Lal Behari And Others vs The State

Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:80149-DB
Reserved on 17.09.2026
Delivered on 05.11.2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 372 of 1982
Lal Behari and others
…..Appellant(s)
Versus
The State
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : S.N. Bhattacharya, Aishwarya
Mishra, Alok Singh, Arnnav Prakash
Tikku, Md. Altaf Mansoor, Meena
Pandey, Nandita Bharti, Rekha
Pandey, Rishad Murtaza
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Govt.advocate,
Court No. - 11
HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.
HON'BLE PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
1. Heard Sri Rishad Murtaza, assisted by Ms. Mandita Bharti, Ms.
Aishwarya Mishra and Sri Arnnav Prakash Tikku, learned counsel for
the appellants no. 5, 8 and 12 and Sri Pawan Kumar Mishra, learned
AGA for State.
2. The present appeal under Section 374 (2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code (herein after referred to as “CrPC” has been preferred
by the appellants Lal Behari, Mata Prasad, Mahesh Prasad alias

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CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
Maheshwar Prasad, Hari Narain, Ram Shiromani, Kalu Ram, Chandra
Shekher, Chandra Bhawan, Swayambar, Smt Kaushilya, Smt Maharani
Devi and Smt Gyana Devi against the judgment and order dated
30.04.1982 passed by learned Session Judge, Pratapgarh, in S.T. No. 138
of 1978 whereby the appellant No.1- Lal Behari was convicted and
sentenced under Section 302 of IPC for life imprisonment, under Section
148 of I.P.C. for 18 months rigorous imprisonment, under Section 324 of
I.P.C. for 18 months rigorous imprisonment and under Section 323 of
I.P.C. for six months rigorous imprisonment.
The appellant No.2-Mata Prasad, appellant No.3-Maheshwar
Prasad, appellant No.4-Hari Narain, appellant No.5-Ram Shiroman,
appellant No.6-Kallu Ram, appellant No.7-Chandra Shekhar, appellant
No.8-Chandra Bhawan and appellant No.9-Swayambar were convicted
and sentenced under Section 302 read with Section 149 I.P.C. for life
imprisonment, under Section 324 read with Section 149 I.P.C. for 18
months rigorous imprisonment, under Section 147 of I.PC. for one year
rigorous imprisonment, under Section 323 of I.P.C. for six months
rigorous imprisonment.
The appellant No.10-Smt Kashilya, appellant No.11-Smt
Maharani Devi and appellant No.12-Smt Gyan Devi were convicted and
sentenced to a fine of Rs. 200/- for the offence under Section 323 of
I.P.C. with one month’s rigorous imprisonment for default of fine.
3. The prosecution case in brief as alleged in the F.I.R. lodged by
Rameshwar is that litigation has been going on between him and accused
Maheshwar Prasad, Kallu Ram about land and that accused parsons were
bearing i11-will and enmity against the complainant and his family and
that threats were held out frequently from the side of the accused persons
and that on 8-4-77 at about 3-3.15 P.M. when he was working on his
tube-well all the nine accused (other than the three lady accused) came
on the tube-well, accused Lal Behari armed with ballam while the rest
carrying lathis and that accused Maheshwar Prasad gave a call to the
other accused to kill the complainant and thereupon all the accused
rushed upon the complainant, he raised alarm which attracted witnesses,

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CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
his son Kuldeep was standing at the door-step of his house, that the
complainant raising alarm rushed towards his house and that the
members of his family also came out of the house in order to save the
complainant. It is alleged that the accused persons surrounded the
complainant and started beating him with ballam and lathis and that the
lady accused also came out and started throwing brick bats. The
allegation further is that when Kuldeep son of the complainant rushed
forward with his lathi to save the complainant, Lal Behari gave a ballam
blow at the chest of Kuldeep and that accused Hari Narain also gave a
lathi blow to Kuldeep and as a result of the ballam and lathi injuries, he
fell down at the spot. When Lal Behari tried to inflict the second ballam
blow, the complainant and the ladies of the complainant's house
managed to get hold of the ballam. The complainant and the ladies of the
house of the complainant used lathi, brick bats in their self defence
which caused some injuries on the accused side. When the witnesses
who had arrived and witnessed the incident raised alarm, the accused
persons ran away. According to the prosecution, injured Kuldeep was
brough on cot by the complainant, his son Samarjit, Prakash, Ram
Adhin, Ram Kishore and Shiv Murari to the police Station but on the
way Kuldeep died.
4. On the basis of written information given by the informant, First
Information Report (herein after referred to as ‘FIR”) against accused
persons.
5. During the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer
examined the complainant and sent him as also his son Samarjit to the
Public Health Centre, Sandwa Chandrika, where Dr. D.P.Singh (PW-8)
examined the injuries of Ram Sahodar and Samarjit. The Investigating
Officer recorded the statement of Sankatha Prasad and other witnesses,
made inspection of the place of occurrence, prepared a site-plan. The
dead body of the deceased Kuldeep was sent for post-mortem along with
necessary papers and after concluding the investigation, the Investigating
Officer filed the charge-sheet against the accused persons.

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CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
6. After compliance of mandatory provision, the trial Court framed
charge against appellant-convict Lal Behari under Sections 147, 302,
324 and 323/149 and 325/149 I.P.C. Accused-convict Hari Narain under
Section 147, 302/149, 323, 324/149 and 325/149 I.P.C. and accused
Maheswar Prasad, Mata Prasad, Ram Shiromani, Chandra Sheikhar,
Chandra Bhawan and Swaymbar under Section 147, 302/149, 323/149,
324/149 and 325/149 I.P.C. and accused-convict Smt Kaushilya, Smt
Mahrani and Smt Gayana Devi under Section 323 I.P.C. The charges
were read over and explained to the accused person, who pleaded not
guilty and claimed to be tried.
7. To establish its case, the prosecution examined fourteen witnesses
Ram Sahodar @ Rameshwar Prasad PW-1, Samarjeet Pandey PW-2,
Sarju Prasad Dwivedi PW-3, Onkar Nath Shukla PW-4, Mahesh Lal
Mathuria PW-5, R.K. Purohit PW-6, Dr. R.K.Jain PW-7, Dr. D.P.Singh
PW-8, Sri Ved Prakash Singh PW-9, Sri Ganesh Prasad Sharma PW-10,
Hasan Raja PW-11, Head Constable Ghanshyam Tripathi PW-12,
Rameshwar Baksh Singh PW-13 and Panna Lal Srivastava PW-14.
8. Upon closure of the prosecution evidence, statements of the
accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.. The
accused persons denied the allegations leveled against them and said that
they had been wrongly implicated in the case due to enmity. Accused
Maheshwari stated that on the day of the incident he had gone to
Pratapgarh. Accused Hari Narayan also stated that he was not in the
village on the of the incident. Swayambar stated he was roped in as an
accused as he was Maheshwar’s servant. Lal Behari in his defence stated
that on the day of the incident Ram Sahodar’s tubewell was working and
the water flowing into his barn through the drain. On expressing his
objection regarding this Ram Sahodar challenged him and subsequently
he was chased by Ram Sahodar, Kuldeep, Jagjeet, Samarjeet, Sankath,
Ram Murti and Shiv Kant. Ram Sahodar had a ballam and the rest had
lathis and stone with them. He further stated that he caught hold of Ram
Sahodar’s ballam and in the scuffle Kuldeep got hurt from the ballam
after which many people arrived and started pelting stones. In this

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CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
Kaushalya Devi, Gyana Devi and Maharani Devi standing in front of
Kalu’s house were also beaten by Ram Sahodar and othes.
9. No defence witness was examined by the accused persons in their
defence.
10. Upon analyzing the facts, circumstances and the evidence
available on record the trial court convicted appellant no. 1 to 10 as
mentioned above.
11. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment of
the trial court the accused persons have preferred the present appeal
before this Court.
12. During the pendency of the appeal, appellants no. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9,
10, and 11—namely Lal Behari, Mata Prasad, Mahesh Prasad, Kalu
Ram, Chandra Shekher, Swayambar, Smt. Kaushila, and Smt. Maharani
—died; consequently, their appeal was abated vide order dated
14.07.2023. Additionally, appellant no. 4, Hari Narain, died on
21.02.2025 and his appeal was abated vide order dated 20.02.2026.
13. The appeal only survives for appellants no. 5, 8 and 12, namely,
Ram Shiromani, Chandra Bhawan and Smt Gyana Devi.
14. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that in the case in
hand, the role of appellant No. 5, Ram Shiromani, and appellant No. 8,
Chandra Bhawan, is attributed to inflicting lathi blows, while the role of
surviving appellant No. 12, Smt. Gyana Devi, is alleged to be assaulting
with brickbats. The alleged incident occurred suddenly, spontaneously,
and without premeditation in the heat of passion. A sudden altercation
broke out between the parties, leading to the appellants inflicting injuries
upon the deceased and the injured.
15. He further submits that the recital of the FIR and the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses clearly indicate that the surviving appellants
did no overt act in furtherance of the common object. Therefore, they are
not vicariously liable for the act committed by other members of the
unlawful assembly. He further argued that to attract the provisions
contained under Section 149 of the IPC, it must be shown that the
members of the assembly had knowledge of the likelihood of the

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CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
commission of the offence in prosecution of the common object; only
then can another member of the unlawful assembly be held vicariously
liable for the said criminal act. Learned counsel next submits that the
trial court did not consider the role attributed to the surviving appellants,
and merely by recognizing the surviving appellants as members of the
unlawful assembly, held them vicariously guilty for a criminal act which
was not in their knowledge.
16. He also contended that an offence under Section 302 read with
Section 149 of the IPC against the surviving No.5-Ram Shiromani and
appellant No.8-Chandra Bhawan has not been proved and the offence
committed by the surviving No.5-Ram Shiromani and appellant No.8-
Chandra Bhawan respectively at the maximum would fall under Section
324/149 of I.P.C., whereas learned trial Court erroneously convicted and
sentenced them for the offence under Section 302/149 of I.P.C.,
therefore, the findings and observations given by trial court, to that
extent, is liable to be set aside.
17. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the case
of Lalji and others Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1973 SC 2505 , wherein
Hon’ble Apex Court observed that where a sudden quarrel arises as a
result of remonstrance and counter remonstrance and an unpremeditated
free fight takes place it cannot be said that the accused, who were
present there formed an unlawful assembly. Each of the accused persons
should be held liable for his own act and not vicariously liable for the
acts for the others.
18. Learned counsel for the appellants has also placed reliance on the
case of Ishwar Singh Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1976 SC 2423, wherein
Hon’ble Apex Court observed that free fight between two parties, armed
with weapons, the accused party not being the aggressor as such, no case
either under Section 147 of IPC or Section 148 of IPC can be maintained
against them in the absence of any evidence regarding individual
assaults committed by them. Hon’ble Apex Court has also held that their

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CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
conviction under Sections 326, 324 and 323 of IPC on the basis of
Section 149 of IPC cannot be sustained.
19. Per contra, learned A.G.A. appearing for the State vehemently
argued that surviving appellants were members of an unlawful assembly
armed with deadly weapons, as one of them was having a "ballam", a
sharp pointed weapon, in his hand. He further submits that the appellants
had intention to kill Maheshwar Prasad and his son Kuldeep in carrying
out of common object. One of them, accused Lal Behari, inflicted blows
with ballam while other members inflicted blows with lathi, and when
son of injured, Rameshwar Prasad alias Ram Sahodar (PW-1), came to
rescue his father, then they assaulted him and resultantly, he succumbed
to the injuries on the spot. He further contended that role of accused-
appellant No. 5-Ram Shiromani and appellant No. 8-Chandra Bhawan is
attributed for inflicting lathi blows while role of appellant No. 12-Gyana
Devi has been attributed to inflicting blows by throwing brickbats;
therefore, the intention of the appellants to kill the deceased was clearly
established. The learned trial court, after considering all the facts,
evidence, and circumstances in their entirety, rightly convicted the
appellants for the charges levied against them and sentenced them
accordingly. Therefore, there is no illegality or perversity in the
impugned judgment and the appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be
dismissed.
20. Learned AGA has placed reliance on the judgment of Lal Sita
Ram Versus Bimal Rana and others 2036 INSC 178 wherein Hon’ble
Apex Court held that once it is established that an unlawful assembly
existed and the accused respondents intended to commit murder of the
deceased in furtherance of common object of such assembly, the
individual attribution of fatal injury fades into significance for it is trite
law that Section 149 IPC embodies the principle of vicarious liability
and renders every member of an unlawful assembly guilty of the offence
committed in prosecution of the common object. It was further observed
that object of the provision is to ensure that criminal liability can not be
evaded on the plea that specific role of the particular accused could not

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CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
be discerned from evidence. Conduct of each person forming the
unlawful assembly, coupled with participation in prosecution of the
common object, is sufficient to fasten vicarious liability on every
member of the assembly for the offence committed by any member of
that assembly. In such circumstances, it is immaterial as to which
accused delivered the fatal injury, once the offence is shown to have
been committed in furtherance of common object of unlawful assembly.
It was further observed that factum of causing injury or not causing
injury could not be relevant, where the accused is sought to be roped in
with the aid of the Section 149 IPC. The learned A.G.A. thus argues that
the relevant question to be examined by the Court is whether the accused
was a member of an unlawful assembly and not whether he actually took
active part in the crime or not.
21. Learned A.G.A. further submits that upon claiming the juvenility
of appellant-accused Ram Shiromani in pending appeal, it was sent to
the Juvenile Justice Board for conducting inquiry and reports in this
regard has been filed by Juvenile Justice Board and it is up to the Court
to decide the claim of his juvenility.
22. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the
parties and perused the material available on record.
23. It is evident from the record that initially, charges were framed
against appellant-convict Lal Behari under Sections 147, 302, 324,
323/149, and 325/149 I.P.C.; against accused-convict Hari Narain under
Sections 147, 302/149, 323, 324/149, and 325/149 I.P.C.; against
accused-convicts Maheswar Prasad alias Mata Prasad, Ram Shiromani,
Chandra Sheikhar, Chandra Bhawan, and Swaymbar under Sections 147,
302/149, 323/149, 324/149, and 325/149 I.P.C.; and against accused-
convicts Smt. Kaushilya, Smt. Mahrani, and Smt. Gayana Devi under
Section 323 I.P.C. To bring home the charges against the accused
persons, sufficient ocular evidence was produced by the prosecution.
Injuries of injured Ram Sahodar PW-1

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CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
The injured Ram Sahodar was medically examined by Doctor
D.P.Singh- PW-8, who found following injuries:
1. Punctured wound 0.5 cm. x 0.2 cm. x 0.5 cm on left palm at
the root of left index finger. Slight bleeding present.
2. Traumatic swelling 2 cm x 1 cm on middle of back of left
thumb.
3. Traumatic swelling 3 cm x 1 cm on middle of back of right
thumb.
4. Traumatic swelling 4 cm x 2 cm on front of right wrist joint.
5. Contusion 7 cm x 2 cm on middle of back of right thigh, red
colour.
6. Traumatic swelling 3 cm x 1 cm on middle of back of right
leg.
7. Abrasion 1 cm x 0.5 cm on middle of chin.
8. Lacerated wound 3.5 cm x 0.5 cm x bone deep 9.5 cm.
above from right ear, 14 cm. from right eye-brow.
All injuries were simple in nature. The injury No.1 was caused by
sharp pointed weapon. Injury No. 7 was caused by friction against rough
surface and other injuries were caused by blunt weapon.
Duration was found fresh.
Injuries of injured Samarjeet PW-2
Dr. D.P.Singh PW-8 also medically examined the injured
Samarjeet on 08.04.1977 and found following injuries:
1. Traumatic swelling 4 cm x 2 cm on middle of back of right
elbow joint, red colour.
2. Injury was simple and caused by blunt weapon. Duration was
fresh.
On 09.04.1977 autopsy of the dead body of the deceased
Kuldeep Kumar was conducted by Dr. R.K. Jain PW-7 and found
following ante-mortem injuries:
Ante-mortem injuries:
1. Perforated wound 3/4" x 1/4" x cavity deep on the left side front
of chest 3" away from the nipple at 11 O'Clock position.
2. Abrasion on 2" x 1/2" on the outer side of right arm upper part.
3. Abrasion 1/2" x 1/2" on the outer side of right shoulder.

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CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
4. Abrasion 1/2" x 1/2" on the right knee lower part.
5. Abraded contusion 4" x 1" on the back of left chest lower part.
Internal Examination
The pleura was found to be perforated at the wound.
Trachen was also cut from below the wound in chest. Aorta was
perforated. Death according to the opinion of the doctor was
st
caused due to shock and haemorrhage due to 1 injury. The
probable time of death was mentioned injury to be about one day.
On 09.04.1977 another injured persons Smt Jagpatti, Smt
Pali and Sarju Prasad were also medically examined by Dr. R.K.
Purohit between 9.30 A.M. to 10.10 A.M.
Injuries of Jagpatti
1. Abrasion 1.5 cm x 0.5 cm on the dorsal surface of left middle
finger.
2. Traumatic swelling on post aspect of left hand.
3. Contusion 3.5 cm x 2.0 cm on the post aspect of fore-arm.
4. Traumatic swelling over right hand post surface.
Injuries of Smt Pali
She had no visible injury. She only complained of pain on back
lower part.
Injuries of Sarju Prasad
1. Lacerated wound 0.5 cm x 0. 5 cm x skin deep over the anterior
surface of left leg upper 1/3 portion, colour red;
2. abrasion 1.0 cm x 0.5 cm on the anterior surface of left leg
middle part scab not fully formed
Both the injuries were simple. Injury No.1 was caused by a
blunt weapon and the second injury may be caused by friction
against hard object. Duration was described 12-24 hours.
24. The injuries found on the person of the injured and the body of the
deceased were duly proved by the doctors who conducted their medical
examinations and the testimony of PW-1 Ram Sahodar @ Rameshwar
Prasad, PW-2 Samarjeet Pandey (injured witnesses), and PW-3 Sarju

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CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
Prasad (an independent witness) unanimously corroborated the injuries
sustained by the injured and the deceased.
25. Now it is to be seen as to what offence had been committed by the
surviving appellants ?
26. Before entering into the testimonies of the injured witnesses and
eye-witness, it is expedient to refer to settled legal principles laid down
by Hon’ble Apex Court with regard to constructive liability.
27. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajendra Santaram
Todankar Vs. State of Maharashtra and others (2003) 2 SCC 257 has
held:
“14. Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860 provides that if an
offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in
prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as
the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed
in prosecution of that object, every person who at the time of
the committing of that offence, is a member of the same
assembly is guilty of that offence. The two clauses of Section
149 vary in degree of certainty. The first clause contemplates
the commission of an offence by any member of an unlawful
assembly which can be held to have been committed in
prosecution of the common object of the assembly. The second
clause embraces within its fold the commission of an act which
may not necessarily be the common object of the assembly,
nevertheless, the members of the assembly had knowledge of
likelihood of the commission of that offence in prosecution of
the common object. The common object may be commission of
one offence while there may be likelihood of the commission of
yet another offence, the knowledge whereof is capable of being
safely attributable to the members of the unlawful assembly. In
either case, every member of the assembly would be vicariously
liable for the offence actually committed by any other member
of the assembly. A mere possibility of the commission of the
offence would not necessarily enable the court to draw an
inference that the likelihood of commission of such offence was
within the knowledge of every member of the unlawful
assembly. It is difficult indeed, though not impossible, to collect
direct evidence of such knowledge. An inference may be drawn
from circumstances such as the background of the incident, the
motive, the nature of the assembly, the nature of the arms
carried by the members of the assembly, their common object
and the behaviour of the members soon before, at or after the
actual commission of the crime. Unless the applicability of
Section 149 — either clause — is attracted and the court is
convinced, on facts and in law, both, of liability capable of
being fastened vicariously by reference to either clause of
Section 149 IPC, merely because a criminal act was committed

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CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
by a member of the assembly every other member thereof would
not necessarily become liable for such criminal act.”
28. In another case Hon’ble Apex Court in Daya Kishan Vs. State of
Haryana (2010) 5 SCC 81 has held that:
“26. Section 149 IPC creates a constructive or vicarious liability
on the members of the unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts
committed pursuant to the common object by any other member of
that assembly. The basis of the constructive guilt under Section
149 IPC is mere membership of the unlawful assembly with the
requisite common object or knowledge. This section makes a
member of the unlawful assembly responsible as a member for the
acts of each and all, merely because he is a member of an
unlawful assembly. While overt act and active participation may
indicate common intention of the person perpetrating the crime,
the mere presence in the unlawful assembly may fasten vicariously
criminal liability under Section 149.
27. There are two essential ingredients of Section 149 viz. (1)
commission of an offence by any member of an unlawful
assembly, and (2) such offence must have been committed in
prosecution of the common object of that assembly or must be
such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be
committed. Once the court finds that these two ingredients are
fulfilled, every person, who at the time of committing that offence
was a member of the assembly has to be held guilty of that
offence. After such a finding, it would not be open to the court to
see as to who actually did the offensive act nor would it be open
to the court to require the prosecution to prove which of the
members did which of the offensive acts. Whenever a court
convicts any person of an offence with the aid of Section 149, a
clear finding regarding the common object of the assembly must
be given and the evidence discussed must show not only the
nature of the common object but that in pursuance of such
common object the offence was committed. There is no manner of
doubt that before recording the conviction under Section 149 IPC,
the essential ingredients of Section 149 IPC must be established.”
29. In Jawed Shaukat Ali Qureshi Vs. State of Gujarat (2023) 9
SCC 164 Hon’ble Apex Court held that it is well settled that mere
innocent presence in assembly of persons, as for example a bystander
does not make accused member of unlawful assembly, unless it is shown
by direct or circumstantial evidence that accused shared common object
of assembly.
30. Keeping in mind the law propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court
and on a perusal of the record, it is revealed that in the FIR, it is averred

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CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
that accused Lal Behari was armed with a ballam (spear), and Mahesh
Prasad, Mata Prasad, Hari Narayan, Semar, Kalu Ram, Chandra Shekhar,
Chandra Bhawan alias Babu Lal, and Ram Shiromani were armed with
lathis. They entered the tubewell of the informant, Ram Prasad alias
Ram Sahodar. On their coming, accused Mahesh Prasad struck a ballam
blow to the complainant, Rameshwar Prasad, and exhorted the others to
kill him. Thereafter, all the accused persons assaulted him. Upon his
screaming, witnesses rushed to the spot, and other family members of
the complainant arrived. When the complainant ran towards his home to
save himself, all the accused persons surrounded him and inflicted lathi
and ballam blows on him.
31. Ram Sahoder @ Rameshwar (PW-1) has deposed that Ram Raj
asked him to water his field from his tube well, but this witness refused
to supply the water. On this issue, accused-appellant Lal Behari, armed
with a Ballam, and the remaining accused, armed with lathis, came to his
door step, and accused Maheshwar Prasad exhorted them to kill the
informant/complainant. The complainant rushed towards his house
raising an alarm, but the accused persons surrounded him at his door step
and inflicted blows with the weapons they were holding in their hands.
32. He further submits that when his son Kuldeep proceeded to save
him, accused Lal Behari inflicted a Ballam blow and accused Hari
Narain inflicted a Lathi blow on Kuldeep, while other accused Maharani
and Kashi used brickbats to cause injury. When Samarjeet, Smt. Jagpati
and Pali arrived upon hearing the noise, they were also injured by the
accused persons.
33. Thus, from his evidence, it transpires that there are two sets of
incidents. In the first set of the incident, all the accused persons except
the females arrived at the tube well of the complainant. Out of them, Lal
Behari was armed with a ballam , while the remaining were armed with
lathis in their hands. When the complainant rushed towards his house to
seek help while raising an alarm, those accused persons started causing
injury to him with the weapons they had in their hands.

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CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
34. Another witness, who was also injured in the alleged incident,
namely Samarjeet (PW-2), corroborated this fact in his deposition made
before the court. Apart from this independent witness, Sarju Prasad (PW-
3) also substantiated this fact in his deposition
35. Thus, it becomes very clear that the intention of the accused
persons—Lal Behari, Mata Prasad, Mahesh Prasad, Hari Narain, Ram
Shiromani, Kallu Ram, Chandra Shekhar, Chandra Bhawan, and
Swayamber—was to kill the informant Ram Sahodar @ Rameshwar
Prasad. In causing injury to Ram Sahodar @ Rameshwar Prasad (PW-1),
the accused persons constituted an unlawful assembly and acted in
prosecution of their common object.
36. On cross-examination, all those witnesses stood firm on the
statements given in their examination-in-chief. Their statements are also
corroborated by the medical evidence. The injuries sustained by the
injured were found to be simple in nature, and they were members of an
unlawful assembly who rioted. It is expedient to mention that in the FIR,
two sets of incidents have been averred. The subsequent incident
happened when the complainant rushed towards his house to seek help,
whereupon his son Kuldeep came forward to save him, but accused Lal
Behari hit him with a Ballam blow to his chest, while accused Hari
Narain inflicted a lathi blow. In his examination-in-chief, Ram Sahodar
alias Rameshwar (PW-1) deposed that Lal Behari hit two ballam blows
to kill Kuldeep, while Hari Narayan inflicted a lathi blow on him.
37. Samarjeet Pandey (PW2) substantiated this fact, as did his father,
the complainant, in his testimony. Another witness, Sarju Prasad (PW3),
also corroborated this fact in his testimony.
38. Thus, it transpires that the intention of the surviving appellant-
accused was not to kill the son of the informant, and they did not commit
any overt act. Although in the first incident they were members of the
unlawful assembly that caused injuries to Rameshwar Prasad, in the
subsequent incident only Lal Behari and Hari Narain assaulted the

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CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
complainant's son, who received a fatal blow to a vital part of his body
and succumbed to the injuries.
39. At this juncture, the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Zainul Vs. State of Bihar 2025 SCC online SC 2152 is also
to be seen wherein in paragraphs No. 49 and 50 it has been held as
under:
“49. The expression “in prosecution of the common object” means
that the offence committed must be directly connected with the
common object of the assembly, or that the act, upon appraisal of
the evidence, must appear to have been done with a view to
accomplish that common object. In Charan Singh v. State of U.P.,
(2004) 4 SCC 205, this Court held that the test for determining the
“common object” of an unlawful assembly must be assessed in
light of the conduct of its members, as well as the surrounding
circumstances. It can be deduced from the nature of the assembly,
the weapons carried by its members, and their conduct before,
during, or after the incident. The relevant observations read as
thus:—
“13. […]Section 149 IPC has its foundation on constructive
liability which is the sine qua non for its operation. The
emphasis is on the common object and not on common
intention. Mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot
render a person liable unless there was a common object and
he was actuated by that common object and that object is one
of those set out in Section 141. Where common object of an
unlawful assembly is not proved, the accused persons cannot
be convicted with the help of Section 149. The crucial question
to determine is whether the assembly consisted of five or more
persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more
of the common objects, as specified in Section 141. It cannot
be laid down as a general proposition of law that unless an
overt act is proved against a person, who is alleged to be a
member of an unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a
member of an assembly. The only thing required is that he
should have understood that the assembly was unlawful and
was likely to commit any of the acts which fall within the
purview of Section 141. The word “object” means the purpose
or design and, in order to make it “common”, it must be
shared by all. In other words, the object should be common to
the persons, who compose the assembly, that is to say, they
should all be aware of it and concur in it. A common object
may be formed by express agreement after mutual
consultation, but that is by no means necessary. It may be
formed at any stage by all or a few members of the assembly
and the other members may just join and adopt it. Once
formed, it need not continue to be the same. It may be modified
or altered or abandoned at any stage. The expression “in
prosecution of common object” as appearing in Section 149

16
CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
has to be strictly construed as equivalent to “in order to attain
the common object”. It must be immediately connected with
the common object by virtue of the nature of the object. There
must be community of object and the object may exist only up
to a particular stage, and not thereafter. Members of an
unlawful assembly may have community of object up to a
certain point beyond which they may differ in their objects and
the knowledge, possessed by each member of what is likely to
be committed in prosecution of their common object may vary
not only according to the information at his command, but
also according to the extent to which he shares the community
of object, and as a consequence of this the effect of Section
149 IPC may be different on different members of the same
assembly.
14. “Common object” is different from a “common
intention” as it does not require a prior concert and a
common meeting of minds before the attack. It is enough if
each has the same object in view and their number is five or
more and that they act as an assembly to achieve that object.
The “common object” of an assembly is to be ascertained
from the acts and language of the members composing it,
and from a consideration of all the surrounding
circumstances. It may be gathered from the course of
conduct adopted by the members of the assembly. What the
common object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular
stage of the incident is essentially a question of fact to be
determined, keeping in view the nature of the assembly, the
arms carried by the members, and the behaviour of the
members at or near the scene of the incident. It is not
necessary under law that in all cases of unlawful assembly,
with an unlawful common object, the same must be
translated into action or be successful. Under the
Explanation to Section 141, an assembly which was not
unlawful when it was assembled, may subsequently become
unlawful. It is not necessary that the intention or the
purpose, which is necessary to render an assembly an
unlawful one comes into existence at the outset. The time of
forming an unlawful intent is not material. An assembly
which, at its commencement or even for some time thereafter,
is lawful, may subsequently become unlawful. In other
words, it can develop during the course of incident at the
spot eo instanti.”
50. To put it briefly, Section 149 of the IPC makes all the members
of an unlawful assembly constructively liable when an offence is
committed by any member of such assembly with a view to
accomplish the common object of that assembly or the members of
the assembly knew that such an offence was likely to be committed.
However, such liability can be fastened only upon proof that the
act was done in pursuance of a common object. The essentials of
Section 149 were succinctly explained by the Constitution Bench in
the decision of Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 174.
It reads thus:—

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CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
“8. The true legal position in regard to the essential
ingredients of an offence specified by Section 149 are not
in doubt. Section 149 prescribes for vicarious or
constructive criminal liability for all members of an
unlawful assembly where an offence is committed by any
member of such an unlawful assembly in prosecution of
the common object of that assembly or such as the
members of that assembly knew to be likely to be
committed in prosecution of that object. It would thus be
noticed that one of the essential ingredients of Section
149 is that the offence must have been committed by any
member of an unlawful assembly, and Section 141 makes
it clear that it is only where five or more persons
constituted an assembly that an unlawful assembly is
born, provided, of course, the other requirements of the
said section as to the common object of the persons
composing that assembly are satisfied. In other words, it
is an essential condition of an unlawful assembly that its
membership must be five or more.[…]”
40. Upon applying the above principles, in the case in hand, we find
that at the first instance when informant was hit by accused persons for
causing hurt to informant, they had overt act in the prosecution of
common object, but on subsequent event, only accused Lal Behari gave
ballam blow and Hari Narayan gave lathi blow to Kuldeep, the son of
the informant, resultantly he succumbed to the injuries. That was not a
common object of remaining accused persons and as such, for killing the
deceased Kuldeep, the surviving appellants-accused persons are not held
responsible for subsequent set of incident, therefore, the
observations/findings given by the learned trial Court in respect of
surviving appellant No.5 Ram Shiromani and appellant No.8 Chandra
Bhawan for the offence under Section 302/149 of I.P.C. is perverse and
is liable to be set aside.
41. Upon considering entire facts, evidences and circumstances and in
the light of proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, we find
that against surviving appellant No.5-Ram Shiromani and appellant No.8
Chandra Bhawan the charge for offence under Section 324/149 and 323
and 147 of I.P.C. has duly been proved by prosecution, but the charge
under Section 302/149 of I.P.C. against appellant No.5-Ram Shiromani
and appellant No.8-Chandra Bhawan is not proved beyond reasonable

18
CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
doubt. Therefore, the conviction of the surviving appellant No.5 Ram
Shiromani and appellant No.8 Chandra Bhawan for the offence under
Section 302/149 of I.P.C. is set aside, while the conviction and sentence
for the offence under Section 324/149 and 323 and 147 of I.P.C.
awarded by the learned trial Court is upheld .
42. So far as, surviving appellant appellant No.12 Smt Gyana Devi
is concerned, as discussed earlier, there is sufficient evidence against her
to causing simple hurt by inflicting brick bats to injured persons which
establishes offence under Section 323 of I.P.C. and as such, she has
rightly been convicted for the same by the trial Court. There is no
perversity in the impugned judgment and order to that extent.
43. Sri Murtaza, learned counsel for the appellants has further argued
that so far as appellant no. 5, namely Ram Shiromani is concerned, he
was aged less than 16 years at the time of the incident, which occurred
on 08.04.1977, his date of birth being 25.04.1961. He further stated that
the learned trial court, vide judgment and order dated 30.04.1982,
convicted the said appellant for life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC
read with Section 149 IPC, 18 months of rigorous imprisonment for the
offense under Section 324 IPC read with Section 149 IPC, one year of
rigorous imprisonment for the offense under Section 147 IPC and six
months of rigorous imprisonment for the offense under Section 323 IPC.
Sri Murtaza has raised the plea of juvenility for the appellant No.5 by
filing an application.
44. It was argued that under Section 7A of Act of 2000, the plea of
juvenility can be raised at any stage.
45. It is expedient to extract provisions of Section 7A of Act, 2000 as
below:
“[7A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is raised
before any court.—
(1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before any court or a
court is of the opinion that an accused person was a juvenile on the
date of commission of the offence, the court shall make an inquiry, take
such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so as to

19
CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
determine the age of such person, and shall record a finding whether
the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as nearly as
may be:
Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any court and
it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final disposal of the case,
and such claim shall be determined in terms of the provisions
contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder, even if the juvenile
has ceased to be so on or before the date of commencement of this Act.
(2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall forward the
juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate orders and the sentence,
if any, passed by a court shall be deemed to have no effect.]
46. This Court, vide order dated 17.10.2023, upon the application
being filed claiming juvenility on the date of the commission of the
crime under Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015, sent the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board,
Lucknow, or the concerned Juvenile Justice Board (Board) to collect
evidence as to the juvenility of appellant no. 5 and to submit that
evidence to this Court.
47. In pursuance thereof, the Board submitted its report dated
22.12.2023, which is on record, according to which Sri Ram Shiromani
has been declared to be a juvenile on the basis of the evidence led before
the Board.
48. We have proceeded to consider the said report.
49. Section 94 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 2015") provides for
presumption and determination of age of a juvenile.
50. For ready reference, the same is reproduced herein under:
94. Presumption and determination of age. —(1) Where, it is
obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of
the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act
(other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person
is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such
observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and
proceed with the inquiry under Section 14 or Section 36, as the case
may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age.

20
CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for
doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or
not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall
undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by
obtaining—
(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the
matriculation or equivalent from the concerned examination
Board, if available; and in the absence thereof;
(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal
authority or a panchayat;
(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be
determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical
age determination test conducted on the orders of the
Committee or the Board:
Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of
the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen
days from the date of such order.
(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the
age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this
Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.
Thus the process of age determination is provided in sub-
section (2) of Section 94 which is identical to the procedure
prescribed under sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007,
which is extracted herein-below:
“(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with
law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the
Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by
seeking evidence by obtaining-
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available;
and in the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play
school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal
authority or a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a)
above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted
Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or
child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the
Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the
reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary,
give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on
lower side within the margin of one year.
and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into
consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical
opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age
and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i),
(ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the

21
CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile
in conflict with law.”
51. Now the plea of learned counsel for the appellants claiming
juvenility of the surviving appellant No.5 Ram Shiromani is to be
considered.
52. Sri Murtaza has argued that he does not intend to challenge the
conviction of Sri Ram Shiromani, appellant no. 5, but prays that, keeping
in view the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mumtaz v.
State of U.P.- (2016) 11 SCC 786 , the sentence be set aside and the
matter be remitted to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for
determining the appropriate punishment as prescribed under the Juvenile
Justice Act, 1986.
53. On the other hand, the learned AGA stated that a report has been
submitted by the Board on 22.12.2023. He does not dispute the
proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Mumtaz (supra) .
54. We have perused the report of the Board. A perusal of the report
indicates that the Board itself declared appellant no. 5 a juvenile—which
it could not have done, keeping in view the order of the Division Bench
of this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 921 of 1981 ( Ali Hasan v. State
of U.P. and Others ) dated 20.09.2023 , we proceed to determine whether
appellant no. 5, Ram Shiromani, was a juvenile on the date of the
incident on the basis of the evidence collected by the Board.
55. We have examined the documents and evidence on record, which
include the statements of the guardian, the then Principal, the
educational certificates and the affidavit.
56. A perusal of the educational certificates, including the High
School certificate, reveals that the date of birth of Sri Ram Shiromani is
25.04.1961, which has not been controverted by any of the parties.
Consequently, considering the evidence on record, we hold that Sri Ram
Shiromani, appellant no. 5 was 15 years, 11 months, and 13 days old on
the date of the incident (08.04.1977).

22
CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
57. After recording finding of conviction of appellant No.5-Ram
Shiromani, the next points which arises before us for consideration is as
to what sentence would be appropriate for the appellant No.5-Ram
Shiromani.
58. In this regard, it would be apt to refer to the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mumtaz (supra) , wherein the Hon'ble
Supreme Court also considered the interplay of the Juvenile Justice Act,
1986 and the Act of 2000, and the procedure to be adopted when a claim
of juvenility is raised during the pendency of a criminal appeal.
59. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
18. The effect of Section 20 of the 2000 Act was considered in Pratap
Singh v. State of Jharkhand [Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2005)
3 SCC 551 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 742] and it was stated as under : (SCC p.
570, para 31)
“31. Section 20 of the Act as quoted above deals with the special
provision in respect of pending cases and begins with a non obstante
clause. The sentence
‘notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all proceedings in
respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date on
which this Act came into force’
has great significance. The proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending
in any court referred to in Section 20 of the Act are relatable to
proceedings initiated before the 2000 Act came into force and which
are pending when the 2000 Act came into force. The term “any court”
would include even ordinary criminal courts. If the person was a
“juvenile” under the 1986 Act the proceedings would not be pending in
criminal courts. They would be pending in criminal courts only if the
boy had crossed 16 years or the girl had crossed 18 years. This shows
that Section 20 refers to cases where a person had ceased to be a
juvenile under the 1986 Act but had not yet crossed the age of 18 years
then the pending case shall continue in that court as if the 2000 Act has
not been passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed
an offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any
sentence in respect of the juvenile, shall forward the juvenile to the
Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile.”
19. In Bijender Singh v. State of Haryana [Bijender Singh v. State of
Haryana, (2005) 3 SCC 685 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 889] , the legal position
as regards Section 20 was stated in the following words : (SCC pp.
687-88, paras 8-10 & 12)
“8. One of the basic distinctions between the 1986 Act and the 2000
Act relates to the age of males and females. Under the 1986 Act, a
juvenile means a male juvenile who has not attained the age of 16

23
CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
years, and a female juvenile who has not attained the age of 18 years.
In the 2000 Act, the distinction between male and female juveniles on
the basis of age has not been maintained. The age-limit is 18 years for
both males and females.
9. A person above 16 years in terms of the 1986 Act was not a juvenile.
In that view of the matter the question whether a person above 16 years
becomes “juvenile” within the purview of the 2000 Act must be
answered having regard to the object and purport thereof.
10. In terms of the 1986 Act, a person who was not juvenile could be
tried in any court. Section 20 of the 2000 Act takes care of such a
situation stating that despite the same the trial shall continue in that
court as if that Act has not been passed and in the event, he is found to
be guilty of commission of an offence, a finding to that effect shall be
recorded in the judgment of conviction, if any, but instead of passing
any sentence in relation to the juvenile, he would be forwarded to the
Juvenile Justice Board (in short “the Board”) which shall pass orders
in accordance with the provisions of the Act as if it has been satisfied
on inquiry that a juvenile has committed the offence. A legal fiction
has, thus, been created in the said provision. A legal fiction as is well
known must be given its full effect although it has its limitations. …
*11.
12. Thus, by reason of legal fiction, a person, although not a juvenile,
has to be treated to be one by the Board for the purpose of sentencing,
which takes care of a situation that the person although not a juvenile
in terms of the 1986 Act but still would be treated as such under the
2000 Act for the said limited purpose.”
20. In Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Dharambir v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2010) 5 SCC 344 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1274] the
determination of juvenility even after conviction was one of the issues
and it was stated : (SCC p. 347, paras 11-12)
“11. It is plain from the language of the Explanation to Section 20 that
in all pending cases, which would include not only trials but even
subsequent proceedings by way of revision or appeal, etc., the
determination of juvenility of a juvenile has to be in terms of clause (l)
of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceases to be a juvenile on or before 1-
4-2001, when the 2000 Act came into force, and the provisions of the
Act would apply as if the said provision had been in force for all
purposes and for all material times when the alleged offence was
committed.
12. Clause (l) of Section 2 of the 2000 Act provides that “juvenile in
conflict with law” means a “juvenile” who is alleged to have
committed an offence and has not completed eighteenth year of age as
on the date of commission of such offence. Section 20 also enables the
court to consider and determine the juvenility of a person even after
conviction by the regular court and also empowers the court, while
maintaining the conviction, to set aside the sentence imposed and

24
CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
forward the case to the Juvenile Justice Board concerned for passing
sentence in accordance with the provisions of the 2000 Act.”
21. Similarly in Kalu v. State of Haryana [Kalu v. State of Haryana,
(2012) 8 SCC 34 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 761] this Court summed up as
under : (SCC p. 41, para 21)
“21. Section 20 makes a special provision in respect of pending cases.
It states that notwithstanding anything contained in the Juvenile Act,
all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any
area on the date on which the Juvenile Act comes into force in that area
shall be continued in that court as if the Juvenile Act had not been
passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence,
it shall record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in
respect of the juvenile forward the juvenile to the Board which shall
pass orders in respect of that juvenile in accordance with the provisions
of the Juvenile Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry under the
Juvenile Act that the juvenile has committed the offence. The
Explanation to Section 20 makes it clear that in all pending cases,
which would include not only trials but even subsequent proceedings by
way of revision or appeal, the determination of juvenility of a juvenile
would be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceased
to be a juvenile on or before 1-4-2001, when the Juvenile Act came into
force, and the provisions of the Juvenile Act would apply as if the said
provision had been in force for all purposes and for all material times
when the alleged offence was committed.”
22. It is thus well settled that in terms of Section 20 of the 2000 Act, in
all cases where the accused was above 16 years but below 18 years of
age on the date of occurrence, the proceedings pending in the court
would continue and be taken to the logical end subject to an exception
that upon finding the juvenile to be guilty, the court would not pass an
order of sentence against him but the juvenile would be referred to the
Board for appropriate orders under the 2000 Act. What kind of order
could be passed in a matter where claim of juvenility came to be
accepted in a situation similar to the present case, was dealt with by
this Court in Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P. [Jitendra Singh v. State of
U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 193 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 725] in the following
terms : (SCC pp. 210-11, para 32)
“32. A perusal of the “punishments” provided for under the Juvenile
Justice Act, 1986 indicate that given the nature of the offence
committed by the appellant, advising or admonishing him [clause (a)]
is hardly a “punishment” that can be awarded since it is not at all
commensurate with the gravity of the crime. Similarly, considering his
age of about 40 years, it is completely illusory to expect the appellant
to be released on probation of good conduct, to be placed under the
care of any parent, guardian or fit person [clause (b)]. For the same
reason, the appellant cannot be released on probation of good conduct
under the care of a fit institution [clause (c)] nor can he be sent to a
special home under Section 10 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 which
is intended to be for the rehabilitation and reformation of delinquent
juveniles [clause (d)]. The only realistic punishment that can possibly
be awarded to the appellant on the facts of this case is to require him to

25
CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
pay a fine under clause (e) of Section 21(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act,
1986.”
23. In Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P. [Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P.,
(2013) 11 SCC 193 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 725] , having found the
juvenile guilty of the offence with which he was charged, in accordance
with the law laid down by this Court as stated above, the matter was
remanded to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board constituted under
the 2000 Act for determining appropriate quantum of fine. The view
taken therein is completely consistent with the law laid down by this
Court and in our opinion the decision in Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P.
[Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 193 : (2013) 4 SCC
(Cri) 725] does not call for any reconsideration. The subsequent repeal
of the 2000 Act on and with effect from 15-1-2016 would not affect the
inquiry in which such claim was found to be acceptable. Section 25 of
the 2015 Act makes it very clear.
24. Thus, while holding appellant Dilshad alias Pappu to be juvenile in
terms of the 2000 Act as on the day of occurrence and guilty of the
offence with which he was tried, we set aside the sentence of life
imprisonment passed against him and remit the matter to the
jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for determining the appropriate
quantum of fine that should be levied on the appellant Dilshad alias
Pappu and the compensation that should be awarded to the family of
the deceased, keeping in mind the directions issued in Jitendra Singh v.
State of U.P. [Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 193 :
(2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 725]
25. Criminal Appeal No. 2084 of 2009 is thus dismissed while Criminal
Appeal No. 460 of 2010 is allowed to the aforesaid extent and the
matter as regards appellant Dilshad alias Pappu stands remitted to the
jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for determination as aforesaid.
The bail bonds furnished by appellant Mumtaz alias Muntyaz are
cancelled and he shall be taken in custody forthwith to undergo the
sentence awarded to him.
60. From a perusal of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Mumtaz (supra) , it emerges that the Apex Court considered the aspect
of a plea of juvenility being raised during the pendency of an appeal.
After finding that the convict was a juvenile at the time of the incident,
the Apex Court upheld his guilt for the offense, set aside the sentence
awarded to him and remitted the matter to the jurisdictional Juvenile
Justice Board for determining the appropriate quantum of punishment.
61. Incidentally, the Hon'ble Supreme Court for the purpose of the
quantum of punishment placed reliance on its earlier judgment in
Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P. -(2013) 11 SCC 193 .

26
CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
62. The judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of Jitendra Singh
(supra) has been approved by a three Judge judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Karan @ Fatiya vs. State of M.P.-(2023)
5 SCC 504 .
63. Keeping in view the aforesaid observations, we hold the appellant
no.5-Ram Shiromani to be juvenile in terms of the Act, 2000 as on the
day of occurrence and guilty of the offence with which he was tried.
However, we set-aside the sentence passed against him and remit the
matter to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for determining the
appropriate punishment that should be levied on him keeping in mind the
directions issued in the case of Jitendra Singh (supra) .
64. The appellants no.5-Ram Shiromani is directed to appear before
the Juvenile Justice Board on 17.11.2026 along with certified copy of
this judgment.
65. An order in this regard would be passed by the concerned Board
within a period of six weeks from the date of communication of a
certified copy of this order.
66. The appellant No. 8-Chandra Bhawan and appellant No.12-Smt
Gyana Devi are on bail. The personal bonds and surety bonds of the
appellants No. 8 Chandra Bhawan and appellant No.12-Smt Gyana Devi
are cancelled and their sureties are discharged.
67. The appellant-convict Chandra Bhawan is directed to surrender
before the trial court concerned immediately and the court concerned is
directed to take the appellant-convict into custody, in the aforesaid case,
for the offence under Section under Section 324/149 and 323 and 147 of
I.P.C. and send him to serve out the remaining sentence, awarded by the
trial court under Section 324/149, 323 and 147 of I.P.C. and affirmed by
us.
68. Since the appellant-convict-Smt Gyana Devi was sentenced of Rs.
200/- only for the offence under Section 323 of I.P.C. with one month’s
rigorous imprisonment for default of fine, therefore, it is directed that if

27
CRLA No. - 372 of 1982
the fine of Rs. 200/- is not been paid within 15 days from today, if not
already paid then she shall be sent to jail for serving out the default
punishment.
69. The period appellants-convicts have already undergone shall be
adjusted.
70. Appeal is disposed of accordingly.
71. Let record of lower Court be sent back to trial court along with
copy of judgment within two weeks for information and necessary
compliance. The compliance report shall be sent by the court concerned
to this Court within a further period of fifteen days.
(Pramod Kumar Srivastava,J.) (Abdul Moin,J.)
November 05, 2026
Arvind
Digitally signed by :-
ARVIND KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench