MANJU BAI MEENA D/O KAILASH CHAND MEENA vs THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

Court
Rajasthan High Court

[2026:RJ-JP:46272-DB]
REPORTABLE
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
Judgment R eserved on: 04.11.2026
Judgment d elivered on: 18 .11.2026
Judgment (Full) uploaded on: 18.11.2026
D.B. Civil Reference No. 2/2025
CNR: RJHC020601852025 | URN: CREF / 5U / 2025
Manju Bai Meena D/o Kailash Chand Meena, Aged About 27
Years, R/o Village Ishwana, Post Babeli, Tehisil Rani, District
Alwar (Raj.)
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The State Of Rajasthan, through its Principal Secretary,
Department of Panchayati Raj, Govt. Secretariat, Jaipur
2. The Director, Elementary Education, Directorate, Bikaner
3. The Chief Executive Officer, Zila Parishad, Sriganganagar,
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sandeep Pathak, Adv.,
Mr. Tanveer Ahamad with
Mr. Iliyas Khan and
Mr. Tanay Jareda
Mr. Shiv Charan Singh, Adv. with
Mr. Harsh Saraswat
Mr. Chain Singh Rathore, Adv.
Mr. Vikash Meena, Adv.
Mr. Akshit Gupta,
Ms. Pragya Seth,
Mr. Nakul Bansal,
Mr. Shreyansh Dhariwal
Mr. Pallav Pancholi
Mr. Kapil Gupta, Adv.
Mr. Ajay Gadhwal, Adv.
Mr. R.S.Sinsinwar, Adv.
Mr. Dharemndra Kumar Bairwa, Adv.
Ms. Anisha Yadav, Adv.
Mr. Chitransh Saxena, Adv.
Mr. Abhay Singh Rathore, Adv.
Mr. Tanay Choudhary, Adv.
Mr. Ayal Yadav, Adv.
Mr. Sushil Yadav,
Mr. Akshay Singh
Mr. Ranvijay Singh
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Ms. Vedika Yadav
Mr. Akshay Singh
Mr. Bhawani Shankar
Mr. Ashish Mittal
Mr. Aditya Raj
Mr. Punit Singhvi
Mr. Ayush Singh
Mr. Ajay Singh Rathore
Mr. Ishan Verma
Mr. Naman Dadhich
Mr. Lakshya Sharma
Mr. Prem Chand Dewanda
Mr. Kapil Choudhary
Ms. Riya Choudhary
Mr. Himanshu Dholia
Mr. Abhishek Singh Devanda
Ms. Muskaan Jalu
Mr. Avin Chhangani with
Ms. Priyanka Bishnoi (through VC
from Jodhpur)
Mr. Tribhuvan Narayan Singh
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Virendra Lodha, Sr. Adv. assisted
by Mr. Jai Lodha, Adv.
Mr. Ankit Rathore, Adv.,
Ms. Saral Sharma, Adv. and
Ms. Katyani Singh, Adv.
Mr. Ashish Saksena
Mr. S.S.Naruka, AAG with
Ms. Ritika Naruka, AAAG,
Mr. Sachin Rathore, AAAG
Mr. Manish Sharma, Adv.,
Mr. Ritik Dahiya, Adv. and
Mr. Abhishek Singh, Adv.
Mr. Sandeep Jain, Adv.,
Mr. Shobit Tiwari, Adv. with
Mr. Pushpendra Singh Tanwar, Adv.
and Mr. Rohit Tiwari, Adv.
Mr. M.F.Baig, Adv.
Mr. Naman Maheshwari
Mr. Vishwas Fatehpuria
Mr. Priyansh Gupta, Adv.
Mr. Raghu Nandan Sharma, Adv.
With Ms. Manasvita Sharma, Adv.
Dr. Saugath Roy
Full Bench
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJAY K. AGRAWAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN
HON'BLE MR. JUS PRAMIL KUMAR MATHUR
C.A.V Judgment
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Sanjay K. Agrawal, CJ
For the sake of exposition, the judgment is divided in the
following parts:
Part Particulars Page Nos.
I. Reference Order 3
II. Facts leading to the reference 4
III. Relevant legal provisions 5
IV. Last date of submission of the application form is
sacrosanct
8
V. The divorcee is a legal status that must exist 14
VI. A customary divorce must be pleaded and proved
before a Court and recruitment body cannot decide it
15
VII Conclusion and answer to question of law 18
Part-I: Reference Order
1. Anoop Kumar Dhand, J. a finding conflict with the Division
Bench judgment rendered in the matter of Rajasthan Public
1
Service Commission Vs. Sunita Meena & Ors. , and another
Division Bench decision rendered in the matter of The Secretary,
Rajasthan Public Service Commission Vs. Sangeeta Varhat
2
and others , referred the following question of law for
determination and adjudication to Hon’ble The Chief Justice:
“Whether a female candidate of Scheduled Tribe
Category is entitled to get appointment under the
Divorcee Category without having a decree of
dissolution of marriage by the Competent Court of
law before the last date of submission of the
application form?”
1 D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 829/2017
2 2023 (1) RLW 240 (Raj.)
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Part-II: Facts Leading To The Reference
2. In the Sunita Meena (supra), a Scheduled Tribe candidate
relied on a customary dissolution of marriage dated 11.05.2008
and a dissolution certificate issued by her community, which is
said to have occurred before the cut-off date prescribed with the
recruitment. It is stated that Family Court and the civil court both
have refused to entertain her suit for declaration. The Single
Judge vide its order dated 17.01.2017 kept a post vacant for six
months and gave a liberty to obtain a decree from the Family
Court a declaration from the family court that her marriage stood
dissolved on 11.05.2008. A writ-appeal being preferred by the
Rajasthan Public Service Commission, the Division Bench declined
to interfere with the order of the Single Bench. In fact the
Division Bench order lays down no general proposition of law.
3. In the Sangeeta Varhat (supra), the another Division
Bench held that decree of divorce of the competent court existing
on the last date of application is sine qua non for the divorce
category and a custom cannot be allowed to supersede the terms
and conditions governing the recruitment process and further held
that customary practice cannot displace the prescribed
requirement and treated the Sunita Meena’s case (supra) as per
incuriam and held as under:
“We are of the considered opinion that the
requirement of a decree of divorce for a female
candidate to claim reservation against the reserved
quota for divorcee women on the cut off date/on
the last date of submitting application form is sine
qua non and the candidature cannot be considered
against said category in the absence of decree of
divorce issued by the competent court. A custom
cannot be allowed to supersede the terms and
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conditions governing the recruitment process. The
terms and conditions of recruitment are framed to
adhere to the mandate enshrined under Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution of India which
guarantee equal opportunities to all citizens for
their advancement in the matter of employment.”
Part-III: Relevant Legal Provisions
4. The concept of reservation for women came to be introduced
in the State of Rajasthan vide Notification dated 24.01.2011 is by
Department of Personnel (A-Gr-II) whereby amendment was
made in all the Service Rules invoking Article 309 of the
Constitution of India which reads as under: -
" Reservation of vacancies for women - Reservation
of vacancies for women candidates shall be 30%
category wise in direct recruitment out of which 8%
shall be for widows and 2% for divorced women
candidates. In the event of non-availability of eligible
and suitable widows and divorced women candidates in
a particular year, the vacancies so reserved for widow
and divorced women candidates shall be filled by other
women candidates and in the event of non-availability
of eligible and suitable women candidates, the
vacancies so reserved for them shall be filled up by
male candidates and such vacancies shall not be
carried forward to the subsequent year and the
reservation shall be treated as horizontal reservation
I.e. the reservation of women candidates shall be
adjusted proportionately in the respective category to
which the women candidates belong.
Explanation:- In the case of widow, she will have to
furnish a certificate of death of her husband from the
competent Authority and in case of divorcee she will
have to furnish the proof of divorce."
5. Article 13 of the Constitution of India reads as under:
Article 13 - Laws inconsistent with or in
derogation of the fundamental rights.-
(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately
before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far
as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part,
shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away
or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any
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law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the
extent of the contravention, be void.
(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise
requires,-
(a) "law" includes any Ordinance, order, bye-
law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage
having in the territory of India the force of law;
(b) "laws in force" includes laws passed or made
by a Legislature or other competent authority in the
territory of India before the commencement of this
Constitution and not previously repealed,
notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof
may not be then in operation either at all or in
particular areas.
(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment
of this Constitution made under article 368.
