Garunesh Singh And Another vs State Of U.P.

AFR
Reserved on 24.07.2026
Pronounced on 05.11.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 472 of 2016
Garunesh Singh and another
…..Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : Nagendra Mohan, Maharaj Baksh
Singh, Ram Narain Gupta, Salil
Mohan, Surendra Pratap Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Govt. Advocate,
Court No. - 9
HON'BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J.
HON'BLE RAM MANOHAR NARAYAN MISHRA, J.
1.  Heard Sri Maharaj Baksh Singh, learned counsel for the appellant and
Sri Bipul Kumar Singh, learned State Counsel for the State- respondent. 
2. The instant criminal appeal has been filed under Section 374 (2)
Cr.P.C. challenging the validity of judgment and order dated 28.03.2016
passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/ Fast Track Court (for criminal
cases relating to the women), Sultanpur in Sessions Trial No.81 of 2004,
State Vs. Garunesh Singh and Another, arising out of Case Crime
No.312 of 2000, Police Station- Jagdishpur, District- Amethi, whereby
the appellant no.1 has been convicted for the offence under Section
498A of IPC and sentenced for three years’ rigorous imprisonment with

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fine of Rs.5,000/-  and in default of payment of fine, six months’
additional rigorous imprisonment; for the offence under Section 304-B
of IPC, he has been convicted and sentenced for life imprisonment and
for the offence under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, he has been
convicted and sentenced for two years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine
of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of fine, four months’ additional
rigorous imprisonment. All the sentences were directed to run
concurrently.
3. Notably, pursuant to the report dated 31.03.2018 given by the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Sultanpur, the appeal has been abated in respect of
appellant no.2- Dr. Jitendra Nath Singh, who died on 30.12.2017. The
appeal is surviving only for appellant no.1-Garunesh Singh. Hence,
appellant no.1- Garunesh Singh is hereinafter referred to as “appellant”.
4. The present case was instituted on the basis of an FIR lodged by the
complainant on 29.10.2000, alleging that his daughter had married
appellant No. 1 on 10.06.1997. At the time of marriage, the complainant
had given dowry according to his financial capacity. However, after the
marriage, the husband of the deceased and his family members allegedly
started demanding additional dowry for purchasing a V.C.R. and a Bullet
Motorcycle. Upon the complainant expressing his inability to fulfill the
said demands, the husband of the deceased and his family members
allegedly subjected his daughter (since deceased) to harassment and
cruelty. A girl child was born out of the wedlock, who was
approximately 4–5 months old at the time of the incident. It was further
alleged that, owing to the complainant's failure to meet the additional
dowry demands, the accused persons murdered his daughter and her
dead body was lying in B.K. Nursing Home.
5. The post-mortem examination mentioned five ante-mortem injuries:
(1) Contusion 2.0 cm x 1.0 cm x oblique on (R) side of chin; (2) Mark of
ligature 30.00 cm long x 1.0 cm broad continuous horizontally placed
over thyroid cartilage one cutting neck muscles ecymosed; (3) Swelling
over front of neck 10 cm x 25 cm beginning from just below ligature

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mark extending upto clavicles; (4) Contusion 5 cm x 6 cm on (R) palm
and (5) Contusion 4 cm x 7 cm on (Lt.) palm. In the opinion of the
Doctor, who conducted the post-mortem, death occurred due to asphyxia
as a result of strangulation.
6. The prosecution examined the complainant (Ramji Singh) as PW-1;
complainant’s son (Pankaj Kumar Singh) was examined as PW-2; Devi
Baksh Singh, who was Constable Moharrir and scriber of the FIR, was
examined as PW-3; Jang Bahadur Yadav, Naib Tehsildar, Amethi, who
had prepared the inquest report, was examined as PW-4; V.D. Verma,
retired Inspector, CBCID and subsequent Investigating Officer of the
case, was examined as PW-5; Dr. Irfan Wajih, who had conducted the
post-mortem examination of the deceased, was examined as PW-6 and
he proved the post-mortem report; Sanjay Kumar, the then C.O. and
earlier Investigating Officer, was examined as PW-7; S.I. Mewaram
Chaudhary was examined as PW-8.
7. After closure of prosecution evidence, the accused person was
examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein he outrightly denied all the
charges and incriminating evidence against him and claimed himself to
be innocent.
8. The prosecution examined Ramji Singh as PW-1, who is the
complainant and father of the victim (since deceased), and deposed that
he married Archana to Garunesh on 10.06.1997 and gave Rs.2 lakh cash,
6 tola gold, TV, VCR, dinner set, cooler, sofa and other goods. After the
marriage, the accused persons (Dr. Jitendra Nath, Garunesh, Pushpa and
Anupama) repeatedly demanded a VCR, a dining table, a Bullet
motorcycle and an NSC/Indira Vikas Patra of Rs. 1 lakh. He gave the
VCR and Dining table but expressed his inability to give rest of the
demands. Archana told him of harassment, abuse, starvation and
beatings. The demand was repeated at the time of Gauna (06.05.1998)
and again on Telephone on 26.10.2000. On 29.10.2000, he had received
a phone call to come at once to the in-laws’ place of his daughter. At
about 8:30–9:00 AM, he found the body of his daughter on a plank with

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marks on both palms, a chin injury, a swollen neck with a ligature mark,
blood oozing out from the nose and mouth and torn, bloodstained
clothes. He believed she was killed and made to look like a case of
hanging. He had got the FIR written and proved the dowry letters Ex.
Ka-2 to Ka-10, the telephone bill (Ka-11) and the registered-letter
envelope (Ka-12). He stated that Archana was not ill and no suicide note
was found at the spot.
9. PW-2 Pankaj Kumar Singh, son of the informant, has deposed that he
corroborates the evidence of PW-1 on the factum of marriage and Rs.2
lakh and goods, which were given at the time of marriage, and the
demands for IVP, Bullet Motorcycle and VCR. He relies on the letters
Ex. Ka-2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10. Archana told him, she was taunted that
Garunesh would have fetched Rs.10 lakh, had he got married elsewhere.
He reached Jagdishpur at about 5:00 PM on 29.10.2000 and saw injury
marks on both palms, chin cut mark, swollen neck with ligature mark,
blood oozing from the nose and mouth of the deceased and torn,
bloodstained clothes. He wrote the application for lodging the FIR (Ka-
1) at his father’s dictation.
10. PW-3, Devi Baksh Singh, the scriber of the FIR, has deposed that he
registered the FIR on 29.10.2000 at 18:10 hours (Case Crime No.
312/2000) on the written report of Ramji Singh.
11. PW-4, Jang Bahadur Yadav, the then Naib Tehsildar, Mushafirkhana,
Sultanpur, has deposed on 30.10.2000 that he conducted the inquest
(panchayatnama) at Qasba Jagdishpur, at 10:00 AM alongwith one Sub
Inspector and one A.S.I. Shiv Dutt. There were five inquest witnesses
including Garunesh Singh and others present at the spot. He proved the
inquest report (Ex. Ka-16) and the post-mortem papers and photographs
(Ex. Ka-17 to Ka-21). In cross-examination, he noted 15 bangles on each
hand, a chin injury on the right side, ligature mark all around the neck,
and blood oozing from the nose and mouth of the deceased. He did not
record the blood oozing from nose and mouth of the body of the
deceased in the inquest report and could not recall her height.

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12. PW-5, V.D. Verma, the Investigating Officer, who was a retired
Inspector of CBCID, in his examination-in-chief has stated that he took
over the charge of investigation on 14.03.2001 under a Government
Order and recorded statements of various witnesses. He found no dowry-
related mention in the letters, including nine letters written by the
deceased. A handwriting expert and expert of the Forensic Science
Laboratory (FSL) found the suicide note in the deceased’s handwriting.
He filed charge sheet against Jitendra Nath and Pushpa on 21.11.2003
(Ex. Ka-22) before the court concerned. The local police had earlier
charged Garunesh and Anupama. He proved Ex. Ka-23 to Ka-30 (letters
to FSL and the Medical Jurisprudence Expert). To the Court, he admitted
that the charge sheet was based on the complainant’s side and the
expert’s opinion despite the finding that the note was in the deceased’s
hand writing. No witness other than the complainant’s side spoke of
dowry demand or harassment. He found that Archana had been treated
for nervousness and restlessness, and two Doctors told him that she was
depressed and could commit suicide. Upon investigation, he noted that
she was hanged after being killed, but admitted that the rope was sent to
FSL about 2 years and 3 months after the incident and he had not seen it.
He drew the conclusion that the deceased was not harassed for dowry
and on the contrary, PW-1 was given Rs.40,000/- as per Bank Statement.
He recorded that Pankaj did not tell him about demand of dowry for
Rs.10 Lakh, IVP/Kisan Patra or he having seen injuries.
13. PW-6, Dr. Irfan Wajih, deposed that he conducted the post-mortem
on 30.10.2000 at 1:45 PM alongwith Dr. C.P. Tiwari. As per his
evidence, the deceased was about 25 years old and had died about one
day ago. He opined that the death might have caused on 29.10.2000, (32
hours before the post-mortem). He has proved the post-mortem report
and in his opinion, death was due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation.
14. PW-7, Sanjay Kumar, has deposed that he was posted as C.O. at P.S.
Gauriganj, District- Sultanpur and had been initially appointed as
Investigating Officer. He took the informant’s statement on 30.10.2000,

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inspected the scene and prepared the site map (Ex. Ka-32). He recorded
statements of Garunesh, Shanti Devi, Asha Singh and others. After
finding sufficient evidence against Garunesh and Anupama, he filed
charge sheet (Ex. Ka-33), after that, the investigation was transferred to
CBCID. He proved Ex. Ka-32 and Ex. Ka-33.
15. PW-8, S.I. Mewaram Chaudhary, recovery witness, deposed that
he was present at the time of Panchayatnama on 30.10.2000 and took
two ropes (one blue and one turquoise) in his possession from the room
where the dead body was laid, in the presence of the villagers, namely,
Akhilesh Singh and Shyam Narayan Singh. He prepared the memo (Ex.
Ka-34) and sealed them in cloth on the spot. He proved Material
Exhibits 1 and 2 as the ropes he had sealed. He accompanied the Circle
Officer when the site was inspected. A stool was found at point B and a
rope was found near point A on the site map. He could not say whether
the ropes were sent for chemical examination.
16. In his defence, appellant produced, two medical witnesses, DW-1
Dr. Shyam Karan Pathak and DW-2 Dr. Brijesh Kumar Yadav, who were
examined to show that the deceased suffered from psychological illness
before her death. DW-1 proved three prescription slips dated 19.02.1999,
02.03.1999 and 30.03.1999 (Ex. Kha-18 to Kha-20) for “Archana Singh
W/o Garunesh Singh”, diagnosing “Anxiety Neurosis” and stated that in
a severe state, the patient may commit suicide. In cross-examination,
however, he admitted that he never saw the patient, wrote the medicines
only on symptoms described to him, and could not say whether she was
in depression. He also accepted before the Court that doing so was not
within his duty. DW-2, a Government Medical Officer at CHC
Jagdishpur, stated that he examined a patient “Archana Singh, aged 24
years” on 18.12.1998, 03.01.1999 and 04.02.1999 and found “Acute
Anxiety and Anxiety Neurosis”, and issued three slips. He could not say
with certainty whether suicide was possible in this illness and did not
remember whether she was Dr. J.N. Singh’s daughter-in-law or whether
the CBCID had recorded his statement. He conceded that the slips carry

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no husband’s or father’s name or address. He also could not say whether
the slip related to Archana or to another patient, nor he saw her inside or
outside the hospital.
17. Three other defence witnesses were examined on money given to
the complainant (PW-1) from the side of the appellant and other
documents. DW-3 Ramakant Mishra, Branch Manager, SBI Jagdishpur,
produced the original Cheque No.373340 for Rs. 40,000/- dated
20.06.1999, issued by B.K. Nursing Home (proprietor J.N. Singh) in the
name of Ramji Singh and paid in cash to Ramji Singh on 01.07.1999
(Ex. Kha-24). The ledger had been destroyed, and he could not identify
Ramji Singh. DW-4 Hridayram, Branch Manager, Baroda U.P. Gramin
Bank, proved that accused Garunesh applied to District Industries Centre
on 27.01.1999 for a Mini Rice Mill and was sanctioned a loan of
Rs.1,50,000 on 24.11.1999, secured by two guarantors and an NSC/KVP
of Rs.1 lakh, which has been fully repaid (Ex. Kha-25). The purpose is
to suggest the NSC/IVP was a loan security rather than a dowry demand.
He admitted that he was not posted at the Branch when the loan was
sanctioned and did not know the writing of the forwarding Manager.
DW-5 S.P. Gupta, a private handwriting expert, opined that the two
signatures on the back of the cheque were made by the same person who
wrote the specimen writings of Ram Ji Singh (Ex. Kha-26), which would
contradict PW-1’s denial of going to the Bank or taking the money. In
cross-examination, he admitted that he was a private expert, was paid a
fee and had never served the Government, and he denied that he had
prepared reports in favour of his clients.
18. After going through the entire evidence, the Trial Court concluded
that the deceased died in her in-laws’ home in unnatural circumstances,
within seven years of her marriage. Accordingly, the Trial Court
convicted the appellant for the offence under Sections 498-A, 304-B of
IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
19. At the very outset, learned counsel for the appellant has drawn
attention of this Court towards the suicide note, wherein the deceased

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did not blame the present appellant and made no allegation of demand
for dowry or harassment against him. As per the post-mortem report,
there was no substantial ante-mortem injury except the ligature mark
around the neck. A perusal of the suicide note indicates that it was an
emotional note in which the deceased expressed her deep love for her
husband. She stated that as she was not a beautiful woman, her husband,
the present appellant, did not love her properly, which had caused her
great disappointment. She further stated that she was leaving this world
but leaving behind her daughter and requested the appellant to take
proper care of their daughter. She also expressed that if the appellant
looked after their daughter properly, she would have no regret about
leaving behind her husband and daughter. Therefore, learned counsel for
the appellant has submitted that in the aforesaid facts and circumstances,
the prosecution had failed to prove that the deceased, Smt. Archana, had
been subjected to cruelty soon before her death. Further, learned counsel
has stated that the present appellant remained on bail during trial and did
not misuse the liberty of bail.
20. Further submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that the
judgment of the learned Trial Court is based on perverse findings and
improper appreciation of the legal provisions inasmuch as demand of
dowry and on such demand, cruelty and harassment should be soon
before the death but no prosecution witness has deposed that the
deceased was harassed for demand of dowry soon before her death. On
the contrary, if the suicide note left by the deceased is taken on its face
value, it does not disclose any demand for dowry. Learned counsel has
submitted that if the suicide note is considered as concrete evidence on
the ground that the deceased had narrated the relevant facts therein
before her death, its entire contents must also be considered as they are.
It has been further submitted that had the deceased committed suicide
after narrating the facts and circumstances compelling her to take such
an extreme step, she could also have mentioned the demand for dowry or
cruelty allegedly inflicted upon her. However, admittedly, no such
allegation has been made against the appellant in the suicide note.

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21. Learned counsel has further submitted that the victim (since
deceased) was suffering from severe depression after giving birth to a
girl child and that fact was brought to the notice of the learned Trial
Court. According to the appellant, the deceased committed suicide in
that mental state, which was also reflected in her suicide note. However,
the learned Trial Court completely overlooked this aspect of the matter.
It was also pointed out that the prescription papers issued by the Doctor
had been produced before the learned Trial Court and according to the
opinion of the Doctor, the deceased was at risk of committing suicide,
but the learned Trial Court has not considered the said medical opinion
and ignored this material piece of evidence.
22. In addition to the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the
appellant has requested for reducing the sentence to the period for which
the appellant has already remained in custody. He has submitted that the
appellant has no prior criminal history of any kind whatsoever. He has
placed reliance on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
cases of Hem Chand v. State of Haryana: (1994) 6 SCC 727 and
Kashmira Devi v. State of Uttarakhand: (2020) 11 SCC 343.
23. As learned counsel for the appellant has requested for reducing the
sentence to the period for which the appellant has already remained in
custody, Sri Bipul Kumar Singh, learned State Counsel, has left it to the
discretion of the Court to decide the period of sentence.
24. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record. Even if the prosecution story is taken on its
face value, the suicidal note indicates that under compelling
circumstances as indicated in the suicide note, the victim might have
committed suicide and in that case, this case may be considered under
Section 306 IPC but no charge under Section 306 IPC was framed and
no such evidence was led, therefore, we are not going into such aspect.
However, for the offence under Section 306 IPC also, the maximum
punishment is 10 years. Learned counsel for the appellant has stated that
since the present appellant has already served about 12 years of actual

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CRLA No. - 472 of 2016
period of incarceration and with remission, this period is about 14 years,
therefore, the minimum punishment under Section 304-B of IPC, which
is seven years, has already been served by the appellant. For imposing
the maximum punishment of life imprisonment under Section 304-B of
the IPC, the learned Trial Court must have recorded specific reasons and
findings justifying the imposition of such punishment. Therefore,
considering the request of learned counsel for the appellant that the
sentence of life imprisonment may be reduced to the period already
undergone by the appellant and the appeal may be allowed, we find it
appropriate that the aforesaid request made on behalf of the appellant be
considered sympathetically.
25. A custody certificate issued by the Senior Superintendent of
Central Jail, Naini, Prayagraj dated 25.07.2025 has been annexed as
Annexure No.5 with the fourth bail application, as per which the
appellant had remained in custody for 1 year, 4 month & 17 days during
trial and after conviction till 25.07.2025, he remained in custody for 9
years, 3 months and 27 days. Thus, actual period of custody of the
appellant is 10 years, 8 months and 14 days till 25.07.2025 and till
today, it would be around 11 years, 11 months and 24 days and with
remission, it has been indicated in the custody certificate as 12 years, 4
months and 17 days custody of the appellant as on 25.07.2025.
26. Since 25.07.2025, the appellant has spent a further period of 1
year 3 months 10 days in custody, which makes the period undergone in
custody after adding the period of remission earned after 25.07.2025, the
total period undergone by the appellant in custody becomes about 13
years and 11 months.
27. This Court now proceeds to consider and examine the
proportionality of sentence awarded to the appellant commensurate to
the offence, in view of evidence led by parties and the prayer of leniency
qua sentence is again examined in the light of certain authorities of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court which governs the field, with respect to
sentence particularly life imprisonment in relation to Section 304-B IPC

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CRLA No. - 472 of 2016
(major penal provision). The penal provision under Section 304-B
provides, Courts could award sentence in exercise of its discretion
between seven years to life imprisonment, depending upon the facts and
circumstances of each case, thus, the minimum sentence provided is ‘not
less than 7 years’ and the extreme punishment is ‘life imprisonment’.
The extreme penalty of life imprisonment in cases of section 304-B is
not imposed as a matter of course, but only in rare cases.
28. This Court is faced with the question “whether the extreme
punishment of imprisonment for life is warranted in the circumstances of
instant case.”
29. The culpability/guilt under Section 304-B IPC is primarily
dependent upon presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act.
Unlike Section 302 IPC, the conviction under Section 304-B IPC do not
require direct or circumstantial evidence but almost in every case the
presumption as casts by virtue of 113-B of Indian Evidence Act is the
foundation, though such presumption remains rebuttable one, but again
the million dollar question is ‘can a person be convicted for throughout
life based on presumption cast by law and for this reason the sentence of
life imprisonment as envisaged under Section 304-B IPC is for rare cases
and not in every case. The phrase rarest of rare cases used for section
302 IPC, cannot be compared to be or given same meaning when offence
under Section 304-B IPC is tried with. It is profitable to have glimpse of
ratio laid down in the case of Hariom Vs. State of Haryana reported
in (2014) 10 SCC 577 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined
the possibility of alteration of sentence in proportion to the gravity of
crime. The relevant paragraphs of aforementioned judgment with respect
to award of sentence are extracted as under:
“16. Now, the question arises as to whether we should
reduce the appellant's sentence and if so, to what extent, as
urged by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant.
17. This issue has been the subject-matter of debate before
this Court in several cases, which arose out of Section 304-
B read with Section 498-A and wherein this Court while
interpreting the expression “may” occurring in Section 304-

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CRLA No. - 472 of 2016
B IPC held that it is not mandatory for the Court in every
case to award life imprisonment to the accused once he is
found guilty of the offence under Section 304-B. It was held
that the Court could award sentence in exercise of its
discretion between seven years to life imprisonment
depending upon the facts of each case. It was held that in no
case it could be less than seven years and that extreme
punishment of life term should be awarded in “rare cases”
but not in every case.
18. In Hem Chand v. State of Haryana [(1994) 6 SCC 727 :
1995 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1995 SC 120] , the courts below
had awarded life term to the accused under Section 304-B
read with Section 498-A but this Court reduced it to 10
years. This was also a case where the accused was a police
officer who had suffered life imprisonment. This Court held
as under: (SCC p. 731, paras 7-8)
“7. … the appellant-accused was a police employee and
instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein
and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the
increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As
mentioned above, Section 304-B IPC only raises
presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should
be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life.
Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment
for life should be in rare cases and not in every case.
8. Hence, we are of the view that a sentence of 10 years' RI
would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while
confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section
304-B IPC, reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to
10 years' RI.”
19. Similarly, this Court in State of Karnataka v. M.V.
Manjunathegowda [(2003) 2 SCC 188 : 2003 SCC (Cri)
467] , while convicting the accused under Section 304-B
awarded 10 years' imprisonment in somewhat similar facts.
20. Recently, in G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka
[(2010) 3 SCC 152 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] , this Court
while allowing the appeal filed by the accused only on the
question of sentence altered the sentence from life term to
10 years on more or less similar facts. Hon'ble H.L. Dattu,
J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench held as
under: (SCC p. 160, para 31)
“31. In conclusion, we are satisfied that in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the appellant was rightly
convicted under Section 304-B IPC. However, his sentence
of life imprisonment imposed by the courts below appears to
us to be excessive. The appellant is a young man and has
already undergone 6 years of imprisonment after being
convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge and the High
Court. We are of the view, in the facts and circumstances of

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CRLA No. - 472 of 2016
the case, that a sentence of 10 years' rigorous imprisonment
would meet the ends of justice. We, accordingly while
confirming the conviction of the appellant under Section
304-B IPC, reduce the sentence of imprisonment for life to
10 years' rigorous imprisonment. The other conviction and
sentence passed against the appellant are confirmed.”
21. Applying the principle of law laid down in the
aforementioned cases and having regard to the totality of
facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the
considered opinion that the ends of justice would meet, if we
reduce the sentence of the appellant from life imprisonment
to that of 10 years. In our view, this case does not fall in the
category of a “rare case” as envisaged by this Court so as
to award to the appellant the life imprisonment. That apart,
we also notice that while awarding life imprisonment, the
courts below did not assign any reasons.
22. The learned counsel for the State and the complainant
were not able to cite any authority in support of their
submission except to oppose the prayer made by the
appellant. Therefore, we are not impressed by their
submission.
23. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is allowed in part. The conviction of the
appellant Hari Om (A-1) under Section 304-B read with
Section 498-A IPC is upheld. However, the sentence (life
imprisonment) awarded to the appellant is altered and
accordingly, is reduced to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment.
To this extent, the impugned judgment [Hari Om v. State of
Haryana, Criminal Appeal No. 190 of 2004, decided on 14-
5-2010 (P&H)] stands modified.
30. The proposition of law qua awarding life sentence under Section
304-B IPC was also examined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of
State of Karnataka Vs M.V Manjunathe gowda & Anr. (2003) 2 SCC
188; and G.V. Siddaramesh vs State of Karnataka, (2010) 3 SCC 152 ;
wherein in both the cases the life term was reduced to 10 years.
31. The question of sentence in penal provision such as under Section
304-B IPC came for consideration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Hem Chand (supra), wherein the Trial Court had awarded life
imprisonment to the accused under Sections 304-B read with 498A
I.P.C., however, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reduced the sentence to 10
years and held as under:

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CRLA No. - 472 of 2016
“7. Now coming to the question of sentence, it can be
seen that Section 304-B IPC lays down that:
“Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for
life.”
32. In Kashmira Devi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court followed
the decision in Hem Chand (supra) and keeping in view the age of the
appellant and also the contribution that would be required to be made by
her to the family as the appellant’s husband was also aged and further
taking into consideration all other circumstances, the sentence of life
imprisonment awarded by the High Court was modified by ordering the
appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years
and to pay the fine as imposed and thereby the default sentence was
sustained.
33. In K. Pounammal v. State: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1784 , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: -
“6. The conviction and sentence have their respective realms.
While the conviction would be recorded on the basis of
evidence adduced before the Court which would establish the
implication of the accused in the offence, the guilty person or
the convicted when to be awarded a sentence, a host of factors
would operate to govern.
6.1. In determining the final sentence and the nature thereof,
variety of factors that would operate would include the
intervening time between the commission of offence and the
actual award of the sentence, age of the accused, the stress
which he or she might have suffered because of passage of
time during each case has remained pending and undecided,
the family circumstance and such other factors, without
becoming exhaustive.
7. The process of sentencing by the courts is guided by
theories such as punitive, deterrent or reformative. Each
school of thought has its own object and purpose to explain
awarding of sentence and its utility. Amongst these theories,
reformative approach has become increasingly acceptable to
the modern jurisprudence. Reformation is something always
considered progressive. When there are mitigating
circumstances, the court would lean towards reducing of the
sentence. The focus would be on the crime, and not on the

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criminal. The society and system would nurture the guilt with
positivity, while selecting the sentence.”
(Emphasis added)
34. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held in K. Pounammal
(supra) that: -
“9. The prolongation of a criminal case for an unreasonable
period is in itself a kind of suffering. It amounts to mental
incarceration for the person facing such proceedings. For a
person who is convicted and who has appealed against his or
her conviction and sentence and who everyday awaits the fate of
litigation, spends time in distress. In the present-day system of
administration of justice, in which proceedings have often go on
protracted unreasonably and therefore unbearably, the passage
of long time itself makes the person suffer a mental agony.”
35. While deciding the quantum of sentence, the learned Trial Court
awarded the maximum sentence of imprisonment for life for the offence
under Section 304-B IPC, although the minimum sentence for the
offence is imprisonment for 7 years. The Trial Court has not assigned
any reason for rejecting the appellant’s request for awarding a lesser
sentence in view of the mitigating circumstances pleaded by the
appellant and has awarded the maximum sentence without assigning any
reason.
36. It is settled law that reason is the very soul of any order and any
judicial order bereft of a sound and cogent reasoning has no legs to stand
on. In the present case, learned Trial Court without recording any
reasons has arbitrarily awarded the maximum prescribed sentence to the
accused appellant. Therefore, we are of the view that the Trial Court has
committed an error in awarding the maximum sentence without
assigning any reason, which in our opinion is not proper.
37. In the present case, this Court does not find any plausible reasons
recorded by the learned Trial Court as to why the maximum punishment
of life imprisonment has been awarded to the appellant. The sentence
awarded under Section 498-A of IPC and Section 4 of Dowry

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Prohibition Act having been undergone by the appellant calls for no
interference.
38. Keeping in view the submissions advanced on behalf of the
appellant, in the light of the proposition of case laws cited above, it was
the first offence of the appellant, he has no criminal history and also the
fact that the appellant has already undergone about 14 years in custody
(including the period of remission), we are of the view that the sentence
of life imprisonment awarded to the appellant- Garunesh Singh deserves
to be modified and reduced to an imprisonment for the period for which
he has already remained in custody.
39. Accordingly, the instant criminal appeal is allowed in part by
upholding the conviction of appellant no.1- Garunesh Singh for the
offence under Sections 498-A, 304-B of IPC and Section 4 of Dowry
Prohibition Act, but the sentence of imprisonment for life for the offence
under Section 304-B of IPC is reduced to the period already undergone
by the appellant in custody. Consequently, appellant no.1- Garunesh
Singh shall be released from jail forthwith, if he is not required in any
other case.
40. However, the entire amount of fine awarded by the learned Trial
Court shall be deposited by the appellant within two months from the
date of his release and in default of payment of fine, the default sentence
shall remain intact and be served by the appellant.
41. Appellant no.1- Garunesh Singh shall be released from custody
forthwith, upon his executing a personal bond under the provision of
Section 437-A Cr.P.C., containing an undertaking to appear before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in case any appeal is filed against this order and
the Hon'ble Supreme Court issues notice of the appeal. The bond shall
remain in force for a period of six months.
42. The judgment and order dated 28.03.2016 (supra) passed by the
learned Trial Court is modified to the aforesaid extent.

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43. The Trial Court record alongwith copy of this judgment be sent
back to the learned Trial Court forthwith for compliance.
44. Before parting with, we appreciate the research work and assistance
provided by Ms. Vanshika Gaur, Research Associate.
(Ram Manohar Narayan Mishra,J.) (Rajesh Singh Chauhan,J.)
November 05, 2026
RBS/-
Digitally signed by :-
RAM BIR SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench