Praveen Sonkar vs State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Deptt. Of Appointment Govt. Of U.P. Civil Secrt. Lko. And Anr

A.F.R.
Reserved on : 12.08.2026
Delivered on: 12.11.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
WRIT - A No. - 4050 of 2022
Praveen Sonkar
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Deptt. of Appointment Govt. of U.P.
Civil Secrt. Lko. and Anr
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Ashok Kumar Singh, Adarsh
Srivastava, Vikas Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C., Gaurav Mehrotra, Shishir
Jain
Court No. - 5
HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.
HON'BLE AMITABH KUMAR RAI, J.
(Delivered by Hon’ble Amitabh Kumar Rai, J.)
1. Heard Shri Dhruv Mathur, learned Senior Advocate assisted
by Shri Adarsh Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned
Standing Counsel representing the State-respondent No.1 as well as Shri
Shishir Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent
No.2- High Court.
2. The instant writ petition has been filed challenging the order
dated 29.11.2021 passed by the respondent no.1, compulsorily retiring
the petitioner from service along with the order dated 26.11.2021 passed
by this court recommending the compulsory retirement of the petitioner
from the services.

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3. The brief facts, as averred in the writ petition, are that
the petitioner was appointed as Civil Judge, Junior Division and
was posted as Additional Civil Judge, Junior Division, Lakhimpur
Kheri in the year 2006 and was promoted to Higher Judicial
Services in the year 2019 and was posted as Additional District
and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Hamirpur vide the
notification dated 06.08.2019 passed by the Government of Uttar
Pradesh. Throughout his tenure, the petitioner served at various
districts throughout the state of Uttar Pradesh in various judicial
capacity; until he was compulsorily retired from his services vide
the order dated 29.11.2021 passed by the Respondent no.1/
Government of Uttar Pradesh.
4. Shri Dhruv Mathur, learned Senior Advocate while
assailing the impugned order of compulsory retirement has raised
the following arguments in the writ petition before us :
(I) The order dated 26.11.2021 by means of which the
petitioner has been compulsorily retired from service, has been
passed in lieu of the three departmental proceedings pending
against him. It is contended that the order of compulsory
retirement has been passed with a view to cutting short the
departmental enquiries pending against the petitioner and is,
therefore, punitive in nature. Accordingly, the impugned order
cannot be said to have been passed in public interest.
(II) Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits
that the recommendations dated 11.06.2020 and 15.06.2020 made
by the Screening Committee of this Court are intrinsically
punitive and stigmatic in nature, as they cast aspersions on the
character and integrity of the petitioner. It is, therefore, contended
that such recommendations cannot form the basis for
compulsorily retiring the petitioner under the provisions of
Fundamental Rule 56(c), as applicable in the State of Uttar
Pradesh.

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(III) Learned counsel for the petitioner next submits
that the petitioner was promoted to the cadre of Higher Judicial
Services vide order dated 06.08.2019 on the basis of the criterion
of seniority-cum-merit, despite the four complaints dated
27.07.2018, 27.07.2018, 31.07.2018 and 22.09.2018 already being
in existence. It is contended that the petitioner's promotion during
the pendency of the said complaints demonstrates that he was
found suitable for promotion notwithstanding their pendency, and
that the said complaints did not cast any doubt on his integrity. It
is further submitted that the petitioner was considered suitable for
promotion by the same authority which subsequently
recommended his compulsory retirement.
(IV) Learned counsel for the petitioner further
submits that the petitioner had no adverse entries throughout his
service record. It is pointed out that despite the fact that the then
District Judge, Amroha had forwarded four complaints against the
petitioner to this Court within a short span of approximately two
months, between 10.08.2018 and 22.09.2018, the ACR entries
during the petitioner’s tenure at Amroha described the petitioner's
conduct as "Beyond Doubt" and assessed him as "Very Good". On
the basis of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel contends
that the impugned order of compulsory retirement is perverse and
vitiated by mala fides.
(V) Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits
that the fourth complaint, made by a lady judicial officer against
the petitioner, was subsequently referred to the Internal
Complaints Committee of this Court, which, upon being satisfied
with the reply submitted by the petitioner and finding no fault on
his part, decided to close the proceedings against him. It has been
further submitted that the Screening Committee had taken the
very same complaint into consideration while recommending the
petitioner's compulsory retirement. Therefore, it is contended that

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the subsequent exoneration of the petitioner vitiates the
satisfaction arrived at by the Screening Committee.
5. In support of the aforesaid submissions, Shri Dhruv
Mathur, learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the petitioner has
placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex court in the case of
State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel : (2001) 3 SCC 314 and
has submitted that the Hon’ble Apex court in the case of
Umedbhai (supra) has laid down that the order of compulsorily
retirement should not be passed during the pendency of
departmental enquiry; and merely on allegations of misconduct,
which had not been enquired and proved; and in the absence of
adverse entries in the service record to support the order of
compulsory retirement, the same should be rendered as
unsustainable.
6. Further reliance has been placed by learned counsel
for the petitioner on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
State of Gujarat v. Suryakant Chunilal Shah, (1999) 1 SCC
529 . It has been submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the said
judgment, has held that the efficiency and honesty of an officer
must be assessed on the basis of the material available on record,
of which confidential reports constitute an important input. It has
further been held that the mere pendency of cases against an
officer, by itself, cannot constitute sufficient ground for passing an
order of compulsory retirement.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed
reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Nand
Kumar Verma v. State of Jharkhand, (2012) 3 SCC 580 . It has
been submitted that, in the said case, the Hon'ble Apex Court held
the order of compulsory retirement to be unsustainable on the
ground that the same had been passed by selectively relying upon
the adverse entries against the petitioner while ignoring the
totality of his service record.

