned. It is significant
that the section requires the Collector to give notice of the
award immediately after making it. This provision lends
support to the view which we have taken about the
construction of the expression "from the date of the
Collector's award" in the proviso to Section 18. It is because
communication of the order is regarded by the legislature as
necessary that Section 12(2) has imposed an obligation on
the Collector and if the relevant clause in the proviso is read
in the light of this statutory requirement it tends to show that
the literal and mechanical construction of the said clause
would be wholly inappropriate. It would indeed be a very
curious result that the failure of the Collector to discharge
his obligation under Section 12 (2) should directly tend to
make ineffective the right of the party to make an application
under Section 18, and this result could not possibly have
been intended by the legislature.”
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5. An identical view was taken by the Division Bench of this
Court in the case of Heirs of deceased Aher Naran Maiya
Bhupat Naranbhai (supra) wherein also the Division Bench
has held as under:
“12. In the case of Rajat Hirabhai Motibhai & Ors. vs.
Deputy Collector(supra), the Division Bench of this Court,
has held that reading the language of sub-section (2) of
Section 12 it suggests that there is an obligation on the part
of the Collector not merely to intimate about the passing of
the award but has to communicate the essential contents of
the award, if not a copy of the award. Paragraph 3 of the
Judgment, reads thus:-
“3. The question, therefore, is whether under sec. 12(2)of the
Land Acquisition Act, there is an obligation upon the
Collector merely to intimate about the passing of the award
or he is obliged to convey the matters contained in the award
by serving either a copy of the award or the essential part of
it. In State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1963
SC 1604, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the
purpose of the notice under Sec. 12(2) in the context of a plea
as to whether mere knowledge of the passing of the award
would be sufficient as a starting point reckoned for the
purpose of filing a reference application. It is in dealing with
this that the Supreme Court observed:
"Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere
knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The
knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award.
These contents may be known either actually or
constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under
Sec.12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with
knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or
not. Similarly when a party is present in Court either
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personally or through his representative when the award is
made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the
contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the
Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean
knowledge of the essential contents of the award."
This Court has expressed the same view referring to the
above said decision in Rasulkhanjiv. H. P. Rathod, (1975) 16
Guj LR 911. In this view, it is clear that there is -an
obligation on the part of the Collector not merely to intimate
about the passing of the award but he has to communicate
the essential contents of the award, if not a copy of the
award. That has not been fulfilled in this case and we direct
that this shall be done within a month.”
6. This Court has also referred to the decision of the Apex
Court in the case of Premji Nathu (supra), wherein the Apex
Court has held as under:
“11. The reason for providing six months from the date of the
award for making an application seeking reference, where
the applicant did not receive a notice under Section 12(2) of
the Act, while providing only six weeks from the date of
receipt of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act for making an
application for reference where the applicant has received a
notice under Section 12(2) of the Act is obvious. When a
notice under Section 12(2) of the Act is received, the
landowner or person interested is made aware of all relevant
particulars of the award which enables him to decide
whether he should seek reference or not. On the other hand,
if he only comes to know that an award has been made, he
would require further time to make enquiries or secure
copies so that he can ascertain the relevant particulars of the
award. What needs to be emphasised is that along with the
notice issued under Section 12(2) of the Act, the land owner
who is not present or is not represented before the Collector
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at the time of making of award should be supplied with a
copy thereof so that he may effectively exercise his right
under Section 18(1) to seek reference to the Court.”
7. Considering the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the
decisions referred hereinabove, in the opinion of this Court it
is obligatory on the Collector to give immediate notice of the
award to the persons interested as are not present personally
or by their representatives when the award is made. In
absence of the same, the claimants would deprive the
statutory right of challenging the same within the time
prescribed under the Act. In the instant case, record does not
indicate issuance of the notice neither receipt of the same by
the claimant. In that background, deciding the reference only
on the ground of limitation, ignoring the merits of the case,
would cause great injustice to the claimants whose lands
were acquired under the compulsory land acquisition and
could not get the reasonable amount of compensation.
However, at the same time, to maintain equity, the claimants
would not be entitled for the interest for the period from the
date of award, under section 11 of the Act, till raising the
objection. ”
6.1 Adopting the same view, this Court is of the considered
opinion that this appeal deserves to be partly allowed and
the same is required to be remanded to the concerned
Reference Court for its decision afresh, on merits.
7. In the result, the present first appeal is partly
allowed and the impugned judgment and order of the
Reference Court dated 01.10.2024, passed in Land
Reference Case No. 195 of 2024, is quashed and set aside.
The original reference case is restored to its original file and
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the same is remanded back to the concerned Reference
Court for its consideration afresh, on merits. However, the
claimants would not be entitled to any interest on enhanced
amount, if any, for the period between 16.09.1975 to
30.11.1988, i.e. the period between the date of passing of
the award, till filing of objections before the Land
Acquisition Officer, and one of the appell ants shall file an
affidavit to that effect. R&P, if any, be sent back to the
concerned Court, forthwith.
7.1 Registry to keep the affidavit, to be filed by one of the
appell ants, on the record of this matter. Direct service is
permitted.
(J. C. DOSHI,J)
UMESH/-
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