United India Insurance Co Ltd vs Mamta Rani & Ors
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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% Reserved on : 26 May 2026
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Pronounced on : 01 July 2026
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Uploaded on : 02 July 2026
+ MAC.APP. 1089/2014 & CM APPL. 19663/2014
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO LTD .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Pankaj Seth, Ms. Shruti Jain,
Mr. Yuvraj Sharma & Ms. Vijay
Laxmi, Advs.
versus
MAMTA RANI & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Pankaj Gupta, Adv. for R-1.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL
JUDGMENT
ANISH DAYAL, J.
1. This appeal has been filed by the Insurance Company assailing the
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impugned award dated 26 September 2014 passed by the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal [‘ MACT ’], Central District, Tis Hazari Courts
in Suit No. 26/2014.
2. The Insurance Company has challenged the award on the ground
that compensation was granted treating the matter as a death case of the
deceased, Anoop Sharma , whereas it ought to have been treated as an
injury case, since the cause of death was not attributable to the injuries
sustained in the accident.
The accident
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3. On 28 April 2007 at about 09:15 p.m., Anoop Sharma was
travelling back to his home by a scooter. When he reached Vikas Marg,
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Opposite Delhi Secretariat, ITO , a bus driven by respondent no.4/
Rajender Kumar , allegedly in high speed and rash and negligent manner
came from behind and hit the scooter. Anoop Sharma fell down on the
road and sustained grievous injuries.
4. Anoop Sharma suffered fracture of both bones in his right leg along
with crush injuries and other injuries. He remained in the hospital from
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28 April 2007 till 12 May 2007 and then again from 18 August 2007
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till 29 August 2007. There was yet another set of admissions in the
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hospital on 06 November 2007 (discharged on 19 November 2007) and
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on 17 February 2008. This time, however, he could not survive and
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passed away on 22 February 2008.
5. The wife claimed that it was due to the injuries sustained by him in
the accident. The deceased was 42 years of age, earning Rs.8,000/- per
month as a manager with Golden Pusk, Sadar Bazar, Delhi and had
studied up to higher secondary.
6. The claim was contested by the Insurance Company, as also by the
driver and owner initially. However, the driver and owner were proceeded
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ex parte on 09 August 2011.
The impugned award
7. The MACT noticed the testimony of PW5 , Dr. Seema Singh ,
Assistant Professor (Surgery), GTB Hospital, who testified that the
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deceased was admitted on 17 February 2008 and died due to “ ileal
perforation peritonitis with septicemia with acute renal failure ”. She
testified that he had been previously admitted into different hospitals and
this time, during his hospitalisation, he died. She further testified that the
cause of death can be a result of patient taking NSAIDS (group of
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medicines used as pain killers), which were given to the patient as a result
of the accident in question. She denied the suggestion that the death in
this case is not related to the accident in question in any manner.
8. Based on the existence of criminal proceedings and the testimony
of PW1 , wife of the deceased and PW2 , doctor, the MACT concluded
that the deceased died as a result of circumstances attributable to the
accidental injuries in question and the treatment given for the same.
9. On the issue of compensation, Rs.15,794/- was awarded towards
medical bills, income of the deceased was taken as Rs.3,918/- (minimum
wages of a matriculate), since there was no document to prove the income
of the deceased. Further, future prospects at 30% along with deduction of
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1/3 towards personal and living expenses was used to calculate the
multiplicand. Since the deceased was 42 years of age on the date of the
accident, multiplier of ‘ 14 ’ was adopted. Accordingly, the loss of
dependency was calculated at Rs.5,70,462/- .
10. Compensation under the non-pecuniary heads was awarded at
Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of love and affection , Rs.10,000/- towards loss
of estate , Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses , and Rs.1,00,000/-
towards loss of consortium to the wife , together with interest @9% per
annum from the date of filing of the petition. However, no interest was
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awarded for the period from 09 August 2011 to 30 November 2013,
during which the claimants' evidence remained pending.
11. The apportionment was decided as 50% to Mamta Rani , wife of the
deceased, 30% to Kumari Santiksha , daughter of the deceased and 20%
to Rameshwari Sharma , mother of the deceased. The joint and several
liability was placed on the owner and the insurer. The Insurance Company
was directed to deposit the awarded amount.
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Proceedings before this Court
12. Notice was issued in the appeal filed by the Insurance Company on
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08 December 2014. Directions were given to the Insurance Company to
deposit the entire awarded amount along with accrued interest before the
Registrar General of this Court. further, release orders for 60% of the
amount in favour of claimants proportionately as per directions in the
impugned award.
Submissions on behalf of the Insurance Company
13. Mr. Pankaj Seth , counsel for Insurance Company, stated that the
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date of accident was 28 April 2007 and originally a claim for injury
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compensation was filed. After the death of the deceased on 22 February
2008, an application for amendment under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (‘ CPC ’) was moved, which was allowed by the
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Court on 13 May 2008. The issues, which were framed, were also
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amending and the impugned award came to be passed on 26 September
2014.
14. Mr. Pankaj Seth , counsel for Insurance Company, advanced
submissions on tortious liability, contending that the core issue was
whether the death was a foreseeable consequence of the injuries sustained
in the accident and thus fell within the scope of recoverable damage, or
whether the chain of causation stood interrupted in view of the doctor's
evidence that the administration of NSAIDs may have caused the
perforation which ultimately resulted in the death.
15. Submissions of Mr. Seth , counsel for Insurance Company, were
focused on basic principles of damages, causation, foreseeability,
intended consequences, the concept of the “ eggshell skull ” rule, and novus
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actus interveniens. He contended that where damage or injury is caused
by a tortious act but is too remote, it does not attract liability for damages.
In other words, a defendant is liable only for those consequences of a
tortious act that are reasonably foreseeable to the plaintiff, such
foreseeability being tested on the standard of a reasonable person and not
otherwise.
16. Reliance was placed on Simmons v. British Steel Plc. (2004)
UKHL 20, which summarized the principle involved in considering the
question of remoteness of damages.
Submissions on behalf of respondent/ claimants
17. Mr. Pankaj Gupta, counsel for claimant, advanced inter alia the
following submissions:
(i) Claimants have duly established that the deceased died as a
consequence of the injuries sustained in the accident. The evidence
of PW1 and PW5 demonstrates that, following the accident, the
deceased remained bedridden, underwent continuous treatment,
and was admitted to hospitals on several occasions. The Insurance
Company's contention that the death was unrelated to the accident
could not be substantiated, particularly in the absence of any post-
mortem examination, is therefore unsustainable.
(ii) An amendment application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC had been
filed after the claim had been preferred to seek death compensation
instead of injury compensation. The Insurance Company did not
file a reply. Issues were also freshly framed in 2014 and there was
no objection taken by the Insurance Company.
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(iii) There was no break in the chain of causation since there was a
direct and uninterrupted nexus between the injuries sustained in the
accident, prolonged treatment, repeated hospitalisation,
deterioration of medical condition and eventual death.
(iv) The doctrine of novus actus interveniens applies only when there
is an independent and unforeseeable intervening event, which
completely displaces the original cause. In the present case due to
continued treatment, subsequent medical complications arose
during such treatment and, therefore, there was no independent
event.
(v) The medicines which appear to have caused the complication were
administered solely on account of the injuries sustained in the
accident. Therefore, there exists a causal connection even if the said
medicines had adverse side effects. The deceased’s hospitalization
on four occasions indicates continuous medical management and a
progressive deterioration of his condition. Further, the provisions
of the Motor Vehicles Act are a piece of social welfare legislation
intended to provide just compensation.
18. Mr. Gupta , counsel for claimant, placed reliance on the following
decisions:
(i) In National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Meenakshi Gupta & Ors.
2019:DHC:3496, where the Court held that non-filing of post
mortem report would not defeat the claimants’ case, as all the other
medical reports, post surgery medication, bills of medicines,
frequent follow up visits of hospital clearly indicate that his injured
condition worsened with the passage of time, to which he
ultimately succumbed.
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(ii) In New India Assurance Co. Ltd v Suman Gupta & Ors ,
2025:DHC:8822, the decision of the Coordinate Bench of this
Court, where it was stated that where a Tribunal had given a finding
of causation, it was not for the High Court to disprove such findings
without adequate reason. The reliance was placed on Supreme
Court's decision in Ramathal & Ors v. Manging Director, Cheran
Transport Corpn, Coimbatore , 2003 10 SCC 53. Since the
findings of the Tribunal were based on uncontroverted medical
evidence, the Court declined to allow the appeal of the Insurance
Company.
(iii) In United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shakuntala and Ors ,
2016: DHC: 7316, the victim had been injured in the road accident
but later went into depression and committed suicide, a year after
the accident. The Insurance Company contended that there was no
connection between the accident and the death of the deceased. The
Court agreed with the Kerala High Court's decision in Venugopal
Narayanan Nair v. T.L. Paulson , AIR 2009 Ker 86 which was
decided in similar circumstances.
(iv) In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Robinson and Anr ,
2024:KER:52685, the victim was injured in an accident and
ultimately died subsequently after months of treatment . The
Insurance Company objected to the claim petition, denying that the
death was caused due to injuries in the accident. The Tribunal
decided in favour of claimant, stating that the causation was related
to the injuries sustained in the accident. Medical evidence stated
that the accident was not the immediate cause of the death, while,
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in cross-examination it came out that there were no ailments before
the accident, but he died because of liver cirrhosis. In this regard
reliance was placed on Ranchhodbhai and Anr v Babubhai
Bhailalbhai & Anr , AIR 1982 Guj 308, and National Insurance
Co. Ltd v. Anthony (since deceased) and Ors , 2015:KHC:6121,
where it was stated that lack of post mortem cannot be a reason to
decline the claim. The Court noted the application of “ but for test ”
since the aggravation of the disease might have occurred due to the
accident, the victim being able-bodied person 26 years prior to the
accident. The Court, therefore, upheld the Tribunal's finding on
causation.
(v) In Govind Singh v. A.S. Kailasam, 1974 SCC OnLine Mad 163,
the victim sustained an injury on her left foot due to an accident by
a car and developed tetanus despite receiving medical attention and
died 15 days later. The Insurance Company claimed that the death
was not due to the injury sustained in the accident, but due to novus
actus interveniens . The Court held that there was no negligence on
behalf of the victim which caused the infection to set in the wound.
The definitive evidence of the doctors was that the death was due
to tetanus and the infection had been brought about by the injury
sustained in the accident. It was held that injury sustained in one
accident may be the cause of subsequent injury. The Court applied
the law by the English Courts in Smith v. Leech Brain and Co.
Ltd ., (1961) 3 All ER 1159 and Pigney v. Pointera Transport
Service Ltd ., (1957) 2 All ER 807, taking into account that tetanus
was a foreseeable and likely consequence of a bleeding injury and
in the absence of any evidence that there was any other supervening
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cause which brought about the tetanus infection, it was concluded
that there was no possibility that the death was caused by novus
actus interveniens .
Analysis
19. Before appreciating the factual matrix in which the issue of
causation would be tested, it would be apposite to first sketch out the legal
principles which are applicable.
20. A claim for compensation on account of injury, albeit under the
statutory framework of the Motor Vehicles Act, is essentially a claim for
damages arising out of tortious liability, in this case, negligence, that is
cause of injury due to the wrongful act of the defendant.
21. The first issue which needs to be established is of causation i.e.
whether the damage was actually caused by defendant. If the answer is
affirmative then the second issue of remoteness arises i.e. the scope and
extent of protection which is accorded to plaintiff and whether the law
protects the plaintiff from the particular damage that he had suffered.
22. Causation was initially conflated with the direct consequences test
to determine the extent of liability. Later, it was replaced by the test of
foreseeability as per the decision of the Court of Appeal in Overseas
Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd. (The
Wagon Mound) , [1961] AC 388, [1961] 1 ALL ER 404. To decide
whether the damage was caused by defendant’s wrongful act, the general
test applied was whether “ but for the defendant’s wrongful act ” the
damage would not have taken place. If it appears that the damage would
have taken place, wrongful act or not, the defendants' act cannot be
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considered as the cause of the damage. The assessment was on balance of
probabilities ( and not percentage of probabilities ).
23. The Wagon Mount test which overruled a prior ruling in Re
Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co. Ltd. [1921] 3 KB 560 has also been
referred to by the Supreme Court in Rajkot Municipal Corporation v.
Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum & Ors ., (1997) 9 SCC 552. The test of
foreseeability is used to test remoteness, the issue of extent of liability is
decided based on whether the damage was within the foresight of a
reasonable man.
24. The issue in this case relates to the chain of causation set in motion
by the wrongful act of the driver/owner which allegedly is interrupted or
snapped by intervening events. This introduces the problem of
determining whether damage resulting after the intervention of the new
act or event qualifies for an award of damages. An intervening act or
human action, as opposed to intervening events/natural events, does not
per se sever the chain of causation. The plaintiff can still be entitled to
claim damages for all injury caused by the original wrongdoer, the person
who set the chain in motion, even though the intervening act is one of the
elements contributing to the final injury. An intervening act breaks the
chain of causation only if it is in the nature of something unwarrantable,
unreasonable, extraneous or extrinsic. ( Halsbury Laws of India Vol. 9,
Edition 2001 115.071 )
25. The chain of causation may break when the third-party acts with
unconstrained choice to commit the intervening act and the defendant is
less likely to be liable. But if the act of the third party is lawful, generally
damage will not result. If the act of the third party is wrongful, negligent
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or intentional, then it is less likely that the defendant will be liable and the
damage will be considered remote and unrecoverable.
26. The plaintiff can recover damages for an unforeseeable
consequence of a foreseeable type of injury as in the case of Smith v.
Leech Brain & Co. Ltd. [1962] 2 QB 405 , where a burn on the lip led to
cancer and Robinson v. Post Office , 1974 2 ALL ER 737, where an anti-
tetanus shot administered on account of an injury lead to an allergic
reaction.
27. It is important to mention the so-called ‘ eggshell skull rule ’ which
states that the defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him. If a normal
plaintiff would have had an action in tort, it does not avail the defendant
to say that because of some abnormal physical or mental fragility the
injury to the plaintiff is more extensive or different in kind from what
might have been expected.
28. In Smith v. Leech Brain (supra), a workman of the defendants
suffered a burn injury on his lower lip because of their negligence and the
injury promoted cancer at the site of the burn resulting in his death. In an
action by the widow, the defendants were held liable even though it had
been established that there was a pre-malignant condition which would
have developed at some stage of his life.
29. Summarising, the concept of causation has to be examined in two
stages namely, factual causation (whether the defendants’ act actually
contributed to the occurrence of the damage) and then, legal causation
(whether the defendants’ act was sufficiently connected with the damage
so as to justify the imposition of legal responsibility). While the factual
causation is determined on the “ but for test ”, legal causation is determined
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on the aspect of foreseeability as propounded by the Privy Council Wagon
Mound Case ( supra ), including within its scope the “ eggshell skull rule ”.
30. In establishing this chain of causation, an intervening act can break
the chain only if such an intervening act is completely unwarranted or
unforeseen and it is so potent that it supersedes the original negligence.
The general rule is that medical treatment necessitated by the original
injury does not ordinarily break the chain of causation. The defendant
remains liable even if the injury is aggravated by the medical treatment or
by the claimant’s peculiar susceptibility to such treatment. Only in
exceptionally or grossly negligent treatment an intervening act can be
triggered, constituting a novus actus interveniens .
31. Medical error is considered as a foreseeable incident of treatment.
In this light, the following decisions from international jurisdictions may
be considered:
I. Pigney v. Pointers Transport Services Ltd. [1957] 1 WLR
1121:
i. Plaintiff was injured in an accident during the course of
employment, however, suffered from anxiety, neurosis and
depression and ultimately committed suicide by hanging.
The plaintiff’s widow was held entitled to damages since
the death was considered as directly traceable to the injury
in the accident for which the defendants were responsible.
The act of committing suicide did not break the chain of
causation even though it was considered as a felony.
ii. The Court of Appeal held that there was no doubt on the
evidence that the deceased would not have committed
suicide if he had not been in a condition of acute neurotic
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depression induced by the accident. In that sense, the injury
which he sustained in the accident was a causa sine qua non
of the accident, even though this could not have been
reasonably foreseen by the defendants. In this case, the
Court of Appeal applied the direct causation test. This
approach was subsequently superseded by the reasonable
foreseeability test laid down in The Wagon Mound case
( supra ). Accordingly, the present case has been referred to
solely for the sake of completeness.
II. Smith v. Leech Brain & Co Ltd. [1962] 2 QB 405:
i. Plaintiff had a lip burn as part of his work at the employer’s
site. Later, the burn triggered cancer resulting in death. It was
held in a claim under the Fatal Accidents Act, that the
damage was in the course of employment with the
defendants. Lord Parker, CJ , dealt with the issue whether the
cancer and the death resulting from it were caused in part by
the burn.
ii. Though little was known of the etiology of cancer, it was
noted that there could be various causes. The court found that
“ the burn was the promoting agency of cancer in tissues
which already had a pre-malignant condition ”. It was,
therefore, held that but for the burn, it would not have
necessarily ever developed into cancer, but the burn did
contribute to or caused in part the cancer and the death.
iii. Queen’s Bench Division (QBD) noted the Wagon Mound
Case ( supra ) and stated that “ the test is not whether these
employers could reasonably have foreseen that a burn would
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cause cancer and that he would die. The question is whether
these employers could reasonably foresee the type of injury
he suffered, namely, the burn. What, in the particular case,
is the amount of damage which she suffers as a result of that
burn, depends on the characteristics and constitution of the
victim ”.
III. Wieland v. Cyril Lord Carpets Ltd. [1969] 3 All ER 1006:
i. The plaintiff suffered an injury caused by the admitted
negligence of the defendants. After attending hospital, she
felt shaken and the movement of her head was restricted by
a collar. As a result, she was unable to use a bifocal
spectacle and fell while descending stairs. The Queen’s
Bench Division (QBD) held that the injury and damage
because of the second fall were attributable to the original
negligence of the defendants so as to attract compensation
from them.
ii. It was observed that “ it is foreseeable that one injury may
affect a person’s ability to cope with the vicissitudes of life
and thereby be a cause of another injury and if
foreseeability is required, that is to say, if foreseeability is
the right word in this context, foreseeability of this general
nature will, in my view, suffice ”. The Court found that the
plaintiff's ability to negotiate stairs was impaired and it
resulted in a fall which is one of the ordinary activities of
life for which she had been rendered less capable than she
previously was.
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IV. Rouse v. Squires [1973] WLR 925:
i. The issue related to a claim resulting from an accident
which involved three vehicles on the highway and was
called a “ chain reaction accident”. The issue was whether
the negligence of the first wrongdoer ceases when a
subsequent negligent act contributes to the accident. The
Court of Appeal held otherwise, stating that the negligent
act created risk for other vehicles travelling in the same
direction and the risk subsisted creating a dangerous
situation which continued to a substantial degree. The
accident would not have happened but for this continuing
danger and, therefore, the first tortfeasor was negligent.
V. Robinson v. The Post Office & Anr. [1974] 2 All ER 737:
i. The Court of Appeal was dealing with a technician
employed by the post office who slipped while descending
a ladder at the post office and sustained a wound on his left
shin. Later when he visited the doctor he was given an Anti-
Tetanus Serum (ATS). The injection triggered a reaction
and later he was admitted to hospital suffering from
encephalitis which was a rare consequence of the
administration of the serum.
ii. It was held that the administration of the serum was not a
novus actus interveniens since he had not been negligent or
inefficient in deciding to administer the ATS and failure to
administer a proper dose had no causative effect. The post
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office was bound to take the plaintiff as they found him i.e.
with an allergy to a second dose of ATS, based on “ eggshell
skull rule ”. It was held to be foreseeable that as a result of
the wrongful act, he may require medical treatment, in the
absence of a novus actus interveniens , they were liable for
consequences of the treatment even though they could not
have reasonably foreseen those consequences.
VI. Looney v. Davis, 721 So. 2d 152 (Ala. 1998)
i. Plaintiff visited the dentist complaining of severe pain in her
upper right molar. She was questioned about the pain and
bleeding in her gums and questioned about her bleeding
problems, if any. Post the tooth extraction, she continued to
experience bleeding. Later she was found passed out on the
bed with blood-stained bed sheets. She later passed away,
despite treatment.
ii. The defence by the dentist was that there was negligence on
the part of the treating doctors in the Emergency Room, much
after the dentist had extracted a tooth and there was a
supervening intervening cause. It was argued that it was
unforeseeable that Mrs. Davis would die as a result of
improper tooth extraction. The Supreme Court of Alabama
applied the foreseeability as a cornerstone of proximate cause
holding the defendant responsible for all consequences
which a prudent and experienced person at the time of the
negligent act would have thought reasonably possible to
follow. It also noted the principle that “ where one is injured
by the negligent or wrongful act of another, and uses
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ordinary care in endeavouring to be healed, and in the
selection of medical and surgical help, but his injury is
aggravated by the negligence or unskillfulness of the latter,
the party causing the original injury will be responsible for
resulting damages to its full extent ”. ( Williams v. Woodman
424 So.2d 611).
VII. Webb v. Barclays Bank, PLC [2001] EWCA Civ 1141:
i. In this case, Mrs. Webb contracted polio as a child and had
mobility issues. While being employed by Barclays Bank,
she tripped on a protruding stone in the forecourt of the
bank, the injury causing gross instability and severe pain.
There was an option of above knee amputation by the
medical doctor without conducting proper investigations
into the cause of the pain.
ii. Mrs. Webb consented to the amputation but later
commenced proceedings for damages for personal injury or
failure to properly maintain the forecourt where she had
tripped and fallen. The issue in question was when an
employee was injured in service and by the negligence of
her employer, is the liability terminated by the intervening
negligence of a doctor brought in to treat the original injury
who in fact made it worse. The Court of Appeal considered
the decision in Rahman v. Arearose Ltd. & Anor. [2001]
QB 351, where the proposition that later negligence
extinguishes the causative potency of an earlier tort was
rejected.
iii. In the aforesaid case reliance was placed on the decision of
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High Court of Australia in Mahony v. J Kruschich
(Demolitions) Pty Limited (1985) 156 CLR 522 stated that
where an injury was exacerbated by medical treatment, the
exacerbation can be regarded as a foreseeable consequence
for which the first tortfeasor was liable. The original injury
can be regarded as carrying the risk that medical treatment
might be negligently given. Reliance was also placed on
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Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (18 Edition, 2-55) “ moreover, it
is submitted that only medical treatments so grossly
negligent as to be a completely inappropriate response to
the injury inflicted by the defendant should operate to break
the chain of causation ”. Court of Appeals held that the chain
of causation was not broken by the advice of the doctor for
amputation.
VIII. Jenkinson v Hertfordshire County Council (2023) EWCH 872
(KB)
i. Claimant asserted a claim against the defendant/ Local
Highway Authorit y after his foot went into an uncovered
manhole or drain causing a fracture to his right ankle which
required surgery. Though the defendant admitted liability
for negligence or breach of statutory duty, it made no
admission as to the extent of injury and put the claimant to
proof on quantum. The expert evidence relating to surgical
procedure revealed that the surgery had been performed
negligently and the claimant had to undergo six further
surgeries. Defendant issued an application to amend its
defense to add a new paragraph denying that it could be held
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responsible for injury, loss and damage due to the negligent
surgical treatment. As a result of which, chain of causation
had been broken and constituted a novus actus interveniens .
ii. The District Judge refused the application, holding that the
medical treatment of an injury caused by the defendant’s
tort could not break the chain of causation unless it was
grossly negligent treatment and a completely inappropriate
response to the injury. The District Judge relied upon the
decision in Webb v. Barclays Bank, PLC ( supra ) and stated
that it established this principle as a rule of law. The King’s
Bench Division deliberated upon this determination by the
District Judge, provided its own analysis and concluded that
such a rule does not exist as a principle of law, defining a
necessary ingredient of a novus actus interveniens in
context of medical interventions. Based on the evidence of
the orthopedic expert, the Kings Bench allowed the
application to amend on the basis that such orthopedic
evidence stated that there would have been a better response
if the surgery had been carried out to a correct standard.
iii. In the King’s Bench opinion, the issue hinged upon whether
poor quality surgery could turn appropriate treatment into
inappropriate medical response, but had to be considered in
the trial whether the claimant was so badly mistreated that
the defendant ought not to be considered responsible for the
consequences of mistreatment. The King’s Bench seem to
place reliance on the opinion of the editors of Clerk &
rd
Lindsell on Torts 23 edition at para 02-114, summarizing
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the law on intervening conduct of a third party. It would be
instructive to extract this view which has been stated with
approval by the King’s Bench as under:
“ No precise or consistent test can be offered to
define when the intervening conduct of a third
party will constitute a novus actus interveniens
sufficient to relieve the defendant of liability for
his original wrongdoing. The question of the effect
of a novus actus “can only be answered on a
consideration of all the circumstances and, in
particular, the quality of that later act or event”
[per Lord Simonds, one of the majority, in Hogan,
at 593]. Four issues need to be addressed; (i) Was
the intervening conduct of the third party such as
to render the original wrongdoing merely a part
of the history of events; (ii) Was the third party’s
conduct either deliberate or wholly unreasonable;
(iii) Was the intervention foreseeable; (iv) Is the
conduct of the third party wholly independent of
the defendant, i.e. does the defendant owe the
claimant any responsibility for the conduct of the
intervening third party? In practice, in most cases
of novus actus more than one of the above issues
will have to be considered together. ”
(emphasis added)
iv. The King’s Bench, speaking through Andrew Baker J .,
merely displaced a straitjacket rule which the District Judge
had taken to be crystallized in Webb v. Barclays Bank, PLC
( supra ) and instead opened the issue for consideration of all
circumstances, in particular the quality of the intervening
act. The King's Bench drew attention to the opinion of the
Court of Appeal in Webb v. Barclays Bank plc ( supra ),
observing that it constituted a clear articulation of the
Court's reasoning rather than the formulation of a single,
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crystallised rule of law. The same is stated as under:
“[56] We are of clear opinion that [here] the
chain of causation was not broken. We have in
mind that:
(a) the original wrong-doing remained a
causative force, as it had increased the
vulnerability of the claimant and reduced the
mobility of the claimant over and above the effect
of the amputation;
(b) the medical intervention was plainly
foreseeable, and it was also foreseeable that the
claimant’s pre-existing vulnerability would
impose its own risks;
(c) given the doctor’s conduct was negligent, but
not grossly negligent and given the findings
expressed at (a) and (b) it would not be just and
equitable, nor in keeping with the expansive
philosophy of the 1978 Act for the wrongdoer to
be given, in these circumstances, a shield against
(i) being liable to the claimant for any part of the
amputation damages; and (ii) being liable to make
such contribution to the Trust’s amputation
damages as was just and equitable.
[57] In short, the negligence in advising
amputation did not eclipse the original
wrongdoing. The Bank remained responsible for
their share of the amputation damages. The
negligence of [the consultant] was not an
intervening act breaking the chain of causation. ”
(emphasis added)
v. In essence, the view taken by the Court of Appeal in Webb
v. Barclays Bank PLC ( supra ) was subsequently endorsed
by the King's Bench. The factors that emerge from these
decisions and taken into consideration are: firstly , whether
the original wrongdoing remained an operative and
causative force, thereby increasing the claimant's
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vulnerability; secondly , whether the medical intervention
was reasonably foreseeable, including whether the
claimant's pre-existing vulnerability enhanced the risk of
such intervention; thirdly , whether the medical treatment
was negligent or grossly negligent; and fourthly , whether
the negligent medical treatment eclipsed the original
wrongdoing as the effective cause of the injury.
Assessment
32. Applying above principles to the facts of the case, it would be
noted that there is no doubt or dispute that the original injury caused
to the deceased was due to the accident. The issue would be whether
the subsequent admittance in the hospital and the death caused due to
the ileal perforation peritonitis and septicemia with acute renal
failure , as per PW5, the surgeon from GTB Hospital, would form an
unforeseeable event and the opinion of PW5 , who stated that it could
be the result of patient taking NSAIDS/pain killers, would form an
intervening cause. In this regard the testimony of PW5 is critical. Two
statements made in testimony and cross examination by PW5 which
are relevant are extracted as under:
“ The cause of death of the patient is his suffering
from ileal perforation peritonitis and septicemia
which can be the result of the patients taking
NSAIDS (group of medicines used as pain killers)
which were given to the patient as a result of the
accident in question .”
“ It is wrong to suggest that death in this case, is
not related to the accident in question in any
manner ”
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33. This is the only relevant medical evidence on record. Aside
from this is the evidence of PW1 , the wife of the deceased, who stated
th
that deceased was admitted in hospital on 28 April 2007, discharged
th th
on 12 May 2007. He was again admitted in hospital on 18 August
th
2007 and was later discharged on 29 August 2007. Deceased was
th th
admitted for the third time on 06 November 2007, discharged on 19
th
November 2007. Yet again admitted on 17 February 2008 and died
nd
in the hospital while under treatment on 22 February 2008.
34. There was no post mortem conducted; therefore, the Court can
only rely on the uncontroverted medical evidence on record, basis the
finding of this Court in Suman Gupta ( supra ).
35. The Insurance Company had pointed out to the Progress Record
during the course of treatment when the patient was admitted in
February 2008. It is stated that there was history of cough on and off
since April 2007, and he was smoker (one bundle/day bidi × 20 years).
It was stated that the cause of the death could be related to this and,
therefore, not attributable to the injuries sustained in the accident.
However, it importantly the same Progress Report also notes that
patient has history of tibia fracture in April 2007 for which she used
to take NSAIDS and antibiotics.
36. In this regard, the Court is inclined to accept the testimony of
the medical expert i.e. PW5 who stated that the cause of death was
taking NSAIDS which are pain killers. Clearly, the pain killers would
not have been given unless the crush injuries were suffered in the
accident and were obviously not relatable to the cough/ respiratory
problem, which the Insurance Company sought to highlight.
Moreover, PW5 clearly states and denies the suggestion that the death
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could not have resulted due to the injuries caused by the accident. The
testimony of PW5 remains uncontroverted and the other evidence on
record also points towards the fact that the death is attributable to the
injuries suffered in the accident.
37. Applying the principles noted above, the original tortfeasor, i.e .
the driver of the offending vehicle, caused the injuries which led to
continuous medical treatment to which the deceased was subjected.
The deceased had at least four hospital admissions spread over several
months. The contemporaneous medical records also show that he was
administered NSAIDs for fractures in his leg. No evidence was
produced by the Insurance Company before the MACT to controvert
the same. In fact, the Insurance Company did not lead any evidence
before the MACT at all. It is also noted that they did not object to the
amendment filed by the claimants for converting the case into a death
claim, nor to the subsequent framing of issues.
38. The Insurance Company completely gave up its opportunity to
place evidence in order to counter the medical evidence given by PW5
and cannot now profess in the appeal, on the basis of a purely
speculative contention, that the decision of MACT ought to be set
aside. Even, during the appeal proceedings, no attempt has been made
to place fresh evidence on record by the Insurance Company and the
matter has been presented by the Insurance Company purely on first
principles rather than robust evidence.
39. It is clear that the injuries would not have been caused but for
the accident, and that the injuries led to the deceased undergoing
continued treatment and prolonged hospitalisation, which in turn
resulted in a deterioration of his medical condition and the
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administration of medications in the form of ordinary painkillers,
which were not unusual in any manner. This ultimately led to his
serious condition developing and his death. There is no evidence on
record to suggest that there was any negligence on the part of the
doctors in administering NSAIDs for the fractures.
40. Quite to the contrary, in case of fractures, there is acute pain in
the healing phase and, therefore, administration of pain killers would
be normal in that circumstance. NSAIDS include medicines such as
naproxen, ibuprofen, etc. and are obviously within the normal range
of medicines which are given as pain killers. There was no
unwarranted or exceptional intervening act which would break the
chain of causation. If there was some unusual susceptibility to
NSAIDS, neither was it recorded by any hospital nor any evidence has
been produced in that regard.
41. Notwithstanding the application of the “ eggshell skull rule ”,
which is embedded within the principle of foreseeability, it is the
opinion of the Court that the damage caused, i.e. the death of the
deceased, was within the scope of foreseeable consequences arising
from the original injury. The submissions of respondent that there was
no break in the chain of causation are accepted, as the doctrine of
novus actus interveniens is not applicable in the absence of any
independent and unforeseeable intervening event so potent as to
displace the original cause. The medical treatment herein was a natural
consequence of the injuries sustained and does not break the chain of
causation. The continuous hospitalisation establishes a continuing
operative cause, and the Insurance Company has failed to discharge
the burden of proof required to displace this position.
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42. Moreover, it has been stated by counsel for respondent that
ultimately the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a social welfare legislation
and, therefore, liberal and pragmatic approach should be adopted to
determine causation. However, the Court has not based its opinion by
simply adopting a beneficial and a liberal approach. Rather the
conclusion by the Court is based on a rational and logical application
of legal principles that have prevailed over many years relating to such
situations, and the appeal is unmerited.
Directions
th
43. By order dated 8 December 2014, this Court had passed
directions for deposit of entire awarded amount along with accrued
interest before the Registrar General, subject to such deposit there
shall be stay on the execution of the impugned award. Further, it was
directed that 60% of the amount be released to the claimants
proportionately as per the directions in the Award through UCO Bank,
th
Delhi High Court Branch. Vide order dated 15 October 2015 it was
brought to the notice of the Court that the awarded amount has been
deposited by appellant in two forums i.e. the High Court and the
Claims Tribunal. Accordingly, the Registry was directed to refund the
principal amount along with interest accrued thereon.
44. Since the appeal has been dismissed, the balance amount along
with accrued interest shall be released in favour of claimants, as per
the directions of the MACT in the impugned Award.
45. Appeal stands dismissed. Pending applications, if any, are
rendered infructuous.
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46. Statutory deposit, if any, be refunded only if the order of deposit
have been complied with.
47. Copy of this judgment be sent to the concerned MACT and also
to the concerned bank for information and necessary compliance.
48. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.
ANISH DAYAL
(JUDGE)
JULY 1, 2026/ mk / rk/ak/zb
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