RAMLAL vs JANKI BAI (Died) Through Lrs

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CGHC010166662024 2026:CGHC:38711-DB
Digitally signed
by ANURADHA
TIWARI
Date:
2026.09.03
10:27:09
+0530
NAFR
ANURADHA
TIWARI
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 401 of 2024
1 - Ramlal S/o Late Golul Ram, Aged About 40 Years R/o Village
Baradwar, District- Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)
2 - Ramkumar S/o Late Gokul Ram, Aged About 38 Years R/o Village
Charpara, Deragarh, Tahsil Baradwar, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)
3 - Kanhaiya S/o Late Gokul Ram, Aged About 35 Years R/o Village
Charpara, Dergarh, Tahsil Baradwar, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)
4 - Chhotelal S/o Late Gokul Ram, Aged About 22 Years R/o Village
Charpara, Deragarh, Tahsil Baradwar, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)
5 - Purnima Kumari D/o Late Gokul Ram, Aged About 20 Years R/o
Village Charpara, Deragarh, Tahsil Baradwar, District Janjgir-Champa
(C.G.)
6 - Bundkunwar D/o Late Gokul Ram, Aged About 33 Years W/o
Ganesh Ram R/o Village Kewali, Tahsil Kharsia, District Raigarh (C.G.)
7 - Usha D/o Late Gokul Ram, Aged About 30 Years W/o Goutam R/o
Village Kewalli, Tahsil Kharsia, District Raigarh (C.G.) (All Are Legal
Heirs Of Deceased Petitioner Gokul Ram And Substituted As Honble
Court's Order Dated 13-06-2023)
... Appellants
versus
1 - Janki Bai (Died) Through Lrs As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated
25/03/2026
1.1 - (A) Lalit Sidar S/o Late Premsing Sidar Aged About 53 Years
Resident Of Village Garhgorhi Post And P.S. Sakti Tehsil Sakti Dist-
Sakti (C.G.)

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1.2 - (B) Sushil Sidar S/o Late Premsing Sidar Aged About 51 Years
Resident Of Village Garhgorhi Post And P.S. Sakti Tehsil Sakti Dist-
Sakti (C.G.)
1.3 - (C) Lalita Bai D/o Late Presing Sidar Aged About 49 Years
Resident Of Village- Kerribancha Tehsil Sakti Dist- Sakti C.G.
1.4 - (D) Satrupa Bai D/o Late Premsing Sidar Aged About 47 Years
Resident Of Village Garhgorhi Post And P.S. Sakti Tehsil Sakti Dist-
Sakti C.G.
1.5 - (E) Sukrita Bai D/o Late Prem Singh Sidar Aged About 44 Years
Resident Of Village Talwa Tehsil Bhothia Dist- Sakti C.G.
2 - Lakhan Lal S/o Beniram, Aged About 49 Years Caste-Rathore, R/o
Deragarh, Tahsil - Sakti, District Janjg-Champa, Now District Sakti,
Chhattisgarh.
3 - State of Chhattisgarh, Through The Secretary, Department of
Revenue D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
4 - Sub-Divisional Officer, Sakti, District- Janjgir-Champa, Now District
Sakti, Chhattisgarh.
5 - Additional Collector, Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh, District Janjgir-
Champa (C.G.)
6 - Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
7 - Board of Revenue Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.)
(Respondent No. 8 In Writ Petition Namely Sukhwara Bai Died And Her
Name Is Deleted As Per Honble Court Order Dated 13-06-2023
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellants : Mr. B.P. Sharma and Mr. M.L. Sakat,
Advocates
For Respondents No.1.1 to
1.5
: Mr. Jai Prakash Shukla, Advocate
For State/Respondents No.2
to 7
: Mr. Shashank Thakur, Additional
Advocate General

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Judge ,
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
01.09.2026
1 Heard Mr. B.P. Sharma and Mr. M.L. Sakat, learned counsel for
the appellants as well as Mr. Jai Prakash Shukla, learned counsel
for respondents No.1.1 to 1.5 and Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned
Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents
No.2 to 7.
2 By way of this writ appeal, appellants have prayed for following
relief(s):-
“It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court
may kindly be pleased to allow this appeal, set
aside the impugned order dated 20.3.20242
(Annexure A-1), allow the writ petition in toto
and in effect dismiss the application filed by
respondent concerned under Section 170B of
the CG Land Revenue Code, 1959 in the
interest of justice and/or pass such other orders
as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts
and circumstances of the case.”
3 The present intra-Court appeal has been filed against the order
dated 20.03.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ
Petition (C) No.2051/2019, whereby the writ petition filed by the
writ petitioners/appellants has been dismissed.

