Mayank Agrawal S/O Umashankar Agrawal Through Special Power Of Attorney Shri Umashakar Agrawal S/O Lt Shri Kalyan Sahay Agrawal vs Roshni Mittal

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:29507
1 MP-6324-2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANDEEP N. BHATT
th
ON THE 16 OF OCTOBER, 2026
MISC. PETITION No. 6324 of 2026
CNR No.: MPHC020407292026
MAYANK AGRAWAL S/O UMASHANKAR AGRAWAL THROUGH
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY SHRI UMASHAKAR AGRAWAL
S/O LT SHRI KALYAN SAHAY AGRAWAL
Versus
ROSHNI MITTAL
Appearance:
Shri Abhinav Dhanodkar - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Shyam Singh Thakur advocate for respondent.
ORDER
The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution has been
filed by petitioner praying for the following reliefs:
i) Direct the Ld. Family Court, Indore, Madhya Pradesh, to
consider and decide the application filed by the Petitioner and
Respondent under Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955 seeking waiver of the cooling-off period on an early date and
in accordance with law;
(ii) Direct the Ld. Family Court, Indore, Madhya Pradesh, to
permit the Petitioner-husband to further participate in the
proceedings through Video Conferencing on or before obtaining
the decree of divorce, subject to such terms and conditions as may
be deemed appropriate;
(iii) Pass any other order or grant any other relief which this
Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner and the
respondent have jointly filed an application u/S 13B of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955 for divorce by mutual consent. After hearing the case, the trial
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHUNESHWAR
DATT
Signing time: 16-10-2026
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:29507
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Court had fixed the case for 07/09/2026 i.e. after six months to give cooling

period to the parties as per Section 13B(2) of the HMA. The petitioner had
filed an application seeking waiver of the aforesaid cooling period and to
decide the case after taking the evidence of both the parties. However, the
said application has not been decided by the trial Court. Therefore, the
present petition has been filed.
3. Learned counsel has further relied upon the order dated
24/07/2025 passed in M.P. no. 3313/2025 as also the order dated 04/08/2026
passed by this Court in M.P. No.4144/2026 in similar set of facts wherein
cooling period was waived off by allowing the petition and therefore, the
present petition may also be allowed in the light of the said order.
4. I have considered the submissions made by the parties and
perused the record.
5. Considering the submission that the issue involved in the present
petition is squarely covered by the order dated 04/08/2026 passed in M.P.
No.4144/2026, relevant paragraphs of the order are required to be
reproduced for convenience and reference, which are as under:
"3. It is pleaded by referring to section 13(B)(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act,
which reads as under :
13(B)(1). Divorce by mutual consent.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a
petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the
district court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was
solemnized before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment)
Act, 1976 (68 of 1976), on the ground that they have been living separately for a
period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that
they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.
4. It is also pointed out that in view of the judgments delivered by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Amit Kumar Vs. Suman Beniwal [ Civil Appeal
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHUNESHWAR
DATT
Signing time: 16-10-2026
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:29507
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no. 7650 of 2021 decided on 11/12/2021] and Amardeep Singh Vs. Harveen

Kaur reported in VI (2017) SLT, 921 as also, the judgment dated 17/12/2025
delivered by High Court of Delhi in the case of Shiksha Kumari Vs. Santosh
Kumar , now the law is very settled. For the sake of reference, relevant
observations made in para nos. 16, 17, 18, 22, 23 of Amardeep Singh's case
(supra), are reproduced as under :
16. The object of the provision is to enable the parties to dissolve a marriage by
consent if the marriage has irretrievably broken down and to enable them to
rehabilitate them as per available options. The amendment was inspired by the
thought that forcible perpetuation of status of matrimony between unwilling
partners did not serve any purpose. The object of the cooling off the period
was to safeguard against a hurried decision if there was otherwise possibility of
differences being reconciled. The object was not to perpetuate a purposeless
marriage or to prolong the agony of the parties when there was no chance of
reconciliation. Though every effort has to be made to save a marriage, if there
are no chances of reunion and there are chances of fresh rehabilitation, the
Court should not be powerless in enabling the parties to have a better option.
17. In determining the question whether provision is mandatory or directory,
language alone is not always decisive. The Court has to have the regard to the
context, the subject matter and the object of the provision. This principle, as
formulated in Justice G.P. Singh’s “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” (9th
Edn., 2004), has been cited with approval in Kailash versus Nanhku and
ors.15as follows:
15 (2005) 4 SCC 480 ​ “The study of numerous cases on this topic does not lead
to formulation of any universal rule except this that language alone most often
is not decisive, and regard must be had to the context, subject-matter and object
of the statutory provision in question, in determining whether the same is
mandatory or directory. In an oft-quoted passage Lord Campbell said: ‘No
universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory enactments shall be
considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for
disobedience. It is the duty of courts of justice to try to get at the real intention
of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be
considered.’ “ ‘For ascertaining the real intention of the legislature’, points out
Subbarao, J. ‘the court may consider inter alia, the nature and design of the
statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one
way or the other; the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of
complying with the provisions in question is avoided; the circumstances,
namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with
the provisions; the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not
visited by some penalty; the serious or the trivial consequences, that flow
therefrom; and above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated
or furthered’. If object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same
directory, it will be construed as mandatory, whereas if by holding it
mandatory serious general inconvenience will be created to innocent persons
without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same will be
construed as directory.”
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHUNESHWAR
DATT
Signing time: 16-10-2026
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NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:29507
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18. Applying the above to the present situation, we are of the view that where
the Court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is made out to waive the
statutory period under Section 13B(2) , it can do so after considering the
following :
i) the statutory period of six months specified in
ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of
iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including alimony,
custody of child or any other pending issues between the parties;
iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony.
22. Needless to say that in conducting such proceedings the Court can also use
the medium of video conferencing and also permit genuine representation of
the parties through close relations such as parents or siblings where the parties
are unable to appear in person for any just and valid reason as may satisfy the
Court, to advance the interest of justice.
23. The parties are now at liberty to move the concerned court for fresh
consideration in the light of this order.
5. It is also relevant to reproduce the observations made in para nos. 20 and

21 of Amit Kumar 's case (supra),
20. Since we are of the view that the period mentioned in Section 13 B(2) is not
mandatory but directory, it will be open to the court to exercise its discretion in
the facts and circumstances of each case where there is no possibility of parties
resuming cohabitation and there are chances of alternative rehabilitation.”
20. The factors mentioned in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (supra), in
Paragraph 19 are illustrative and not exhaustive. These are factors which the
Court is obliged to take note of. If all the four conditions mentioned above are
fulfilled, the Court would necessarily have to exercise its discretion to waive
the statutory waiting period under Section 13B (2) of the Marriage Act.
21. The Family Court, as well as the High Court, have misconstrued the
judgment of this Court in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (supra) and
proceeded on the basis that this Court has held that the conditions specified in
paragraph 19 of the said judgment , quoted hereinabove, are mandatory and that
the statutory waiting period of six months under Section 13B (2) can only be
waived if all the aforesaid conditions are fulfilled, including, in particular, the
condition of separation of at least one and half year before making the motion
for decree of divorce.
6. In view of this, prima-facie, the observations made by learned Family
Court, while deciding the application for waiving off cooling period, is based
on the earlier law and without considering the subsequent decisions, which are
now available on that issue. Therefore, the impugned order is quashed by
remanding back the matter to learned Family Court to decide the application by
keeping in mind the above mentioned three judgments, as expeditiously as
possible preferably within 15 days from the date of receipt certified copy of
this order.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHUNESHWAR
DATT
Signing time: 16-10-2026
19:02:02

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:29507
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7. With the aforesaid direction, present petition is disposed of."

6. Since the issue involved in the present petition is also regarding
waiver of cooling period as parties are residing separately as in the matter
relied upon by the counsel for petitioner, the petition is required to be
allowed.
7. Accordingly, the petition is disposed off with a direction to the
learned Family Court to decide the application by keeping in mind the
judgments referred in similar order dated 04/08/2026 passed in M.P. No.
4144/2026 as expeditiously, as possible, preferably within a period of 15
days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. The learned trial
Court can also use the medium of video conferencing while conducting such
proceedings as observed in para 22 of the above judgment in case of
Amardeep Singh (supra) since it is stated that petitioner resides abroad.
8. With the aforesaid direction, petition stands disposed off.
(SANDEEP N. BHATT)
JUDGE
BDJ

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: BHUNESHWAR
DATT
Signing time: 16-10-2026
19:02:02