Deepak Ramnani vs Directorate Of Enforcement

$~P-1 to 3
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 18.05.2026/03.06.2026
Pronounced on: 05.06.2026
Uploaded on: 05.06.2026
+ BAIL APPLN. 4286/2024
DEEPAK RAMNANI .....Petitioner
versus
STATE OF DELHI (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) .....Respondent
+ BAIL APPLN. 4441/2024
PRADEEP RAMDANEE .....Petitioner
versus
STATE NCTOF DELHI .....Respondent
+ BAIL APPLN. 4869/2025
DEEPAK RAMNANI .....Petitioner
versus
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT .....Respondent
Appearance:-
Mr. Anant Malik, Mr. Kunal Narwal and Ms. Ananya Chandra,
Advocates for Petitioners.
Mr. Sanjay Jain, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Akhand Pratap Singh, SPP, Ms.
Samridhi Dobhal, Mr. Krishna Mohan Chandel, Mr. Hritwik Maurya, Mr.
Utkarsh Singh, Mr. Apoorv Paliya, Mr. Nishank Tripathi, Ms. Rishika
Agarwal, Ms. Harshita Sukhija, Ms. Shreyan Srivastava, Advocates for
State with Insp. Shikhar Kadyan in BAIL APPLN. 4286/2024 and BAIL
APPLN. 4441/2024.
Mr. Rahul Tyagi, SC for ED with Ms. Priya Rai, Mr. Sangeet Sibou, Mr.
Aniket Kumar and Mr. Priyansh Raj Singh, Advocates in BAIL APPLN.
4869/2025.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
Signing Date:05.06.2026
16:17:48
BAIL APPLN. 4286/2024 and connected matters Page 1 of 50

CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN
J U D G M E N T
1. These three bail applications arise out of allied proceedings, one
registered under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999
[“MCOCA”] and the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [“IPC”], and the other
registered under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
[“PMLA”], details whereof are as follows:
(a) The petitioners in BAIL APPLN. 4286/2024 and BAIL APPLN.
4441/2024, Deepak Ramnani and Pradeep Ramdanee [hereinafter,
“Deepak” and “Pradeep”, respectively], are brothers. They seek
regular bail in connection with FIR No. 208/2021 dated
07.08.2021, at Police Station Special Cell, Delhi. The FIR was
originally registered under Sections 170/ 384/ 385/ 388/ 419/ 420/
506/ 120B of IPC and Section 66D of the Information Technology
Act, 2000 [“IT Act”]. At the time of filing of the chargesheet,
Sections 3 and 4 of MCOCA were invoked.
(b)Deepak is also the petitioner in BAIL APPLN. 4869/2025, wherein
he seeks bail in connection with ECIR/54/DLZO-II/2021, dated
08.08.2021, under Sections 3 and 4 of PMLA [“PMLA
proceedings”], instituted by the Directorate of Enforcement
1
[“ED”], following the registration of the aforesaid FIR .
1
Pradeep Ramdanee, who is the petitioner in BAIL APPLN. 4441/2024, is also an accused in the
PMLA proceedings, but has been granted regular bail therein, by order of the Special Court dated
02.08.2022.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
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2. It may be noted, at the outset, that by separate judgments dated
05.05.2026, this Court disposed of bail applications filed by co-accused
Leena Paulose [hereinafter, “Leena”], both in the proceedings instituted
2 3
by the State , and in the proceedings instituted by ED . The application of
Leena in the State proceedings was rejected, whereas bail was granted in
the PMLA proceedings, subject to various conditions.
3. I have heard Mr. Anant Singh Malik, learned counsel for the
petitioners, Mr. Sanjay Jain, learned Senior Counsel for the State, and Mr.
Rahul Tyagi, learned Standing Counsel for ED. The State/ED have filed
status reports/replies in the respective bail applications, which are on
record.
4. Although arguments were concluded on 18.05.2026, the matter was
again listed on 03.06.2026, to enable learned counsel to make
submissions on certain judgments and orders delivered by the Supreme
Court in the interregnum. Learned counsel addressed on the said
decisions, and also provided updates as to the status of the proceedings
before the Special Court.
A. P ROSECUTION C ASE :
I. Proceedings instituted by the State
5. The prosecution case in FIR No. 208/2021, as it appears from the
material on record, is summarised below:
A. FIR No. 208/2021, dated 07.08.2021, lodged at Police Station
Special Cell, Delhi, under Sections
2
BAIL APPLN. 1802/2024, decided on 05.05.2026 [hereinafter, “ Leena Paulose-II ”]. An earlier
application for bail filed by Leena in the State proceedings [BAIL APPLN. 3706/2022] was rejected by
judgment dated 11.07.2023 [hereinafter, “Leena Paulose-I ”] .
3
BAIL APPLN. 4657/2024, decided on 05.05.2026 [hereinafter, “ Leena Paulose-ED ”].
Signature Not Verified
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VASHIST
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170/384/385/388/419/420/506/120B of IPC and Section 66D of the
IT Act, has been registered at the instance of one Ms. Aditi Singh.
B. According to the complaint, on 15.06.2020, the complainant
received a call on her mobile phone from a landline number. The
caller introduced himself as a senior officer in the Ministry of Law
and offered assistance in securing bail for her husband, who was in
judicial custody in cases related to M/s Religare Enterprises Ltd.
C. It is alleged that the caller demanded Rs. 50 crores in exchange for
facilitating the bail and explained the method of delivering the
money.
D. Subsequently, through his associates, the caller allegedly extorted
money from the complainant on multiple occasions between June
2020 and August 2021, amounting to a total of Rs. 217 crores.
There are further allegations with regard to impersonation of senior
officials, including the Home Secretary, Government of India, and
misrepresenting the involvement of other government
functionaries, including the Home Minister.
E. Acting on the said information, on 07.08.2021, the police laid a
trap and apprehended Pradeep, while he was receiving the extorted
amount. He was arrested on the same day. During interrogation, he
disclosed that he was acting on the instructions of his brother,
Deepak, who was subsequently arrested on 08.08.2021.
F. Using technical surveillance of the mobile phone used for making
the calls, and the statements of co-accused, the caller was identified
as one Sukesh Chandra Shekhar @ Sukash Chandra Shekhar
[hereinafter, “Sukesh”].
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VASHIST
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G. At this time, Sukesh was already lodged in Tihar Jail as an
undertrial prisoner in a separate case, involving allegations of
collecting money from a political leader on the pretext of helping
him retain a particular election symbol. He was later shifted to
Rohini Jail.
H. A raid was conducted on the intervening night of 07/08.08.2021 by
the Special Cell, during which two mobile phones were recovered
from Sukesh, while he was in custody, and he was formally
arrested in connection with the present FIR. His interrogation led to
the identification and arrest of other associates and co-conspirators.
I. During investigation, it was found that Sukesh was involved in
multiple cases, including attempt to murder, criminal intimidation,
cheating, and extortion, often by impersonating high-ranking
officials.
J. As far as Deepak is concerned, it is alleged that:
i. He played a role in planning the illegal activities of the
Organised Crime Syndicate [“OCS”] led by Sukesh and his
wife, Leena, and in execution thereof.
ii. He was introduced to Sukesh by Chandra Brothers of Unitech,
who were also incarcerated in the same jail as Sukesh, and
were already known to him.
iii. He, thereafter, participated in the activities of the OCS by
assisting Sukesh in formulation of the extortion scheme and
identifying the complainant as a potential victim.
iv. Deepak was instrumental in collecting and in disposing of the
extorted amounts for a commission.
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VASHIST
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v. He was conscious of the fact that the amounts being collected
by him, and/or his brother Pradeep, on his instructions, were
extorted funds.
vi. Deepak also, knowing the illegal nature of the activities,
misidentified himself to the complainant as “Rohit”, and
misidentified Pradeep as “Rajesh”.
vii. It was Deepak who engaged the services of co-accused Avtar
Singh Kocchar @ Dolly [since deceased] [hereinafter,
“Avtar”], as a hawala operator, whose services were being
used to transmit the extorted amount to intended recipients,
including Leena.
viii. He was thus not only abetting the activities of the OCS, but
also directly involved in selection of the victim, formulation of
the modus operandi of the crime, and execution thereof.
ix. Deepak participated in approximately 50 such transfers of
funds, despite knowing that the funds were derived and
obtained from commission of an organised crime, and is guilty
of various offences enumerated in Section 3 of MCOCA,
including the commission of organised crime, abetment or
knowing facilitation of an organised crime, as well as
membership of an OCS.
x. Reliance is placed upon the disclosure statements under
Section 18 of MCOCA of co-accused Sukesh, Dharam Singh
Meena, Avtar, and Deepak himself, as well as the statements
[not under section 18 of MCOCA] of complainant and her
sister Arundhati Singh Khanna.
Signature Not Verified
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VASHIST
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K. As far as Pradeep is concerned, the prosecution case is that he
participated in the activities of the OCS by personally collecting
the extorted funds from the complainant and her sister, Arundhati
Singh Khanna, on the instructions of Deepak. Such activity was
carried out by misrepresenting himself as “Rajesh”, and his brother
Deepak, as “Rohit”. The prosecution case against Pradeep is also
based upon the statements under Section 18 of MCOCA of
Deepak, and the statements of the complainant and Arundati Singh
Khanna.
L. In the chargesheet, the roles of Deepak and Pradeep, and the
material against them, is summarized as follows:
12. Accused Deepak Ramnani:
“
 Arrest of his brother Pradeep Ramdani in a trap by police.
 Statements u/s 18(1) MCOC Act of Sukash, B. Mohan Raj, Deepak
Ramnani and Avtar Singh Kochar@Dolly.
 Details recovered of M/S Evernice International Trading Company
Pvt. Ltd. from Deepak Ramnani’s phone. Money extorted from
Japna was trnsferred to A/C of this company based in Hongkong.
Particulars of this company were given by Dolly to Deepak
Ramnani who gave it to Sukash and Sukash gave it to Japna.
 The residence and hotels addresses and hideouts of Avtar Singh
Kochar@Dolly were pointed out on his disclosure and lead to
arrest of accused Avar Singh Kochar@Dolly.
 Arrest of D. S. Meena and seizure of his car on his disclosure.
 One Token number - 98V88j602, Jitendera +919953839944 Delhi
75 L image was found in Redmi mobile of Deepak
 In Contact list of Redmi phone of Deepak, mobile contacts of Sonu,
Raju, &Avtar Singh Kochar@Dollywere found.
 Some telegraphic transfer of USD 83000/- & USD 45000 to
NICKO SERVICES PTE Ltd was found in Redmi mobile of
Deepak.
 It was further ascertained that one telegram number used by
Sukash +16692594162 is found saved in contact list of Deepak’s
phone. In this way, Sukash found connected with Deepak.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
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 Name of Co-accused Leena & her mother name –Lissy Paul was
found mentioned at transancation no. 519156. This show that
accused Deepak was in touch with Sukash& his wife Leena.
 One location of Wazirpur at transaction number 893986 of
whatsapp chat was found. It is the same locality where delivery
was given to accused D.S Meena by Accused Deepak.
 Pappu, delivery man of Avatar Singh Kochhar@ Dolly contact
found in the phone of Deepak.
 Avatar Singh Kochhar name reflected in contact list of Deepak
found in Redmi Phone.
 One suspicious swift transaction in name of Trendy Ace Limited of
USD 52945 found in phone of Deepak & the same was confirmed
by Avtar Singh Kocchar@Dolly.
13. Accused Pradeep Ramdani:
 He was arrested in a trap while he came to collect money from the
victim on behalf of' Sukash.
 Arrest of Deepak Ramdani on his disclosure.
 Seizure of his car and recovery of complainant’s money from his
possession.
 Statements u/s 18(1) MCOC Act of Sukash, B. Mohan Raj, Avatar
Singh Kochhar@ Dolly and Deepak Ramnani.
 One hand written note dated 29/7/2021 consisting some
calculation of huge amount in name of Sardarji, Kohli, PizzaHUt,
Jor Bagh, Kumar was found in mirrior image of Mobile Honor 7X
of Pardeep Ramdani. ”
II. Proceedings instituted by ED
6. The prosecution case against Deepak in the PMLA proceedings, as
it appears from the material on record, is summarised below:
A. Pursuant to registration of FIR No. 208/2021, and having regard to
the fact that Sections 384/386/419/420/120B of IPC are scheduled
offences, ECIR/54/DLZO-II/2021, dated 08.08.2021, was
registered under Sections 3 and 4 of PMLA.
B. During investigation, it was found that Deepak was a trusted
associate of Sukesh, and was responsible for collecting the cash
extorted by him and delivering the same to various destinations for
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
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its utilization. He was fully aware of Sukesh's incarceration, having
performed a puja for securing his bail. Further, contact details of
Leena and her mother were found stored in his mobile phone.
C. Deepak allegedly admitted that he carried out cash transactions on
behalf of Sukesh, not only during the period relevant to the present
offence, but also on prior occasions.
D. Deepak further acknowledged the quantum of cash collected on
various occasions. Significantly, the technical evidence in the form
of his Internet Protocol Detail Records corroborated the dates and
timings of several such deliveries. Deepak was able to identify and
remember all individuals who delivered cash on behalf of the
complainant.
E. Investigation further revealed that Deepak remained in regular
contact with Sukesh and actively assisted in laundering the
proceeds of crime, not only within Delhi but also across different
States in India and abroad.
F. Deepak used token-based mechanisms for collection of cash,
copies of which were subsequently produced before the Economic
Offences Wing [“EOW”] by the complainant. The circumstances
demonstrate that he was fully aware that these were not legitimate
commercial transactions undertaken for lawful commission.
G. In order to avoid suspicion and evade scrutiny during COVID-19
restrictions, Deepak often ensured the presence of his wife in the
vehicle while transporting the cash. He allegedly personally
counted, transported, and delivered substantial amounts of cash to
various locations in accordance with the instructions of Sukesh. On
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:PARUL
VASHIST
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occasions when Deepak was unavailable, he deputed his brother
Pradeep to coordinate and execute the collection and delivery of
cash.
H. He ensured continuity of the operation even in his absence, and
remained in constant touch with Sukesh for the purpose of
collecting the extorted funds and delivering them to the intended
beneficiaries.
I. In connection with the PMLA proceedings, Deepak was arrested on
05.10.2021, and was sent to judicial custody on 19.10.2021.
TATEMENTS UNDER ECTION
B. S S 18 MCOCA:
7. The statements under Section 18 MCOCA, relied upon by the
prosecution to the extent relevant in respect of the present petitioners,
have been summarised in the status report filed by the State in BAIL
APPLN. 4286/2024. The extracts of the said status report are reproduced
hereinbelow:
“ Confessional statement of Deepak Ramnani recorded u/s18 MCOC Act
During investigation, confessional statement U/s 18(1) MCOC Act
of accused Deepak Ramnani was recorded and it was confessed by him
that he and his brother Pradeep Ramdanee were part and parcel of
syndicate led by accused Sukash Chandra Shekar and it was well within
the knowledge of accused Deepak Ramnani that money collected from
various places and further transmitting the same through Hawala
Channel on the direction of Sukash Chandra Shekhar, was crime
proceeds. Deepak Ramnani apprised discussed with Avtar Singh
Kochar@Dolly about the plan of Sukash, lodged in the Delhi jail, for
transfer of heavy cash in India and abroad through Hawala. He also told
him that Sukash Chandra Shekhar is a big cheat and he would give big cut
in cheated/extorted amount if they transfer his funds. As the money is
generated from crime, hence Avtar Singh Kochar@Dolly demanded 7%
commission on each transaction. Deepak also instructed Avtar Singh
Kochar@Dolly for taking precaution while working for Sukash Chandra
Shekhar. Deepak further disclosed that with the help of Avtar Singh
Kochar@Dolly, he sent money abroad several times through Hawala and
sometimes through banking channel using shell companies. He also
Signature Not Verified
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VASHIST
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disclosed that in his absence, his brother Pradeep Ramdani used to collect
cash from complainant and her family members and further handed over
to persons as per directions of Sukash Chandra Shekar.
Confessional statement of Avtar Singh Kochar recorded u/s18 MCOC
Act:
Accused Avtar Singh Kochar@Dolly confessed that he was
engaged in the business of Hawala transactions. He knew Deepak
Ramnani for last 15 years and Deepak had sent money abroad of several
corporate houses through Hawala Channels. In the year May-June 2020,
accused Deepak told him that one Sukash Chandra Shekhar who was in
the Rohini Jail and he wanted to send his money abroad which was
gained through extortion and in other parts of India. Avtar Singh
Kochar@Dolly was informed by accused Deepak Ramnani about the
criminal past of the Sukash Chandra Shekhar and the money to be
transferred was crime proceed. Hence, Avtar Singh Kochar@Dolly asked
for hefty commission. After that from July-2020 to July 2021, he
transferred about 90-100 crores to abroad in addition to the 10-12 crores
to Pune, Chennai, Hyderabad etc.
Confessional statement of Sukash Chandra Shekar recorded u/s18
MCOC Act:
While Sukash Chandra Shekhar was regularly meeting Chandra
brothers of Unitech, he came in contact with Deepak Ramnani, a person
close to Chandra brothers. Deeapk Ramnani was handling funds of
Chandra brothers. They introduced Deepak Ramnani to him and told that
he was a person who can be relied upon in the management of funds.
Confessional statement of Dharam Singh Meena recorded u/s18 MCOC
Act:
During investigation both the brothers namely Deepak Ramnani
and Pradeep Ramdanee were correctly identified by the co accused
Dharam Singh Meena. It is confessed by Dharam Singh Meena in his
confessional statement recorded u/s 18 MCOC Act that both the brothers
delivered him cash on numerous occasions at the behest of the Syndicate
head Sukesh Chandra Shekhar. Dharam Singh Meena further disclosed
that both the brothers used to meet him with different names. ”
C. S UBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE P ARTIES :
I. Submissions in the State Case
8. The submissions advanced by Mr. Malik, in support of these
applications, may be summarized as follows:
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a. The principal argument of Mr. Malik was based upon the period of
custody of the petitioners. Deepak was arrested on 08.08.2021, and
Pradeep on 07.08.2021. They have thus spent a period of
approximately 4 years and 10 months in custody. An order on
charge was passed by the Special Court on 30.05.2026, but, at the
time of the last hearing on 03.06.2026, charges were yet to be
formally framed.
b. The prosecution filed the first chargesheet in November 2021, but
also filed five supplementary chargesheets thereafter, the last of
which was filed only on 04.10.2024. Thus, filing of chargesheets
itself took a period of almost three years. The arguments on charge
were commenced upon filing of each of the chargesheets, but were
disrupted on account of filing of successive chargesheets. Mr.
Malik submitted that, even after the filing of the last chargesheet,
arguments were addressed, but there was a change in the Presiding
Officer of the Special Court on 05.12.2025, after which arguments
recommenced. The case involves 23 accused persons, 403
witnesses, and chargesheets collectively exceed 10,000 pages.
Even after formal framing of charges, Mr. Malik submitted that the
trial is likely to take considerable time.
c. He further submitted that trial is now likely to be further delayed,
as another co-accused Nivaas KL has been arrested only on
04.05.2026.
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VASHIST
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4
d. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb , and several later cases, the
Supreme Court has clearly held that the mandate under Article 21
of the Constitution prohibits prolonged pre-trial incarceration of an
accused, particularly when there is no reasonable likelihood of
expeditious conclusion of proceedings. He submitted that, in K.A.
Najeeb , this principle was applied even to the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1967 [“UAPA”], which also, like MCOCA,
incorporates stringent conditions for the grant of bail. Mr. Malik
also drew my attention to several judgments and orders of the
Supreme Court and this Court, in which bail has been granted on
this ground, even in cases under MCOCA.
e. Relying upon Section 479 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Surakasha
Sanhita [“BNSS”] (corresponding to Section 436A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 [“CrPC”]), Mr. Malik submitted that the
petitioner has already been in custody for close to the minimum
period of sentence under Section 3(1) of MCOCA, which is five
years.
f. This Court has dealt with similar submissions advanced on behalf
of Leena in Leena Paulose-II . Mr. Malik submitted that the
judgment in Leena Palouse-II proceeds on the basis of the
interpretation of K.A. Najeeb in Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of
5
NCT of Delhi) , which has itself been doubted in Syed Iftikhar
6
Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency . Syed Iftikhar Andrabi
expresses concern regarding the “ hollowing out ” of the ratio of
4
(2021) 3 SCC 713 [hereinafter, “ K.A. Najeeb ”].
5
2026 SCC OnLine SC 10 [hereinafter, “ Gulfisha Fatima ”].
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K.A. Najeeb in Gulfisha Fatima , and holds that constitutional rights
under Article 21 must prevail over any statutory restrictions on the
7
grant of bail . Mr. Malik urged this Court, in the face of the
aforesaid conflict between Gulfisha Fatima and Syed Iftikhar
Andrabi, to apply the law laid down in K.A. Najeeb .
g. Although bail was declined to Leena in Leena Palouse-II , he
submitted that the present petitioners would be entitled to bail,
even on the basis of legal principles, as understood in Leena
Palouse-II .
h. Taking the prosecution case at the highest, the role of Deepak and
Pradeep can be described as financial and logistical support
without any participation in conceptualisation or strategic
command. In the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gulfisha
Fatima , five accused in the proceedings under UAPA, whose roles
were of a similar or graver nature, were granted bail. Mr. Malik
also relied upon a judgment of this Court in Haris Nisar Langoo v.
8
National Investigation Agency , in this connection.
i. Neither Deepak nor Pradeep, even on the prosecution’s highest
showing, were involved in the activity of OCS as statutorily
defined, nor in Sukesh’s activities in jail. They were also not part
of any contact with the victims, except for the purposes of
collection of the extorted amount, on the instructions of Sukesh.
6
2026 SCC OnLine SC 881 [hereinafter, “ Syed Iftikhar Andrabi ”].
7
Paragraphs 29 to 33.
8
CRL.A. 406/2023 and connected matter, decided on 20.03.2026 [hereinafter, “ Haris Nisar Langoo ”],
paragraphs 50 to 60.
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j. The role ascribed to the petitioners is essentially that of cash
couriers. Deepak was acting only on the instructions of Sukesh,
and had no role in ascertaining the amount to be collected,
modalities of collection or the destination to which the funds were
to be sent. He was not the “controlling mind” of the conspiracy, or
even a decision-making participant. Pradeep’s role was even more
limited, acting only as a field agent on behalf of Deepak.
k. The statements under Section 18 of MCOCA relied upon by the
prosecution have all been retracted by the makers at the first
available opportunity. However, even taking the statements at face
value, they only reveal that Deepak was acting upon the
instructions of Sukesh, and Pradeep was acting upon the
instructions of Deepak.
l. Mr. Malik disputed the prosecution’s characterisation of the
alleged role played by Deepak, drawing my attention to the reply
filed by the prosecution in the Special Court, wherein Deepak was
treated only as an alleged facilitator, without any role being
attributed to him in conceptualisation or controlling the activities of
OCS.
m. Reliance upon Call Detail Records, in the absence of any transcript
or recording of alleged conversations between the accused, cannot
be considered inculpatory at the stage of consideration of bail. To
this effect, Mr. Malik relied upon a judgment of the High Court of
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Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh in Sareed Ahmed Ganie v. Union of
9
India .
n. The allegations in the chargesheet relating to a company by the
name of Evernice International do not concern FIR No. 208/2021
at all, but relate only to FIR No. 124/2021, registered at EOW.
o. The provisions of MCOCA were invoked on 04.09.2021, i.e.
almost one month after the registration of the subject FIR, which
shows that, at the outset, the activity was not considered relatable
to OCS at all.
p. Pradeep was arrested on 07.08.2021 in a trap laid by the Special
Cell, but Deepak remained available for interrogation and reported
to the Investigating Officer when summoned. He was arrested on
the next date on 08.08.2021.
q. The petitioners have no prior criminal involvements other than the
two proceedings involved in these applications, they are accused in
FIR No. 124/2021 registered at Police Station EOW, under
Sections 170/384/386/419/420/506 IPC and Section 66D IT Act, in
a similar claim of extortion registered at the instance of the sister-
in-law of the complainant, whose husband was also in jail in
connection with the same offence as the complainant’s husband.
Deepak is also an accused in proceedings under PMLA, in
10
connection with FIR No. 124/2021 .
r. Lastly, Mr. Malik submitted that the petitioners are both senior
citizens, Deepak being aged 68 years and Pradeep around 58 years.
9
2025 SCC OnLine J&K 1026 [hereinafter, “ Sareed Ahmed Ganie ”].
10
ECIR No. 55/DLZO-II/2021 under Sections 3 and 4 of PMLA.
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9. Mr. Jain, on the other hand, opposed the applications, arguing as
follows:
a. On the legal issue concerning the interplay between the Article 21
rights of an accused and statutory restrictions on the grant of bail,
Mr. Jain submitted that the judgment in Gulfisha Fatima remains
good law, and this Court ought to proceed on the basis of the law
laid down therein, as interpreted in Leena Palouse-II .
b. Although a Bench of co-equal strength in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi has
expressed reservations, such reservations do not tantamount to
denuding Gulfisha Fatima of binding force, or diluting it in any
manner. Reference to a larger Bench does not diminish the
authority of an earlier decision of a coordinate Bench of the
Supreme Court. For this purpose, Mr. Jain referred to the
Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Central
Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Anr. v. State of
11
Maharashtra and Anr. .
c. Mr. Jain also drew my attention to two judgments of the Supreme
Court in Sheikh Mehmood v. Union Territory of Jammu and
12 13
Kashmir and Ors. and State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa ,
delivered on 01.06.2026 and 02.06.2026, respectively, which also
guide the Court, as to the relevant considerations in adjudicating a
bail application.
d. Deepak was not a mere facilitator or logistics provider, but a
principal participant in conceptualizing and executing the criminal
11
(2005) 2 SCC 673, paragraph 12.
12
SLP (CRL.) No. 19036/2025 [hereinafter, “ Sheikh Mehmood ”].
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activities of the OCS. He was introduced to Sukesh while Sukesh
was already lodged in jail, and offered his services for arranging
hawala operations through Avtar. Deepak involved himself in
these transactions after satisfying himself as to Sukesh’s
credentials and operations of the OCS. He was constantly in touch
with Sukesh, who directed both the collection of funds and
utilization of funds. Deepak was fully aware that the funds he was
collecting were, in fact, derived from the activities of the OCS.
e. Deepak facilitated the transfer of money through his network of
hawala operators [including Avtar] to Sukesh’s wife and other
recipients, and also directly made payments to jail officials,
including co-accused Dharam Singh Meena, who would then
distribute the money to other jail officials.
f. Deepak has been involved in multiple transactions of collection
and transmitting the extorted funds. Both the quantum and the
relatively higher commission being paid in respect of these
transactions was on account of the high level of mutual trust
between Sukesh and Deepak, as well as the illicit nature of the
activity, which was known to Deepak and Pradeep.
g. Mr. Jain submitted that, although Pradeep was acting on the
instructions of Deepak, he was also aware of the nature of the
transactions and was, in fact, the first of the accused to be arrested,
when he was caught red-handed receiving an amount of Rs. 1 crore
from the complainant.
13
SLP (CRL.) No. 896/2026 [hereinafter, “ Balraj Singh ”].
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h. Both the petitioners identified themselves to the victim by
pseudonyms, revealing their knowledge of the illegal nature of the
activities and the transactions in question.
i. The record reveals telephone connectivity between Deepak and
Sukesh, as well as Deepak and Dharam Singh Meena.
j. Mr. Jain submitted that, at the stage of bail, Section 18 MCOCA
statements cannot be disregarded, and the effect of the alleged
retraction would be a matter for trial. He relied upon the judgments
of this Court rejecting two bail applications filed by co-accused
Leena – Leena Palouse-I and Leena Palouse-II . He emphasised
that Deepak was a key participant in identification of Complainant
as a potential victim of extortion, relying upon the Section 18
MCOCA statements of Sukesh and Deepak himself.
k. Mr. Jain also submitted that Deepak and Pradeep both conducted
activities which fall within the definition of Sections 3(1)(ii) and
3(1)(2) of MCOCA, and their activities clearly reveal
“ membership ” of OCS under Section 3(1)(4) of MCOCA as
interpretated by Bombay High Court in Sachin Bansilal Ghaiwal v.
14
State of Maharashtra .
l. Mr. Jain also drew my attention to an order of the Supreme Court
15
dated 08.05.2026 , which was directed against orders of this Court
16
granting bail to some of the co-accused in FIR No. 208/2021 . He
14
(2014) SCC OnLine Bom 725.
15
In SLP(CRL.) No. 5659/2024 [Pinki Irani]; SLP(CRL.) No. 9306/2024 [Sunil Kumar]; and
SLP(CRL.) No. 6651/2024 [Avtar Singh Kocchar].
16
Avtar Singh Kocchar v. State of NCT of Delhi [BAIL APPLN 1811/2023, decided on 29.11.2023];
Pinky Irani v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi [BAIL APPLN 1127/2023, decided on 20.10.2023]; Sunil Kumar
v. State of NCT of Delhi [BAIL APPLN. 1130/2023, decided on 02.04.2024].
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submitted that this Court had inter alia proceeded on the basis that
the accused were only financial facilitators, and were entitled to
bail. However, the Supreme Court set aside all observations made
in those orders, while directing that the accused therein shall
remain on bail. The Supreme Court specifically declared that the
observations in the impugned orders are irrelevant for the purposes
of the ongoing trial. As far as the SLP against the order granting
bail to Avtar is concerned, the petition was disposed of as
infructuous, in view of the fact that the accused had since passed
away.
II. Submissions in the ED Case
10. Mr. Malik submitted that Deepak has already undergone custody in
the PMLA complaint, for a period over 4 years and 8 months, and is
therefore liable to be released on bail on the ground of prolonged
incarceration. His arguments in this regard, were similar to those
advanced in the State case. He further submitted that the period of
custody undergone exceeds half of the maximum sentence of seven years,
under Section 4 PMLA, and the petitioner is therefore entitled to the
benefit of Section 479 BNSS. He submitted that the twin conditions
prescribed in Section 45 PMLA would not be applicable, in view of the
lapse of time provided in Section 479 BNSS. In connection with this
submission, he relied upon Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary v. Union of
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17
India and Ajay Ajit Peter Kelkar v. Directorate of Enforcement &
18
Ors. .
11. Mr. Malik also submitted that the petitioner is entitled to the
benefit of parity. He stated that out of the 18 accused persons in the
present ECIR, 13 have already been granted bail, four by this Court and
nine by the Special Court. These orders were not challenged by the ED. It
was submitted that both co-accused Arun Muthu and Avtar were granted
bail in the PMLA case, despite the rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA
being applicable to them, and the petitioner’s case stands on an even
better footing on facts.
12. Mr. Tyagi submitted that a prima facie case of money laundering
was made out against Deepak. However, on the question of prolonged
incarceration, he accepted that Deepak would be entitled to parity with
19
co-accused Leena, whose bail application in the ED case was allowed .
The aforesaid submission was expressly made without prejudice to the
rights and contentions of ED, in the event it chooses to challenge the
judgment of this Court in Leena Paulose-ED .
D. R ELEVANT P ROVISIONS :
13. Statutory provisions referred to by learned counsel for the parties in
20
the course of their arguments are set out below for ease of reference .
a. MCOCA:
“ Section 2: Definitions.
17
(2023) 12 SCC 1 [hereinafter, “ Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary ”].
18
Criminal Appeal Nos. 2601-2602/2024, decided on 16.05.2024 [hereinafter, “ Ajay Ajit Peter
Kelkar ”].
19
Leena Paulose-ED .
20
Learned counsel for the parties also referred to the bail provisions in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 [Section 37], and Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002
[Section 45]. These are not separately reproduced as they are pari materia to Section 21(4) MCOCA.
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(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) “ abet ”, with its grammatical variations and cognate
expression, includes,
(i) the communication or association with any person with the
actual knowledge or having reason to believe that such person is
engaged in assisting in any manner, an organised crime syndicate ;
(ii) the passing on or publication of, without any lawful
authority, any information likely to assist the organised crime syndicate
and the passing on or publication of or distribution of any document or
matter obtained from the organised crime syndicate; and
(iii) the rendering of any assistance, whether financial or
otherwise, to the organised crime syndicate ;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) “continuing unlawful activity” means an activity prohibited
by law for the time being in force, which is a cognizable offence
punishable with imprisonment of three years or more, undertaken either
singly or jointly, as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on
behalf of such syndicate in respect of which more than one charge-sheets
have been filed before a Competent Court within the preceding period of
ten years and that Court has taken cognizance of such offence;
(e) “organised crime” means any continuing unlawful activity by
an individual, singly or jointly, either as a member of an organised
crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate , by use of violence or
threat of violence or intimidation or coercion, or other unlawful means,
with the objective of gaining pecuniary benefits, or gaining undue
economic or other advantage for himself or any other person or
promoting insurgency;
(f) “organised crime syndicate” means a group of two or more
persons who, acting either singly or collectively, as a syndicate or gang
indulge in activities of organised crime ;
Section 3: Punishment for organized crime.
(1) Whoever commits an offence of organised crime shall,—
xxx xxx xxx
(ii) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to a fine, subject to a
minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(2) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit or advocates, abets
or knowingly facilitates the commission of an organised crime or any
act preparatory to organised crime, shall be punishable with
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imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than five years but
which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to a
fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Any person who is a member of an organised crime syndicate
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall
also be liable to a fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees five lacs.
(5) Whoever holds any property derived or obtained from
commission of an organised crime or which has been acquired through
the organised crime syndicate funds shall be punishable with a term which
shall not be less than three years but which may extend to imprisonment
for life and shall also be liable to fine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees
two lacs.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 17: Special rules of evidence.
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code,
or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (I of 1872), for the purposes of trial and
punishment for offences under this Act or connected offences, the Court
may take into consideration as having probative value, the fact that the
accused was,-
(a) on any previous occasion bound under section 107 or section
110 of the Code;
(b) detained under any law relating to preventive detention; or
(c) on any previous occasion was prosecuted in the Special Court
under this Act.
(2) Where it is proved that any person involved in an organised
crime or any person on his behalf is or has at any time been in possession
of movable or immovable property which he cannot satisfactorily account
for, the Special Court shall, unless contrary is proved, presume that such
property or pecuniary resources have been acquired or derived by his
illegal activities.
(3) Where it is proved that the accused has kidnapped or abducted
any person, the Special Court shall presume that it was for ransom.
Section 18: Certain confessions made to the police officer to be taken
into consideration.
(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Code or in the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 (I of 1872), but subject to the provisions of this section, a
confession made by a person before a police officer not below the rank of
the Superintendent of Police and recorded by such police officer either in
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writing or on any mechanical devices like cassettes, tapes or sound tracks
from which sounds or images can be reproduced, shall be admissible in
the trial of such person or co-accused, abettor or conspirator:
Provided that, the co-accused, abettor or conspirator is charged and tried
in the same case together with the accused.
(2) The confession shall be recorded in a free atmosphere in the
same language in which the person is examined and as narrated by him.
(3) The police officer shall, before recording any confession under
sub-section (1), explain to the person making it that he is not bound to
make a confession and that, if he does so, it may be used as evidence
against him and such police officer shall not record any such confession
unless upon questioning the person making it, he is satisfied that it is
being made voluntarily. The concerned police officer shall, after recording
such voluntary confession, certify in writing below the confession about
his personal satisfaction of the voluntary character of such confession,
putting the date and time of the same.
(4) Every confession recorded under sub-section (1) shall be sent
forthwith to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial
Magistrate having jurisdiction over the area in which such confession has
been recorded and such Magistrate shall forward the recorded confession
so received to the Special Court which may take cognizance of the offence.
(5) The person from whom a confession has been recorded under
sub-section (1) shall also be produced before the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom the confession is
required to be sent under sub-section (4) alongwith the original statement
of confession, written or recorded on mechanical device without
unreasonable delay.
(6) The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate
shall scrupulously record the statement, if any, made by the accused so
produced and get his signature and in case of any complaint of torture, the
person shall be directed to be produced for medical examination before a
Medical Officer not lower in rank than of an Assistant Civil Surgeon.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 21: Modified application of certain provisions of the Code.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person
accused of an offence punishable under this Act shall, if in custody, be
released on bail or on his own bond, unless -
(a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the
application of such release; and
(b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not
guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.
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xxx xxx xxx
Section 23: Cognizance of, and investigation into, an offence.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code,-
(a) no information about the commission of an offence of organised crime
under this Act, shall be recorded by a police officer without the prior
approval of the police officer not below the rank of the Deputy Inspector
General of Police;
(b) no investigation of an offence under the provisions of this Act shall be
carried out by a police officer below the rank of the Deputy
Superintendent of Police.
(2) No Special Court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act
without the previous sanction of the police officer not below the rank of
21
Additional Director General of Police. ”
b. UAPA:
“ Section 43-D: Modified application of certain provisions of the Code .
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person
accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act
shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the
Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the
application for such release:
Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on
his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report
made under Section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such
22
person is prima facie true. ”
E. L EGAL POSITION REGARDING INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE
C ONSTITUTIONAL G UARANTEE UNDER A RTICLE 21 AND THE B AIL
R ESTRICTIONS UNDER S PECIAL S TATUTES
14. A fundamental question which requires consideration in these cases
concerns the petitioners’ entitlement to bail on the ground of prolonged
period spent in custody as under-trials, particularly having regard to the
21
Emphasis supplied.
22
Emphasis supplied.
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twin restrictions on the grant of bail, provided in Section 21(4) of
MCOCA and Section 45 of PMLA.
15. In Leena Paulose-II , I have considered this question, in the light of
several judgments and orders of the Supreme Court, both under MCOCA
and UAPA, which contains similar [but not identical] restrictions in
Section 43-D(5).
16. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner therein was that,
23
even in several cases under MCOCA , the Supreme Court has released
the accused on bail upon consideration of the period of custody and stage
of trial, following the principles laid down in K.A. Najeeb . The same
24
position obtains in various decision of this Court .
17. In contrast to these decisions, the prosecution relied upon some
decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court which declined to
extend the concession of bail to persons accused under MCOCA, holding
inter alia that delay in trial cannot by itself be determinative, and each
25
case must be analysed on its own facts . My attention was also drawn to
the judgment of Supreme Court in Gulfisha Fatima , and judgments of the
Division Bench of this Court in Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of
23
Rockysingh Jalindersingh Kalyani v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 176/2022, decided
on 03.02.2022]; Ranjana Tanaji Wanve v. State of Maharashtra [SLP (Crl.) No. 12740/2024, decided
on 22.10.2024]; Siddhant v. State of Maharashtra [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3798]; Vinod v. State of
Maharashtra [SLP (Crl.) No. 14166/2024, dated 08.01.2025]; Vivek @ Vicky Janak Paneri v. State of
Maharashtra [SLP (Crl.) No. 2677-2678/2025, dated 15.04.2025]; Kailash Ramchandani v. State of
Maharashtra & Anr. [SLP (Crl.) No. 4276/2025, dated 06.01.2026]; Jagruti Dhanesh Thorat v. State of
Maharashtra [SLP (Crl.) No. 17295/2025, dated 13.01.2026].
24
Arun v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) [BAIL APPLN. 3348/2023, dated 07.04.2025]; Ashish
@ Deva v. State (NCT of Delhi) [BAIL APPLN. 1618/2024, dated 29.04.2025]; Rajesh Kumar v. State
(Government of NCT of Delhi) [BAIL APPLN. 2986/2023, dated 08.05.2025]; and Jitender Dixit @
Bantu v. The State (Government of NCT of Delhi) [BAIL APPLN. 3831/2023, dated 19.05.2025].
25
Jayashree Kanbar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [(2025) 2 SCC 797]; Dheerpal v State (Govt. of
NCT of Delhi) [2024 SCC OnLine Del 4106]; Umesh @ Kala v. State [2025 SCC OnLine Del 6573];
Dheerpal v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi [2026 SCC OnLine Del 909].
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26
Delhi and Haris Nisar Langoo , all of which arose under UAPA. In
Gulfisha Fatima , the Supreme Court granted bail to some of the
applicants, while rejecting the applications of other accused. In Tasleem
Ahmed , the Division Bench of this Court found the applicant not entitled
to bail, whereas in Haris Nisar Langoo, the applicant was granted bail.
18. In view of the above decisions, this Court held as follows in Leena
Paulose-II , as to the proper approach in such cases:
“ 29. The decision in Gulfisha Fatima, in my view, provides guidance on
the approach to be adopted while adjudicating bail application under
MCOCA also. Section 21(4) of MCOCA being on a “higher pedestal”
than Section 43D(5) of UAPA, I agree with Mr Jain that, at the very least,
the same principles would govern the interplay between Section 21(4) of
MCOCA and the Article 21 rights of an accused. The apparently distinct
lines of authority cited above can, in my view, be reconciled, by applying
the ratio of Gulfisha Fatima.
30. The position which emerges therefrom is that statutory restrictions on
grant of bail cannot preclude constitutionally protected claims,
referrable to Article 21 of the Constitution. The ground of prolonged pre-
trial incarceration without likelihood of culmination of proceedings must
therefore be considered, even in cases involving special statutes.
However, these are not stand-alone considerations, but require to be
analysed along with the nature of the offence and the prima facie
material on record. Conversely, while adjudicating the satisfaction
required in terms of the statutory conditions, the material must be
assessed through the lens of the right under Article 21 of the Constitution.
In order to adjudicate such a question, the factors to be borne in mind
include the length of custody already undergone, the possible sentence
for the offence, the possibility of concluding the proceedings within a
reasonable time, whether delay in proceedings is attributable to the
prosecution or the defence, and the nature of the prima facie case made
out against the accused.
31. Haris Nisar Langoo, in my view, does not depart from the above
principles, but provides an example in which the Court was satisfied that
the petitioner was entitled to bail, even after applying Section 43D(5) of
UAPA. In fact, it may be noted that, even in Gulfisha Fatima, some of the
26
2025 SCC OnLine Del 5754 [hereinafter, “ Tasleem Ahmed ”].
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accused were granted bail, having regard to the specific facts of their
27
cases. ”
19. There have, however been some further developments in the few
weeks that have passed since Leena Paulose-II was delivered. The
Supreme Court, in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi , has doubted the interpretation
placed upon K.A. Najeeb in Gulfisha Fatima . The petitioner in Syed
Iftikhar Andrabi was accused of offences under Sections 17, 38 and 40 of
UAPA read with Sections 8, 21, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 [“NDPS Act”], as well as Section
120-B of IPC. The Supreme Court framed the following question for
consideration:
“ 2. The present case raises an important question concerning the
interface between Section 43-D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention)
Act, 1967 and the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. More particularly, the issue
concerns the propriety of smaller Benches progressively hollowing out the
constitutional force of a larger Bench decision without ever expressly
disagreeing with it. ”
20. Having regard to the restrictions on grant of bail in UAPA and
particularly the judgment of the three-Judge Bench in K.A. Najeeb , as
28
well the decisions in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra ,
29
Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of U.P. and Arvind Dham v. Directorate of
30
Enforcement [under the PMLA], the Supreme Court in Syed Iftikhar
Andrabi held that two of its judgments – Gurwinder Singh v. State (Govt.
31
of NCT of Delhi) and Gulfisha Fatima – “ have taken a somewhat
27
Emphasis supplied.
28
(2024) 9 SCC 813.
29
(2024) 8 SCC 293.
30
2026 SCC OnLine SC 30.
31
(2024) 5 SCC 403 [hereinafter, “ Syed Iftikhar Andrabi ”].
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divergent view from the clear distinctive trajectory taken by this Court
32
qua grant of bail even under special enactments like TADA , UAP Act
33
and NDPS Act. ” . The Court has expressed its reservation about the
decisions in Gurwinder Singh and Gulfisha Fatima , as follows:
“ 27.2. In our view, the decision in Gurwinder inasmuch as it refuses to
be bound by Najeeb, is difficult to be followed by us as a matter of
precedent. It is plain that a judgment rendered by a Bench of lesser
strength is bound by the law declared by a Bench of greater strength.
Judicial discipline mandates that such binding precedent must either be
followed or, in case of doubt, be referred to a larger Bench. A smaller
Bench cannot dilute, circumvent, or disregard the ratio of a larger Bench.
xxx xxx xxx
27.7. We also note that the Bench in Gurwinder formulated the so-called
‘twin-prong test’ governing grant of bail under the UAP Act. It held that
the inquiry under Section 43-D(5) must proceed in two sequential
stages: first, whether the accusation is prima facie true; and second, only
if the first question is answered in favour of the accused, whether ordinary
bail considerations, such as, flight risk, tampering with evidence, or
influencing witnesses, justify release. If the first stage of this twin-prong
test is satisfied against the accused, bail becomes absolutely
impermissible.
27.8. With respect, this test flows neither from the text of Section 43-D(5)
of the UAP Act nor from Najeeb. In fact, on the contrary, it is in teeth
of Najeeb which categorically stated that Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act
provides no more than another possible ground, namely that the
accusations against the accused are prima facie true, for the competent
court to refuse bail, in addition to the well-settled considerations like
possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses, or the
accused evading the trial by absconding etc. If this twin-prong test is
accepted, the State need only satisfy a low prima facie threshold while the
trial may continue for years with the result that pre-trial incarceration
begins to acquire a post-trial punitive character and even then, no court
could ever grant bail no matter the length of period of such incarceration
because the case stood prima facie made out against the accused. A plain
reading of Najeeb will show that it was trying to prevent precisely this
possibility from arising when it cautioned that Section 43-D(5) must not
32
Terrorist And Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.
33
Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, paragraph 26.
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become ‘the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of
constitutional right to speedy trial.’
27.9. Therefore, the caution of Najeeb is that continued incarceration
cannot go unabated by a mere discharge by the State of the prima
facie standard under Section 43-D(5). The judgment explicitly held that
Section 43-D(5) will ‘melt down’ where prolonged incarceration and
delayed trial produce a violation of Article 21. The constitutional
inquiry in Najeeb therefore operated independent of, and
notwithstanding, the statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5) in the realm
of constitutional principles. That being the case, the formulation
of Gurwinder becomes difficult to follow. Once the three-Judge Bench
in Najeeb recognised that constitutional courts retain the authority to
intervene despite the existence of a prima facie case against the accused
where prolonged incarceration and delayed trial would breach Article 21,
the statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5) could no longer be treated as
the gateway through which the prayer of bail must first pass.
27.10. As a matter of law, nothing further need be said except that in any
case, constitutional courts can always intervene to grant bail despite
satisfaction of prima facie threshold under Section 43-D(5), and the
section need not control the grant of bail if the accused person's liberty
is infringed for a prolonged period of time. The power of the
constitutional court to grant such a prayer cannot in our view be
diminished by exercise of legislative power.
27.11. The holding in Najeeb was never that mere passage of time
automatically entitles the accused to bail. Instead, the larger Bench
recognised that where incarceration becomes unduly prolonged and the
trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time, the continued
application of Section 43-D(5) becomes constitutionally suspect given the
mandate of Article 21. In that sense, Najeeb articulated a constitutional
limitation on the operation of the statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5).
xxx xxx xxx
29. We have serious reservations on various aspects of the judgment
in Gulfisha Fatima , including foreclosing the right of the two appellants
to seek bail for a period of one year. The judgment in Gulfisha
Fatima would have us believe that Najeeb is only a narrow and
exceptional departure from Section 43-D(5) justified in extreme factual
situations. It is this hollowing out of the import of the observations
in Najeeb that we are concerned with.
30. No reading of Najeeb suggests that the mere passage of time,
divorced from all surrounding circumstances, mechanically entitles an
accused to release. The real concern addressed in Najeeb lay elsewhere.
This Court was concerned with the manner in which Section 43-D(5) was,
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in practice, being deployed as an almost conclusive basis for denial of
bail notwithstanding extraordinary delay in trial and prolonged
incarceration. It is precisely for that reason that this Court observed that
the ‘rigours’ of Section 43-D(5) would ‘melt down’ where there is no
likelihood of the trial being completed within a reasonable time and
where the period of incarceration undergone has already exceeded a
substantial part of the prescribed sentence. This Court
in Najeeb cautioned that such an approach was necessary to prevent
provisions like Section 43-D(5) from being used as ‘the sole metric for
denial of bail or for wholesale breach of the constitutional right to speedy
trial.’
31. In K.A. Najeeb, a three-Judge Bench of this Court was clear and
unequivocal in holding that once it is obvious that a timely trial would not
be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant
period of time, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge the
accused on bail. We have already extracted supra paragraph 17 of the
said judgment where it has been clearly stated that the presence of
statutory restrictions like Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act per se does not
oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of
violation of Part III of the Constitution. Whereas at the commencement
of the proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative
policy against grant of bail but the rigors of such provisions will ‘melt
down’ where there is no likelihood of the trial being completed within a
reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has
exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence . In the facts of that
case, this Court observed that it was conscious of the fact that the charges
levelled against the accused were grave and a serious threat to societal
harmony and had it been the case at the threshold, perhaps the Court
would have outrightly rejected such a prayer. However, keeping in mind
the duration of incarceration and the unlikelihood of the trial being
completed in the near future, the accused had to be enlarged on bail.
32. The reasoning first in Gurwinder and then in Gulfisha Fatima,
appears to proceed against something invented and then destroyed. We
are constrained to reiterate that Najeeb was not warning courts against
treating incarceration as the sole factor favouring bail. Instead, it was
warning against treating the statutory embargo as the sole factor
justifying continued detention by ignoring constitutional principles.
Therefore, the subsequent reading that Najeeb does not create an
automatic entitlement to bail on account of delay answers a proposition
that Najeeb itself never advanced.
33. The emphasis in Najeeb was constitutional in nature: it was directed
towards preventing Section 43-D(5) from overpowering Article 21
considerations in cases of gross delay and prolonged incarceration. The
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constitutional force of Najeeb lies in its restoration of the hierarchy
between a statute, namely, the UAP Act, and the Constitution. Section 43-
D(5) remains subordinate to Article 21 at all times and a constitutional
court need not hold back bail to the accused in the garb of Section 43-
D(5). As this Court held in Sk. Javed Iqbal :
31. … Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and
the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time,
the courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail.
34
34. Therefore, Jalaluddin Khan Vs. Union of India , is a timely warning
to the courts. It says that when a case is made out for grant of bail, the
courts should not have any hesitation in granting bail. The allegation of
the prosecution may be very serious; but the duty of the courts is to
consider a case for grant of bail in accordance with law. ‘Bail is the rule
and jail is the exception’ is a settled law. The Bench cautioned that if the
courts start denying bail in deserving cases, it will be a violation of the
rights guaranteed under Article 21 of our Constitution.
35. The often invoked phrase ‘bail is the rule and jail is the exception’ is
not merely an empty statutory slogan flowing from the CrPC as
Gurwinder has stated. It is a constitutional principle flowing from Articles
21 and 22 of the Constitution and the presumption of innocence which is
the cornerstone of any civilised society governed by the rule of law.
Statutes may undoubtedly calibrate the manner in which that principle is
applied, particularly in cases involving national security or terrorist
offences for which the UAP Act is meant, but those cannot altogether
invert the constitutional relationship between liberty and detention . The
statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5) must remain a circumscribed
restriction that operates subject to the guarantee of Articles 21 and 22 of
the Constitution. Therefore, we have no manner of doubt in stating that
even under the UAP Act, ‘bail is the rule and jail is the exception’; of
course, in an appropriate case, bail can be denied having regard to the
facts of that particular case . ”
Having so held, the Supreme Court, in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, examined
the case of the accused on merits, and directed that he was entitled to be
released on bail.
34
(2024) 10 SCC 574.
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21. Pursuant to Syed Iftikhar Andrabi , the Supreme Court has once
again engaged with this issue in Tasleem Ahmad v. State Govt. of NCT of
35
Delhi , which concerned a challenge to the Division Bench decision of
this Court referred to above. While recounting the position laid down in
Gulfisha Fatima , and the reservations expressed in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi ,
the Court referred the issue for consideration by a larger bench, with the
following observations:
“ 15. We do not propose to enter into any adjudication on the correctness
of observations made by a coordinate Bench. Judgments of this Court are
not to be answered by counter-observations from another Bench of equal
strength. The discipline of precedent demands a higher institutional
method.
16. However, where a coordinate Bench entertains reservations
about the reasoning of an earlier coordinate Bench, particularly on the
application of a binding three-Judge Bench decision, the proper course is
well settled. The matter must ordinarily be placed before Hon'ble the
Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate Bench. A
coordinate Bench cannot, by strong observations, effectively unsettle the
ratio of an earlier coordinate Bench while continuing to sit in equal
strength.
17. We deem it necessary to observe that disagreement between
coordinate Benches, by itself, is neither unusual nor undesirable. The law
has often grown through reasoned difference. What the discipline of
precedent does not countenance, however, is a course by which an earlier
coordinate Bench is subjected to reservations of a fundamental character,
particularly on the alleged misapplication of a larger Bench decision,
without the matter being placed before a Bench competent in strength to
resolve the perceived conflict. A coordinate Bench may distinguish an
earlier decision, may explain its own understanding of the law, and may,
in an appropriate case, express doubt. But where the doubt goes to the
root of the legal principle applied, the matter cannot be left at the stage of
criticism. A doubt expressed in emphatic terms is still a doubt; it is not a
declaration of law. Unless resolved by a Bench of appropriate strength, it
only introduces uncertainty in the administration of justice.
18. The obligation of judicial discipline is, therefore, not discharged
35
SLP (CRL.) No. 3867/2026, dated 22.05.2026 [hereinafter, “ Tasleem Ahmed 2 ”].
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by merely stating it. It lies in adopting the course which the institution
requires. A Bench of equal strength cannot achieve, by language of
reservation, what it cannot achieve by declaration of law. If the earlier
view is thought to be inconsistent with a larger Bench decision, the proper
course is reference. That course protects not merely the judgment
doubted, but the authority of this Court itself. In matters touching
personal liberty, national security, statutory restrictions on bail and
prolonged incarceration, uncertainty in the law is itself an institutional
cost. We, therefore, consider it our duty not to add another competing
formulation to the field, but to place the perceived conflict before a Bench
of appropriate strength so that the law may speak with the clarity and
authority expected of this Court.
19. It is possible for Benches of this Court to differ in emphasis. It is
equally possible that two decisions may proceed on the same
constitutional foundation but apply it differently to distinct factual
settings. But where the difference is projected as one concerning the
binding force of a three-Judge Bench decision, and where such difference
is likely to affect pending trials under special statutes across the country,
the matter cannot be left to uncertain application by courts.
20. We are also conscious that an unqualified reading of the
proposition that lapse of time by itself must compel bail in every case
under the UAPA may have serious consequences. Such an approach
may leave little room for courts to examine the nature of allegations,
centrality of role, protected witnesses, risk of intimidation, possibility of
reactivation of networks, nature of delay and whether such delay is
attributable to the accused himself/herself, public order concerns and
national security implications. On the other hand, an equally
unqualified insistence on Section 43D(5) without regard to prolonged
incarceration would imperil Article 21. The Constitution does not
command either extreme. It is this precise issue that may warrant
attention of the appropriate bench dealing with the issues.
21. The question, therefore, is not whether Article 21survives
Section 43D(5). It undoubtedly does. The true question is how Article 21
is to be applied in a statutory field where Parliament has consciously
imposed restrictions on bail in respect of offences alleged to affect the
security of the State and the stability of civic life.
22. We clarify that nothing in this order is intended to whittle down,
dilute, read narrowly, or detract from the authority of K.A. Najeeb. On the
contrary, the present reference is necessitated because K.A. Najeeb
deserves application with the clarity, consistency and institutional fidelity
which a binding three-Judge Bench decision commands. If a coordinate
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Bench has expressed reservations on the manner in which another
coordinate Bench has applied K.A. Najeeb, the proper answer is not
further reservation. The proper answer is authoritative resolution.
”
22. The question that arises before this Court, in light of the aforesaid
decisions, is to determine the approach which must be adopted in
adjudication of the present applications. Needless to say, the differing
approaches expounded by the Supreme Court in Gulfisha Fatima and
Syed Iftikhar Andrabi, are both binding upon this Court. Although the
question has been referred to a larger bench in Tasleem Ahmed 2 , the
factum of reference itself does not denude a Supreme Court decision of
36
its binding authority .
23. The possible course of awaiting an authoritative decision by the
larger bench of the Supreme Court does not commend to me, in the
context of these applications for bail, which by their very nature require
expeditious resolution. Instead, having considered the judgments cited by
both sides, which were rendered after Gulfisha Fatima , I am of the view
that a practical approach must be adopted, at least until the reference is
answered by a larger bench. In the present case, such an approach
requires this Court first to adjudicate upon Mr. Malik’s submission that,
even in terms of the interpretation of K.A. Najeeb in Gulfisha Fatima , as
understood by this Court in Leena Palouse-II , the petitioners are entitled
to bail. If this contention is accepted, it is unnecessary to delve further
into the exercise of reconciliation between the views expressed in
36
Harbhajan Singh and Another v. State of Punjab , (2009) 13 SCC 608, paragraph 15; National
Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi , (2017) 16 SCC 680; Union Territory of Ladakh and Ors.
v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference and Anr. , (2024) 18 SCC 643, paragraph 35.
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Gulfisha Fatima and Syed Iftikhar Andrabi , with regard to the competing
interpretation of K.A. Najeeb .
24. Before embarking upon this exercise, I may only add that this
course is also not, in my view, inconsistent with the interpretation of K.A.
Najeeb in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi. The position of law laid down in
Gulfisha Fatima , as I have understood it in Leena Paulose-II , was that the
ground of prolonged incarceration without likelihood of culmination of
proceedings, must be considered even in cases involving statutory
restrictions on grant of bail. However, these must be analysed, alongwith
the nature of offence, and the prima-facie material available against the
accused. The articulation in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi , is that the statutory
limitation on the grant of bail cannot override rights under Article 21, but
that “ of course, in an appropriate case, bail can be denied having regard
37
to the facts of that particular case ” . Syed Iftikhar Andrabi therefore also
requires a factual examination, to determine whether a particular accused
is to be granted bail, despite an argument based upon his/her Article 21
rights. It may be noted that, both in Gulfisha Fatima and in Syed Iftikhar
Andrabi , the Supreme Court examined the case of accused on merits, in
the backdrop of period of incarceration and the likely length of trial. In
Gulfisha Fatima , five of the seven accused were granted bail, as was the
sole accused in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi .
25. Mr. Jain relied on two other very recent judgments, which must be
dealt with at this stage:
a. Sheikh Mehmood was rendered in the context of an FIR under
Section 302 IPC. Mr. Jain referred to the following observations:
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“ 31. Evidence on record before the Sessions Court till now has
been noticed by us. “Bail is the rule and jail is an exception”,
although is a cardinal principle of bail jurisprudence in India,
it is not an absolute rule. The rule is sort of a guiding principle
that should be kept in mind along with the facts of each case
and statutory restrictions, if any, while considering a prayer for
bail. In relation to offences such as the one under consideration,
murder and conspiracy are serious offences. Section 437(1) of
the CrPC bars grant of bail if reasonable grounds exist that the
accused has committed an offence which is punishable with
either death or life imprisonment. The cardinal rule has to be
balanced with factors like prima facie case, gravity of offence,
nature of evidence, antecedents, differentiation of roles, parity,
delay in conclusion of trial, age of the accused, medical
grounds, etc. However, bail could be declined if the offence is
heinous and premeditated, there is grave apprehension of the
witnesses being influenced or the evidence being tampered, a
possibility of the accused absconding should he be granted bail
and thereby evading trial, etc. ”
b. Mr. Jain also placed reliance upon Balraj Singh , wherein the Court
was concerned with a case in which twin restrictions on the grant
of bail under Section 37 of the NDPS Act were applicable.
Although the Court found, in the facts of that case, that
incarceration of the accused of 1 year and 7 months did not
constitute incarceration for a long period, it also observed that the
quantum of custody which would constitute prolonged
incarceration for the purposes of bail has not been expounded by
the Supreme Court. Mr. Jain particularly relied upon the following
observation:
“ 22. However, we note that recently this Court in Tasleem
Ahmed v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi has referred the question
concerning the approach of constitutional Courts in bail matters
under special statutes, where “Article 21, prolonged
incarceration and statutory restrictions intersect”. In view of the
37
Syed Iftikhar Andrabi , paragraph 35.
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said reference, we do not wish to deliberate on this issue
further, save and except that in our view paramount
consideration is nothing but interest of justice for all. Should
there be any conflict between the sovereignty of country and
personal liberty, undoubtedly, the former shall prevail,
particularly, when a war is waged against the nation, be it in
the form of supply of drugs, which vitally affects the national
economy and health of the people . ”
26. The judgments in Sheikh Mehmood and Balraj Singh, to the extent
that they provide guidance on the proper approach in bail cases, do not, in
my view, require a different approach from the one I propose to adopt.
The Court, in Sheikh Mehmood, held that “ bail is the rule and jail is an
exception ” is a cardinal principle of bail jurisprudence in India, but not an
absolute rule. Mr. Jain emphasised that the Court has mandated
consideration inter alia of statutory restrictions, which would include
Section 21(4) MCOCA. While that is true, it bears notice that the Court
has also delineated several other factors, including prima facie case,
gravity of offence, nature of evidence, antecedents, differentiation of
roles, parity, delay in conclusion of trial, age of the accused, medical
grounds, etc. Balraj Singh stands on a somewhat different footing than
the present case, as the Court found that the period of custody in that case
was not such as to warrant interference in view of Article 21 of the
Constitution. In the present case, however, the period of custody is close
to five years, and the charges have just been framed. The petitioners’
Article 21 rights are therefore, in my view, clearly implicated.
27. As noted above, the judgments of this Court granting bail to Pinky
Irani, Sunil Kumar and Avtar in the State case, were carried in appeal to
the Supreme Court. As the reasoning in those judgments has been set
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aside by the Supreme Court, and the State’s appeal in the case of Avtar
was rendered infructuous by his demise, I have not considered the ground
of parity in the State cases at all, or relied upon the judgments of this
Court in those cases. This judgment proceeds on an independent analysis
on the merits of each case.
F. A PPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASES :
I. Analysis in the State cases
28. Turning to the facts of the present cases, following the aforesaid
approach, I am of the view that the petitioners herein are entitled to bail,
even if the issue is considered on the basis of the law laid down in
Gulfisha Fatima, as understood in Leena Palouse-II. My reasons are as
follows:
A. The period of custody of both the accused, as undertrials in the
State case, is substantial - almost 4 years and 10 months.
B. The stage of trial is that charges had not been formally framed at
the time of the last hearing on 03.06.2026, but an order on charge
had been passed. One co-accused, Navas KL, has recently been
arrested and a supplementary chargesheet [the sixth supplementary
chargesheet] will have to be filed to deal with his case.
C. There are 23 accused and 403 witnesses cited in the chargesheets
already filed, which clearly implies that even after framing of
charges, the trial will take a considerable period.
D. As far as the attribution for delay is concerned, however, I have
held in Leena Paulose-II that the delay is not attributable to
prosecutorial inaction or court delays alone, without the
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contribution of the accused. The pace of trial is impacted by the
complexity of the case, number of accused and various
institutional factors.
E. The period of sentence for the offence under section 3 of MCOCA
is five years to life imprisonment, alongwith minimum fine of Rs.
5 lakhs.
F. Despite the aforesaid findings with regard to responsibility for the
delay in the trial and the maximum sentence prescribed for the
offence, I am of the view that the role attributed to the petitioners
in the commission of the offence does not justify their further
incarceration pending trial. For this purpose, it may be noted that,
even in Gulfisha Fatima , the Court found that responsibility for
delay was not attributable to the prosecution or court delays
38
alone . Nonetheless, those individuals who were alleged to have
contributed to mobilization of financial and human resources, were
39
granted bail . Specifically, in the case of Shifa-ur-Rehman, who
was primarily alleged to be collecting funds and distributing the
same for the purpose of mobilizing crowds, the Supreme Court
held as follows:
“ 266. According to the charge-sheet, Shifa-ur-Rehman, stated to
be the President of the Alumni Association of Jamia Millia Islamia
(AAJMI), is alleged to have played an active role in the funding
and execution of the riots in Delhi . The charge-sheet alleges that
Shifa-ur-Rehman was entrusted with significant responsibilities in
furtherance of the alleged conspiracy hatched by Umar Khalid and
Sharjeel Imam. It is further alleged that he collected funds and
38
Gulfisha Fatima , paragraph 38.
39
Mareen Haider, who was alleged to be an active conspirator who organised and administered
multiple permanent protest sites and collected, managed, and channelled funds, was also granted bail in
the said judgment [Paragraphs 345 to 360].
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distributed the amounts so collected for the purpose of engaging
women, children, and girls to assemble at protest sites, with the
intent that the presence of such groups would deter the police
from taking stringent action at the protest locations.
267. The charge-sheet further alleges that Shifa-ur-Rehman was
closely associated with Umar Khalid, described as the principal
conspirator, and that he remained in constant contact with him.
It is alleged that Shifa-ur-Rehman also attended secret
conspiratorial meetings. The charge-sheet records several
instances of fund-raising activities conducted at the office of
AAJMI in connection with the protests.
268. It is further alleged that Shifa-ur-Rehman, along with other
co-accused, was instrumental in the establishment of 24 × 7
protest sites . According to the charge-sheet, he regularly visited
these protest sites and instigated participants to organise chakka
jams under the guise of peaceful protests. Call Detail Records
(CDRs) are relied upon to assert his frequent presence at the
protest sites.
269. Statements of protected witnesses “Alpha”, “Bond”,
“James”, and “Hector” are relied upon to allege that, in his
capacity as President of AAJMI, Shifa-ur-Rehman was responsible
for raising substantial funds to finance the protests. The charge-
sheet further alleges that, in order to avoid detection and to leave
no financial trail, Shifa-ur-Rehman fabricated false bills of
expenditure in the name of AAJMI. Copies of the purportedly
fabricated bills have been produced along with the charge-sheet. It
is alleged that Shifa-ur-Rehman collected a minimum amount of
Rs. 7-8 lakhs, the majority of which was received in cash.
270. The charge-sheet further alleges that Shifa-ur-Rehman was
among the principal individuals responsible for sourcing and
sustaining the protests. Apart from his alleged role in funding, it is
stated that he participated in a conspiratorial meeting held on
22.02.2020, wherein it was purportedly agreed that the protests
should be escalated to the next stage by enforcing chakka jams and
engineering violent riots.
271. According to the prosecution, the primary role attributed to
Shifa-ur-Rehman was to provide financial and logistical support
to all protest sites. The charge-sheet asserts that the funding and
logistical assistance allegedly provided by him played an
instrumental role in the riots that occurred in Delhi between
23.02.2020 and 26.02.2020, under the ostensible cover of protests
against the CAA/NRC.
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272. Upon a prima facie consideration of the material presently
relied upon by the prosecution, the role attributed to Shifa-ur-
Rehman does not disclose participation at the level of
conceptualisation or strategic command of the alleged
conspiracy. The allegations principally pertain to logistical
facilitation, fund-raising, and coordination at identified protest
sites, premised upon directions purportedly originating from
persons situating themselves above him in the asserted hierarchy.
In the absence of demonstrable material suggesting that he
exercised autonomous decision-making authority over the
alleged broader design, his continued incarceration as a pre-trial
measure does not presently appear warranted.
273. The prosecution asserts that Shifa-ur-Rehman was associated
with fund-raising activities and implementation of protest-site
requirements however, the evidentiary material does not indicate
that he retained control over the deployment of such funds, nor
that he exercised selective discretion over strategic decisions
concerning escalation. The record discloses that the appellant's
actions were derivative in nature, aligned to instructions
transmitted by others, and largely confined to sustaining logistics
rather than shaping the trajectory of the protests. Such attribution,
while relevant to trial, does not justify indefinite pre- trial
detention when weighed against the limited and executory nature
of his alleged role.
274. The State's apprehension that the appellant may re-establish
operational linkages or interfere with witnesses must be evaluated
in light of present circumstances. There is no material to
demonstrate that the appellant retains any functional capacity to
mobilise resources or coordinate activities independent of the
structures that, according to the prosecution itself, acted under
higher-level guidance and have since ceased to exist in the form
alleged. The risks articulated by the State can be effectively
neutralised through conditions restricting public engagement
pertaining to the case, prohibiting contact with witnesses, and
mandating regular court attendance.
275. While the seriousness of the events culminating in violence
during the relevant period cannot be discounted, this Court is
mindful that gravity alone cannot eclipse the constitutional
requirement of individualized examination of the necessity of pre-
trial detention. The appellant's role, as narrated, is not linked to
instigation of violence, procurement of weapons, or direct
involvement in acts of physical aggression. In the absence of a
proximate and continuing nexus between the appellant and the
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capacity to compromise the integrity of the proceedings, further
incarceration would assume a punitive character incompatible
with settled constitutional jurisprudence under Article 21.
276. The Court is also conscious that pre-trial detention serves
limited and clearly defined purposes securing the presence of the
accused, preventing obstruction of justice, and safeguarding
public interest where demonstrable risk persists. In the present
case, none of these objectives appear incapable of being achieved
through calibrated restrictions short of incarceration. The absence
of material suggesting an enduring organisational infrastructure
capable of being reactivated through the appellant's efforts weighs
significantly against the necessity of continued custody.
277. It is further noted that the prosecution's submissions rely
substantially on the appellant's positional proximity to individuals
alleged to have played a strategic role. Mere associative
proximity, without corresponding evidence demonstrating
capacity to exert influence or direction, does not satisfy the
threshold required to curtail liberty at the post-investigative
stage. The appellant's purported involvement in facilitative tasks,
while forming part of the evidentiary matrix to be assessed at
trial, cannot be a standalone basis for extending pre-trial
detention where imposition of protective conditions offers an
adequate safeguard.
278. Where the prosecution narrative itself draws a distinction
between strategic architects and operational facilitators, judicial
scrutiny at the bail stage must remain attentive to proportionality
in attribution. The material presently relied upon depicts the
appellant as a conduit within a hierarchically structured
mobilisation, rather than as a node of independent initiative.
Elevating such a role to one warranting prolonged custodial
deprivation would risk diluting the constitutionally embedded
principle that pre-trial restraint must correlate to demonstrated
necessity rather than inferred association.
279. Finally, while the evidentiary record merits thorough
adjudication at trial, the Constitution mandates that liberty be
curtailed only where compelling grounds grounded in present
necessity exist. The prosecutorial hypothesis of a broader
conspiracy, though serious, cannot become a charter for
undifferentiated incarceration of all alleged participants
irrespective of their individual function or continuing capacity.
In the circumstances disclosed, and given the availability of
stringent safeguards to address the apprehensions raised, the
balance of constitutional considerations favours the appellant's
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release on terms ensuring non-interference with the proceedings
and adherence to all conditions imposed by the Court.
280. Having regard to the differentiated standing that the
prosecution narrative itself assigns to the appellant, particularly
when contrasted with the alleged principal conspirators Umar
Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, and in view of the absence of any
present investigative requirement necessitating custodial
detention, this Court finds that pre-trial liberty can be secured
without prejudicing the administration of justice. Accordingly,
subject to conditions designed to ensure his availability for trial,
prevent any contact with prosecution witnesses, and restrain
public commentary bearing upon the merits, the appellant is held
entitled to be enlarged on bail. It is clarified that the observations
herein are confined to the determination of bail and shall not be
construed as expressing a view on the merits of the prosecution’s
40
case. ”
G. While I am conscious of the fact-intensive nature of a bail
adjudication, I am of the considered view that the roles ascribed
to Deepak and Pradeep in the present case are, at the highest, in
pari materia with the aforesaid analysis in Gulfisha Fatima .
H. In Deepak’s case, the prosecution alleges an active role in
identification of the complainant, establishment of conspiracy
with Sukesh, and implementation thereof, by directly or
indirectly collecting the extorted funds, and remitting them to
hawala operators, and distributing it to jail officials and other
beneficiaries. The aspect of collection of money from the
complainant or her representatives, directly or through Pradeep,
and distribution thereof to Leena and others through hawala
operators, or to Dharam Singh Meena and other beneficiaries
directly, falls within the scope of logistical facilitation. These
activities were, even according to the prosecution, undertaken
40
Emphasis supplied.
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strictly on Sukesh’s instructions; it is not alleged that Deepak
exercised any autonomy in determining the quantum of
collection or its destination.
I. Mr. Jain additionally argued that Deepak exercised an important
role in the planning of the foundational offence, particularly in
identifying the potential victim, and gathering information about
her, and that he was in direct contact with Sukesh. While these
are matters for trial, I do not find the prima facie material such
as to imply strategic command or conceptualization of the
foundational offence. The legal position with regard to the
Section 18 statements relied upon by the prosecution, are also a
matter for trial. However, even taken at face value, the
statements do not prima facie suggest anything other than
information gathering by Deepak, which was passed on to
Sukesh. “Associative proximity”, by way of frequent contact
with Sukesh and Leena, has also been held in the aforesaid
extracts of Gulfisha , to be insufficient to justify prolonged pre-
trial incarceration of the accused.
J. Even according to the prosecution, Pradeep’s role was more
limited. He was tasked only with collecting the extorted amount
from the complainant or her representatives on the instructions
of Deepak, who in turn obtained instructions from Sukesh. Such
a role clearly falls within the scope of “ financial facilitation ”.
K. Although Mr. Jain submitted that both Deepak and Pradeep were
members of the OCS, and therefore liable under Section 3(4)
MCOCA, this allegation is also prima facie derived from the
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allegation with regard to their roles in the activities of the OCS,
which I have dealt with above.
II. Analysis in the ED case
29. As far as the ED case is concerned, the period of custody of 4 years
and 9 months, juxtaposed with maximum sentence of 7 years under
Section 4 PMLA, in my view, indicates that further pre-trial incarceration
is unjustified. Charges have been framed only recently, i.e. on
03.06.2021, and given the number of witnesses [311 proposed witnesses]
and the volume of documents, it is unlikely that the trial will conclude in
the near future. In fact, it is not implausible that, if denied bail, Deepak
will even serve the maximum period of imprisonment, before the trial is
concluded.
30. This period of incarceration is also significantly beyond the
threshold contemplated under Section 479 BNSS, i.e. one-half of the
maximum sentence for the offence. Further, although Deepak is involved
41
in two other cases , they arise out of the same substantive allegations. In
FIR No. 124/2021, which is the predicate offence, he is on bail. In Vijay
42 43
Madanlal Chaudhary and Ajay Ajit Peter Kelkar , the Supreme Court
has clearly held that Section 436A CrPC [corresponding to Section 479
BNSS] is applicable to PMLA cases also. In view thereof, Deepak, in my
view, is entitled to the benefit of Section 479 BNSS, despite the rigours
of Section 45 PMLA.
31. Further, out of the 18 accused persons arrayed in the present ECIR,
13 have already been enlarged on bail, four by this Court and nine by the
41
FIR No. 124/2021 and ECIR No. 55/DLZO-II/2021.
42
Paragraph 321.
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Special Court. None of these orders were challenged by the ED. In
particular, reliance has been placed on the order granting bail to co-
accused Leena by this Court in Leena Paulose-ED , who was allegedly
handling, utilising, and enjoying the proceeds of crime. The Court
granted bail, having regard to Section 479 BNSS, and the proviso to
Section 45 PMLA, which exempts a women-accused from the twin
conditions.
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32. Bail was also granted to co-accused Arun Muthu by this Court ,
who was allegedly involved in assisting Sukesh in laundering and
layering the proceeds of crime. While granting bail, this Court had also
extended to him the benefit of Section 436A of the CrPC (corresponding
to Section 479 BNSS). Bail was also granted by this Court to co-accused
45
Avtar , who was alleged to be the principal hawala operator facilitating
the movement of the proceeds of crime, though his age and medical
ailments were also relevant considerations. Both Arun Muthu and Avtar
were thus granted bail, despite the rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA
being applicable to them.
33. The role attributed to the petitioner in the present case under
PMLA, is primarily that of collecting, transporting, and delivering the
proceeds of crime allegedly generated through the extortion activities of
Sukesh. The prosecution alleges that Deepak routinely handled large cash
transactions on Sukesh's behalf, including the collection of substantial
sums from various individuals and their subsequent delivery to
designated beneficiaries in India and abroad. The prosecution also alleges
43
Paragraph 3.
44
BAIL APPLN 1821/2024, decided on 20.02.2025.
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that, whenever unavailable, he deputed his brother, Pradeep, to carry out
the collection and delivery of cash, thereby ensuring continuity of the
operation. According to the prosecution, these acts demonstrate his active
involvement in the handling and movement of the proceeds of crime and
his assistance in their concealment, transfer, and utilisation.
34. Having regard to the fact that 13 co-accused have already been
granted bail, I am of the view that the Deepak’s case cannot be said to
stand on a graver footing than theirs. Deepak is, therefore, also entitled to
the benefit of parity with the co-accused in the PMLA proceedings.
ONCLUSION
G. C :
35. Having regard to the period of custody undergone by Deepak and
Pradeep in light of their roles in the alleged offences, I am of the
considered view that they are entitled to be released on bail in FIR No.
208/2021. Additionally, in connection with the ED case, having regard to
Section 479 BNSS and the benefit of parity with similarly placed co-
accused, I am of the view that Deepak is entitled to be released on bail in
the said proceedings as well.
36. In view of the above discussion, the applications are allowed, and it
is directed that:
A. Pradeep and Deepak be released on bail in connection with FIR
No. 208/2021 dated 07.08.2021, registered at Police Station
Special Cell, Delhi, under Sections
170/384/385/388/419/420/506/120B of the IPC, and Section 66D
of the IT Act, subject to furnishing a personal bond of Rs.
2,50,000/- each, alongwith two sureties each in the like amount, to
45
BAIL APPLN 1814/2022, decided on 29.11.2023.
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the satisfaction of the concerned Special Court/Duty Magistrate;
and
B. Deepak be also released on bail in connection with
ECIR/54/DLZO-II/2021 dated 08.08.2021, under Sections 3 and 4
of PMLA, subject to furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 2,50,000/-,
alongwith two sureties in the like amount, to the satisfaction of the
concerned Special Court/Duty Magistrate.
38. The grant of bail to the petitioners is subject to the further
following conditions:
a. The petitioners shall appear before the Special Court on each and
every date of hearing;
b. The petitioners shall surrender their passport(s) before the Special
Court, and shall not leave the country without prior permission of
the concerned Court;
c. The petitioners shall provide their permanent addresses to the
concerned Court, as also the address where they are residing during
the pendency of the case. The petitioners shall intimate the
Investigating Officer [“IO”], and file affidavits before the Special
Court, regarding any change in residential address;
d. The petitioners shall provide their mobile numbers to the
concerned IO/Station House Officer, which shall be kept in
working condition at all times. The mobile phones shall not be
switched off or changed without prior intimation to the IO during
the pendency of the trial;
e. The petitioners shall not, directly or indirectly, make any
inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the
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facts of the case or tamper with the evidence of the case, in any
manner whatsoever;
f. The petitioners shall not commit any offence during the period of
their release.
37. The bail applications are disposed of in terms of the above.
38. It is clarified that any observations made in the present judgment
are solely for the purpose of deciding the present bail applications, and
shall neither influence the trial proceedings, nor be construed as an
expression of opinion on the merits of the case.
39. Copy of the judgment be communicated to the concerned Jail
Superintendent electronically for information and necessary compliance.
PRATEEK JALAN, J
JUNE 05, 2026
PV /AD/KA/
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