6. Sections 2 and 3 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955,
read as under:
Section 2 (2) - Notwithstanding anything
contained in sub-section (1), nothing
contained in this Act shall apply to the
members of any Scheduled Tribe within the
meaning of clause (25) of Article 366 of the
Constitution unless the Central Government,
by notification in the Official Gazette,
otherwise directs.
Section 3- Definitions .- In this Act, unless
the context otherwise requires,-
(a) the expressions "custom" and "usage"
signify any rule which, having been
continuously and uniformly observed for a
long time, has obtained the force of law
among Hindus in any local area, tribe,
community, group or family:
Provided that the rule is certain and not
unreasonable or opposed to public policy; and
Provided further that in the case of a
rule applicable only to a family it has not been
discontinued by the family;
7. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, reads as
under:
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Section 7 - Jurisdiction.- (1) Subject to the
other provisions of this Act, a Family
Court shall-
(a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction
exercisable by any district court or any
subordinate civil court under any law for the
time being in force in respect of suits and
proceedings of the nature referred to in the
Explanation; and
(b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising
such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district
court or, as the case may be, such subordinate
civil court for the area to which the jurisdiction
of the Family Court extends.
Explanation. - The suits and proceedings
referred to in this sub-section are suits and
proceedings of the following nature, namely:-
(a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a
marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage
(declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as
the case may be, annulling the marriage) or
restitution of conjugal rights or judicial
separation or dissolution of marriage;
(b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as
to the validity of a marriage or as to the
matrimonial status of any person;
8. WHAT THE RULES REQUIRE AS "PROOF OF DIVORCE"
The Governing Rule. By the Rajasthan Various
Service (Amendment) Rules, 2011 (Notification
No. F.7(2)DOP/A-11/88/Pt.1, made under the
proviso to Article 309), the women-reservation
rule in 106 service rules was substituted. The
Schedule includes the Rajasthan Educational
Subordinate Service Rules, 1971 (Rule 7B). The
substituted rule reserves 30% of posts for
women, of which 8% are for widows and 2% for
divorced women. Its Explanation reads:
"Explanation :- In the case of widow, she will
have to furnish a certificate of death of her
husband from the competent Authority and in
case of divorcee she will have to furnish the
proof of divorce."
The same Explanation appears in the RPSC
(Ministerial and Subordinate Services) Rules and
Regulations, 1999 (Rule 9, as substituted in
2011), and in the Explanation to Rule 265 (age)
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of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996,
which governs Teacher Grade III.
9. For the sake of convenience, the question of Law as so
referred is divided in following two parts:
“1.Whether the last date of submission of the
application form is sacrosanct for furnishing last
date of decree of dissolution of marriage/proof of
dissolution of marriage are it can be diluted?
2.What is the proof of divorce that rule requires
from Scheduled Tribes/ST women is a record of
divorce issued by the customary Authority of her
community is really deny of law?”
Part-IV: Last date of submission of the application form is
sacrosanct
10. It is well settled that the suitability and eligibility have to be
considered with reference to the last date for receiving the
applications. The Supreme Court in the matter of Dr. M.V. Nair V.
3
Union of India and Others , has held that the suitability and
eligibility have to be considered with reference to the last date for
receiving the application and observed as under:
“9. In the above situation, it was necessary for the
Tribunal to have recorded a finding on the
correctness or otherwise of the above submission of
the Union of India and Dr Nair. Without doing so, the
Tribunal could not have set aside the appointment of
Dr Nair to the said post. The Tribunal was also not
justified in holding that Dr Bhatnagar was also
equally qualified and eligible for the said post like Dr
Nair when Dr Bhatnagar had himself come forward
with the plea that he was not eligible and asked for
grant of relaxation to make him eligible. The Tribunal,
in our opinion, was also not justified in stating, in the
direction granted by it, that inasmuch as Dr
Bhatnagar "has by now become eligible in all
respects under the recruitment rules, his suitability
should be considered along with other eligible
candidates and if he is found suitable for the
appointment he should be appointed to the said
post". It is well settled that suitability and eligibility
have to be considered with reference to the last date
3 (1993) 2 SCC 429
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for receiving the applications, unless, of course, the
notification calling for applications itself specifies
such a date.”
4
11. In Ashok Kumar Sonkar V. Union of India and Others ,
eligibility is to be judged as on the prescribed date. A candidate
cannot acquire the qualification after the back date and claim
retrospective eligibility and observed in paras 11, 15, 16 and 20 as
under:
11. The question as to what should be the cut-off
date in absence of any date specified in this behalf
either in the advertisement or in the reference is no
longer res integra. It would be last date for filing
application as would appear from the discussions
made hereinafter.
12 to 14. xxxxxxx
15. It was held: (SCC pp. 21-22, para 6)
"So far as the first issue referred to in our order
dated 1-9-1995 is concerned, we are of the
respectful opinion that majority judgment (rendered
by Dr. T.K. Thommen and V. Ramaswami, JJ.) is
unsustainable in law. The proposition that where
applications are called for, prescribing a particular
date as the last date for filing the applications, the
eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judged
with reference to that date and that date alone, is a
well-established one. A person who acquires the
prescribed qualification subsequent to such
prescribed date cannot be considered at all. An
advertisement or notification issued/published calling
for applications constitutes a representation to the
public and the authority issuing it is bound by such
representation. It cannot act contrary to it. One
reason behind this proposition is that if it were
known that persons who obtained the qualifications
after the prescribed date but before the date of
interview would be allowed to appear for the
interview, other similarly placed persons could also
have applied. Just because some of the persons had
applied notwithstanding that they had not acquired
the prescribed qualifications by the prescribed date,
they could not have been treated on a preferential
basis. Their applications ought to have been rejected
at the inception itself. This proposition is indisputable
and in fact was not doubted or disputed in the
majority judgment. This is also the proposition
affirmed in Rekha Chaturvedi v. University of
Rajasthan. The reasoning in the majority opinion that
4 (2007) 4 SCC 54
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by allowing the 33 respondents to appear for the
interview, the recruiting authority was able to get the
best talent available and that such course was in
furtherance of public interest is, with respect, an
impermissible justification. It is, in our considered
opinion, a clear error of law and an error apparent on
the face of the record. In our opinion, R.M. Sahai, J.
(and the Division Bench of the High Court) was right
in holding that the 33 respondents could not have
been allowed to appear for the interview."
The said decision is, therefore, an authority for the
proposition that in absence of any cut-off date
specified in the advertisement or in the rules, the last
date for filing of an application shall be considered as
such.
16. Indisputably, the appellant herein did not hold
the requisite qualification as on the said cut-off date.
He was, therefore, not eligible therefor.
17 to 19. xxxxxx
20. Possession of requisite educational qualification
is mandatory. The same should not be uncertain. If
an uncertainty is allowed to prevail, the employer
would be flooded with applications of ineligible
candidates. A cut-off date for the purpose of
determining the eligibility of the candidates
concerned must, therefore, be fixed. In absence of
any rule or any specific date having been fixed in the
advertisement, the law, therefore, as held by this
Court would be the last date for filing the application.
12. In the matter of Shankar K. Mandal and Others Vs. State
5
of Bihar and Others , held that the cut-off is fixed by the Rules
first among filling them by the advertisement and if neither
specifies ordinarily by the last date for receipt of application and
observed in paragraph 5 as under:
5. Pursuant to the directions contained in the earlier
judgment of the High Court as affirmed by this Court,
a fresh exercise was undertaken. Since the present
appellants were not selected, writ petitions were filed
before the High Court. In the writ petition which was
filed by fifty-five persons and disposed of by the
Division Bench the conclusions were essentially as
follows: (1) Some of the writ petitioners (Writ
Petitioners 5, 18, 23, 28, 41 and 53) were overage at
the time of their initial appointment and their cases
5 (2003) 9 SCC 519
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were, therefore, wholly covered by the directions
given by the High Court, and they were not entitled
to relaxation of age; (2) So far as Writ Petitioners 6,
26, 30 and 55 are concerned, the stand was that
they had not crossed the age-limit at the time of
making the applications for appointment and,
therefore, were within the age-limit at the time of
initial appointment and were, therefore, entitled to
relaxation of age in terms of the judgment passed by
the High Court earlier and affirmed by this Court.
This plea was turned down on the ground that what
was relevant for consideration related to the age at
the time of initial appointment and not making of the
application; (3) As regards Writ Petitioner 24, he was
underage at the time of appointment. He was
permitted to file a representation before the Director
of Primary Education and the High Court ordered that
his case would be considered afresh; (4) In respect
of Writ Petitioners 9 and 17, it was noted that they
were refused absorption on the ground that they had
not made any application in d response to
advertisement issued pursuant to the order passed
by this Court. Since no material was placed to
substantiate this stand and no reasons had been
communicated for non-absorption, direction was
given to consider representations if made by them
within one month from the date of judgment. The
said judgment is under challenge in CA No. 916 of
1999. The appellants have taken the stand that in
terms of this Court's judgment, a person who was
not overage on the date of initial appointment was to
be considered. Though it was conceded before the
High Court that they were overage at the time of
initial appointment, much would turn as to what is
the date of initial appointment. The High Court had
not considered as to what was the applicable rule so
far as the eligibility regarding age is concerned.
Learned counsel appearing for the respondent State
however submitted that having made a concession
before the High Court that they were overage on the
date of appointment, it is not open to the appellants
to take a different stand. The crucial question is
whether appellants were overage on the date of their
initial appointment. It is true that there was
concession before the High Court that they were
overage on the date of initial appointment. But there
was no concession that they were overage at the
time of making the application. There was no definite
material before the High Court as to what was the
eligibility criteria so far as age is concerned. No
definite material was placed before the High Court
and also before this Court to give a definite finding
on that aspect. What happens when a cut-off date is
fixed for fulfilling the prescribed qualification relating
to age by a candidate for appointment and the effect
of any non-prescription has been considered by this
Court in several cases. The principles culled out from
the decisions of this Court ( see Ashok Kumar Sharma
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v. Chander Shekhar, Bhupinderpal Singh v. State of
Punjab and Jasbir Rani v. State of Punjab ) are as
follows:
(1) The cut-off date by reference to which the
eligibility requirement must be satisfied by the
candidate seeking a public employment is the date
appointed by the relevant service rules.
(2) If there is no cut-off date appointed by the
rules then such date shall be as appointed for the
purpose in the advertisement calling for applications.
(3) If there is no such date appointed then the
eligibility criteria shall be applied by reference to the
last date appointed by which the applications were to
be received by the competent authority.
13. In the matter of Dolly Chandra V. Chairman,JEE and
6
Others : their Lordship of the Supreme Court distinguishes
possessing the substantive eligibility by the cut-off from producing
proof of it. It is further held that a deficiency in proof may,
depending on the governing conditions, be curable; the eligibility
can neither be relaxed nor acquired later and observed in
paragraph 7 and 8 as under:
“ 7. The general rule is that while applying for any
course of study or a post, a person must possess the
eligibility qualification on the last date fixed for such
purpose either in the admission brochure or in
application form, as the case may be, unless there is
an express provision to the contrary. There can be no
relaxation in this regard i.e. in the matter of holding
the requisite eligibility qualification by the date fixed.
This has to be established by producing the
necessary certificates, degrees or marksheets.
Similarly, in order to avail of the benefit of
reservation or weightage, etc. necessary certificates
have to be produced. These are documents in the
nature of proof of holding of particular qualification or
percentage of marks secured or entitlement to
benefit of reservation. Depending upon the facts of a
case, there can be some relaxation in the matter of
submission of proof and it will not be proper to apply
any rigid principle as it pertains in the domain of
procedure. Every infraction of the rule relating to
submission of proof need not necessarily result in
rejection of candidature.
6 (2005) 9 SCC 779
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8. This principle was explained and applied in Charles
K. Skaria v. Dr. C. Mathew. The controversy here
related to admission to a postgraduate course in
medicine. The relevant rule provided for addition of
10% marks if a candidate possessed a diploma in the
relevant subject or subspecialty and this benefit
could be given only if the candidate's success in the
diploma course was brought to the knowledge of the
Selection Committee before completion of selection
in an authentic or acceptable manner. The prospectus
provided that the attested copies of statement of
marks and other documents should be attached with
every application. Three such candidates were given
admission who had not attached the certificate of
having passed the diploma along with their
applications. Their admission to postgraduate course
was set aside by the High Court on the ground that
their applications, wherein they claimed the benefit
of diploma, were liable to be rejected as the requisite
certificates had not been attached. This Court
speaking through Krishna Iyer, J. reversed the
judgment of the High Court and held that the
admission to the candidates had rightly been given
as they had in fact passed the diploma before the
date fixed. The relevant parts of paras 20 and 24 of
the judgment, where this principle was highlighted
are being reproduced below: (SCC pp. 762 & 763)
" 20. There is nothing unreasonable or arbitrary
in adding 10 marks for holders of a diploma. But to
earn these extra 10 marks, the diploma must be
obtained at least on or before the last date for
application, not later. Proof of having obtained a
diploma is different from the factum of having got it.
Has the candidate, in fact, secured a diploma before
the final date of application for admission to the
degree course? That is the primary question. It is
prudent to produce evidence of the diploma along
with the application, but that is secondary. Relaxation
of the date on the first is illegal, not so on the
second. Academic excellence, through a diploma for
which extra mark is granted, cannot be denuded
because proof is produced only later, yet before the
date of actual selection. The emphasis is on the
diploma; the proof thereof subserves the factum of
possession of the diploma and is not an independent
factor.... Mode of proof is geared to the goal of the
qualification in question. It is subversive of sound
interpretation and realistic decoding of the
prescription to telescope the two and make both
mandatory in point of time. What is essential is the
possession of a diploma before the given date; what
is ancillary is the safe mode of proof of the
qualification. To confuse between a fact and its proof
is blurred perspicacity. To make mandatory the date
of acquiring the additional qualification before the
last date for application makes sense. But if it is
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unshakeably shown that the qualification has been
acquired before the relevant date, as is the case
here, to invalidate this merit factor because proof,
though indubitable, was adduced a few days later but
before the selection or in a manner not mentioned in
the prospectus, but still above board, is to make
procedure not the handmaid but the mistress and
form not as subservient to substance but as superior
to the essence.
*
24. It is notorious that this formalistic, ritualistic
approach is unrealistic and is unwittingly traumatic,
unjust and subversive of the purpose of the exercise.
This way of viewing problems dehumanises the
administrative, judicial and even legislative processes
in the wider perspective of law for man and not man
for law. Much of hardship and harassment in
administration flows from overemphasis on the
external rather than the essential. We think the
Government and the Selection Committee rightly
treated as directory (not mandatory) the mode of
proving the holding of diplomas and as mandatory
the actual possession of the diploma. In actual life,
we know how exasperatingly dilatory it is to get
copies of degrees, decrees and deeds, not to speak
of other authenticated documents like marklists from
universities, why, even bail orders from courts and
government orders from public offices."
14. As such the eligibility is to be judged on the last date of
receiving application, unless the advertisement or rules provides
otherwise. (See Rekha Chaturvedi Vs. University of
7 8
Rajasthan ; Bhupinderpal Singh Vs. State of Punjab ; Ashok
Kumar Sonkar Vs. Union of India (Supra); Rakesh Kumar
9
Sharma Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) .
Part-V: The divorcee is a legal status that must exist
15. The divorcee category is the horizontal reservation within a
category. A candidate who claims and asserts that he/she is no
7 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 168
8 (2000) 5 SCC 262
9 (2013) 11 SCC (58)
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longer married. These are the legal status and the claim must be
true and verifiable on the last date.
16. Section 2(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 saves tribal
custom. However, it does not relieve a candidate of the terms of a
public recruitment. Custom must be pleaded and proved including
its content, antiquity and the manner of dissolution. A recruiting
body verifying thousands of documents cannot adjudicate the
existence of a custom, its application to the individual and the
date of dissolution. A decree of a court of competent jurisdiction
is the uniform and verifiable proof. Family Courts have jurisdiction
over declarations of marriage and matrimonial status under
Section 7(1), Explanation (b) of the Family Courts Act, 1984.
Part-VI: A customary divorce must be pleaded and proved
before a Court and recruitment body cannot decide it
17. The Scheduled Tribe candidates are not precluded from
obtaining such a declaration. The requirement burdens no one
unequally. It asks the candidate to establish her status in the
ordinary forum before she claims a benefit that depends on it.
18. Section 29(2) of the Hindu marriage Act saves a right to
dissolve the marriage by custom but the custom must be
specifically pleaded and specifically proved by the party relying on
it as held by their Lordship in Supreme Court in Yamanaji H.
10
Jadhav V. Nirmala , and observed in para 7 as under:
“7. In the view that we are inclined to take in this
appeal, we do not think it is necessary for us to go
into the contentions advanced by the learned counsel
for the parties in this case, because we find that the
courts below have erroneously proceeded on the
basis that the divorce deed relied upon by the parties
10 (2002) 2 SCC, 637
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in question was a document which is acceptable in
law. It is to be noted that the deed in question is
purported to be a document which is claimed to be in
conformity with the customs applicable for divorce in
the community to which the parties to this litigation
belong to. As per the Hindu law administered by
courts in India divorce was not recognised as a
means to put an end to marriage, which was always
considered to be a sacrament, with only exception
where it is recognised by custom. Public policy, good
morals and the interests of society were considered
to require and ensure that, if at all, severance should
be allowed only in the manner and for the reason or
cause specified in law. Thus such a custom being an
exception to the general law of divorce ought to have
been specially pleaded and established by the party
propounding such custom since the said custom of
divorce is contrary to the law of the land and which,
if not proved, will be a practice opposed to public
policy. Therefore, there was an obligation on the trial
court to have framed an issue whether there was
proper pleadings by the party contending the
existence of a customary divorce in the community to
which the parties belonged and whether such
customary divorce and compliance with the manner
or formalities attendant thereto was in fact
established in the case on hand to the satisfaction of
the court. In the instant case, we have perused the
pleadings of the parties before the trial court and we
do not find any material to show that prevalence of
any such customary divorce in the community, based
on which the document of divorce was brought into
existence was ever pleaded by the defendant as
required by law or any evidence was led in this case
to substantiate the same. It is true that in the courts
below the parties did not specifically join issue in
regard to this question and the lawyers appearing for
the parties did orally agree that the document in
question was in fact in accordance with the
customary divorce prevailing in the community to
which the parties belonged but this consensus on the
part of the counsel or lack of sufficient pleading in
the plaint or in the written statement would not, in
our opinion, permit the court to countenance the plea
of customary divorce unless and until such customary
divorce is properly established in a court of law. In
our opinion, even though the plaintiff might not have
questioned the validity of the customary divorce, the
court ought to have appreciated the consequences of
there not being a customary divorce based on which
the document of divorce has come into existence
bearing in mind that a divorce by consent is also not
recognisable by a court unless specifically permitted
by law. Therefore, we are of the opinion to do
complete justice in this case it is necessary that the
trial court be directed to frame a specific issue in
regard to customary divorce based on which the
divorce deed dated 26-6-1982 has come into
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existence and which is the subject-matter of the suit
in question. In this regard, we permit the parties to
amend the pleadings, if they so desire and also to
lead evidence to the limited extent of proving the
existence of a provision for customary divorce
(otherwise through the process of or outside court) in
their community and then test the validity of the
divorce deed dated 26-6-1982 based on the finding
arrived at in deciding the new issue.”
19. The Supreme Court in the matter of Sanjana Kumari V.
Vijay Kumar- Criminal Appeal No.2905/2023 decided on
18.09.2023, held that parties can have a valid divorce through a
customary divorce deed only if they prove that it was established
custom, whether the parties are governed by such custom is a
question of fact which cannot deliberately adjudicated only by a
Civil Court and until it is proved there is presumption of subsisting
marriage and observed in para 10 and 11 as under:
“10. There can be thus no doubt that the party who
places reliance on customary divorce deed is
obligated to establish that such custom is allowed by
a practice that has been uniformly observed for a
long time and such custom is not unreasonable or
opposed to public policy and thus the validity of such
customary divorce is duly protected by the exception
carved out in Section 29(2) of the 1955 Act.
11. The issue whether the parties are governed by
the custom under which a divorce can be obtained
without recourse to Sections 11 and 13 of the 1955
Act, is essentially a question of fact which is required
to be specifically pleaded and proved by way of
cogent evidence. Such question can ordinarily be
adjudicated only by a civil court. May be in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of a case, the
validity of a customary divorce deed can be
examined even by a court other than the Civil Court
in some collateral proceedings. But that is not the
question which falls for our consideration in these
proceedings.”
20. Section 7(1) Explanation (b) Family Court confers jurisdiction
over a suit or proceedings for declaration as to the validity of a
marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person and a
tribal man, who claims a customary divorce can seek exactly such
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a declaration from family court and it cannot be done by the
recruiting body. In fact Sunita Meena’s (supra) is confined to the
facts of the case and does not hold the customary divorce is
enough as Sunita Meena (supra) did not hold that community
divorce is sufficient. The Division Bench affirmed the order of
Single Bench who kept the selection results for six months with
liberty to her to obtain a declaration from the Family court that
her marriage was dissolved on 11.05.2008 and directed
consideration only if she fulfilled the conditions stipulated in the
Single Judge order. So even there, a Family Court declaration was
required. He dealt with candidate whose declaratory suit has been
refused by two Courts below.
Part-VI: Conclusion and Answer to question of law
21. In view of the above, the question so referred is answered as
under:-
(1) A female candidate of Scheduled Tribes category is not
entitled to appointment under the Divorcee category on the
strength of a customary divorce without a decree of
dissolution of marriage by jurisdictional court establishing her
status as divorcee on or before the last date of submission of
the application form.
(2) Section 2(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 does not
relief such a candidate of requirement of proof; a customary
divorce must be pleaded and proved before a competent
court and cannot be adjudicated by the recruiting body.
(3) The Secretary, Rajasthan Public Service
Commission Vs. Sangeeta Varhat (supra), lays down the
law correctly on this point and Rajasthan Public Service
Commission Vs. Sunita Meena (supra) is confined to its
own facts.
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22. The reference is accordingly disposed off.
23. Let the matter be placed before the appropriate Bench
having the roster for considering the appeal on its own merits.
24. We place on record our appreciation for the assistance
rendered by Mr. Sandeep Pathak, Mr. Tribhuvan Narayan Singh, Mr.
Tanveer Ahamad with Mr. Iliyas Khan and Mr. Tanay Jareda, Mr.
Shiv Charan Singh, with Mr. Harsh Saraswat, Mr. Chain Singh
Rathore, Mr. Vikash Meena, Mr. Akshit Gupta, Ms. Pragya Seth, Mr.
Nakul Bansal, Mr. Shreyansh Dhariwal, Mr. Pallav Pancholi, Mr.
Kapil Gupta, Mr. Ajay Gadhwal, Mr. R.S. Sinsinwar, Mr. Dharemndra
Kumar Bairwa, Ms. Anisha Yadav, Mr. Chitransh Saxena, Mr. Abhay
Singh Rathore, Mr. Tanay Choudhary, Mr. Ayal Yadav, Mr. Sushil
Yadav, Mr. Akshay Singh, Mr. Ranvijay Singh, Ms. Vedika Yadav,
Mr. Akshay Singh, Mr. Bhawani Shankar, Mr. Ashish Mittal, Mr.
Aditya Raj, Mr. Punit Singhvi, Mr. Ayush Singh, Mr. Ajay Singh
Rathore, Mr. Ishan Verma, Mr. Naman Dadhich, Mr. Lakshya
Sharma, Mr. Prem Chand Dewanda, Mr. Kapil Choudhary, Ms. Riya
Choudhary, Mr. Himanshu Dholia, Mr. Abhishek Singh Devanda,
Ms. Muskaan Jalu, Mr. Avin Chhangani with Ms. Priyanka Bishnoi,
Mr. Virendra Lodha, Sr. Adv. assisted by Mr. Jai Lodha, Mr. Ankit
Rathore, Ms. Saral Sharma, and Ms. Katyani Singh, Mr.
S.S.Naruka, AAG with Ms. Ritika Naruka, Mr. Sachin Rathore, Mr.
Manish Sharma, Mr. Ritik Dahiya, and Mr. Abhishek Singh, Mr.
Sandeep Jain, Mr.Shobit Tiwari, with Mr. Pushpendra Singh Tanwar,
and Mr. Rohit Tiwari, Mr. Ashish Saksena, Mr.M.F. Baig, Mr. Naman
Maheshwari, Mr. Vishwas Fatehpuria, Mr.Priyansh Gupta, Mr. Raghu
Nandan Sharma, with Ms. Manasvita Sharma, Dr. Saugath Roy,
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learned counsels who appeared and made submissions in arriving
at the aforesaid conclusion.
(PRAMIL KUMAR MATHUR, J.) (SAMEER JAIN, J) (SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, CJ)
Naval Gandhi(Reserved)
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