RANJIT KUMAR KUNDU @ RANJIT KUNDU AND ANOTHER vs STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR
- Court
- Calcutta High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon’ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
CRR 2852 of 2024
Ranjit Kumar Kundu @ Ranjit Kundu & Anr.
Vs
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Shibaji Kr. Das,
Mr. R. N. Basu,
Ms. Deblina De.
For the State : Mr. Ramashis Mukherjee,
Ms. Jayashree Patra.
For the Opposite Party No.2 : Ms. Gopa Biswas,
Mr. Mainak Ghosal.
Judgment reserved on : 07.08.2026
Judgment delivered on : 31.08.2026
Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:
1. The revisional application has been preferred praying for quashing of
proceedings in Spl. Case No.1 of 2017, arising out of Ashoknagar Police
Station Case No.998 Of 2016 dated 2nd November, 2016 which
culminated in Charge Sheet No.258 of 2024 dated 21st May, 2024
under Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Section
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3(1) (r) of the Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 corresponding to G.R. No.3159 of 2016 presently
pending before the Court of the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 1st
Court at Barasat, District-North 24 Parganas being the Learned Judge,
Special Court under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
2. The petitioners’ case is that the Opposite Party No.2 herein is the
younger sister-in-law of the Petitioners herein being the wife of the
younger brother of the Petitioner No.1 herein namely Biswajit Kundu.
The Petitioners and the Opposite Party No.2 herein reside in
separate premises as will be evident from the addresses given in the
cause-title to this petition.
3. It is further stated that the husband of the Party No.2 herein namely
Biswajit Kundu was all along a very homeless person. Since the relation
between the Petitioners herein and the husband of the Opposite Party
No.2 herein, the Opposite Party No.2 herein was all along very sweet.
The Petitioner No.2 herein in the capacity of being the sister-in-law
decided to help her brother-in-law and his family members including the
Opposite Party No.2 herein.
4. Accordingly, the Petitioner No.2 herein by executing a Deed Of Gift
being Deed No.354 for the year 2001 dated 9 February, 2001 which
was duly registered before the Sub-Registrar, Guma, District-North
24 Parganas transferred 1.30 Cottahs of land in favour of the
husband of the Opposite Party No.2 herein out of the total 33%
Cottahs of land which she had received as a refugee, who had come
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from East Pakistan presently Bangladesh and delineated in the
Government Records as LOP No.92A vide a Deed Of Gift being
executed in her favour by the Government of West Bengal in the
year 1989. After execution of the Deed of Gift by the Petitioner
No.2 herein, the husband of the Opposite Party No.2 herein and the
Opposite Party No.2 herein started to reside over the said plot of
land by constructing their residential house over the same.
5. Gradually by the passage of time the Petitioners herein were able to
understand that both the husband of the Opposite Party No.2 herein
and the Opposite Party No.2 herein are very greedy persons who were
trying to grab the properties of the Petitioners herein by hook or by
crook. The husband of the Opposite Party No.2 herein happens to be
police personnel and by mis-utilizing his power and position he along
with the Opposite Party No.2 herein were all along trying evict the
Petitioners herein who are aged ailing persons from their lawful
possession of their property without due process of law.
6. On 31st October, 2016, the Opposite Party No.2 herein and her
husband once again attempted to block the common passage in between
the two adjacent buildings by raising bamboo pillars and thereby block
the egress and ingress of the Petitioners herein, but due to objection
raised by the Petitioners herein they failed in their evil attempt. The
Petitioners herein were threatened by the Opposite Party No.2 herein
and her husband that unless they transfer the entire property in their
name they would be subjected to such types of nuisances and
disturbances regularly and they could also be killed by life or faced with
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physical harm of all kinds. Such fact was duly reported by the Petitioner
No.2 herein on 31st October, 2016 to the local Ashokenagar Police
Station through a Written Complaint which was diarized as G.D. Entry
No.1561 of 2016.
7. On 17th November, 2016, the Petitioner No.1 herein was brutally
assaulted by the husband of the Opposite Party No.2 herein namely
Biswajit Kundu with his ill-motive to grab the property by forcibly
evicting the Petitioners herein. Due to such assault the Petitioner No.1
herein had to be medically treated since he had sustained grievous
injuries as will be evident from his injury report issued on the self-same
date by the authorities of the Ashokenagar General Hospital. Over such
incident the Petitioner No.1 herein had lodged a Written Complaint
to the Ashokenagar Police Station which was diarized as G.D. Entry
No.801 of 2016 dated 17th November, 2016. Though the Petitioner
No.1 herein was subjected to severe assault by the husband of the
Opposite Party No.1 herein namely Biswajit Kundu, but owing to the
fact that he was a member of the Police Force by mis-utilizing his power
and position he had influenced the authorities of Ashokenagar Police
Station and thus based on the Written Complaint lodged by the
Petitioner No.1 herein Ashokenagar Police Station Case No. 1049 Of
2016 dated 17th November, 2016 under sections 341/323/506 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was registered by the police authorities of
Ashokenagar Police Station as against Biswajit Kundu (husband of the
de facto complainant herein) which is presently pending in the Court of
the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, North 24 Parganas at Barasat.
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8. In order to safeguard their lawfully owned and possessed property from
the hands of Biswajit Kundu and the Opposite Party No.2 herein, the
Petitioner No.2 herein thereafter lodged proceedings as against the said
Biswajit Kundu under the provisions of Section 144(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 & Section 107 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 before the Court of the Learned Executive Magistrate at
Barasat, District-North 24 Parganas being M.P. Case No.3496 Of 2016 &
M.P. Case No.3499 Of 2016 and obtained orders in their favour.
9. Thereafter they came to know that as a counter blast to the police
complaint lodged by the Petitioner No.2 herein on 31 October, 2016 and
with a view to forcibly oust the Petitioners herein from their lawfully
owned and possessed property and thereby to grab the same and
further in order to wreck her vengeance upon them and also harass
them unnecessarily, by suppressing material facts, the Opposite Party
No.2 herein on 2nd November, 2016 had lodged a Written Complaint
addressed to the Officer-In-Charge, Ashokenagar Police Station and the
same has been registered as Ashokenagar Police Station Case No.998 Of
2016 dated 2nd November, 2016 under Section 498(A) of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 read with Section 3(ii) of the Scheduled Caste &
Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 corresponding to
G.R. No.3159 Of 2016 as against the Petitioners herein which was
pending before the Court of the Learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Barasat, District-North 24 Parganas. The husband of the
de facto complainant is not an accused in this case.
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10. The allegations levelled in the Written Complaint by the Opposite Party
No.2 herein inter-alia in brief are to the effect that:-
“On 26th June, 1988 she got married to Biswajit Kundu
according to Hindu Rites & Customs and she is Schedule
Caste by birth. It is further alleged that since her marriage
she and her family was tortured both physically and
mentally by the accused persons who happens to be her
elder brother-in-law and his elder sister-in-law and the
Accused No.2 who is a brahmin by caste criticized and
humiliated her and used filthy languages over the issue of
her caste. The accused no.2 always told her that she could
not achieve higher education and defamed her due to her
caste.”
11. In the said investigation conducted by the Deputy Superintendent
of Police (Headquarters), the same ended in a final report being
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Ashokenagar Police Station FR False No. 227 of 2017 dated 28 of
March, 2017 under Section 498(A) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 &
Section 3(ii) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989.
12. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with Final Report being
Ashokenagar Police Station FR False No.227 Of 2017 dated 28 March,
2017, the Opposite Party No.2 herein had filed a Petition For
Further Investigation before the Learned Special Court below under
the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
and the Learned Court below vide Order No.34 dated 19th September,
2023 after a lapse of a period of more than six years was inter-alia
pleased to allow and dispose of such petition and thereby directed for
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re-investigation by a competent person other than previous 1.0. and the
SDPO, Habra which is legally impermissible as it is a well settled
proposition of law that re-investigation is not permitted.
13. The same investigation ended in a charge sheet in the proceedings of
which quashing has been prayed for.
14. Parties have filed their respective affidavits wherein the opposite party
no.2 in her affidavit-in-opposition has denied the case of the petitioners
and has reiterated her case, as made out in the written complaint and
also the proceedings before the Trial Court.
15. In reply, the same is denied.
16. The State along with the written notes has placed the case diary.
17. The petitioners herein in support of their case have relied upon the
following judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court:-
(a) Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto – Vs. State of
Bihar & Another reported in (2026) Live Law (SC) 62, 2026
SCC Online SC 799, Relevant Paragraphs – 11 to 20.
(b) Shajan Skaria Vs. State of Kerala & Another reported in
2024 SCC Online SC 2249, Relevant Paragraphs – 53 to
88.
(c) State of Haryana & Others Vs. Bhajanlal & Others
reported in (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335.
18. In respect of the offence alleged under Section 498A of the Indian Penal
Code, the petitioners have relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Others – Versus-
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State of Bihar & Others reported in (2022) 6 SCC 599, Relevant
Paragraphs – 10 to 22.
19. In respect of the allegations under Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Caste
and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 it is stated that
the ingredients required to constitute the said offence is not prima facie
present in the materials on record including the case diary.
20. It is further argued by the petitioners that in order to constitute offence
under Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (i) this Section requires the accused
to abuse a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe “by the
caste name in public view” – noted that the intent behind the abuse
must be found to be denigrating towards the caste resulting in a feeling
of caste based humiliation. (ii) Merely saying a caste name or simple
abuse does not automatically constitute an offence.
21. The petitioners have relied upon Clause 3(1), (3), (5) and (7) of
Paragraph 102 of the Judgment in State of Haryana & Ors. Vs.
Bhajanlal & Ors. (Supra) and have prayed that their case is entitled to
be quashed.
22. Heard the learned counsels for the parties and perused the materials on
record including the copy of the gift deed which was executed in
favour of the husband of the opposite party no.2/de facto complainant
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by the petitioner no.2 herein. The said deed has been executed on 9
February, 2001. The deed proves that part of the property which
was allotted in favour of the petitioner no.2 was gifted to the
husband of the opposite party no.2. It appears that this supports the
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case of the petitioners that it is the land which was gifted by the
petitioner no.2 on which the de facto complainant and her husband
reside.
23. On perusal of the materials on record it appears that the parties reside
separately and not in a joint family. There appears to be a family
property dispute between the parties and case/counter-case lodged.
The present case also appears to be prima facie a fall out of the bitter
relationship, between the parties. The allegations in respect of the
offence alleged under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code are general
in nature.
24. Section 498A of IPC, lays down:-
―498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband
or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to three years and shall also be
liable to fine.
Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty”
means—
(a)any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
physical) of the woman; or
(b)harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.
Ingredients of offence. - The essential ingredients of the
offence under sec. 498A are as follows:-
(1) A woman was married;
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(2) She was subjected to cruelty;
(3) Such cruelty consisted in -
(i) any lawful conduct as was likely to drive such woman
to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her
life, limb or health whether mental or physical;
(ii) harm to such woman with a view to coercing her to
meet unlawful demand for property or valuable security or
on account of failure of such woman or any of her
relations to meet the lawful demand;
(iii) the woman was subjected to such cruelty by her
husband or any relation of her husband.”
25. In Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. vs State of Telangana & Anr.,
in Criminal Appeal No. ………… of 2024 (arising out of SLP
(Criminal) No. 16239 of 2024, decided on December 10, 2024, the
Supreme Court held:-
“ 15. An offence is punishable under Section 498A of
the IPC when a husband or his relative subjects a
woman to cruelty, which may result in imprisonment
for a term extending up to three years and a fine.
The Explanation under Section 498A of the IPC
defines “cruelty” for the purpose of Section 498A of
the IPC to mean any of the acts mentioned in clauses
(a) or (b). The first limb of clause (a) of the
Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that
“cruelty” means any wilful conduct that is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide. The second limb of clause (a) of the
Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that
cruelty means any wilful conduct that is of such a
nature as to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb
or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman.
Further, clause (b) of the Explanation of Section
498A of the IPC states that cruelty would also
include harassment of the woman where such
harassment is to coerce her or any person related to
her to meet any unlawful demand for any property
or valuable security or is on account of failure by her
or any person related to her to meet such demand.
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16. Further, Section 3 of the Dowry Act deals with
penalty for giving or taking dowry. It states that any
person who engages in giving, taking, or abetting the
exchange of dowry, shall face a punishment of
imprisonment for a minimum of five years and a fine
of not less than fifteen thousand rupees or the value
of the dowry, whichever is greater. Section 4 of the
Dowry Act talks of penalty for demanding dowry. It
states that any person demanding dowry directly or
indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or
guardians of a bride or bridegroom shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than six months, but which may extend
to two years and with fine which may extend to ten
thousand rupees.
18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the
allegations made by respondent No.2 are vague and
omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No.1
harassed her and that appellant Nos.2 to 6
instigated him to do so, respondent No.2 has not
provided any specific details or described any
particular instance of harassment. She has also not
mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which
the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR
lacks concrete and precise allegations.
25. A mere reference to the names of family
members in a criminal case arising out of a
matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations
indicating their active involvement should be nipped
in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of
judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to
implicate all the members of the husband‟s family
when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial
discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations
unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised
allegations cannot form the basis for criminal
prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such
cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the
legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of
innocent family members. In the present case,
appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the
family of appellant No.1 have been living in different
cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house
of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein.
Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal
prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the
process of the law in the absence of specific
allegations made against each of them.
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28. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way
of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty
inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family,
ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in
recent years, as there have been a notable rise in
matrimonial disputes across the country,
accompanied by growing discord and tension within
the institution of marriage, consequently, there has
been a growing tendency to misuse provisions
like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing
personal vendetta against the husband and his
family by a wife. Making vague and generalised
allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not
scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes
and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics
by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is
taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the
husband and his family in order to seek compliance
with the unreasonable demands of a wife.
Consequently, this Court has, time and again,
cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his
family in the absence of a clear prima facie case
against them.
29. We are not, for a moment, stating that any
woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what
has been contemplated under Section 498A of the
IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from
making a complaint or initiating any criminal
proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid
observations but we should not encourage a case
like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to
the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the
first appellant-husband of the second respondent
herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is
lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said
provision is meant mainly for the protection of a
woman who is subjected to cruelty in the
matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security in the
form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as
in the present case.
30. In the above context, this Court in G.V. Rao vs.
L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 observed as
follows:
“12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial
disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred
ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the
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young couple to settle down in life and live
peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes
suddenly erupt which often assume serious
proportions resulting in commission of heinous
crimes in which elders of the family are also involved
with the result that those who could have counselled
and brought about rapprochement are rendered
helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the
criminal case. There are many other reasons which
need not be mentioned here for not encouraging
matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder
over their defaults and terminate their disputes
amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it
out in a court of law where it takes years and years
to conclude and in that process the parties lose their
“young” days in chasing their “cases” in different
courts.”
31. Further, this Court in Preeti Gupta vs. State of
Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667 held that the courts
have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing
with these complaints and must take pragmatic
realties into consideration while dealing with
matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment by
the husband‟s close relatives who had been living in
different cities and never visited or rarely visited the
place where the complainant resided would have an
entirely different complexion. The allegations of the
complainant are required to be scrutinized with great
care and circumspection.
32. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the
impugned FIR No.82 of 2022 filed by respondent
No.2 was initiated with ulterior motives to settle
personal scores and grudges against appellant No.1
and his family members i.e., appellant Nos.2 to 6
herein. Hence, the present case at hand falls within
category (7) of illustrative parameters highlighted in
Bhajan Lal. Therefore, the High Court, in the
present case, erred in not exercising the powers
available to it under Section 482 CrPC and thereby
failed to prevent abuse of the Court‟s process by
continuing the criminal prosecution against the
appellants.”
26. In Hitesh Verma vs The State of Uttarakhand & Anr., Criminal
Appeal No. 707 of 2020, on 05.11.2020, the Court held:-
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“ 14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or
intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is
to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up
for consideration before this Court in the judgment
reported as Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State through
Standing Counsel & Ors.,(2008) 8 SCC 435 . The
Court had drawn distinction between the expression
“public place” and “in any place within public view”. It
was held that if an offence is committed outside the
building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn
can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside
the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a
place within the public view. On the contrary, if the
remark is made inside a building, but some members of
the public are there (not merely relatives or friends)
then it would not be an offence since it is not in the
public view. The Court held as under:
“28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar,
the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3
(by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car
which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our
opinion, this was certainly a place within public view,
since the gate of a house is certainly a place within
public view. It could have been a different matter had
the alleged offence been committed inside a building,
and also was not in the public view. However, if the
offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn
outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone
from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the
lawn would certainly be a place within the public view.
Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but
some members of the public are there (not merely
relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence
since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not
confuse the expression “place within public view” with
the expression “public place”. A place can be a private
place but yet within the public view. On the other hand,
a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is
owned or leased by the Government or the municipality
(or other local body) or gaon sabha or an
instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons
or private bodies.”
15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the
informant were within the four walls of her building. It
is not the case of the informant that there was any
member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at
the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the
basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any
place within public view” is not made out. In the list of
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witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain
witnesses are named but it could not be said that those
were the persons present within the four walls of the
building. The offence is alleged to have taken place
within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view
of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh , it
cannot be said to be a place within public view as none
was said to be present within the four walls of the
building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.”
27. The Supreme Court in Ramawatar vs State of Madhya Pradesh
reported in AIR 2021 SC 5228, categorically held:-
“ 16. On the other hand, where it appears to the
Court that the offence in question, although
covered under the SC/ST Act, primarily private
or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence
has not been committed on account of the caste
of the victim, or where the continuation of the
legal proceedings would be an abuse of the
process of law, the Court can exercise its power
to quash the proceedings. On similar lines,
when considering a prayer of quashing on the
basis of compromise/settlement, if the Court is
satisfied that the underlying objection of the Act
would not be contravened or diminished even if
the felony in question goes unpunished, the
mere fact that the offence is covered under a
„special statue ’ would not refrain this Court or
the High Court, from exercising their respective
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or
Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure.”
28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya vs. The
State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. in Criminal Appeal No…../2023
(arising out of SLP(CRL) No. 1249 of 2023) in Paragraph 18 held:-
“ 18. That apart, assuming arguendo that the
appellant had hurled caste related abuses at the
complainant with a view to insult or humiliate him,
the same does not advance the case of the
complainant any further to bring it within the ambit
of section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. We have noted
from the first F.I.R. as well as the charge-sheet that
the same makes no reference to the utterances of the
appellant during the course of verbal altercation or to
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the caste to which the complainant belonged, except
for the allegation/observation that caste-related
abuses were hurled. The legislative intent seems to
be clear that every insult or intimidation for
humiliation to a person would not amount to an
offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act
unless, of course, such insult or intimidation is
targeted at the victim because of he being a member
of a particular Scheduled Caste or Tribe. If on calls
another an idiot (bewaqoof) or a fool (murkh) or a
thief (chor) in any place within public view, this
would obviously constitute an act intended to insult
or humiliate by user of abusive or offensive
language. Even if the same be directed generally to
a person, who happens to be a Scheduled Caste or
Tribe, per se, it may not be sufficient to attract
section 3(1)(x) unless such words are laced with
casteist remarks. Since section 18 of the SC/ST Act
bars invocation of the court‟s jurisdiction under
Section 438, Cr.P.C. and having regard to the
overriding effect of the SC/ST Act over other laws, it
is desirable that before an accused is subjected to a
trial for alleged commission of offence under section
3(1)(x), the utterances made by him in any place
within public view are outlined, if not in the F.I.R.
(which is not required to be an encyclopaedia of all
facts and events), but at least in the charge-
sheet(which is prepared based either on statements
of witnesses recorded in course of investigation or
otherwise) so as to enable the court to ascertain
whether the charge sheet makes out a case of an
offence under the SC/ST Act having been committed
for forming a proper opinion in the conspectus of the
situation before it, prior to taking cognizance of the
offence. Even for the limited test that has to be
applied in a case of the present nature, the charge-
st
sheet dated 21 January, 2016 does not make out
any case of an offence having been committed by the
appellant under section 3(1)(x) warranting him to
stand a trial.”
29. In Randheer Singh vs The State of U.P. & Ors., Criminal Appeal No.
932 of 2021, on September 02, 2021, the Supreme Court held:-
23.
“ Even though an FIR need not contain every detail,
an offence has to be made out in the FIR itself. It is the
case of the Private Respondents that Bela Rani has no
title. Bela Rani executed a false Power of Attorney in
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favour of Rajan Kumar (since deceased). Alternatively,
the Power of Attorney, in itself, was a forged document.
33. In this case, it appears that criminal proceedings
are being taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment
against a purchaser. It is reiterated at the cost of
repetition that the FIR does not disclose any offence so
far as the Appellant is concerned. There is no whisper
of how and in what manner, this Appellant is involved
in any criminal offence and the charge sheet, the
relevant part whereof has been extracted above, is
absolutely vague. There can be no doubt that
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should be
used sparingly for the purpose of preventing abuse of
the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice. Whether a complaint discloses criminal
offence or not depends on the nature of the allegation
and whether the essential ingredients of a criminal
offence are present or not has to be judged by the High
Court. There can be no doubt that a complaint
disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal
texture. The High Court has, however, to see whether
the dispute of a civil nature has been given colour of
criminal offence. In such a situation, the High Court
should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings
as held by this Court in Paramjeet Batra (supra)
extracted above.”
30. Though the de facto complainant submits that he has been insulted due
to his caste, there is no materials or statements to make out an offence
against the opposite party as alleged, either in the FIR nor in the charge
sheet.
31. Accordingly in view of the observations of the Apex Court in (Hitesh
Verma vs The State of Uttarakhand & Anr.(Supra)) and (Ramesh
Chandra Vaishya vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (Supra)),
this Court finds that the order under revision requires no interference.
32. The revisional application being CRR 2852 of 2024 is dismissed.
33. All connected applications, if any, stand disposed of.
34. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
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35. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for necessary
compliance.
36. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied
expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal formalities.
(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)