Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra vs State Of M.P.

Court
Supreme Court

2026 INSC 899






NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 937 OF 2014


RAVI KUMAR SINGH
MALHOTRA

… APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF MADHYA
PRADESH

…RESPONDENT(S)




J U D G M E N T


AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J.

1. The present appeal assails the common judgment and order
dated 09.10.2012 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at
Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No.491 of 1994 and Criminal
Appeal No.1190 of 1996 whereby the judgment and order of
Signature Not Verified
the Additional Sessions Judge, Panna was reversed, and the
Digitally signed by
RAJNI MUKHI
Date: 2026.08.20
18:13:05 IST
Reason:
appellant was convicted under sections 302 and 201 of the

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Indian Penal Code (hereinafter, “IPC”) and sentenced to
undergo imprisonment for life and rigorous imprisonment
for 2 years respectively.


2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that on 26.09.1989
at about 7:00 am, one Mohammed Naimuddin (PW-31) was
passing through Bhero Ghat while driving his truck when
he saw a naked male child aged 4-5 years (PW-28) waving
his hands indicating him to stop. The boy appeared injured
with abrasions on his abdomen. PW-31 brought him to
Naga Baba (PW-7) who took him to the police station and
thereafter for medical treatment. The next day in the
evening, the dead body of a deceased woman, and then of a
male child were found in the ghat.

3. Investigation revealed that in the morning of 20.09.1989,
the deceased Sushma had left with her sons and their
father, i.e. the appellant herein, for a trip from Kanpur to
Khajuraho. The appellant had been living separately from
Sushma and his two sons for about six years. The deceased
lived in a rented house with her sons. Under the pretext of
the trip, the appellant is alleged to have murdered the
deceased persons by strangulation. An attempt was also
made to kill the male child, PW-28, who managed to escape.


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4. Two consecutive FIRs bearing Case Crime nos. 22 and 23
of 1989 dated 01.10.1989 came to be lodged and further
investigation proceeded. The Investigating Officer, Rajeev
Singh Bhadoria (PW-21), visited the house and office of
Ravi Malhotra at Kanpur, but found them locked. A few
days later, the statement of the child, PW-28 was recorded
by the police wherein he gave testimony regarding
witnessing the killing of his mother and brother by his
father, the appellant.

5. Further investigation was transferred to Mr. Lavi Mishra
(PW-11). On 08.03.1990, a tipster informed him that a
person was seeking information regarding an unknown
child at Basti hotel, leading to the arrest of the appellant.
He reached the spot and the appellant came to be arrested.

6. It is the case of the prosecution that at around 3:00 am on
the same night, the appellant, in the presence of witnesses,
confessed to killing his wife, Sushma and their child,
Shashank, and thereafter clothes, and one empty bottle,
allegedly used to pour acid on the deceased persons, were
recovered from the dump at Bhero ghat at his instance.
The recovered articles were sent to FSL.

7. Chargesheets were filed in both the FIRs before the
Judicial Magistrate of First Class and on 05.09.1991 the

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committal orders were passed and the cases came to be
committed to the Sessions Court. Charges were framed
under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC. The appellant
pleaded not guilty and the trial proceeded on the clubbing
of both cases with common evidence, as Sessions Trial
Nos.86 and 87 of 1991.

8. By judgment and order dated 14.12.1993, the Additional
Sessions Judge, Panna, acquitted the appellant of all the
charges, holding that the prosecution had failed to prove
the case beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of the
child, PW-28 was found to be unreliable, being filled with
contradictions. It was observed that he was only 4.5 years
old at the time of the incident and was not in a position to
state with whom he was then residing. It was also observed
that the magistrate had made a remark that while
recording the statement, the child had remained silent
upon being asked a question, and had then said that he
would tell him in ears. Thereafter, he had made a different
statement in his testimony, leading to the conclusion that
his testimony was not totally natural and reliable. Other
than such unreliable evidence, the court further observed
that there was not enough evidence to corroborate the
case.


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9. Appeals bearing Criminal Appeal Nos.491 of 1994 and
1190 of 1996 were filed in the High Court by the State
against this judgment of acquittal, which came to be
allowed by the impugned judgment and order. The High
Court found that testimony of the child, PW-28,
implicating the appellant, to be reliable. It was held that
there was no occasion and reason to tutor the child. The
said testimony was held to have corroborated with the
conduct of the appellant in absconding and giving an
explanation under Section 313 CrPC of being on a
pilgrimage, which the Court considered to be false. Based
on the said circumstances, the court arrived at a finding
that the case was proved beyond reasonable doubt, and
the appellant was convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment for life.

10. Aggrieved, the appellant approached this Court by way of
the present appeal.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the High
Court has failed to appreciate the findings of the Trial
Court. When the view expressed by the Trial Court is a
plausible one, the High Court should not replace the Trial
Court’s view with its view.


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12. It is submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The case
rests solely on the uncorroborated and tutored testimony
of the child, PW-28. Referring to his statement, the
counsel submitted that the child deposed that prior to his
entering the Court, a person from the police department
had read out a statement and instructed him to give a
statement in Court on the same lines. No circumstantial
evidence corroborates this testimony.
13. This, the counsel states is corroborated by the statement
of PW-11 and PW-7, who have stated that the child was
living with a police constable. The account of PW-28
regarding he being strangulated and burnt with acid is
falsified by medical evidence which records that no
external injuries were present on his throat, and no
injuries were attributable to acid.

14. Furthermore, it is submitted that there is no evidence
linking the appellant to the crime or the place of
occurrence. The origins of the bloodstains, having
disintegrated, could not be determined. Neither the alleged
car and truck nor the driver was ever traced. Motive is also
not proved as PW-17 had deposed that the relations
between the appellant and the deceased were amicable.


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15. It is also contended that the delay in lodging the FIR, and
the fact that the panchnama and post-mortem all precede
the FIR makes the prosecution case doubtful. Even though
PW-28 was handed over to the police on 26.09.1989, the
FIR was filed almost 5 days later i.e. on 01.10.1989. He
thus prays for setting aside the impugned judgment and
acquittal of the appellant.

16. Per contra, learned counsel for the State supports the
impugned judgment and order of the High Court.

17. It is submitted that the direct testimony of the child
witness, PW-28 is reliable and natural. He correctly
disclosed his identity and school where he was studying.
He further categorically stated that he came with his
mother, brother and the appellant from Kanpur to
Khajuraho, and that he witnessed the killing of his mother
and his brother by the appellant.

18. It is further submitted that the homicidal nature of the
deaths is established by medical evidence. Dr. Jain (PW-
20) found a torn wound on the neck of the brother of PW-
28 which aligned with the testimony of strangulation.
Chemical analysis also confirmed traces of sulphuric acid
on the articles seized from the spot of occurrence.


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19. Furthermore, it is submitted that the motive and
relationship of the appellant and the deceased is
established by the testimony of the neighbours who stated
that they were married and had two children. The fact that
PW-17 used to send reminders regarding rent to the
appellant proves presence of financial burden on the
appellant.

20. Lastly, it is contended that the subsequent conduct of the
appellant in remaining absconding, and the recoveries of
the clothes and the bottle from the spot of occurrence at
his instance, anchor him to the crime. Therefore, the chain
of circumstances is complete and points solely towards the
guilt of the appellant. On this basis, dismissal of appeal is
prayed for.

21. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
upon perusal of the material on record, we are unable to
sustain the view taken by the High Court for the reasons
mentioned hereinbelow.

22. At the very outset, it must be noted that this being an
appeal against an order reversing an acquittal, the High
Court, as per settled law, was bound to bear in mind the
double presumption of innocence operating in favour of the
appellant, and could interfere only upon a finding that the

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view taken by the Trial Court was not merely different from
its own but was one no reasonable court could have taken
on the material before it. This principle is well settled and
1
expounded in Chandrappa v State of Karnataka . The
relevant paragraph is produced hereinbelow.

“44. ….. (4) An appellate court, however, must
bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is
double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available
to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
court should not disturb the finding of acquittal
recorded by the trial court.”

23. In our considered opinion, this threshold has not been met
in the present case. The High Court’s finding of guilt
principally rested on the statement of the child witness,
PW-28, whom the court found to be a reliable and natural
witness. The Trial Court had declined to give undue weight
to this testimony for reasons that were duly supported by
material.


1
(2007) 4 SCC 415

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24. It is well settled that while there is no inflexible rule
requiring the testimony of a child witness to be
corroborated before a conviction can be sustained, this
Court has held that such corroboration is a rule of
prudence which is to be ordinarily followed. In Bhagwan
2
Singh v. State of M.P. , this Court held that the evidence of
a child has to be evaluated carefully given he is an easy
prey to tutoring. Paragraph 19, which deals with it is as
follows:
“19. The law recognises the child as a competent
witness but a child particularly at such a tender
age of six years, who is unable to form a proper
opinion about the nature of the incident because
of immaturity of understanding, is not
considered by the court to be a witness whose
sole testimony can be relied upon without other
corroborative evidence. The evidence of a child is
required to be evaluated carefully because he is
an easy prey to tutoring. Therefore, always the
court looks for adequate corroboration from other
evidence to his testimony. (See Panchhi v. State
of U.P. [(1998) 7 SCC 177 : 1998 SCC (Cri)
1561])”


Tested against this standard, the Trial Court’s insistence on
independent corroboration of the child witness’s account,
given the specific and serious doubts as to tutoring as
discussed below, cannot be said to be an unreasonable or
impermissible approach.



2
(2003) 3 SCC 21

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25. The child (PW-28) was only four and a half years of age
when the incident occurred and the testimony was
recorded 4 years later. Moreover, it is an admitted fact that
the child lived with a constable Ramkishore. The said child
witness in paragraphs 30 and 61 of his statement had also
categorically stated that he was tutored. He had said that
the Station House Officer had made him read his
statement before going to the Court and had told him that
the same statement was to be given before the Magistrate.
He had also stated that the appellant had tried to
strangulate him with a rope and thrown acid on him.
However, the said statement stands falsified by medical
evidence.

26. The Trial Court also noted that the version of PW-28, that
upon hearing his mother cry, he had woken up and
witnessed the appellant killing his mother and then
throwing her in the jungle, and then had gone back to
sleep. It was further stated that he had again woken up
and witnessed his brother being killed, which was
unnatural and contrary to human conduct. In light of
these circumstances, the testimony of PW-28 was not
found to be reliable.

27. The High Court has also disbelieved the explanation of the
appellant regarding his absence from his office and

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residence, and held it to be an important circumstance
pointing to his guilt. We are of the opinion that mere
suspicion arising from the appellant's explanation cannot
substitute for the requirement that each circumstance in
the chain of events needs to be established by cogent
evidence, such that the sequence so taken as a whole,
points solely to the guilt of the accused. The settled
position in law has been summarized by a judgment of this
Court in Karakkattu Muhammed Basheer v. State of
3
Kerala . The relevant paragraphs are produced
hereinbelow.
“14. This Court in Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna
Reddy v. State of A.P. [Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna
Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 172 : (2006)
3 SCC (Cri) 512] while referring to the various
earlier judgments which have been passed by this
Court from time to time, summarised key
principles which act as a guide for the courts to
come to a conclusion with regard to the guilt of an
accused in cases which are solely dependent on
the circumstantial evidence. The same have been
referred to as the “panchsheel principles” and are
discussed in paras 26 to 28 of the said judgment,
which read as follows : (SCC p. 181)

“26. It is now well settled that with a view to
base a conviction on circumstantial evidence,
the prosecution must establish all the pieces of
incriminating circumstances by reliable and
clinching evidence and the circumstances so
proved must form such a chain of events as
would permit no conclusion other than one of
guilt of the accused. The circumstances cannot
be on any other hypothesis. It is also well
settled that suspicion, however grave it may be,

3
(2024) 10 SCC 813

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cannot be a substitute for a proof and the courts
shall take utmost precaution in finding an
accused guilty only on the basis of the
circumstantial evidence. (See Anil Kumar Singh
v. State of Bihar [Anil Kumar Singh v. State of
Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 67 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1167]
and Reddy Sampath Kumar v. State of A.P.
[Reddy Sampath Kumar v. State of A.P., (2005)
7 SCC 603 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1710] )

27. The last seen theory, furthermore, comes
into play where the time-gap between the point
of time when the accused and the deceased
were last seen alive and the deceased is found
dead is so small that possibility of any person
other than the accused being the author of the
crime becomes impossible. Even in such a case
the courts should look for some corroboration.

28. In State of U.P. v. Satish [State of U.P. v.
Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 642]
this Court observed : (SCC p. 123, para 22)

‘22. The last seen theory comes into play
where the time-gap between the point of time
when the accused and the deceased were
last seen alive and when the deceased is
found dead is so small that possibility of any
person other than the accused being the
author of the crime becomes impossible. It
would be difficult in some cases to positively
establish that the deceased was last seen
with the accused when there is a long gap
and possibility of other persons coming in
between exists. In the absence of any other
positive evidence to conclude that the
accused and the deceased were last seen
together, it would be hazardous to come to a
conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case
there is positive evidence that the deceased
and the accused were seen together by
witnesses PWs 3 and 5, in addition to the
evidence of PW 2.’


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(See also Bodhraj v. State of J&K [Bodhraj v.
State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45 : 2003 SCC
(Cri) 201] .)

15. Thereafter, the above principles have been
reiterated in the subsequent judgments of this
Court and hold the field till date.

16. Thus, these basic established principles can
be summarised in the following terms that the
chain of events needs to be so established that the
court has no option but to come to one and only
one conclusion i.e. the guilt of the accused person.
If an iota of doubt creeps in at any stage in the
sequence of events, the benefit thereof should
flow to the accused. Mere suspicion alone,
irrespective of the fact that it is very strong, cannot
be a substitute for a proof. The chain of
circumstances must be so complete that they lead
to only one conclusion, that is, the guilt of the
accused.

17. Even in the case of a conviction where in an
appeal the chain of evidence is found to be not
complete or the courts could reach to any another
hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused, the
accused person must be given the benefit of doubt
which obviously would lead to his acquittal.
Meaning thereby, when there is a missing link, a
finding of guilt cannot be recorded.

18. In other words, the onus on the prosecution is
to produce such evidence which conclusively
establishes the truth and the only truth with
regard to guilt of an accused for the charges
framed against him or her, and such evidence
should establish a chain of events so complete as
to not leave any reasonable ground for the
conclusion consistent with the innocence of
accused.”

28. In this light, upon perusal of the record, we are of the view
that the prosecution has not been able to bring forth

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sufficient evidence in order to establish the guilt of the
appellant and link him to the alleged offences.

29. There is no medical or scientific evidence connecting the
appellant to the crime. The post-mortem report of the
deceased persons was of no assistance since as per the
statements of the doctors, PW-1 and PW-20, the bodies
were in an advanced stage of decomposition. Therefore, no
definite opinion could be given regarding the cause of
death. The chemical examination report of the blood-
stained soil was also inconclusive as there was not enough
blood for examination and it had decomposed.

30. Furthermore, no forensic link was established between the
recovered articles, or the scene of occurrence, and the
appellant. Although as per the prosecution case, some
clothes and a bottle were recovered from the site of
occurrence at the behest of the appellant, there was no
evidence led by the prosecution to connect these clothes to
the deceased persons or to the appellant.

31. Moreover, the independent witnesses to such confession
by the appellant and the subsequent recovery, namely PW-
4 and PW-5, turned hostile. They deposed that they had
studied only up to the first and second standard,
respectively, and had merely put their signatures on the

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memorandum of arrest, panchnama and recoveries
without enquiring the police regarding the contents
thereof.


32. The recovery of the clothes, in such circumstances also
becomes doubtful considering that such recoveries were
made from the place of occurrence 6 months subsequent
to the discovery of the bodies of the deceased persons.
Further doubt is created when the statement of PW-10, a
witness to the recovery memo of articles seized from the
house of the deceased, is seen who stated that certain
clothes were taken from the house by the police without
any writing. PW-11, the subsequent Investigating Officer,
has also admitted in cross-examination that the recovered
articles did not show any water, mud, or earth residue
which is highly doubtful considering the fact that as per
the prosecution case these articles were seized from under
a rock, 6 feet deep in the ground after being hidden for
several months. In light of the above, the possibility of the
articles being planted cannot be ruled out.

33. The prosecution has also failed to establish last seen
evidence and motive of the appellant. As per the
statements of the neighbours, the appellant had not been
seen near the house of the deceased for several months.
Shadi Lal (PW-17), the landlord, stated that Sushma had

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told his wife, few days prior to 20.09.1989, that she was
going to visit Lucknow for some days, but had not
mentioned that she was going with the appellant. On
20.09.1989 at about 6:30- 7:00 am, Sushma and her
children had left with a person he could not identify.

34. Similarly, Vipin Gosai (PW-18) stated that he saw Sushma
coming out of Shadi Lal’s flat at about 7:00 am in the
morning of 20.09.1989, after which she went and sat in a
car where one person was sitting in this car, he, however,
categorically stated that the said person was not the
appellant and that the appellant had not visited for 7-8
months. Although the Investigating Officer, PW-21 had
given the statement that Vijay Kumar (PW-24) had told him
that Sushma and the children had left with the appellant
on the morning of 20.09.1989, no such statement was
made by PW-24 in his own deposition.

35. On motive, none of the witnesses deposed regarding any
enmity between the appellant and the deceased. In fact,
PW-17 deposed that the relations between the deceased
and the appellant were amicable. It was stated that they
had resolved their issues and decided to live separately,
and she was paying her rent herself. Thus, motive is found
absent and in any case there is lack thereof for the
appellant to have committed such act.

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36. Additionally, although as per the case of the prosecution,
the appellant, the deceased and the children travelled in a
truck and a car, and as per the statement of PW-28, the
truck was being driven by a driver. Although a road tax
receipt was obtained by the investigating officer, no efforts
were made to trace the driver or examine him, who, as per
the statement of the child witness, PW-28, was a witness
to the killing of the deceased persons. Further, there was
failure to trace the said car and its driver. This creates a
significant gap in the chain of events.

37. Another circumstance casting a shadow of doubt over the
prosecution case is the inordinate and unexplained delay
in lodging the FIR. The record reveals that the male child,
PW-28, was brought to the police station as early as
26.09.1989, while the bodies of the deceased were
recovered over the course of the following two days. It is
further the prosecution's own case that PW-28 disclosed
the identity of the accused to PW-21 on 29.09.1989.
Despite this, the FIR came to be registered only on
01.10.1989. Such unexplained delay in setting the
criminal law into motion, particularly when the identity of
the accused was purportedly known well before the FIR
was recorded, seriously undermines the credibility of the

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prosecution version and lends credence to the possibility
of embellishment in the investigation.

38. In light of the above stated reasons, in absence of cogent
evidence leading to the sole conclusion of guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt, this Court is of the
view that the conviction of the appellant cannot be
sustained. The present appeal is allowed and the
impugned judgment and order dated 09.10.2012 passed
by the High Court is set aside. The appellant is acquitted
of the charges.

39. In light of the acquittal of the appellant, the bail bonds as
submitted by the appellant stand discharged.

40. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.


…….……..………..………………..J.
[ SANJAY KAROL ]


…….……..………..………………..J.
[ AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH ]

NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 20, 2026.

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