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4 The material facts, as projected before the learned Single Judge,
may be noticed in brief. Survey No.665/1, admeasuring 0.29
acres, situated at Village Naya Baradwar, was originally recorded
in the name of Latiram and, after his death, the said land came to
be recorded in the name of his son, Dhaniram. Dhaniram
thereafter transferred the subject land in favour of Firtu Ram, who
was also a member of the Aboriginal Tribe, by way of a registered
sale deed dated 23.05.1979 for a consideration of Rs.5,000/-.
Subsequently, upon the death of Firtu Ram, the subject land was
recorded in the name of Gokul Ram and, after his death, the
same came to be recorded in the names of the present
appellants, who claim their rights through late Gokul Ram.
5 It was further the case before the learned Single Judge that
respondent No.1, namely, Janki Bai, initiated proceedings under
Section 170-B of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for
short, ‘the Code, 1959’) before the Sub-Divisional Officer
(Revenue), alleging that, notwithstanding the apparent title and
revenue entries in favour of the tribal persons, the subject land
was, in fact, in the possession and enjoyment of Lakhanlal
Rathore, a person belonging to the non-tribal community. The
Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), upon taking cognizance of the
proceedings, called for a report from the concerned Patwari and
issued notices to the persons concerned. The parties appeared
before the authority and statements of the concerned persons and
other witnesses were recorded.

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6 Upon consideration of the report submitted by the Circle Patwari,
the statements of the witnesses and other material available on
record, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), vide order dated
30.03.1998, directed reversion of the subject land in favour of a
member of the Aboriginal Tribe in exercise of powers under
Section 170-B of the Code, 1959.
7 Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, late Gokul Ram preferred an
appeal before the Collector, who, while setting aside the order of
the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), remanded the matter for
fresh consideration after affording due opportunity of hearing to
the concerned parties. Upon remand, the matter was
reconsidered by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), who, vide
order dated 11.02.2003, once again directed reversion of the
subject land in favour of a member of the Aboriginal Tribe. The
said order was thereafter affirmed by the Collector, Bilaspur, vide
order dated 03.03.2004 and by the Commissioner, Bilaspur
Division, vide order dated 30.11.2009. The challenge carried
before the Board of Revenue also did not yield any relief, the
revision having been dismissed on the ground of maintainability.
8 Being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders passed by the revenue
authorities, the present appellants, being the legal representatives
of late Gokul Ram, approached the learned Single Judge by filing
Writ Petition (C) No.2051/2019. The learned Single Judge, upon
consideration of the rival submissions, the statutory provisions

6
and the material available on record, dismissed the writ petition
vide order dated 20.03.2024. It is against the aforesaid order that
the present intra-Court appeal has been preferred.
9 Mr. B.P. Sharma and Mr. M.L. Sakat, learned counsel appearing
for the appellants, submit that the learned Single Judge as well as
the authorities below have failed to appreciate the fundamental
issue involved in the matter, namely, the effect of the Prohibition
of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988, particularly Section 4
thereof, which, according to the appellants, has retrospective
operation. It is submitted that the subject property was admittedly
purchased in the name of the predecessor-in-interest of the
appellants, who belongs to the Scheduled Tribe community, by
virtue of a registered sale deed, and therefore, the finding that the
transaction was benami and that the property in fact belonged to
Lakhanlal Rathore, a non-tribal, is contrary to the documentary
evidence available on record and is perverse.
10 Learned counsel further submit that the revenue authorities have
failed to accord due weight to the registered sale deed, which
specifically records the predecessor of the appellants as the
purchaser and holder of the property. According to learned
counsel, the title and ownership flowing from a registered
instrument could not have been displaced merely on the basis of
oral statements or conjectures, particularly when there is no
legally sustainable material establishing that the consideration for

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the transaction was paid by Lakhanlal Rathore or that the
predecessor of the appellants was merely a benamidar. It is,
therefore, contended that the conclusion regarding the alleged
benami nature of the transaction is based upon misappreciation of
the evidence and erroneous application of law.
11 It is also submitted that the authorities below proceeded by
addressing an incorrect and legally misconceived question as to
whether the property was actually owned by Lakhanlal Rathore,
instead of examining the matter in the light of the statutory
protection and consequences flowing from Section 4 of the
Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988. Learned
counsel submit that the said aspect goes to the root of the matter
and has escaped proper consideration. The appellants, who claim
their title through a registered sale deed executed in favour of
their predecessor, could not have been deprived of their property
without a proper determination of the alleged benami transaction
in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions.
12 Lastly, learned counsel submit that the impugned orders have the
effect of depriving the appellants of their valuable property rights
and are consequently liable to be interfered with by this Court. It is
contended that such deprivation, without proper consideration of
the registered title document and the statutory provisions relied
upon by the appellants, is violative of the constitutional
guarantees embodied under Articles 14, 19, 21 and 300-A of the

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Constitution of India. On these grounds, learned counsel submit
that the order passed by the learned Single Judge, as well as the
orders of the revenue authorities impugned in the writ petition,
deserve to be set aside and the writ appeal deserves to be
allowed.
13 Reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Khora (Dead) through Legal Heirs
and others v. Mohar Sai and others, (2023) 14 SCC 767 as well
as the judgment passed by this Court in Urmila Devi v. Vikas
Kumar Agrawal and others (Writ Appeal No.590/2026 vide
orde dated 15.07.2026) to buttress his submissions.
14 Mr. Jai Prakash Shukla, learned counsel appearing for the legal
heirs of late Gokul Ram, namely, respondents No.1.1 to 1.5,
opposes the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the
appellants and submits that the orders passed by the revenue
authorities, directing reversion of the subject land under Section
170-B of the Code, 1959, have been passed after due
consideration of the material available on record and in
accordance with the provisions of law. It is submitted that the
competent authorities, upon conducting the requisite enquiry and
considering the report of the concerned Patwari as well as the
statements of the parties and other witnesses, have recorded a
categorical finding that the subject land was, in substance, held
and possessed by a non-tribal, namely, Lakhanlal Rathore. The

9
said finding has consistently been affirmed by the appellate
revenue authorities and, therefore, does not warrant interference
in the present intra-Court appeal.
15 Learned counsel further submits that the appellants cannot derive
any benefit merely from the fact that the sale deed stands in the
name of their predecessor, when the competent authority, on the
basis of the evidence and surrounding circumstances, has found
the transaction to be a benami transaction and the actual
possession and interest in the land to be that of a non-tribal. It is
contended that Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 is intended to
protect tribal land from being transferred or held by non-tribals
through colourable or benami arrangements, and the subsequent
invocation of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act,
1988 cannot be used to defeat the statutory protection available to
members of the Scheduled Tribe community under the State land
revenue law. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that the learned
Single Judge has rightly declined to interfere with the concurrent
findings recorded by the revenue authorities and the writ appeal,
being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed.
16 Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General,
appearing for the State/respondents No.2 to 7, opposes the
submissions advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and
submits that the impugned orders passed by the revenue
authorities are based upon a proper enquiry conducted in

10
accordance with Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. It is submitted
that the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), after calling for the
report from the concerned Patwari, issuing notice to the
concerned parties and recording the statements of the parties and
witnesses, had arrived at a finding that the subject land was in the
possession and enjoyment of a non-tribal, namely, Lakhanlal
Rathore. The said finding was thereafter examined and affirmed
by the Collector as well as the Commissioner, Bilaspur Division.
Learned counsel submits that the appellants have failed to
demonstrate any jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of
principles of natural justice warranting interference with the
concurrent findings recorded by the competent revenue
authorities.
17 Learned Additional Advocate General further submits that the
reliance placed by the appellants upon the Prohibition of Benami
Property Transactions Act, 1988 is wholly misconceived and has
no application so as to defeat the proceedings undertaken under
Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. It is contended that the
proceedings under Section 170-B are intended to protect the land
belonging to members of the Aboriginal Tribe from being held or
enjoyed by non-tribals through benami or other colourable
arrangements, and the mere existence of a registered sale deed
in the name of the predecessor of the appellants cannot, by itself,
conclude the issue of actual ownership and possession when the
competent authority has recorded a finding to the contrary on the

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basis of the material available on record. Learned counsel,
therefore, submits that the learned Single Judge has rightly
refused to exercise writ jurisdiction and that the present writ
appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed.
18 We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
impugned order as well as materials available on record as also
the Writ Petition (C) No.2051/2019.
19 After appreciating the submissions of learned counsel for the
parties as also the materials on record, the learned Single Judge
while relying the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Bhaji v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla and others,
(2003) 1 SCC 692 as also the provisions contained in Section
170-B of the Code, 1959, has passed the impugned order in
following terms:-
“9) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of
Bhaiji vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla and
Others reported in (2003) 1 SCC 692, in
paragraph 8 held as under:-
“8. It is well known that some of the
aboriginal tribes are nomadic and some
indulge into crimes traditionally and
historically. The purpose of settling land with
the tribals mostly which is done at very
concessional rates and at times even without
involving an obligation to pay the land
revenue, is so done with a view to see that
the aboriginals settle at one place

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abandoning nomadism and picking up tilling
the soil as their vocation by settling at one
place and earning livelihood by labour and
toil. It is also well known that creamy layers
have developed and even as amongst
socially unprivileged some have acquired
affluence. An affluent shrewd tribal may
indulge into exploiting his fellow beings.
Possibility cannot be ruled out where a non-
tribal may manage to have land transferred
apparently but not in reality in the name of a
tribal and taking advantage of his status,
affluence or any other means, conferring him
with capacity to exploit, may till the land to
his own advantage depriving the aboriginal
tribal from the benefits of the land settled by
the State with him. All such cases are taken
care of by Section 170-B. The purpose of
enacting Section 170-B of the Code is very
wide. The object sought to be achieved, as
its drafting indicates, is to gather and make
available all statistics with the State officials
so as to find out how much land belonging to
aboriginal tribals is in possession of anyone
to whom it does not belong as on the cut off
date. The information having been collected
the enquiry under sub-Section (3) shall be
directed towards finding out the nature of
transaction resulting into transfer of land -
whether such transaction of transfer has
resulted in the aboriginal tribal having been
defrauded of his legitimate right in the land.
Sub- Sections (1), (2) and (3), as enacted in

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1980, have to be read as part of one whole
scheme. If the submission of Shri Gambhir is
correct then the object of enquiry under sub-
Section (3) would have been to find out if
such transaction of transfer has resulted in
an aboriginal tribal having been defrauded of
his legitimate right by person not belonging
to aboriginal tribe. But that is not so.
Nowhere in the entire scheme of sub-
Sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 170-B, as
enacted in 1980, there is the least indication
of confining the applicability of the provision
to such transactions of transfer as were
entered into by a member of aboriginal tribe
in favour of a member not belonging to
aboriginal tribe. No exception has been
enacted by the Legislature so as to exclude
from the purview of Section 170-B
transactions of transfer between two persons
both of whom are members of aboriginal
tribes. Had it been so, the Legislature would
have specifically said so. The language of
the Section as drafted in 1980 is clear and
unambiguous and does not admit of any
doubt so far as this aspect is concerned.”
In this judgment, it was observed that even
though the transaction was between two Tribes,
the provisions of Section 170-B of the Code,
1959 would attract.
10) As far as the matter of Harjesh Rai (supra)
is concerned, it is not the case with regard to
houses situated in urban areas. The Aboriginal

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Tribe had moved an application for reversion of
agricultural land which was fraudulently
transferred; therefore, the facts of the case
cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners
are entirely different from the facts of the
present case.
11) Taking into consideration the law laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the grounds
raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners
have no merit.
12) With regard to the conversion of Gram
Panchayat to Nagar Panchayat, the sale deed
was executed on 23.05.1979, at that time;
Village Naya Baradwar was Gram Panchayat.
Perhaps in the year 1990-91, it was upgraded
as Nagar Panchayat; therefore Section 170-B
of the Code, 1959 would apply in its full force.
13) Section 59 of the Code, 1959 says as
under:-
“59. Variation of land revenue according to
purpose for which land is used.—
(1)The assessment of land revenue on any
land shall be made with reference to the use
of land—
(a)for the purpose of agriculture or such farm
house, which is situated on holding of one
acre or more;
(b)as sites for dwelling houses; (c)for
purposes other than those specified in item
(a), (b), (d) or (e);

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(d)for industrial or commercial purpose;
(e)for the purpose of mining under a mining
lease within the meaning of Mines and
Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act,
1957 (No. 67 of 1959);
Provided that the assessment of land
revenue on any land situated in the areas
which are constituted as reserved or
protected forests under the Indian Forest
Act, 1927 (16 of 1927), with reference to use
of land for any of the purposes aforesaid
shall not be proceeded with or any
procedure relating to the assessment to be
followed under the relevant provisions of the
Code shall not be commenced except on a
certificate permitting the use of land issued
by an officer of the Forest Department duly
authorised by the State Government in this
behalf.
(2)Where land assessed for use for any one
purpose is diverted to any other purpose, the
land revenue payable upon such land shall,
notwithstanding that the term for which the
assessment may have been fixed has not
expired, be liable to be altered and assessed
in accordance with the purpose to which it
has been diverted.
(2-a) The Alteration or Assessment Referred
to in Sub-Section (2) Shall be Carried out by
the [Collector] [Substituted 'Sub-Divisional
Officer'

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(3)Where the land held free from the
payment of land revenue on condition of
being used for any purpose is diverted to any
other purpose it shall become liable to the
payment of land revenue and assessed in
accordance with the purpose to which is has
been diverted.
(4)The assessment made under sub-
sections (2) and (3) shall be in accordance
with the rules made by State Government in
this behalf and such rules shall be in
accordance with the principles contained in
Chapter VII or VIII, as the case may be.
(5)Where land for use for any one purpose is
diverted to any other purpose, and land
revenue is assessed thereon under the
provisions of this section, the Sub-Divisional
Officer' shall also have power to impose a
premium on the diversion in accordance with
rules made under this Code :
Provided that no premium shall be imposed
for the diversion of any land for charitable
purposes.
(6)Notwithstanding any usage or grant or
anything contained in any law, the right of all
persons holding land, which immediately
before the coming into force of the
Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1954 (II
of 1955), was held in malik makbuza right, to
exemption from payment of premium on
diversion of such land is hereby abolished;

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but every such person shall, on diversion of
such land, be entitled in lieu of such right to
a rebate equal to the land revenue for one
year payable for such land from the amount
of premium determined under sub-section
(5).”
Section 59 of the Code, 1959 does not touch
upon the applicability of Section 170-B of the
Code, 1959, therefore, the contention made by
learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be
accepted.
14) Firtu Ram in his statement has stated that
the house was constructed three years after
the transaction. Undisputedly, the house was
constructed but the member of non-tribe and
other witnesses, namely, Prem Singh, Lakhan
Lal and Bhulau Singh have specifically stated
that the house was constructed in the year
1991-92 or 1997 and the papers of the property
tax annexed by the petitioners in this petition
would show that the electricity meter was
installed in the year 1997 and the property tax
was paid from 1997. The payment of property
tax would not confer any right in favour of the
petitioners; therefore, in the opinion of this
Court, the grounds raised by the petitioners are
of no help.
15) Taking into consideration the fact that there
is a concurrent finding recorded by the
Revenue Courts and undisputedly, the property
belongs to the member of the Aboriginal Tribe,
in the opinion of this Court, no case is made

18
out for interference.
16) In view of the above, this writ petition fails
and is hereby dismissed. No order as to
cost(s). ”
20 The principal question which arises for consideration in the
present intra-Court appeal is whether the learned Single Judge
was justified in declining to interfere with the concurrent orders
passed by the revenue authorities under Section 170-B of the
Code, 1959, directing reversion of the subject land in favour of a
member of the Aboriginal Tribe.
21 The foundation of the challenge raised by the appellants is that
the subject land was purchased in the name of Firtu Ram, a
member of the Aboriginal Tribe, through a registered sale deed
dated 23.05.1979 and that, therefore, the revenue authorities
could not have gone behind the registered instrument and
recorded a finding that the land was, in substance, being held and
enjoyed by Lakhanlal Rathore, a non-tribal. It is further contended
that such a determination amounts to adjudication of a disputed
question concerning the real nature of the transaction and,
therefore, falls beyond the scope of jurisdiction conferred upon the
Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959.
The appellants have also sought to derive support from the
decision of this Court in Urmila Devi (supra).
22 Before dealing with the aforesaid submission, it is necessary to
bear in mind the legislative object underlying Section 170-B of the

19
Code, 1959. The provision is a protective measure intended to
safeguard the land of members of the Aboriginal Tribe from being
lost or placed in the effective possession or enjoyment of persons
who are not entitled to hold such land. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in Bhaiji (supra), has explained the width and object of
Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 and has held that the enquiry
contemplated by the provision is directed towards ascertaining the
nature of the transaction and whether, as a result thereof, an
Aboriginal Tribe has been deprived of his legitimate right in the
land. The statutory protection, therefore, cannot be rendered
ineffective merely because the transaction is clothed in the form of
a registered instrument or because the revenue records contain
an entry in the name of a tribal person.
23 In the present case, the proceedings under Section 170-B of the
Code, 1959 were not initiated or decided in a mechanical manner.
The Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) called for the report of the
concerned Patwari, issued notices to the persons concerned,
afforded them an opportunity of appearing before the authority
and recorded the statements of the parties as well as other
witnesses. The matter was thereafter considered afresh upon
remand by the Collector.
24 Thus, there was a full-fledged statutory enquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the subject land, including the
question of its actual possession and enjoyment. The conclusion

20
reached by the Sub-Divisional Officer was subsequently
examined by the Collector and the Commissioner, and the
findings were consistently maintained.
25 We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission that the
revenue authorities proceeded merely on the basis of an oral
allegation or that the registered sale deed was completely
ignored. A registered document undoubtedly constitutes relevant
evidence of the transaction recorded therein; however, in a
proceeding under Section 170-B, the mere existence of such
document cannot, by itself, foreclose an enquiry into the
circumstances in which the land came to be possessed and
enjoyed by a non-tribal. The statutory enquiry is concerned with
the substance and consequence of the transaction and not merely
with its outward form.
26 The material noticed by the learned Single Judge assumes
significance in this regard. The learned Single Judge specifically
adverted to the evidence relating to the construction raised over
the subject property. Firtu Ram, in his statement, stated that the
house had been constructed approximately three years after the
transaction. However, the evidence of the non-tribal as well as
other witnesses, namely, Prem Singh, Lakhan Lal and Bhulau
Singh, was to the effect that the house had been constructed
much later, around the years 1991-92 or 1997. This aspect finds
further corroboration from the documents relied upon by the

21
appellants themselves, which indicate that the electricity
connection was obtained only in the year 1997 and that property
tax was being paid from the year 1997. Thus, the learned Single
Judge did not proceed merely on the basis of the registered sale
deed, but examined the surrounding circumstances and the
material relating to actual possession and use of the property. The
payment of property tax or existence of an electricity connection,
by itself, may not confer title; however, such circumstances are
certainly relevant while examining the factual question of
possession and enjoyment of the property in the context of the
statutory enquiry contemplated under Section 170-B of the Code,
1959.
27 We may now deal with the reliance placed by learned counsel for
the appellants upon the judgment of this Court in Urmila Devi
(supra). Having carefully examined the said judgment, we are of
the considered opinion that the same does not govern the
controversy involved in the present appeal. In Urmila Devi
(supra), the controversy arose in a materially different factual
setting where the revenue authorities had proceeded to declare
the registered sale transaction itself to be fraudulent and, on that
basis, had sought to annul the subsequent registered transfer in
favour of a non-tribal purchaser. The Division Bench, following the
principle laid down in Khora (Dead) through Legal
Representatives and others v. Mohar Sai and others, (2023)
14 SCC 767 , held that determination of such disputed questions

22
concerning title, intention of the parties and the true nature of a
registered transaction, for the purpose of declaring the transaction
itself to be benami or fraudulent, falls within the domain of a
competent civil court and cannot be undertaken by the revenue
authorities in a summary proceeding under Section 170-B of the
Code, 1959.
28 The factual and legal position in the present case stands on a
different footing. Here, the proceedings under Section 170-B of
the Code, 1959 concern the possession and enjoyment of the
subject land and the statutory obligation to protect the land of an
Aboriginal Tribe from being held by a non-tribal. The authorities
have not merely purported to adjudicate a complicated suit for
declaration of title between rival claimants; rather, after conducting
the enquiry contemplated by Section 170-B of the Code, 1959,
they have recorded findings on the basis of the revenue report,
statements of witnesses and surrounding circumstances that the
land was in the possession and enjoyment of a non-tribal and was
consequently liable to be reverted. The said finding has thereafter
been affirmed at successive stages. Thus, the ratio of Urmila
Devi (supra) cannot be mechanically applied to the present case
so as to render the statutory enquiry under Section 170-B wholly
otiose.
29 It is also important to appreciate the distinction between an
adjudication of title in the strict sense and an enquiry into the

23
factual circumstances relevant for exercising the statutory power
under Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. The appellants cannot
contend that the Sub-Divisional Officer is completely precluded
from examining the surrounding circumstances, actual possession
or the effect of a transaction merely because a registered
document exists. If such a construction were accepted, the
protective purpose of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 could be
defeated in every case by placing a registered document on
record, irrespective of the actual manner in which the land came
to be possessed or enjoyed. The provision must receive an
interpretation which advances its object and prevents its
circumvention through form rather than substance.
30 The reliance placed by the appellants upon Section 4 of the
Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 also does
not assist them in the facts of the present case. The present
proceedings arise under the special statutory scheme contained
in Section 170-B of the Code, 1959. The appellants cannot invoke
the provisions of another enactment in such a manner as to
completely nullify the statutory enquiry specifically contemplated
under the Code. In any event, the existence of a registered sale
deed in favour of a tribal person cannot, by itself, answer the
question whether the land was subsequently placed in the
effective possession or enjoyment of a non-tribal in circumstances
attracting the protective provisions of Section 170-B of the Code,
1959.

24
31 We are equally unable to accept the contention that the finding
recorded by the revenue authorities is based merely on
conjectures or surmises. The record, as noticed by the learned
Single Judge, contains material relating to the construction over
the property, the period of such construction, the electricity
connection, payment of property tax and, more importantly, the
statements of the persons examined during the statutory enquiry.
These circumstances were considered cumulatively. It is not for
this Court, in exercise of intra-Court appellate jurisdiction, to
substitute its own appreciation of such evidence merely because
another possible inference may be suggested by the appellants.
32 The fact that the subject land was originally transferred to Firtu
Ram, who himself belonged to the Aboriginal Tribe, also does not
conclude the matter. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Bhaiji (supra), Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 is not confined
only to cases where the initial transfer is directly from a member
of the Aboriginal Tribe to a non-tribal. The statutory enquiry is
wider and is intended to ascertain whether the transaction has, in
substance, resulted in the tribal being deprived of his legitimate
right in the land. The learned Single Judge has, therefore,
committed no error in applying the principle laid down in Bhaiji
(supra) to the facts of the present case.
33 We are also mindful that the impugned orders have been passed
after considerable lapse of time. However, mere passage of time

25
cannot, in the facts of the present case, by itself defeat the
statutory protection available to members of the Aboriginal Tribe,
particularly when the competent authority, after enquiry, has
recorded a finding that the land has come to be held or enjoyed
by a person not belonging to the protected class. The legislative
purpose of Section 170-B of the Code, 1959 would be
substantially diluted if an arrangement found, upon statutory
enquiry, to have resulted in deprivation of tribal land could be
sustained merely on account of the passage of time.
34 So far as the scope of interference in the present intra-Court
appeal is concerned, the appellants have failed to demonstrate
that the learned Single Judge committed any jurisdictional error or
adopted a view which is contrary to the statutory scheme. The
learned Single Judge considered the relevant provisions, took
note of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhaiji
(supra), examined the circumstances relied upon by the parties
and found that the concurrent findings recorded by the revenue
authorities did not warrant interference. No perversity, patent
illegality, violation of principles of natural justice or manifest error
of law has been demonstrated before us.
35 We also find that the contention that the registered sale deed
conclusively establishes the appellants' right in the subject land
cannot be accepted in the context of the present proceedings.
Registration of an instrument is undoubtedly a significant

26
circumstance, but it cannot be treated as an absolute bar against
an enquiry which the statute itself requires the competent
authority to undertake. What is material is whether,
notwithstanding the apparent transaction, the land of an Aboriginal
Tribe has, in reality, come to be held or enjoyed by a person who
is not entitled thereto. That is precisely the aspect which has been
examined by the revenue authorities in the present case.
36 The learned Single Judge has further noticed that the house
existing over the subject land was not shown to have been
constructed contemporaneously with the transaction relied upon
by the appellants. On the contrary, the evidence regarding the
subsequent construction, coupled with the electricity connection
and property-tax records from the later period, was considered
while examining the plea regarding possession and enjoyment.
The learned Single Judge rightly observed that mere payment of
property tax would not, in itself, confer title upon the appellants.
The said documents, therefore, could not displace the findings
recorded by the competent authorities on the basis of the
evidence as a whole.
37 On a cumulative consideration of the entire material, we are
satisfied that the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer
(Revenue), Collector and Commissioner, Bilaspur Division, do not
suffer from any jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference. The
proceedings were undertaken in accordance with the statutory

27
mechanism, the concerned parties were afforded opportunity of
hearing, the relevant material was considered and the findings
recorded by the authorities have remained consistent. The
learned Single Judge, therefore, rightly declined to exercise the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court.
38 In view of the foregoing discussion, the reliance placed by learned
counsel for the appellants upon Urmila Devi (supra) is misplaced
and does not advance their case. The said decision cannot be
read as laying down a proposition that, in every proceeding under
Section 170-B of the Code, 1959, the competent revenue
authority is prohibited from examining the actual possession,
enjoyment and surrounding circumstances of the subject land
merely because a registered sale deed exists in the name of a
tribal person. The said judgment is confined to the factual and
legal situation considered therein, namely, the assumption of
jurisdiction by the revenue authorities to adjudicate and declare
the registered transaction itself to be fraudulent/benami and to
annul a subsequent transfer on that basis. The present case, on
the other hand, concerns an enquiry into the circumstances
relevant to the statutory protection under Section 170-B of the
Code, 1959, followed by concurrent findings based upon the
material available on record.
39 Consequently, we find no ground to interfere with the well-
reasoned order passed by the learned Single Judge. The

28
appellants have failed to establish that the impugned order dated
20.03.2024 passed in Writ Petition (C) No.2051/2019 suffers from
any error of law, jurisdictional infirmity, perversity or violation of
the principles of natural justice. The findings recorded by the
competent revenue authorities, having been considered and
affirmed by the learned Single Judge, do not warrant interference
in the present intra-Court appeal.
40 Accordingly, the present writ appeal is dismissed . The order
dated 20.03.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ
Petition (C) No.2051/2019, as well as the orders dated
11.02.2003, 03.03.2004 and 30.11.2009 passed by the Sub-
Divisional Officer (Revenue), Collector and Commissioner,
Bilaspur Division, respectively, are affirmed.
41 There shall be no order as to costs.
42 Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha )
Judge Chief Justice
Anu