SRI BADAMI BANASHANKARI S/O S D BASANNA vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKAAT DHARWAD
ND
DATED THIS THE 22 DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
WRIT PETITION NO.107400 OF 2026 (S-KAT)
BETWEEN:
SRI. BADAMI BANASHANKARI S/O. S. D. BASANNA,
AGE: 72 YEARS, OCC: RETIRED HEAD MASTER,
GOVERNMENT HIGHER PRIMARY SCHOOL,
SANDUR – 583 119, R/O: L. B. COLONY, SANDUR,
TQ: SANDUR, DIST: BALLARI.
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. ARAVIND D. KULKARNI,ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION
&LITERACY, M.S. BUILDING,
BENGALURU – 560001.
2. THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER,
SCHOOL EDUCATION, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
KALABURGI – 585101.
3. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
SCHOOL EDCUATION, BALLARI,
BALLARI – 583101.
Digitally signed by
RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench
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4. THE BLOCK EDUCATION OFFICER,
SANDUR, TQ: SANDUR – 583119.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. SHARAD V. MAGADUM, AGA)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 06.04.2026 (ANNEXURE – C) PASSED
IN APPLICATION NO.10367/2025 PASSED BY THE KARNATAKA
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, BELAGAVI BY ISSUING A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI AS ILLEGAL AND CONSEQUENTLY BE
PLEASE TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER OF PENALTY OR
REDUCTION OF PENSION BY 25% PERMANENTLY BEARING NO.
ED 228 PMS 2018 BENGALURU, DATED 19.09.2024 PASSED BY
ST
THE 1 RESPONDENT (ANNEXURE - A14) BY ALLOWING THIS
WRIT PETITION AND ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
ORAL ORDER
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )
The petitioner is before the Court calling in question an
order dated 04.04.2026 passed by the Karnataka State
Administrative Tribunal, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’
for short), whereby the imposition of penalty that was
challenged upon the petitioner comes to be rejected.
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2. Heard the learned counsel, Shri Aravind D. Kulkarni,
appearing for the petitioner and the learned Additional
Government Advocate, Shri Sharad V. Magadum, appearing for
the respondents.
3. Facts in brief, germane are as follows:
3.1. The petitioner, at the relevant point in time, was
working as a Headmaster in the Government Higher Primary
School. He retires on attaining the age of superannuation on
31.05.2007. Before the said retirement, it transpires that, on an
incident concerning demand of ₹200/- for sanctioning of a
student scholarship, the Lokayuktha Police had laid a trap upon
the petitioner and had seized the currency, but not from the
possession of the petitioner. Based on the said incident, a crime
had been registered against the petitioner, which was being tried
before the Special Court, Ballari, in Special Case No.48 of 1998.
The petitioner is acquitted in the said case by the judgment
dated 01.10.2005.
3.2. On the same set of facts sprang a proceeding before
the Lokayuktha by issuance of a charge sheet on 13.10.2000.
The petitioner submitted a reply to the said charge sheet issued
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against him. After recording the evidence, the Enquiry Officer
holds that the charges against the petitioner are proved and,
enclosing the said report of the Enquiry Officer, a second show-
cause notice is issued to the petitioner. A penalty of compulsory
retirement is imposed by an order dated 29.04.2003.
3.3. This is challenged by the petitioner before the
Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal in Application No.5426
of 2003. The Tribunal allows the application, sets aside the order
of compulsory retirement, holding that the recommendation of
the Lokayuktha was bad in law, and remits the matter back to
the hands of the competent authority in terms of its order dated
11.12.2008.The petitioner, in the meantime, retires on attaining
the age of superannuation on 31.05.2007.
3.4. Since the matter was remitted back for fresh
consideration, the Lokayuktha then modifies the punishment
from compulsory retirement to reducing 25% of the pension
permanently, as obtaining under Rule 241(1) of the KCSR, in
terms of its communication dated 19.11.2009. The
recommendation was accepted by the competent authority, who
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imposes a punishment of 25% reduction in pension permanently
in terms of its order dated 14.12.2010.
3.5. The order of the modified penalty was also called in
question before the Tribunal in Application No.2010 of 2013. The
Tribunal allows the application, remits the matter back to the
first respondent to pass necessary orders bearing in mind the
observations made therein, in terms of its order dated
23.11.2017. This was the second success of the petitioner before
the Tribunal.
3.6. After the matter being remitted back to the hands of
the competent authority, the petitioner had already brought it to
the notice of the concerned authority about the acquittal of the
petitioner. Even then, the same order of punishment of
reduction of pension by 25% permanently was again imposed
upon the petitioner, which comes to be challenged before the
Tribunal in Application No.10484 of 2023.
3.7. The Tribunal partly allows the application in terms of
its order dated 11.01.2024 and directs the first respondent to
pass fresh orders upon the claim of the petitioner.
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3.8. Again, on 19.09.2024, the same penalty is imposed.
The petitioner again, for the fourth time, knocks at the doors of
the Tribunal in Application No.10367 of 2025, which comes to be
rejected now, and the petitioner is before us calling in question
the said order, which is the fifth round of litigation at the hands
of the petitioner against the State.
4. The learned counsel Shri Aravind D. Kulkarni
appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the
petitioner is now 73 years and has been fighting this battle for
the last 23 years, all on a case where the complainant and the
shadow witness do not support the case of the prosecution. He
has been acquitted before the Criminal Court way back in the
year 2005 and, on the same set of facts, the present penalty is
lingering on his head in the evening of his life. He would submit
that, in the light of the law now laid down, the order of
imposition of punishment of 25% reduction of pension is
untenable in law.
5. Per contra , Shri Sharad V Magadum, learned
Additional Government Advocate, would vehemently refute the
submissions, contending that there is nothing wrong with the
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order of reduction of pension by 25% permanently, as the
petitioner was held guilty not once but three times on a remand
by the Tribunal. He would submit that the acquittal in the
criminal case would not have any bearing upon the departmental
enquiry, while admitting the fact that both the proceedings had
sprung from a solitary incident of a trap being laid for ₹200/-.
6. We have given our anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the respective learned counsel appearing
for the parties.
7. The afore-narrated facts, the chain of events and the
dates are all a matter of record.The petitioner retires on
attaining the age of superannuation on 31.05.2007. All the
incidents today are before the said date of retirement. A trap is
allegedly laid against the petitioner for demanding ₹200 for
sanction of a student scholarship. The amount was not seized
from the possession of the petitioner, but somewhere in the
office. Two proceedings sprang from the same incident. One, a
criminal case in Special Case No.48 of 1998, and the other, a
departmental inquiry by issuance of a charge sheet on
13.10.2000.The petitioner in the criminal case is acquitted after
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a full-blown trial. The order of acquittal assumes significance for
consideration of the issue in the lis . The concerned Court has
held as follows:
“13. PW 4 Smt. Ganganıma d/o Mallamma, PW 5 Smt.
Ningamma, PW 6 Smt. Gangamma d/o Durgamma, PW 7
Chandramma do Mailamma, were Devadasis and their
children were studying in the school wherein the accused
was working as Head Master. According to the
prosecution case the said witnesses have also applied for
sanction of scholarship in respect of their children
studying in the said school and accused demanded
Rs.200/- from the said witnesses also for sanctioning of
the scholarship. All the said witnesses in their evidence
testified that their children were studying in the school at
Sandur, wherein the accused was working as Head Master
and they submitted applications for scholarship and
accused after receipt of the said applications, informed
these witnesses that they would get Scholarship of
Rs.1,000/-. There is nothing in the evidence of these
witnesses regarding the demand of bribe amount by the
accused. The learned PP cross examined all these
witnesses on the ground that they have resiled from their
previous statement. Nothing has been elicited during the
course of cross examination to show that the accused
demanded bribe from these witnesses for sanctioning of
scholarship amount.
14. PW 8 is Kotrappa, who was working as
Clerk/Assistant, in the District Women and Children
Welfare and Development Welfare Officer, during 1997.
This witness in his examination in chief testified that
during 1997 Rs.1,000/- each to the children of Devadasis
who were studying in Primary Schools, was being
sanctioned from the District Women and Children Welfare
Development Authority. That Nagappa, teacher brought
CTS Form No.8 and handed over to this witness and the
said forms were incomplete, hence he returned the same.
That he has not asked any bribe from either Nagappa or
anybody.
15. PW 9 is one Umapathi, who was working as Typist in
Bellary Municipality. This witness in his examination in
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chief testified that on 20.11.1997, as per the instructions
of his Superior Officers, he went to Bellary Lokayukta
Office and there another pancha by name Shashikala and
the complainant were present. The said woman had given
complaint to the Lokayukta Police stating that for
sanctioning scholarship, the Head Master as asked bribe
amount. The said woman Produced four notes of Rs.50.
each amounting to Rs.200/- to police. Thereafter
phenolphthalein powder was applied to the said notes and
this witness counted the said notes and noted down the
number of the said notes and thereafter the solution was
prepared and hand wash of this witness turned to pink
colour. Thereafter Lokayukta police instructed the said
woman to given the said amount to the accused if
demanded and another pancha was asked to accompany
the complainant. That police drawn mahazar as per Ex.P 7
in the Lokayukta office. That thereafter this witness along
with Lokayukta police, complainant and another pancha,
went to Sandur. That the complainant and pancha No.2
went inside the school, where the accused was working
and after some time, they came back and informed the
police that they have given money to the accused. That
thereafter raiding party went inside the school and hand
wash of the accused turned to pink colour. That the notes
were kept below the book and accused took the said
notes and handed over the same to the police. This
witness verified the said notes and the said notes were
the notes given by the complainant in the Lokayukta PS.
That the mahazar was drawn as per Ex. P 8. The evidence
of this witness would not help the prosecution in any way
to show that the notes marked as MO 1, were recovered
from the possession of the accused. Even if the evidence
of this witness is accepted in tuto, it discloses that the
notes were kept below the book and the accused has
handed over the said notes to the Lokayukta police.
16. PW 10 is the complainant Smt. Gouramma. This
witness in her examination in chief testified that her three
children were studying at Sandur school, situated in Ward
No.1 and the accused was Head Master of the said school
and during the said period Government was providing
Rs.1,000/- scholarship to the children of Devadasis. That
she asked the accused to provide scholarship to her
daughter Kumari Geeta. Accordingly the other Devasis
were also had submitted applications for sanction of said
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scholarship. That subsequently the accused informed this
witness that the said scholarship had not sanctioned and
asked the complainant to approach the Women and
Children Welfare Development Office at Bellary and pay
money there and will sanction the said scholarship.
Thereafter this witness went to Lokayukta Police Station,
Bellary for filing complaint. That the accused had not
demanded any bribe amount from her and that she has
not given complaint before the Lokayukta Police as per
Ex. P 10. That thereafter this witness along with the
others went to Sandur. Accordingly, this witness and
pancha No.2 Shashikala went inside the school and at
that time as the accused was teaching to the students,
hence she kept the notes below the books and went to
her house. The learned PP cross examined this witness,
treating this witness as hostile and nothing has been
elicited during the course of cross examination of this
witness. There is nothing in the evidence of this witness
that the accused had demanded or accepted the bribe
amount.
17. PW 11 Shashikala was working as SDA in CTO office
at Bellary during 1997. This witness in her examination in
chief testified that on 20.11.1997 she had been to the
office of Lokayukta at about 1.00 p.m. and there
Umapathi; the another panch was present and
complainant Smt. Gouramma was also present. That
complainant informed the Lokayukta police that for
sanctioning scholarship, the accused is demanding
Rs.200/- bribe. That the complainant produced Rs.200/-
and pancha No.1 noted the number of the said notes and
counted the said notes after applying phenolphthalein
powder and after hand wash of pancha No.1. the solution
turned in to pink colour. Thereafter Lokayukta Police
asked this witness to go along with the complainant and if
the accused demands bribe, the complainant should pay
the same. Accordingly the raiding party along with this
witness came to Sandur and there the jeep was parked
little away from the school and thereafter this witness and
the complainant went inside the school at 3.00.p.m., and
that the accused was present in the school. That the
complainant asked the accused regarding scholarship
amount of her daughter. Thereafter the complainant
informed, the accused that she had brought Rs. 200/- and
remaining persons would also bring the amount. The
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accused received the said amount of Rs.200/- from the
complainant and put the same on the table and
complainant went outside and gave a signal to the
Lokayukta police and raiding party enquired the accused
and hand wash of the accused turned to pink colour.
Regarding the same a mahazar was drawn as per Ex. P 8
and accused gave explanation in writing as per Ex. P 12.
This witness in her examination in chief did not say
anything regarding the demand of bribe by the accused
from the complainant. Considering the same, leaned PP
cross examined this witness or the point demand made by
the ceased from the complainant. Learned PP suggested
to this witness that the accused asked the complainant
whether she had brought Rs.200/- for paying the same to
official of the Women and Children Welfare Development
Department, for sanction of the scholarship and the said
suggestion was accepted by this witness. The said
suggestion accepted by this witness even if accepted it
would not disclose that the accused demanded bribe for
sanctioning of the scholarship. The said admissions of this
witness show that the accused asked the complainant
whether she had brought money of Rs 200/- for paying
the same to the official working in Women and Children
Welfare Development Department, at Bellary, for
sanctioning of the scholarship amount. Absolutely there is
nothing in the evidence of this pancha witness that the
accused demanded a bribe amount of Rs.200/- from the
complainant and accepted the same.
18. PW 12 is the Police Inspector, Lokayukta, Bellary.
This witness testified in detail, regarding the appearance
of the complainant to be forenoon on 20.11.1997 at
about 11.00 a.m., and filing the complaint registering the
same and securing the panchas, and conducting pretrial
demonstration and instructing the complainant and
pancha No.2 to go to the school of the accused and if
demanded to pay the bribe amount and regarding
drawing of mahazar and regarding obtaining sanction for
prosecuting the accused.
19. PW 13 is Sri. Jagadish. This witness was working as
FDA in DDPI Office Bellary during 1997. This witness
identified the hand writing of the DIDPI and regarding
sanction given by the DDPI for prosecuting the accused.
This document is marked as Ex. P17.
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20. The evidence on record discloses that the amount was
kept on the table below the book and the accused as per
the instructions of the Lokayukta police took out the said
amount and handed over the same, Absolutely there is
nothing on record to show that the accused demanded
and accepted the bribe.
21. The learned counsel for the accused, firstly placed
reliance on a decision reported in 2005 Supreme Court
Cases (Cri) 151. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said
case has held that the mere evidence of independent
witness that when they entered the house Rs.400/- was
recovered from under the mattress of accused and
accused hand tested positive for having handled the
tainted money in view of the explanation given by the
accused, not sufficient to prove that the said money was
received as bribe. In the instant case the amount as
deposed by the witnesses was kept on the table below the
book and the same was recovered by the IO. There is
nothing on record to show that the accused had
demanded and accepted the bribe and the money was
recovered from the possession of the accused.
22. Secondly, the learned counsel for the accused placed
on a decision reported in 2002 Crl. L.J. 2787 (Supreme
Court). In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
held s under:
"Mere acceptance of money without there
being any other evidence would not be
sufficient for convicting the accused under
Section 13 (1) (d) (I). In SS 13 (1) (a) and
(b) of the Act the Legislature has specifically
used the word 'accepts' or ‘obtains’. As
against this, there is departure in the
language used in Clause (1) (d) of S 13 and
it has omitted the word 'accepts’ and has
emphasized the word 'obtains’. Further, the
ingredient of sub-clause (I) is that by corrupt
and illegal means, a public servant obtained
any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage
any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage,
under complainant is quite credible no
conviction can be based on such evidence
unless it is corroborated by independent
material.:
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24. Apart from that the learned counsel for the accused
placed on a decision, reported in 1992 Crl. L.J. 608
(Supreme Court). In the said case the Hon'ble High Court
has held that there is no independent evidence regarding
the demand of bribe, conviction based merely on
probabilities is liable to be set aside.
25. Lastly the learned counsel for the accused placed
reliance on a decision reported in AIR 1979 Supreme
Court 1408. In the said case, the Hon ble High Court has
held as under
"In a case of bribery, mere recovery of
money divorced from the circumstances
under which it is paid is not sufficient to
convict the accused when the substantive
evidence in the oase is not reliable."
In the said case shadow witness has
made two inconsistent statements in her
evidence regarding the acceptance of money
by the accused. Even if the entire evidence
of the said shadow witness accepted that
would not hold the accused to prove Aral the
accused has demanded the bribe and
accepted the same. Cause (ii) be obtains
such thing by abusing his position as a public
servant, he obtains for any person any
valuable thing or pecuniary advantage
without any public interest. Therefore, for
convicting the person under S. 13 (1) (d),
there must be evidence on record that
accused, obtained; for himself or for any
other person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage by either corrupt or illegal means
or by abusing his position as a public servant
or he obtained for any person any valuable
thing or pecuniary advantage without any
public interest.’
In the instant case the complainant has not
supported the prosecution case. The shadow
witness has not supported the prosecution
case in respect of main ingredients of
demand and acceptance of amount. From the
relevant part of the evidence of both the
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witnesses, it is difficult to find out any
statement made by her that accused
demanded any amount from, the
complainant.
23. Thirdly the learned counsel for the accused placed
reliance on a decision reported in 1993 Crl.LJ 2878. In
the said case the Hon'ble Bombay High Court has held
that even where evidence of Apart from that in the
instant case the money was not recovered from the
possession of the accused. The said tainted money was
kept on the table below the book, and the accused as
per the instructions of the Lokayukia police, handed over
the same to the Lokayukta police.
In view of my above discussion, I hold that the
prosecution has failed to prove beyond all reasonable
doubt that the accused has committed offence punishable
under S. 7, 13 (1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988. Hence I answer point No.1 in the
negative.
26. POINT No. 2:
In view of the finding on point No.1 in the negative, I
proceed to pass the following
ORDER
The accused is acquitted U/s. 235(1) of Cr.P.C. of
the offence punishable U/ss. 7. 13 (1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The bail bond of the
accused stands cancelled.
The property M.Os.2 to 8 are ordered to be
destroyed, after appeal period is over MO 1, amount of
Rs.200/- is ordered to be confiscated to State.”
The Criminal Court acquits the petitioner on the ground that no
prosecution witness has supported the case of the prosecution
except the Investigating Officer. The shadow witness has turned
hostile. The complainant has turned hostile and the proof of
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demand and acceptance is not even proved to its semblance by
the prosecution. Therefore, acquits the petitioner holding that
the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the guilt beyond all
reasonable doubt. This acquittal becomes final.
8. Now, let us consider the proceedings instituted on
the departmental side by the Lokayuktha. A penalty of
compulsory retirement is imposed in terms of an order dated
29.04.2003. This is challenged before the Tribunal in Application
No.5426 of 2003. This comes to be allowed by the following
order:
“4. This Tribunal in A.No.1922 of 2004, 3903
& 3904 of 2004 and connected cases decided on
20.10.2008 considered this question of law. The
applicant had placed reliance on the principle enunciated
by the Karnataka High Court in Prof.S.N.HEGDE Vs. THE
KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA, BANGALORE & OTHERS
(2004 (3) KLJ 505)} . The learned Government
Advocate contended In those applications that the
observations of the High Court were obiter dicta. After
considering the arguments, this Tribunal in the decision
dated 20.10.2008 observed as follows:
"6. We have carefully perused the decision
of the Hon'ble Single Judge of the Karnataka High
Court Vs. The Karnataka in Prof.S.N.Hegde
Lokayuktha, Bangalore and others (2004 (3)
K.L.J. 505) , referred to above. The main point
that was considered in the said decision was the
jurisdiction of Lokayuktha to investigate into the
complaint against a Vice Chancellor of the
University. That was not a case where reference
of the complaint was to the Upalokayuktha and
further action had been taken by the Hon'ble
Lokayuktha. Nevertheless, the point as to
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whether the Lokayuktha had jurisdiction to
Investigate Into allegations grievances which are
exclusive to be Investigated by the
Upalokayuktha under Section 7(4) of the Act
when no Upalokayuktha had been appointed was
gone Into and It has been decided by the
Karnataka High Court. The point formulated has
been answered by the High Court in the
affirmative holding that when Upalokayuktha had
been appointed, the Lokayuktha had no
jurisdiction to investigate the complaints which
are to be Investigated by the Upalokayuktha
under Section 7(4) of the Karnataka Lokayuktha
Act in the absence of Government referring the
complaint to the Lokayuktha under Section (2-A)
of Section 7 of the Act. In the detailed discussion
done by the Karnataka High Court, the following
observations have been made regarding the
competency of Lokayuktha to discharge the
functions of an Upalokayuktha:
"53. Therefore, it is
abundantly clear from the above
that for the Lokayukta to discharge
the functions of Upalokayuktha, the
existence of the following
conditions are prerequisites. They
are-
(a) Appointment of a person
to be known as the Upalokayuktha;
and
(b) Person so appointed is
unable to discharge his functions
owing to-
(i) absence;
(II) illness; or
(III) any other cause.
When no Upalokayuktha Is
appointed and is not discharging
his functions, sub-section (4) is not
attracted acted at all. It is attracted
to a case where Upalokayuktha is
in being but not able to discharge
his functions for the aforesaid
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reasons. In other words
Upalokayukta though actually
present, is unable to discharge his
functions for any of the aforesaid
reasons. Upalokayukta is not
appointed at all, or if appointed,
dies, or he is removed from his
office under the Act, then the said
sub-section has no application at
all. In any of those contingencies
the Lokayukta does not get
jurisdiction to discharge the
functions of a Upalokayukta at all.
In spite of it, if he exercises
jurisdiction, it would be a case of
exercise of jurisdiction which is not
vested him in law and therefore
vold ab initio, non est and a nullity.
Any other Interpretation would be
contrary to the Intention of the
Legislature."
7. We refrain from expressing any opinion as to
whether under the facts of the case of
Prof.S.N.Hegde the observations made in the sald
case would be obiter dicta since in view of
detalled discussion of law on the point made in
the above mentioned case, and also taking into
consideration the Information submitted at the
time of argument that on the basis of the sald
decision, several matters have been sent back by
the High Court to Upalokayuktha, and to maintain
judicial discipline, on the basis of the sald
decision, we hold that the same principles be
applied In the present case also. Consequently,
the report of the Inquiry submitted by the
Additional Registrar of Inquiries, Karnataka
Lokayuktha, in furtherance of entrustment of the
Inquiry made by the Upalokayuktha, could have
been considered and further action could have
been taken only by the Upa Lokayuktha. The
consideration of the report by the Hon'ble
Lokayuktha and further recommendation by him
were, therefore, in the light of the observations
In Prof.S.N.Hegde's case referred to above, were
without jurisdiction."
5. In the light of the above mentioned decision,
we have considered the present case and find that the
recommendation made by the Hon'ble Lokayuktha in the
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present case and subsequent order passed by the
Government are liable to be set-aside.
6. For the above said reasons, the application is
allowed and the recommendation of the Hon'ble
Lokayukta bearing No. LOK/ARE-I/Enq. /2002-03 dated
20.8.2002 (Annexure.A9) and the order of the
Government bearing No. ED.51.PBS.2000 dated
29.4.2003 (Annexure.A-10) are quashed, with a direction
to the government to send back the records to the
Hon'ble Upalokayukta for taking further action in the
matter from the stage the inquiring authority's report was
submitted.”
The matter is remitted back to the hands of the Government.In
the light of the retirement of the petitioner, again the same is
now modified to withholding of pension to the tune of 25%
permanently. This is again challenged before the Tribunal. Now,
the Tribunal, in terms of its order dated 23.11.2017, allows the
petition on the following reasons:
“10. As could be seen from the records, admittedly, a
complaint was registered on 19.11.1997 by Smt.
Gouramma, the mother of a student in which school the
applicant was the Head Master. On the basis of the said
complaint, a trap was held by the jurisdictional Lokayukta
Police, Bellary, on 20.11.1997. After conducting a
detailed enquiry, a charge sheet was filed against the
applicant. As many as 13 witnesses came to be examined
before the Special Court and 17 exhibits have been
marked and 8 materials objects got marked. On analysing
the entire evidence, the learned Special Judge opined that
the prosecution has failed to prove guilt of the accused.
In para 20 of the said judgement of acquittal, the learned
Special Judge specifically has observed that the amount
was kept below the book and the accused, as per the
Instructions of the Lokayukta Police, took out the said
amount and gave the same to the Police. Therefore, It Is
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specifically observed that there is nothing on record to
show that the accused either demanded or accepted the
bribe. Para 20 the said judgment In Ink page 103 Is
relevant and extracted below:
"20. The evidence on record discloses that the
amount was kept on the table below the book
and the accused as per the instructions of the
Lokayukta police took out the said amount and
handed over the same. Absolutely there is
nothing on record to show that the accused
demanded and accepted the bribe."
11. This observation so made by the learned Special
Judge is based on the proper assessment of the evidence.
On going through the entire judgment of acquittal In S.C.
No.48/1998, we are of the considered opinion that the
judgment of acquittal is an honourable acquittal for all the
practical purpose. It is not an acquittal given in the
absence proof beyond reasonable doubt. Order of
acquittal is dated 01.10.2005. The Impugned order of
withholding of 25% of pension of the applicant
permanently came to be passed on 14.12.2010 as per
Annexure-A13. In para 4 of Annexure-A13 passed on
14.12.2010 there is only a reference of the acquittal of
the applicant by the competent authority, as found in his
reply to the 2nd show-cause-notice and acquittal of the
applicant is not at all discussed. The 1st respondent who
had entrusted the enquiry to the Lokayukta has Ignored
this vital contention raised in the reply submitted by the
applicant to the 2nd show-cause-notice. No discussion is
found in the Impugned order dated 14.12.2010. The
Disciplinary Authority, being a quasi-judicial authority,
should have considered the enquiry report as well as the
reply submitted by the applicant.
12. What Is held by this Tribunal In the case of Y UVARAJ
NAIKIJ.M. -VS- STATE reported in 1996 KSLJ 92 Is that
the Disciplinary Authority should consider the reply
furnished by the delinquent and that consideration should
be reflected in the order, otherwise there is no guarantee
that the reply has been considered and in the absence of
such consideration the order of penalty is liable to be set
aside. This reiteration of law is based on two decisions of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court In the cases of MOHAMMED
RAMZAN KHAN -vs- UNION OF INDIA reported In AIR
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1991 SC 471 and in the case of MANAGING DIRECTOR,
ECIL -VS- KARUNAKAR. B reported In AIR 1994 SC 1074.
13. On going through the facts of the case in the light of
the honourable acquittal, we are of the considered
opinion that the 1st respondent has not applied its mind
and has not properly examined the materials placed
before it.
14. The period between 05.06.1998 to 02.05.2003 i.e.
the suspension period of 4 years 10 months and 26 days
is regularised by the Additional Commissioner of Public
Instructions, Bellary, as already mentioned above and in
the said order, the period between 09.06.2003 to
31.04.2007 i.e. the period from the date of reinstatement
till his retirement on attaining the age of superannuation
has also been regularised. When the departmental
enquiry was entrusted by the Government under Rule 14-
A of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules, 1957, the Government alone is
competent to regulate these periods. It is very clear that
the Additional Commissioner of Public Instructions,
Bellary, Is not competent to pass the order of
regularisation. In this view of the matter also the
regulation of the periods so made at Annexure-A14 Is
liable to be set aside.
15. A complaint was registered on 19.11.1997 and trap
was held on 20.11.1997. The charge sheet was filed
within one year from the date of register of a case before
the Lokayukta Police. The special case went on for 6 ½
years and it ultimately ended in the acquittal of the
applicant on 01.10.2005 as per Annexure-A16. Whereas
the departmental enquiry was entrusted by the
Government to the Lokayukta on 28.07.2001 i.e. almost
2 years 7 months after the alleged commission of
misconduct of demand for bribe and receipt of the same.
st
Infact there was no Inhibition for the 1 respondent
competent authority to have initiated departmental
enquiry soon after the case registered against the
applicant when it is filed in the year 1998.
16. As the recommendation was made by an Incompetent
authority and being aggrieved by the same, the applicant
had approached this Tribunal by filing A.No.5426/2003
which was disposed of on 11.12.2008 as per Annexure-
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A11. Once again, the matter was remitted to
Upalokayukta and the Upalokayukta submitted a report
on 19.11.2009 as per Annexure-A12 and penalty was
imposed on 14.12.2010 as per Annexure-A13. There was
a delay of 11 months in submitting fresh recommendation
by the Upalokayukta as per Annexure-A12 and one year
delay to Impose of the penalty after the receipt of the
recommendation of the Upalokayukta.
17. This aspect of delay cannot be easily ignored. While
passing the impugned order, as already discussed in
st
detail, the 1 respondent has not at all applied its mind.
The 1st respondent should have considered the factum of
acquittal of the applicant in the present case.
18. It is true that the departmental enquiry and criminal
case stand on different footings. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt is insisted in the criminal case; whereas evidence in
the departmental enquiry Is assessed on the touch stone
of intrinsic probabilities. But one cannot ignore the time
spent by the applicant before the criminal court for 6½
years. The judgement of acquittal passed by the learned
Special Judge, in our opinion, Is not a judgment of
acquittal based on the absence of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. But It Is an honourable acquittal for all
practical purposes. This aspect of the matter is not at all
considered by the 1st respondent while passing the
Impugned order dated 14.12.2010.
19. For the above reasons, we are of the considered
opinion that the impugned order dated 14.12.2010 as per
Annexure-A13 and regularisation of periods passed by the
Additional Commissioner of Public Instructions as per
Annexure-A14 need to be quashed and the matter needs
st
to be-remitted to the 1 respondent in regard to the
quantum of penalty as well as the regularisation of period
as indicated above.
20. Hence, we pass the following:
ORDER
(I) The Application is allowed and the
Impugned orders at Annexures-A13
and A14 are set aside.
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st
(II) The matter is remitted to the 1
respondent to pass appropriate
penalty order keeping in mind the
observations made above, within four
months from the date of receipt of a
copy of this order.
st
(III) We make it clear that the 1
respondent alone has to pass
appropriate order in regard to
regularisation of the applicant's
suspension period as well as the
period for which he was out of service
because of the order of compulsory
retirement.”
The matter is remitted back to the hands of the Government,
which imposes the same penalty yet again. Finally, challenging
the remand and fourth penalty that was repeatedly imposed
upon the petitioner, the petitioner challenges it in Application
No.10367 of 2025. The Tribunal, on the following reasons,
rejects the petition by the order dated 06.04.2026. The order
reads as follows:
“5. We have heard the rival submissions on both sides
and gone through the pleadings carefully and anxiously.
After analyzing the facts and circumstances of the case,
the issue that emerges before us is as to whether this
Tribunal can interfere with the findings of the disciplinary
authority. It is well settled law that Courts cannot sit in
appeal over the findings of the departmental enquiry
unless there is a violation of statutory provisions or
violation of principles of natural justice. In the case on
hand, though in the earlier rounds of litigation, this
Tribunal had remitted the matter back to the Uplokayukta
for reconsideration. The disciplinary authority on the
recommendation of enquiry officer modified the order of
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penalty, declined to exonerate completely though urged
that the Applicant was honourably acquitted by the
Special Court. It is pertinent to point out that the
standard of proof in criminal trial is proof beyond
reasonable doubt whereas in domestic enquiry the
standard of proof is that of preponderance of probability.
៨
Though the Applicant relied on GM Tank and Bangl
Antony cases in his support that since the set allegations,
and evidence involved in both the special case and the
departmental enquiry are one and the same, thus, the
imposition of penalty is bad, is not sustainable, since it
depends upon facts and circumstances of each case.
Further, the reliance placed on the decision of the Hon'ble
High Court of Karnataka in W.P. No.9642 of 2020 (S-
KSAT) in the case of P.V. Rudrappa v. the State of
Karnataka dated 30.01.2024 that the acquittal in criminal
case is required to be considered by the disciplinary
authority and imposition of major penalty amounts to
double jeopardy is not acceptable since it is well settled
that the courts cannot interfere with the decision or
conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority but only
in the decision making process. In contrast to the
submission of the Applicant, the Hon'ble High Court,
Dharwad Bench, in Writ Petition No.100268/2024 (S-
KAT), decided on 25.09.2025, held that the Court or
Tribunal should not lightly interfere in the matter of
misconduct arising out of charges or corruption.
Corruption is a menace that not only threatens the very
fundamental principles of democracy but also undermines
the rule of law and institutions that serve as its guardian.
In the case of corruption, the courts are not mere
spectators but rather the last bastion of justice, duty
bound to uphold the rule of law and ensure that
accountability prevails over impunity,
6. Further, as regards the submission of the Applicant
that the alleged seized amount was not found in the
actual possession of the Applicant, thus, the findings of
the enquiry officer is perverse, it is observed supra that
Courts cannot interfere with the findings of the
disciplinary authority unless it is in violation of the
statutory provisions or mala fide or violation of principles
of natural justice and that the standard of proof in
domestic enquiry is preponderance of probability.
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Thus, devoid of any merits and is liable to be
dismissed.
7. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.”
The Tribunal ignores all the happenings prior to the order that is
being passed. The petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal
charge, which was for an alleged bribe amount of ₹200/-, and
today the petitioner is suffering the penalty of 25% of the
pension permanently withheld right from 31.05.2007.
9. The issue now would be whether on the acquittal of
the petitioner in the criminal trial, the departmental inquiry
pursuant to which the penalty is imposed on the petitioner
warrants interference or otherwise. Jurisprudence is replete with
the law laid down by the Apex Court and various High Courts on
the issue.
9.1. The Apex Court in the case of RAM LAL v. STATE
1
OF RAJASTHAN holds as follows:
".... .... ....
12. However, if the charges in the departmental
enquiry and the criminal court are identical or similar, and
if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and
the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension.
If the Court in judicial review concludes that the acquittal
in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of
1
(2024) 1 SCC 175
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the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution
miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in judicial
review can grant redress in certain circumstances. The
Court will be entitled to exercise its discretion and
grant relief, if it concludes that allowing the
findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will
be unjust, unfair and oppressive. Each case will turn
on its own facts. (See G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat [ G.M.
Tank v. State of Gujarat , (2006) 5 SCC 446 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 1121] , State Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao
[ State Bank of Hyderabad v. P. Kata Rao , (2008) 15 SCC
657 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 489] and S. Samuthiram
[ State of T.N. v. S. Samuthiram , (2013) 1 SCC 598 :
(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 566 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229] .)
Discussion
Validity of the disciplinary proceeding — Question 1
13. A brief analysis of the facts of the case is
essential. The origin of this dispute, which does not
inspire confidence at all, is as follows. The appellant's
cousin Shravan Lal (PW 4 in the departmental enquiry
and PW 6 in the criminal case), deposed as under before
the enquiry officer:
“Stated on enquiry that about 13 months
ago, I was operating engine at well. On that day
at about 3.00 p.m., Ramlal after drinking liquor,
came at well and switched off the engine.
Thereafter, Ramlal abused me and scuffled with
me and said that today I will operate the engine
and you cannot do anything to me. I have
received job by fooling the Government. When I
enquired him that how you did that, then, Ramlal
told me that I have received job by altering my
date of birth as 21-4-1972 in my marksheet,
whereas, my date of birth was 21-4-1974.
Thereafter I went to school and enquired about
this fact, whereupon I came to know that his
date of birth was 21-4-1974 . Due to this reason,
I produced an application before the
Superintendent of Police, Ajmer and made one
report to the Commandant, 9th Battalion, RAC,
Tonk and I also made one report to the Hon'ble
Chief Minister and one report to DIG, RAC,
Rajasthan, Jaipur….”
(emphasis supplied)
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14. A FIR was registered on 2-9-2002. A charge-
sheet in the departmental proceeding was issued on 2-4-
2003. It will be relevant to extract the two charges in the
disciplinary proceedings:
“ Charge 1:
In the year 1991, an application for
appointment on the post of Constable was made by
you, along with which, marksheet of 8th pass issued
by Government Secondary School, Tiloniya (Ajmer),
bearing Roll No. 323 and Admission No. 2314, in
which, your date of birth was mentioned as 21-4-
1974, but you by altering it to 21-4-1972,
fraudulently got recruited on the post of Constable.
Charge 2:
As a result of altering your date of birth from 21-
4-1974 to 21-4-1972 in the marksheet issued by the
Government Secondary School, Tiloniya (Ajmer),
Crime No. 183/02 under Sections 420, 467, 468,
471IPC was registered against you in PS Mandor,
District Jodhpur.”
15. Five witnesses were examined in the
departmental enquiry, namely, PW 1 Jagdish Chand,
Principal in Government Secondary School, Village
Tiloniya, PW 2 Bhawani Singh (Constable who was tasked
to bring the school records), PW 3 Karan Sharma, who
was Circle Officer and had recorded the statement of
Shravan Lal; PW 4 Shravan Lal and PW 5 Raj Singh who
conducted the investigation of the criminal case.
16. The evidence of PW 5/Raj Singh, as set out in
the enquiry report taken as it is, is significant since he
clearly disproved the charge. He stated the following in
the cross-examination before the enquiry officer:
“Raj Singh you conducted investigation of
Crime No. 102 and sent the copy to
Commandant, 9th Battalion, RAC, Tonk, what
documents you sent along with the same — The
documents which were sent by me were copy of
FIR, copy of charge-sheet which was submitted in
the court and statements of witnesses recorded
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during the investigation and documents; whose
photocopies were also given to the accused.
Whether you had sent the copies of
statements recorded in the aforesaid case to the
Commandant — I did not send the copies to
Commandant Sahab.
Which officer had submitted the charge-
sheet, order of result in the court — the then
SHO of PS Mandor, District — Jodhpur City,
namely, Shri Ram Pratap submitted result of
investigation, order and charge-sheet against the
accused, in the court.
During the investigation, you had
recorded statements of Dharmendra Kumar Jatav
and Jairam Gurjar, did you record more
statements and whether you would identify the
copies of those statements — Yes, I recorded the
statement of witnesses as it is. And I am
producing herewith the statements of both the
aforesaid witnesses.
Whether those have been written by
yourself — Yes, those statements have been
written by me, which are Ext. D-1 and Ext. D-2.
In Ext. D-1, I recorded statement of Teacher,
namely, Rakishan Dev Murari on A to B part and I
filled the marksheet of Ramlal, wherein, date of
birth of Ramlal is mentioned as 21-4-1972 in C to
D part, which has been written as per the
dictation of Checking Teacher Ramkishan Dev
Murari.
Date of birth of 21-7-1972 mentioned on
E to F part, was not mentioned in deliberate
manner, in fact, same has been written due to
the human error, whether you are agree with this
statement — This statement is correct, whereas,
at the time of filling up form for recruitment in
Police RAC, Ramlal could enclose TC of 9th Pass,
and he was studying in 10th class.”
17. Thereafter, referring to Ext. D-2 (statement of
Jairam Gurjar), he deposed as under:
“Similarly, in Ext. D-2, on A to B part, you
have shown me the photocopy of 8th class
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marksheet of Ramlal s/o Shri Tejuram
Chaudhary, r/o Tiloniya, on which, signatures of
it's issuer i.e. Teacher, namely, Shri Dharmendra
Kumar, Ramkishan Dev Murari and Headmaster
Shri Vishnu Miyani are mentioned. I am
acquainted with their signatures.”
18. Most importantly dealing with the 8th class
marksheet of the appellant, which formed the basis for
his application seeking appointment as Constable, PW
5/Raj Singh stated as under:
“The 8th class marksheet of Ramlal
enclosed in the documents, which is Ext. P-3 ,
(sic) in which, whether any alteration has been
found in the date of birth anywhere, and whether
date of birth has been mentioned as 21-4-1972
therein — Yes, no alteration has been made in
the marksheet of 8th class and date of birth is
21-4-1972.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. It is very clear from the above that no
alteration was found in the appellant's 8th class
marksheet (which forms part of the enclosed documents
sent to the Commandant) and the date of birth mentioned
on it was 21-4-1972. Reference to ‘P-3’ in the above
extract appears to be a mistake. The charge-sheet and
documents enclosed were Exts. P-12/1 to P-12/12. The
defence also exhibited the original 8th class marksheet
separately as Ext. D-3, as is clear from the chart of
exhibits set out in the enquiry report.
20. The enquiry officer, after setting out the
depositions of the witnesses, set out the chart of the “P”
series exhibits and the exhibits of the delinquent, namely,
the “D” series, and without any further discussion or
marshalling of the evidence recorded the following with
regard to Charge 1:
“On perusal of statement of
witnesses, namely, PW 1, PW 2, PW 3, PW
4, PW 5 and Exts. P-1 to P-12, it is clear that
correct date of birth of delinquent Constable
was 21-4-1974. When, delinquent Constable
submitted application for recruitment on the
post of Constable, at that time, he did not
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complete the age of 18 years, therefore, due
to the apprehension of rejection of his
application due to the less age, delinquent
Constable has altered his date of birth as
21-4-1972 from 21-4-1974, therefore,
Charge 1 stands proved.
Delinquent Constable has also passed
10th class, whose marksheet is Ext. P-4, in
which, his date of birth is mentioned as 21-4-
1974.”
21. Insofar as Charge 2 was concerned, it was
merely noticed that challan had been filed in the criminal
case as on 28-2-2004, the date of enquiry report, and
that the trial had not concluded.
22. In the operative part of the enquiry report
under the head, “conclusions”, there is no reference to
the 8th class marksheet, (which was part of the enclosed
documents sent by Constable Raj Singh with the charge-
sheet) or to Ext. D-3 (the original 8th class marksheet)
exhibited by the defence. There is also no reference to
the statement of Raj Singh PW 5 in the enquiry, who had
acknowledged that there was no alteration in the
marksheet of the 8th class. What is referred to in the
chart of exhibits are letter of Jagdish Chand (Ext. P-1);
the duplicate marksheet of 8th class issued by Jagdish
Chand (Ext. P-2); the statement of Shravan Lal (Ext. P-
3); 10th class marksheet of Secondary Education Board
Rajasthan, Ajmer (Ext. P-4); preliminary enquiry dated
16-10-2002 by Circle Officer, Kishangarh (Ext. P-5); FIR
No. 183/2000 (Ext. P-6); application submitted by Ram
Lal for recruitment to the post of Constable (Ext. P-7);
letter of appointment dated 8-11-1991 (Ext. P-8);
verification letter filed by Ramlal (Ext. P-9); appointment
order dated 16-12-1991 (Ext. P-10); letter of
Government School Tiloniya (Ext. P-11); and charge-
sheet dated 24-4-2003 (Ext. P-12).
23. It is very clear that relevant and material
evidence being, the deposition of PW 5/Raj Singh; the
marksheet of 8th class of the appellant (enclosed to the
charge-sheet) and the original marksheet independently
marked as Ext. D-3 by the defence have been completely
left out in the discussion and consideration. Inference has
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been drawn about the proof of the charges by ignoring
crucial, relevant and material evidence which had come
on record. The evidence of PW 5 Raj Singh and the
marksheet enclosed in the documents annexed to the
charge-sheet and the original marksheet marked as Ext.
D-3, were materials having a direct bearing on the
charge. The disciplinary authority has merely
reiterated the reasoning in the enquiry report.
Equally so are the findings of the appellate
authority. It is well settled that if the findings of the
disciplinary authorities are arrived at after ignoring
the relevant material the court in judicial review
can interfere. It is only to satisfy ourselves to this
extent, that we have scrutinised the material to see
as to what was reflected in the record. We are
satisfied that the disciplinary proceedings are
vitiated and deserve to be quashed.
24. In this scenario, we are inclined to accept the
explanation given by the appellant that overwriting in the
application form was only due to correction of an
inadvertent error. As long as the original 8th standard
marksheet reflected his date of birth as 21-4-1972 and
there is no correction or manipulation in that document,
the appellant cannot be penalised.
Effect of acquittal in the criminal proceeding —
Question 2
25. With this above background, if we examine the
criminal proceedings the following factual position
emerges. The very same witnesses, who were examined
in the departmental enquiry were examined in the
criminal trial. Jagdish Chandra, Bhawani Singh, Shravan
Lal, Raj Singh and Karan Sharma were examined as PW
2, PW 3, PW 6, PW 9 and PW 13 respectively at the
criminal trial. Apart from them, eight other witnesses
were also examined. The gravamen of the charge in the
criminal case was that the appellant had submitted an
application for recruitment along with his marksheet and
he, by making alteration in his date of birth to reflect the
same as 24-4-1972 in place of 21-4-1974, and obtained
recruitment to the post of Constable.
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26. Though the trial court convicted the appellant
under Section 420IPC, the appellate court recorded the
following crucial findings while acquitting the appellant:
“…Mainly the present case was based on
the documents to this effect whether the date of
birth of accused is 21-4-1972 or 21-4-1974. Ext.
P-3 is original marksheet, in which, the date of
birth of accused has been shown as 21-4-1972
and same has also been proved by the witnesses
examined on behalf of the prosecution . Whatever
the documents have been produced before the
court regarding the date of birth of 21-4-1974
are either the letters of Principal or are duplicate
TC or marksheets. Neither the prosecution has
produced any such original documents in the
subordinate court to this effect that when the
admission form of accused was filled, what date
of birth was mentioned by the accused in it, what
was the date of birth in Roll Register of School,
what date of birth was mentioned by accused in
the examination form of Secondary, and nor after
bringing the original records from the witnesses
concerned, same were got proved in the
evidence. In these circumstances, this fact
becomes doubtful that date of birth of the
accused was 21-4-1974, and the accused is
entitled to receive its benefit. In the considered
opinion of this Court, the conviction made by the
learned subordinate court merely on the basis of
oral evidence and letters or duplicate documents,
is not just and proper. It is justifiable to acquit
the accused.
Resultantly, on the basis of aforesaid
consideration, the present appeal filed by the
appellant-accused is liable to be allowed.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. What is important to notice is that the
Appellate Judge has clearly recorded that in the document
Ext. P-3 — original marksheet of the 8th standard, the
date of birth was clearly shown as 21-4-1972 and the
other documents produced by the prosecution were either
letters or a duplicate marksheet. No doubt, the Appellate
Judge says that it becomes doubtful whether the date of
birth was 21-4-1974 and that the accused was entitled to
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receive its benefit. However, what we are supposed to
see is the substance of the judgment. A reading of the
entire judgment clearly indicates that the appellant
was acquitted after full consideration of the
prosecution evidence and after noticing that the
prosecution has miserably failed to prove the
charge (see S. Samuthiram [ State of T.N. v. S.
Samuthiram , (2013) 1 SCC 598: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri)
566: (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 229] ).
28.Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and
“honourably acquitted”, used in judgments are not
to be understood as magic incantations. A court of
law will not be carried away by the mere use of
such terminology . In the present case, the Appellate
Judge has recorded that Ext. P-3, the original marksheet
carries the date of birth as 21-4-1972 and the same has
also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of
the prosecution. The conclusion that the acquittal in
the criminal proceeding was after full consideration
of the prosecution evidence and that the
prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge
can only be arrived at after a reading of the
judgment in its entirety. The Court in judicial
review is obliged to examine the substance of the
judgment and not go by the form of expression
used.”
The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment holds that where
the criminal and departmental proceedings rest on substantially
the same charges, witnesses, evidence and circumstances, and
the criminal Court has fully considered the evidence and found
the prosecution case to have failed, the findings in the
disciplinary proceedings can be interfered with; if not interfered,
it would become unjust, unfair and oppressive. The Apex Court
also holds that expressions like ‘benefit of doubt’ and
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‘honourably acquitted’, used in the judgments are not to be
understood as magical incantations and the Court in judicial
review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and
not to be swayed away in the form used.
9.2. The Apex Court later in the case of MAHARANA
2
PRATAP SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR has held as follows:
".... .... ....
47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does
not automatically entitle the accused to have an
order of setting aside of his dismissal from public
service following disciplinary proceedings, it is
well-established that when the charges, evidence,
witnesses, and circumstances in both the
departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings
are identical or substantially similar, the situation
assumes a different context. In such cases,
upholding the findings in the disciplinary
proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and
oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision
in G. M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision
of recent origin in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan .
48. To assess the degree of similarity between the
charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in the
disciplinary and criminal proceedings, it is indeed crucial
to review the materials placed before the Court where
such an issue arises. However, we regret, absence of the
departmental file has disabled us from looking into the
same.
49. Notwithstanding the above, a plain
reading of the materials available on record only
reveals that charge no. 1 in the disciplinary closely
2
2025 SCC OnLine SC 890
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resembled the allegations in the criminal
proceedings. In fact, the disciplinary proceedings
were initiated based on the written complaint of the
informant.
50. The judgment acquitting the appellant reveals
that the prosecution “miserably failed to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt” as both the informant and PW-
2 refused to identify the appellant in court. This
discussion confirms that the appellant's acquittal was
based not on mere technicalities. In Ram Lal (supra), this
Court held that terms like “benefit of doubt” or
“honourably acquitted” should not be treated as
formalities. The Court's duty is to focus on the substance
of the judgment, rather than the terminology used.
51. That apart, it is noteworthy that in course
of the inquiry PW-2 had also declined to identify the
appellant during cross-examination, and the
informant was not called as a witness in the
disciplinary proceedings. This sort of creates a
parallel between the circumstances in both the
criminal and disciplinary proceedings.
52. Besides, the appellant's case is
strengthened by the principle of adverse inference.
It can be reasonably inferred that the respondents
deliberately withheld the scanned copy of the
departmental file, which was essential for us to
assess whether the charges, witnesses, evidence,
and circumstances in both the criminal and
departmental proceedings were substantially
similar or identical, likely due to concerns over the
potential adverse consequences.
53. In light of the preceding discussion and the
adverse presumption that is available to be drawn, we
hold that the finding of the appellant being guilty of
charge no. 1 cannot be sustained following his acquittal in
the criminal proceedings, which seem to have involved
substantially similar or identical charges, evidence,
witnesses, and circumstances.”
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The Apex Court again reiterates that the acquittal in a criminal
case cannot automatically entitle the accused to have the order
in the departmental enquiry to be set aside. If the charges,
evidence, witnesses and circumstances in both the departmental
inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical, the Court
should not hesitate to quash the order of dismissal.
9.3. A Division Bench of this Court also considers an
identical issue in the case of SRI CHIDANANDA v. THE
3
UPALOKAYUKTA and holds as follows:
".... .... ....
13. At the same time the Supreme Court has
carved out a limited exception to the aforesaid rule. In G.
M. Tank vs State of Gujarat and Others reported in
(2006) 5 SCC 44 which has been followed in Ram Lal vs
State of Rajasthan and Others reported in (2024) 1
SCC 175 and Maharana Pratap Singh vs The State of
Bihar and Others reported in Civil Appeal No.
5497/2025, DD 23.04.2025 it has been held that where
charges, witnesses, evidence, and circumstances in the
criminal trial and the departmental enquiry are identical
or substantially similar, and the Criminal Court records a
clear acquittal on merits after completely disbelieving the
prosecution case, it may be unjust, unfair and oppressive
to sustain the disciplinary punishment, particularly where
the enquiry is founded on no additional or independent
evidence.
14. Equally, the Supreme Court in the case of
State of Karnataka and Another vs Umesh reported
in (2022) 6 SCC 563 , reiterated that the departmental
proceedings are independent of the criminal prosecution,
3
Writ Appeal No.1168 of 2025, decided on 30-06-2026
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and that misconduct is to be assessed on the standard of
preponderance of probabilities. It was held at paragraph
Nos.17 to 24 as under :
" 17. In a judgment of a three-Judge
Bench of this Court in State of Haryana v. Rattan
Singh [(1977) 2 SCC 491], V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.
set out the principles which govern disciplinary
proceedings as follows: (SCC p. 493, para 4)
“ 4. It is well settled that in a
domestic enquiry the strict and
sophisticated rules of evidence under
the Evidence Act, 1872 may not apply.
All materials which are logically
probative for a prudent mind are
permissible. There is no allergy to
hearsay evidence provided it has
reasonable nexus and credibility . It is
true that departmental authorities and
Administrative Tribunals must be
careful in evaluating such material and
should not glibly swallow what is
strictly speaking not relevant under the
Evidence Act. For this proposition it is
not necessary to cite decisions nor text
books, although we have been taken
through case-law and other authorities
by counsel on both sides. The
essence of a judicial approach is
objectivity, exclusion of
extraneous materials or
considerations and observance of
rules of natural justice. Of course,
fairplay is the basis and if
perversity or arbitrariness, bias or
surrender of independence of
judgment vitiate the conclusions
reached, such finding, even though
of a domestic tribunal, cannot be
held good. However, the courts
below misdirected themselves,
perhaps, in insisting that
passengers who had come in and
gone out should be chased and
brought before the tribunal 4
(2022) 6 SCC 563 before a valid
finding could be recorded. The
“residuum” rule to which counsel for
the respondent referred, based upon
certain passages from American
Jurisprudence does not go to that
extent nor does the passage from
Halsbury insist on such rigid
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requirement. The simple point is, was
there some evidence or was there no
evidence — not in the sense of the
technical rules governing regular court
proceedings but in a fair commonsense
way as men of understanding and
worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in
this way, sufficiency of evidence in
proof of the finding by a domestic
tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of
any evidence in support of a finding is
certainly available for the court to look
into because it amounts to an error of
law apparent on the record. We find, in
this case, that the evidence of
Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying
Squad, is some evidence which has
relevance to the charge levelled
against the respondent. Therefore, we
are unable to hold that the order is
invalid on that ground.”
(emphasis in original and supplied )
These principles have been reiterated in
subsequent decisions of this Court including State
of Rajasthan v. B.K.Meena [(1996) 6 SCC 417];
Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah
Mazdoor Sangh [(2004) 8 SCC 200; Ajit Kumar
Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [(2005) 7 SCC 764]
and CISF v. Abrar Ali [(2017) 4 SCC 507].
18. In the course of the submissions, the
respondents placed reliance on the decision in
Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar [(2009) 12
SCC 78]. In that case, six charges were framed
against the respondent. One of the charges was
that he demanded a commission of 1% for
paying the railway staff. The enquiry officer found
all the six charges proved. The disciplinary
authority agreed with those findings and imposed
the punishment of reversion to a lower rank.
Allowing the petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court observed that there
was no evidence to hold that he was guilty of the
charge of bribery since the witnesses only said
that the motive/reason for not making the
payment could be the expectation of a
commission amount. The respondent placed
reliance on the following passages from the
decision: (SCC pp. 85 & 87, paras 21 & 31)
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“ 21. Such a serious charge
of corruption requires to be proved
to the hilt as it brings both civil
and criminal consequences upon
the employee concerned. He would
be liable to be prosecuted and
would also be liable to suffer
severest penalty awardable in such
cases. Therefore, such a grave
charge of quasi-criminal nature
was required to be proved beyond
the shadow of doubt and to the
hilt. It cannot be proved on mere
probabilities.
*
31. … wherein it has been held
that the punishment should always be
proportionate to the gravity of the
misconduct. However, in a case of
corruption, the only punishment is
dismissal from service. Therefore, the
charge of corruption must always be
dealt with keeping in mind that it has
both civil and criminal consequences.”
19. The observations in para 21 of Gyan
Chand Chattar case [Union of India v. Gyan
Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78] are not the
ratio decidendi of the case. These observations
were made while discussing the judgment of the
High Court. The ratio of the judgment emerges in
the subsequent passages of the judgment, where
the test of relevant material and compliance with
natural justice as laid down in Rattan Singh
[State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC
491] was reiterated: (Gyan Chand Chattar case
[(2009) 12 SCC 78], SCC p. 88, paras 35-36)
“ 35. … an enquiry is to be
conducted against any person giving
strict adherence to the statutory
provisions and principles of natural
justice. The charges should be specific,
definite and giving details of the
incident which formed the basis of
charges. No enquiry can be sustained
on vague charges. Enquiry has to be
conducted fairly, objectively and not
subjectively. Finding should not be
perverse or unreasonable, nor the
same should be based on conjectures
and surmises. There is a distinction in
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proof and suspicion. Every act or
omission on the part of the delinquent
cannot be a misconduct.
36. In fact, initiation of the
enquiry against the respondent
appears to be the outcome of anguish
of superior officers as there had been
an agitation by the railway staff
demanding the payment of pay and
allowances and they detained the train
illegally and there has been too much
hue and cry for several hours on the
railway station. The enquiry officer has
taken into consideration the non-
existing material and failed to consider
the relevant material and finding of all
facts recorded by him cannot be
sustained in the eye of the law .”
(emphasis supplied)
On the charge of corruption, the Court observed
in the above decision that there was no relevant
material to sustain the conviction of the
respondent since there was only hearsay
evidence where the witnesses assumed that the
motive for not paying the railway staff “could be”
corruption. Therefore, the standard that was
applied by the Court for determining the validity
of the departmental proceedings was whether ( i )
there was relevant material for arriving at the
finding; and ( ii ) the principles of natural justice
were complied with.
20. In Karnataka Power Transmission
Corpn. Ltd.v. C. Nagaraju [(2019) 10 SCC 367],
this Court has held: (SCC p. 371, para 9)
“9. Acquittal by a criminal court
would not debar an employer from
exercising the power to conduct
departmental proceedings in
accordance with the rules and
regulations. The two proceedings,
criminal and departmental, are entirely
different. They operate in different
fields and have different objectives. In
the disciplinary proceedings, the
question is whether the respondent is
guilty of such conduct as would merit
his removal from service or a lesser
punishment, as the case may be,
whereas in the criminal proceedings,
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the question is whether the offences
registered against him under the PC
Act are established, and if established,
what sentence should be imposed upon
him. The standard of proof, the mode
of inquiry and the rules governing
inquiry and trial in both the cases are
significantly distinct and different.”
21. The Court also held that: (C. Nagaraju
case [Karnataka Power Transmission Corpn. Ltd.
v. C. Nagaraju, (2019) 10 SCC 367], SCC p. 372,
para 13)
“13. Having considered the
submissions made on behalf of the
appellant and Respondent 1, we are of
the view that interference with the
order of dismissal by the High Court
was unwarranted. It is settled law that
the acquittal by a criminal court does
not preclude a departmental inquiry
against the delinquent officer. The
disciplinary authority is not bound by
the judgment of the criminal court if
the evidence that is produced in the
departmental inquiry is different from
that produced during the criminal trial.
The object of a departmental inquiry is
to find out whether the delinquent is
guilty of misconduct under the conduct
rules for the purpose of determining
whether he should be continued in
service. The standard of proof in a
departmental inquiry is not strictly
based on the rules of evidence. The
order of dismissal which is based on
the evidence before the enquiry officer
in the disciplinary proceedings, which
is different from the evidence available
to the criminal court, is justified and
needed no interference by the High
Court.”
22. In the exercise of judicial review,
the Court does not act as an appellate forum
over the findings of the disciplinary
authority. The court does not reappreciate
the evidence on the basis of which the
finding of misconduct has been arrived at in
the course of a disciplinary enquiry. The
Court in the exercise of judicial review must
restrict its review to determine whether:
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( i ) the rules of natural justice have been
complied with;
( ii ) the finding of misconduct is based on
some evidence;
( iii ) the statutory rules governing the
conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have
been observed; and
( iv ) whether the findings of the disciplinary
authority suffer from perversity; and
( v ) the penalty is disproportionate to the
proven misconduct.
23. However, none of the above tests
for attracting the interference of the High
Court were attracted in the present case.
The Karnataka Administrative Tribunal
having exercised the power of judicial
review found no reason to interfere with the
award of punishment of compulsory
retirement. The Division Bench of the High
Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article
226 and trenched upon a domain which falls
within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
employer. The enquiry was conducted in
accordance with the principles of natural
justice. The findings of the enquiry officer
and the disciplinary authority are
sustainable with reference to the evidence
which was adduced during the enquiry. The
acquittal of the respondent in the course of
the criminal trial did not impinge upon the
authority of the disciplinary authority or the
finding of misconduct in the disciplinary
proceeding.
24. For these reasons, we allow the
appeals and set aside the impugned judgment
and order of the High Court of Karnataka at the
Kalaburagi Bench dated 29-11-2017 in Umesh v.
State of Karnataka [2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4973].
The petition instituted by the respondent under
Article 226 of the Constitution shall stand
dismissed. The finding of misconduct and the
punishment of compulsory retirement are
restored."
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15. The Apex Court in Umesh (supra) observed
that the recovery of tainted money established in the
departmental enquiry may, by itself, be sufficient to
sustain the finding of misconduct, notwithstanding the
acquittal of the employee in the criminal case. The Apex
Court held that in the exercise of judicial review, the court
does not act as an appellate forum over the findings of
the disciplinary authority. The Court does not re-
appreciate the evidence on the basis of which the findings
of misconduct has been arrived at in the course of the
disciplinary enquiry and the Court in exercise of the
judicial review must restrict its review to determine
whether:
(i) the rules of natural justice have been complied
with;
(ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some
evidence;
(iii) the statutory rules governing the conduct of
disciplinary enquiry have been observed; and
(iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary
authority suffer from perversity; and
(v) the penalty is disproportionate to the proven
misconduct.
16. Similarly in Karnataka Power Transmission
Corporation Limited vs C. Nagaraju and Another
reported in (2019) 10 SCC 367 , the Supreme Court
observed that the acquittal by Criminal Court does not
automatically invalidate or bar disciplinary proceedings on
the same allegations. The disciplinary authority is not
bound by a criminal acquittal, where the evidence
produced in the departmental enquiry is different from
that produced at the criminal trial, since two proceedings
differ in objective, procedure and standard of proof,
(proof beyond reasonable doubt versus preponderance of
probabilities). It was held that M. Paul Anthony vs
Bharat Gold Mines Limited reported in (1999) 3 SCC
679 and G.M.Tank (supra) -permitting the departmental
action to be set aside on the strength of the acquittal - is
attracted only where the evidence in both proceedings is
identical and the Criminal Court has recorded an
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honourable acquittal on merits by wholly disbelieving the
prosecution case.
17. In Union of India and Others vs Gyan
Chand Chattar reported in (2009) 12 SCC 78 which
also was taken note by the Supreme Court in Umesh 's
case, wherein it was held that the departmental enquiry
must be founded on specific, definite and clear charges
supported by proper evidence; findings cannot rest on
vague charges, hearsay conjecture or surmise. There is a
distinction between suspicion and proof. Charges
involving corruption, given their quasi-criminal character
and civil/criminal consequences, must be proved "to the
hilt". While corruption, once proved, warrants no
sympathy and permits no punishment short of dismissal,
an enquiry that fails to establish the charge with real
evidence cannot sustain a major penalty.
18. In the instant case, the appellant cannot derive
any benefit from the exception carved out by the
Supreme Court in G.M Tank, Ram Lal and the other
subsequent decisions. The acquittal recorded by the
Criminal Court was not founded upon a categorical
finding that the prosecution case of demand and
acceptance of illegal gratification was false. On the
contrary, the acquittal rested on the benefit of
doubt arising from certain contradictions in the trap
evidence and the loan defence having been held
probable, and not upon any categorical finding that
the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification
was false. In particular, weight was given to the
admissions elicited from PW1 during his cross
examination wherein he admitted that he had
borrowed Rs.1,500 from the appellant and that the
amount paid on the date of trap was towards the
repayment of the said hand loan. On that basis the
Criminal Court extended the benefit of doubt to the
accused.
19. The departmental enquiry, however, after
considering the very same admissions, expressly
rejected them. The enquiry officer held that the
complainant's evidence in examination-in-chief and
the complaint - Ex. P1 consistently established the
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, that
the admissions made during cross-examination
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were an afterthought and appeared to have been
made for extraneous reasons, and the defence of
repayment of a hand loan was inherently
improbable and unsupported by any independent
material.
20. Consequently, the enquiry officer concluded
that the amount received by the appellant constituted an
illegal gratification with respect to the three pending
applications. The enquiry findings are also supported by
evidence relating to the trap proceedings. The
complainant lodged a complaint before the Lokayukta
alleging demand of Rs.1,500 as an illegal gratification.
Pursuant thereto, the Lokayukta Police secured two
independent panch witnesses, conducted the pre-trap
formality by smearing three currency notes of Rs.500
each with phenolphthalein powder. The Lokayukta Police
prepared the entrustment mahazar and entrusted the
complainant to hand over the tainted currency only upon
demand. The shadow witness accompanied the
complainant. After the pre-arranged signal was given, the
Lokayukta Police entered the office, recovered the tainted
currency from the right pocket of the appellant’s trousers,
conducted the hand wash test which turned pink, and
seized the relevant records. The chemical examination
report confirmed the presence of phenolphthalein on the
handwashes, the recovered currency notes and trousers
worn by the appellant. These circumstances were
accepted by the enquiry officer as corroborative to
the complainant's version and sufficient to establish
misconduct on preponderance of probabilities."
The Division Bench holds that if the criminal Court records clear
acquittal on merits after completely disbelieving the prosecution
case, it would be unjust and unfair to sustain the disciplinary
punishment.
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9.4. The High Court of Calcutta in the judgment rendered
4
in the case of ASIM KUMAR PAUL v. UNION OF INDIA has
held as follows:
".... .... ....
12. It thus appears to us that the charges, the
evidence, the witnesses and the circumstances in both
the departmental enquiry and the criminal proceeding are
identical or substantially similar. At his juncture, the moot
question arises for our consideration is as to whether on
account of such similarity, the finding of the enquiry
authority, appellate authority, revisional authority as well
as of the Tribunal in the impugned judgment can be
allowed to be sustained following the acquittal of the writ
petitioner/ original applicant in criminal appeal. At this
juncture, if we look to the reported decision of
MaharanaPratap Singh (Supra), we find that the
Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding the said Civil
Appeal framed four numbers of issues as reveals from
paragraph no. 25 of the said reported decision. For better
understanding we propose to quote paragraph 25 of the
reported decision of Maharana Pratap Singh ( Supra )in
verbatim and the same is reproduced hereinbelow:
“25. The issues for determination that
emerge for decision are:
(i) Whether due process was followed in
dismissing the appellant from service and
whether his dismissal from service is justified, on
facts and in the circumstances, that have
unfolded before us?
(ii) Whether, in light of the facts,
evidence, witnesses, and circumstances of the
case, the charges in the criminal proceedings are
substantially identical to those in the
departmental proceedings, such that an acquittal
in the criminal case would render the findings in
the disciplinary proceedings vulnerable?
4
WP.CT 75 of 2010, decided on 19.05.2025
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(iii) Whether the impugned judgment,
which allowed the appeal of the respondents and
dismissed the writ petition of the appellant,
deserves to be upheld?
(iv) Whether the appellant is entitled to
any relief, should the aforesaid questions be
answered in his favour?”
.... .... ....
14. Keeping in mind the proposition of law as
decided in the case of MaharanaPratap Singh ( Supra ) ,
if we look to the factual aspects as involved in the instant
writ petition, it appears to us that the charges as
framed against the delinquent in the enquiry
proceeding are almost similar to the charges as
framed in the criminal proceeding and the evidence
and the witnesses and the circumstances of both
the enquiry proceeding and criminal proceeding are
either identical or substantially similar. We have
also noticed that apart from the charge of mala fide
and fraudulent act of the delinquent thereby
attracting contravention of the Rule 3(1) (i), (ii)
and (iii) of the said Rule, no other independent
charge was framed in the said disciplinary
proceeding alleging culpable negligence on the part
of the writ petitioner in discharging his duty. It thus
appears to us that on account of passing of the
judgment of acquittal in the aforementioned
criminal appeal the findings of the enquiry
authority, appellate authority as well as the
revisional authority cannot be allowed to stand. "
9.5. The High Court of Orissa in the case of ABHAY
5
BEHERA v. STATE OF ODISHA has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
5
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4.4. Hon’ble Apex Court in Para-47 & 50 of the
decision in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh has
held as follows:-
“ 47. While an acquittal in a criminal
casedoes not automatically entitle the accused
to have an order of settingaside of his dismissal
from public service following disciplinary
proceedings, it is well-established that when
the charges, evidence,witnesses, and
circumstances in both the departmental inquiry
and the criminal proceedings are identical or
substantially similar, the situation assumes a
different context. In such cases, upholding
the findings in the disciplinary proceedings
would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This
is a position settled by the decision in G. M. Tank
(supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent
origin in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan31.
xxx xxx xxx
50. The judgment acquitting the appellant
reveals that the prosecution "miserably failed
to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt" as
both the informant and PW-2 refused to identify
the appellant in court. This discussion
confirms that the appellant's acquittal was
based not on mere technicalities. In Ram Lal
( supra ), this Court held that terms like "benefit
of doubt" or "honourably acquitted" should not be
treated as formalities. The Court's duty is to
focus on the substance of the judgment,
rather than the terminology used.”
4.5. This Court in Para-20 of the decision in the
case of Banshidhar Bariki has held as follows:-
“20. To substantiate the
aforementioned charge, the inquiry officer, as
has been stated above has examined the same
set of witnesses, whose version has been
clearly discarded by a judicial finding by the
Court of Addl. Sessions Judge. The important
aspect of this matter is the plea of alibi taken
by the respondent, which has been
established by him by cogent evidence and
believed by the trial court. If the plea of alibi is
believed by the trial Court in the judgment
dated 26.11.2018, which has attained the
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finality, the entire genesis of the case is
washed away on facts. Therefore, it could be
safely inferred that departmental proceedings
and their conclusion are based on “no evidence”.
The learned Single Judge has rightly relied
upon numerous judgments to un-justify the
departmental action taken against the
respondent. It is no gain saying that the
judgment relied upon by the learned Single
Judge is apt in the fact scenario of the present
case. The eventual conclusion drawn by the
learned Single Judge, setting aside the
departmental action against the respondent
cannot be faulted with on law as well as
facts. Therefore, this is clearly not a case for
interference by this Court”.
4.6. Reliance was also placed to a decision of this
Court passed on 18.09.2025 in W.P.(C) No.27964 of
2024.
4.7 . It is accordingly contended that the
proceeding initiated in Gajapati District Proceeding No.14
of 2012 be quashed.
5 . Mr. S. Das, learned Addl. Standing Counsel
for the State on the other hand contended that since
the proceeding is at the stage of the 2nd show cause if
some time will be allowed the proceeding will be
finalized in accordance with law.
5 . 1 . It is also contended that since the factum of
proof so required to be followed in a departmental
proceeding is different from criminal proceeding, the
order of acquittal passed in the criminal proceeding
has got no binding effect with regard to conduct of
the disciplinary proceeding.
5 . 2 . It is accordingly contended that if two
months’ time will be allowed the proceeding will be
disposed of.
6 . Having heard learned counsel appearing for
the Parties and considering the submissions made, this
Court finds that the proceeding in question was initiated
against the Petitioner vide Gajapati District Proceeding
No.14 of 2012 inter alia with the following charges:-
“CHARGE
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Sri Abhay Behera, Ex.IIC R. Udayagiri PS, in
Gajapati district now Inspector in Koraput
district is charged with gross misconduct in
that:-
During his incumbency as IIC, R. Udayagiri
P.S., in
Gajapati district, Berhampur Vigilance PS Case
No. 51 dt.30.11.10 u/s 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e)
P.C. Act. 1988 has been registered. During
investigation it was found that during his
period of service from 1.1.2001 to 5,3.2010
he has acquired and possessed
disproportionate assets in hisname and in the
name of his family members worth of
` 11,32,821.54.
He was found to have acquired movable
properties such as Laptop, TV, Hero Honda
Pleasure Motor Cycle, Computer, Inverter with
batteries, Philips Stereo etc. and immovable
properties relating to purchase of plots and
construction of building as found during house
search on 5.3.2010. He has not obtained any
permission nor sent any intimation to his
authority regarding acquisition of properties in
his name and in the name of his family
members as required u/s 21 and 21(3) of
Odisha Govt.Servant's Conduct Rule, 1959.
That Sri Behera has not submitted any property
statement to his authority during his service
period as required under Rule 21 of Govt.
Servant Conduct Rule 1959. As such, Sri Behera
failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion
of duty, decorum of conduct and committed
misconduct in violation of Rule 3 and Rule
21 of Odisha Govt. Servant's Conduct Rules,
1959.
He is therefore, directed to show cause by
31.10.2012 as to why he shall not be suitably
dealt with in the event of the charges being held
to be proved against him.
Any representation that he may wish to
make in this regard will be duly considered by
the authority competent to pass final order
before passing such orders.
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Director General of Police & Inspector
General of Police, Odisha, Cuttack”.
6 . 1 . It is also found that Petitioner faced the
criminal proceeding in Berhampur Vigilance P.S. Case
No.51, dtd. 30.11.2010 corresponding to GR Case No.53
of 2010 (V)in the file of learned Special Judge,
(Vigilance), Berhampur. In the said vigilance
proceeding Petitioner was acquitted of the charges
vide judgment dtd.30.01.2014 under Annexure-1.
6.2. Since the charges in both the
proceeding are same and Petitioner has been
acquitted in the criminal proceeding vide
judgment under Annexure-1, placing reliance on
the decisions as cited (supra), this Court is of the
view that further continuance of the disciplinary
proceeding is not to the interest of the Petitioner
and will be an abuse of the process of Court. Not
only that on the face of the submission of the
enquiry report since 31.02.2014, the proceeding is
yet to be disposed of. "
9.6. The High Court of Patna in the case of SUSHIL
6
KUMAR SINGH v. THE STATE OF BIHAR has held as follows:
".... .... ....
19. Nonetheless, this Court is cognizant of the
settled position of law that mere acquittal in a criminal
trial does not, ipso facto, entitle a delinquent employee to
reinstatement, since the standard of proof and the nature
of enquiry in a departmental proceeding are materially
different from those governing a criminal trial. However,
by appreciating the material facts and circumstances of
the given case at hand, it is imperative to adduce the
governing principles of law by way of the following judicial
pronouncements.
.... .... ....
6
CWJC No.11480 of 2017 decided on 03-09-2026
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22. Answering the said question, and
reaffirming the ratio in G.M. Tank (supra), the
Supreme Court held, in substance, that while a
mere acquittal in a criminal case does not by itself
entitle an employee to have his dismissal set aside,
where the charges, evidence, witnesses and
circumstances in the departmental and criminal
proceedings are identical or substantially similar,
upholding a contrary finding of guilt in the
departmental enquiry would be unjust, unfair and
oppressive.
The Court further held that expressions such
as "benefit of doubt" and "honourable acquittal"
are not to be treated as mere formalities or labels —
the duty of the Court is to look to the substance of
the judgment of acquittal, and not merely to the
terminology employed therein.
The Supreme Court also held that failure on the
part of the State to produce the complete departmental
enquiry file, when specifically called upon to do so,
attracts an adverse inference under Section 114 (g), of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
.... .... ....
28 . In view of the aforesaid facts and
circumstances and the governing principles of law
enunciated hereinabove, this Court finds it appropriate to
hold that the enquiry purportedly conducted afresh,
pursuant to the order dated 23.10.2006 (Annexure-3),
was not, in substance, a fresh enquiry, but a mere
continuation, in form, of the earlier vitiated proceeding,
inasmuch as, no witness was examined afresh and the
petitioner was denied any real opportunity of cross-
examination.
Further, the departmental proceeding and the
criminal prosecution arose out of the same
occurrence and were founded on substantially
overlapping factual allegations.
29. It is needless to state that the petitioner
was acquitted in Sessions Trial No. 28 of 1999 by
judgment dated 09.08.2016. The said acquittal,
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arising out of the same occurrence, is a relevant
circumstance to be taken into account while
examining the sustainability of the departmental
action.
30. Having regard to the fact that the
departmental proceeding and the criminal
prosecution arose of the same occurrence, and,
more importantly, that the fresh departmental
enquiry was conducted without independently
recording the evidence of the departmental
witnesses and without according the Petitioner an
effective opportunity of cross-examination, the
impugned departmental actions cannot be
sustained in law. "
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
10.1. In the case of RAM LAL supra , the Apex Court held
that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically
nullify disciplinary proceedings . An exception arises where
the charges, evidence, witnesses and surrounding circumstances
in the criminal trial and departmental enquiry are identical or
substantially the same. If, after considering the entire
prosecution evidence, the criminal Court finds that the
prosecution has failed to establish the charge, the Court
exercising judicial review may interfere with the disciplinary
punishment where allowing it to stand would be unjust, unfair
and oppressive . On facts, the disciplinary authority had
ignored crucial evidence, including the original mark sheet and
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the Investigating Officer's evidence showing that there was no
alteration in it. The departmental findings were therefore
vitiated. Significantly, the Apex Court held that expressions such
as ‘benefit of doubt’ and ‘honourably acquitted’ are not
magic incantations ; the substance of the judgment of
acquittal, rather than the terminology employed, must
determine its effect.
10.2. In the case of MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH supra ,
the Apex Court reiterated the law laid down in the cases of G.M.
TANK v. STATE OF GUJARAT reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446
and RAM LAL . While criminal acquittal ordinarily does not result
in automatic setting aside of a dismissal imposed
departmentally, the position changes where the charges,
evidence, witnesses and circumstances are identical or
substantially similar . In that situation, sustaining a contrary
departmental finding may become unjust, unfair and oppressive.
The Apex Court found a close similarity between the principal
departmental charge and the criminal accusation. The informant
and another material witness had failed to identify the appellant
in the criminal trial, resulting in an acquittal that was not merely
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technical. Similar evidentiary infirmities existed in the
departmental enquiry. The non-production of the departmental
file also justified an adverse inference. Consequently, the finding
of guilt on charge No.1 was held unsustainable.
10.3. In the case of SRI CHIDANANDA supra , the
Division Bench of this Court recognised the limited exception
carved out in G.M. TANK, RAM LAL and MAHARANA PRATAP
SINGH : where the criminal trial and departmental enquiry rest
upon identical or substantially similar charges, witnesses,
evidence and circumstances, and the criminal Court acquits the
employee on merits after disbelieving the prosecution case,
continuation of the departmental punishment may become
unjust and oppressive, particularly when the enquiry contains no
additional or independent evidence . At the same time,
relying on STATE OF KARNATAKA v. UMESH reported in 2022
SCC OnLine SC 345 , the Division Bench emphasised that
departmental proceedings are ordinarily independent and
misconduct is tested on the preponderance of probabilities ,
not proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the facts considered by
the Division Bench, however, the exception was held
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inapplicable: the criminal acquittal arose from contradictions in
the trap evidence and a probable hand-loan defence, whereas
the enquiry officer independently evaluated the material and
relied upon the trap proceedings, recovery of tainted currency
and phenolphthalein evidence.
10.4. In the case of ASIM KUMAR PAUL supra , the High
Court of Calcutta, while following the judgment of the Apex
Court in MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH , found that the charges,
evidence, witnesses and circumstances in the departmental
and criminal proceedings were identical or substantially similar.
There was no separate or independent departmental charge
capable of surviving the criminal acquittal. Consequently, once
the criminal appeal resulted in acquittal, the findings of the
enquiry authority, appellate authority and revisional authority
founded upon the same material could not be permitted to
stand.
10.5. In the case of ABHAY BEHERA supra , the High
Court of Orissa applied MAHARANA PRATAP SINGH to a
departmental proceeding arising from allegations of
disproportionate assets. The petitioner had already been
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acquitted in the corresponding vigilance prosecution. Since the
charges in both proceedings were found to be the same , the
High Court of Orissa held that further continuation of the
disciplinary proceeding would not serve the petitioner's interest
and would amount to an abuse of process , particularly when
the proceeding had remained pending for an extraordinary
period despite submission of the enquiry report.
10.6. In SUSHIL KUMAR SINGH supra , the High Court of
Patna reiterated that mere criminal acquittal does not ipso facto
confer a right to reinstatement because departmental and
criminal proceedings employ different standards of proof.
Applying G.M. TANK, RAM LAL and MAHARANA PRATAP
SINGH , however, it held that where both proceedings arise from
the same occurrence and substantially overlapping
allegations , the acquittal becomes a material circumstance in
examining the sustainability of departmental action. The case
had an additional infirmity: the purported fresh departmental
enquiry was not genuinely fresh, since witnesses were not
examined afresh and the employee was denied an effective
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opportunity of cross-examination. The departmental action was
therefore held unsustainable.
11. On a conspectus of the judgments quoted
hereinabove, what unmistakably emerges is that an
acquittal in a criminal prosecution does not, ipso facto ,
wash away the penalty imposed in a departmental
proceeding. Quashment of a departmental penalty cannot
be an automatic sequel to an order of acquittal. Much
would depend upon the facts obtaining in each case and,
more particularly, upon whether the charge, the
substratum of allegations, the evidence, the witnesses
and the documents in the criminal trial and the
departmental enquiry are the same or substantially the
same. It is only when the two proceedings travel on
substantially identical terrain that an acquittal in the
criminal prosecution may cast its shadow upon the
sustainability of the departmental penalty.
12. Equally, where the acquittal is on merits, the
mere phraseology employed by the criminal Court –
whether the accused is acquitted by extending the
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‘benefit of doubt’ or because the prosecution failed to
establish guilt ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ – cannot, by
itself, become the determinative factor for sustaining or
setting aside a departmental penalty. The substance of
the acquittal must prevail over its semantics. The Court
must look beyond the label and examine the evidence, the
witnesses and the foundation upon which both
proceedings rested. The issue, therefore, must necessarily
turn upon the peculiar facts of each case.
13. In the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court,
the Division Bench of this Court, and the High Courts of Calcutta,
Orissa and Patna, the unmistakable inference would be the
obliteration of the order of penalty and granting all consequential
benefits to the petitioners.
14. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) The Writ Petition is allowed;
(ii) The order dated 06.04.2026 (Annexure-C)
passed in Application No.10367 of 2025 passed
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by the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal,
Belagavi is set aside;
(iii) The order imposing penalty that was
challenged with the application before the
Tribunal stands allowed.
(iv) The petitioner becomes entitled to all
consequential benefits, including payment of
complete pension from the date of imposition
of penalty, from the date it became due.
(v) The pension shall be recalculated and paid to
the petitioner within twelve (12) weeks from
the date of receipt of the copy of the order.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE
Vnp / CT: ASC
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 36