GOURDAS SAHA AND ANR. vs DIPANKAR MAJUMDAR

Form No. J(2)


In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side

Present: The Hon‟be Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon‟ble Justice Biswaroop Chowdhury


F.M.A. 25 of 2026
IA No: CAN 1 of 2025

Sri Gourdas Saha and another
Vs.
Sri Dipankar Majumdar



For the appellant : Mr. Debnath Ghosh, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Biswaroop Mukherjee
Mr. Abhik Chitta Kundu
Mr. Angshujit Ghosh, Advs.

For the respondent : Mr. Supratick Syamal
Ms. Arkarupa Roy, Advs.

Heard on : 11.05.2026

Judgment on : 11.05.2026


Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-



1. The appeal is admitted to be heard on the grounds taken in the
memorandum of appeal and, on consent of the parties, is taken
up for hearing along with the application.

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2. The moot contention raised by the appellants before this court is
twofold - first, the suit pertains to a commercial dispute as
contemplated in the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 but has been
instituted as a regular civil suit; secondly, although the suit has
been couched as a declaratory suit simpliciter, the foundational
premise of the plaintiff‟s cause of action is infringement of the
alleged copyright of the plaintiff/respondent in respect of two
chapters of a Chemistry book published by the
defendants/appellants, which is a part of the West Bengal
Higher Secondary Council syllabus.
3. It is contended by learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants that not only was the suit required to be filed before a
designated commercial court, the trappings of a commercial
dispute had to be reflected in the plaint itself, since a
commercial suit has certain unique features which are absent in
a regular suit, such as the applicability of Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

4. Secondly, the learned Single Judge, it is argued, did not record
any reason worth the name as to what was the compelling
urgency to grant ad interim injunction without giving notice to

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the defendants, within the contemplation of the proviso to Order
XXXIX Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
5. In support of such contention, learned senior counsel cites Time
City Infrastructure and Housing Limited vs. State of U.P. and
others reported at 2025 SCC Online SC 1674 .

6. In the said judgment, the imperative nature of the proviso to
Order XXXIX Rule 3, mandating the court to give reason for
passing an ex parte ad interim order, was discussed at length by
considering several previous judgments on the self-same
proposition.
7. On the necessity of reasons, learned senior counsel also cites
Union of India and others vs. Essen Mining & Industries Limited
and another reported at (2005) 6 SCC 675 .
8. By placing reliance on the relevant provisions of the Copyright
Act, 1957, learned senior counsel contends that the suit, as
framed, is steeped in the copyright claim made by the plaintiff,
although framed as an ordinary declaratory suit.

9. Even otherwise, it is submitted that since the alleged offending
book contains only two chapters purported to have been
authored by the plaintiff, the trial court could very well have
permitted the appellants to continue publishing the book by

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deleting the said two offending chapters. Instead, the learned
Trial Judge restrained the appellants from publishing the said
book in its entirety without reflecting the name of the
plaintiff/respondent as author.
10. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff/respondent argues
that in the City Civil Court at Calcutta, there is no specific
notification designating any commercial court but certain courts
have been earmarked for entertaining suits of a commercial
nature.
11. As such, there was no scope for the suit to be filed specifically in
the Commercial Division of the City Civil Court.
12. Even otherwise, it is submitted that the premise of the suit is
declaratory relief on the manuscript authored by the
plaintiff/respondent. Thus, the trappings of a commercial suit
are not applicable.
13. In addition, learned counsel submits that there was no
agreement alleged to have been entered into between the parties
to bring the suit within the purview of a “commercial dispute” as
stipulated in the 2015 Act.
14. Learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent submits that the
defendants/appellants are guilty of recurring violations of the

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order of injunction passed by the learned Trial Judge by
continuing to print the concerned book with the offending
chapters, without attributing due credits for those chapters to
the plaintiff/respondent as the author.
15. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the Court comes to
the following conclusions:
16. Insofar as the first ground of the appeal is concerned, there is
substance in the contention of the appellants that the suit, on
the face of the plaint, pertains to a “commercial dispute” as
contemplated under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
17. Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of the said Act provides that a “commercial
dispute” includes a dispute arising out of intellectual property
rights relating to registered and unregistered trademarks,
copyright, patent, design, etc.
18. From the very frame of the present suit, it is clear that the
plinth of the rights, which form the premise of the cause of
action of the plaintiff/respondent, is based on the plaintiff‟s
alleged copyright.
19. In the suit, the plaintiff/respondent has claimed that he has
authored certain manuscripts containing the two offending
chapters, which were handed over by him in good faith to the

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appellants-publishers and are being allegedly published by the
defendants/appellants without taking his permission and
without acknowledging the authorship of the
plaintiff/respondent.
20. From a perusal of the relevant provisions of the Copyright Act, in
particular Sections 55 and 57 thereof, it is clear that the
foundation of the suit is comprised of rights flowing from the
Copyright Act, 1957, thus, coming within the purview of Section
2(1)(c)(xvii) of the Commercial Courts Act, particularly since, as
per the valuation of the suit disclosed in the plaint itself, it is
above the “specified value” stipulated for the City Civil Court at
Calcutta.
21. Hence, as the issue of jurisdiction hits at the very root of the
prima facie case, this court is of the opinion that the ad interim
injunction order was passed by the learned Trial Judge, acting
in the capacity of a regular civil court (as opposed to a
designated Commercial Court), without jurisdiction. Although
the respondent is correct in arguing that despite no particular
Bench having been designated by notification as „Commercial
Court‟ in the City Civil Court at Calcutta, commercial suits are
assigned to different Benches of the said Court according to

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territorial jurisdiction, fact remains that the present suit was
filed as a regular declaratory suit and, thus, was entertained by
the Trial Court as an ordinary suit.
22. Even otherwise, although the learned Trial Judge paid lip-service
to reasons in respect of the three tests of injunction, there was
no exercise on the part of the learned Trial Judge to advert to
the actual materials placed before him, nor was there any
specific reason assigned in the impugned order as to why the
object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay, as
required to be furnished under the proviso to Order XXXIX Rule
3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
23. As has been reiterated time and again by the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court and different High Courts of the country, the reason for
the purpose of grant of ad interim injunction has to be
specifically enumerated in the order itself, in however
precise/concise manner it may be.
24. However, we do not find any such reason having been recorded
in the present impugned order, thus vitiating the ad interim
injunction on such count as well.
25. In view of the above findings, we deliberately choose not to enter
into the merits of the respective claims of the parties at this

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stage, since it may adversely prejudice either of the parties in
other proceedings and/or subsequent stages of the present suit.
26. Be that as it may, the impugned order suffers from several
errors of law and fact, as pointed out above, and is tainted prima
facie by lack of jurisdiction.

27. Accordingly, FMA 25 of 2026 is allowed on contest, thereby
setting aside the impugned order, bearing Order No. 2 dated
November 24, 2025 passed by the learned Judge, Tenth Bench,
City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit No.2637 of 2025.
28. CAN 1 of 2025 is accordingly disposed of.
29. There will be no order as to costs.
30. Urgent photostat copies of this order, if applied for, be given to
the parties upon compliance of all requisite formalities.






(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.


(Biswaroop Chowdhury, J.)
AD-36
AK