Juvenile - X vs State of U.P. and Another

A.F.R.
Reserved on : 08.10.2026
Delivered on : 27.10.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 4845 of 2026
Juvenile - X
.....Revisionist(s)
Versus
State of U.P. and Another
.....Opposite
Party(s)
Counsel for Revisionist(s) : Ankita Tiwari, Nidhi, Sr. Advocate
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : Kunwar Akhilendra Singh, G.A.

Court No. - 82
HON'BLE JAI PRAKASH TIWARI, J.
1. Vakalatnama of Sri Shyam Kishore Yadav and Sri Kunwar Akhilendra
Singh, learned Advocates, filed on behalf of O.P. No.2 is taken on record.
2. Heard Sri Sushil Shukla, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms.
Ankita Tiwari, learned counsel for the revisionist, Sri Shyam Kishore
Yadav, learned counsel for the O.P. No.2 and Sri Ashutosh Srivastava,
learned AGA for the State-respondent.
3. The present criminal revision under Section 102 of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 has been preferred by the
revisionist challenging the validity and correctness of the judgment and
order dated 16.07.2026 passed by the Special Judge (POCSO
Act)/Children Court, Bulandshahr in Criminal Appeal No. 106 of 2026,
by which, the learned Children Court affirmed the order dated 11.05.2026
passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, Bulandshahr in Criminal Misc. Case
No. 107 of 2023 arising out of Case Crime No. 483 of 2016, under
Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC, Police Station Khurja
Nagar, District Bulandshahr, whereby the revisionist's application seeking
trial before the Juvenile Justice Board was rejected, directing the
transmission of record for trial before the Children Court.
4. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the revisionist submitted that
the present FIR was lodged on 30.06.2016 at 21:35 hours at Police

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Station- Khurja Nagar, District- Bulandshahr against unknown person by
Haji Rafeeq, the owner of Altamash Pvt. Ltd., with regard to fraud and
cheating of Rs. 40 lakhs committed against him. After investigation,
charge-sheet was submitted against multiple accused including the present
revisionist under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC.
Subsequently an application was moved on behalf of the revisionist
claiming him juvenile at the time of the alleged incident. Vide order dated
10.05.2022, the concerned Juvenile Justice Board (hereinafter referred to
as "the Board")declared the revisionist to be a juvenile assessing his age
at the time of the commission of the alleged offence to be above 16 years
but below 18 years (specifically 16 years, 9 months, and 7 days) and
opined that since the alleged offence falls under the category of heinous
offence, therefore, a preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the
Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") is required
to be conducted. Consequently, a preliminary assessment under Section
15 of the Act was conducted and on the basis of preliminary assessment,
vide order dated 18.05.2022 the Board formed an opinion that the child in
conflict with law ought to be tried by the competent Court as an adult,
thereby transferred the record under Section 18(3) of the Act to the
concerned Court. Thereafter, the mother of the juvenile (child in conflict
with law) moved an application dated 26.08.2022 before the court of
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Khurja, Bulandshahar with a prayer
that the case record pertaining to the juvenile (present revisionist) be
separated and transmitted to the competent Court, however, the A.C.J.M.,
Khurja vide order dated 03.02.2023 rejected the said application
observing that the Board transferred the record to the said court for trial.
The revisionist approached this Court through Application U/s 482 Cr.P.C
No. 6596 of 2023 to quash the order dated 03.02.2023 passed by learned
A.C.J.M., Khurja and this Court allowed the application and transferred
the case/trial before the Children's Court and directed the learned
A.C.J.M. concerned to send the case record to the Board/Children's Court
having jurisdiction to try the case. In compliance of the order of this
Court, the A.C.J.M., Bulandshahr transmitted the record to the Board.
Thereafter, the Board vide order dated 20.07.2023 held that the offence in
question did not fall within the category of heinous offence but rather
within the category of serious offence; consequently, the J.J. Board,

