Mohammed Salim Hajisattar Dayatar And Anr. vs Bela Avinash Mehta

Court
Bombay High Court

CNR No : HCBM010045602026

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Santosh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 88 OF 2026
1. Mohammed Salim Hajisattar Dayatar
2. Farzana Salim Dayatar
...Applicants
Versus
Bela Avinash Mehta …Respondent
Mr. Vasim Siddiqui a/w Mr. Faiz Ali Khan, for the Applicants.
Mr. Pradeep Sancheti, Senior Advocate h/f Mr. Amardev Uniyal,
for the Respondent.
SANTOSH
SUBHASH
KULKARNI
Digitally signed by
SANTOSH SUBHASH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.11.18
19:13:33 +0530
CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
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RESERVED ON: 30 SEPTEMBER, 2026
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PRONOUNCED ON: 18 NOVEMBER, 2026
JUDGMENT:-
1. This revision application is directed against a judgment
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and decree dated 23 December, 2025, passed by the learned
Judge, City Civil Court in S.C. Suit No.2426 of 2016, whereby
the applicants-defendants have been directed to put the
respondent-plaintiff in possession of Room No.12B, Khimani
Mansion, 26 MMC Road, First Cross Road, Mahim (West),
Mumbai, (‘the suit premises’), and an inquiry to determine the
mesne profits has been ordered.
2. The background facts leading to this application can be
stated in brief as under:
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2.1 Mr. Rahim Khimani is the owner and landlord of the
building known as ‘Khimani Mansion’, wherein the suit
premises is situated. Late Devendra Mehta, the brother-in-law of
the plaintiff was residing in room No.13 on the first floor of the
Khimani Mansion. Mrs. Lilian L. Fernandes was the tenant in
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respect of the suit premises. Under an agreement dated 29
July, 2008, the tenancy came to be transferred in the name of
Mohammed Salim Hajisattar Dayatar (D1), purportedly with the
consent of the landlord. Since then the defendants were in the
occupation of the suit premises as the tenants thereof. In the
year 2012, the defendants desired to vacate the suit premises.
2.2 The plaintiff claims, late Devendra Mehta had negotiations
with the defendants and, eventually, the defendants
surrendered the tenancy rights in the suit premises in favour of
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the landlord under a declaration dated 2 July, 2012. After the
surrender of the tenancy by the defendants, the plaintiff came
to be inducted as a tenant in the suit premises at an increased
monthly rent of Rs.80/-. The plaintiff had been in the
occupation of the suit premises.
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2.3 On 21 March, 2016, defendant No.1, alongwith his
associates Shoeb and Junaid, illegally broke open the door of
the suit premises, unlawfully entered into the suit premises and
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kept the belongings of the defendants in the suit premises.
Sushma Mehta (PW3), the wife of Devendra Mehta, who resides
in the said building in flat No.13, informed the plaintiff about
the said incident and FIR No.110/2016 was lodged against the
defendant No.1 and his associates at Mahim Police Station.
2.4 The plaintiff thus instituted the instant suit under Section
6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, alleging illegal dispossession at
the hands of the defendants, and seeking restoration of the
possession of the suit premises to the plaintiff and claiming
mesne profits.
2.5 The defendants resisted the suit. It was categorically
denied that defendant No.1 had surrendered the tenancy in
respect of the suit premises in favour of the plaintiff. The
purported declaration evidencing the surrender of tenancy
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dated 2 July, 2012 was stated to be forged and fabricated. The
defendants claimed to be in peaceful, continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the suit premises. Conversely, the
plaintiff was never in possession of the suit premises. The
substance of the defence of the defendants was that by a
concocting a false story of illegal dispossession, in connivance
with the plaintiff, the landlord attempted to dispossess the
defendants and, therefore, defendant No.1 was constrained to
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institute R.A.E. Suit No.410/2016 before the Court of Small
Causes, Mumbai, seeking declaratory and injunctive reliefs.
