SATHISH NAGABHUSHAN vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
- 1 -
Reserved on : 02.09.2026
Pronounced on : 04.11.2026
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 04 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 10193 OF 2026
BETWEEN:
1. SATHISH NAGABHUSHAN
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS
S/O LATE NAGABHUSHAN
RD
RESIDING AT NO.TF 7, 3 FLOOR,
AJANTHA MEADOWS APARTMENT,
RD
3 CROSS, AKSHAYA NAGARA,
BEGURU, BENGALURU – 560 083.
2. JAYAMMA
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
W/O LATE NAGABHUSHAN
RD
RESIDING AT NO.TF 7, 3 FLOOR,
AJANTHA MEADOWS APARTMENT,
RD
3 CROSS, AKSHAYA NAGARA,
BEGURU, BENGALURU – 560 083.
3. CHETANA N.,
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
W/O MANU KUMAR
RESIDING AT NO.11,
Digitally signed
by CHETAN B C
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka
- 2 -
JASVITH'S VILLA
TH
16 MAIN ROAD, NEW MICO LAYOUT
HONGASANDRA
BENGALURU – 560 068.
…PETITIONERS
(BY SMT. HEMAVATHI RAJARAM, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY SOUTH EAST WOMEN POLICE STATION,
BENGALURU.
(REPRESENTED BY
THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,)
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
BENGALURU – 560 001.
2. SMT. PARVATHI KRISHNA @ PARVATHI
W/O SATHISH NAGABHUSHAN
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.78,
POOJA MANSION
ST
BSK 1 STAGE, BENGALURU.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT.RASHMI PATEL, HCGP FOR R-1;
SRI H.T.NAGARAJA, ADVOCATE FOR R-2(ABSENT))
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 528 OF
BNSS., PRAYING TO QUASH THE PROCEEDINGS IN
C.C.NO.28444/2026 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE COURT OF
XXXIX ADDL. CJM BENGALURU, ARISING OUT OF CRIME
NO.28/2026 REGISTERED BY THE SOUTH EAST WOMEN POLICE
- 3 -
STATION, BENGALURU, INCLUDING THE CHARGE SHEET FILED
PURSUANT THERETO, IN SO FAR AS THE PETITIONERS ARE
CONCERNED, FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS
85, 115(2), 351(2) AND 352 OF BNS 2023 (ANNEXURE-A).
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 02.09.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioners, who are arrayed as accused Nos.1, 2 and 3,
are before this Court calling in question the proceedings in
C.C.No.28444 of 2026 pending before the XXXIX Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru, arising out of Crime No.28 of 2026,
registered for offences punishable under Sections 85, 115(2),
351(2) and 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the BNS' for short).
2. Heard Smt. Hemavathi Rajaram , learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners, Smt. Rashmi Patel , learned High
- 4 -
Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 and
Sri H.T.Nagaraj, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2.
3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -
nd st
3.1. The 2 respondent/complainant is the wife of the 1
petitioner. The genesis of the relationship between the two can be
traced to the year 2023, when talks of a matrimonial alliance first
commenced. It is averred in the petition that the complainant was
st
introduced to the 1 petitioner through his first cousin one Sarika.
The proposal, however, did not fructify, ostensibly on account of
certain caste considerations. The relationship, which had thus
remained in abeyance, was revived between August 2024 and
March 2025, when the complainant is said to have re-established
st
contact with the 1 petitioner and renewed the matrimonial
proposal. It is the allegation of the petitioners that the complainant
had concealed the factum of her earlier marriage.
3.2. The renewed proposal culminated in the solemnization of
st
marriage between the 1 petitioner and the complainant on
08-06-2025. What was expected to herald the commencement of
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matrimonial harmony appears, according to the petitioners, to have
descended into discord almost from its inception. The matrimonial
relationship, instead of blossoming into companionship, is said to
have become embroiled in acrimony, accusations and repeated
confrontations. The petitioners allege that the complainant
assaulted the petitioners, created a commotion in the matrimonial
home and caused injuries, compelling the petitioners to approach
the jurisdictional police. The complaint, however, did not culminate
in the registration of a cognizable crime and was treated as a non-
cognizable matter, resulting in the registration of N.C.R.No.308 of
2026.
3.3. The allegations of threats and physical altercations are
said to have continued. Matters allegedly assumed more serious
proportions when the complainant, accompanied by her mother
Govindamma and sister Saraswathi, attempted to forcibly enter the
residential premises of the petitioners and hurled stones and
slippers into the apartment. This resulted in the petitioners
registering a complaint, which came to be numbered as Crime
No.97 of 2026.
- 6 -
3.4. It is thereafter that the complainant instituted the
proceedings, which form the subject matter of the present petition,
resulting in the registration of a crime in Crime No.28 of 2026
against the petitioners. The police, upon investigation, filed a
charge sheet. The learned Magistrate took cognizance on
15-05-2026 and registered C.C.No.28444 of 2026 for the offences
as afore-quoted. It is the registration of the criminal case and the
consequential issuance of summons that have driven the petitioners
to the doors of this Court.
SUBMISSIONS:
PETITIONERS:
4.1. Learned counsel Smt. Hemavathi Rajaram , appearing
for the petitioners, would vehemently contend that the entire
prosecution is founded upon allegations which are not merely
exaggerated, but are demonstrably contrary to the material on
record. According to the learned counsel, the complainant, who is
herself alleged to have repeatedly assaulted and threatened the
petitioners, has sought to turn the tables by setting the criminal law
in motion against them. The learned counsel would submit that the
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complainant had, on several occasions, indulged in acts of violence
against the husband and other members of the family by hurling
vessels, stones, slippers and whatever objects came within her
reach. It is contended that the allegations against petitioner Nos.2
and 3, who are the mother-in-law and sister-in-law of the
complainant, are wholly omnibus and bereft of any specific overt
act.
st
4.2. Insofar as the 1 petitioner/husband is concerned, the
learned counsel would submit that the prosecution rests upon three
allegations: first, that the husband had taken away the jewellery
belonging to the complainant; second, that certain monetary
transactions constituted demands for dowry; and third, that the
complainant was subjected to forcible medical termination of
pregnancy. The learned counsel would seek to demonstrate, with
reference to the documents and the charge sheet, that none of
these allegations possesses the requisite factual or legal foundation
to constitute the offences alleged. It is, therefore, contended that
permitting the prosecution to continue would amount to allowing
the criminal process to become an instrument of harassment.
- 8 -
5. This Court, owing to continuous non-appearance of the
learned counsel for respondent No.2, who was present on his own
on the day when the interim order was granted, went on to pass
the following orders between 07-08-2026 and 02-09-2026:
“07-08-2026:
“ORAL ORDER ON I.A.No.1/2026
Heard the learned counsel, Smt. Hemavathi Rajaram,
appearing for the petitioners.
The petitioners-accused Nos.1, 2 and 3 are before the
Court calling in question the proceedings in C.C.No.28444/2026
arising out of Crime No.28/2026, registered for the offences
punishable under Sections 85, 115(2), 351(2) and Section 352
of BNS, 2023.
The second respondent is the complainant-the wife of the
first petitioner-the husband.
The learned counsel, Smt. Hemavathi Rajaram appearing
for the petitioners takes this Court through the allegations. The
allegations against the husband in the complaint are threefold:
(1) the jewellery being taken away by the husband, (2) money
transactions and (3) forcible medical termination of pregnancy.
The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that even
according to the complaint, the medical termination of
pregnancy has happened at 11 weeks which cannot medically
be terminated by tablets. It has to be by a procedure for which
consent would be required and the wife has consented to it and
is now projecting it to be forcible termination of pregnancy. The
second, is that the summary of the charge sheet would not
indicate that there is any jewellery being taken away by the
husband or the family members. It was only in the complaint.
- 9 -
The third is money transaction of ` 50,000 or more. Therefore,
this is insofar as the husband. The allegations against the other
members of the family are omnibus, does not indicate any overt
act that are allegedly performed by these petitioners.
Therefore, reserving liberty to the respondents to file
application seeking vacation of the interim order, there shall be
an interim order of stay of further proceedings in
C.C.No.28444/2026 pending before the XXXIX Addl. Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru, qua the petitioners, till the next
date of hearing.
Learned HCGP waives notice for respondent No.1.
Issue emergent notice to respondent No.2.
List the matter on 27.08.2026 .”
...
“01-09-2026:
“ORAR ORDER
Heard Smt. Hemavathi Rajaram, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners.
This Court on 07.08.2026 had passed the following order:
“Heard the learned counsel, Smt. Hemavathi
Rajaram, appearing for the petitioners.
The petitioners-accused Nos.1, 2 and 3 are
before the Court calling in question the proceedings in
C.C.No.28444/2026 arising out of Crime No.28/2026,
registered for the offences punishable under Sections 85,
115(2), 351(2) and Section 352 of BNS, 2023.
The second respondent is the complainant-the
wife of the first petitioner-the husband.
The learned counsel, Smt. Hemavathi Rajaram
appearing for the petitioners takes this Court through
the allegations. The allegations against the husband in
the complaint are threefold: (1) the jewellery being
- 10 -
taken away by the husband, (2) money transactions and
(3) forcible medical termination of pregnancy. The
learned counsel for the petitioners submits that even
according to the complaint, the medical termination of
pregnancy has happened at 11 weeks which cannot
medically be terminated by tablets. It has to be by a
procedure for which consent would be required and the
wife has consented to it and is now projecting it to be
forcible termination of pregnancy. The second, is that
the summary of the charge sheet would not indicate that
there is any jewellery being taken away by the husband
or the family members. It was only in the complaint. The
third is money transaction of ` 50,000 or more.
Therefore, this is insofar as the husband. The allegations
against the other members of the family are omnibus,
does not indicate any overt act that are allegedly
performed by these petitioners.
Therefore, reserving liberty to the respondents to
file application seeking vacation of the interim order,
there shall be an interim order of stay of further
proceedings in C.C.No.28444/2026 pending before the
XXXIX Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru, qua the
petitioners, till the next date of hearing.
Learned HCGP waives notice for respondent
No.1.
Issue emergent notice to respondent No.2.
List the matter on 27.08.2026 .”
This was after hearing the learned counsel
appearing for the complainant, as well.
The matter was again listed on 27.08.2026 and
interim order stood extended. The possibilities of a
settlement could be explored was the opinion of this
Court.
The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would
however submit that the instructions are sought and there is no
warrant of settlement being arrived at between the petitioners
and the respondent/complainant.
- 11 -
As a last chance, awaiting the appearance of the learned
counsel appearing for respondent No.2, list this matter on
02.09.2026 .
In the event, the learned counsel would not be
present, appropriate orders would be passed on hearing
the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners.
Interim order granted earlier is extended till the next
date of hearing.”
...
“02-09-2026:
“ORAL ORDER
This Court on the following dates had passed the
following orders:
On 07.08.2026:
.... .... ....
On 27-08-2026:
List this matter on 31-08-2026 in the fresh matters
list.
Interim order granted earlier stands extended till
the next date of hearing.
On 01-09-2026:
.... ..... ....
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is repeatedly
heard and awaiting the appearance of learned counsel appearing
for respondent No.2, the matter is being adjourned from time to
time.
Even today, there is no representation on behalf of the
learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2.
- 12 -
This Court on 01.09.2026 had clearly held that, in the event
the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 would not be
present, appropriate orders would be passed on hearing the
learned counsel appearing for the petitioners.
Heard.
Reserved.
The interim order granted earlier is extended till the disposal
of the petition.”
In the light of the interim order so granted, further proceedings
before concerned Court has not gone on.
THE STATE:
6. The learned High Court Government Pleader Smt. Rashmi
Patel would, however, refute the submissions advanced on behalf
of the petitioners. It is contended that the jurisdictional police, upon
conducting investigation, have filed a charge sheet and that the
st
allegations against the 1 petitioner disclose a prima facie case
requiring adjudication in a full-fledged trial. The learned High Court
Government Pleader would submit that the truth or otherwise of the
accusations cannot be determined in proceedings invoking the
inherent jurisdiction of this Court and that the petitioners must
establish their defence before the competent criminal Court.
- 13 -
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record.
CONSIDERATION:
st
8. The relationship between the 1 petitioner and the
complainant commenced with matrimonial negotiations in the year
2023 and culminated in marriage on 08-06-2025. The material
placed before the Court would indicate that matrimonial discord
surfaced almost immediately thereafter. What followed was not an
isolated disagreement between spouses, but a succession of
complaints, counter-complaints and allegations of physical
confrontation. The first complaint lodged by the petitioners against
the complainant came to be treated as a non-cognizable matter in
N.C.R.No.308 of 2026. The said complaint reads as follows:
- 14 -
The complaint made by the husband alleged that the complainant
was threatening to commit suicide, necessitating police
intervention. The matter, however, was closed by treating it as a
dispute between husband and wife.
9. The petitioners thereafter sought to lodge another
complaint on 21-02-2026, which also came to be treated as a
non-cognizable matter. The relevant report reads as follows:
- 15 -
The reason for complaining against the wife could be gathered from
the following complaint:
“21/02/2026
FROM
CHETHANA NAGABUSHAN
rd rd
TFT, 3 floor, 3 Cross
Ajantha Meadows Apartment
Akshayanagar B’lore-76
6360818775
To
Inspector Huylimavu Sation
Hulimavu B’lore-76
Respected Sir,
- 16 -
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(sic)
The earlier complaints thus did not culminate in the registration of
cognizable crimes. The matrimonial discord, however, did not
subside. The petitioners allege that the complainant and persons
accompanying her thereafter indulged in acts of assault and
violence, resulting in registration of Crime No.97 of 2026. In the
said crime, the husband figures as the complainant, his wife and
her associates as the accused. The gist of the complaint reads as
follows:
“10.FIR Contents (Attach separate sheet if necessary):
:05/03/2026 37 ,
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- 17 -
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10. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the impugned
complaint came to be registered by the wife against the husband
and the other two petitioners on 02-03-2026, alleging offences
punishable under Sections 85, 115(2) and 351(2) of the BNS. The
complaint reads as follows:
“TO:
The Sub Inspector of police,
Southeast Women Police stations,
Adugodi Bangalore city - 560030
FROM:
Parvathi D/O Krishnappa, age 30 years
#78, Pooja Mansion,
Seetha Circle, SBM Colony,
st
BSK 1 Stage, Bangalore - 560050
PH: 9066779585 / 9148314789
- 18 -
Cast: Hindu Raj Bhovi
E-mail address:[email protected]
Dear Sir/Madam,
Subject: Complaint against my husband Sathish,
my mother-in law Jayamma and my
sister-in-law Chethana.
I am currently living at the above address for 1.6 years. I
have friend named Sarika, who showed his cousin Sathish as
alliance in the year 2023. Due to different castes my mother
rd
rejected the alliance and in 2024 August 03 , Sarika called me
to arrange for blood, as her mother was suffering from Breast
cancer and I arranged the blood for her mother. On the same
day, I texted Sathish for the Job opening in his company (NES
FIRCROFT, KORAMANGALA BANGALORE). Later we became
friends and friendship turned into Love. We committed to
nd
getting married soon. On November 2 , 2024, I went to Goa
with Sathish and his friends. There he promised me that he
would get married to me. Till the month of February 2025, there
were NO issues. Not sure what had happened to his family, all
sudden his family started treating me so weirdly. I even told
Sathish about this, but he asked me to ignore it and not give
much importance to it.
th
Our marriage got fixed in the month of April 30 , 2025,
due to his ego and some fights with Sarika he cancelled the
th
marriage with me on 26 April 2025. Because of this incident I
came out of my home and went to Mysore alone. My mom and
my sister called Sathish to ask him what had happened between
me and Sathish. Instead of consoling them or explaining the
issue! He abuses them and uses inappropriate words against
them. Later my mom called and told me about the issue, on the
th
same day i.e., 26 April 2025 and I came back to Bangalore
from Mysore and stayed in SRM Ladies PG, Hulimavu
th
Bangalore till 30 May 2025 .
st
On 01 May 2025, Sathish took me to Dhondenling,
Kollegala and had a physical intimacy with me for 5 days. Later
- 19 -
he again fixed a date for marriage on June 08, 2025, and
we got married on June 08, 2025, at THRIGUNATHMIKA
SHREE MAHALAKSHMI TEMPLE, Saraswathipuram,
nyanappana halli, Hulimav Bangalore 560076 . However, I
was already carrying (Pregnant) before marriage. My pregnancy
th th
was confirmed on May 19 , 2025. On 20 May 2025, we went
to Dhamma Phapulla Tumkur Alur, for meditation for 10 days
and I was doing fine there. We kept our pregnancy a secret. We
got Married on June 08, 2025. After a week so, I told my
Mother-in-Law about my pregnancy, and she reacted
aggressively and forced me to abort the baby. Because of these
mental harassments and past incidents, I started to faint very
often. When I consulted the doctor, they said it was because of
lot of stress. Again, my mother-in-law threatened either to abort
the baby or leave my husband's home. As I was not ready to
abort my baby, I left my husband home and stayed in my
mom's place. After few days, Sathish came to my mom's place
(GIRINAGAR) and physically harassed me to abort the baby
th
(Photos attached). I denial for abortion. When I was 11 week
nd
pregnant, On June 22 , 2025, he came to my mom's place
again and took me to hospital for normal checkups on the same
day(Rajashri Grandhim Hospital Bilekalahalli, Vijaya bank
layout) Which is his close family friend hospital. I fainted in the
hospital, so he gave me tablet which was abortion tablet and
aborted my baby on June 23rd, 2025.
My mom called Sathish multiple times to share the
location of the hospital, but he didn't answer my mother's call
nor shared the location of the hospital and post abortion and
D&E surgery he took me to his place (Akshaya nagar) on June
rd
23 2025, he took care of me for 3 days in his place and he
th th
went to office on 4 day. On 28 June 2025, my Mother-in-law
started to torture me by not giving food. I even told him about
his mother's behavior, but he didn't care and asked to adjust to
the situation.
th
On 29 June 2025, my mother-in-law asked me to leave
the place, when I asked her for the reason, she said "FOR
AASHADA" then I agreed and left to my mom's place. Even after
30 days I stayed in mother's place he didn't come to me to take
th
me to his place. On 29 July 2025, my mom and I went to his
place (AKASHAYA NAGAR, AJANTHA MEADOWS) but my
mother-in-law and my husband physically assaulted me .
- 20 -
On the same night I committed suicide by taking multiple
tablets. I was hospitalized in Appollo hospital, and my husband
left me abandonly and refuse to pay the hospital bill amount of
" 1,02,073" INR . Later I called my friend Arun, and Arun paid
the hospital bill.
Post paying the hospital bill and discharge, my husband
came to hospital, and he took me to CAFÉ COFFEE DAY In
Kanakapura road to manipulate me. He asked me to stay in my
mom's place (GIRINAGAR) for few months and even I agreed
with that.
Due to all these incidents, I used to faint very often, I
consulted Neurologist and undergone MRI and ECG tests, and
everything came out normal. My husband and his sister and
his mom abused me saying am MENTALLY UNSTABLE OR
MENTALLY ILL and my husband insisted on me to consult
psychiatrist and took me to CADABAMS, JP Nagar forcefully for
Therapy. (From the month of August 2025 till Jan 2026). There
the doctor told me that the fainting or the seizure happening
because of stress. I even went for weekly and monthly
Therapy's and followed their medications. My husband promised
me that he will take me to his place, If I go for therapy's and
follow the medications for 6 Months.
It's been 8 months since my marriage; he never paid
single rupee for maintenance. He used to come to my
place just to have physical intimacy with me. He always
asks for Money to clear his debts and help to pay his
house rent. I was zeady to give him 20Lakhs and help
him with paying rent, just to save my marriage.
I also gave him 50,000 INR when he was suffering from
th
his debts to pay his interest on November 19 , 2025.
st
On 21 Feb 2026, my husband and I went for annual corporate
health check-up at DOCUBE; while returning home, he started
to ask for 3 LAKH for his house advance, as he was looking for
new rented house. He was at my place, and he assaulted me,
and demanded to give him my jewelry, so that he could pledge
the jewelry and pay his house rent advance. He took my
earrings, ring and chain with pendent and left home. Later, I
went to his place to take back my Jewels. When I went there
- 21 -
my husband, his mom and his sister assaulted me
physically and abused me and kicked me out of his home.
His sister CHETHANA filed a FAKE NCR case against me,
giving statement that I tried to kill her daughter HITA . I
was the one who used to give gift dresses and take care of that
child. I directly went to Victoria hospital alone and did an MLC,
in the hospital I had a seizure and alone at hospital, doctors
called my mom and sister as there were no attendees with me.
st
At 9.30 PM, 21 Feb 2026, after MLC and few medical
treatments at Victoria hospital, my mom took me to his place
along with my sister Saraswathi. My husband and his family
didn't open the door. Later, I called 112 for help, they asked us
to go to Hulimavu Police station,
we filed an NCR (NCR NO
310/2026 )over there and they referred to AUDUGODI WOMES
nd
POLICE STATION, as this is a family issue. On 22 Feb 2025 I
again filed an NCR in Audugodi women splice station( LPT NO-
145/2026 ). They asked me to come on the next day for
counselling. Counselling didn't impact on us.
th
On 25 Feb 2026, when I called my husband, he requested not
to give an FIR against him, and he is ready to live with me. On
th
27 February 2026 he asked me to go to his place
(AKSHAYNAGAR, HULIMAVU) when my mom and I went to his
place, the door was locked and no one was at home. I called
him and he was not answering my calls or texts. I waited till
8.30 PM at his place, and he called me and asked me to come to
his workplace (NES FIRCROFT, KORAMANGALA) When I and
mom were going on an auto, he again called me and asked us
to come to HULIMAVU POLICE STATION. Till 11.30 PM he was
refused to take me to his place. He called his relatives to come
to the police station and agreed in front of them to take me to
his house. I went by auto, and he came by walking. When I
went nobody was there at his place, and I called him multiple
times and didn't answer and switched off his phone. I was
shattered and had no clue what to do, and I went to my mom's
house (GIRINAGAR BANGALORE). At 12.30 AM I booked a taxi
and went home alone.
I have tolerated so much disrespect, domestic violence,
manipulation, physical harassment, mental harassment, dowry
torture, sexual harassment, forceful abortion and lived alone at
- 22 -
my place for 8 months without single rupee from my husband
just to save my marriage.
Kindly accept my complaint against my husband SATHISH, my
mother-in-law JAYAMMA and my sister-in-law CHETHANA
1. SATHISH, Age-39 Years
PH: 9108175363
TEAM LEAD AT NES FIRCORFT, KORAMANGALA,
Cast: ST (AK)
TF-7 AJANTHA MEADOWS
AKSHAYA NAGARA, HULIMAVU
BANGALORE
2. JAYAMMA
PH: 916360314184
TF-7 AJANTHA MEADOWS
AKSHAYA NAGARA, HULIMAVU
BANGALORE
3. CHETHANA
PH: 6360818775
TF-7 AJANTHA MEADOWS
AKSHAYA NAGARA, HULIMAVU
BANGALORE
Thank you,
Yours Faithful
Sd/-
(PARVATHI K)”
The Police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet against
these petitioners. The summary of the charge sheet as obtaining in
Column No.17 is as follows:
“17.
ೇ
ನ ಸಂuಪ fಾNಾಂಶ
- 23 -
85, 115(2), 351(2), 352 2023
ಕಲಂ vಾರ+ೕಯ 3ಾFಯ ಸಂg ೆ- ರ ಅ)ಯ $
12 -1 -01
ೋxಾNೋಪTಾ ಪPQ ಅಂಕಣ ರ $ ನಮೂ&
ರುವ ಎ ಆNೋkಯು fಾu
:08.06.2025 , ,
ರವರನು &3ಾಂಕ Oೆಂಗಳeರು ನಗರ ಹುH(ಾವj 3ಾನಪyನಹHoಯ
,
ಸರಸq+ಪjರಂದ $ರುವ YUೕ ಮ ಾಲuz ೇ<ಾಲಯದ $ ಮದು<ೆiಾBದು; ಮದು<ೆBಂತ ಮುಂ6ೆ
-01 -1 .
fಾu ರವರು ಎ ಆNೋkಯ Mೊ ೆ *ೆUೕಮಸಂಬಂಧ ಇರುವjದ7ಂದ ಗ| }iಾBದು;
-1 -2 -01
ಮದು<ೆಯ ನಂತರ ಎ ಮತು ಎ ಆNೋkಗಳK fಾu ರವ7Aೆ ಗಭ *ಾತ
.
(ಾ)
ೊಳKoವಂ ೆ ಒ ಾ !
ೈgಕ<ಾB ಮತು (ಾನ
ಕ ?ರುಕುಳ Iೕ)ರು ಾ Nೆ ನಂತರ
-01 -2 -3 -01
fಾu ರವರ ಆNೋಗF ಹದAೆpಾQಗ ಎ ಮತು ಎ ಆNೋkಗಳK fೇ7 ೊಂಡು fಾu
' ' , . . ' ' (Cadabams)
ರವ7Aೆ (ಾನ
ಕ ಅಸqfೆ~ ಎಂದು Iಂ&
Mೆ k ನಗರದ ೆ%ಾಬ•€ ಆಸy ೆUAೆ
-1
•? ೆ€Aೆ ಬಲವಂತ<ಾB fೇ7
ಆಸy ೆUಯ ಖಚು <ೆಚ‚ಗಳನು Iೕಡ ೆ ಎ ಆNೋkಯು ತನ fಾಲ
-01
+ೕ7ಸಲು ಮತು ಮ3ೆ Oಾ)AೆAಾB fಾu ರವರ ಬH ಹಣ ೇH ಅವ7ಂದ &3ಾಂಕ
29.11.2025 50 . 21.02.2026
ರಂದು fಾ ರ ರೂ ಹಣವನು ಪ%ೆದು ೊಂ)ದು; &3ಾಂಕ
-1 -1 -1
ರಂದು ಎ ಆNೋkಯು fಾu ರವರ ತವರು ಮ3ೆAೆ ೋB fಾu ರವ7Aೆ ೊಸ Oಾ)Aೆ
-01 3
ಮ3ೆAೆ ಅ%ಾq[€ Iೕಡಲು fಾu ರವ7Aೆ ಲS ರೂ ಹಣ ೇH ಆ ೆAೆ ಸಂಬಂƒ
ದ •ನ ದ
, 4.00
ಒಡ<ೆಗಳನು ಒ ಾ ಯ (ಾ) ಪ%ೆದು ೊಂಡು ೋBದು; ಈ ಬAೆC ಅ ೇ &ನ ಸಂMೆ ಸು(ಾರು
-01 -1 .
ಗಂpೆAೆ fಾu ರವರು ತನ ಒಡ<ೆಗಳನು ೇಳಲು ಎ ಆNೋkಯ ಮ3ೆiಾದ *ಾ$b ನಂ
TF-7, , , ,
ಅಜಂ ಾ %ೋa ಅ*ಾb ಂb ಅSಯನಗರ ಹುH(ಾವj Oೆಂಗಳeರು ಇ $Aೆ
-1 -3
ೋಾಗ ಎ 7ಂದ ಎ ಆNೋkಗಳK fೇ7 ೊಂಡು ಸೂ„ೆ ಮುಂ%ೆ ೊಫ` ಮುಂ%ೆ ಎಂದು
-01
ಅ<ಾಚF ಶಬ;ಗHಂದ Oೈದು ೈgಕ<ಾB ಮತು (ಾನ
ಕ<ಾB ?ರುಕುಳ Iೕ) ಹ ೆ$ (ಾ) fಾu
, -01 ,
ರವರನು ಮ3ೆ!ಂದ ೊರAೆ ಾ?ದು; ನಂತರ fಾu ರವರು ೊQೕ7iಾ ಆಸy ೆUಯ $ •? ೆ€
. -6 -1
ಪ%ೆ&ದು; ಈ ಬAೆC fಾu ರವರು fಾu ರವ7Aೆ fಾ(ಾನF ಸqರೂಪದ Aಾಯ<ಾBರುವ ಬAೆC
.
Aಾಯದ ಪU(ಾಣ ಪತUದ ವರ& Iೕ)ರುವjದು ತI†ೆ!ಂದ ದೃಢಪPQರುತ ೆ
-1 -3 85, 115(2), 351(2), 352
ಆದ;7ಂದ ಎ 7ಂದ ಎ ಆNೋkಗಳK ಕಲಂ
-2023
vಾರ+ೕಯ 3ಾFಯ ಸಂg ೆ ಅ)ಯ $ Y5ಾಹ ಅಪNಾಧ ಎಸBರು ಾ Nೆಂದು
ೋxಾNೋಪTಾ ಪPQ.”
11. A perusal at the complaint and the summary of the
charge sheet, insofar as petitioner Nos.2 and 3 are concerned,
reveals allegations of a distinctly general character. The substance
- 24 -
of the accusation is that the mother-in-law and sister-in-law, acting
in concert with the husband, subjected the complainant to mental
harassment, which allegedly necessitated treatment at Cadabams
Hospital. Beyond this broad assertion, the material, as presented,
does not attribute any particular overt act to either petitioner No.2
or petitioner No.3. There is no distinct narration of the conduct
allegedly indulged in by each of them, the circumstances in which
such conduct occurred, or the manner in which it would satisfy the
statutory ingredients of the offences invoked.
12. The law does not contemplate criminal culpability
by association. A person does not become an accused merely
because he or she happens to be related to another accused.
Relationship may explain the presence of a person in a
household; it cannot, without more, establish participation in
an offence. The prosecution must rest upon allegations of
individual conduct and not upon the convenient enlargement
of the array of accused to encompass every member of the
matrimonial household. In the absence of any specific
allegation, disclosing prima facie criminality against
- 25 -
petitioner Nos.2 and 3, compelling them to undergo the
ordeal of a criminal trial would amount to permitting the
process of law to operate as a punishment in itself.
13. Insofar as the implication of the mother-in-law,
sister-in-law and other relatives of the husband is concerned, the
jurisprudence developed by the Apex Court is both extensive and
unequivocal. The Apex Court has repeatedly cautioned against
the tendency to indiscriminately implicate every member of
the husband's family in criminal proceedings arising out of
matrimonial discord. The principle running through these
pronouncements is that the complaint and, where investigation has
culminated in a charge sheet, the material collected during
investigation must disclose specific allegations and a prima facie
foundation for the offences attributed to each accused. Vague,
sweeping and omnibus allegations cannot, merely by reason of their
repetition in a charge sheet, acquire the character of legally
sustainable accusations.
The protective provisions of criminal
law were enacted to combat cruelty and harassment, not to
create a presumption of guilt against entire family, merely
- 26 -
because a matrimonial relationship has turned acrimonious.
The law may cast its protective mantle over a woman
subjected to cruelty, but that mantle cannot be stretched so
far, as to engulf persons against whom no criminal act is
alleged. To do so would be to substitute familial relationship
for criminal culpability, a proposition wholly alien to the
fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence.
14. The present case, insofar as petitioner Nos.2 and 3
are concerned, appears to fall within the category of
proceedings where the allegations, even if accepted as
presented, fail to disclose the necessary ingredients of the
offences alleged. Continuation of proceedings against them
would, therefore, amount to an abuse of the process of law.
JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE QUA FAMILY MEMBERS:
15. Jurisprudence is replete with the law laid down by the
Apex Court that in-laws cannot be drawn into proceedings under
Section 85 of the BNS on vague or omnibus allegations.
- 27 -
15.1. The Apex Court in the case of
DR. SUSHIL KUMAR
1
PURBEY v. STATE OF BIHAR , has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
7. Having considered the submissions advanced by the
parties and upon a careful perusal of the material on record, we
are of the view that the High Court fell into error in restricting
the quashing of criminal proceedings only to the sister-in-law
(Respondent 3). A comparative reading of the FIR reveals
that the allegations levelled against the sister-in-law and
those against the present appellants are, in all material
particulars, identical. The FIR does not assign any specific
or overt act to either appellant; there are no particular
dates, places, or individual acts attributed to them. The
lone allegation that stands separately against the present
appellants is that they would quarrel. This, however, does
not constitute a criminal offence and cannot, by itself,
sustain cognizance of the offences under
Sections 341, 323, 498A & 34 IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of
the Dowry Act for which the appellants have been
summoned. The standard applied by the High Court in
quashing proceedings against the sister-in-law, on the
ground that the allegations against her were general and
omnibus, applies with equal force to the present
appellants, and there is no principled basis for
distinguishing between them.
8. It is further pertinent to note that the marriage was
solemnised in July 2019, and the husband filed the divorce
petition as early as March 2021. The criminal complaint against
the appellants was, however, lodged only in March 2022, nearly
a year after the filing of the divorce petition. Though this delay,
standing alone, would not constitute a sufficient ground for
quashing the criminal proceedings against the appellants.
However, viewed in conjunction with the absence of any specific
allegations attributable to them, the delay lends credence to the
submission that the criminal complaint against the in-laws may
have been instituted by way of a counter-blast to the divorce
1
2026 SCC OnLine SC 338
- 28 -
proceedings initiated by the husband. When these two
considerations are read together, we are satisfied that the
continuation of the criminal proceedings against the present
appellants cannot be sustained.
9. Before moving forward, we consider it necessary to
clarify that the observations made hereinabove are confined to
the question of the maintainability of the criminal proceedings
against the present appellants, and must not be construed as an
expression of any opinion on the merits of the case as a whole.
The criminal proceedings against the husband shall continue in
accordance with law. We note, in this context, that the husband
did not seek quashing of the proceedings against him before the
High Court under Section 482 CrPC; it was only the present
appellants and the sister-in-law who did so. The husband is also
not before this Court in the present appeal. We therefore find no
occasion to comment upon the allegations levelled against him,
and the proceedings against him shall be governed by law.
10. In view of the foregoing, we are of the
considered opinion that the High Court erred in applying
different standards to persons who stand on an identical
footing insofar as the nature of the allegations against
them is concerned. Since the allegations against the
present appellants and the sister-in-law are, in
substance, the same, the reasoning that led the High
Court to quash the proceedings against the sister-in-law
ought equally to have led to the quashing of proceedings
against the present appellants. The impugned order, to
the extent that it declined to extend such relief to the
appellants, cannot be sustained. ”
15.2. The Apex Court in the case of CHARUL SHUKLA v.
2
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH , has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
2
2026 SCC OnLine SC 476
- 29 -
21. At the outset, we find it important to underline and
highlight that the husband is not a party in the present appeals
and therefore we have been mindful of the fact that the said
allegations have to be viewed from the standpoint of only the
accused/appellants herein who are the sister-in-law and
parents-in-law of the complainant. From a perusal of the instant
FIR it is apparent that the complainant has alleged that at the
time of her marriage with the accused/husband, her family had
given gifts as per the status of his family. Despite that from the
very first day after the marriage on 16.04.2017, when the
complainant started residing at her matrimonial home, the
husband along with the accused/appellants started harassing
the complainant and demanded Rs. 8,50,000/- (Rupees Eight
lakhs Fifty Thousand) along with a car as additional dowry.
Furthermore, the allegations against the sister-in-law of the
complainant is that she instigated the husband of the
complainant by making false accusations about the complainant
having an illicit affair outside the marriage. Firstly, with
reference to the allegations of dowry demand and related
harassment of the complainant, it is noted by us that the
complainant and the prosecution have failed to put forth
any material evidence or substance which support the
allegations contained in the FIR and the chargesheet. A
mere statement stating that the accused/appellants
herein frequently demanded dowry and harassed the
complainant for the same is not sufficient to initiate
criminal proceedings against them when the same are not
corroborated or bolstered by other materials placed on
record . At the same time, the said allegations also have to be
juxtaposed with the fact that the complaint was registered by
the complainant only on 15.11.2023 i.e. after a delay of more
than six years and seven months from the alleged dowry
demand. The prosecution has failed to put forth any sufficient
cause for such delay and this casts aspersions on their story. At
this juncture, we find it apposite to underline the importance of
taking an early recourse to pursue and prosecute criminal
complaints. We find that the citizens who allege commission of
an offence should not dawdle on their rights but should rather
pursue them in real time in order to achieve the ends of justice
as vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt meaning, law
protects those who are vigilant about their rights. The delay or
lack thereof assumes greater importance in the matrimonial
cases or criminal cases between the spouses as due to the
- 30 -
personal nature of the allegations and relationship shared
between the parties, there is already an insufficiency and
inadequacy of evidence to support or rebut the claims and
counterclaims. A delay of nearly seven years can therefore be
fatal to the prosecution's case especially when the same has not
been properly explained.
Furthermore, with respect to the allegations against
22.
the sister-in-law regarding the incitement of the complainant's
husband in relation to the alleged extra-marital affair, the
prosecution has failed to provide any specific detail and has not
been able to elaborate upon the nature of the relationship or
how those accusations purportedly affected complainant's
relationship with her husband. It is apposite to note that upon
the perusal of the records of the case, nothing material has
been put forth to advance or substantiate the said allegations.
Time and again, this Court has observed that merely
stating certain vague and omnibus allegations without
any cogent material evidence to support the same should
not become a fillip to jump-start the criminal machinery
of the State. At this juncture, we find it appropriate to
quote the observations of this Court in Dara Lakshmi
Narayana v. State of Telangana , (2025) 3 SCC 735 which
is extracted as under:
“27. A mere reference to the names of
family members in a criminal case arising out of a
matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations
indicating their active involvement should be
nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact,
borne out of judicial experience, that there is often
a tendency to implicate all the members of the
husband's family when domestic disputes arise out
of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and
sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete
evidence or particularised allegations cannot form
the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must
exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse
of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid
unnecessary harassment of innocent family
members. …
x x x
- 31 -
30. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by
way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty
inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family,
ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in
recent years, as there have been a notable rise Page 22
of 26 in matrimonial disputes across the country,
accompanied by growing discord and tension within the
institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a
growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A
of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta
against the husband and his family by a wife . Making
vague and generalised allegations during
matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead
to the misuse of legal processes and an
encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a
wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is
taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against
the husband and his family in order to seek
compliance with the unreasonable demands of a
wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again,
cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his
family in the absence of a clear prima facie case
against them.
31. We are not, for a moment, stating that any
woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has
been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC
should remain silent and forbear herself from making a
complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is
not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we
should not encourage a case like as in the present one,
where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of
marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the
second respondent herein, a complaint under Section
498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the
insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for
the protection of a woman who is subjected to
cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to
an unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security in the form of dowry. However,
sometimes it is misused as in the present case. ”
.”
- 32 -
15.3. The Apex Court in the case of
ARTI MEHTA v. STATE
3
OF MADHYA PRADESH , has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
21. As regards the present appellants, namely, Arti
Mehta, Shrivati Bai Dhakad, Manisha Dhakad and Vikram
Dhakad, the allegations are essentially omnibus and generalised
in nature. In the FIR, the complainant merely states that
the husband and the in-laws “ started abusing me and
would tell me to go and live with my parents ” and that
the appellants “ would demand dowry from me every day
and would tell me that if I did not bring dowry, I should
go back to my parental home. ” Beyond these broad and
sweeping assertions, no specific incident, date, overt act
or particular role has been attributed individually to any
of the appellants. The allegations do not disclose as to
which appellant made what demand, on which occasion,
in whose presence, or in what manner any specific act
constituting cruelty under Section 498A IPC was
committed.
22. Significantly, even in the elaborate divorce petition
subsequently filed by the complainant/wife, the allegations
continue to remain substantially vague insofar as the present
appellants are concerned. The detailed allegations of cruelty,
harassment and mental trauma overwhelmingly revolve around
the conduct of the husband at Sheopur, where admittedly the
complainant was residing with him in the government
accommodation allotted to him. The complainant herself states
in paragraph 2 of the divorce petition that “ after some time of
marriage, the non-applicant took the applicant to live in his
government quarter in Sheopur. ” She further reiterates in
paragraph 3 that during the second Karva Chauth, “ the
applicant and the non-applicant lived in the government
quarters of Sheopur. ” These pleadings clearly indicate that the
matrimonial residence of the parties was at Sheopur and not at
Shivpuri, where the present appellants were residing.
3
2026 SCC OnLine SC 933
- 33 -
The complainant, however, in the counter affidavit
as well as in the written submissions filed before this
Court, has attempted to explain the aforesaid position by
contending that while she was residing with her husband
at Sheopur, the husband along with the present
appellants used to harass her for dowry and that
whenever the husband left her at the in-laws' house at
Shivpuri, the appellants also used to harass her and
prevent her from residing peacefully in the matrimonial
home. It has further been contended on behalf of the
complainant that these aspects are also reflected in the
translated divorce petition and the prosecution's story.
Even if the aforesaid explanation is accepted at its
face value, the allegations against the present appellants
nevertheless remain broad, generalised, and bereft of
specific particulars. Neither in the FIR nor in the divorce
petition nor even in the subsequent pleadings before this
Court has the complainant specified any particular date,
incident or overt act attributable individually to any of the
present appellants which would prima facie constitute
cruelty or unlawful demand of dowry within the meaning
of Section 498A IPC or Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act. The allegations essentially remain
collective assertions that the appellants “used to harass”
the complainant or “supported” the husband, without any
clear delineation of the precise role allegedly played by
each of them. Mere use of omnibus expressions against
all family members, in the absence of specific factual
assertions, would not by itself justify continuation of
criminal proceedings against the present appellants.
23. In fact, the complainant's own pleadings substantially
dilute the allegations sought to be levelled against the
appellants in the FIR. While the FIR creates an impression of
continuous harassment by all in-laws collectively, the divorce
petition narrates specific acts, almost entirely concerning the
husband. Even the allegation regarding the demand for money
is primarily against the husband, wherein the complainant
states that “ the non-applicant told the applicant that my entire
salary is spent on my father's treatment, and now I am unable
to bear your expenses. … now bring some money from your
parents. ” The subsequent allegation that the husband became
- 34 -
angry and started abusing and slapping her is also directed
solely against him. The appellants are not alleged to have
actively participated in any specific demand or act of cruelty.
24. The allegations against the appellant No. 4 -
Vikram Dhakad are also of a generalised nature and do
not disclose any criminal intent or overt act constituting
an offence under Section 498A IPC. In paragraph 6 of the
divorce petition, the complainant merely states that
Vikram Dhakad remarked that “ guests keep coming to
our house ” and questioned why she was residing at
Shivpuri while her husband was staying in Sheopur. Even
if the said allegations are accepted at their face value,
they merely indicate a domestic disagreement regarding
her stay at the matrimonial house and do not amount to
cruelty or unlawful dowry demand within the meaning of
the penal provisions invoked.
25. Similarly, the allegations against the appellant
No. 1 Arti Mehta are confined to assertions that the
complainant had informed her regarding the conduct of
the husband and that she did not react in the manner
expected by the complainant. In paragraph 9 of the
divorce petition, the complainant states that “ The non-
applicant's elder sister Aarti Mehta also came to Sheopur
many times. The applicant informed her regarding all
types of acts, such as beating and abuse by the non-
applicant. No statement was made on the incident told by
the applicant. ” Mere failure to intervene in a matrimonial
dispute between spouses, without any specific allegation
of active participation in cruelty or dowry demand, cannot
by itself attract criminal liability.
26. It is also pertinent to note that the complainant
herself states in paragraph 9 of the divorce petition that she
travelled from Sheopur to Shivpuri on the occasion of Raksha
Bandhan along with the appellant No. 1 Arti Mehta. The relevant
portion states that “ the applicant came from Sheopur to
Shivpuri on 8.9.2022 on the festival of Raksha Bandhan with the
non-applicant's sister. ” This circumstance assumes significance
because it becomes difficult to readily accept that the
complainant would voluntarily travel with the very same
appellant whom she alleges to have been continuously harassing
- 35 -
and tormenting her for dowry. Though this circumstance by
itself may not be determinative, it certainly weakens the
allegation of persistent and active cruelty attributed to the
appellant No. 1.
Further,
27. the complainant's own pleadings
demonstrate that there was no continuous shared
household with the present the appellants. The repeated
references in the divorce petition indicate that the
complainant was residing with her husband at Sheopur in
his government accommodation and that the visits to
Shivpuri were occasional and temporary in nature. Thus,
even on the complainant's own showing, the principal
matrimonial relationship and the alleged acts of cruelty
were centred around the husband at Sheopur.
28. What, therefore, emerges from a cumulative
reading of the FIR and the divorce petition is that while
there are specific allegations against the husband
relating to physical assault, verbal abuse, neglect and
suspicious conduct, the allegations against the present
appellants remain bald, generalised, and devoid of
material particulars. No independent or specific role has
been attributed to any of the present appellants so as to
disclose prima facie commission of offences under
Sections 498A/34 IPC or Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act. The allegations against them appear to
be omnibus assertions made on account of their
relationship with the husband rather than on the basis of
any distinct criminal acts allegedly committed by them.
29. It is a matter of common judicial experience that
matrimonial disputes are often accompanied by heightened
emotions, strained relationships and deep-seated personal
grievances. In such circumstances, complaints alleging
cruelty and harassment frequently tend to implicate not
only the spouse but also the entire family of the spouse,
including those relatives who may have had little or no
active role in the matrimonial discord. Quite often, family
members who may have remained passive spectators,
failed to intervene, or merely sided with one party in a
domestic disagreement, are also arrayed as accused.
However, mere familial association with the husband, or
- 36 -
failure to support the complainant in a marital dispute,
cannot by itself constitute a criminal offence in the
absence of specific allegations disclosing active
participation in acts amounting to cruelty, harassment or
unlawful demand of dowry.
30. It must also be borne in mind that when
matrimonial relationships deteriorate and bitterness sets
in, there is a natural tendency for allegations to be
amplified or broadly worded out of anger, frustration or
emotional distress. While the anguish of a complainant in
a failed marriage cannot be lightly disregarded, equally,
criminal law cannot be permitted to be set in motion
against every relative of the husband merely on the basis
of generalised and omnibus allegations lacking a specific
factual foundation. Courts, therefore, are required to
exercise greater caution and carefully scrutinise whether
the allegations genuinely disclose the commission of
cognizable offences against each accused individually,
lest the criminal process itself becomes a tool of
harassment and misuse.
…. …. ….
34. Insofar as the present appellants are
concerned, the allegations in the DV complaint remain
broadly worded and largely collective in nature. The
complainant states that due to refusal to bring money
from her parental home, “ my husband and in-laws …
used to get angry with me. In this way they started
torturing me physically and mentally. ” However, beyond
the use of such omnibus expressions, the complaint does
not disclose any specific incident, date, act or conduct
individually attributable to any of the appellants which
would constitute “domestic violence” within the meaning
of the DV Act.
35. Even the allegations concerning the complainant's
brother-in-law, namely, Vikram Dhakad (Appellant No. 4), are
essentially in the nature of statements allegedly advising the
complainant regarding her matrimonial life. The complaint
states that Vikram Dhakad questioned why the complainant was
staying at Shivpuri while the husband was residing at Sheopur
- 37 -
and allegedly told her that “ you bring money from your
maternal home as per our demand and either stay in Sheopur or
stay in your maternal home in Guna. ” Thereafter, it is alleged
that Vikram Dhakad, along with Manisha Dhakad and Ganesh
Dhakad, did not permit her to continue residing at Shivpuri.
Even if these allegations are accepted at their face value, they
do not disclose any specific act of physical violence, criminal
intimidation or overt conduct of such nature as would
independently attract criminal liability under the provisions of
the DV Act.
Similarly, the allegations against the complainant's
36.
mother-in-law, namely, Shrivati Bai Dhakad (Appellant No. 2)
and the wife of the complainant's brother-in-law, namely,
Manisha Dhakad (Appellant No. 3), are confined to broad
assertions that “ they used to insult me on small matters and
demand money. ” The complaint is conspicuously silent
regarding the particulars of such alleged demands, the
time and place where such incidents occurred, or the
manner in which such demands were allegedly made.
General allegations of “insult” or “harassment” without
supporting particulars cannot by themselves form the
basis for continuation of criminal proceedings.
37. As regards the complainant's sister-in-law Arti Mehta
(Appellant No. 1), the allegation is essentially that when the
complainant informed her about the husband's conduct, she
allegedly scolded the complainant and advised her to remain
quiet and fulfil the family's demands. The relevant allegation
reads that “ I told his sister Aarti Mehta about his activities many
times, then she scolded me and said that you should keep quiet,
otherwise it will not be good. ” The allegation, even if
accepted in entirety, merely suggests that appellant No. 1
sided with her brother in the matrimonial dispute. Mere
failure to support the complainant, or advising her to
continue in the matrimonial relationship, without any
further overt act, would not ipso facto amount to
domestic violence so as to justify criminal prosecution.
…. …. ….
39. What ultimately emerges from a cumulative
reading of the DV complaint is that while the complainant
- 38 -
has narrated several detailed allegations concerning the
husband's conduct and the strained matrimonial
relationship between the spouses, the allegations against
the present appellants remain generalised and derivative
in character. The complaint does not disclose any specific
or direct act individually attributable to the appellants
constituting domestic violence, physical abuse, verbal
abuse, emotional abuse or economic abuse within the
meaning of the DV Act. The allegations against them are
essentially that they supported the husband, failed to
intervene in the matrimonial dispute, or asked the
complainant to adjust to the situation. Such omnibus and
broadly worded allegations, in the absence of clear
particulars and specific overt acts, would not justify
continuation of proceedings against the present
appellants.
40. We have also taken note of the fact that during the
pendency of the present proceedings, the marriage between the
complainant and her husband already stood dissolved by a
decree passed by the competent Family Court. In such
circumstances, continuation of the proceedings under the DV Act
qua the present appellants, in the absence of specific and
substantiated allegations against them as of now, would serve
no useful purpose. It is, however, clarified that the complainant
would be at liberty to avail such remedies against the husband
as may be permissible to her in accordance with law.
41. It is further required to be stated that the invocation
of the criminal process is not a matter of course. The coercive
machinery of criminal law carries serious civil and
personal consequences and, therefore, can be
legitimately set in motion only where the allegations
disclose specific acts constituting offences punishable
under the penal law. This principle assumes even greater
significance in cases arising out of matrimonial and
domestic discord. Family relationships are founded upon
emotional bonds, mutual trust, affection and shared
responsibilities, and cannot be viewed through the same
lens as ordinary commercial, civil disputes or criminal
cases. It is not uncommon that when matrimonial
relationships deteriorate, allegations are made in the
heat of emotional turmoil and bitterness, often resulting
- 39 -
in the entire family of the spouse being drawn into
criminal litigation. However, criminal law cannot be
permitted to become an instrument for venting personal
grievances or settling familial scores in the absence of
clear, specific and legally sustainable allegations. Courts
must therefore exercise a heightened degree of caution
and judicial scrutiny before permitting criminal
prosecution against relatives who are sought to be
implicated merely by virtue of their relationship with the
spouse.
At the same time, this Court is equally conscious of
42.
the reality that genuine cases of cruelty and domestic violence
do occur within the confines of the matrimonial home and often
remain concealed from public gaze. Acts of emotional, verbal,
economic or physical abuse within the domestic sphere may not
always leave behind readily available evidence or independent
witnesses, and the absence of such evidence at the threshold
cannot by itself be a ground to disbelieve a victim. It is precisely
to address this social evil that legislations such as the Protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and the penal
provisions relating to cruelty and dowry harassment have been
enacted with wide amplitude and protective intent. The object of
such statutes is to ensure meaningful legal protection to women
subjected to domestic abuse and harassment within the
matrimonial home.
43. However, while safeguarding the rights and
dignity of victims of domestic violence remains of
paramount importance, courts are simultaneously
required to ensure that the rigours of criminal law are not
indiscriminately extended to every member of the family
without a clear factual foundation. In prosecutions
arising out of matrimonial disputes, the allegations
against each accused must be specific, distinct and
supported by prima facie material indicating active
involvement in the alleged acts of cruelty, harassment or
unlawful demand of dowry. Mere allegations that family
members “supported” the husband, failed to intervene, or
advised the complainant to adjust in the matrimonial
relationship, without anything further, would not ipso
facto attract criminal liability. There may indeed be
situations where certain relatives remain passive
- 40 -
spectators or fail to come to the aid of the complainant;
however, such conduct, though morally questionable,
cannot automatically be elevated to the status of criminal
culpability unless the surrounding circumstances clearly
disclose their active complicity or participation in the
alleged offences.
It must therefore be emphasised that each case
44.
arising out of matrimonial discord or allegations of domestic
violence must necessarily turn on its own peculiar facts and the
nature of allegations levelled against the accused concerned.
The observations made herein should not be construed to mean
that relatives of the husband can never be prosecuted under the
relevant penal provisions.
Where the material on record
discloses specific overt acts, active participation, or direct
involvement in perpetrating cruelty, harassment or
domestic violence, such relatives would undoubtedly be
liable to face prosecution in accordance with the law.
What the Court is required to carefully examine is
whether the allegations are genuine, specific and
supported by foundational facts, or whether they are
merely a consequence of matrimonial acrimony resulting
in sweeping and omnibus implication of all family
members. In the absence of such specific allegations
and prima facie material, continuation of criminal
proceedings against such relatives would amount to
abuse of the process of law.
45. Having given our anxious consideration to the
allegations contained in the FIR, the complaint under the DV
Act, the pleadings exchanged between the parties in the
matrimonial proceedings and the material placed on record, we
find that the substratum of the allegations primarily concerns
the matrimonial discord between the complainant and her
husband. The allegations relating to physical assault, abusive
conduct, emotional neglect, suspicion regarding extramarital
relationship, threats, restriction on movement and denial of
marital companionship are overwhelmingly directed against the
husband. Insofar as the present appellants are concerned, the
allegations remain generalised, omnibus and lacking in material
particulars.
- 41 -
As discussed hereinabove, neither the FIR nor the DV
complaint nor even the subsequent pleadings before the
Family Court disclose any specific overt act individually
attributable to the present appellants so as to prima facie
constitute offences punishable under
Sections 498A/34 IPC, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act or the provisions of the DV Act. The
allegations against the appellants essentially proceed on
broad assertions that they “supported” the husband,
“used to harass” the complainant, or advised her to
either adjust with the husband or return to her parental
home. However, no distinct incident, date, specific
demand, act of physical cruelty, unlawful intimidation or
active participation in the alleged harassment has been
clearly attributed to any of the appellants individually.
46. Though their behaviour as projected in the complaint
appear to be reproachable otherwise, yet these may not be
sufficient to attract criminal liabilities. Permitting the
proceedings to continue against the appellants in the absence of
specific and legally sustainable allegations would amount to an
abuse of the process of law.”
15.4. The Apex Court in the latest judgment rendered in the
4
case of PRASANTA KUMAR DHAR v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL ,
has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
19. Cruelty under Section 498A IPC would consist of
either:
(a) Any wilful conduct that
i. is likely to drive a woman to commit
suicide, or
4
2026 SCC OnLine SC 2061
- 42 -
ii. cause grave injury or danger to her life,
limb, or health (whether mental or
physical); or
(b) Harassment
i. to coerce her or any persons related to her
to meet any unlawful demand for property
or valuable security, or
ii. harassment on account of failure to meet
such demand.
20. A perusal of the records, however, shows that
neither the complaint nor the investigation carried out by
the police reveals any material that indicates that the
Appellants herein had caused grave injury to her life, limb
or mental or physical health, nor do they reveal any
independent material that the Appellants harassed her
for any property or valuable security.
21. As regards the offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the
DP Act, the complainant has alleged that the Appellants and the
complainant's husband had demanded and accordingly were
paid Rs. 5 lakhs at the time of the marriage. Further, demands
for a four-wheeler were made by them, in fulfilment of which,
furniture was allegedly given to them. The specifics of the
same, any other witnesses privy to the demands for
dowry, and any material outside of the allegations of the
complainant did not surface during the investigation. The
allegations do not disclose the particulars of the demands
of dowry made by the Appellants, the occasions, the
presence of any independent witnesses, or the manner
such that such specific overt acts constituting cruelty
under Section 498A IPC were committed.
…. …. ….
25. We find that the allegations made and
investigation carried out do not reveal details as to any
threats made by the Appellants to the complainant, her
family, their property or their reputation. It is pertinent
to note that the complainant states that her signing of
- 43 -
the document stating that she has received all of her
streedhan and valuables back was made under duress
and coercion and intimidation of the first Appellant and
her husband. However, the only material to demonstrate
any coercive or intimidating behaviour of the first
Appellant is her own complaint and the statements of her
parents recorded under Section 161 Cr. P.C. There is no
other evidence/material on record to implicate the first
Appellant as regards the allegations of coercion or
intimidation at the complainant's parental house.
26. Finding reliance on Bhajan Lal (supra), Arti
Mehta (supra) and Geddam Jhansi (supra), we are of the
view that the allegations levelled against the present
Appellants are not specific, cogent and credible. They do
not attribute an overt or specific act to either Appellant.
Neither the complaint nor the investigation reveals any
independent material that shows that the Appellants as
the in-laws of the complainant committed any of the
offences mentioned in the FIR or the chargesheet. The
allegations against the Appellants for the demands for
dowry, of criminal intimidation and cruelty find no
supporting material in the FIR or the chargesheet
submitted after the investigation. The oral allegations are
devoid of any supporting material or witnesses, which
renders the allegations of the complainant against the
Appellants without any legal basis to continue the legal
proceedings against the Appellants.
27. Specific allegations of cruelty, harassment and dowry
demands have been made against the husband of the
complainant, who was neither a party to the proceedings before
the High Court, nor here. Hence, we are not dealing with the
allegations against the husband.
28. We, therefore, find that the complaint and
investigation, as they currently stand, do not disclose sufficient
material to warrant subjecting the Appellants herein to the
rigours of a criminal trial. Since the allegations against the
present Appellants are general and not substantiated by any
investigative material in the chargesheet, the High Court ought
to have quashed the entire proceedings against the present
- 44 -
Appellants. The impugned order, to the extent that it declined to
quash the remaining sections, cannot be sustained.”
THE HUSBAND/ PETITIONER NO.1:
st
16. Insofar as the 1 petitioner/husband is concerned, the
allegations, as noticed in the interim orders, are threefold: the
alleged taking away of jewellery belonging to the complainant,
monetary transactions sought to be characterized as dowry
demands, and forcible medical termination of pregnancy. These
allegations must be examined individually, for the criminality
attributed to the husband cannot be determined by the cumulative
weight of accusations, unless the material discloses the ingredients
of the offences alleged.
17.1. The first allegation that calls for consideration is, the
alleged forcible medical termination of pregnancy. The fulcrum of
this accusation, as emerging from the complaint and the summary
of the charge sheet, is that the pregnancy of the complainant was
terminated when she was approximately eleven weeks pregnant,
allegedly by administration or consumption of tablets.
- 45 -
17.2. The learned counsel for the petitioners would contend
that termination of pregnancy at that stage could not have been
brought about in the manner alleged and that the complainant had
consented to a medical procedure, which is now sought to be
portrayed as a forcible termination. The allegation is undoubtedly
grave. An involuntary termination of pregnancy, if established,
cannot be trivialized as a mere incident of matrimonial discord. It
concerns bodily autonomy and reproductive choice, matters of
profound legal significance. At the same time, the gravity of an
allegation cannot dispense with the requirement of a factual
foundation. The manner of termination, the medical records, the
nature of the procedure, and the circumstances surrounding
consent assume significance. The decisive consideration must be,
whether the material collected during investigation supports the
allegation of compulsion or absence of consent. It is trite that when
the fetus is beyond nine weeks old, the procedure of oral
medication for abortion cannot be conducted and it is only by
surgical methods that the pregnancy can be terminated. It is
alleged that the pregnancy of the complainant was terminated by
- 46 -
oral medication when the fetus was eleven weeks old. This would
cast a serious doubt on this allegation so raised in the complaint.
17.3. If the charge sheet does not disclose material
st
connecting the 1 petitioner to an involuntary termination,
the accusation cannot be sustained merely upon its
seriousness. The criminal law demands evidence capable of
supporting a prima facie inference, not an inference drawn
from the gravity of the allegation alone. The Apex Court in the
5
case of SAJAL BOSE v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL observes that
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C./ Section 528
of the BNSS can be exercised when unimpeachable evidence would
disprove the allegations in the prosecution's case, and holds as
follows:
“…. …. ….
23. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, it is
evident that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court
under Section 482 of CrPC is intended to be exercised,
inter alia , where the allegations made in the FIR, even if
taken at their face value, do not prima facie constitute
any offence, or where the uncontroverted allegations and
the material collected fail to disclose the commission of
5
2026 SCC OnLine SC 525
- 47 -
an offence, or where the criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with malafide and instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance. The categories
illustratively enumerated in paragraph 102 of Bhajan Lal
(supra) serve as guiding principles to prevent abuse of
the process of law and to secure the ends of justice.
Tested on the anvil of these settled parameters, it becomes
necessary to examine whether the allegations in the present
case, read as they stand along with the material on record
including the CCTV footage, disclose the essential ingredients of
the offences alleged against the appellants, or whether the
continuation of proceedings them would amount to
qua
permitting the criminal process to be used as an instrument of
harassment.
…. …. ….
29. We are further constrained to note that by the very
same impugned judgment, and on the basis of the same set of
allegations arising out of the same FIR and chargesheet, the
High Court proceeded to quash the criminal proceedings against
two of the co-accused, while declining similar relief to the
appellants. The impugned judgment does not disclose any
cogent or discernible reasoning for drawing such a
distinction, particularly when the allegations stem from a
common incident and are founded on substantially similar
assertions. In the absence of a clear rationale justifying
differential treatment, the approach adopted by the High
Court is legally and factually unsustainable.
…. …. ….
31. In view of the foregoing discussion and upon a
cumulative consideration of the allegations in the FIR,
the material collected during investigation, and the
evidence placed before us, we are of the considered
opinion that the present case falls squarely within the
illustrative categories (1), (3) and (7) enumerated in
paragraph 102 of Bhajan Lal (supra). Even if the
allegations in the FIR and the material collected during
investigation are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety, they do not prima facie constitute the
necessary ingredients of offences alleged against the
- 48 -
appellants . Further, the uncontroverted material available
on record, to be specific, the CCTV footage, completely
belies the allegation of their participation in the alleged
offences so as to justify their being put to trial.
Additionally, the attendant circumstances, particularly
the admitted pre-existing disputes between the parties
and the absence of specific and distinct overt acts
attributed to the appellants, lend substance to their
contention that the criminal proceedings are manifestly
attended with malafide and have been initiated with an
ulterior motive. In such circumstances, permitting the
continuation of prosecution of the appellants would not
advance the cause of justice but would instead amount to
an abuse of the process of law.
32. Recently, this Court in Pradeep Kumar
11
Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh , revisited and
further elucidated the parameters governing the exercise
of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. While
drawing guidance from earlier precedents, this Court
delineated a structured four-step test to assess the
sustainability of a prayer for quashing criminal
proceedings. The said decision underscores that where
the material relied upon by the accused is of sterling and
impeccable quality; is sufficient to negate the allegations
in the complaint; remains unrefuted or incapable of
justifiable refutation by the prosecution; and where
continuation of the proceedings would amount to an
abuse of the process of Court and not serve the ends of
justice, the High Court would be justified in exercising its
inherent powers to quash the proceedings . For ready
reference, the relevant observations from the said judgment are
reproduced hereinbelow:—
“20. The following steps should ordinarily
determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing,
raised by an accused by invoking the power vested
in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.:
—
(i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the
accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable,
i.e., the materials is of sterling and impeccable
quality?
- 49 -
(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the
accused, would rule out the assertions contained
in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e.,
the material is sufficient to reject and overrule
the factual assertions contained in the complaint,
i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a
reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the
factual basis of the accusations as false.
(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by
the accused, has not been refuted by the
prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is
such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the
prosecution/complainant?
(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial
would result in an abuse of process of the court,
and would not serve the ends of justice?
If the answer to all the steps is in the
affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court
should persuade it to quash such criminal
proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it
under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Such exercise of
power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save
precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in
holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising
therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same
would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.
[(See: Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor
(Criminal Appeal No. 174 of 2013)]”
[Emphasis supplied]”
18.1. The next allegation concerns, the jewellery said to have
been taken away by the husband or members of his family. The
complaint contains an allegation to that effect. The summary of the
charge sheet, however, as noticed hereinabove, does not appear to
- 50 -
disclose any corresponding particulars concerning the jewellery
allegedly taken, the circumstances of its entrustment or removal, or
the individual role attributed to the petitioners. An accusation
relating to jewellery cannot be elevated into criminal misconduct
merely by employing the expression that it was taken away. The
factual foundation must disclose the conduct complained of and its
nexus with the offence alleged.
18.2. The conspicuous absence of such particulars in
the summary of the charge sheet assumes significance. An
allegation may initiate an investigation; it is the material
emerging from investigation that must furnish a legally
sustainable basis for prosecution. The charge sheet cannot
merely carry forward an accusation as an article of faith. It
must disclose material which gives the accusation a prima
facie foundation in law. In the absence of such material, the
allegation relating to jewellery remains unsupported for the
purposes of determining whether the prosecution should be
permitted to continue.
- 51 -
19.1. The third allegation concerns certain monetary
st
transactions between the complainant and the 1 petitioner,
involving an amount of ` 50,000/- or more. The complainant seeks
to characterize these transactions as constituting a demand for
dowry. The material referred to in the draft, including the statement
attributed to the complainant, indicates that the transactions were
connected with hospital expenses and medical treatment. A
monetary transaction between spouses does not, merely by reason
of its existence, constitute a demand for dowry. In this regard, it
would be apposite to refer to Section 85 of the BNS. It reads as
follows:
“ 85. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty .—Whoever, being the husband or
the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman
to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.”
Section 85 of the BNS is the statutory successor to Section 498A of
the IPC. The expression cruelty is defined under Section 86 of the
BNS. It encompasses wilful conduct of such gravity as is likely to
drive a woman to commit suicide or cause grave injury or danger to
her life, limb or health, whether mental or physical, and harassment
- 52 -
intended to coerce the woman or her relatives to meet an unlawful
demand for property or valuable security, or harassment on
account of failure to meet such demand.
19.2. Thus, cruelty under the provision is not confined
exclusively to dowry demands. Nevertheless, where the
prosecution is founded upon an alleged unlawful monetary
demand, the necessary nexus between the demand and the
harassment must be disclosed. In the case at hand, the
monetary transactions, as projected in the material, appear
to relate to hospital expenses. The summary of the charge
sheet does not disclose how these transactions assumed the
character of unlawful demands accompanied by harassment
of the nature contemplated under Section 86 of the BNS.
20. When the three allegations against the husband are
considered on the touchstone of the statutory ingredients, what
emerges is a prosecution, which on the material described
hereinabove, appears to rest more upon the existence of
matrimonial discord, than upon specific acts constituting criminal
cruelty. The complaint alleges much; the charge sheet, on the
- 53 -
narration presently available, appears to substantiate little.
The
distinction is of consequence. A complaint may be expansive
in its accusations, but a charge sheet must be anchored in
material. The transition from accusation to prosecution
cannot be sustained by rhetoric, where the statutory
ingredients remain unfulfilled.
21. It is also significant that the present matter is not at the
threshold of registration of a crime, when investigation is yet to
unfold. Investigation has already been completed and a
charge sheet has been placed before the jurisdictional Court.
The question is, therefore, whether the material collected
during investigation discloses a prima facie case warranting
trial. The earlier complaints lodged by the petitioners, the
non-cognizable reports, the registration of Crime No.97 of 2026 and
the subsequent institution of the impugned proceedings provide the
background against which the allegation of retaliatory prosecution is
advanced.
- 54 -
MISUSE OF SECTION 85 OF THE BNS/ SECTION 498A OF THE
IPC:
22. The law declared by the Apex Court concerning the
misuse of matrimonial criminal proceedings is intended to ensure
that a genuine victim of cruelty is not denied protection and, with
equal force, that criminal prosecution is not permitted to become a
weapon of private retribution.
22.1. The Apex Court in the case of ABHISHEK v. STATE
6
OF MADHYA PRADESH , has held as follows:
"…. …. ….
14. This being the factual backdrop, we may note at the
very outset that the contention that the appellants' quash
petition against the FIR was liable to be dismissed, in any
event, as the charge-sheet in relation thereto was submitted
before the Court and taken on file, needs mention only to be
rejected. It is well settled that the High Court would
continue to have the power to entertain and act upon a
petition filed under Section 482CrPC to quash the FIR
even when a charge-sheet is filed by the police during
the pendency of such petition [See Joseph Salvaraj A. v.
State of Gujarat [ Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat ,
(2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] ]. This principle
was reiterated in Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of
Delhi) [ Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi) ,
(2019) 11 SCC 706 : (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 288 (2)] . This
issue, therefore, needs no further elucidation on our part.
6
(2023) 16 SCC 666
- 55 -
15. The contours of the power to quash criminal
proceedings under Section 482CrPC are well defined. In
V. Ravi Kumar v. State [ V. Ravi Kumar v. State , (2019)
14 SCC 568 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 401] , this Court
affirmed that where an accused seeks quashing of the
FIR, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court,
it is wholly impermissible for the High Court to enter into
the factual arena to adjudge the correctness of the
allegations in the complaint. In Neeharika Infrastructure
(P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [ Neeharika
Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra , (2021)
19 SCC 401] , a three Judge Bench of this Court
elaborately considered the scope and extent of the
power under Section 482CrPC. It was observed that the
power of quashing should be exercised sparingly, with
circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, such
standard not being confused with the norm formulated
in the context of the death penalty. It was further
observed that while examining the FIR/complaint,
quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark
upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or
otherwise of the allegations made therein, but if the
court thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of
quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, and
more particularly, the parameters laid down by this
Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [ R.P. Kapur v.
State of Punjab , 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1960 SC
866] and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [ State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 426] , the court would have jurisdiction to
quash the FIR/complaint.
16. Instances of a husband's family members filing
a petition to quash criminal proceedings launched
against them by his wife in the midst of matrimonial
disputes are neither a rarity nor of recent origin.
Precedents aplenty abound on this score. We may now
take note of some decisions of particular relevance.
Recently, in Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar
[ Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar , (2022) 6 SCC 599 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 684] , this Court had occasion to deal
with a similar situation where the High Court had
- 56 -
refused [ Mohd. Ikram v. State of Bihar , 2019 SCC OnLine
Pat 1985] to quash an FIR registered for various
offences, including Section 498-AIPC. Noting that the
foremost issue that required determination was whether
allegations made against the in-laws were general
omnibus allegations which would be liable to be
quashed, this Court referred to earlier decisions wherein
concern was expressed over the misuse of Section 498-
AIPC and the increased tendency to implicate relatives
of the husband in matrimonial disputes. This Court
observed that false implications by way of general
omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial
disputes, if left unchecked, would result in misuse of the
process of law. On the facts of that case, it was found
that no specific allegations were made against the in-
laws by the wife and it was held that allowing their
prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against
the in-laws would result in an abuse of the process of
law. It was also noted that a criminal trial, leading to an
eventual acquittal, would inflict severe scars upon the
accused and such an exercise ought to be discouraged.
17. In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [ Preeti
Gupta v. State of Jharkhand , (2010) 7 SCC 667 : (2010)
3 SCC (Cri) 473] , this Court noted that the tendency to
implicate the husband and all his immediate relations is
also not uncommon in complaints filed under Section
498-AIPC. It was observed that the courts have to be
extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these
complaints and must take pragmatic realities into
consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases, as
allegations of harassment by husband's close relations,
who were living in different cities and never visited or
rarely visited the place where the complainant resided,
would add an entirely different complexion and such
allegations would have to be scrutinised with great care
and circumspection.
18. Earlier, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti [ Neelu Chopra
v. Bharti , (2009) 10 SCC 184 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 286] ,
this Court observed that the mere mention of statutory
provisions and the language thereof, for lodging a
- 57 -
complaint, is not the “be all and end all” of the matter,
as what is required to be brought to the notice of the
court is the particulars of the offence committed by each
and every accused and the role played by each and every
accused in the commission of that offence. These
observations were made in the context of a matrimonial
dispute involving Section 498-AIPC.
19. Of more recent origin is the decision of this Court in
Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P. [ Mahmood Ali v. State of
U.P. , (2023) 15 SCC 488] on the legal principles
applicable apropos Section 482CrPC. Therein, it was
observed that when an accused comes before the High
Court, invoking either the inherent power under Section
482CrPC or the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution, to get the FIR or the criminal
proceedings quashed, essentially on the ground that
such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious
or instituted with the ulterior motive of wreaking
vengeance, then in such circumstances, the High Court
owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little
more closely. It was further observed that it will not be
enough for the court to look into the averments made in
the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the
alleged offence are disclosed or not as, in frivolous or
vexatious proceedings, the court owes a duty to look
into many other attending circumstances emerging from
the record of the case over and above the averments
and, if need be, with due care and circumspection, to try
and read between the lines.
20. In Bhajan Lal [ State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , 1992
Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] , this Court had set
out, by way of illustration, the broad categories of cases in
which the inherent power under Section 482CrPC could be
exercised. Para 102 of the decision [ State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] reads as
follows : (SCC pp. 378-79)
“ 102 . In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court
- 58 -
in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such
power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such
power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute
only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
- 59 -
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the Act concerned (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the Act concerned,
providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
the accused and with a view to spite him due
to private and personal grudge.”."
22.2. The Apex Court in the case of ACHIN GUPTA v.
7
STATE OF HARYANA , has held as follows:
"…. …. ….
24. If a person is made to face a criminal trial on
some general and sweeping allegations without bringing
on record any specific instances of criminal conduct, it is
nothing but abuse of the process of the court. The court
owes a duty to subject the allegations levelled in the
complaint to a thorough scrutiny to find out, prima facie ,
whether there is any grain of truth in the allegations or
whether they are made only with the sole object of
involving certain individuals in a criminal charge, more
particularly when a prosecution arises from a
matrimonial dispute.
7
(2025) 3 SCC 756
- 60 -
25. In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [ Preeti Gupta v.
State of Jharkhand , (2010) 7 SCC 667 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri)
473] , this Court observed the following : (SCC pp. 676-77,
paras 30-38)
“ 30 . It is a matter of common knowledge
that unfortunately matrimonial litigation is rapidly
increasing in our country. All the courts in our
country including this Court are flooded with
matrimonial cases. This clearly demonstrates
discontent and unrest in the family life of a large
number of people of the society.
31 . The courts are receiving a large number of
cases emanating from Section 498-A of the Penal Code,
1860 which reads as under:
‘ 498-A. Husband or relative of
husband of a woman subjecting her to
cruelty .—Whoever, being the husband or the
relative of the husband of a woman, subjects
such woman to cruelty shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation .—For the purposes of this
section, “cruelty” means:
( a ) any wilful conduct which is of such
a nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or
danger to life, limb or health (whether mental
or physical) of the woman; or
( b ) harassment of the woman where
such harassment is with a view to coercing her
or any person related to her to meet any
unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or
any person related to her to meet such
demand.’
32 . It is a matter of common experience
that most of these complaints under Section 498-
AIPC are filed in the heat of the moment over
- 61 -
trivial issues without proper deliberations. We
come across a large number of such complaints
which are not even bona fide and are filed with
oblique motive. At the same time, rapid increase
in the number of genuine cases of dowry
harassment is also a matter of serious concern .
33 . The learned members of the Bar have
enormous social responsibility and obligation to
ensure that the social fibre of family life is not
ruined or demolished. They must ensure that
exaggerated versions of small incidents should
not be reflected in the criminal complaints.
Majority of the complaints are filed either on their
advice or with their concurrence. The learned
members of the Bar who belong to a noble
profession must maintain its noble traditions and
should treat every complaint under Section 498-A
as a basic human problem and must make serious
endeavour to help the parties in arriving at an
amicable resolution of that human problem. They
must discharge their duties to the best of their
abilities to ensure that social fibre, peace and
tranquillity of the society remains intact. The
members of the Bar should also ensure that one
complaint should not lead to multiple cases.
34 . Unfortunately, at the time of filing of
the complaint the implications and consequences
are not properly visualised by the complainant
that such complaint can lead to insurmountable
harassment, agony and pain to the complainant,
accused and his close relations .
35 . The ultimate object of justice is to find
out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the
innocent. To find out the truth is a herculean task
in majority of these complaints. The tendency of
implicating the husband and all his immediate
relations is also not uncommon. At times, even
after the conclusion of criminal trial, it is difficult
to ascertain the real truth. The courts have to be
extremely careful and cautious in dealing with
these complaints and must take pragmatic
realities into consideration while dealing with
matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment
- 62 -
of husband's close relations who had been living
in different cities and never visited or rarely
visited the place where the complainant resided
would have an entirely different complexion. The
allegations of the complaint are required to be
scrutinised with great care and circumspection .
36 . Experience reveals that long and
protracted criminal trials lead to rancour,
acrimony and bitterness in the relationship
amongst the parties. It is also a matter of
common knowledge that in cases filed by the
complainant if the husband or the husband's
relations had to remain in jail even for a few days,
it would ruin the chances of amicable settlement
altogether. The process of suffering is extremely
long and painful .
37 . Before parting with this case, we would like
to observe that a serious relook of the entire provision
is warranted by the legislature. It is also a matter of
common knowledge that exaggerated versions of the
incident are reflected in a large number of complaints.
The tendency of over implication is also reflected in a
very large number of cases. The criminal trials lead to
immense sufferings for all concerned. Even ultimate
acquittal in the trial may also not be able to wipe out
the deep scars of suffering of ignominy. Unfortunately a
large number of these complaints have not only flooded
the courts but also have led to enormous social unrest
affecting peace, harmony and happiness of the society.
It is high time that the legislature must take into
consideration the pragmatic realities and make suitable
changes in the existing law. It is imperative for the
legislature to take into consideration the informed
public opinion and the pragmatic realities in
consideration and make necessary changes in the
relevant provisions of law .
38 . We direct the Registry to send a copy of this
judgment to the Law Commission and to the Union Law
Secretary, Government of India who may place it before
the Hon'ble Minister for Law and Justice to take
appropriate steps in the larger interest of the society .”
(emphasis supplied)
…. …. ….
- 63 -
31. If the submission canvassed by the counsel appearing
for Respondent 2 and the State is to be accepted mechanically
then in our opinion the very conferment of the inherent power
by CrPC upon the High Court would be rendered otiose. We are
saying so for the simple reason that if the wife on
account of matrimonial disputes decides to harass her
husband and his family members then the first thing, she
would ensure is to see that proper allegations are
levelled in the first information report. Many times the
services of professionals are availed for the same and
once the complaint is drafted by a legal mind, it would be
very difficult thereafter to weed out any loopholes or
other deficiencies in the same. However, that does not
mean that the Court should shut its eyes and raise its
hands in helplessness, saying that whether true or false,
there are allegations in the first information report and
the charge-sheet papers disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence. If the allegations alone as levelled,
more particularly in the case like the one on hand, are to
be looked into or considered then why the investigating
agency thought it fit to file a closure report against the
other co-accused? There is no answer to this at the end of
the learned counsel appearing for the State. We say so,
because allegations have been levelled not only against
the appellant herein but even against his parents, brother
and sister. If that be so, then why the police did not deem
it fit to file charge-sheet against the other co-accused? It
appears that even the investigating agency was
convinced that the FIR was nothing but an outburst
arising from a matrimonial dispute.
32. Many times, the parents including the close
relatives of the wife make a mountain out of a molehill.
Instead of salvaging the situation and making all possible
endeavours to save the marriage, their action either due
to ignorance or on account of sheer hatred towards the
husband and his family members, brings about complete
destruction of marriage on trivial issues. The first thing
that comes in the mind of the wife, her parents and her
relatives is the police, as if the police is the panacea of all
evil. No sooner the matter reaches up to the police, then
- 64 -
even if there are fair chances of reconciliation between
the spouses, they would get destroyed. The foundation of
a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting
one another. Tolerance to each other's fault to a certain
bearable extent has to be inherent in every marriage.
Petty quibbles, trifling differences are mundane matters
and should not be exaggerated and blown out of
proportion to destroy what is said to have been made in
the heaven. The Court must appreciate that all quarrels
must be weighed from that point of view in determining
what constitutes cruelty in each particular case, always
keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the
parties, their character and social status. A very technical
and hypersensitive approach would prove to be
disastrous for the very institution of the marriage. In
matrimonial disputes the main sufferers are the children.
The spouses fight with such venom in their heart that
they do not think even for a second that if the marriage
would come to an end, then what will be the effect on
their children. Divorce plays a very dubious role so far as
the upbringing of the children is concerned. The only
reason why we are saying so is that instead of handling
the whole issue delicately, the initiation of criminal
proceedings would bring about nothing but hatred for
each other. There may be cases of genuine ill-treatment
and harassment by the husband and his family members
towards the wife. The degree of such ill-treatment or
harassment may vary. However, the police machinery
should be resorted to as a measure of last resort and that
too in a very genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The
police machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of
holding the husband at ransom so that he could be
squeezed by the wife at the instigation of her parents or
relatives or friends. In all cases, where wife complains of
harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498-AIPC cannot be
applied mechanically. No FIR is complete without
Sections 506(2) and 323IPC. Every matrimonial conduct,
which may cause annoyance to the other, may not
amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations, quarrels
between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married
life, may also not amount to cruelty."
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
- 65 -
23. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances
persuades this Court that the continuation of proceedings against
the petitioners, on the allegations and material noticed
hereinabove, would not advance the cause of criminal justice. The
accusations against petitioner Nos.2 and 3 are bereft of specific
st
overt acts. The allegations against the 1 petitioner, when
examined in the context of the charge sheet as described, do not
disclose the requisite factual foundation for the offences invoked.
The material must also disclose the distinct ingredients of
voluntarily causing hurt, criminal intimidation and intentional insult
under Sections 115(2), 351(2) and 352 of the BNS, respectively.
Mere matrimonial acrimony cannot be employed as a
substitute for those ingredients.
24. The criminal process is not intended to be an
extension of matrimonial hostility. The very initiation and
continuation of a criminal trial can visit an individual with
anxiety, reputational injury, financial burden and the
perpetual uncertainty of prosecution. The law does not
contemplate that an accused must invariably undergo the
- 66 -
entire rigmarole of a criminal trial, merely because a
complaint has been registered and a charge sheet has
followed. If the complaint and the material collected during
investigation do not disclose the commission of an offence,
compelling the accused to stand trial would amount to allowing the
process to become the punishment.
25. To permit further proceedings in C.C.No.28444 of 2026 to
continue, in the circumstances obtaining in the case at hand, would
amount to an abuse of the process of law and result in a
miscarriage of justice. This is, therefore, a fit case for exercise of
the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the
BNSS, to secure the ends of justice.
26. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
O R D E R
(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
- 67 -
(ii) Proceedings in C.C.No.28444 of 2026 pending before
the XXXIX Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Bengaluru arising out of Crime No.28 of 2026 stand
quashed qua the petitioners.
This Court places its appreciation to the able assistance
rendered by Miss. Samriddhi N. Shenoy, Law Clerk cum Research
Assistant attached to this Court.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
bkp