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3
Bulandshahar had the jurisdiction to conduct the trial/inquiry in the
matter. Accordingly, it was fixed before J.J. Board, Bulandhshahar but
vide order dated 11.05.2026, the Board rejected the application and
observed that the order dated 18.05.2022 passed by the Board directing
trial as an adult remained valid, binding and beyond its review powers.
The appeal filed thereagainst was also dismissed by the Children's Court
vide order dated 16.07.2026. Hence this revision.
5. Learned Senior counsel further submitted that both the Courts below
have committed grave error of law by failing to appreciate the legal
framework laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal v.
State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 787 . It was vehemently contended
that Section 467 IPC, which carries punishment extending upto
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term which may be extended
to ten years, does not prescribe a "minimum" sentence of seven years
imprisonment; consequently, as per the principles in case of Shilpa Mittal
(supra) , the offence committed under Section 467 IPC falls strictly within
the classification of "serious offences" rather than "heinous offences"
under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015.
6. Learned Senior counsel next submitted that preliminary assessment
under Section 15 of the Act and transfer of case/trial under Section 18(3)
of the Act apply exclusively to "heinous offences" and as such, treating
the revisionist as an adult to try before the Children's Court is wholly
illegal and devoid of jurisdiction.
7. Per contra, learned AGA appearing for the State and the learned
counsel for the O.P. No. 2 supported the impugned orders. They
submitted that the Juvenile Justice Board had already conducted a
preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the Act and transferred the
case to the Children's Court under Section 18(3) vide order dated
18.05.2022. They further argued that since the order dated 18.05.2022
was never challenged or set aside by any higher Court, it attained finality.
8. Learned AGA further submitted that under the law, criminal Courts
including the J.J. Board have no power to review or recall their own
orders. Therefore, the Board could not have reconsidered its earlier

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transfer order dated 18.05.2022 and the Children's Court rightly
maintained the jurisdiction over the case.
9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
materials available on record.
10. The fundamental issues that arises for consideration before this Court
are:-
i- Whether an offence punishable under Section 467 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860, which prescribes a punishment of
imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to ten years and fine, but does not
prescribe a minimum period of imprisonment of seven years,
can be categorized as a 'heinous offence' within the ambit of
Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015.
ii- Whether the Juvenile Justice Board can oust its own
jurisdiction and transfer the matter to the Children's Court
merely on the premise that it lacks the power to review or
recall its own order, ignoring the mandatory statutory
framework and threshold criteria governing transfer of
proceedings under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015.
11. In addressing the first issue, it is apposite to note that the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, creates a tripartite
statutory division of offences into petty, serious, and heinous offences,
based upon the quantum of punishment.
11.1. Under Section 2(45) of the Act, "petty offences" are
defined as follows:
Section 2(45):"petty offences" include the offences
for which the maximum punishment under the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for
the time being in force is imprisonment up to three

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years;
11.2. Under Section 2(54) of the Act, "serious offences" are
defined as follows:
Section 2(54):"serious offences" include the
offences for which the punishment under the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the
time being in force is imprisonment between three to
seven years;
11.3. On the other hand, Section 2(33) of the Act defines
"heinous offences" in the following terms:
Section 2(33):"heinous offences" include the
offences for which the minimum punishment under
the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law
for the time being in force is imprisonment for seven
years or more;
12. A bare reading of Section 2(33) of the Act of 2015 makes it clear that
for an offence to be termed as "heinous", the statute must prescribe a
mandatory minimum sentence of at least seven years imprisonment.
However, an ambiguity arose regarding a category of offences under the
Indian Penal Code such as Section 467 IPC, where the maximum
punishment may extend to ten years or life imprisonment, but no
minimum sentence is provided by law. This issue was settled by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Shilpa Mittal (supra) . The Apex Court
held that offences, where the maximum sentence is more than seven years
or life imprisonment but no minimum sentence or a minimum sentence of
less than seven years is prescribed, cannot be treated as "heinous
offences" under Section 2(33) of the Act. The Court held that until the
Parliament amends the law, such offences must be categorized and treated
as "serious offences" under Section 2(54) of the Act of 2015. Same is
quoted below –
36. In view of the above discussion we dispose of the appeal by
answering the question set out in the first part of the judgment

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in the negative and hold that an offence which does not provide
a minimum sentence of 7 years cannot be treated to be an
heinous offence. However, in view of what we have held above,
the Act does not deal with the 4th category of offences viz.
offence where the maximum sentence is more than 7 years'
imprisonment, but no minimum sentence or minimum sentence
of less than 7 years is provided, shall be treated as "serious
offences" within the meaning of the Act and dealt with
accordingly till Parliament takes the call on the matter.
13. In case at hand, the revisionist is charged under Section 467 IPC,
which carries a punishment of imprisonment for life or imprisonment up
to ten years along with a fine. Applying the above settled position of law
to the present case, since Section 467 IPC does not prescribe any
minimum sentence of imprisonment, it does not fall within the definition
of a "heinous offence" under Section 2(33). Instead, it falls under the
category of a "serious offence" under Section 2(54) of the Act.
14. Accordingly, the First Issue is answered in the negative. The offence
under Section 467 IPC charged against the revisionist cannot be
categorized as "heinous offence" under Section 2(33) of the Act of 2015.
15. Adverting to the second issue, it is well settled law that the Act of
2015 anchors full statutory power in the Juvenile Justice Board to
adjudicate matters concerning a juvenile in conflict with law. Before
determining the validity of the transfer orders passed by the Juvenile
Justice Board and the Children's Court, it is necessary to examine the
doctrine of jurisdiction. In legal parlance, jurisdiction refers to the
authority or power of a court to hear and decide a case. It is broadly
categorized into three heads:
(i) Pecuniary Jurisdiction : The financial limits within which a
court can adjudicate matters.
(ii) Territorial Jurisdiction : The legal boundary or
geographical limit within which a court exercises its authority.
(iii) Subject-Matter Jurisdiction : The statutory power

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conferred upon a court to hear and decide cases of a particular
nature or class.
16. It is a cardinal principle of law that subject-matter jurisdiction strikes
at the very authority of the court. A defect of inherent or subject-matter
jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent or procedural waiver. The law in
this regard is well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kiran Singh v.
Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 , wherein it was held that a decree or
order passed by a court without inherent jurisdiction is a nullity and
coram non judice (not before a judge). This principle was further
reaffirmed in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra, (1990) 1 SCC
193 and Harshad Chimanlal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC
791 , wherein the Apex Court reiterated that neither consent nor failure to
raise an objection can confer jurisdiction on a court or tribunal, if it lacks
statutory competence over the subject matter.
17. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vikram Bakshi v.
R.P. Khosla, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1783 , has stated that criminal courts
are generally barred under Section 362 Cr.P.C. from reviewing or altering
their final orders, save for clerical errors or limited instances of
"procedural review" (such as recall due to lack of inherent jurisdiction,
fraud, mistake of court, or non-service/death of a party, provided such
grounds were not available during the original proceedings), observing as
under:
31. This Court, however, in exceptional cases, has carved out limited
scope for exercise of review power by criminal courts. In Grindlays Bank
Ltd. (supra), it was observed that review can be distinguished between
"procedural review" and "substantive review". A "procedural review" is
inherent or implied in a court to set aside a palpably erroneous order
passed under misapprehension by it, however, a "substantive review" is
when error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the
face of the record. It is in the latter sense, this Court, held that no review
lies on merits unless specifically provided under a statute.
32. This distinction has been further clarified in Budhia Swain v.
Gopinath Deb 6 , wherein this Court has laid down certain grounds on
which a criminal court can review or recall its judgment or order i.e.

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when the proceedings before it itself suffers from an inherent lack of
jurisdiction or, a fraud is played upon court to obtain the order or, a
mistake of court causing prejudice to party or the order was in ignorance
of non-serving of necessary party or party had died and estate was not
represented. It was further clarified that these exceptions were subjected
to the limitation that such grounds cannot be raised to recall or review if
they were available during the original action and was not availed.
33. In Ganesh Patel (supra) this Court held that application for recall
seeking "procedural review" and not "substantive review" to which
Section 362 of CrPC be attracted is permissible. This Court upheld the
order of the High Court wherein it recalled the earlier order passed in the
absence of the Respondent and based on false information.
34. A careful consideration of the statutory provisions and the aforesaid
decisions of this Court clarify the now-well-settled position of
jurisprudence of Section 362 of CrPC which when summarize would be
that the criminal courts, as envisaged under the CrPC, are barred from
altering or review their own judgments except for the exceptions which
are explicitly provided by the statute, namely, correction of a clerical or
an arithmetical error that might have been committed or the said power is
provided under any other law for the time being in force. As the courts
become functus officio the very moment a judgment or an order is signed,
the bar of Section 362 CrPC becomes applicable, this, despite the powers
provided under Section 482 CrPC which, this veil cannot allow the courts
to step beyond or circumvent an explicit bar. It also stands clarified that
it is only in situations wherein an application for recall of an order or
judgment seeking a "procedural review" that the bar would not apply and
not a substantive review" where the bar as contained in Section "362
CrPC is attracted. Numerous decisions of this Court have also elaborated
that the bar under said provision is to be applied stricto sensu.
34A. Having said that, the following exceptional circumstances may be
identified, wherein a criminal court is empowered to alter or review its
own judgment or a final order under Section 362 CrPC:
a. Such power is expressly conferred upon court by CrPC or
any other law for the time being in force or;

