Smt Pradeep Kaur vs Harvinder Singh Khurana

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 18.08.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 27.10.2026

+ C.R.P. 320/2025
SMT PRADEEP KAUR .....Petitioner
Through: Petitioner in person.

versus

HARVINDER SINGH KHURANA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Adrash Jaiswal, Advocate.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present Civil Revision Petition, under Section 115 of the
1
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 , read with Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, has been filed seeking to assail the Order dated
2
08.02.2019 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court (Central),
3
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi , in HMA No. 61628/2016, titled “H. S.
Khurana @ Goldi v. Pradeep Kaur” , whereby the Divorce Petition
filed by the Respondent herein was allowed on the ground of cruelty
and the marriage between the parties was dissolved. The present
4
Petition also assails the Order dated 11.07.2025 , whereby the

1
CPC
2
Impugned Order dated 08.02.2019
3
Family Court
4
Impugned Order 11.07.2025
Signature Not Verified
C.R.P. 320/2025 Page 1 of 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

Application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC, preferred by the
Petitioner herein, came to be dismissed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts germane to the
institution of the present Petition are as under:
a. The marriage between the parties, namely, Sh. H.S.
Khurana/Respondent herein and Smt. Pradeep Kaur/Petitioner
herein, was solemnised on 19.07.1992 and out of the said
wedlock two children were born.
b. On 15.04.2006, the Respondent instituted a Petition under
Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, seeking
dissolution of the marriage on the ground of cruelty. The parties
filed their respective pleadings and the learned Family Court
framed issues with respect to the alleged cruelty and the
Respondent‘s entitlement to the relief sought.
c. In the said proceedings, the Respondent entered the witness box
as PW-1 and his brother, Parvinder Singh Khurana, as PW-2.
Upon conclusion of the Respondent and his brother‘s evidence
on 11.09.2018, the matter was fixed for the Petitioner‘s
evidence on 02.11.2018, in which she remained absent.
However, no adverse order was passed against her. A last and
final opportunity was granted to her, and the matter was again
taken up for her evidence.
d. On 10.12.2018, the Petitioner again remained absent and, in the
absence of the Petitioner and her witnesses, the learned Family
Court closed her right to lead evidence and listed the matter for
final arguments, while granting her liberty to address her
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C.R.P. 320/2025 Page 2 of 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

arguments before passing the Judgment. The Petitioner
thereafter also remained absent on 28.01.2019, when the matter
was taken up for final arguments.
e. The learned Family Court, vide Judgment and Decree dated
08.02.2019, upon appreciation of the evidence and material on
record, held the ground of cruelty to have been established and
consequently dissolved the marriage between the parties under
Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
f. Thereafter, on 23.05.2019, the Petitioner instituted Misc.
5
Application No. 35/2019 under Order IX Rule 13 read with
Section 151 CPC, seeking recall of the Ex-parte Judgment and
Decree dated 08.02.2019. On 13.02.2020, the Petitioner filed an
accompanying Application under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay of 73 (Seventy-three)
days in filing the said Application.

g. In the proceedings arising from the Recall Application, the
learned Family Court, on the very same day i.e., on 13.02.2020,
framed issues as to whether the Petitioner had been prevented
by sufficient cause from appearing when the Divorce Petition
was decreed ex-parte and whether the Judgment and Decree
dated 08.02.2019 were liable to be set aside.
h. The learned Family Court, vide Judgment dated 11.07.2025,
held the Application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to be
maintainable and, adopting a liberal approach, condoned the
delay in filing the same. On consideration of the record of the
original proceedings and the evidence led in the recall
proceedings, the learned Family Court, however, held that the

5
Recall Application
Signature Not Verified
C.R.P. 320/2025 Page 3 of 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

Petitioner had failed to establish ―sufficient cause‖ for her non-
appearance on the relevant dates and consequently dismissed
the Application preferred by the Petitioner herein.
i. Aggrieved by the Judgement and Orders dated 08.02.2019 and
11.07.2025, the Petitioner has preferred the present Petition.
j. This Court, vide Order dated 17.11.2025, had recorded its prima
facie view wherein it was stated that the present Petition also
involves the issue pertaining to maintainability as the Petitioner/
wife seeks to challenge the ex-parte decree of divorce dated
08.02.2019 passed by the learned Family Court as also
contemporaneously seeks to challenge the impugned order
dated 11.07.2025 whereby her application under Order IX rule
13 of the CPC had been dismissed, after a considerable gap of
almost six and a half years. In view of the same, apart from the
merits, the Petitioner herein would also have to satisfy the Court
as to how the present Petition is maintainable.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:
3. The Petitioner, who appears in person, would submit that the
Impugned Orders have resulted in denial of procedural justice and
have failed to properly appreciate the circumstances which prevented
her from continuing to appear before the learned Family Court.
4. The Petitioner would submit that she had actively contested the
matrimonial proceedings for approximately thirteen years, having
personally appeared in the matter and conducted the proceedings,
including cross-examining the Respondent/husband. It would be
submitted that her absence occurred only at the later stage of the
proceedings and, therefore, could not have been viewed in isolation or
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C.R.P. 320/2025 Page 4 of 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

as indicative of any intention to abandon the litigation. According to
the Petitioner, circumstances beyond her control prevented her from
continuing to participate in the proceedings in the manner in which
she had previously been doing so.
5. It would further be submitted that, during the relevant period,
the Petitioner was simultaneously prosecuting the criminal
proceedings instituted by the elder brother of the Respondent/husband.
The Petitioner would submit that she was herself conducting the said
proceedings, including cross-examining the complainant, and that the
simultaneous conduct of the criminal and matrimonial proceedings
caused her considerable strain. She would further rely upon her
medical condition during the relevant period, submitting that she was
suffering from panic/anxiety attacks and related health issues, which
materially affected her ability to participate in the proceedings. In
support thereof, reliance would be placed upon the medical documents
dated 18.03.2019 and the medical records stated to relate to the period
from 2009 to 2020. It would be submitted that the criminal complaint
was ultimately withdrawn by the elder brother of the
Respondent/husband on 26.07.2019.
6. The Petitioner would accordingly submit that the aforesaid
circumstances, considered cumulatively, constituted ―sufficient cause‖
within the meaning of Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC. It would be
contended that the learned Family Court ought to have adopted a
liberal and justice-oriented approach while considering the
explanation furnished by the Petitioner, particularly in view of her
prolonged and active participation in the matrimonial proceedings.
The Petitioner would submit that the circumstances leading to her
absence ought not to have been viewed as deliberate default, but
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C.R.P. 320/2025 Page 5 of 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

required consideration in their entirety and in the context of her
previous conduct in diligently prosecuting the proceedings.
7. It would also be submitted that there was a procedural
irregularity in the manner in which the proceedings culminated in
the Impugned Order dated 08.02.2019. According to the Petitioner,
after her last appearance, she was not served with an appropriate
notice regarding the subsequent proceedings leading to the passing of
the said Impugned Order. She would submit that, in the absence of
proper notice of the hearing or of the proposed ex-parte proceedings,
the learned Family Court was required to examine whether the
circumstances pleaded by her constituted sufficient cause for her non-
appearance. The Petitioner would therefore contend that failure to
appropriately consider this aspect resulted in violation of the
principles of natural justice.
8. The Petitioner would further submit that the Impugned Order
dated 11.07.2025 suffers from perversity and failure to exercise
jurisdiction vested in the learned Family Court. In particular, it would
be contended that the learned Family Court failed to properly
appreciate the material placed on record in support of the Petitioner‘s
explanation for her absence, including the medical documents and the
circumstances relating to the parallel criminal proceedings. According
to the Petitioner, the failure to consider the aforesaid in their proper
perspective materially affected the adjudication of her Application
under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC. It bears emphasis that, more or
less, the grounds taken by the Petitioner while challenging both the
Impugned Orders are identical and rely upon the contemporaneous
litigations as also the medical exigency allegedly faced by her.
Signature Not Verified
C.R.P. 320/2025 Page 6 of 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

9. On the question of maintainability, the Petitioner would submit
that the present Petition is not merely an attempt to seek re-
appreciation of facts, but raises issues concerning the exercise of
jurisdiction by the learned Family Court. It would be contended that
where the learned Family Court has failed to exercise jurisdiction
vested in it or has acted with material irregularity, the revisional
jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC can be invoked. The
Petitioner would further submit that, in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the present case, this Court may also exercise its
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,
particularly where the Impugned Order is alleged to be perverse and to
have resulted in failure of justice.
10. The Petitioner would also contend that the challenge to the
Impugned Order dated 08.02.2019 is not confined to her non-
appearance, but also involves an allegation that the said Impugned
Order was procured by fraud and suppression of material facts. It
would be her submission that the Respondent/husband had allegedly
suppressed material facts and had played fraud upon the Court during
the course of the litigation. On this basis, the Petitioner would invoke
the principle that fraud vitiates judicial proceedings and submit that a
decree allegedly obtained by fraud cannot be permitted to stand
merely on the ground that an alternative appellate remedy may be
available. She would therefore contend that the allegations of fraud
and the alleged jurisdictional errors warrant consideration in exercise
of the revisional and supervisory jurisdiction of this Court.
11. To further buttress her submissions, the Petitioner would place
reliance upon, inter alia , the Judgments of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court
Signature Not Verified
C.R.P. 320/2025 Page 7 of 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

6
of India in Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar , S.P.
7
Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath , and A.V. Papayya Sastry v.
8
Government of A.P. .

ANALYSIS:
12. This Court has heard the Petitioner, who appears in person, and
has perused the material placed on record, including the proceedings
before the learned Family Court, the Judgment and Decree dated
08.02.2019, the Application preferred by the Petitioner under Order
IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the CPC, the evidence led in the
said proceedings, and the Judgment dated 11.07.2025 whereby the
said Application came to be dismissed.
13. At this juncture, for the sake of clarity, convenience and
completeness, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the
relevant finding rendered by the learned Family Court in the
Impugned Order dated 11.07.2025, whereby the learned Family Court
has succinctly laid down the reasoning while considering the conduct
of the Petitioner and proceeded to dismiss the Recall Application. The
relevant paragraphs of the Impugned Order dated 11.07.2025 read as
under:
― 13. Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to return a
finding vis-à-vis maintainability of the application under Order IX
Rule 13 read with section 151 CPC. I may note that the Order dt.
10.12.2018 passed in the divorce matter does not specifically
mention that Ms. Pradeep Kaur has been proceeded ex parte . Order
dt. 10.12.2018, inter alia , states, ― Since neither Respondent nor
any witness is present today, right to lead Respondent's Evidence is
therefore, closed.‟ Perhaps, taking cue from this, non-applicant H.
S. Khurana in his reply takes the stand that the divorce case was
not decided ex parte , but on merits. Hereinabove, I have already
taken note of paragraph no. 35 of the judgment in the divorce

6
(2005) 1 SCC 787
7
(1994) 1 SCC 1
8
(2007) 4 SCC 221
Signature Not Verified
C.R.P. 320/2025 Page 8 of 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

petition. It bears repetition to state that in paragraph no. 35 of the
judgment in divorce petition, the Court observes, ― After conclusion
of petitioner's evidence, respondent was granted opportunity to
lead respondent's evidence but she stopped appearing and the
court proceeded as per order XVII Rule 3 (b) of CPC. ‖ Thus, it is
quite apparent that on 10.12.2018 the Family Court had taken
recourse to XVII Rule 3 (b) of CPC in proceeding ahead with the
divorce petition in view of Ms. Pradeep Kaur's absence. Now,
Rules 2 and 3 of XVII of CPC read as under:
2. Procedure if parties fail to appear on day fixed - Where,
on any day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned,
the parties or any of them fail to appear, the Court may
proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed
in that behalf by Order IX or make such other order as it
thinks fit.
Explanation. —Where the evidence or a substantial portion
of the evidence of any party has already been recorded and
such party fails to appear on any day to which the hearing
of the suit is adjourned, the Court may, in its discretion,
proceed with the case as if such party were present.
3. Court may proceed notwithstanding either party fails to
produce evidence, etc. - Where any party to a suit to
whom time has been granted fails to produce his evidence,
or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to perform
any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit,
for which time has been allowed, the Court may,
notwithstanding such default, —
(a) if the parties are present, proceed to decide the suit
forthwith; or
(b) if the parties are, or anv of them is, absent, proceed
under Rule 2.
14. It is clear from a reading of Rule 3 (b) of Order XVII of CPC
that where a party fails to produce evidence or cause attendance of
witnesses despite time being granted, Court may proceed under
Order XVII Rule 2 of CPC. And, as per Order XVII Rule 2 of
CPC, the Court may adopt the modes prescribed under Order IX of
CPC in the event of failure of a party to appear. Thus, the net effect
of this is that by observing in the judgment that it took recourse to
Order XVII Rule 3 (b) of CPC in the divorce matter, the Court had
in fact taken the route as prescribed under Order IX Rule 13 of
CPC. Given this, it is my view that the instant application of Ms.
Pradeep Kaur under Order IX Rule 13 read with section 151 of
CPC is maintainable.
15. Next is the aspect of limitation. On 13.02.2020 Ms. Pradeep
Kaur had moved an application under section 5 of Limitation Act
for condonation of delay in moving the application for recall of the
ex parte judgment/decree dt. 08.02.2019. In terms of Article 123 of
the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the limitation period for
moving an application for recall of ex parte decree is 30 days and
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C.R.P. 320/2025 Page 9 of 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

the time from which the said period begins to run is the date of the
decree. The application under Order IX Rule 13 read with section
151 CPC was filed on 23.05.2019. The judgment/ decree was
passed on 08.02.2019. Thus, there has been a delay of 73 days in
the moving the application for recall of judgment/ decree dt.
08.02.2019. Under section 5 of Limitation Act delay may be
condoned on „sufficient cause‟ being shown. Now, the law is well
settled that the phrase ‗ sufficient cause‟ as occurring in section 5 of
Limitation Act ought to be construed liberally so as to advance the
cause of justice and not the cause of technicalities. In Collector,
Land Acquisition, Anantnag Ors. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., AIR 1987
SC 1353 it was observed:
3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone
delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act
of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial
justice to parties by disposing of matters on ― merits” . The
expression ―sufficient cause‖ employed by the legislature
is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law
in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of
justice – that being the life-purpose for the existence of the
institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this
Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in
matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not
appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in
the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on
principle as it is realized that;
― 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to
benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a
meritorious matter being thrown out at the
very threshold and cause of justice being
defeated. As against this when delay is
condoned the highest that can happen is that a
cause would be decided on merits after hearing
the parties.
3. ―Every day's delay must be explained‖ does
not mean that a pedantic approach should be
made. Why not every hour's delay, every
second's delay? The doctrine must be applied
in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done
because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is
occasioned deliberately, or on account of
culpable negligence, or on account of mala
Signature Not Verified
C.R.P. 320/2025 Page 10 of 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit bv
resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious
risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciarv is respected
not on account of its power to legalize
injustice on technical grounds but because it is
capable of removing injustice and is expected
to do so.‖
16. Thus, adopting a liberal and justice oriented approach, this
Court is inclined to condone the delay in moving the application
for recall of decree/judgment dt. 08.02.2019. This Court is of the
view that it would be fit and appropriate if the said application
under Order IX Rule 13 read with section 151 of CPC is decided
on merits. This Court is thus inclined to allow Ms. Pradeep Kaur's
application under section 5 of Limitation Act. It is ordered
accordingly.
17. Now to the merits of the application Order IX Rule 13 read
with section 151 of CPC. On the basis of the material and the
evidence presented in this matter, I am not convinced that Ms.
Pradeep Kaur was prevented by „sufficient cause‟ from appearing
when the divorce petition was called on for hearing on 10.12.2018
and on the subsequent dates thereafter. The reasons are as follows:
(I) Petitioner's Evidence (PE) was closed on 11.09.2018 and
the matter was set for recording of Respondent's Evidence
(RE) on 02.11.2018 and on which date no adverse order was
passed against Ms. Pradeep Kaur notwithstanding her absence.
Thereafter, on the next date of hearing (10.12.2018) the court
proceeded to close her evidence. This was then followed by
final arguments on 28.01.2019. These three dates i.e.
02.11.2018, 10.12.2018 and 28.01.2019 are important. While
Ms. Pradeep Kaur did not appear before the Family Court in
Tis Hazari on 02.11.2018, 10.12.2018 and 28.01.2019; during
this period, she had been regularly appearing before the Court
of Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate (MM) in Tis Hazari and this is
evident from certified copies of the court orders that are on
record. From certified copies, it is crystal clear that Ms.
Pradeep Kaur had appeared before the court of Ld. MM-05 in
Tis Hazari on 26.10.2018, 28.01.2019, 06.03.2019, 04.04.2019
and 09.05.2019. Ms. Pradeep Kaur claims that that due to
heavy medication for depression and panic attacks, she was
unable to properly track her divorce case or appear in the
Family Court when required; that she was confused about the
next hearing date after PE and, while still recovering from
anxiety, managed to visit the Court on 15.04.2019 to inquire
about the case status. In support of this, she relies on few
hospital records. However, this ground is not at all cogent and
convincing. If at all her depression and panic attacks were
severe enough to prevent her from attending the divorce
proceedings before the Family Court at Tis Hazari, it becomes
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C.R.P. 320/2025 Page 11 of 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

difficult to understand how she was simultaneously able to
pursue and regularly appear before another court in the very
same court complex. This contradiction raises serious doubts
about the extent to which her mental health issues actually
impaired her ability to participate in the divorce matter,
especially considering that both courts are located in the same
premises and would require a similar level of engagement. It is
equally difficult to accept the notion that Ms. Pradeep Kaur's
struggles with depression, panic attacks, and anxiety were so
conveniently selective that they affected her ability to appear
only in connection with the divorce petition pending before the
Family Court, and not in the other legal matter before the court
of Ld. MM-05, Tis Hazari. The fact that during the relevant
time she was able to regularly attend and actively pursue
proceedings before another court within the same Tis Hazari
Court complex casts serious doubt on the genuineness and
consistency of her claims. Such a selective and seemingly
convenient application of her medical condition appears
disingenuous and cannot be condoned. This approach has to be
rejected.
(II) It is important to highlight that on 28.01.2019, both the
complaint case and the divorce case were scheduled to be
heard before their respective courts within Tis Hazari Court
complex. On that very day (28.01.2019), Ms. Pradeep Kaur
made an appearance before the Court of learned MM-05, yet
she failed to appear before the Family Court where her divorce
matter was listed. This raises a significant concern and
presents a glaring inconsistency. It is difficult to comprehend
how she was able to attend one legal proceeding in the same
court complex, seemingly without any hindrance, yet did not
attend the equally divorce hearing on that very day. If her
medical condition genuinely prevented her from participating
in court matters, it is perplexing that it only affected her
appearance before the Family Court and not the other. Such
selective participation undermines the credibility of her claims
and casts doubt on the sincerity of her stated reasons for
absence.
(III) Next, Ms. Pradeep Kaur claims that in the divorce matter
she was confused about the next hearing date after conclusion
of PE and, while still recovering from anxiety she managed to
visit the Court on 15.04.2019 to inquire about the status of
divorce matter. This claim of hers is not credible for two
reasons. On 28.0l.20l9 Ms. Pradeep Kaur was very much
present in Tis Hazari Court complex. On that very day,
28.01.2019, Ms. Pradeep Kaur could have easily walked a
short distance within the court complex to visit the Family
Court and inquired about the status of her divorce case, nay,
even attended the scheduled hearing. Her physical presence in
the same court complex on 28.01.2019 before the Court of
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C.R.P. 320/2025 Page 12 of 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

learned MM makes it difficult to believe that she was unable to
make such a minimal effort. Furthermore, with the
advancement of court technology, particularly the CIS (Case
Information System) software, the next date of hearing is
regularly updated and can be easily accessed through the e-
Courts mobile application or the website. Even though orders
of the Family Court are not be uploaded online, basic case
status and upcoming hearing dates are still made available
through these platforms. In today's digital age, where one can
conveniently obtain case-related information from the comfort
of their home, the explanation provided by Ms. Pradeep Kaur
regarding her inability to stay informed about her divorce
proceedings appears unconvincing and lacks credibility.
(IV) Ms. Pradeep Kaur (AW1) in her cross-examination states
as follows:
It is correct that on dates i.e. 09.07.2018,
14.08.2018, 26.10.2018, 28.01.2019,
06.03.2019, 04.04.2019, 09.05.2019 and
26.07.2019 I was physically appearing in the
case filed against me by my brother-in-law.
I was well aware about the pendency of the
divorce petition on the aforesaid dates also.
It is wrong to suggest that I deliberately not
appeared in the divorce petition on the
aforementioned dates.
Q. Is it correct that you were well aware about
the pendency of divorce petition while you
were appearing physically before the court of
M. M., Tis Hazari, Delhi in the above stated
criminal matter?
Ans. I was myself cross examining the
petitioner in the divorce case before the
Family Court. And as such, I was aware of the
pendency of the divorce petition while the case
before the Ld. M. M. was sub judice. Vol.
Simultaneously I was dealing with both the
above said cases.
Given her response in her cross-examination, it is difficult to
comprehend as to why Ms. Pradeep Kaur did not appear before
the Family Court on and after 02.11.2018. She admits in her
cross-examination that on dates 09.07.2018, 14.08.2018,
26.10.2018, 28.01.2019, 06.03.2019, 04.04.2019, 09.05.2019
and 26.07.2019 she had regularly appeared before the court of
learned MM and was very much aware about the pendency of
the divorce matter. Given this, it is difficult to comprehend the
reasons for her absence from the proceedings in the divorce
matter, when she was very well aware about its pendency.
(V) The records reflect that Ms. Pradeep Kaur changed her
advocates multiple times throughout the proceedings, alleging
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C.R.P. 320/2025 Page 13 of 30
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:29.10.2026
17:00:14

malafide conduct on the part of each of her advocates. Even in
the present lis under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC, mid-way she
engaged a legal aid counsel, Kapil Kumar Nayyar, only to
abruptly disengage him as well at the last stage. Notably,
despite her serious accusations against her previous advocates,
claiming they acted in a contumacious manner, she never filed
any formal complaint or took any action against them before
any appropriate authority. This pattern raises questions about
the credibility of her allegations and her overall approach to
the litigation process.
(VI) In view of the findings hereinabove, the large number of
medical records filed by applicant Ms. Pradeep Kaur do not
persuade me to take a different view of the matter. I do not
think that Ms. Pardeep Kaur was diligent and vigilant in the
divorce matter on and after 02.11.2018. The material on record
demonstrates that her conduct amounted to gross negligence,
especially so on 28.01.2019, when she appeared before another
court in Tis Hazari but failed to appear before the Family
Court located in the same court complex.

18. For the reasons set out hereinabove, I am of the view that Ms.
Pradeep Kaur has failed to establish that she was prevented by a
'sufficient cause' from appearing when the divorce petition was
called on 10.12.2018 and on the subsequent dates thereafter. This
issue is accordingly decided against Ms. Pradeep Kaur and in
favour of Sh. H. S. Khurana.‖
(emphasis supplied)

14. The principal grievance of the Petitioner is that her absence
from the matrimonial proceedings on the relevant dates was
occasioned by circumstances beyond her control. In particular,
reliance has been placed upon her medical condition during the
relevant period and upon her simultaneous participation in criminal
proceedings pending before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate.
According to the Petitioner, these circumstances, when considered
cumulatively and in the backdrop of her prolonged participation in the
matrimonial proceedings, constituted sufficient cause for her non-
appearance. It is, therefore, her contention that the learned Family
Court ought to have recalled the Judgment and Decree dated
08.02.2019.
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15. Before examining the aforesaid contention, it is apposite to note
the manner in which the learned Family Court has dealt with the
Application under Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 CPC. The
said Application was not dismissed at the threshold. The learned
Family Court first examined the question of its maintainability and
held the same to be maintainable. Thereafter, the question of
limitation was considered and, adopting a liberal approach, the delay
of 73 days in filing the Application was condoned. The learned
Family Court thereafter proceeded to examine the Application on
merits and considered the explanation furnished by the Petitioner for
her absence on 02.11.2018, 10.12.2018 and 28.01.2019. Thus, the
Petitioner was afforded an opportunity to establish the existence of
sufficient cause for her non-appearance, and the said question has
been adjudicated upon by the learned Family Court after consideration
of the material and evidence available on record.

16. A perusal of the Judgment dated 11.07.2025 further
demonstrates that the learned Family Court has not rejected the
Petitioner's case merely on account of her absence from the
matrimonial proceedings. The explanation furnished by her has been
examined in the context of the contemporaneous circumstances
emerging from the record. The learned Family Court, in particular,
took note of the Petitioner's admitted presence before the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate during the relevant period, including on
28.01.2019, when the criminal proceedings and the matrimonial
proceedings were both listed before the respective Courts in the same
Tis Hazari Court complex. The learned Family Court considered this
circumstance while assessing the Petitioner's explanation that her
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medical condition had materially impaired her ability to participate in
the matrimonial proceedings.
17. The learned Family Court also considered the medical material
relied upon by the Petitioner and examined the same in conjunction
with her conduct during the relevant period. The Court took note of
her statement in cross-examination acknowledging that she was aware
of the pendency of the divorce proceedings while simultaneously
prosecuting the criminal proceedings. It further considered her
repeated appearances before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and
her active participation in the said proceedings. Upon an overall
consideration of the aforesaid circumstances, the learned Family Court
concluded that the material placed on record did not satisfactorily
establish that the Petitioner had been prevented by sufficient cause
from appearing in the matrimonial proceedings. The said conclusion is
founded upon an appreciation of the evidence and the conduct of the
Petitioner as emerging from the record.
18. The question that consequently arises before this Court is
whether the aforesaid findings suffer from any jurisdictional error,
material irregularity or perversity so as to warrant interference in
exercise of the jurisdiction invoked by the Petitioner. It is well settled
that the revisional and supervisory jurisdiction of this Court is not
intended to enable a re-appreciation of the evidence as if the Court
were exercising appellate jurisdiction. The mere possibility of another
view being taken on the material available on record would not, by
itself, furnish a ground for interference, unless the conclusion arrived
at by the Court below is shown to be perverse, manifestly erroneous,
unsupported by the record or otherwise vitiated by a jurisdictional
infirmity.
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19. In the present case, the learned Family Court has considered the
explanation furnished by the Petitioner, examined the medical
material relied upon by her, taken note of her admitted presence and
participation in the proceedings before the learned Metropolitan
Magistrate during the relevant period, and thereafter recorded reasons
for concluding that sufficient cause for her non-appearance had not
been established. The findings so returned cannot, on the material
available on record, be said to suffer from such perversity,
jurisdictional error or material irregularity as would warrant
interference by this Court. This Court, therefore, finds no ground to
interfere with the Judgment dated 11.07.2025.
20. Having arrived at the aforesaid conclusion, it is necessary to
consider the further and distinct question arising in the present
Petition, namely, whether the Petitioner can, at this stage, maintain a
challenge to the original Judgment and Decree dated 08.02.2019. The
said decree dissolved the marriage between the parties under Section
13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The challenge to the said
decree is sought to be maintained alongside the challenge to the
subsequent Judgment dated 11.07.2025, notwithstanding that the
Application specifically preferred by the Petitioner under Order IX
Rule 13 CPC for recall of the said decree has itself been dismissed.
21. The aforesaid issue assumes significance having regard to the
substantial lapse of time between the passing of the Judgment and
Decree dated 08.02.2019 and the institution of the present
proceedings. The Petitioner has not approached this Court solely
against the Judgment dated 11.07.2025. She has also sought to assail
the original Judgment and Decree dated 08.02.2019 on merits. The
maintainability of such a challenge would, therefore, necessarily have
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to be examined independently, having regard to the nature of the
decree sought to be assailed, the statutory remedies available against
the same, and the lapse of time.
22. Before considering the question whether the original Judgment
and Decree dated 08.02.2019 can be assailed in the present
proceedings, it would be apposite to set out the statutory framework
governing the remedy of appeal against a judgment or decree passed
by a Family Court. The present proceedings arise out of a matrimonial
petition under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955,
which culminated in the Judgment and Decree dated 08.02.2019
dissolving the marriage between the parties. The statute, therefore,
specifically provides for an appellate remedy against such
adjudication. The relevant provision of the Family Courts Act, 1984
reads as under:
“19. Appeal .—(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2) and
notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code or Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974), or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from
every judgement or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a
Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law.
(2) No appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the
Family Court with the consent of the parties [or from an order
passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(2 of 1974):
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any
appeal pending before a High Court or any order passed under
Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)
before the commencement of the Family Courts (Amendment) Act,
1991].
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a
period of thirty days from the date of the judgement or order of a
Family Court.
[(4) The High Court may, of its own motion or otherwise, call
for an examine the record of any proceeding in which the Family
Court situate within its jurisdiction passed an order under Chapter
IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for the
purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or
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propriety of the order, not being an interlocutory order, and as to
the regularity of such proceeding.]
[(5)] Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any
court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court.
[(6)] An appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall be heard
by a Bench consisting of two or more Judges.‖

9
23. Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 , specifically
provides that, save as otherwise provided therein, an appeal shall lie to
the High Court from every judgment or order, not being an
interlocutory order, of a Family Court, both on facts and on law.
Significantly, Section 19(3) prescribes that every such appeal shall be
preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment
or order of the Family Court. Section 19(5) further provides that,
except as contemplated under Section 19 itself, no appeal or revision
shall lie to any Court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family
Court.
24. The statutory scheme is significant inasmuch as it provides a
specific appellate remedy against an adjudication by a Family Court,
while prescribing the period within which such remedy is to be
invoked. The Petitioner, therefore, had a statutory remedy of appeal
against the Judgment and Decree dated 08.02.2019, which would have
enabled the High Court to examine the correctness of the decree both
on facts and on law, subject to the procedural requirements governing
the invocation of such remedy.
25. The position, therefore, is that the Petitioner had a specific
statutory appellate remedy against the Judgment and Decree dated
08.02.2019. The said remedy was not merely a restricted revisional

9
Family Courts Act
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remedy; Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act expressly
contemplated an appeal to the High Court both on facts and on law.
Consequently, any challenge to the correctness of the decree on its
merits was required to be brought before the appellate Court in
accordance with the statutory scheme and within the period prescribed
by law, subject to the power of the Court to condone delay upon
sufficient cause being shown.
26. The aforesaid distinction assumes significance in the present
case because the Petitioner did not pursue the statutory appellate
remedy against the Judgment and Decree dated 08.02.2019. Instead,
she invoked Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the CPC,
seeking recall of the decree on the ground that her absence from the
matrimonial proceedings was occasioned by sufficient cause. The said
Application was held to be maintainable by the learned Family Court,
the delay in its institution was condoned, and the Application was
thereafter adjudicated on merits and dismissed by the Judgment dated
11.07.2025. The Petitioner has, thus, already pursued the remedy
specifically directed towards the circumstances in which the decree
came to be passed in her absence.
27. It is in this statutory backdrop that the invocation of Article 227
of the Constitution of India needs to be examined. While the High
Court possesses constitutional power of superintendence over
subordinate Courts, such power is supervisory in nature and cannot be
exercised as a substitute for appellate jurisdiction. The existence of
this constitutional power does not entitle a litigant to seek re-
examination of every order or decree merely because the litigant is
aggrieved by the conclusion arrived at by the subordinate Court.
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28. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate
10
(P) Ltd . , explained that the power under Article 227 is not an
unlimited jurisdiction to correct every erroneous decision of a
subordinate Court. It held that interference may be warranted where
there is a serious dereliction of duty, a flagrant violation of
fundamental principles of law or justice, want of jurisdiction, or a
finding so perverse that no reasonable person could have arrived at it.
It was further clarified that the High Court cannot, while exercising
such jurisdiction, substitute its own judgment for that of the
subordinate Court as though it were exercising appellate jurisdiction.
29. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated by the Hon'ble
11
Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath , and M/s
12
Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel . These decisions emphasise
that supervisory jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and does not
permit the High Court to reappreciate or reweigh evidence merely
because another view is possible. Interference must be justified by a
patent legal or jurisdictional infirmity of the nature warranting the
exercise of such extraordinary power.
30. More importantly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasised the significance of an available statutory appellate remedy
while considering the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227.
In Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai v.
13
Tuticorin Educational Society , the Apex Court held that, where
proceedings are before a civil Court, and the CPC itself provides a
remedy of appeal, the availability of such remedy operates, as a matter

10
(2001) 8 SCC 97
11
(2015) 5 SCC 423
12
2022 INSC 37
13
(2019) 9 SCC 538
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of judicial discipline and prudence, as a near-total bar to the exercise
of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. The Court cautioned
against permitting a litigant to challenge even a decree under Article
227 on grounds which could properly be urged in the statutory appeal.
31. The principle is particularly relevant in the context of an ex
14
parte decree. In Mohamed Ali v. V. Jaya , the Hon'ble Supreme
Court adjudicated a case in which an ex parte judgment and decree
had been sought to be challenged before the High Court under Section
115 of the CPC and Article 227, despite the availability of a statutory
appeal. The Apex Court held that, where a statutory alternative
remedy by way of appeal was available against the ex parte judgment
and decree, the High Court ought not to have entertained the revision
petition under Section 115 or the petition under Article 227 for the
purpose of challenging the decree. The Court also took note of the
substantial delay in the proceedings under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and
emphasised that the question of condonation of such delay could not
be bypassed by directly assailing the original decree under Article
227.
32. The principle in Mohamed Ali (supra) is directly relevant to the
present case. Having pursued the remedy under Order IX Rule 13
CPC and failed therein, the Petitioner cannot ordinarily invoke Article
227 to reopen the very decree against which a statutory appeal was
available. Permitting such a course would effectively enable the
Petitioner to circumvent the limitation governing the appellate remedy
and to seek, through supervisory jurisdiction, an adjudication which
ought to have been pursued through the statutory appellate
mechanism.

14
(2022) 10 SCC 477
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33. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had, even on earlier occasions,
cautioned against such an approach. In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd.
15
Mustaqim , wherein the Apex Court deprecated the tendency of
litigants to bypass the normal remedy of appeal or revision by
invoking Article 227. The Court emphasised that supervisory
jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be employed as a substitute for an
available statutory remedy. This principle reinforces the requirement
that the constitutional power of superintendence be exercised within
its recognised limits and not as a means of securing an additional
forum for adjudication on merits.
34. The question of delay must also be considered in the context of
the nature of the jurisdiction invoked. In Bithika Mazumdar v. Sagar
16
Pal , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that no statutory period of
limitation is prescribed for an application under Article 227 of the
Constitution. At the same time, the Court recognised that such a
petition is expected to be filed without unreasonable delay and that
any delay must be satisfactorily explained. The absence of a
prescribed period of limitation, therefore, does not confer an
unrestricted right to reopen a concluded adjudication at any point of
time.
35. The Andhra Pradesh High Court, in R.K. Agarwal v. Ch. Vijaya
17
Kumari , similarly recognised that, where the ordinary appellate
remedy has become barred by limitation, a litigant who has allowed
the order of the subordinate Court to attain finality by failing to
approach the appellate forum within time cannot ordinarily invoke
Article 227 to circumvent the limitation applicable to that remedy.

15
(1983) 4 SCC 566
16
(2017) 2 SCC 748
17
2006 SCC OnLine AP 840
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The principle underscores that the constitutional supervisory
jurisdiction cannot be converted into an alternative route for securing
relief which has not been pursued through the prescribed statutory
procedure.
36. It is, however, apposite to clarify that the existence of a
statutory remedy or the expiry of the period of limitation does not
extinguish the constitutional power under Article 227. Nevertheless,
the availability of an appeal permitting examination of the matter both
on facts and on law, coupled with substantial or unexplained delay,
constitutes a compelling consideration for judicial restraint. The Court
must consider the nature of the alleged infirmity, the conduct of the
litigant, the extent of the delay, the explanation furnished therefor, and
the consequences of permitting a concluded adjudication to be
reopened. Supervisory jurisdiction is intended to correct jurisdictional
failures and grave procedural or legal infirmities, and not to provide a
second appellate forum where the statutory remedy has not been
pursued within time.
37. In the present case, the relevant circumstances must, therefore,
be considered cumulatively. These include the existence of a specific
statutory appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated 08.02.2019;
the period prescribed under Section 19(3) of the Family Courts Act,
1984; the Petitioner's election to pursue the distinct remedy under
Order IX Rule 13 CPC; the condonation of delay in that proceeding
and the adjudication of the Application on merits; its dismissal on
11.07.2025; and the subsequent attempt to challenge the original
decree itself after a substantial lapse of time. Entertaining the
challenge in these circumstances would permit the Petitioner to
achieve indirectly what she did not pursue through the statutory
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appellate mechanism, thereby undermining the limitation prescribed
for such remedy.
38. The challenge sought to be mounted against the Judgment and
Decree dated 08.02.2019 is not confined to a jurisdictional defect in
the proceedings culminating in the decree. The Petitioner seeks, in
substance, to re-open the original adjudication itself. The grounds
advanced in relation to the alleged procedural irregularity, the
circumstances of her absence and the alleged failure to consider her
explanation substantially overlap with the issues which formed the
subject matter of the proceedings under Order IX Rule 13 CPC. The
Court must, therefore, distinguish between a case in which Article 227
is invoked to correct a patent jurisdictional error or grave miscarriage
of justice and one in which the jurisdiction is invoked to secure a fresh
adjudication of a decree for which the legislature has already provided
an appellate remedy.

39. In this context, the reliance placed by the Petitioner
upon Bhanu Kumar Jain (supra) requires to be understood in its
proper perspective. The Hon'ble Supreme Court recognised the
availability of distinct remedies against an ex parte decree, namely, an
application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and an appeal against the
decree itself. While the former concerns the circumstances in which
the decree came to be passed in the absence of a party, the latter
enables the aggrieved party to challenge the decree on merits within
the scope of the appellate jurisdiction. The said judgment, however,
does not dispense with the procedural requirements governing the
invocation of these remedies, nor does it confer an unrestricted right to
reopen the original decree through subsequent collateral or
supervisory proceedings. The pursuit of an application under Order IX
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Rule 13 CPC cannot, therefore, be construed as conferring an
unlimited period within which the original decree may subsequently
be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution.
40. The Petitioner has also sought to overcome the aforesaid
difficulty by contending that the Judgment and Decree dated
08.02.2019 was allegedly obtained by fraud and suppression of
material facts. Reliance has, in this regard, been placed upon the
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya
Naidu v. Jagannath (supra) and A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of
A.P. (supra).
41. There can be no quarrel with the principle enunciated in S.P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu (supra) that a judgment or decree obtained by
playing fraud upon the Court cannot be permitted to stand and that
fraud, when established, vitiates the judicial process. The judgment
proceeds on the premise that the Court has been deceived into passing
an order on account of a fraudulent act or suppression of a material
fact. Similarly, in A.V. Papayya Sastry (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court reiterated that a judgment, decree or order obtained by fraud is a
nullity and may be questioned even in appropriate collateral
proceedings. These authorities, however, do not dispense with the
requirement of establishing the foundational facts constituting fraud.
The mere assertion of fraud, without proof of the fraudulent act
complained of, does not automatically render the statutory scheme of
remedies and limitation inapplicable.
42. The distinction is material in the present case. The Petitioner
has alleged fraud and suppression principally in relation to the manner
in which the matrimonial proceedings proceeded and the
circumstances in which the Judgment and Decree dated 08.02.2019
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came to be passed. However, there is no finding by the learned Family
Court establishing that the decree was procured by fraud upon the
Court. On the contrary, the circumstances relied upon by the
Petitioner, including her absence from the matrimonial proceedings,
her medical condition and her simultaneous participation in the
criminal proceedings, were specifically placed before and considered
by the learned Family Court while adjudicating the Application under
Order IX Rule 13 CPC. Consequently, Bhanu Kumar Jain (supra),
which concerns the distinct remedies available against an ex parte
decree, and S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (supra) and A.V. Papayya
Sastry (supra), which address the consequences of fraud when
established, do not support the proposition that a mere allegation of
fraud, in the absence of proof establishing the same, is sufficient to
overcome the statutory framework governing remedies against a
decree.

43. In the present case, therefore, the invocation of the principle
that fraud vitiates judicial proceedings cannot, by itself, furnish an
independent basis for permitting the Petitioner to reopen the Judgment
and Decree dated 08.02.2019. The allegations of fraud are
substantially intertwined with the circumstances which formed the
subject matter of the Petitioner's Application under Order IX Rule 13
CPC, and those circumstances have already been examined by the
learned Family Court. In the absence of any established case of fraud
or any demonstrated jurisdictional infirmity in the Judgment dated
11.07.2025, this Court finds no basis to invoke its revisional or
supervisory jurisdiction for reopening the original decree.
44. Accordingly, while this Court retains its constitutional power of
superintendence under Article 227, the exercise of such power must
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be justified by circumstances warranting supervisory intervention and
not merely by an allegation that the original decree was erroneous or
that another view of the material was possible. In the absence of a
demonstrated jurisdictional error, patent perversity, violation of
fundamental principles of procedure or an established case of grave
miscarriage of justice, the supervisory jurisdiction cannot ordinarily
be employed as a substitute for the statutory appellate remedy or to
reopen an adjudication which has otherwise attained finality.
45. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the
Judgment and Decree dated 08.02.2019 was independently amenable
to a statutory appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act,
1984, which was required to be preferred within the period prescribed
under Section 19(3) thereof, subject to condonation of delay upon
sufficient cause being shown. The Petitioner, however, did not avail of
the said remedy within the prescribed period and instead approached
the learned Family Court by way of an Application under Order IX
Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the CPC, seeking recall of the said
decree. The said Application was accompanied by an Application
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay,
and was ultimately adjudicated on merits and dismissed on
11.07.2025. In these circumstances, and in the absence of any
demonstrated jurisdictional infirmity or other exceptional
circumstance warranting interference, the challenge to the original
decree cannot be entertained at this belated stage as a means of
circumventing the statutory appellate mechanism and the limitation
governing its exercise.
46. This Court is conscious of the submission of the Petitioner that
she had participated in the matrimonial proceedings for a considerable
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period and that the decree dated 08.02.2019 came to be passed when
she was not appearing before the learned Family Court. However, the
question whether her absence was occasioned by sufficient cause was
specifically examined in the proceedings under Order IX Rule 13
CPC. The learned Family Court, after considering the material and
evidence on record, returned a finding against the Petitioner. No
jurisdictional infirmity, material irregularity or perversity warranting
interference with the Judgment dated 11.07.2025 has been
demonstrated before this Court.
47. The mere institution and subsequent prosecution of an
Application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC cannot have the effect of
indefinitely extending or reviving the period prescribed for availing
the independent statutory remedy against the original decree. The fact
that the Petitioner elected to pursue the former remedy cannot, by
itself, confer upon her a fresh or unlimited period within which the
original decree may subsequently be assailed in collateral or
supervisory proceedings. Such a course would defeat the distinction
between the statutory remedies recognised in Bhanu Kumar
Jain (supra) and would, in substance, permit the limitation applicable
to a challenge to the original decree to be circumvented by recourse to
a subsequent proceeding.
48. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no ground
to interfere with the Judgment dated 11.07.2025. The challenge to the
Judgment and Decree dated 08.02.2019, having been raised after a
substantial lapse of time and in circumstances where the Petitioner's
Application seeking recall of the said decree has already been
adjudicated and dismissed, cannot be permitted to be pursued in the
present proceedings merely by invoking the revisional or supervisory
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jurisdiction of this Court. Any examination of the merits of the
original decree would, in effect, amount to permitting the Petitioner to
circumvent the statutory remedy available against the said decree and
the limitation governing such remedy.
49. Accordingly, the present Petition is liable to be dismissed. The
challenge to the Judgment dated 11.07.2025 is rejected on merits,
while the challenge to the Judgment and Decree dated 08.02.2019 is
not liable to be entertained at this belated stage.
50. The Petition is, accordingly, dismissed and disposed of, along
with pending applications, if any.


HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
OCTOBER 27, 2026/va


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