2.6 On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the learned Judge,
City Civil court, framed issues, inter alia, as to whether the
plaintiff proved that she was in settled possession of the suit
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premises on or before 21 March, 2016 and that the defendants
had dispossessed her without following due process of law. And
after appraisal of the evidence, the learned Judge returned
affirmative findings thereon. The learned Judge, City Civil
Court, was of the view that absence of evidence to show that
defendant No.1 had paid rent to the landlord after July 2012 till
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14 December, 2016 and the lack of credible material to show
the possession of the defendants over the suit premises after the
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surrender of tenancy under the declaration dated 2 July, 2012
indicated that the plaintiff had been in possession of the suit
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premises prior to 21 March, 2016 and she ws unlawfully
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dispossessed on 21 March 2016.
3. Being aggrieved, the defendants have invoked the
revisional jurisdiction.
4. I have heard Mr. Vasim Siddiqui, the learned Counsel for
the Applicants, and Mr. Pradeep Sancheti, the learned Senior
Advocate for the respondent, at some length. With the
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assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have also
perused the evidence and material on record.
5. Mr. Siddiqui, the learned Counsel for the applicants,
submitted that the learned Judge, City Civil Court, committed a
manifest error in returning a finding that the plaintiff was in
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possession of the suit premises on 21 March, 2016. The
learned Judge, City Civil Court, completely misread the evidence
and ignored the admissions elicited in the cross-examination of
the plaintiff (PW1) and Sushma (PW3), which demonstrate that
the plaintiff had never been in possession of the suit premises.
6. Secondly, Mr. Siddiqui urged that the learned Judge, City
Civil Court, misdirected himself in placing reliance on the
purported declaration of surrender of tenancy (Exhibit-28) and
the absence of rent receipts for the intervening period as it was
for the plaintiff to prove her case. In the process, the learned
Judge transgressed the jurisdictional limits of inquiry in a suit
under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and ventured into the
questions of lawful tenancy, in respect of which the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court is expressly barred.
7. Thirdly, Mr. Siddiqui submitted that the trial court was
required to evaluate whether the plaintiff succeeded in making
out a case of possession over the suit premises and unlawful
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dispossession therefrom. Though the plaintiff miserably failed to
establish both facts by leading cogent evidence, the learned
Judge, City Civil Court, returned affirmative findings on those
issues on the basis of surmises and conjectures. The
overwhelming evidence tendered by the defendants to establish
their possession over the suit premises during the relevant
period, was unjustifiably discarded.
8. Fourthly, the learned Judge, City Civil Court, did not
properly appreciate the objections to the admissibility of the
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purported declaration of surrender of tenancy dated 2 July,
2012 on the count of it being an insufficiently stamped
instrument, and the same being otherwise a false and fabricated
document. Mr. Siddiqui would urge, if the aforesaid factors are
considered cumulatively an inference becomes inescapable that
the impugned decree suffers from the vice of perverse
appreciation of evidence and material irregularity in the exercise
of jurisdiction.
9. Per contra, Mr. Sancheti, the learned Senior Advocate for
the respondent, would support the impugned judgment and
decree. Mr. Sancheti would urge, in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction, this Court may not re-appreciate the evidence like
an appellate court. If the impugned judgment and decree is
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examined keeping in view the parameters of the limits of
revisional jurisdiction, Mr. Sancheti would urge, it cannot be
said that there was either jurisdictional error or material
irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.
10. Even on the merits of the matter, Mr. Sancheti would urge,
the plaintiff has proved by cogent evidence both the factum of
previous possession and unlawful dispossession. The evidence
was required to be appreciated in the backdrop of the sequence
of events commencing from the surrender of tenancy by
defendant No.1 to unlawful dispossession of the plaintiff by the
defendants. In that context, the contemporaneous conduct of
the parties and the evidence or absence thereof assumed
importance.
11. Mr. Sancheti laid emphasis on two factors. First, the
production of the original rent receipts, which were delivered by
the defendants to the plaintiff at the time of surrender of the
tenancy, which pertained to the period prior to the surrender of
tenancy by the plaintiff and not by the defendants. The custody
of the original rent receipts with the plaintiff, according to Mr.
Sancheti, establishes the factum of surrender squarely. Second,
the absence of rent receipts in favour of defendant No.1 during
the period from July 2012 to March 2016. No explanation could
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be offered for the absence of the rent receipts with the
defendants for the said period. Thus, the learned Judge, City
Civil Court, was fully justified in drawing an inference about the
possession and dispossession, submitted Mr. Sancheti.
12. Before adverting to appreciate the aforesaid rival
submissions canvassed across the bar, it may be necessary to
note few uncontroverted facts. First, the fact that Rahim
Khimani (PW5) is the landlord of the suit premises is not in
dispute. Nor is it in dispute that Mrs. Lilian L. Fernandes was
the tenant in respect of the suit premises and pursuant to an
agreement for tenancy the defendant No.1 came in possession of
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the suit premises on 29 July, 2008. Thirdly, it was
indisputable that the landlord was issuing the rent receipts.
Fourthly, the fact that late Devendra Mehta, was a tenant in
respect of Room No.13 on the first floor of the very same
building and was residing therein alongwith his family
members, including his wife Sushma (PW3) and son Shreyansh
(PW4) was also not in contest. The controversy between the
parties revolves around the question as to whether the plaintiff
came in possession of the suit premises in the month of July
2012 after the purported surrender thereof by defendant No.1,
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and whether the plaintiff was unlawfully dispossessed on 21
March, 2016.
13. It would be advantageous to notice at the beginning itself,
the contours of a suit for possession under Section 6 of the
Specific Relief Act. Possession is considered to be nine points in
law. The policy of law is to accord recognition to possession and
condemn dispossession of a party in settled possession without
following the due process of law. Law proscribes recovery of
possession of a property by resorting to extrajudicial means.
14. Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act thus provides a swift
and effective remedy to a person who has been unlawfully
dispossessed of an immovable property without his consent. The
question of title to the property, in such a situation, becomes
immaterial. The only question that the Court has to determine
is, whether the plaintiff was in possession of the subject
property and whether he had been illegally dispossessed
therefrom within six months prior to the institution of the suit.
The avowed object of Section 6 is to restrain a person from using
force, violence and other illegal means to dispossess another
without following due process of law.
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15. In the case of M. C. Chockalingam and Others vs. V.
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Manickavasagam and others , the Supreme Court has
enunciated that what Section 6 provides is that, a person, even
if he is a landlord, cannot take the law into his own hands and
forcibly evict a tenant after the expiry of the lease. This section
is relevant only to the wrongful act of a person, be it by a
landlord, in forcibly recovering possession of the property
without recourse to law. Section 6 frowns upon forcible
dispossession without recourse to law but does not at the same
time declare that the possession of the evicted person is lawful
possession. The question of lawful possession does not enter
the issue at that stage. All that the court is then required to
consider is whether an evicted person has been wrongfully
dispossessed and whether he has come to the court within six
months of the dispossession. The various civil rights between
the landlord and the tenant will have to be adjudicated upon
finally in a regular civil suit, if filed.
16. In the case of S. R. Ejaz vs. T. N. Handloom Weavers’
2
Cooperative Society Ltd. , the Supreme Court again emphasised
the object of Section 6 and the law’s abhorrence of
dispossession of a person without following due process of law.
1
AIR 1974 Supreme Court 104.
2 (2002) 3 SCC 137.
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The observations in paragraph 8 are instructive and hence
extracted below:
“8. In our view, if such actions by the mighty or powerful
are condoned in a democratic country, nobody would be safe
nor the citizens can protect their properties. Law frowns
upon such conduct. The Court accords legitimacy and
legality only to possession taken in due course of law. If such
actions are condoned, the fundamental rights guaranteed
under the Constitution of India or the legal rights would be
given go bye either by the authority or by rich and influential
persons or by musclemen. Law of jungle will prevail and
'might would be right' instead of 'right being might'. This
Court in State of U.P. and others vs. Maharaja Dharmander
Prasad Singh and others [(1989) 2 SCC 505] dealt with the
provisions of Transfer of Property Act and observed that a
lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume
possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even
after the expiry or earlier termination of the lease by
forfeiture or otherwise. Under law, the possession of a lessee,
even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical
possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited. The
Court also held that there is no question of Government
withdrawing or appropriating to it an extra judicial right of
re-entry and the possession of the property can be resumed
by the Government only in a manner known to or recognized
by law.”
17. In the light of the aforesaid legal position, in the context of
a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property under
Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, reverting to the facts of the
present case, first the aspect of possession. The tenor of the
plaintiff’s claim was that defendant No.1 was a tenant in respect
of the suit premises and after the tenancy came to an end
purportedly by way of surrender in the month of July 2012, the
plaintiff came to be inducted in the suit premises. What was the
material before the trial court to substantiate the said claim?
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18. The plaintiff predominantly relied upon the rent receipts
issued by the landlord for the months commencing from July
2012 to March 2016 (Exhibits-7/8 to 7/20). In addition, the
plaintiff examined the landlord Abdul Rahim Khimani (PW5) as
her witness. Abdul Rahim Khimani (PW5) deposed that in July
2012, defendant No.1 who was in the occupation of the suit
premises delivered the possession thereof to the plaintiff. Since
then the plaintiff had been in the occupation of the suit
premises. Conversely, Abdul Rahim Khimani (PW5) declined to
accept the rent which was sought to be tendered by defendant
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No.1 vide cheque dated 14 December, 2016 towards the arrears
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of rent from 1 July, 2012 to 31 December, 2016, under a
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receipt purportedly dispatched on 15 December, 2016. Abdul
Rahim Khimani (PW5), the landlord, refused to accept the rent
so tendered and returned the cheque vide communication to the
effect that the defendants were not the tenants in respect of the
suit premises.
19. The aforesaid exchange of correspondence between the
landlord and the defendants implied that the defendants had
not paid rent since July 2012 and the arrears of rent for the
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period 1 July, 2012 to 31 December, 2016 were sought to be
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tendered vide letter styled as a receipt dated 15 December,
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2016. The situation which thus emerged was that, for the period
for which the plaintiff claimed to have been in possession of the
suit premises, the landlord had issued the rent receipts in her
favour. In contrast, the defendants, who were indisputably in
the occupation of the suit premises from July 2008 to July
2012, did not have the rent receipts for the period beyond July
2012 as they had not admittedly paid rent. The evidence of the
landlord Abdul Rahim Khimani (PW5) thus assumes critical
salience.
20. The conduct of the defendants during the relevant period
also bears upon the probabilities of the case. Ordinarily, there
ought to have been some action on the part of the defendants if
the landlord did not accept the rent. Complete inaction till the
month of December, 2016 cannot be said to be immaterial or
inconsequential. When confronted with the said aspect, during
the course of his cross-examination of Mohd. Salim (DW1) had a
lame excuse that he might have forgot to write a letter to the
landlord for accepting rent in respect of the suit premises before
December 2016. The evidence was required to be appreciated in
the light of the fact that a state of affairs had continued from
July 2008 to July 2012, and despite the discontinuation of that
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state of affairs, there was no action on the part of the
defendants.
21. It is true, in the course of the cross-examination of the
plaintiff, certain admissions were elicited with regard to the
situation of the suit premises and the areas adjacent thereto.
However, those admissions do not detract materially from the
claim of possession over the suit premises for the reason that
admittedly the plaintiff was residing in a flat in another building
and the suit premises was being used by the members of her
family as well as Devendra Mehta. The absence of actual
residence of the plaintiff in the suit premises, sought to be
critically commented upon by Mr. Siddiqui, is not of
determinative significance. It was not necessary that the
plaintiff must use the suit premises as a household to establish
the factum of possession.
22. It is well recognized, the possession is not an abstract
concept. Whether a particular property or thing is in possession
of a person can be determined with reference to the existence of
the right and power to control in relation to that property or
thing, in that person. Whether such person is in general control
of that property or thing has to be seen. In the case of Supdt.
and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal vs. Anil Kumar
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3
Bhunja and others , a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court
exposited what possession in law signifies. The observations in
paragraphs 13 to 15 are material and hence extracted below:
“13. "Possession" is a polymorphous term which may have
different meanings in different contexts. It is impossible to
work out a completely logical and precise definition of
"possession" uniformly applicable to all situations in the
contexts of all statutes. Dias & Hughes in their book on
Jurisprudence say that if a topic ever suffered from too much
theorizing it is that of "possession". Much of this difficulty
and confusion is (as pointed out in Salmond's Jurisprudence,
12th Ed., 1966) caused by the fact the possession is not
purely a legal concept. "Possession", implies a right and a
fact; the right to enjoy annexed to the right of property and
the fact of the real intention. It involves power of control and
intent to control . (See Dias and Hughes, ibid)
14. According to Pollock & Wright,
"when a person is in such a relation to a thing that, so
far as regards the thing, he can assume, exercise or
resume manual control of it at pleasure, and so far as
regards other persons, the thing is under the protection
of his personal presence, or in or on a house or land
occupied by him or in any receptacle belonging to him
and under his control, he is in physical possession of
the thing".
15. While recognising that "possession" is not a purely
legal concept but also a matter of fact; Salmond (12th Ed.,
page 52) describes "possession, in fact", as a relationship
between a person and a thing. According to the learned
author the test for determining "whether a person is in
possession of anything is whether he is in general control of
it".”
(emphasis supplied)
23. In the case at hand, an endeavour was made on behalf of
the defendants to drive home the point that the suit premises
was allegedly taken by Devendra Mehta. Mr. Siddiqui invited
attention of the Court to the manner in which the plaintiff (PW1)
3 (1979) 4 SCC 274.
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and Sushma Mehta (PW3) fared in their cross-examination in
regard to the part played by Devendra Mehta in allegedly taking
the suit premises. However, in the process, as rightly submitted
by Mr. Sancheti, the defendants strengthened the case of the
plaintiff. It was suggested to Sushma Mehta (PW3) that
Devendra Mehta was managing affairs of the husband of the
plaintiff. An extra key of room No.12B was handed over to her,
since the date suit premises was acquired by them. Sushma
Mehta, went on to concede that the suit premises was acquired
by Devendra Mehta and not by Bela Mehta, the plaintiff.
24. The aforesaid evidence is required to be considered in the
backdrop of the averments in the plaint that since Devendra
Mehta was already occupying room No.13 on the first floor of the
said building and was managing affairs of the family, he had
negotiated with the landlord and the defendants. Moreover, the
suggestion that one key of the suit premises was with Sushma
Mehta by implication admits the factum of possession.
25. Another factor which weighed with the learned Judge was
the production of the original rent receipts for the period for
which defendants were admittedly in possession of the suit
premises, by the plaintiff. There was no plausible reason for the
plaintiff to be in custody of those original rent receipts.
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26. The execution of the declaration evidencing the purported
surrender of tenancy by defendant No.1 in favour of the landlord
now deserves to be appreciated in the aforesaid context. The
thrust of the defence was that the said declaration is forged and
fabricated. In a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act,
the trial court was not expected to record a definitive finding
about the genuineness or otherwise of the said document.
R.A.D. Suit No.410/2016 was instituted a couple of months
before the dispatch of the letter to the landlord. Thus, the said
aspect can be legitimately determined by the Small Causes
Court as the defendants are seeking a declaration about the
tenancy. In the instant suit, the said declaration assumed
importance from the point of view that a state of affairs which
continued up to that point, namely the jural relationship
between the landlord and the defendants, did not obtain
thereafter and instead the plaintiff appeared to be in possession
of the suit premises.
27. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the learned Judge, City
Civil Court, cannot be said to have committed any error in
returning the finding that the plaintiff was in possession of the
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suit premises on 21 March, 2016.
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28. On the aspect of dispossession, suffice to note that there
was instantaneous reporting of the matter to the police by the
plaintiff. Certain minor discrepancies in the evidence of Sushma
Metha (PW3) as to the actual act of breaking open the lock do
not detract materially from the plaintiff’s claim. Nothing
material could be elicited in the cross-examination of Shreyansh
(PW4) who claimed to have witnessed the act of breaking open
the lock and informed his mother Sushma. Once the factum of
possession was established and the contemporaneous material
indicated that the claim of the plaintiff that she was unlawfully
dispossessed of the suit premises was preponderately probable,
the issue of dispossession was required to be answered in the
affirmative.
29. The upshot of the aforesaid consideration is that the
learned Judge, City Civil Court, on the basis of the evidence and
material has recorded justifiable findings of fact. The view taken
by the learned Judge cannot be said to be perverse and the one
which no court could have taken, nor does the impugned
judgment suffer from any jurisdictional error or material
irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. Therefore, in exercise
of revisional jurisdiction no interference is warranted with the
impugned judgment and decree.
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30. The application, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.
31. Hence, the following order:
: O R D E R :
The application stands dismissed.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
At this stage, the learned Counsel for the applicant seeks
stay to the execution and operation of the decree passed by the
trial court.
In the light of the view this Court is persuaded to take, the
prayer for stay to the execution and operation of the decree
passed by the trial court is not justifiable.
Hence, the oral application stands rejected.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
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