Padam Chand Gupta vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
th
ON THE 7 OF JULY, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 25373 of 2026
PADAM CHAND GUPTA AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri N K Gupta - Senior Advocate along with Shri Yashasvi Pratap
Singh Rathore- Advocate for the petitioners.
Shri Dharmendra Nayak- Government Advocate for the
respondents/State.
ORDER
The instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has
been preferred assailing the orders dated 10.09.2025 passed by the Collector,
Gwalior, whereby the firearm licences of the petitioners were suspended till
conclusion of the trial on account of Crime No.168/2021 registered at Police
Station Kotwali, District Gwalior under Sections 294, 323, 506 and 34 of the
IPC.
2. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioners, while
referring to Section 17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959, submits that the licensing
authority is empowered to suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit
only if any of the contingencies enumerated therein are attracted. According
to him, the only provision which could possibly have been invoked in the
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present case is clause (b) of Section 17(3), namely, that suspension of the

licence is necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety.
It is contended that the Collector has not recorded any finding whatsoever
with regard to the existence of the aforesaid condition. Instead, the impugned
orders proceed merely on the assumption that since the petitioners are
involved in a criminal case, there is every likelihood of misuse of the
licensed firearms in future. Such an assumption, it is submitted, is wholly
perverse and renders the impugned orders unsustainable in law.
3. It is further submitted that the criminal case on the basis of which
the licences have been suspended pertains to the year 2021 and relates to
allegations of simple assault (maarpeet) under Section 323 IPC, use of
abusive language and criminal intimidation. Except for the aforesaid case, no
other criminal antecedents or involvement of the petitioners in any heinous
offence have been brought on record. Therefore, there was no material
before the Collector to form an opinion that the petitioners posed any threat
to public peace or public safety. Since the existence of such satisfaction is a
mandatory prerequisite under Section 17(3) of the Arms Act, the impugned
orders deserve to be set aside.
4. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Advocate has placed
reliance in the matter of Gajendra Singh Vs. State of M.P. and Others
reported in 2020(2) MPLJ 441 and in the matter of Abdul Saleem Vs. State
of M.P. and Others reported in 2019(3) MPLJ 332.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents/State supported the
impugned orders and submitted that, considering the criminal background of
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the petitioners, there exists every possibility of misuse of the firearms in

their possession and, therefore, no interference with the impugned orders is
warranted.
6. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on
record.
7. In the matter of Abdul Saleem (supra) in paragraphs 17 to 23 this
Court had held as under:-
17. A Full Bench (consists of three Judges) of Allahabad High
Court in the case of Changga Prasad Sahu vs. State of U. P.
(supra) in the context of applicability of the provision of section
17 of the Act with respect to recording satisfaction and to explain
the object of enquiry has held as under:—
15. The object of the enquiry that a licensing authority may, while
proceeding to consider the question as to whether or not an arms
licence should be revoked or suspended, like to make, clearly is to
enable the licensing authority to come to a conclusion as to
whether or not the facts stated in clauses (a) to (e) of section 17(3)
exist and as already explained it is not obliged to before
considering that a case for revocation/ suspension of licence has
been made out, associate the licensee in such enquiry. In this view
of the matter it can safely be taken that where a licensing authority
embarks upon such an enquiry it is, till then, not convinced about
existence of the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of
section 17(3) of the Act. So long as it is not so convinced no case
to make an order either revoking or suspending an arms licence as
contemplated by the section will be made out.
18. The said case of Changga Prasad Sahu vs. State of U. P.
(supra) has been reconsidered by Five Judges' Bench of Allahabad
High Court in Rana Pratap Singh vs. State of U. P., reported in
1996 All LJ 301 :—
19. The scheme of the Act i.e. section 17 itself contemplated
suspension or revocation on two independent counts; when
challenge is made to suspension directed by the licensing
authority; the ground for suspension is to be scrutinised to find out
as to whether it falls under the scheme of section 17(3) or not. The
action of suspension if found justified and in accordance with the
provisions of section 17(3) its affect and validity shall not be
denuded only because the licensing authority wants to give an
opportunity before cancelling the licence. As laid down by all the
Full Benches the revocation order can be made if satisfaction is
recorded under section 17(3) without giving an opportunity to the
licensee.However, five Judge Full Bench in Kailash vs. State of U.
P. case AIR 1985 All 291 (supra) has observed that finality to such
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revocation be not attached unless the licensee is given an
opportunity to represent against such revocation. Although power
is given to revoke a licence on being satisfied with the grounds
under section 17(3) but in a case where licensing authority wanted
to give an opportunity before passing the revocation order, the said
action cannot denude the jurisdiction and power of the licensing
authority to suspend the licence. Each case has to be examined
from the orders passed by the licensing authority to test it whether
the suspension has been ordered without forming requisite opinion
or the authority has not formed opinion and wanted to enquire
before forming opinion, as noted above, if the authority has not
formed a definite opinion and is in process of enquiry to come to a
definite conclusion suspension cannot be ordered. However, if the
opinion is recorded and there is already material, suspension of
arm licence cannot be faulted with.
19. In the case of Ganesh Chandra Bhatt vs. District Magistrate,
Almora (supra), the Allahabad High Court has considered the
issue of grant of licence in the context of provision of section 14
of the Act. However, the said case can only be relevant in the
context of meaning of the phrase "public peace and public safety"
otherwise the power of grant of licence and its revocation are in
contradistinction to each other.
20. In the case of Ajay Jayawant Bhosale vs. Commissioner of
Police, Pune City, Pune and others (supra), the Division Bench of
Bombay High Court has considered the question of cancellation of
arm licence and held as under:—
12. The question, therefore, arises as to whether there was
sufficient material placed before the Commissioner of Police for
arriving at subjective satisfaction that continuation of licence or
renewal would be endangering public peace or public safety. It
seems that the show-cause notice was issued by the Commissioner,
Pune consequent to filing of application by the petitioner to the
Home Department of the State Government for getting all India
arms licence. Nevertheless at any stage the licensing authority
after getting subjectively satisfied and on the basis of material
placed before it could revoke licence under section 17 of the Act
but whether there was sufficient material with the licensing
authority to pass order of revocation.
13. The right to life and liberty are guaranteed under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. Arms licence is granted for personal
safety and security after due enquiry by the authorities in
accordance with provisions contained in the Arms Act, 1959. The
provisions of Arms Act with regard to suspension or cancellation
of Arms licence cannot be invoked lightly in an arbitrary manner.
The provisions of the Arms Act particularly section 13 to 17
indicate that once a licence is granted under the Act, the same
shall be renewed from time to time unless there exist a ground of
refusal as enumerated under section 14 of the Act. Protection to
life, property of citizen is responsibility of the State. It is only
when person apprehends that machinery of State would not come
to his help for protection, he/she applies for licence under the Act.

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The provisions of section 17-A of the Arms Act indicate that arms
licence can be cancelled or suspended if the licensing authority
finds it necessary for the security of public peace or public safety.
Merely because a criminal case is pending, the provisions of
section 17 of the Arms Act would not be attracted. Such
provisions would be attracted in case the licensing authority finds
that continuance of licence is detrimental to public peace or public
security and safety. But the authority concerned will have to
record a finding that how and under what circumstances and in
what manner possession of arms licence could be contrary to the
provisions of section 17-B of the Arms Act. Each case is required
to be considered on its own merits.
14. Nothing was placed before us by the respondents to indicate
that the petitioner had misused the licenced weapon at any point of
time in past. The order of revocation of license refers to two
criminal cases registered against the petitioner. In the facts we find
that mere registration of criminal case/cases could not be a ground
to revoke the license. The order shall indicate clearly that
continuance of licence would be against public peace, safety and
security.
15. Learned Counsel appearing for petitioner submits that in fact
petitioner and his driver were attacked in the year 2009 regarding
which he had filed a complaint. Considering the business
activities, political and social work of the petitioner, it was
submitted that to protect petitioner's life and property, arms licence
was applied for and it was granted. The petitioner still requires the
same. The licensing authority has not given any opinion as to
whether the petitioner requires licence to protect his life and
property. The subjective satisfaction of the authority, therefore,
plays a vital role while assessing merits of a case before passing
orders under the provisions of section 13, 14 or 17(b). Each case
needs to be assessed, tested on its own merits. Therefore, it is
imperative that before arriving at a conclusion of invoking powers
under the provisions of section 17(b), the licensing authority ought
to have considered the entire material, threat perception of the
licence and pass appropriate orders.
21. This Court in the case of Badshah alias Taj Mohammad vs.
State of M.P. and another, reported in 2007(4) M.P.L.J. 527 has an
occasion to consider altogether similar issue as involved in the
present case wherein the Court relying upon some of the
judgments of the Allahabad High Court observed as under :—
From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that there is no finding in
the aforesaid criminal cases that the firearm owned by the
petitioner under valid licence was ever used or misused by the
petitioner. No threat is stated to have been extended by the
petitioner on the strength of the said firearm. There is no specific
provision in Arms Act or elsewhere that no licence is to be issued
when criminal cases are pending against the applicant. There is
further no material on record to infer that the petitioner has caused
obstruction to public safety. This being so, the revocation of the
petitioner's licence on the ground of public safety is not

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sustainable in law.
On perusal of the order dated 8-1-2001 contained in Annexure P/3
it may be seen that certain criminal cases were pending at that time
against the petitioner. This position was entirely changed at the
time of passing of the impugned orders contained in Annexures
P/1 and P/2 in the year 2005 because firstly, no criminal case was
pending against the petitioner, secondly, cases under sections 107,
110, 116(3) of Criminal Procedure Code came to an end on
account of expiry of six months. Only in one criminal case namely
Criminal Case No. 285/92, a fine was imposed on the petitioner.
Remaining criminal cases stood terminated in his favour on
account of acquittal or compromise. From perusal of the record of
criminal cases, it is ample clear that the firearm was not found to
have been used or misused. Even in the order of District
Magistrate, Narsinghpur, there is no mention that the licensed
weapon was used or misused. Mere apprehension of the District
Magistrate that the licensed firearm may be misused by the
petitioner has no foundation and does not provide a ground for
revoking the licence of the firearm. Moreover, it is quite clear that
the licensing authority did not take into consideration the effect of
termination of criminal cases while passing the impugned order.
In view of this, the earlier order dated 8-1-2001 cannot form a
basis for passing the impugned orders in the year 2005 when
admittedly, the criminal cases against the petitioner were not
pending. Thus, on the date of impugned orders the grounds
assigned for cancellation of licence earlier on 8-1-2001 were non-
existent and the impugned orders are, therefore, found to be
unsustainable in law.
Considering the case in hand on the aforesaid parameters, it may
be seen that there is absolutely no material on record to establish
that the petitioner used or misused the firearm and that possession
of firearm poses a threat to the security of the public peace and
public safety. In this view of the matter, the impugned orders
contained in Annexures P/1 and P/2 are clearly unsustainable in
law and the same are hereby set aside. Respondent No. 2 is hereby
directed to consider the application of the petitioner afresh in
accordance with law keeping in view the aforesaid observations
within a period of one month from the date of receipt of certified
copy of this order.
22. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sunderlal
Bhardwaj vs. State (supra) has dealt with the issue regarding
cancellation of arm licence for the security of public peace or
public safety. In the said case, the Court while considering the
issue of cancellation of arm licence interpreted the words "for the
security of public peace" in the context of section 17(3)(b) of the
Act and observed that expression "security of public peace" means
maintenance of public tranquility and order. The Court referring
the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Romesh Thappar vs.
State of Madras, reported in AIR 1950 SC 124 observed that
public safety ordinarily means security of public or their freedom
from danger.

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23. Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar vs. Delhi
Administration and others, reported in (1982) 2 SCC 403 has an
occasion to consider the issue affecting "public order" vis-à-vis
"law and order". As discussed, "public order" would include the
public peace and public safety. However, the observations of
Hon'ble the Apex Court in the said case, in the context of this case
are relevant, therefore, they are reproduced as under :—
"12. The most crucial question on which the decision must turn is
whether the activities of the detenu fall within the domain of
'public order' or 'law and order' xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
13. The true distinction between the areas of 'public order' and
'law and order' lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the
degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction
between the two concepts of 'law and order' and 'public order' is a
fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping.
Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and
circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might
affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of
law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The
act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the
potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the
community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of
public order. That test is clearly fulfilled in the facts and
circumstances of the present case."

8. In another matter of Gajendra Singh (supra) while discussing
provision of Section 17 of the Arms Act in paragraph 17, this Court had held
as under:-
''17. As far as the discretion of the licencing authority in regard to
maintenance of public peace or public safety is concerned, there
should have been some elements of discussion as to conduct of
the petitioner which would have thrown light to his conduct being
dangerous to the security of the public peace or for public safety.
Even there is no such discussion that after obtaining the licence,
petitioner's conduct has been such so to cause threat to security of
the public peace or public safety. In view of such fact, it can be
conveniently inferred that the impugned order passed by the
Collector is cryptic and is devoid of any reasons and, therefore, on
the touch stone of reasonableness it cannot be sustained. In fact, it
is in clear violation of the provisions of the Act so also it violates
the provisions of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Even
the Commissioner has failed to appreciate these facts in the appeal
as the Commissioner has acted as a post office while deciding the
appeal. There is lack of application of mind while deciding the
appeal and, therefore, even appellate order cannot be sustained."
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9. In view of the law laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it is evident

that only such acts which have the tendency to disturb public peace or
endanger public safety would fall within the ambit of Section 17(3)(b) of the
Arms Act, 1959. In the present case, this Court is concerned only with the
said ground, as none of the other contingencies contemplated under Section
17(3) of the Arms Act have either been invoked or discussed by the
Collector while passing the impugned orders.
10. In the present case, admittedly, the Collector has not recorded any
finding with regard to the maintenance of public peace or public safety. In
the absence of any discussion regarding the conduct of the petitioners
indicating that they pose a threat to public peace or public safety, the
assumption drawn by the Collector cannot be sustained. There is also no
finding that, after obtaining the firearm licences, the conduct of the
petitioners has been such as to endanger public peace or public safety. The
impugned orders are cryptic, bereft of reasons and fail to satisfy the test of
reasonableness, consequently, the same cannot be sustained in law.
11. Though under Section 18 of the Arms Act, there is a provision of
appeal against the orders impugned herein, but since the very orders passed
by the Collector is in total derogation of provision of Section 17 of the Arms
Act and appears to have been passed in the absence of the present petitioners
without giving them any opportunity of hearing, can be said to be against the
principle of natural justice thus, this Court deems it fit to entertain the present
petition.
12. Accordingly, the instant petition is allowed. The impugned orders
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passed by the Collector, Gwalior (Annexure P/1(A) and Annexure P/1(B))

are hereby set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Collector, Gwalior,
for fresh consideration on merits, after affording due opportunity of hearing
to the petitioners, and thereafter to pass a reasoned order strictly in
accordance with law.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE)
JUDGE
VJ

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