Saroj & Ors vs Jagan Lal (Decd.) Thr Lr & Anr

Court
Delhi High Court

$~15 & 16
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 13.08.2026
# CNR No. DLHC013402092016
+ FAO 7/2017
SAROJ & ORS .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Anshuman Bal, Advocate

versus

JAGAN LAL (DECD.) THR LR & ANR .....Respondent
Through: Ms. Suman Bagga, Advocate for
Respondent No. 2
16
# CNR No. DLHC013402172016
+ FAO 8/2017
SUNITA & ORS .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Anshuman Bal, Advocate

versus

LRS OF JAGAN LAL & ORS .....Respondent
Through: Ms. Suman Bagga, Advocate for
Respondent No. 2

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI

JUDGMENT (ORAL)
1. The present appeals have been filed under Section 30 of the
Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 by the claimants/appellants
seeking modification of the impugned orders passed by the learned
Commissioner in Case Nos. CWC-D/NDD/16/2016/479 and CWC-
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D/NDD/15/2016/482.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants in both appeals
contends that the instant cases involve the death of two persons in
respect of whom separate claim applications were filed. The deaths
were held to have arisen out of and in the course of the appellants’
employment. However, the learned Commissioner, instead of directing
the insurance company/respondent no. 2, rather directed the
employer/respondent no. 1 to pay the compensation.
3. It is stated that at the time of the incident, the vehicle in question
was duly insured under a valid and subsisting insurance policy, which
was not denied. Notably, the employer expired during the pendency of
the proceedings before the learned Commissioner. However, during his
lifetime, a written statement was filed by him admitting that Sh.
Kaptan Singh was employed with him as a Helper at a last drawn
salary of Rs.7,500/- per month, and Sh. Sahab Singh was employed
with him as a Driver at a last drawn salary of Rs.10,000/- per month.
The employer also admitted that on 28.02.2014, the vehicle bearing no.
DL-ILN-8239 was being driven by Sh. Sahab Singh from Karala to
Puth Khurd and when he reached his house, a Skoda Car bearing no.
DL-lCP-1772 came from the Puth Khurd side and hit Sh. Sahab
Singh ’s vehicle and a person from the Skoda Car shot at the deceased
with a pistol, resulting in the death of Sh. Sahab Singh . In the incident,
Sh. Kaptan Singh was also shot dead. It was further stated that the
vehicle in question was insured with the insurance company vide a
policy valid from 31.07.2013 to 30.07.2014. A criminal case was also
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registered vide FIR No. 183 on 28.02.2014 with P.S. Bawana .

4. The insurance company filed its written statement denying its
liability by claiming that it was a case of murder and therefore, no
compensation was required to be paid.
5. As noted above, the learned Commissioner directed the
employer to pay the compensation. Before this Court, learned counsel
for respondent no. 2/insurance company reiterated his contention that
this being a case of murder simpliciter , no compensation is payable,
and accordingly opposed the prayer seeking a direction to the
insurance company to pay compensation.
6. Though the insurance company was not held liable for
compensation and consequently preferred no appeal, in light of the
contentions raised by it, this Court proceeds to examine the issue as to
whether, in the present facts, the murder can be held to be an accident
arising out of and in the course of employment.
7. A subtle distinction between a murder which is an accident and a
murder which is not an accident was succinctly explained by the
Supreme Court in Rita Devi and Ors. Vs. New India Assurance Co.
1
Ltd. and Anr. , wherein it was held that the Court has to initially
examine the dominant intention of the act as to whether the intention
of the act of felony was to kill any particular person, or an act of
murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in
furtherance of any other felonious act. In the latter case, the murder
was held to be an accident. The relevant observations are as under:
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“ 10. The question, therefore, is can a murder be an
accident in any given case? There is no doubt that murder, as it is
understood, in the common parlance is a felonious act where death
is caused with intent and the perpetrators of that act normally have
a motive against the victim for such killing. But there are also
instances where murder can be by accident on a given set of facts.
The difference between a murder which is not an accident and a
murder which is an accident, depends on the proximity of the cause
of such murder. In our opinion, if the dominant intention of the Act
of felony is to kill any particular person then such killing is not an
accidental murder but is a murder simplicitor, while if the cause of
murder or act of murder was originally not intended and the same
was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act then such
murder is an accidental murder.
11. In Challis vs. London and South Western Railway
Company (1905 2 Kings Bench 154), the Court of Appeal held
where an engine driver while driving a train under a bridge was
killed by a stone willfully dropped on the train by a boy from the
bridge, that his injuries were caused by an accident. In the said
case, the Court rejecting an argument that the said incident cannot
be treated as an accident held:
The accident which befell the deceased was, as it
appears to me, one which was incidental to his employment
as an engine driver; in other words it arose out of his
employment. The argument for the respondents really
involves the reading into the Act of a proviso to the effect
that an accident shall not be deemed to be within the Act, if
it arose from the mischievous act of a person not in the
service of the employer. I see no reason to suppose that the
Legislature intended so to limit the operation of the Act. The
result is the same to the engine driver, from whatever cause
the accident happened; and it does not appear to me to be
any answer to the claim for indemnification under the Act to
say that the accident was caused by some person who acted
mischievously.

12. In the case of Nisbet vs. Rayne & Burn (1910) 1 KB
689, where a cashier, while travelling in a railway to a colliery with
a large sum of money for the payment of his employers workmen,
was robbed and murdered. The Court of Appeal held: That the
murder was an accident from the standpoint of the person who

1
AIR 2000 SC1930(1)
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suffered from it and that it arose out of an employment which
involved more than the ordinary risk, and consequently that the
widow was entitled to compensation under the Workmens
Compensation Act 1906. In this case the Court followed its earlier
judgment in the case of Challis (supra). In the case of Nisbet, the
Court also observed that it is contended by the employer that this
was not an accident within the meaning of the Act, because it was
an intentional felonious act which caused the death, and that the
word accident negatives the idea of intention. In my opinion, this
contention ought not to prevail. I think it was an accident from the
point of view of Nisbet, and that it makes no difference whether the
pistol shot was deliberately fired at Nisbet or whether it was
intended for somebody else and not for Nisbet.
13. The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Nisbets case
was followed by the majority judgment by the House of Lords in the
case of Board of Management of Trim Joint District School vs. Kelly
(1914 AC 667).
14. Applying the principles laid down in the above cases
to the facts of the case in hand, we find that the deceased, a driver
of the auto rickshaw, was duty bound to have accepted the demand
of fare paying passengers to transport them to the place of their
destination. During the course of this duty, if the passengers had
decided to commit an act of felony of stealing the auto rickshaw and
in the course of achieving the said object of stealing the auto
rickshaw, they had to eliminate the driver of the auto rickshaw then
it cannot but be said that the death so caused to the driver of the
auto rickshaw was an accidental murder. The stealing of the auto
rickshaw was the object of the felony and the murder that was
caused in the said process of stealing the auto rickshaw is only
incidental to the act of stealing of the auto rickshaw. Therefore, it
has to be said that on the facts and circumstances of this case the
death of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was caused accidentally in
the process of committing the theft of the auto rickshaw. ”

8. Drawing an analogy from the above, in the present case also, the
details of events narrated in the impugned order would show that there
was an accident first in which the vehicle driven by the deceased had
collided with a Skoda car, whereupon the occupants of the Skoda car
came out and fired at the deceased Sh. Sahab Singh . In the course of
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events, Sh. Kaptan Singh was also shot. Both were admitted to be the
employees by the employer. Thus, there is no doubt that the murder in
the present case is an accident, where the original intent of the offender
was not to kill the deceased and it happened only because of the
incident in which their car had collided with the vehicle driven by the
deceased. This position is not disputed by the learned counsel for the
appellants.
9. Accordingly, the impugned orders are modified insofar as the
insurance company/respondent no. 2 is directed to pay the
compensation amount to the claimants/appellants.
10. The present appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.


(MANOJ KUMAR OHRI)
JUDGE
AUGUST 13, 2026/ pmc
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