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WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
8. In order to support his argument that the order of
compulsory retirement is stigmatic and punitive in nature, the
learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case Allahabad Bank Officers'
Assn. v. Allahabad Bank, (1996) 4 SCC 504 .
9. To buttress the argument that an order of compulsory
retirement cannot be passed to circumvent the disciplinary
proceedings, reliance has been placed on the recent judgment of
the Hon’ble Apex court in the case of Pramod Kumar Bajaj v.
Union of India, (2023) 11 SCC 466.
10. Per contra, Shri Shishir Jain learned counsel on
behalf of Respondent No.2 has submitted that the order of
compulsory retirement has been passed in accordance with law
and does not suffer from any kind of perversity or malafide. The
learned counsel for the respondent no.2 has raised the following
points in his oral arguments, the Counter Affidavits and the
Written Submissions filed before this court-
(I) Learned counsel for respondent no. 2 submits that
the case of the petitioner for compulsory retirement was
considered at three stages, firstly, by the Screening Committee,
secondly, by the Administrative Committee and finally, by the Full
Court of this Court. It is further submitted that the entire service
record of the petitioner was considered before arriving at the
conclusion that he had outlived his utility and that his further
continuance in service was no longer in public interest.
(II) Learned counsel for respondent no. 2 further
submits that, in the case of compulsory retirement of a judicial
officer, there is no requirement to conduct a departmental enquiry
or to bring the same to its logical conclusion. It is submitted that
an order of compulsory retirement, particularly in the case of a
judicial officer, is neither punitive in nature nor does it entail any
civil consequences.

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WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
(III) Refuting the submission of learned counsel for
the petitioner that the promotion of the petitioner to the Higher
Judicial Services, despite the pendency of four complaints against
him, demonstrates that the said complaints did not cast any doubt
on his integrity, learned counsel for respondent no. 2 submits that
the petitioner's promotion has no bearing on the assessment of his
suitability for retention in service or his compulsory retirement.
To further buttress his argument, it has also been submitted that
the “washed off” theory is not applicable in the cases of
compulsory retirement.
(IV) Rebutting the argument of the learned counsel
for the petitioner that the impugned order is punitive and stigmatic
in nature, the learned counsel for respondent no. 2 submits that it
is a well-settled position of law that an order of compulsory
retirement passed under Fundamental Rule 56(c) is neither
stigmatic nor punitive in nature. It is, therefore, submitted that the
contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is misconceived.
(V) Countering the submission of learned counsel for
the petitioner that the impugned order was passed to cut short the
departmental enquiries pending against him, learned counsel for
respondent no. 2 submits that the departmental enquiries were
concluded during the pendency of the present writ petition. It is
further submitted that the enquiry reports were placed before the
Administrative Committee of this Court in its meeting held on
27.11.2024; however, the Administrative Committee resolved to
defer consideration of the matter in view of the fact that the
petitioner had already been compulsorily retired pursuant to the
impugned order and had filed the present writ petition challenging
the same.
(VI) Lastly, learned counsel for respondent no. 2
submits that the petitioner has not challenged the recommendation
of the Screening Committee, the resolution of the Administrative
Committee or the decision of the Full Court of this Court

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WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
recommending his compulsory retirement. Instead, the petitioner
has challenged only the consequential order dated 29.11.2021
passed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh on the basis of the
decision/recommendation of the Full Court. It is, therefore,
submitted that in the absence of any challenge to the substantive
decision forming the basis of the impugned order, the present writ
petition challenging only the consequential order is not
maintainable.
11. In support of the aforesaid submissions, Shri Shishir
Jain, learned counsel for the respondent no.2 has placed reliance
on various authorities of the Hon’ble Apex Court and this court,
i.e. Ram Murti Yadav v State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2020) 1
SCC 801 (Para 6,9,10,12, 14and 15), Pyare Mohan Lal v. State of
Jharkhand and others (2010) 10 SCC 694 (Para 5,8, 22 to 29),
Arun Kumar Gupta v. State of Jharkhand and others (2020) 13
SCC 355 (Para 5 to 19, 24 and 25), Government of Maharashtra
v. Deokar’s Distillery (2003) 5 SCC 669 (Para 38) and Amarjeet
Singh and others v. Devi Ratan Singh (2010) 1 SCC 417 (Para 28
to 30).
12. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
submissions advanced at the Bar and have carefully examined the
impugned orders as well as the material available on record.
Before adverting to the rival contentions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate to delve into the
concept of compulsory retirement and trace its historical
background.
13. Sometimes, compulsory retirement is also called
premature retirement and is a form of cessation of employment
when the employer finds that the continuance of an employee may
not be desirable in the interest of the department while at the same
time, the employer does not intend to cause any penal effect on
the employee concerned. In some statutory rules, it has also been
included as one of the punishments, but in the State of U.P., it is

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not a punishment under Fundamental Rule 56 and can be resorted
to only when the appointing authority forms an opinion that it is in
the public interest.
14. The concept of compulsory retirement can be traced
to Resolution No.1085-E-A dated 15.11.1919 published in the
Gazette of India, Finance Department with the approval of the
Secretary of State for India by which a new set of rules relating to
the retirement and pension of officers, other than military officers
or members of the Indian Civil Service was published. Rule 4
provided that the Government would have an absolute right to
retire any officer after he had completed 25 years of service
without assigning any reason and without any claim of
compensation in addition to pension. The aforesaid provision was
inserted in the Civil Services Regulations (hereinafter referred to
as the "CSR") vide Gazette notification dated 19.06.1920 by
inserting Articles 465 and 465-A in the CSR.
15. The challenge to Article 465-A was considered by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Lal v. State of U.P.
reported in AIR 1954 SC 369 and Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that compulsory retirement is not a punishment offending Article
311 of the Constitution of India. The validity of Article 465 of the
CSR on the anvil of Article 16 of the Constitution came to be
considered before a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Abdul
Ahad v. I.G. of Police reported in AIR 1965 Allahabad 142 and
it was held that the rule regarding compulsory retirement does not
deny equality of opportunity in employment and is to be invoked
only in the public interest and every servant of the State is equally
liable to be compulsorily retired in the public interest under the
rule.
16. The State Government of U.P., vide Notification
No.G-1-1794/X-534 (19/57) dated 19.10.1963 added a proviso to
Fundamental Rule 56 providing therein that the appointing
authority may require a Government servant to retire after

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attaining the age of 55 years by giving three months' notice
without assigning any reason. On the other hand, it was also
provided that a Government servant could seek voluntary
retirement after attaining the age of 55 years by serving three
months' notice upon the appointing authority, which came to be
incorporated by notification dated 17.01.1968 with effect from
01.01.1964.
17. Fundamental Rule 56 as amended vide notification
dated 19.10.1963 was considered by a Division Bench of this
Court in the case of S. P. Nigam v. State of U.P. reported in 1966
ALJ 153 and the Division Bench of this Court upheld the proviso
to Fundamental Rule 56 holding that it was not hit by Article 14
of the Constitution and also observed that whenever a person is
compulsorily retired, there has to be some reason, since a good
officer would not be retired prematurely.
18. Subsequently, by the U.P. Fundamental (Amendment
and Validation) Act, 1970, it was made clear that the decision to
compulsorily retire an employee shall be taken by the appointing
authority in the public interest. The validity of this provision was
again considered in the case of Iqbal Narain Srivastava v. State
of U.P . reported in AIR 1971 All 178 , wherein a challenge was
made as to whether such a provision could be made by a
Provincial Legislature or not. This Court upheld Fundamental
Rule 56 as inserted by the Validation Act, 1970.
19. Thereafter, by the U.P. Civil Service (First
Amendment) Regulation, 1973 published vide notification dated
01.11.1973, State of U. P. amended Articles 465 and 465-A of the
CSR and both the articles were recast providing therein that the
Government may retire a Government servant on attaining the age
of 50 years without assigning any reason by giving three months'
notice or pay in lieu thereof. This resulted in the creation of

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parallel powers of compulsory retirement and voluntary
retirement under the CSR and Fundamental Rule 56.
20. Ultimately, the U.P. Legislature enacted the U.P.
Fundamental Rule 56 (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1976 and
substituted and inserted Fundamental Rule 56, which stands as it
is today. Simultaneously, Articles 465 and 465-A of CSR were
also repealed.
21. The evolution of the statutory provisions pertaining
to compulsory retirement in the State of U.P. has been discussed
above in order to stress upon the fact that in respect of employees
governed by Fundamental Rule 56 as applicable in the State of
U.P., the Court has to confine itself to the statutory provisions
applicable in the State of U.P. The general observations made by
various Courts as well as Hon'ble Supreme Court in respect of
employees of other States or the Government of India, who are
governed by provisions which are not identical or pari materia to
Fundamental Rule 56 as applicable in the State of U.P. may not
provide a correct exposition of law for considering whether an
order of compulsory retirement passed by an authority in the State
of U.P. is valid or not.
22. Before coming to the facts and merits of the case at
hand, it would be apposite to refer to the landmark judgment of
the Hon’ble Apex Court passed in the case of Baikuntha Nath
Das & another vs. Chief District Medical Officer' (1992) 2
SCC 299 ; wherein Hon’ble Apex court laid down certain
principles which are to be observed in the cases concerning
compulsory retirement paragraph 34 of the said judgment has
been reproduced below:
“34. The following principles emerge from
the above discussion:

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(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a
punishment. It implies no stigma nor any
suggestion of misbehaviour.
(ii) The order has to be passed by the
government on forming the opinion that it is
in the public interest to retire a government
servant compulsorily. The order is passed on
the subjective satisfaction of the government.
(iii) Principles of natural justice have no
place in the context of an order of
compulsory retirement. This does not mean
that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether.
While the High Court or this Court would
not examine the matter as an appellate
court, they may interfere if they are satisfied
that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b)
that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it
is arbitrary — in the sense that no
reasonable person would form the requisite
opinion on the given material; in short, if it
is found to be a perverse order.
(iv) The government (or the Review
Committee, as the case may be) shall have to
consider the entire record of service before
taking a decision in the matter — of course
attaching more importance to record of and
performance during the later years. The
record to be so considered would naturally
include the entries in the confidential
records/character rolls, both favourable and
adverse. If a government servant is promoted
to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse
remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more
so, if the promotion is based upon merit
(selection) and not upon seniority.
(v) An order of compulsory retirement is not
liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the
showing that while passing it
uncommunicated adverse remarks were also
taken into consideration. That circumstance
by itself cannot be a basis for interference.

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Interference is permissible only on the
grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This aspect
has been discussed in paras 30 to 32 above”.
(emphasis supplied)
23. A bare perusal of the above guidelines would point to
the fact that the only permissible way to interfere in an order of
compulsory retirement by a writ court is when such order is
directly hit by guideline (iii) i.e. when the order suffers from
malafides or is based on no evidence or is perverse.
24. The law with regard to the scope of judicial review,
particularly the washed-off theory in respect of judicial officers,
has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Ram Murti Yadav vs. State of U.P. and another , reported in
(2020) 1 SCC 801 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the
scope of judicial review of an order of compulsory retirement,
based on the subjective satisfaction of the employer, is extremely
narrow and restricted, as the service record of the judicial officer,
upon examination by the Screening Committee and on its
recommendations, is approved by the Full Court of the High
Court, and the Court, while exercising judicial review, cannot sit
in judgment over the satisfaction recorded by the Screening
Committee and the Full Court as an appellate authority. The
relevant paragraphs Nos. 6, 9, 10, 12, 14 and 15 of the aforesaid
judgment in the case of Ram Murti Yadav (supra) are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“6. The service records of the appellant have
been examined by the Screening Committee, the
Full Court as also by the Division Bench of the
High Court. The scope for judicial review of an
order of compulsory retirement based on the
subjective satisfaction of the employer is
extremely narrow and restricted. Only if it is
found to be based on arbitrary or capricious
grounds, vitiated by malafides, overlooks
relevant materials, could there be limited scope
for interference. The court, in judicial review,

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cannot sit in judgment over the same as an
Appellate Authority. Principles of natural
justice have no application in a case of
compulsory retirement.
9. The submission of Shri Basant that
compulsory retirement could not have been
ordered for mere error of judgment in decision-
making merits no consideration in view of K.K.
Dhawan (supra) and Duli Chand (supra).
Likewise, what has been euphemistically
described as "washeoff theory" by reason of any
subsequent promotion after adverse entry being
relevant for further promotion but not for
compulsory retirement has to be rejected in
view of Pyare Mohan Lal (supra). A single
adverse entry could suffice for an order of
compulsory retirement as held in Pyare Mohan
Lal (supra) as follows :
“29. The law requires the authority to
consider the “entire service record” of the
employee while assessing whether he can
be given compulsory retirement irrespective
of the fact that the adverse entries had not
been communicated to him and the officer
had been promoted earlier in spite of those
adverse entries. More so, a single adverse
entry regarding the integrity of an officer
even in remote past is sufficient to award
compulsory retirement. The case of a
judicial officer is required to be examined,
treating him to be different from other
wings of the society, as he is serving the
State in a different capacity. The case of a
judicial officer is considered by a
committee of Judges of the High Court duly
constituted by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice
and then the report of the Committee is
placed before the Full Court. A decision is
taken by the Full Court after due
deliberation on the matter. Therefore, there
is hardly any chance to make the allegations
of non-application of mind or mala fides.”

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10. This Court in Syed T.A. Naqshbandi & Ors.
vs State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., (2003) 9
SCC 592, considering the scope of judicial
review of an assessment of the conduct of a
judicial officer approved by a Full Court,
observed as follows:
“7. … As has often been reiterated by this
Court, judicial review is permissible only to
the extent of finding whether the process in
reaching the decision has been observed
correctly and not the decision itself, as such.
Critical or independent analysis or appraisal
of the materials by the courts exercising
powers of judicial review unlike the case of
an appellate court, would neither be
permissible nor conducive to the interests of
either the officers concerned or the system
and institutions of administration of justice
with which we are concerned in this case, by
going into the correctness as such of ACRs
or the assessment made by the Committee
and approval accorded by the Full Court of
the High Court.”
12. It was further observed that:(Rajendra
Singh Verma case : (2011) 10 SCC 1, SCC
pp.77-78, para 192)
“192. … If that authority bona fide forms an
opinion that the integrity of a particular
officer is doubtful, the correctness of that
opinion cannot be challenged before courts.
When such a constitutional function is
exercised on the administrative side of the
High Court, any judicial review thereon
should be made only with great care and
circumspection and it must be confined
strictly to the parameters set by this Court in
several reported decisions. When the
appropriate authority forms bona fide
opinion that compulsory retirement of a
judicial officer.”

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14. A person entering the judicial service no
doubt has career aspirations including
promotions. An order of compulsory
retirement undoubtedly affects the career
aspirations. Having said so, we must also
sound a caution that judicial service is not
like any other service. A person discharging
judicial duties acts on behalf of the State in
discharge of its sovereign functions.
Dispensation of justice is not only an
onerous duty but has been considered as akin
to discharge of a pious duty, and therefore, is
a very serious matter. The standards of
probity, conduct, integrity that may be
relevant for discharge of duties by a careerist
in another job cannot be the same for a
judicial officer. A judge holds the office of a
public trust. Impeccable integrity,
unimpeachable independence with moral
values embodied to the core are absolute
imperatives which brooks no compromise. A
judge is the pillar of the entire justice system
and the public has a right to demand virtually
irreproachable conduct from anyone
performing a judicial function. Judges must
strive for the highest standards of integrity in
both their professional and personal lives.
15. It has to be kept in mind that a person
seeking justice, has the first exposure to the
justice delivery system at the level of
subordinate judiciary, and thus a sense of
injustice can have serious repercussions not
only on that individual but can have its fall
out in the society as well. It is therefore
absolutely necessary that the ordinary
litigant must have complete faith at this level
and no impression can be afforded to be
given to a litigant which may even create a
perception to the contrary as the
consequences can be very damaging. The
standard or yardstick for judging the conduct
of the judicial officer therefore has

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necessarily to be strict. Having said so, we
must also observe that it is not every
inadvertent flaw or error that will make a
judicial officer culpable. The State Judicial
Academies undoubtedly has a stellar role to
perform in this regard. A bona fide error may
need correction and counselling. But a
conduct which creates a perception beyond
the ordinary cannot be countenanced. For a
trained legal mind, a judicial order speaks for
itself.”
25. In the case of Pyare Mohan Lal vs. State of
Jharkhand and others , reported in (2010) 10 SCC 693 , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken into consideration the principle
of the washed-off effect of adverse entries recorded prior to the
date of promotion and has held that the “entire service record” has
to be assessed, irrespective of the fact that the adverse entries had
been communicated and the officials had been promoted earlier
despite such adverse entries. Paragraph No. 29 of the judgment is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“29. The law requires the Authority to consider
the "entire service record" of the employee while
assessing whether he can be given compulsory
retirement irrespective of the fact that the
adverse entries had not been communicated to
him and the officer had been promoted earlier in
spite of those adverse entries. More so, a single
adverse entry regarding the integrity of an
officer even in remote past is sufficient to award
compulsory retirement. The case of a Judicial
Officer is required to be examined, treating him
to be differently from other wings of the society,
as he is serving the State in a different capacity.
The case of a Judicial Officer is considered by a
Committee of Judges of the High Court duly
constituted by Hon'ble the Chief Justice and
then the report of the Committee is placed before
the Full Court. A decision is taken by the Full
Court after due deliberation on  the matter.
Therefore, there is hardly any chance to make

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the allegations of non- application of mind or
mala fide.”
26. Now, coming to the case in hand, the record shows
that certain complaints and enquiries were pending against him at
the time when his case was considered by the Screening
Committee for compulsory retirement. The Screening Committee,
in its meetings held on 11.06.2020 and 15.06.2020, considered the
case of the petitioner for compulsory retirement along with those
of other judicial officers and recommended his compulsory
retirement. The said recommendation was accepted by the
Administrative Committee of the High Court in its meeting dated
18.11.2021. Thereafter, the Full Court of this Court, in its meeting
dated 25.11.2021, considered the case of the petitioner for
compulsory retirement and came to the conclusion that the
petitioner had outlived his utility and that his continuance in
service was no longer in the public interest. Thereafter, vide D.O.
Letter dated 26.11.2021, this Court recommended to the State
Government that the petitioner be compulsorily retired.
Consequently, the State Government passed the order dated
29.11.2021, compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service. The
material placed before the Screening Committee, on the basis of
which it arrived at its conclusion and recommended the
compulsory retirement of the petitioner, included certain
complaints against him relating to his conduct and discharge of
his official duties.
27. The said complaints, in brief, are as follows:
(1) The first complaint against the petitioner was that
the judicial orders passed by him were not in accordance with law.
The said complaint was forwarded by the District Judge, Amroha,
vide letter No. 01/Confidential/Amroha dated 10.08.2018. Upon
consideration of the letter dated 10.08.2018 submitted by the
District and Sessions Judge, Amroha, V.B. Inquiry No. 02 of 2019
was initiated vide order dated 13.07.2019 passed by Hon’ble the

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Chief Justice. In the said V.B. Inquiry, an enquiry report dated
30.09.2019 was submitted by the Special Officer (Vigilance),
High Court, Allahabad, against the petitioner. The said enquiry
report was considered by the Hon’ble Administrative Committee
in its meeting held on 20.11.2019, wherein it was resolved to
accept the enquiry report and initiate a departmental enquiry
against the petitioner. In compliance with the aforesaid resolution,
Departmental Enquiry No. 12/2019/Cf.(A) was initiated against
the petitioner.
(2) The second complaint against the petitioner
related to misconduct and the use of foul language by him. The
said complaint was forwarded by the District Judge, Amroha, vide
letter No. 06/2018/Confidential/DJ Amroha dated 31.08.2018.
Upon consideration of the letter dated 31.08.2018 submitted by
the District and Sessions Judge, Amroha, V.B. Inquiry No.
03/2019 was initiated vide order dated 13.07.2019 passed by
Hon’ble the Chief Justice. In the said V.B. Inquiry, an enquiry
report dated 13.08.2019 was submitted by the Special Officer
(Vigilance), High Court, Allahabad, against the petitioner. The
said enquiry report was considered by the Hon’ble Administrative
Committee in its meeting held on 04.09.2019, wherein it was
resolved to accept the enquiry report and initiate a departmental
enquiry against the petitioner. In compliance with the aforesaid
resolution, Departmental Enquiry No. 09/2019/Cf.(A) was
initiated against the petitioner.
(3) The third complaint against the petitioner was
made by one Sri Mohd. Wasim, son of Mohd. Mustakim, resident
of District Amroha. The said complaint, dated 22.09.2018, was
duly supported by an affidavit, wherein allegations of corruption
and illegal demands for passing favourable orders in three cases
were levelled against the petitioner. Upon consideration of the
said complaint dated 22.09.2018 submitted by Sri Mohd. Wasim,
V.B. Inquiry No. 04 of 2019 was initiated vide order dated

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WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
13.07.2019 passed by Hon’ble the Chief Justice. In the said V.B.
Inquiry, an enquiry report dated 31.10.2019 was submitted by the
Special Officer (Vigilance), High Court, Allahabad, against the
petitioner. The said enquiry report was considered by the Hon’ble
Administrative Committee in its meeting held on 20.11.2019,
wherein it was resolved to accept the aforesaid enquiry report and
initiate a departmental enquiry against the petitioner. In
compliance with the aforesaid resolution, Departmental Enquiry
No. 13/2019/Cf.(A) was initiated against the petitioner.
(4) The fourth complaint against the petitioner was
made on 05.09.2018 by a female judicial officer regarding the
alleged indecent conversations and behaviour of the petitioner
towards her. The said complaint was forwarded by the District
Judge, Amroha, vide letter No. 07/2018/DJ Amroha dated
05.09.2018. The said complaint was referred to the Hon’ble
Internal Committee vide order dated 12.09.2018 passed by
Hon’ble the Chief Justice. Thereafter, another complaint dated
08.09.2018 was received from the said female judicial officer,
wherein it was alleged that the petitioner was pressurising her to
withdraw her earlier complaint dated 05.09.2018. The said
complaint dated 08.09.2018 was tagged with the earlier complaint
dated 05.09.2018 for being placed before the Hon’ble Internal
Committee. Hon’ble Internal Committee, in its meetings, resolved
to ensure compliance with Rules 7(1) and 7(3) of the Sexual
Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and
Redressal) Rules, 2013. Upon compliance with the aforesaid
provisions, the matter was considered by the Hon’ble Internal
Committee in its meeting held on 03.09.2021, wherein it was
resolved to summon the respondent (petitioner herein) and the
complainant (the female judicial officer) before the Hon’ble
Committee at its next meeting, scheduled to be held on
22.10.2021. In compliance with the aforesaid direction, both the
complainant and the respondent appeared before the Hon’ble

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WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
Committee in its meeting held on 29.11.2021, on which date the
following resolution was passed by the Hon’ble Internal
Committee:
"The complainant and Shri Praveen Sonkar,
respondent appeared before this Committee.
The Committee delved into the complaint. Heard both
the complainant and the respondent and perused the
complaint as also the reply submitted by the
respondent.
The respondent has regretted his behavior with the
complainant on the fateful day. The respondent has
tendered unqualified apology in writing which has
been accepted by the complainant and showed his
repentance and has assured that he will be careful in
future and maintain cordial relations not only with the
complainant but also with other female colleagues
and employees of the Judgeship.
Let the letter of apology of the respondent be kept on
record marked as 'X'.
The Committee has further deliberated and found that
the conduct and behaviour of the respondent with the
complainant had caused emotional distress and
mental trauma to the complainant though there are no
allegations of any kind of sexual harassment of the
complainant. Such conduct and behaviour has
disturbed the cordial relations of the complainant
with other judicial officers and created a hostile work
environment which has resulted in undermining the
dignity of the complainant.
The Committee resolves that a warning be given to the
respondent to remain careful in future in his
behaviour with his colleagues whether junior or
senior and in no manner create any kind of pressure
or make any comment upon the complainant in future.
The warning letter be also placed on record as ‘Y’
Let the report be placed before Hon’ble the Chief
Justice.”

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WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
The petitioner had submitted a letter of apology and was
cautioned to be careful in his behaviour towards his colleagues in
future. Thereafter, the matter was placed before the Hon’ble
Internal Committee in its meeting held on 20.11.2021, wherein the
following resolution was passed by the Hon’ble Internal
Committee:
"Resolved that the report be prepared
expeditiously and the same be placed before the
Committee and upon approval of the same, the
report be placed before Hon'ble the Chief
Justice."
In compliance with the aforesaid resolution, a report was
prepared in the matter. After the said report was approved by the
Hon’ble Committee on 26.02.2022, it was placed before Hon’ble
the Chief Justice, who passed the order “Seen” thereon on
30.03.2022.
28. We do take into consideration the fact that the
petitioner was compulsorily retired on 29.11.2021, whereas the
Screening Committee had recommended his compulsory
retirement on 11.06.2020. The proceedings relating to the fourth
complaint and the findings recorded by the Internal Committee
were subsequent to the meeting of the Screening Committee held
in June 2020. Even then, the material available before the
Screening Committee included the complaints made by the female
judicial officer in August 2018. Further, in the V.B. Inquiry
relating to the third complaint, an enquiry report dated 31.10.2019
was submitted by the Special Officer (Vigilance), High Court,
Allahabad, against the petitioner. The said enquiry report was
accepted by the Administrative Committee in its meeting dated
20.11.2019, pursuant to which a departmental enquiry was also
initiated against the petitioner. With regard to the first complaint
as well, the Special Officer (Vigilance), High Court, Allahabad,
submitted an enquiry report dated 30.09.2019 in the V.B. Inquiry,

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WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
and, on the basis of the said report, the Administrative Committee,
in its meeting dated 20.11.2019, resolved to initiate a departmental
enquiry against the petitioner.
29. Similarly, with regard to the second complaint, V.B.
Inquiry No. 03/2019 was initiated, in which an enquiry report
dated 13.08.2019 was submitted. The said enquiry report was
considered by the Administrative Committee in its meeting held
on 04.09.2019 and a departmental enquiry was initiated against
the petitioner.
30. The aforesaid facts indicate that the Screening
Committee, which, upon consideration of the material available
on record, made recommendation for compulsory retirement of
the petitioner. As such, it cannot be said that there was no material
available against the petitioner to warrant his compulsory
retirement.
31. The argument advanced by learned counsel for the
petitioner that, since disciplinary proceedings had been initiated
and no conclusive findings had been recorded against the
petitioner, no reliance could be placed upon such facts and
allegations for the purpose of compulsorily retiring him, cannot be
accepted. In this regard, we are of the view that the pendency of
departmental enquiries in respect of certain allegations which
were taken into consideration by the Screening Committee is of
no consequence, as the order of compulsory retirement is not
punitive in nature but is based on an overall assessment of the
service record of the officer. In this context, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in the case of High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan
vs. Bhanwar Lal Lamror and Others , reported in (2021) 8 SCC
377 , considered the case of a judicial officer against whom
disciplinary proceedings were also pending, raising questions
regarding his integrity. The Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of
the fact that the disciplinary enquiry stood dropped on account of

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WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
the compulsory retirement of the officer and found no infirmity in
the decision to compulsorily retire him. Accordingly, the appeal
preferred by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan was
allowed. The relevant paragraphs, namely, paragraphs 8 to 16 of
the aforesaid judgment, are reproduced hereinbelow:
“8. The moot question is whether it was open to
the High Court to substitute its view for the one
recorded by the Administrative Committee, which
commended to the Full Court of the High Court,
pursuant to which the order of compulsory
retirement came to be issued.
9. Indeed, the High Court on judicial side could
have done so, if it found that there was absolutely
no record or material whatsoever as referred to in
the recommendations made by the Administrative
Committee, or that the Committee relied on
irrelevant material, or that apposite material was
overlooked and discarded. Further, the High
Court’s view would have been acceptable if it
found patent illegality, breach of procedure
causing prejudice to respondent no.1, or
imposition of a gravely disproportionate measure.
We notice that the Administrative Committee, in its
Report, had adverted to the entire service record,
including the pending disciplinary enquiry
regarding integrity of respondent no.1.
10. It is settled position in law that the competent
authority is supposed to consider the entire service
record of the judicial officer and even if there is a
solitary remark of lack and breach of integrity, that
may be sufficient for a Judicial Officer to be
compulsory retired as expounded in Tarak Singh
Vs. Jyoti Basu reported in (2005) 1 SCC 201.
11. The High Court took notice of this judgment,
but still ventured to examine the entire record by
itself, overlooking the thorough examination
conducted by the Administrative Committee, which
was affirmed and commended to the Full Court. It
was not open to the High Court to substitute its
own view for the satisfaction arrived at by the Full

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WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
Court of the High Court regarding the necessity or
otherwise of the respondent no.1 continuing in the
Rajasthan Higher Judicial Services. It was also not
open to the High Court to re-write the annual
confidential reports by taking over the role of
inspecting or confirming authority.
12. Suffice it to note that the disciplinary enquiry
was pending against respondent no.1 which raised
questions about his integrity. Past service record of
respondent no. 1 was found to be sub-par and
short of the exacting standard expected from a
judicial officer.
13. It is also noticed from the record that the
disciplinary enquiry came to be dropped in lieu of
compulsory retirement of respondent no.1. That
was a composite recommendation made by the
Administrative Committee and commended to the
Full Court of the High Court. The two being
inseparable, and the solitary remark about
integrity with the service record being sufficient in
law to proceed against the judicial officer, we fail
to comprehend as to how the conclusion reached
by the competent authority can be said to be
arbitrary or manifestly wrong.
14. Accordingly, this appeal ought to succeed and
resultantly, we set aside the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court.
15. The writ petition filed by respondent no.1
challenging the compulsory retirement stands
dismissed.
16. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. No
order as to costs. Pending applications, if any,
stand disposed of.”
32. It would also be appropriate to refer to the judgment
and order dated 24.10.2024 passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court in Writ-A No. 1382 of 2022, Anil Kumar vs. State of U.P.
and Others , which also concerned a judicial officer whose case
was considered by the same Screening Committee along with that

25
WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
of the petitioner. In the said judgment, the Co-ordinate Bench
considered the effect of the pendency of departmental proceedings
at the time of consideration of the case for compulsory retirement,
as well as the effect of the subsequent exoneration of the judicial
officer in the departmental enquiry. It was held that the subsequent
exoneration of the officer in the departmental enquiry would not,
by itself, render the decision to compulsorily retire him invalid,
particularly when the Screening Committee had considered the
entire service record and other relevant material available on
record. The relevant paragraphs, namely paragraphs 25 and 29 to
36 of the aforesaid judgment, are reproduced hereinbelow:
...(25) We have perused the original records including
the recommendation of the Screening Committee, the
Administrative Committee, the Full Court of the High
Court and the ultimate order passed by the State
Government compulsorily retiring the petitioner. We
find from a perusal of the minutes of the Screening
Committee that it has considered the case of the
petitioner for compulsory retirement in the light of
various Supreme Court decisions referred therein some
of which have been referred hereinabove. The
Committee deliberated on 11.06.2020 and 15.06.2020
and scrutinized the service record of the concerned
officer. The entire service record was available before
the Screening Committee and the same has also been
produced before us, therefore, it was seen by the
Screening Committee.
...(29) As already mentioned in the earlier part of the
judgment, based on the aforesaid, the Chief Justice
ordered vigilance inquiry on 11.05.2013. Vigilance
Officer conducted the inquiry and submitted his report
on 04.03.2016 wherein he found the allegations to be
proved. This vigilance inquiry report was considered by
the Administrative Committee in its meeting dated
14.09.2016 and 16.11.2016 and accordingly, regular
disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the
officer.

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WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
(30) The Screening Committee has taken into
consideration the aforesaid reports to form an opinion
that the petitioner was a deadwood and had outlived its
utility requiring his compulsory retirement in public
interest in terms of F.R.56(C). Now, the said
recommendation of the Screening Committee dated
11.06.2020 and 15.06.2020 was accepted by the
Administrative Committee in its meeting dated
18.11.2021 and thereafter, the matter was placed before
the Full Court which also accepted the
recommendations and recorded a satisfaction that the
petitioner was liable to be compulsorily retired in public
interest and in pursuance thereof, issued the order of
compulsory retirement of the petitioner in public
interest under F.R. 56C on 29.11.2021.
(31) Once the master-servant relationship ceased then
the Disciplinary proceedings bearing No.12/2016
should have been dropped and should not have
continued any further as there was no provision under
which such proceedings could have continued thereafter
unless of course a decision was taken under Civil
Services Regulation 351A for forfeiture/ withholding etc
of pension etc but no such decision had been taken to
continue the proceedings under the said provision. It
appears that the Inquiry Officer was not informed about
the compulsory retirement of the petitioner and the
inquiry report was submitted subsequently on
23.12.2021 in ignorance of the fact that the petitioner
had already retired. In the said report, the petitioner
was exonerated of Charge No.1 and 2 which were
similar to the adverse remarks made by the District
Judge in the A.C.R. for the year 2012-13 and the report
mentioned hereinabove. Much emphasis has been laid
by learned counsel for the petitioner that this
exoneration in the inquiry report which was accepted by
the Administrative Committee on 10.01.2022 was itself
sufficient to show that remarks of the District Judge and
the report sent by him which was taken into
consideration by the Screening Committee and
thereafter, by the Administrative Committee and the Full
Court of the High Court were unjustified and therefore,
the basis for the satisfaction recorded for compulsory
retirement of the petitioner was not tenable on facts and

27
WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
in law. However, as already observed hereinabove, the
said exoneration by the Inquiry Judge is absolutely
without jurisdiction. The Inquiry report dated
23.12.2021 has no legal significance in the eyes of law
as once the master-servant relationship ceased there
was no way that the said inquiry could have continued
which was for purpose of imposition of any punishment
especially as it was not continued for the purpose
mentioned in Article 351A of the Civil Services
Regulation and there is nothing on record to show to the
contrary. So far as the dropping of charges by the
Administrative Committee meeting dated 10.01.2022
while considering the inquiry report dated 23.12.2021 is
concerned, the said decision appears to have been in
view of the fact that the petitioner had already
compulsorily retired and no purpose would be served as
punishment could not have been imposed on a retired
employee. Moreover, as already discussed hereinabove,
a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Arun
Kumar Saxena (supra) had an occasion to consider a
similar plea and for the legal reasoning propounded
therein, it rejected the said plea and for the same
reason, this plea in this case is also liable to be rejected.
Additionally, this plea is liable to be rejected because
the inquiry report in this case was without jurisdiction
and therefore, no advantage could enure to the
petitioner on account of its submission. We have also
gone through the inquiry report. Moreover, as already
discussed, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the
District Judge in the A.C.R. recorded by him for the
year 2012-13 and in his report which led to a vigilance
inquiry does not get washed away by this inquiry report
for the reasons already given by the Co-ordinate Bench
of this Court in the case of Arun Kumar Saxena (supra)
and as already discussed hereinabove, this plea raised
by the petitioner's counsel is therefore rejected.
(32) The Screening Committee considered the A.C.R. for
the year 2012-13, the report of the District Judge and
the report of the Vigilance Officer which was available
before it and the report of Inquiry Judge had not come
by then and, based on the aforesaid material as also the
entire service record, it recommended compulsory
retirement of the petitioner.

28
WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
(33) It is not a case where there was no material before
the Screening Committee or the Administrative
Committee or the Full Court of the High Court for
compulsory retirement of the petitioner. The material
was very much there and based on such material, a
subjective satisfaction was recorded by the Screening
Committee, the Administrative Committee and the Full
Court of the High Court and therefore, the opinion
expressed by the said Committees which consists of
sitting High Court Judges has to be given due
weightage and cannot be brushed aside cursorily as
stated by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in a catena of
decisions which have already been discussed. As
regards the malafide alleged, the District Judge has not
been impleaded as a party in these proceedings,
therefore, the same cannot be considered. The
allegations even otherwise are vague.
(34) As regards the rating of the petitioner as 'average'
by the District Judge for the year 2016-17, the
Administrative Judge upgraded the said categorization
to 'Good' but did not record any opinion on the integrity
of the petitioner on account of pendency of vigilance
inquiry against him. The petitioner submitted a
representation in this regard on 19.04.2018 which was
considered and rejected by the Administrative
Committee in its meeting dated 11.06.2020 and
15.06.2020 while considering compulsory retirement of
the petitioner. Therefore, the Administrative Committee
refused to certify the integrity of the petitioner for the
said year.
(35) As regards the contention of learned counsel for
the petitioner that compulsory retirement was resorted
as a shortcut to avoid disciplinary proceedings without
waiting for its result, we are not satisfied with this
contention in view of the law already discussed
hereinabove. Considering the nature of the material
against the petitioner and the report of Vigilance Officer
which was before the Screening Committee, merely
because a chargesheet had been issued to him and a
disciplinary proceeding had been initiated did not
preclude the High court from considering the petitioner
for compulsory retirement. The law discussed

29
WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
hereinabove did not preclude the High Court from doing
so. In fact, once a decision to compulsorily retire the
petitioner was taken, it was implied therein that the
disciplinary proceedings which had been initiated for
imposing a punishment stood dropped but merely
because the Inquiry Judge may not have been informed
about the said fact resulting in an inquiry report dated
23.12.2021 would not enure to the benefit of the
petitioner as already discussed. Proceedings for
compulsory retirement and disciplinary proceedings are
two distinct proceedings as already discussed in the
case of Arun Kumar Saxena (supra). Moreover, judicial
decisions may not entail disciplinary proceedings but
the same can certainly form the basis for an opinion
while recording annual confidential reports and also for
assessing the work and conduct of a judicial officer as
was done by the District Judge, Badaun and the said
exercise can culminate in a report by Vigilance Officer
which was a material which could have been taken for
consideration by the Screening Committee as has been
done rightly so and the decision arrived at cannot be
said to be one without any material or so apparently
arbitrary or capricious so as to warrant our
interference in the matter. A subjective satisfaction
recorded by the Screening Committee, the
Administrative Committee and the Full Court of this
High Court does not require any interference in the
facts as noticed hereinabove. The assessment of the
work and conduct of a judicial officer by his immediate
superior is of immense importance as has been opined
by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Nand
Kumar Verma (supra) and Rajendra Singh
Verma (supra) especially in view of the report of the
Vigilance Officer. The law is settled that a single
adverse remark regarding integrity of a judicial officer
is sufficient for his compulsory retirement. In this case,
there is sufficient material to sustain the order of
compulsory retirement and also subjective satisfaction
arrived at in this regard. As observed by the Supreme
Court of India, it is not always possible to have positive
evidence in matters of integrity of a judicial officer and
the assessment by the immediate superior officer
regarding his work and conduct including his integrity

30
WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
should not be brushed aside lightly, unless of course,
any malafide is proved which is not the case here.
Therefore, the decision of the Screening Committee, the
Administrative Committee and the Full Court based on
the material before it, are required to be given due
weightage. Decisions relied by the petitioner do not
help his cause in view of the above discussion.
(36) For all these reasons, we do not find merit in the
writ petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed. ”
33. It is noteworthy that the challenge in the present writ
petition is directed against the decision-making process involving
the same Screening Committee, which recommended the
petitioner's compulsory retirement, and the same Administrative
Committee, which accepted the recommendation of the Screening
Committee which was also subject matter and dealt by the Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Anil Kumar (supra) .
The judgment rendered by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in
the case of Anil Kumar (supra) was also challenged before
Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was dismissed vide order dated
13.12.2024 passed in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 29442 of
2024 : Anil Kumar vs. State of U.P. and Anothers . The said
order reads as follows:
“We have heard learned counsel for the
petitioner at length.
We are not inclined to interfere in the matter.
The Special Leave Petition is hence dismissed.
Pending application(s) shall stand disposed of.”
34. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we are of the
considered opinion that the recommendation of the screening
committee approved by Administrative Committee and Full Court
of this Court compulsorily retiring the petitioner was based on
sufficient material available in the service record of the petitioner
and there is no infirmity or illegality in the order of compulsory

31
WRIA No. - 4050 of 2022
retirement of the petitioner, communicated vide orders dated
26.11.2021 and 29.11.2021 and as such, no interference is called
for in the present writ petition.
35. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed .
36. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Amitabh Kumar Rai, J.) (Alok Mathur, J.)
November 12, 2026
Shubhankar
Digitally signed by :-
SHUBHANKAR THAKUR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench