Manish Mal And Ors. vs Union Of India And Ors
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~63
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
# CNR No. DLHC010186642022
+ W.P.(C) 7529/2022 & CM APPL. 23020/2022
MANISH MAL AND ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Rajiv Shukla, Mrs. Shivani
Kapoor, Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Mr. Manish
Kumar, Mr. Manish Bhardwaj, Advs. along
with Mr. Ankit in person
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Tanveer Ahmed Ansari,
SPC for R-1 and 2
Ms. Tanya Agarwal, Mr. Vishal Maurya and
Mohd. Bilal, Advs. for R-3 to 33
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NIVEDITA ANIL SHARMA
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
% 27.10.2026
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
A. The issue in conspectus
1
1. Though the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal ,
rendered on 7 April 2022 in OA 925/2021, is fairly extensive, the
issue in controversy is narrow.
2. The petitioners participated in the Combined Graduate Level
1
“the Tribunal” hereinafter
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2 3
Examination-2019 conducted by the Staff Selection Commission .
The examination took place in three Tiers, and in multiple shifts.
Clause 11.3 of the scheme of the examination as contained in the
notice preceding the examination read thus:
“11.3 Marks scored by candidates in Computer Based
Examinations, if conducted in multiple shifts, will be normalized
by using the formula published by the Commission through Notice
No: 1-1/2018-P&P-I dated 07-02-2019 and such normalized scores
will be used to determine final merit and cut-off marks.”
3. Normalization, as per Clause 11.3 read with the normalization
formula provided in notice dated 7 February 2019 issued by the SSC,
of the marks of the candidates, was undertaken in all three Tiers.
Applying the said formula, the petitioners cleared Tier 1 but could not
clear Tiers 2 and 3. The petitioners never objected to normalization, or
to the normalization formula, before or while undertaking the
examination.
4. After failing to clear the examination, however, the petitioners
objected to the application of the normalization formula. The
petitioners have no objection to the formula per se , and do not contend
that it was wrongly applied. Their contention, which is somewhat
unusual, is that though the formula is not illegal per se, and though it
was not wrongly applied, the SSC ought not to have applied the
formula, as application of the formula resulted in the marks of the
petitioners being reduced to a point where they could not clear the
CGLE, whereas the marks of others increased. This constituted,
2
“CGLE” hereinafter
3
“SSC” hereinafter
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therefore, the principal ground of challenge, by the petitioners, who,
having approached the Tribunal in that regard and having failed in
their attempt, have now petitioned this Court.
5. The Tribunal has primarily held that, having participated in the
selection process in full awareness of Clause 11.3 of the examination
notice, without challenging the said clause at any point of time, the
petitioners cannot, having failed to clear the CGLE, now seek to
challenge the act of the respondents in applying Clause 11.3. Besides,
the Tribunal also finds no substantive substance in the challenge to
Clause 11.3 itself.
6. To our mind, both the findings of the Tribunal are
unexceptionable.
7. The petitioners undertook the CGLE in full awareness of Clause
11.3 and the normalization formula. Even if, they had wanted, they
could not have challenged the Clause after having participated in the
selection. Significantly, as the Tribunal has itself noted, the petitioners
cleared Tier 1 in which the same formula was applied.
8. On merits, too, the petitioners challenge has no legal foundation
whatsoever. The petitioners do not seek to challenge the normalization
formula. They do not contend that the formula was wrongly applied.
In the face of these submissions, there can obviously be no sustainable
grievance merely on the ground that the application of the formula
resulted in what the petitioners feel to be an unconscionable outcome.
The formula was applied across the Board to all candidates and, if, by
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applying the formula, certain candidates’ marks got reduced and
others were increased, that is merely a consequence of applying the
formula. The formula itself not being under challenge, there was
obviously no substance in the petitioners’ case.
B. Facts
9. We may now advert to the facts and rival contentions in
somewhat greater detail.
10. The dispute relates to the CGLE-2019, the notice for the
holding of which was published by the SSC on 22 October 2019. The
CGLE was conducted in four Tiers, in which Tiers-1 and 2 were
computer-based examinations, Tier-3 was a pen and paper descriptive
examination and Tier-4 was a computer proficiency test. The
controversy, in the present case, relates to Tiers-2 and 3.
11. Clause 11.3 of the notice of examination, as already noted,
provided that, where the examination was conducted in multiple shifts
– as in the present case – the marks scored by the candidates in the
computer-based examinations would be normalized using the formula
provided in Notice dated 7 February 2019 issued by the SSC, which
read thus:
“IMPORTANT NOTICE
The Staff Selection Commission has already decided to normalize
the scores of candidates for the examinations which are conducted
in multi-shifts to take into account any variation in the difficulty
levels of the question papers across different shifts. The
normalization is done based on the fundamental assumption that
“in all multi-shift examinations, the distribution of abilities of
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candidates is the same across all the shifts”. This assumption is
justified since the number of candidates appearing in multiple
shifts in the examinations conducted by the Commission is large
and the procedure for allocation of examination shift to candidates
is random. The following formula will be used by the Commission
to calculate final score of candidates in the multi-shift
examinations:
Where:
th th
Normalized marks of j candidate in the i shift.
is the average marks of the top 0.1% of the candidates
considering all shifts (number of candidates will be rounded-up).
is the sum of mean and standard deviation marks of the
candidates in the examination considering all shifts.
is the average marks of the top 0.1% of the candidates in the
th
i shift (number of candidates will be rounded-up).
th
is the sum of mean marks and standard deviation of the i
shift.
th th
is the actual marks obtained by the j candidate in i shift.
is the sum of mean marks of candidates in the shift having
maximum mean and standard deviation of marks of candidates in
the examination considering all shifts.
Calculations of marks will be done up to 5 decimal places”
12. Tier-I of the CGLE was conducted from 2 March 2020 to 11
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March 2020 and Tier-2 was conducted from 15 November 2020 to 18
November 2020. The result of Tier-1 was declared on 1 July 2020.
The result of Tier-2 was, however, declared on 19 February 2021
along with Tier-3 which was conducted on 22 October 2020. Tier-4
was conducted on 15 and 16 September 2021.
13. The petitioners contended, inter alia , before the Tribunal that
the SSC had acted illegally in not declaring the result of Tier-2 after it
was held. The SSC, in reply, submitted that as a policy decision, the
results of Tiers 2 and 3 were declared together on 9 July 2021.
14. We do not find any legal infirmity in the decision of the SSC to
do so.
15. The petitioners principal grievance was, however, with respect
to application of the normalization formula contained in the SSC
notice dated 7 February 2019, in terms of Clause 11.3 of the Notice of
Examination. By applying the said formula, submitted the petitioners,
their marks had been substantially reduced, whereas the marks of
certain other candidates had increased. The petitioners relied on
judgment of the Supreme Court in Sanjay Singh v. U.P. Public
4
Service Commission in support of their challenge to the
normalization principle.
16. The Tribunal rejected the challenge of the petitioners for the
following reasons:
4
(2007) 3 SCC 720
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(i) The petitioners were not challenging Clause 11.3 of the
Examination Notice or the normalization formula per se.
(ii) The petitioners had themselves cleared Tier-1 of the
Examination in which they were marked using the
normalization formula.
(iii) Having participated in the selection in full awareness of
the applicability of the normalization formula and of Clause
11.3 of the Examination Notice, the petitioners could not, once
they had failed to clear, turn around and challenge the formula
itself. Reliance was placed, by the Tribunal, for this conclusion,
on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra
5 6
Shah v. Anil Joshi , Union of India v. S Vinodh Kumar , Om
7
Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla and Vijendra
8
Kumar Verma v. Public Service Commission, Uttarakhand .
Moreover, in its later decision in Sunil Kumar v. Bihar Public
9
Service Commission , the Supreme Court had held that the
decision in Sanjay Kumar had to be understood as confined to
the facts of that case, on the basis of the relevant service rules,
which prescribed a particular syllabus.
Premised on this reasoning, the Tribunal has dismissed the OA filed
by the petitioners.
5
(2013) 11 SCC 309
6
(2007) 8 SCC 100
7
1986 Supp SCC 285
8
(2011) 1 SCC 150
9
(2016) 2 SCC 495
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17. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have approached this Court
by means of the present writ petition.
18. We have heard Mr. Rajiv Shukla, learned Counsel for the
petitioner and Mr. Tanveer Ahmed Ansari, learned SPC for
Respondents 1 and 2 and Ms. Tanya Agarwal, learned Counsel for
Respondent 3 to 33.
19. Learned Counsels have also filed written submissions.
C. Rival Submissions
20. Arguing for the petitioners, Mr. Shukla submits that the
Tribunal overlooked the fact that the petitioners challenge was not to
the concept of normalization per se, but to the arbitrary manner in
which it was implemented, resulting in glaring anomalies and
defeating the constitutional mandate of fairness, transparency and
equal opportunity guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
of India. According to Mr. Shukla, the application of the principle of
normalization by the SSC produced such absurd results, that they ex
facie demonstrated the arbitrariness of the exercise itself.
21. To a query from the Court as to whether the petitioners would
have cleared Tier 1 of the CGLE without normalization, Mr. Shukla
admits that, perhaps, they would not. He has, however, taken us to a
tabular statement reflecting the raw and normalised marks scored by
the petitioners in Mathematics, to underscore his submission that
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normalization resulted in absurd consequences, in which candidates
who scored high raw marks had their marks severely depressed and
those who scored lessor marks fared better. He has placed reliance on
various paras from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sanjay
Singh .
22. Mr. Tanveer Ahmed Ansari, learned SPC and Ms. Tanya
Agrawal, learned Counsel for Respondents 3 to 33, countered the
submissions of Mr. Shukla.
23. Mr. Ansari submits that, once the petitioners do not question the
legality of the normalization formula, nothing further survives in their
challenge. He points out that the petitioners themselves were
beneficiaries of the same formula, as it was by application of the
normalization formula, that the petitioners cleared Tier 1 of the
selection. That the normalization formula would be applied was
informed, to all candidates, in advance, in para 11.3 of the Notice of
the CGLE. Once this was done, any deviation from application of the
formula would amount to changing the rules of the game midway. Mr.
Ansari submits that normalization was necessary as the examination
involved over 8 lakh candidates in several shifts, and variations in
difficulty levels across question papers was inevitable. Normalization
was a universally accepted, scientific and statistical exercise by which
scores were adjusted so that candidates who were made to answer
more difficult papers were benefited and those who faced
comparatively simpler papers were normalised, resulting inequality of
assessment. He points out that the normalization formula was applied,
across-the-board, to all candidates who had undertaken the CGLE and
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that, therefore, the petitioners alone could not seek to challenge the
formula or its application, merely because, by its application, they
suffered. Mr. Ansari relies on the judgments of the Supreme Court in
10
Deependra Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh and State of U.P. v.
11
Atul Kumar Dwivedi , in support of his submission that
normalization was legally valid mode of assessment. The judgment in
Sanjay Singh , on the other hand, submits Mr. Ansari, is
distinguishable as it scrutinised scaling of descriptive answer papers
involving, examiner bias.
24. Supplementing the submissions of Mr. Ansari, Ms. Agrawal
reiterates the contention that normalization is a scientific and well-
established statistical process applied in multi-shift examinations,
whereby the normalised score of a candidate is computed on the basis
of her, or his, relative performance vis-à-vis other candidates of the
same shift, as well as the relative performance of candidates across all
shifts taken together. This methodology, she submits, is adopted, not
only by the SSC, but by various authorities and Boards conducting
examinations, as well as Indian Institutes of Management, Indian
Institutes of Technology and Railway Recruitment Boards. It involves
no human intervention and is purely computer and algorithm based,
solely dependent on the relative performance of candidates. She
echoes Mr. Ansari’s submission that, having once been announced
and notified, the application of the normalization formula could not be
done away with, or altered, midway. She points out that the petitioners
never challenged the formula or Clause 11.3 of the examination
10
(2024) 6 SCR 36
11
(2022) 11 SCC 578
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notice. They, in fact, are beneficiaries of the normalization formula, as
they cleared Tier 1 of the CGLE only by its application. If the
normalization formula were not applied, she submits, that the
th th
candidates who had undertaken the examination on 15 and 16
November would be at a grave disadvantage vis-à-vis those who
th
undertook the examination on 18 November. By its very nature, she
submits that a normalised score could, on occasion, be lower than the
raw score.
25. Ms. Aggarwal submits that the normalization process operated
identically to all candidates, and was not tailored or manipulated to
disadvantage any individual or group. A normalised score is the result
of a statistical transformation based upon the relative performance of
candidates and applicable statistical parametres. The only relevant
issue to be examined, in such a case, is whether the formula was
correctly and uniformly applied. The petitioners, she points out, have
not identified any specific computational error in applying the
normalization formula, or demonstrated that the formula was
selectively applied to any candidate or class of candidates. They,
therefore, have no legally sustainable claim.
D. Analysis
26. The petitioners case, to our mind, is misconceived from its very
inception.
27. Once the petitioners concede that (i) they are not questioning
the legality of the process of normalization or the normalization
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formula itself, and (ii) they are not contending that the formula was
not correctly applied, we fail to see what case remains for them to
argue. If the formula is legally sustainable, and has been correctly
applied, matters must rest, legally, there. No scope remains for judicial
intervention. Indeed, no scope even remains for any further
discussion, by this Court, or this judgment, on the issue in
controversy.
28. If the normalization formula is legally vulnerable to challenge,
the Court can examine the merits of the formula and its legal
sustainability. If the formula is wrongly applied, that by itself would
constitute a complete case for Court to interfere. Mr. Shukla submits,
however, that the petitioners do not question the validity of the
process of normalization or the formula prescribed in that regard, and
that they do not, either, seek to contend that the formula was wrongly
applied.
29. The petitioners challenge has, therefore, to fail even on the basis
of these admissions.
30. Mr. Shukla submits that the grievance of the petitioners is that,
by application of the normalization formula, absurd consequences
have resulted, as the petitioners scores had been severely reduced,
whereas the scores of others, which were otherwise below the
petitioners, had increased. We do not see how this can be a legally
sustainable ground to launch a challenge. If a valid formula is validly
applied, the consequences are not open to judicial scrutiny. If the
consequences are legally unacceptable, that can constitute the basis to
challenge the validity of the formula itself, but the petitioners do not
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choose to do so. It is for this reason that, in our view, the challenge
raised by the petitioners was misconceived from its very inception.
31. Having said that, we do not find any arbitrariness in the
normalization formula itself. The only basis for the petitioners to
allege arbitrariness is the fact that, by application of the formula, their
scores have radically dipped, whereas discourse of the private
respondents have increased above those of the petitioners. This is not
natural, where normalization is undertaken. As Ms. Agarwal correctly
points out, normalization is intended to iron out the creases where an
examination is conducted in multiple shifts, so that candidates who
undertake the examination in a particular shift may be otherwise at an
advantage over those who undertake the examination in other shifts. It
is to equalise these two categories of candidates, which is a
constitutional imperative inherent in Article 14 of the Constitution,
that normalization is undertaken. While the petitioners have not
chosen to dispute the validity of the formula adopted in the SSC notice
dated 7 February 2019 for normalization, any such challenge, even if
it had been raised, would have been bound to fail. Courts are not
experts, who can substitute their subjective view as to the manner in
which normalization is to be undertaken. It is clear, from a glance at
the formula contained in the SSC notice dated 7 February 2019, that it
is complicated and scientifically devised. In applying the formula, the
scores of certain candidates are bound to fall and others to be raised,
which is the whole intent of normalization. It is only thereby that the
creases which develop owing to candidates in different shifts facing
papers with varying levels of difficulty, would be ironed out. That is,
indeed, the very etymological meaning of the word “normalisation”,
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which involves removal and resolution of abnormalities.
32. The petitioners are only 22 in number. The CGLE was
undertaken by over 8 lakh candidates. It goes without saying that, at
the instance of 22 candidates, who are aggrieved at their raw scores
having dipped owing to normalisation, the court cannot interfere.
33. We are also in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that,
having undertaken the CGLE with full knowledge of the manner in
which the marks would be normalised, the petitioners cannot seek to
challenge the normalization procedure, on failing to make the grade.
34. Judicial pronouncements on this proposition are legion, and
reference to a few may suffice.
12
35. In University of Cochin v. N.S. Kanjoonjamma , the
respondent, having failed to secure recruitment, as some of the posts
were reserved exclusively for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,
challenged the adoption, by the Syndicate of the Cochin University, of
Rule 17-A of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules to the
University, by resolution dated 3 December 1980. Inasmuch as the
said adoption was within the knowledge of the respondent at the time
of her participation, the Supreme Court held that, having participated
in the selection, the respondent was “estopped to challenge the
correctness of the procedure”. This principle was reiterated, in
stronger terms, by the Supreme Court in Manish Kumar Shahi v.
12
(1997) 4 SCC 426
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13
State of Bihar , thus, following several earlier authorities:
“16. We also agree with the High Court that after having taken
part in the process of selection knowing fully well that more than
19% marks have been earmarked for viva voce test, the petitioner
is not entitled to challenge the criteria or process of selection.
Surely, if the petitioner's name had appeared in the merit list, he
would not have even dreamed of challenging the selection. The
petitioner invoked jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution of India only after he found that his name does
not figure in the merit list prepared by the Commission. This
conduct of the petitioner clearly disentitles him from questioning
the selection and the High Court did not commit any error by
refusing to entertain the writ petition. Reference in this connection
14
may be made to the judgments in Madan Lal v. State of J&K ,
15
Marripati Nagaraja v. Govt. of A.P. , Dhananjay Malik v. State
16 17
of Uttaranchal , Amlan Jyoti Borooah v. State of Assam and
18
K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines .”
19
36. Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service Commission
enunciated the principle thus, again referring to prior precedents:
“24. When the list of successful candidates in the written
examination was published in such notification itself, it was also
made clear that the knowledge of the candidates with regard to
basic knowledge of computer operation would be tested at the time
of interview for which knowledge of Microsoft Operating System
and Microsoft Office operation would be essential. In the call letter
also which was sent to the appellant at the time of calling him for
interview, the aforesaid criteria was reiterated and spelt out.
Therefore, no minimum benchmark or a new procedure was ever
introduced during the midstream of the selection process. All the
candidates knew the requirements of the selection process and
were also fully aware that they must possess the basic knowledge
of computer operation meaning thereby Microsoft Operating
System and Microsoft Office operation. Knowing the said criteria,
the appellant also appeared in the interview, faced the questions
from the expert of computer application and has taken a chance
and opportunity therein without any protest at any stage and now
13
(2010) 12 SCC 576
14
(1995) 3 SCC 486
15
(2007) 11 SCC 522
16
(2008) 4 SCC 171
17
(2009) 3 SCC 227
18
(2009) 5 SCC 515
19
(2011) 1 SCC 150
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cannot turn back to state that the aforesaid procedure adopted was
wrong and without jurisdiction.
25. In this connection, we may refer to the decision of the
20
Supreme Court in G. Sarana (Dr.) v. University of Lucknow
wherein also a similar stand was taken by a candidate and in that
context the Supreme Court had declared that the candidate who
participated in the selection process cannot challenge the validity
of the said selection process after appearing in the said selection
process and taking opportunity of being selected. Para 15 inter alia
reads thus:
“15. … He seems to have voluntarily appeared before the
committee and taken a chance of having a favourable
recommendation from it. Having done so, it is not now
open to him to turn round and question the constitution of
the committee.”
21
26. In P.S. Gopinathan v. State of Kerala [(2008) 7 SCC 70]
this Court relying on the above principle held thus:
“44. … Apart from the fact that the appellant accepted his
posting orders without any demur in that capacity, his
subsequent order of appointment dated 15-7-1992 issued by
the Governor had not been challenged by the appellant.
Once he chose to join the mainstream on the basis of option
given to him, he cannot turn back and challenge the
conditions. He could have opted not to join at all but he did
not do so. Now it does not lie in his mouth to clamour
regarding the cut-off date or for that matter any other
condition. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion,
rightly held that the appellant is estopped and precluded
from questioning the said order dated 14-1-1992. The
application of principles of estoppel, waiver and
acquiescence has been considered by us in many cases, one
of them being G. Sarana (Dr.) v. University of Lucknow
.. .”
22
27. In Union of India v. S. Vinodh Kumar in SCC at para 18
it was held that:
“18. … It is also well settled that those candidates who had
taken part in the selection process knowing fully well the
procedure laid down therein were not entitled to question
the same.”
20
(1976) 3 SCC 585
21
(2008) 7 SCC 70
22
(2007) 8 SCC 100
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23
28. Besides, in K.H. Siraj v. High Court of Kerala in SCC
paras 72 and 74 it was held that the candidates who participated in
the interview with knowledge that for selection they had to secure
prescribed minimum marks on being unsuccessful in interview
could not turn around and challenge that the said provision of
minimum marks was improper, said challenge is liable to be
dismissed on the ground of estoppel.”
24
37. Ashok Kumar v. State of Bihar expressed the principle thus
(eschewing the extracts already reproduced earlier):
“12. The appellants participated in the fresh process of selection.
If the appellants were aggrieved by the decision to hold a fresh
process, they did not espouse their remedy. Instead, they
participated in the fresh process of selection and it was only upon
being unsuccessful that they challenged the result in the writ
petition. This was clearly not open to the appellants. The principle
of estoppel would operate.
13. The law on the subject has been crystallised in several
decisions of this Court. In Chandra Prakash Tiwari v. Shakuntala
25
Shukla , this Court laid down the principle that when a candidate
appears at an examination without objection and is subsequently
found to be not successful, a challenge to the process is precluded.
The question of entertaining a petition challenging an examination
would not arise where a candidate has appeared and participated.
He or she cannot subsequently turn around and contend that the
process was unfair or that there was a lacuna therein, merely
because the result is not palatable. In Union of India v. S. Vinodh
Kumar , this Court held that:
“18. It is also well settled that those candidates who had
taken part in the selection process knowing fully well the
procedure laid down therein were not entitled to question
26
the same. (See Munindra Kumar v. Rajiv Govil and
27
Rashmi Mishra v. M.P. Public Service Commission .”
28
14. The same view was reiterated in Amlan Jyoti Borooah
wherein it was held to be well settled that the candidates who have
23
(2006) 6 SCC 395
24
(2017) 4 SCC 357
25
(2002) 6 SCC 127
26
(1991) 3 SCC 368
27
(2006) 12 SCC 724
28
Amlan Jyoti Borooah v. State of Assam , (2009) 3 SCC 227
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taken part in a selection process knowing fully well the procedure
laid down therein are not entitled to question it upon being
declared to be unsuccessful.
15. In Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar , the same
principle was reiterated in the following observations:
*
16. In Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service Commission ,
candidates who had participated in the selection process were
aware that they were required to possess certain specific
qualifications in computer operations. The appellants had appeared
in the selection process and after participating in the interview
sought to challenge the selection process as being without
jurisdiction. This was held to be impermissible.
29
17. In Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil Joshi , candidates who
were competing for the post of Physiotherapist in the State of
Uttarakhand participated in a written examination held in
pursuance of an advertisement. This Court held that if they had
cleared the test, the respondents would not have raised any
objection to the selection process or to the methodology adopted.
Having taken a chance of selection, it was held that the
respondents were disentitled to seek relief under Article 226 and
would be deemed to have waived their right to challenge the
advertisement or the procedure of selection. This Court held that:
“18. It is settled law that a person who consciously takes
part in the process of selection cannot, thereafter, turn
around and question the method of selection and its
outcome.”
30
18. In Chandigarh Admn. v. Jasmine Kaur , it was held that
a candidate who takes a calculated risk or chance by subjecting
himself or herself to the selection process cannot turn around and
complain that the process of selection was unfair after knowing of
his or her non-selection. In Pradeep Kumar Rai v. Dinesh Kumar
31
Pandey , this Court held that:
“17. Moreover, we would concur with the Division
Bench on one more point that the appellants had
participated in the process of interview and not challenged
it till the results were declared. There was a gap of almost
four months between the interview and declaration of
29
(2013) 11 SCC 309
30
(2014) 10 SCC 521
31
(2015) 11 SCC 493
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result. However, the appellants did not challenge it at that
time. This, it appears that only when the appellants found
themselves to be unsuccessful, they challenged the
interview. This cannot be allowed. The candidates cannot
approbate and reprobate at the same time. Either the
candidates should not have participated in the interview and
challenged the procedure or they should have challenged
immediately after the interviews were conducted.”
This principle has been reiterated in a recent judgment in Madras
32
Institute of Development Studies v. K. Sivasubramaniyan .
33
20. The decision in Raj Kumar v. Shakti Raj (which was
relied upon by the appellants) involved a case where the
Government was found to have committed glaring illegalities in
the procedure. Hence, it was held that the principle of estoppel by
conduct or acquiescence had no application. The decision is
distinguishable.
21. In this view of the matter, the Division Bench cannot held
to be in error in coming to the conclusion that it was not open to
the appellants after participating in the selection process to
question the result, once they were declared to be unsuccessful.
During the course of the hearing, this Court is informed that four
out of six candidates, who were ultimately selected, figured both in
the first process of selection as well as in the subsequent selection.
One candidate is stated to have retired.”
34
38. Anupal Singh v. State of U.P. exposited the same principle in
the following words:
“55. Having participated in the interview, the private
respondents cannot challenge the Office Memorandum dated 12-
10-2014 and the selection . On behalf of the appellants, it was
contended that after the revised Notification dated 12-10-2014, the
private respondents participated in the interview without protest
and only after the result was announced and finding that they were
not selected, the private respondents chose to challenge the revised
Notification dated 12-10-2014 and the private respondents are
estopped from challenging the selection process. It is a settled law
that a person having consciously participated in the interview
cannot turn around and challenge the selection process.”
32
(2016) 1 SCC 454
33
(1997) 9 SCC 527
34
(2020) 2 SCC 173
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(Emphasis in the original text)
39. Where the eligibility criteria are unfairly changed subsequent to
commencement of the selection process , needless to say, no principle
of estoppel would apply, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Nitesh
35
Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P.
36
40. In Ramjit Singh Kardam v. Sanjeev Kumar , the following
issues were identified by the Supreme Court as arising before it for
consideration, among others:
“33.1. Whether the respondent writ petitioners who had
participated in the selection were estopped from challenging the
selection in the facts of the present case?
33.2. Whether the respondent writ petitioners could have
challenged the criteria of selection applied by the Commission for
selection after they had participated in the selection?”
These 2 issues were addressed together, by the Supreme Court, thus:
“38. The learned counsel for the appellant at the very outset
contended that the writ petitions filed by the respondent
challenging the select list dated 10-4-2001 ought not to have been
entertained by the High Court since the respondent having
participated in the selection without any demur or protest, they are
estopped from challenging the selection. The submission is refuted
by the respondent contending that the above principle of estoppel
is not applicable in the facts of the present case. The petitioner
being not even aware of the criteria, which was to be applied for
selection, which they came to know only after select list was
published, there was no occasion to make any challenge by the
respondents before the above date.
39. The proposition that a candidate, who participates in a
selection without a demur taking a calculated chance to get
35
(2020) 4 SCC 70
36
(2020) 20 SCC 209
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selected cannot turn around and challenge the criteria of selection
and the constitution of the selection committee is well settled. The
appellants have placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in
Madan Lal v. State of J & K ; K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines ;
Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar ; Madras Institute of
Development Studies v. K. Sivasubramaniyan and Ashok Kumar
v. State of Bihar .
40. In Madan Lal , this Court laid down the following in para 9:
“9. … It is now well settled that if a candidate takes a
calculated chance and appears at the interview, then, only
because the result of the interview is not palatable to him,
he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the
process of interview was unfair or the Selection Committee
was not properly constituted. In Om Prakash Shukla v.
Akhilesh Kumar Shukla , it has been clearly laid down by a
Bench of three learned Judges of this Court that when the
petitioner appeared at the examination without protest and
when he found that he would not succeed in examination he
filed a petition challenging the said examination, the High
Court should not have granted any relief to such a
petitioner.”
41. The above proposition has been reiterated in other
judgments of this Court noted above. In the present case, whether
the respondent-writ petitioners are estopped from challenging the
selection? While noticing the facts of the case, we have noted
above that both the appellants and the respondents had submitted
applications in pursuance of Advertisement dated 28-7-2006 No.
6/2006. In the advertisement, it was provided that the Commission
may shortlist the candidates for interview by holding a written
examination or on the basis of a rational criteria to be adopted by
the Commission. The Commission on 28-12-2006 published the
criteria for calling the candidates for interview. Notice dated 28-
12-2006 provided that written examination shall be held for post of
PTI on 21-1-2007, on 100 objective type multiple-choice
questions, each question carrying two marks. The notification also
prescribed the minimum qualifying marks— 50% for General
category, SC, BC and ESM 45% and 25% marks was assigned to
the viva voce. The above criteria was implemented and written
examination was conducted on 21-1-2007, which examination was
cancelled citing complaints regarding malpractices in the written
examination.
42. Further notice dated 11-6-2008 was published fixing 20-7-
2008 for written examination as per criteria earlier notified. Before
the above examination could take place, by public notice dated 30-
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6-2008, it was cancelled. Another public notice dated 11-7-2008
was published where the Commission decided to shortlist eight
times the candidates of the advertised post with minimum
weightage secured in each category. The said shortlisting was also
given up by notice dated 31-7-2009 when it was decided to call all
eligible candidates for interview. The Commission did not publish
any criteria or marks on the basis of which interview was to be
held. The criteria, which was published by the Commission on 28-
12-2006, 11-6-2008 and 11-7-2008 were given up step by step and
no criteria was published for interview, which was scheduled to
take place from 2-9-2008 to 17-10-2008 . When the Commission
had not published any criteria on the basis of which candidates
were going to be subjected for selection process and the
candidates participated in the selection without knowing the
criteria of selection, they cannot be shut out from challenging the
process of selection when ultimately they came to know that the
Commission step by step has diluted the merit in selection. When
the candidate is not aware of the criteria of selection under which
he was subjected in the process and the said criteria for the first
time is published along with final result dated 10-4-2010, he
cannot be estopped from challenging the criteria of selection and
the entire process of selection. Further when the written
examination as notified earlier was scrapped and every eligible
candidate was called for interview giving a go-bye to a fair and
reasonable process for shortlisting the candidates for interview,
that too only by the Chairman of the Commission whereas decision
regarding criteria of selection has to be taken by the Commission,
the candidates have every right to challenge the entire selection
process so conducted. This Court in Raj Kumar v. Shakti Raj held
that when glaring illegalities have been committed in the procedure
to get the candidates for examination, the principle of estoppel by
conduct or acquiescence has no application.
43. Referring to the judgment of this Court's judgment in
Madan Lal , this Court laid down the following in para 16: ( Raj
Kumar )
“16. … The entire procedure is also obviously illegal. It is
true, as contended by Shri Madhava Reddy, that this Court
in Madan Lal v. State of J & K and other decisions
referred therein had held that a candidate having taken a
chance to appear in an interview and having remained
unsuccessful, cannot turn round and challenge either the
constitution of the Selection Board or the method of
selection as being illegal; he is estopped to question the
correctness of the selection. But in his case, the
Government have committed glaring illegalities in the
procedure to get the candidates for examination under the
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1955 Rules, so also in the method of selection and exercise
of the power in taking out from the purview of the Board
and also conduct of the selection in accordance with the
Rules. Therefore, the principle of estoppel by conduct or
acquiescence has no application to the facts in this case.
Thus, we consider that the procedure offered under the
1955 Rules adopted by the Government or the Committee
as well as the action taken by the Government are not
correct in law.”
44. One more judgment of this Court which supports the view
37
taken by the High Court is Bishnu Biswas v. Union of India . An
advertisement was published calling applications for appointment
to the post of Group D staff. The Recruitment Rules only provided
for a written examination having 50 maximum marks. After
holding written examination notice was issued calling the
successful candidates for interview. Although such interview was
not part of the recruitment process, a select list was published
which was challenged in the Tribunal. The Tribunal returned a
finding that the manner in which marks have been awarded in the
interview to the candidates indicated lack of transparency. The
High Court upheld the reasoning of the Tribunal but modified the
order to the extent of continuing the recruitment process from the
point it stood vitiated. This Court laid down the following in paras
19 and 20:
“19. In the instant case, the rules of the game had been
changed after conducting the written test and admittedly
not at the stage of initiation of the selection process . The
marks allocated for the oral interview had been the same as
for written test i.e. 50% for each. The manner in which
marks have been awarded in the interview to the candidates
indicated lack of transparency. The candidate who secured
47 marks out of 50 in the written test had been given only
20 marks in the interview while a large number of
candidates got equal marks in the interview as in the
written examination. Candidate who secured 34 marks in
the written examination was given 45 marks in the
interview. Similarly, another candidate who secured 36
marks in the written examination was awarded 45 marks in
the interview. The fact that today the so-called selected
candidates are not in employment, is also a relevant factor
to decide the case finally. If the whole selection is scrapped
most of the candidates would be ineligible at least in
respect of age as the advertisement was issued more than
six years ago.
37
(2014) 5 SCC 774
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20. Thus, in the facts of this case the direction of the
High Court to continue with the selection process from the
point it stood vitiated does not require interference. In view
of the above, the appeals are devoid of merit and are
accordingly dismissed. No costs.”
45. The Division Bench of the High Court is right in its
conclusion that the selection criteria, which saw the light of the
day along with declaration of the selection result could be assailed
by the unsuccessful candidates only after it was published.
Similarly, selection process which was notified was never followed
and the selection criteria which was followed was never notified
till the declaration of final result, hence, the writ petitioners cannot
be estopped from challenging the selection. We, thus, hold that the
writ petitions filed by the petitioners could not have been thrown
on the ground of estoppel and the writ petitioners could very well
challenge the criteria of selection applied by the Commission,
which was declared by the Commission only at the time of
declaration of the final result. We, thus, answer Points 1 and 2 as
follows:
45.1. The writ petitioners, who had participated in the selection
are not estopped from challenging the selection in the facts of the
present case.
45.2. The writ petitioners could have very well challenged the
criteria of selection, which was declared by the Commission only
in the final result declared on 10-4-2010.”
Where, therefore, the illegality in the selection process became known
to the candidate only after the selection had commenced, for the
reason that it had not been notified or published earlier, there can be
no question of applying the principle of estoppel or for closing the
candidate from contesting the legality of the selection. The principle
of estoppel cannot, therefore, be invoked against the candidate in the
face of opacity on the part of the selecting authority. Estoppel
presumes knowledge, and lack of knowledge, especially if attributable
to the act or omission of the opposite party, defeats the plea of
estoppel.
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38
41. Rajasthan High Court v. Rajat Yadav , while recognising the
position that the principle of estoppel, as operating against a candidate
who, after participating in the selection process unsuccessfully, seeks
to challenge the process itself, is not absolute, crystallised the
applicable legal position thus:
“42. There is a long line of decisions of this Court that
candidates who participated in a selection process cannot later
challenge the procedure adopted merely because the result is not
palatable to them. It has been held there, generally, that the
principle of estoppel operates against such a candidate who, having
taken a calculated chance of selection by participating in the
selection process and failed to secure selection, challenges the
process of selection in Court on the ground of a flawed procedure
being adopted by the recruiting/selecting authority. Profitable
reference may be made to some of the decisions of this Court, viz.
G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow , Om Prakash Shukla v.
Akhilesh Kumar Shukla , Madan Lal v. State of Jammu &
Kashmir , K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines , Manish Kumar
Shahi v. State of Bihar , Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil Joshi and
Ramjit Singh Kardam v. Sanjeev Kumar .
43. However, this rule is not absolute. As elucidated in Meeta
39
Sahai v. State of Bihar , participation of a candidate in a
selection process implies acceptance of the prescribed procedure,
but not of any illegality in the conduct of the said procedure or
constitutional infirmity underlying it. Where the challenge pertains
to a misconstruction of statutory rules or violation of constitutional
principles, the plea of estoppel cannot operate as a bar.
44. This distinction was earlier recognised by a Bench of three
Judges in Raj Kumar v. Shakti Raj , where despite participation,
the Court held that glaring illegalities in the process rendered
estoppel inapplicable.
45. Having considered the precedents in the field, to our mind,
a candidate would be estopped from challenging a selection
process post-participation, unless he can show that despite due
diligence, he could not have known earlier of the illegality in the
38
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2931
39
(2019) 20 SCC 17
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procedure that came to be adopted or that the procedural flaw
striking at the root of the selection process was hidden and
surfaced only after completion of the process of selection; hence,
no challenge could have been laid by him prior to his participation
in the process.
46. In the present case, the advertisement was a representation
to the aspirants for public employment that category-wise lists
would be prepared. None would question such a condition. There
was, however, no indication that meritorious reserved category
candidates would not be treated as General/Open category
candidates even if they outscore the latter. The illegality lies in the
action of the appellants in not treating the meritorious reserved
category candidates as General/Open category candidates, despite
noticing that the former had outperformed and outshone the latter.
Since the petitioning candidates could not have possibly visualised
such an approach on the part of the recruiters by projecting their
own imagination and discover all facts and circumstances that
might be in their contemplation to be adopted while drawing up the
merit lists at the time they participated in the preliminary written
examination, the question of such candidates being estopped from
mounting a challenge to the legality of the process does not and
cannot arise. The petitioning candidates paid a price for their
merit and having challenged the very legality of the process
alleging violation of constitutional norms and legal principles, the
plea of estoppel could not have defeated such a challenge .”
(Emphasis supplied)
This decision is significant, as it notes and explains the earlier
judgment of the Supreme Court in Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar ,
which is often cited to counter the plea of estoppel, raised against the
petitioning candidate. The Supreme Court has, after noticing Meeta
Sahai , nonetheless proceeded to hold that “a candidate would be
estopped from challenging a selection process post-participation,
unless he can show that despite due diligence, he could not have
known earlier of the illegality in the procedure that came to be
adopted or that the procedural flaw striking at the root of the selection
process was hidden and surfaced only after completion of the process
of selection; hence, no challenge could have been laid by him prior to
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his participation in the process”. Noting that, in the facts before it, the
respondent was not aware of the illegality in the manner in which the
merit list was drawn up, till it was actually drawn up and published,
the Supreme Court held the challenge not to be hit by the principle of
estoppel. Clairvoyance, simply put, cannot be expected of the
candidate.
42. In sum and substance, therefore, the principle of estoppel
strictly operates against a candidate who, with full knowledge of the
clause or condition which he later seeks to challenge, participates in
the selection process and does not succeed. As observed by the
Supreme Court, the grievance of such a candidate is not really against
clause or condition which he assails, but with the fact that he could not
succeed in the selection. If he had succeeded, there would be no
question of the candidate raising any such challenge. The challenge is,
therefore, iniquitous and unfair ab initio .
43. Meeta Sahai , it is also important to note, disapproves of the
application of the principle of estoppel in a case in which “the
challenge pertains to a misconstruction of statutory rules or violation
of constitutional principles”. In other words, if the rule, despite having
been in existence at the time of commencement of the selection, is
misconstrued or misapplied by the selecting authority, the candidate
would always be within his right in challenging the manner in which
the rule was applied.
44. This position is especially significant in the facts of the case
before us, as the petitioners do not question either the legality of
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Clause 11.3 of the examination notice or of the normalization formula,
and do not allege that the formula was misapplied or misconstrued,
but are aggrieved by the result of applying the formula. Such a
challenge would squarely be hit by the principle of estoppel. A
candidate who is aware of the rule has also to be deemed to be aware
of the outcome, when the rule is applied.
45. The most recent decision which applies the principle of estoppel
40
is, perhaps, Manoj Goyal v. Rajasthan High Court , which holds:
“20. Moreover, the appellant's entire claim is barred by the
doctrine of estoppel. It is a well-settled proposition of service
jurisprudence that a candidate who participates in a selection
process with full knowledge of the prevailing rules, takes a
calculated chance, and appears for the interview, cannot be
permitted to turn around and assail the rules upon finding his name
absent from the successful list. The appellant participated in the
written examination and the interview under the amended 2011
Rules with his eyes wide open. Having failed to secure the
qualifying marks, he cannot now approbate and reprobate.”
The Supreme Court has, in this decision, again relied on its earlier
pronouncements in Om Prakash Shukla , Madan Lal and Dhananjay
Malik .
The Sequitur
46. The claim of the petitioners before the Tribunal, as well as
before us is, therefore, unsustainable on merits as well as by applying
the principle of estoppel. On merits,
(i) the selection process was conducted by the Staff
40
2026 SCC OnLine SC 1329
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Selection Commission, to whom no mala fides have been
attributed,
(ii) the petitioners have specifically averred, both before the
Tribunal as well as before this Court, that they have no
objection to the application of normalization formula proposed
in the examination notice per se ,
(iii) the petitioners do not contend that the normalization
formula was wrongly applied by the respondents,
(iv) the petitioners do not dispute the finding of the Tribunal
that the petitioners had themselves cleared the Tier-1
examination after applying the same normalization formula, and
(v) even otherwise, there is no inherent illegality either in the
normalization formula or its application, which was applied
across the Board to all candidates,
we are of the view that the petitioners had in fact no sustainable cause
of action before the Tribunal.
47. We have also noticed para 19 of the writ petition, in which the
petitioners have sought to submit that the respondents’ “applied
normalization in an absurd and arbitrary manner”, on which Mr.
Shukla emphasized.
48. This averment, to our mind, makes no legal sense.
49. It is not the petitioners’ case that the respondents did not apply
the normalization formula as envisaged in the examination notice. If
the normalization formula was properly applied as envisaged in the
examination notice, there can be no question of the application being
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absurd and arbitrary.
50. Clearly, the petitioners are aggrieved only because, by
application of the normalization they have not been able to secure
selection.
51. We, therefore, find no error in the impugned judgment passed
by the Tribunal.
52. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed, with no orders as to
costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
NIVEDITA ANIL SHARMA, J.
OCTOBER 27, 2026 /dsn/aky
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