Rishi Levi vs Cbi

Court
Delhi High Court

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Reserved on: 16 October, 2026
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Pronounced on: 27 October, 2026
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Uploaded on: 27 October, 2026

# CNR No. DLHC010477512026
+ W.P.(CRL) 3123/2026
RISHI LEVI .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. K. K. Manan, Senior Advocate
with Ms. Uditi Bali, Mr. Luv Manan,
Mr. K. S. Chaudhary, Mr. Mayank
Arora, Ms. Reenaya Grover, Mr.
Karan, Ms. Ashmita Singh and Ms.
Purnima Das, Advocates.

versus
CBI .....Respondent
Through: Ms. Rajni Gupta, SPP with Mr.
Shivender Gupta and Mr. Siddharth
Shekhar, Advocates.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
JUDGMENT

SANJEEV NARULA, J.:
1. The Petitioner, presently in the custody of the Philippine authorities,
faces extradition to India in connection with a criminal case investigated by
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the Central Bureau of Investigation . He has invoked Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution of India read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik

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“CBI”
Signature Not Verified
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By:HIMANSHI CHAWLA
Signing Date:27.10.2026
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Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to assail the order passed in November 2014 by the
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, East District, Karkardooma
Courts, Delhi, declaring him a Proclaimed Offender under Section 82 of the
3 st
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . He also seeks a stay of the order dated 1
July, 2026 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rouse Avenue District
Courts, in connection with the request for his extradition from the Philippines.
2. Two questions arise for consideration. The first is whether the
proclamation proceedings undertaken in 2014 were lawful, particularly in
light of the Petitioner’s contention that although his Australian address was
recorded in the charge-sheet, no attempt was made to serve him there, and that
he had left India after joining the investigation, at a time when no judicial
order restrained him from travelling abroad. The second is whether setting
aside those proceedings would affect the warrants of arrest, the INTERPOL
Red Notice or the extradition process initiated to secure his presence before
the Trial Court.
Background
3. The impugned proceedings arise from the FIR No. RC-
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BD1/2006/E/0009, registered by the Central Bureau of Investigation on 20
November, 2006, concerning alleged irregularities in merchanting trade
transactions undertaken by the National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing
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Federation of India Ltd. According to the CBI, the transactions involved the
use of letters of credit issued by Renfrew Security Bank & Trust (Offshore)
Ltd., Cyprus, against purported overseas sales which were not supported by

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“BNSS”
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“Cr.P.C.”
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“CBI”
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“NAFED”
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genuine commercial transactions. The prosecution alleges that NAFED
consequently suffered a wrongful loss of approximately ₹233.40 crore.
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4. Upon completion of investigation, the CBI filed a charge-sheet on 23
December, 2009 against thirteen accused persons, including the Petitioner, for
offences under Section 120B read with Sections 409, 420, 467, 468 and 471
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of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, together with the substantive offences
attributed to the respective accused. The Petitioner, arrayed as accused No. 7,
is alleged to have acted as the Indian agent of Renfrew Security Bank and to
have facilitated the arrangement of accommodation letters of credit. The CBI
further alleges that he received substantial commission payments from a co-
accused in connection with these transactions. These allegations form the
subject matter of the pending prosecution and do not require adjudication in
the present proceedings.
5. It is undisputed that the Petitioner joined the investigation on one
occasion in 2008 and thereafter left India. According to him, he departed on
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24 November, 2008, before the charge-sheet was filed. The CBI, however,
contends that, being aware of the investigation, he left the country to evade
the criminal process and has not returned since.
6. The charge-sheet records two addresses of the Petitioner: one at DLF
Phase-I, Gurgaon, and the other at James Street, Ingleburn, New South Wales,
Australia. The address particulars are marked as unverified. The fact remains,
however, that the investigating agency had recorded an identifiable Australian
address before the commencement of proceedings against the Petitioner
before the criminal court.

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“IPC”
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7. Cognizance of the offences was taken on 26 February, 2010 and
summons were issued to the accused persons, including the Petitioner. The
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order dated 30 March, 2010 is of particular significance. It expressly records
that the Petitioner, along with two other accused persons, had not been served
and directs that they be served afresh through the Investigating Officer. There
is nothing in the material placed before this Court to establish that the
subsequent attempt resulted in service upon the Petitioner.
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8. On 25 July, 2011, the ACMM recorded the Petitioner’s absence. The
order does not record that summons had been duly served upon him.
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Subsequently, on 29 May, 2013, non-bailable warrants were issued against
the Petitioner and two other absent accused persons. The order does not
disclose the circumstances in which service of summons upon the Petitioner
was treated as complete, nor does it record any specific reason for resorting
to non-bailable warrants notwithstanding the earlier non-service.
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9. The warrants remained unexecuted. By order dated 12 August, 2014,
the ACMM, observing that the concerned accused appeared to be absconding,
directed issuance of process under Section 82 Cr.P.C. and opening of Look-
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Out Circulars. On 27 September, 2014, the Court specifically recorded that
the process issued under Section 82 against the Petitioner had been received
back not properly served. Thereafter, by the impugned order passed in
November 2014, the ACMM, referring to the reports and statements of the
process servers, declared the Petitioner and co-accused Harsh Shori as
Proclaimed Offenders and directed issuance of process under Section 83
Cr.P.C.
10. There is some discrepancy concerning the date of the impugned
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declaration. While the petition describes it as an order dated 28 November,
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2014, the CBI refers to 10 November, 2014. The copy annexed to the petition
does not clearly disclose the date on which the declaration was made and
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refers to 28 November, 2014 as the next date of hearing. The identity and
contents of the order under challenge are, however, not in dispute.
11. The subsequent developments are also relevant. Open-ended non-
bailable warrants were issued against the Petitioner in November 2024.
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According to the CBI, an INTERPOL Red Notice was issued on 17 March,
2026. Upon the Petitioner being traced to the Philippines, a request for his
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provisional arrest was transmitted in May 2026. On 10 June, 2026, the CJM
directed issuance of fresh open-ended warrants upon the CBI pointing out that
Section 409 IPC had inadvertently been omitted from the earlier warrants. By
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order dated 1 July, 2026, the CJM countersigned the extradition affidavit and
supporting documents, which were thereafter handed over to the investigating
officer for further action. The CBI states that the extradition dossier was
forwarded through diplomatic channels in July 2026 and that the Petitioner
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was arrested by the Philippine authorities on 9 September, 2026. He is
presently stated to be in their custody.
Submissions
12. Mr. K.K. Manan, Senior Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, submits
that the declaration under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is fundamentally defective. He
points out that the Petitioner had left India before the filing of the charge-sheet
and that the subsequent summons were never served upon him. Particular
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reliance is placed upon the order dated 30 March, 2010, recording non-
service, and the charge-sheet itself, which mentioned an Australian address.
It is argued that notwithstanding this information, no attempt was made to
secure service through the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of External
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Signing Date:27.10.2026
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Affairs or any other recognised channel. Senior Counsel further relies upon
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the order dated 27 September, 2014, expressly recording that the process
under Section 82 had not been duly served.
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13. Relying upon Manish Popli v. Central Bureau of Investigation ,
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Hitesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) , Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab ,
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and H.P. Nikhil Petrol Pump v. Ravi Kumar , Mr. Manan submits that a
person already residing abroad cannot be presumed to be absconding merely
because summons or warrants issued at an Indian address remain unserved. It
is further contended that the offences attributed to the Petitioner do not fall
within Section 82(4) Cr.P.C. and, therefore, his declaration as a Proclaimed
Offender is independently unsustainable.
14. On the question of extradition, Mr. Manan submits that the Petitioner
is willing to return to India voluntarily, submit to the jurisdiction of the Trial
Court and furnish a specific undertaking to appear and participate in the
criminal proceedings. It is urged that, since the Petitioner is presently in the
custody of the Philippine authorities, arrangements may be made by the
Indian authorities, in coordination with their counterparts in the Philippines,
to facilitate his transfer to India. He accordingly requests that the extradition
proceedings be kept in abeyance for a limited period to enable his return,
subject to such undertakings and safeguards as this Court may consider
appropriate to secure his presence before the Trial Court.
15. Ms. Rajni Gupta, SPP for the CBI, opposes the petition both on
maintainability and merits. She submits that the petition has been instituted

7
2026:DHC:2499
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2025:DHC:9529
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2024 SCC OnLine P&H 1798
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2024:PHHC:087055
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Signing Date:27.10.2026
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through a person claiming to be the Petitioner’s general power-of-attorney
holder, on the strength of an instrument purportedly executed in the
Philippines. Her principal objection is that the document has not been
apostilled or otherwise duly authenticated for use in India. Further, the
particulars and signatures of the witnesses have been left blank. She
consequently questions the authenticity of the instrument, including whether
it was indeed executed by the Petitioner, whether the identity of the executant
was duly verified and whether the circumstances of its execution can be
reliably ascertained. It is submitted that, in the absence of proper
authentication, the authority of the attorney holder to institute and pursue the
present proceedings on behalf of the Petitioner remains unestablished.
Reliance is placed upon T.C. Mathai v. District & Sessions Judge,
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Thiruvananthapuram , Amrinder Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) , Haji
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Iqbal v. State of U.P. , Dr. Syed Shamsuddin Babar v. Ikram Ali Kaleem ,
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and Rakesh Mehra v. State of Uttarakhand .
16. On merits, she emphasises that the Petitioner was fully aware of the
investigation when he left India in 2008, did not appear before the Trial Court
thereafter, and took no effective steps to submit to its jurisdiction even after
executing the power of attorney in 2024. It is submitted that the present
proceedings were instituted only after the Petitioner was apprehended in the
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Philippines. The CBI relies upon Abhishek v. State of Maharashtra and

11
(1999) 3 SCC 614
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2022 SCC OnLine Del 24
13
2023 SCC OnLine All 829
14
2002 SCC OnLine AP 1445
15 th
Criminal Misc. Application No. 135 of 2024 & Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 159 of 2023 decided on 17
June, 2026
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(2022) 8 SCC 282
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Signing Date:27.10.2026
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Yash Dev Singh Sejwal v. State , to submit that an accused who deliberately
remains beyond the reach of the criminal court is not entitled to discretionary
indulgence.
17. As regards the Petitioner’s willingness to return, Ms. Gupta submits
that Article 15 of the Extradition Treaty between India and the Philippines
expressly provides for voluntary surrender and that the Petitioner is at liberty
to avail himself of that provision. The CBI, however, opposes an arrangement
involving the Petitioner’s release from custody in the Philippines merely upon
an undertaking to appear in India, as there would then be no effective
assurance of securing his presence.
Analysis
Maintainability of the petition
18. The preliminary objection regarding institution of the petition through
a power-of-attorney holder may first be considered. In T.C. Mathai , the
Supreme Court held that a power-of-attorney holder cannot substitute for the
personal appearance of an accused where such appearance is required by the
Cr.P.C. The Court also distinguished representation through an attorney from
representation by a legal practitioner permitted to appear under the Code. The
decision does not, however, lay down that every challenge instituted on behalf
of an accused through an attorney holder must necessarily be rejected without
examining the nature of the proceedings and the circumstances preventing
personal institution.
19. In Amrinder Singh , a Coordinate Bench of this Court declined to
entertain a petition instituted through a special power-of-attorney holder

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2024:DHC:28
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seeking quashing of an FIR, the charge-sheet and consequential proceedings,
including proceedings under Sections 82 and 83 Cr.P.C. A similar approach
was adopted in Haji Iqbal , where the Court also found material defects and
inconsistencies in the instrument of authority and the explanation furnished
for the accused’s absence. The decisions in Dr. Syed Shamsuddin Babar and
Rakesh Mehra likewise emphasise that an attorney holder cannot be employed
as a substitute for an accused’s submission to the criminal process. In Rakesh
Mehra , the accused had failed to appear despite opportunities afforded to him,
and the validity of the proclamation and Look-Out Circular was not itself
directly under challenge.
20. The question has also been considered by this Court in Sachin Dev
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Duggal v. Directorate of Enforcement . After considering, inter alia , T.C.
Mathai and Amrinder Singh , the Court declined to reject a petition
challenging non-bailable warrants merely because it had been instituted
through a power-of-attorney holder. The Court took into account the
petitioner’s residence abroad and the circumstances preventing him from
personally approaching the Court. Reference was also made to the decision of
the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Mangal Dass
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Gautam v. State of Haryana , which recognised that maintainability in such
cases must be determined with reference to the facts, the authority conferred
and the reasons for institution through an attorney.
21. In the present case, the power of attorney authorises the holder to
institute and pursue proceedings concerning criminal cases against the
Petitioner. It is true that the witness columns are unsigned and no apostille is

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2025 SCC OnLine Del 9366
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2018 SCC OnLine P&H 8136
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apparent on the copy placed on record. These are deficiencies bearing upon
proof and authentication of the instrument, and the CBI is entitled to raise
them. Equally, the Court must consider the nature of the relief sought. The
challenge is directed principally against judicial orders, the contents of which
are ascertainable from the record, and not upon disputed factual assertions
resting exclusively within the attorney holder’s personal knowledge. The
Petitioner is also presently detained in the Philippines pursuant to the process
initiated at the instance of the Indian authorities.
22. In these circumstances, the Court is not persuaded to reject the petition
at the threshold solely on account of its institution through the attorney holder.
This conclusion is confined to the maintainability of the present challenge and
does not amount to recognising the attorney holder as a substitute for the
Petitioner’s personal appearance before the Trial Court. Nor does it dispense
with the requirement of proper authentication or personal verification
wherever the nature of any further proceedings may require it.
Validity of the proclamation proceedings
23. Section 82(1) Cr.P.C. empowers a Court to issue a written proclamation
where it has reason to believe that a person against whom a warrant has been
issued has absconded or is concealing himself so that the warrant cannot be
executed. The proclamation must require appearance at a specified place and
time, allowing not less than thirty days from the date of its publication.
Section 82(2) prescribes the manner of publication, including public reading
at a conspicuous place in the town or village where the person ordinarily
resides, affixation at the prescribed place and affixation at the courthouse.
Section 82(3) accords conclusive evidentiary effect to a written statement by
the issuing Court recording due publication on a specified day in the
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prescribed manner.
24. These requirements operate at distinct stages. Before issuing a
proclamation, the Court must have material giving it reason to believe that the
person concerned has absconded or is concealing himself to avoid execution
of the warrant. Once issued, the proclamation must be published in the manner
prescribed and must allow the statutory period for appearance. The mere
return of a warrant unexecuted satisfies neither requirement. The satisfaction
under Section 82 must be founded on material indicating deliberate evasion;
it cannot be inferred merely because process issued at an address where the
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accused no longer resides has remained unexecuted.
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25. The charge-sheet was filed on 23 December, 2009. On 26 February,
2010, the Court took cognizance and issued summons to the accused,
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including the Petitioner. On 30 March, 2010, the ACMM recorded that the
Petitioner had not been served and directed the Investigating Officer to serve
him afresh. Nothing on record shows that he was served thereafter.
26. The charge-sheet expressly contained an Australian address. The CBI’s
reply states that summons could not be served at the known addresses in India,
but does not disclose any attempt to verify the Australian address or effect
service there. Section 105 Cr.P.C. contemplated reciprocal arrangements for
service of judicial process outside India. The Ministry of Home Affairs had
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also issued comprehensive guidelines on 11 February, 2009 governing
service of summons, notices and judicial process upon persons residing
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abroad. By 2014, mutual legal assistance arrangements between India and
Australia provided a recognised channel for seeking service of judicial

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Hitesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025:DHC:9529.
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No. 25016/17/2007-Legal Cell Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs, IS Division-II:Legal Cell
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documents.
27. These circumstances assume significance in examining whether the
satisfaction required under Section 82(1) Cr.P.C. was justified. The order
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dated 12 August, 2014 proceeded upon the return of the non-bailable
warrants as unexecuted, without identifying any material indicating that the
Petitioner had absconded or was concealing himself to evade their execution.
When the investigating agency was already aware of his overseas address, but
had demonstrated no effort to pursue it, the mere failure to execute the
warrants could not, by itself, justify an inference of deliberate evasion.
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28. The later proceedings do not cure the defect. On 27 September, 2014,
the ACMM recorded that the process under Section 82 Cr.P.C. had been
returned not duly served . The impugned order thereafter relies on the
statements of two process servers to declare the Petitioner a Proclaimed
Offender. Even if the proclamation was subsequently published in the manner
prescribed by Section 82(2), due publication could not supply the
jurisdictional requirement under Section 82(1). Before issuing the
proclamation, the Court was required to record its satisfaction, on the basis of
material before it, that the Petitioner had absconded or was concealing himself
so that the warrant could not be executed. The impugned order identifies no
such material beyond his absence and the return of the process unexecuted,
although his overseas address was available with the investigating agency.
29. In Manish Popli , this Court set aside proclamation proceedings against
an accused residing in Australia where the investigating agency, despite
knowledge of his overseas residence, had not pursued service through legally
recognised channels. The judgment examined both the material necessary for
the Court’s satisfaction under Section 82 and the procedure followed in
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issuing the proclamation. The facts of Manish Popli are not identical. The
accused in that case had maintained communication with the investigating
agency and had also faced restrictions affecting his ability to travel.
Nevertheless, the principle concerning the need for a proper statutory
foundation before invoking Section 82 is directly relevant.
30. The decisions in Sucha Singh and H.P. Nikhil Petrol Pump similarly
recognise that residence abroad, particularly before issuance of the relevant
warrants, cannot without further material be equated with abscondence. Those
decisions do not establish that departure from India before issuance of a
warrant invariably excludes deliberate evasion. In the present case, the
Petitioner knew of the investigation before leaving India. His subsequent
conduct is therefore a relevant circumstance, but it does not relieve the Court
of the obligation to satisfy the requirements of Section 82.
31. There is also an independent statutory infirmity in the declaration.
Section 82(4) Cr.P.C. authorises a Court, after the prescribed inquiry, to
pronounce a person a Proclaimed Offender only where the proclamation
concerns an offence enumerated in that provision. The offences attributed to
the Petitioner, namely Sections 120B, 409, 420, 467, 468 and 471 IPC, are
not included in that enumeration. In Sanjay Bhandari v. State (NCT of
22
Delhi) , this Court explained the distinction between a person against whom
a proclamation has been validly issued under Section 82(1) and a person who
may additionally be declared a Proclaimed Offender under Section 82(4). The
distinction was subsequently applied in Yash Dev Singh Sejwal .
32. The offences alleged against the Petitioner are not listed in Section

22
2018 SCC OnLine Del 10203
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82(4) Cr.P.C. He could not, therefore, have been declared a Proclaimed
Offender. Further, the record does not show that summons were sent to his
Australian address, that there was material to conclude that he had absconded
or concealed himself, or that the process was duly published after the order
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dated 27 September, 2014. The proclamation must therefore be set aside.
The Petitioner’s conduct and delay
33. The Court has also considered the CBI’s objection founded upon the
Petitioner’s conduct. He joined investigation in 2008 and subsequently left
India. The assertion made in the proceedings that he had departed before
registration of the FIR is contrary to the admitted chronology, the FIR having
been registered in November 2006. His failure to return or approach the Trial
Court for several years is also a circumstance requiring explanation.
34. Of particular significance is the power of attorney executed in 2024,
authorising representation in criminal proceedings instituted against the
Petitioner in India. Whatever may have been his knowledge of the specific
judicial proceedings in 2010 or 2014, this document indicates awareness of
the need to pursue remedies concerning those proceedings by 2024. Yet the
present challenge was instituted only after his apprehension in the Philippines
in September 2026. The explanation attributing this delay to the negligence
of his attorney holder does not satisfactorily account for the prolonged
inaction.
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35. In Abhishek v. State of Maharashtra the Supreme Court observed
that a person who remains beyond the reach of the investigating agency while
deliberately avoiding the process of law would ordinarily not deserve

23
(2022) 8 SCC 282
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discretionary indulgence. In Yash Dev Singh Sejwal , this Court declined
interference with the underlying coercive proceedings having regard to the
accused’s repeated participation in related litigation, knowledge of the
proceedings and prolonged failure to appear.
36. These principles bear upon the relief that may appropriately be granted.
They do not, however, authorise the continuation of a declaration made
without satisfying the governing statutory requirements. The validity of the
proclamation must be assessed by reference to the law and the material
supporting its issuance. Subsequent conduct cannot retrospectively establish
compliance which was not shown when the proclamation was made. Equally,
setting aside the proclamation does not absolve the Petitioner of his obligation
to face the pending prosecution.
37. For the reasons discussed above, the proceedings initiated against the
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Petitioner under Section 82 Cr.P.C. pursuant to the order dated 12 August,
2014, and the resulting declaration as a Proclaimed Offender in November
2014, cannot be sustained. Both are liable to be set aside insofar as they
concern the Petitioner. This conclusion is confined to the proclamation
proceedings and does not affect the warrants of arrest issued against him,
whose validity has not been examined in these proceedings.
Effect upon the Red Notice and extradition proceedings
38. The remaining question concerns the consequences of setting aside the
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proclamation. The Petitioner seeks a stay of the order dated 1 July, 2026
passed by the CJM in connection with the extradition request. That order,
however, did not itself direct extradition. It records that the competent CBI
officer signed the extradition affidavit and supporting documents in Court,
whereafter those documents were countersigned by the CJM and handed over
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to the investigating officer for further action. The extradition request was
thereafter pursued through the competent authorities.
39. Extradition is governed by a legal framework distinct from the
procedure for proclamation under Section 82 Cr.P.C. Article 8 of the
Extradition Treaty between India and the Philippines provides that a request
for extradition shall be made through diplomatic channels. Where the request
concerns a person accused of an offence, Article 8(3) requires an arrest
warrant issued by a judge, magistrate or other competent authority, together
with the evidence contemplated by the Treaty. Article 9 separately provides
for provisional arrest and expressly permits a request to be transmitted
through INTERPOL. Neither provision requires that the person sought must
first have been declared a Proclaimed Offender under Indian criminal
procedure.
40. The nature and legal effect of an INTERPOL Red Notice was explained
by the Supreme Court in Bhavesh Jayanti Lakhani v. State of
24
Maharashtra . A Red Notice is a mechanism of international police
cooperation and is not, by itself, an arrest warrant. Under INTERPOL’s Rules
on the Processing of Data, a Red Notice seeking a person for prosecution must
be supported by a valid arrest warrant or an equivalent judicial decision. The
issuance and continuation of such a notice must satisfy the applicable
requirements of those Rules.
41. In the present case, non-bailable warrants had been issued against the
Petitioner even before the proclamation proceedings commenced in 2014.
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Subsequently, open-ended non-bailable warrants were issued on 26

24
(2009) 9 SCC 551
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November, 2024, followed by the INTERPOL Red Notice on 17 March,
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2026. On 10 June, 2026, the Chief Judicial Magistrate directed issuance of
fresh open-ended warrants after the CBI pointed out that Section 409 IPC had
inadvertently been omitted from the earlier warrants. The previously issued
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warrants were returned and taken on record. It was thereafter, on 1 July,
2026, that the Chief Judicial Magistrate countersigned the extradition
affidavit and supporting documents for transmission through the competent
authorities.
42. The warrants of arrest and the proclamation under Section 82 CrPC are
distinct judicial processes. Setting aside the proclamation does not invalidate
the warrants, which remain unaffected by this judgment. Consequently, the
invalidity of the 2014 proclamation furnishes no ground, by itself, to interfere
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with the order dated 1 July, 2026, or to direct suspension of the INTERPOL
Red Notice or the pending extradition proceedings. These measures shall
continue to be governed by the Treaty and applicable law.
43. The CBI shall communicate this judgment, through the prescribed
channels, to India’s National Central Bureau for INTERPOL and the
authorities handling the extradition request, including the Philippine
authorities wherever the 2014 proclamation formed part of the material
furnished to them. The communication shall clarify that the subsequent
warrants and pending prosecution remain unaffected, enabling the National
Central Bureau to make the necessary updates and assess the Red Notice in
accordance with Article 80(2) of INTERPOL’s Rules on the Processing of
Data.
Voluntary surrender and return to India
44. Mr. Manan submits that the Petitioner is willing to return to India,
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submit to the jurisdiction of the Trial Court and furnish appropriate
undertakings. He contends that his voluntary return would serve the purpose
of the extradition proceedings. In response, counsel for the CBI points out that
Article 15 of the India-Philippines Extradition Treaty provides for voluntary
surrender and that the Petitioner may avail himself of that procedure.
45. Indeed, Article 15 permits the Requested State, upon the written
consent of the person sought, to surrender that person to the Requesting State
as expeditiously as possible without further proceedings. The Supreme Court
of the Philippines has also framed the Rules on Extradition Proceedings, A.M.
th th
No. 22-03-29-SC, dated 8 April, 2025, which came into effect on 10
November, 2025. Rule 5 provides for voluntary surrender even where the
person concerned is under provisional arrest or extradition proceedings are
pending. The procedure contemplates a notarised affidavit of waiver executed
with the assistance of counsel, followed by consideration by the competent
Philippine court of whether the consent has been given knowingly and
voluntarily.
46. Thus, the Treaty and the applicable Philippine Rules expressly
contemplate a procedure through which the Petitioner may voluntarily
consent to his surrender. The availability of that mechanism also addresses
the practical concern expressed by the CBI. The Petitioner is presently in the
custody of the Philippine authorities. His return, if he elects voluntary
surrender, would take place through the competent authorities in accordance
with the applicable legal procedure, rather than upon his release into private
custody on the strength of an undertaking furnished before this Court.
47. In these circumstances, no separate arrangement involving suspension
of the extradition process or release of the Petitioner from custody abroad is
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HIMANSHI CHAWLA
Signing Date:27.10.2026
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warranted. The decision whether to consent to voluntary surrender must be
made by the Petitioner himself, upon legal advice and with full knowledge of
its consequences. Nothing in the present judgment requires him to waive any
right available under Philippine law.
48. The Petitioner shall accordingly remain at liberty to invoke Article 15
of the Treaty read with Rule 5 of the Philippine Rules on Extradition
Proceedings, should he so elect. If voluntary surrender is permitted by the
competent Philippine authorities, the Indian authorities may coordinate his
transfer in accordance with law. Upon being brought to India, the Petitioner
shall be produced before the competent criminal court without avoidable
delay and dealt with in accordance with law. Any application concerning bail,
custody or other relief shall be considered independently by the competent
Court, without being influenced by the observations made herein.
49. The Petitioner has also raised questions concerning his nationality.
While the charge-sheet describes him as an Indian national, the subsequent
material refers to Australian citizenship, and the Petitioner has claimed
residence and citizenship-related rights in the Philippines. It is unnecessary to
resolve these questions in the present proceedings. Article 3 of the India-
Philippines Extradition Treaty, in any event, provides that the Treaty does not
preclude extradition by the Requested State of its own nationals in respect of
an extraditable offence. Questions concerning the Petitioner’s nationality and
their consequences under the applicable law are left open for consideration by
the competent authorities, should they arise.
Directions
50. In view of the foregoing discussion, the petition is partly allowed, with
the following directions:
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HIMANSHI CHAWLA
Signing Date:27.10.2026
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(i) The order passed by the ACMM, East District, Karkardooma Courts,
Delhi, in November 2014, annexed as Annexure-1 to the petition, is set aside
insofar as it declares the Petitioner, Rishi Levi, a Proclaimed Offender.
Consequently, the proclamation proceedings initiated against him pursuant to
th
the order dated 12 August, 2014 shall also stand set aside.
(ii) The direction for issuance of process under Section 83 Cr.P.C., insofar
as it is founded upon the proclamation hereby set aside, shall consequently
cease to operate against the Petitioner.
(iii) This judgment shall not operate as cancellation of the warrants of arrest
issued against the Petitioner in May 2013, November 2024 or June 2026, none
of which has been independently adjudicated upon herein. The pending
criminal proceedings shall continue in accordance with law. The competent
Court shall remain at liberty to take such steps as may be permissible for
securing the Petitioner’s presence.
st
(iv) The prayer for staying the order dated 1 July, 2026 and the extradition
proceedings is declined. The present judgment shall not, by itself, require
suspension or withdrawal of the INTERPOL Red Notice or the extradition
request. Their continuation shall remain subject to the independent
requirements of the applicable law and Treaty.
(v) The CBI shall comply with the directions contained in paragraph 43
above.
(vi) The Petitioner shall be at liberty to avail himself of the mechanism for
voluntary surrender contemplated under Article 15 of the India-Philippines
Extradition Treaty and Rule 5 of the applicable Philippine Rules, subject to
the decision of the competent Philippine authorities and compliance with the
prescribed procedure.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HIMANSHI CHAWLA
Signing Date:27.10.2026
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51. It is clarified that this Court has expressed no opinion on the merits of
the allegations against the Petitioner, the independent validity of the
subsisting warrants of arrest, or the legality of his detention and the pending
proceedings under Philippine law. Those questions, if raised, shall be
considered by the competent courts or authorities in accordance with law.
52. The writ petition, along with pending applications, stands disposed of
in the aforesaid terms.

SANJEEV NARULA, J
OCTOBER 27, 2026 /ab


Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HIMANSHI CHAWLA
Signing Date:27.10.2026
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