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b. The court passing such a judgment or order lacked
inherent jurisdiction to do so or;
c. A fraud or collusion is being played on court to obtain
such judgment or order or;
d. A mistake on the part of court caused prejudice to a party
or;
e. Fact relating to non-serving of necessary party or death
leading to estate being non-represented, not brought to
notice of court while passing such judgment or order.
It needs to be reiterated that all these exceptions are only exercisable for
seeking a recall or review of an order or judgment, if a ground that is
raised was not available or existent at the time of original proceedings
before the Court. Mere fact that the said ground, although available, was
not raised or pressed during the concerned proceedings, does not provide
for an exemption to the parties to assert it as a ground. Moreover, the
said power cannot be invoked as a means to circumvent the finality of the
judicial process or mistakes and/or errors in the decision which are
attributable to a conscious omission by the parties.
35. Before we delve into the facts of the instant case in an attempt to sieve
out the correct jurisprudence from the gamut of the arguments raised by
the parties before us, we find it appropriate to first consider the
maintainability of the Review Petition No. 579 of 2020 under Order
XLVII of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 preferred by the Khosla Group
before the High Court. The Khosla Group filed the said review under the
provisions of CPC 1908 seeking recall of Order dated 13.08.2020 passed
in Criminal Miscellaneous (Co.) No. 4 of 2019 which was filed under
section 340 of the CrPC.
36. The scheme of CrPC as enshrined in its long title defines it is an Act
"to consolidate and amend the law relating to Criminal Procedure".
Further, Section 4 of CrPC provides for scope of the CrPC which is
reproduced herein:
"4. Trial of offences under the Penal Code, 1860 and other

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laws.
(1) All offences under the Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860)
shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt
with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.
(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated,
inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to
the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time
being in force regulating the manner of place of
investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with
such offences."
The provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of CrPC expressly
mandates an investigation, inquiry or trial of offences under Penal Code,
1860 of 1860 to be conducted strictly as per the procedure provided in the
provisions of the CrPC. The definition of "inquiry" as stipulated in
Section 2 (g) of CrPC means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted
under the CrPC by a Magistrate or Court.
18. In view of the above, this Court finds that although, there is no
specific provision conferring upon the Court the power to review its own
order but there is limited power of review as the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court. Such power is confined to cases involving an
inherent lack of jurisdiction or applications seeking the recall of an order
or judgment on procedural grounds, commonly referred to as a procedural
review, as distinguished from a substantive review on merits. In such
circumstances, the bar imposed by Section 362 Cr.P.C., would not apply
to a genuine application for procedural recall; however, the statutory bar
would continue to operate against a substantive review of the order or
judgment.
19. Applying these principles to the facts at hand, this Court finds that
under Section 8(1) read with Section 9(2) of the Act of 2015, the Juvenile
Justice Board possesses exclusive original jurisdiction to conduct
inquiries into all petty and serious offences. The relevant statutory
provisions read as under:

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: Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
Section 8(1)
law for the time being in force but save as otherwise expressly
provided in this Act, the Board constituted for any district shall
have the power to deal exclusively with all the proceedings
under this Act, relating to children in conflict with law, in the
area of jurisdiction of such Board.
: In case a person alleged to have committed an
Section 9(2)
offence claims before a court other than a Board, that the
person is a child or was a child on the date of commission of
the offence, or if the court itself is of the opinion that the
person was a child on the date of commission of the offence,
the said court shall make an inquiry, take such evidence as may
be necessary (but not an affidavit) to determine the age of such
person, and shall record a finding on the matter, stating the age
of the person as nearly as may be:
Provided that such a claim may be raised before any court and
it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final disposal of
the case, and such a claim shall be determined in accordance
with the provisions contained in this Act and the rules made
thereunder even if the person has ceased to be a child on or
before the date of commencement of this Act.
20. The Children's Court derives jurisdiction to try a juvenile as an adult
only upon a valid, lawful transfer order passed under Section 18(3)
following a preliminary assessment under Section 15 for a "heinous
offence". The statutory framework governing this transfer provides as
follows:
: In case of a heinous offence alleged to have
Section 15(1)
been committed by a child, who has completed or is above the
age of sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a preliminary
assessment with regard to his mental and physical capacity to
commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of
the offence and the circumstances in which he allegedly
committed the offence, and may pass an order in accordance

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with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 18:
Provided that for such an assessment, the Board may take the
assistance of experienced psychologists or psycho-social
workers or other experts.
Explanation - For the purposes of this section, it is clarified
that preliminary assessment is not a trial, but is to assess the
capacity of such child to commit and understand the
consequences of the alleged offence.
: Where the Board after preliminary assessment
Section 18(3)
under section 15 pass an order that there is a need for trial of
the said child as an adult, then the Board may order transfer of
the trial of the case to the Children's Court having jurisdiction
to try such offences.
21. In the present case, since the offence under Section 467 IPC is a
"serious offence", the Juvenile Justice Board had no statutory authority to
invoke Section 15 or pass a transfer order under Section 18(3). The Board
erred in holding that it could not recall its order and that the Children's
Court must try the matter. Statutory jurisdiction can neither be created nor
abdicated on the pretext of procedural constraints or an inability to recall
an order. An order passed by a court or board lacking subject-matter
jurisdiction is void ab initio.
22. Furthermore, the Children's Court erred in affirming its jurisdiction
over a non-heinous offence. When a case is received by the Children's
Court following a preliminary assessment, Section 19(1) of the Act of
2015 imposes a mandatory statutory duty upon it to independently
determine whether there is a need to try the child as an adult. The
provision states:
Section 19(1) : After the receipt of preliminary assessment
from the Board under section 15, the Children's Court may
decide that—
(i) there is a need for trial of the child as an adult...

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(ii) there is no need for trial of the child as an adult,
then the Children's Court may conduct an inquiry as
a Board and pass appropriate orders in accordance
with the provisions of section 18.
23. Under Section 19(1)(ii), if the Children's Court comes to the
conclusion that there is no need for a trial as an adult which includes cases
where the offence itself is non-heinous it is required to step into the shoes
of the Board, conduct the inquiry itself, and pass appropriate orders under
Section 18 of the Act.
24. Alternatively, where the transfer order passed by the Board is
fundamentally without jurisdiction, the Children's Court lacks inherent
original subject-matter jurisdiction over serious offences. In such
circumstances, it ought to have exercised its statutory powers under
Section 9(2) of the Act of 2015 read with Section 228(1)(a) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973(Section 251(1)(a) of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) to decline jurisdiction and return/forward the file
to the competent Juvenile Justice Board.
25. In view of the findings recorded above, the criminal revision is
.
allowed
26. The impugned order dated 11.05.2026 passed by the Juvenile Justice
Board transferring the case to the Children's Court, as well as the
subsequent impugned order dated 16.07.2026 passed by the Children's
Court affirming its jurisdiction, are hereby quashed and set aside.
27. The matter is remanded back to the Juvenile Justice Board,
Bulandshahar having jurisdiction, under Section 9(2) of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
28. The Juvenile Justice Board is directed to register the matter on its own
vector and proceed with the inquiry strictly in accordance with the
procedure prescribed for "serious offences" under Section 14 read with
Section 18(1) of the Act, without subjecting the revisionist to any adult
trial.

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29. The record of the case shall be transmitted forthwith from the
Children's Court to the concerned Juvenile Justice Board.
30. Before parting with the order, I would like to express my appreciation
to my Research Associate Ms. Divya Pandey , for her thorough research
and assistance to the Court in the instant case.
(Jai Prakash Tiwari,J.)
October 27, 2026
KK Patel
Digitally signed by :-
KRISHN KANT PATEL
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad