Jyotinjay Verma vs State Of U.P. Thru. Its Secy. Basic Education Lko. And 6 Others

Court
Allahabad High Court

A.F.R.
Reserved On : - October 13, 2026
Delivered On : - November 20, 2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CIVIL MISC REVIEW APPLICATION No. - 120 of 2026
Jyotinjay Verma
…..Applicant(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Its Secy. Basic Education Lko.
And 6 Others
…..Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s) : In Person
Counsel for Opposite
Party(s)
:
And
CIVIL MISC REVIEW APPLICATION No. - 119 of 2026
Jyotinjay Verma
…..Applicant(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Its Secy. Basic Education Lko.
And 6 Others
…..Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s) : In Person
Counsel for Opposite
Party(s)
:
And

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
CIVIL MISC REVIEW APPLICATION No. - 121 of 2026
Jyotinjay Verma
…..Applicant(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Secy. Basic Education U.P. Lko.
And 7 Others
…..Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s) : In Person
Counsel for Opposite
Party(s)
:
And
CIVIL MISC REVIEW APPLICATION No. - 122 of 2026
Jyotinjay Verma
…..Applicant(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Secy. Basic Education Lko. And 7
Others
…..Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s) : In Person
Counsel for Opposite
Party(s)
: Shivam Sharma
Court No. - 3
HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
HON'BLE ABDHESH KUMAR CHAUDHARY, J.
Hon’ble Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary, J.: Heard the
review petitioner-in-person, in the present Review
Application, along with three other Review Applications,
being, C.M.R.A. No. 119 of 2026; C.M.R.A. No. 121 of
2026; and C.M.R.A. No. 122 of 2026. Since all four

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
review petitions involve identical grounds and raise the
same controversy, they have been heard together and as
such are being decided by this common judgment.
2. All these review applications/petitions have been
filed under Chapter V Rule 12 of the Allahabad High Court
Rules 1952, seeking review of the common judgment and
th
order dated 14 of August, 2026 passed in four writ
petitions, lead being Writ-C No. 5832 of 2025 (Jyotinjay
Verma V/s State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.) along-with
Writ-C No. 5828 of 2025; Writ-C No. 6045 of 2025;
Writ-C No. 8217 of 2025; (hereinafter referred as “the
impugned order”), whereby this Court dismissed the writ
petitions, holding that a writ petition is not maintainable
by an Advocate for recovery of his professional fees.
3. This Court also went on to hold that the engagement
of the petitioner as an Advocate by the State was
essentially contractual in nature and the amount sought to
be recovered were found to be disputed and not admitted
by the respondent-State. Thus, this Court went on to
additionally hold that the writ petitions were not
maintainable as it involved several disputed questions of
fact and as such relegated the petitioner to the jurisdiction
of Civil Court, in the following words:
“26. Further, there is another aspect of the matter as
according to this Court, the present writ petition is
additionally not maintainable for there are several
complicated questions of facts in the present case, which
could be settled only by leading evidence in a regular
trial before a Civil Court. Apparently, in the present
case, we find that the petitioner was initially empaneled
as a Counsel with the Basic Shiksha Parishad.
Subsequently, the petitioner was appointed as a

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
special Counsel for the said Parishad for disposal of
Special Appeals in this High Court on 23.04.2009. The
fees payable to a Special Counsel in the range between
Rs.15,000/- to Rs.5,00,000/- per case came to be
prescribed vide Government order dated 02.03.2011. A
facial reading of the said Government order merely
signifies that the fee for a special counsel would be in
the range of Rs. 15,000/- to Rs.5,00,000/- per case and
does not in any manner fix the fee for a special counsel
for the maximum fee of Rs.5,00,000/- in all cases
allotted to him. There is no automatic applicability of the
fees and to the mind of this Court, the said Government
Order merely gives a guidance to the various
department of the Government indicating therein that in
case a special counsel is to be appointed, the fee has
to be finalized between Rs.15,000/- to Rs.5,00,000/-.
This Court finds force in the argument of the learned
Counsel for the respondent No. 8 and 9, wherein they
have submitted that the fees have to be agreed by Basic
Shiksha Department for each case individually on case-
to-case basis and then only an Advocate could have
charged for the said agreed fees. It is the case of the
Basic Shiksha Department that the fee of
Rs.5,00,000/- was never agreed by them qua the
Petitioner. Thus, according to this Court, a dispute exists
between the parties related to the quantum of fee
payable for each special Appeal as on the one hand, the
petitioner has contended that he is entitled for the
maximum fees and on the other hand the Basic Shiksha
Department have contended that the Government order
merely stipulated the range of fee payable, however the
actual fee was never agreed upon by them. To add
further chaos, to the existing confusion, it has also been
contended that this government Order is not applicable
to Basic Shiksha Department. Thus, a complex web of
disputed facts is involved in the present case, which
obviously cannot be adjudicated and decided by this
Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
27. According to this Court, the facts of the matter, gets
even more worse, when the contesting respondent
contends that in fact the petitioner is no longer
empaneled with the Basic Shiksha Department, ever
since the Government order dated 13.10.2011. This
court does not wish to comment on the entitlement of
the fee to a special counsel as per Government order
dated 2.03.2011, who came to be removed from
empanelment on 13.10.2011, i.e. in the same year, as
it would be prejudicial to the rights and contention of the
parties, who may engage in future litigation.

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
28. We also find that the respondents have also raised a
very technical objection related to the petitioner
pursuing a stale claim, as according to them, the fee, if
at all payable is also barred by limitation. According to
the learned Counsel for the respondents, it is the self-
admitted case of the petitioner that the fee had been
outstanding since the year 2009. Flagging the said
date of occurrence of cause of action, the respondents
have submitted that the claim is time-barred as the
same has been claimed after more than 16 years.
29. However, this Court does not wish to go into the said
question of claim being time-barred as we are not only
conscious of the fact that limitation is a mixed question
of law and fact, but we have already stated that the
present writ petitions are not maintainable for recovery
of the fee-bills, as the claims of fee-bills have not been
admitted by the respondents.
30. Accordingly, while dismissing this writ petitions for all
the aforesaid reasons, we leave it to the wisdom of the
petitioner to claim his professional fee by approaching a
competent civil court, where the parties can lead
evidence and prove their case after exchanging their
pleadings, documents and cross-examining witness to
establish their version of the case in a regular trial.
Further, we grant liberty to the petitioner, that in case
he chooses to file a civil suit, the benefit of Section 14 of
the limitation Act would be available to him, in
accordance with law. ”
4. The review petitioner, appearing-in-person in all
these petitions has raised several grounds. However, the
hinge of his submissions is three-fold. First, according to
the review-petitioner, he had filed a written submission
dated 10.07.2026 along with compilation of cases,
however, the same had gone completely unnoticed. The
review petitioner in his endeavor to substantiate the said
ground has again cited several judgments as part of a
ground and has submitted that these judgments were filed
along with the written submission, however, the same was
not considered in the impugned judgment. According to
the review petitioner, non-payment of fees by the

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
respondent-State is a breach of fundamental right and it
has escaped the attention of this Court that fundamental
rights cannot be enforced by a Civil Court.
5. The second ground adduced by the review petitioner
is the contents of paragraph 25 of the impugned judgment.
According to him, an error apparent on the face of record
has crept in the said paragraph as it has been submitted
that although this Court record in the said paragraph that
no document has been filed on records to show that the
fee bills were admitted by the respondents , however,
according to him, vide a letter dated 16.09.2025, the Zila
Basic Shiksha Adhikari had forwarded his professional bills
to the Finance and Accounts, Basic Shiksha, Sitapur and
similar letters dated 26.09.2025 forwarding his bills to the
Finance and Accounts, Basic Shiksha, Raebareli.
6. The review petitioner has also highlighted that there
is also an apparent error in the observation made by this
Court in the said paragraph, in as much as although this
Court records that the requisite fee bills raised and
received by the respondents were not annexed with the
writ petition, however, according to the review petitioner,
he has placed on record material and documents in support
of his claim, being (i) Government order dated 23.04.2009
and 02.03.2011; (ii) Order passed by this Court
demonstrating the presence of review-petitioner as a
Special Counsel; and (iii) letters dated 16.09.2025 and
26.09.2025 of the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari forwarding
his professional bills to the Finance and Accounts, Basic
Shiksha, Sitapur and Raebareli, respectively.

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
7. The third ground agitated by the review petitioner is
that this Court has relied on per incuriam judgment in the
th
impugned judgment dated 14 of August, 2026.
8. Two additional grounds of infringement of the
fundamental rights under Article 21- relating to right to life
and Article 23(1) relating to right against “begar” having
been not decided by this Court in the impugned judgment,
has also been sought to be agitated in the review petition.

9. Further, an incidental ground of not deciding the
following two issues, has also been taken by the review
petitioner at ground No. 36 and 37 of the review petition:
* Applicability of Government order dated 02.03.2011
regarding fee payment of special counsel to the review
petitioner;
* Applicability of Government order dated 23.04.2009,
relating to entitlement of fee payment as special counsel
to the review petitioner, in view of authorising him to
conduct all the special appeals of the Basic Education
Department as special counsel.
10. This Court has patiently heard the review petitioner-
in-person and has perused the various grounds urged in
the review petitions and the material available on record.
11. No doubt, Chapter V Rule 12 of the Allahabad High
Court Rules 1952, provides the procedure for presenting
an application for review. However, the grounds on which

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
review may be granted are those contained in Section 114
read with Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C., and the power of this
Court in writ jurisdiction is exercised within those limits.
The issue is no longer res-integra that a review lies only
for (a) new and important matter that could not be
produced earlier despite due diligence; (b) an error
apparent on the face of the record; or (c) any other
sufficient reason analogous to these. An error apparent
must be self-evident and must be in the nature that such
an error immediately strikes the eye without a long process
of reasoning or a debate on which two views are possible.
A review is not an appeal in disguise, and an erroneous
decision cannot be corrected in review. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Sanjay Kumar Agarwal v. State Tax
Officer (1) & Anr, reported in (2024) 2 SCC 362 , after
enumerating the various judgments relating to the scope
within which a power of review operates, held at paragraph
No. 16 as follows:
“16. The gist of the afore-stated decisions is that: -
(i) A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a
mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.
(ii) A judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and
departure from that principle is justified only when
circumstances of a substantial and compelling character
make it necessary to do so.
(iii) An error which is not self-evident and has to be
detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said
to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying
the court to exercise its power of review.
(iv) In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule
1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to
be “reheard and corrected.”
(v) A Review Petition has a limited purpose and cannot
be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.”

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
(vi) Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot
be permitted to reagitate and reargue the questions
which have already been addressed and decided.
(vii) An error on the face of record must be such an
error which, mere looking at the record should strike and
it should not require any long-drawn process of
reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be
two opinions.
(viii) Even the change in law or subsequent decision/
judgment of a co-ordinate or larger Bench by itself
cannot be regarded as a ground for review. ”
12. Keeping the aforesaid principle of law in mind, this
Court proposes to test each of the grounds against the
aforesaid principles governing the scope of the present
review petition filed by the petitioner. For the sake of
convenience, the grounds are taken for consideration in
seriatim.
13. The review petitioner's primary contention that his
written submissions dated 10.07.2026 and case
compilation were ignored is legally untenable. Written
submissions serve merely to aid oral arguments and
cannot supplant judicial reasoning. A judgment is not
vitiated by the mere omission of specific citations from a
compilation, nor is the Court required to analytically
distinguish every cited authority. In any case Court’s
silence on a citation is not an error apparent, so as to be
amenable to review jurisdiction. Further, non-reference to
a particular authority cited at the Bar does not by itself
show that the Court overlooked it, and even if it did, the
omission is not an error apparent that is self-evident on
the face of the record. A challenge on that footing requires
a re-examination of the merits, which is impermissible in

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
review. ( See: Sanjay Kumar Agarwal (supra), para 16 (iii),
(vi) and (vii) ).
14. The question in review is as to whether an omitted
authority would have changed the outcome. Admittedly,
the review-petitioner has not shown how any cited
judgment would have done so. According to this Court, the
real contention of the review-petition in citing these
judgments is that non-payment of fees breaches a
fundamental right and that a Civil Court cannot enforce
fundamental rights. That is a challenge to the correctness
of the Court’s view on the merits, which is the province of
an appeal. This Court at paragraph 9 of the impugned
judgment has framed the relief claimed by the review-
petitioner in the following words:
“9. Thus, a total sum of about Rs. 4,80,00,000/- has
been claimed in these petitions and in order to
substantiate and drive home his contention, the
petitioner has relied on copies of Government
order dated 23.04.2009 and 02.03.2011, list of
Special Appeals represented by him,
representations send by him to the respondent-
authorities, requesting for payment and order
dated 12.02.2024 passed by the Honble Supreme
Court in Civil Appeal Nos.2142-2143 of 2024 (The
State of Uttar Pradesh and others Vs. Gopal K.
Verma). Thus, the petitioner has prayed for
issuance of a direction against the respondents
to ensure up-to-date payment to him with penal
interest, keeping in view that the fee payment is
pertaining to special appeals, which has been
decided and/or pending since 23.04.2009 and has
also claimed violation of fundamental rights under
Article 21 and Article 23(1) of the Constitution of
India. ”
15. This Court after dealing with the various judgments,
went on to hold that writ petition is not maintainable
for recovery of professional fees by an Advocate and

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
specifically observed at paragraph 17, which is being
delineated herein below:
“17. A perusal of the relief being sought by the
petitioner-in-person immediately brings us to
fore that he has essentially prayed for recovery of
up-to-date payment of special Counsel fee bills in
view of the Government Order dated 23.04.2009
and the Government Order dated 02.03.2011. In
order to fortify his stand for maintainability of the
present writ petition, has heavily relied on an
order dated 12.02.2024 passed by the Honble
Supreme Court in Gopal K. Verma case (supra).
The petitioner, while relying on the said
judgment, has drawn the attention of this Court
regarding release of the money with interest.
There is not an iota of doubt relating to the
proposition as settled by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the said order, however a bare reading of
the said judgment would reveal that the issue
relating to maintainability of a writ petition by an
Advocate for recovery of fee bill was not an issue
argued or decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in that case. In fact, the Apex Court merely
noted that the payments of professional fee have
already been made and in the said background,
the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India has
granted an amount as interest on the said
payment. Therefore, this Court is of the
considered view that the case referred and relied
by the petitioner does not come to its rescue as
the same is distinguishable on facts and most
importantly, having been passed under Article 142
of the Constitution of India is not a binding
precedent. ”
16. The submission that a Civil Court cannot enforce
fundamental rights does not assist him. This is a writ
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
not a Civil Court, and whether the claim for fees is
enforceable in writ jurisdiction was decided on the
merits. Re-agitating and re-hearing that finding is
impermissible and beyond the scope of a review
jurisdiction. In view thereof, this ground for

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
maintaining the present review application, is hereby
rejected.
17. The Second ground argued by the petitioner-in-
person, is relating to the findings arrived by this Court
at paragraph 25 of the impugned Judgment.
According to his submission, an error apparent on the
face of record has crept in the said paragraph as this
Court record in the said paragraph that no
document has been filed on records to show that
the fee bills were admitted by the respondents ,
however, vide a letter dated 16.09.2025, the Zila
Basic Shiksha Adhikari had forwarded his professional
bills to the Finance and Accounts, Basic Shiksha,
Sitapur and similar letters dated 26.09.2025
forwarding his bills to the Finance and Accounts, Basic
Shiksha, Raebareli.
18. First and foremost, it must be understood that (i)
Forwarding is not admission. The letters of
16.09.2025 and 26.09.2025 record only that the Zila
Basic Shiksha Adhikari forwarded the petitioner’s bills
to the Finance and Accounts offices at Sitapur and
Raebareli. Forwarding a claim for examination is a
routine administrative step. It does not admit that the
sum is due, or that the quantum is correct, or for that
matter that the petitioner is entitled to it under the
Government Orders. Treating a forwarding letter as
an admission of liability would make every
administrative reference a concession of the claim.
This Court’s observation that no document showed

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
admission of the bills is therefore, at the highest, a
view on the effect of the documents. It is not a
mistake about their existence.
19. Further, (ii) Even if the said forwarding is admitted,
that itself does not make the entitlement enforceable
in law. Forwarding does not mean that the
entitlement follows. An admission that bills were
received does not by itself create a right enforceable
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Entitlement depends on the terms of engagement and
the governing Government Orders, and on whether
the amount is payable in the manner and sum
claimed. It is a matter of fact and as is also apparent
from the present review petition that the requisite
fee-bills were not annexed with the writ petition.
Admittedly, the review-petitioner has based his entire
claim on the basis of the forwarding letters,
Government Orders, appearance orders and not the
actual fee-bills and it was in this context that this
Court has observed that no fee-bills were annexed
along with the writ petition. This Court has considered
the documents relied upon by the petitioner, and they
do not displace the finding arrived in the impugned
judgment.
20. In any case, (iii) the observation was not the
foundation of the decision. The dismissal rests on the
maintainability of the writ petition as made out at
paragraph 24 of the impugned judgment and
additionally at paragraph 26, wherein this Court has

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
observed that there are several complicated
questions of facts, which are to be settled by leading
evidence in a regular Trial before a Civil Court. This
Court has further held that it cannot adjudicate and
decide these complicated facts in exercising summary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. Therefore, the conclusion would stand even if
paragraph 25 were read as the petitioner suggests.
An error that does not affect the result is not a
sufficient ground for review. Furthermore, (iv) the
Government Orders and the Court orders showing
appearance do not take the case for entitlement of
fees any further. That the petitioner was appointed or
appeared as Special Counsel is not in dispute and was
not the basis of the decision. These documents
therefore add nothing. Therefore, this ground of the
review petitioner is hereby rejected.
21. As far as the third ground relating to reliance by this
Court on a per incuriam judgment is concerned, it
must be at the very outset understood that a decision
is per incuriam only when rendered in ignorance of a
binding statutory provision or a binding authority of a
superior court.( See: A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
(1988) 2 SCC 602; Punjab Land Development and
Reclamation Corporation v. Presiding Officer (1990) 3
SCC 682. ) Neither in the review petition nor in the
oral submission, the petitioner points to any such
ignorance in the decision relied upon. In any case, the
plea invites this Court to sit in judgment on a
precedent it applied. Whether a precedent is correct,

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
or was rendered per incuriam , can be examined only
by a superior Court in appeal and not in review of an
order that followed it. Therefore, this ground is
hereby rejected.
22. As far as the additional grounds of infringement of
fundamental rights under Article 21- relating to right
to life and Article 23(1) relating to right against
“begar”, suffice to say that the impugned judgment
held that the writ petition was not maintainable for
recovery of professional fees by an Advocate and no
enforceable entitlement to the claimed fees could be
established from the material on record.
23. Therefore, once that finding was reached, the
question whether non-payment violates Articles 21
and 23(1) did not survive. A Court need not to answer
a contention that cannot affect the result, and its non-
decision is an implied rejection. In any event, the
contentions lack substance on their face. The
petitioner accepted a professional engagement as
Special Counsel, and a dispute over the quantum or
release of fees under that engagement is a
contractual or service-conditions claim, not forced
labour under Article 23(1). The petitioner has also not
shown a deprivation of life or livelihood amounting to
a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. If
he believes this Court erred in not deciding the point,
the remedy lies in appeal and not by way of a
review petition.

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
24. Further, as far as the incidental ground of not
deciding the applicability of Government order dated
02.03.2011 and Government order dated
23.04.2009, is concerned, both these government
orders were part of the petitioner’s case, and the
judgment dealt with them expressly at paragraph 26
of the impugned Judgment and held that a complex
web of disputed facts is involved in the present
case, which obviously cannot be adjudicated and
decided by this Court exercising jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, by
necessary implication, in rejecting the claim of the
review-petition, this Court held that the entitlement
of the petitioner on the basis of these Government
Order(s) had to be proved along with its applicability
to the facts of the case, by evidence in a regular Trial
and cannot be decided merely on the strength of
these Government Order(s). The review petitioner’s
grievance that this Court did not accept his
construction of them, which is basically a plea of
erroneous interpretation, is again not an error
apparent.
25. The review petitioner-in-person has failed to point
any mistake or error that is self-evident and apparent
on the face of the record. There is no discovery of
new facts or evidence nor any “other sufficient
reason” has been pleaded analogous to be treated as
“new and important matter” within the meaning of
Order XLVII Rule 1 C.P.C. In essence, the review
petition seeks re-hearing and a fresh adjudication of

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CMRA No. - 120 of 2026
issues already decided. Evidently, the present review-
petition is in the guise of an Appeal. That is
impermissible in review jurisdiction. Entertaining
such a petition would defeat the principle of finality of
judicial decisions.
26. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds no
error apparent on the face of the record and no
sufficient reason warranting review of the common
th
impugned order dated 14 of August, 2026.
27. The review petition, accordingly being devoid of
merits is dismissed.
(Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary, J.)
I agree
(Shekhar B. Saraf, J.)
November 20, 2026
Praveen/Anuj Singh
Digitally signed by :-
ANUJ PRATAP SINGH
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench