Ashok Kumar vs Madhu Sudan And Anr.
- Court
- Punjab and Haryana High Court
RSA-1346-2013 (O&M)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
RSA-1346-2013 (O&M)
Ashok Kumar ...Appellant-Plaintiff
Versus
Madhu Sudan Aggarwal (LR of Siri Niwas, deceased)
and another ...Respondents-Defendants
Reserved on: 19.11.2026
Pronounced on: 21.11.2026
Pronounced fully/operative part: Fully
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
Argued by: Mr. Ajit Singh Lamba, Ms. Annie and
Ms. Rhea, Advocates, for the appellant.
Ms. Priyanka, Mr. SPS Rana, and
Ms. Tanya Kanwar, Advocates, for respondent No.1.
DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
The present Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the
plaintiff against the judgment & decree dated 08.01.2013 passed by the
learned Additional District Judge, Bhiwani, whereby the judgment & decree
dated 29.02.2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bhiwani,
decreeing the plaintiff's suit for declaration and permanent injunction, have
been reversed and the suit dismissed.
2. The controversy essentially revolves around the nature of the suit
property, the genuineness and legal effect of the family settlement allegedly
arrived at in the year 1988 and recorded through memorandum dated
26.02.1990 (Ex.P1), and the question whether the First Appellate Court was
justified in reversing the findings of the trial Court.
Factual Matrix
3. The suit property is a double-storeyed residential house of about
250 square yards, M.C. Unit No. N-463, Gali Bhagat Ami Lal, Banwariwala,
behind Kirorimal Mandir, Bhiwani. Siri Niwas (defendant No. 1) had three sons,
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Ashok Kumar (plaintiff), Madhu Sudan and Prem Chand, a daughter Gayatri
Devi, and wife, Smt. Laxmi Devi. These relationships are not in dispute. By
partition deed dated 06.03.1958 (Ex. D-2), executed between Siri Niwas and
his brothers, the suit house fell to the share of Siri Niwas under Schedule 'C'.
Execution of this deed is admitted by both sides.
4. The plaintiff pleaded that the family owned various properties
and business interests. According to the plaintiff, an oral family settlement was
arrived at among the family members in the year 1988, whereby the disputed
house fell to his exclusive share, while other properties, business interests and
cash were allotted to the remaining family members. The said arrangement
was subsequently recorded in a Memorandum of Family Settlement dated
26.02.1990 (Ex.P1), which itself contains a recital referring to the family
settlement having already taken place in 1988. The memorandum was typed
at Calcutta on stamp paper purchased on 13.12.1989 in the name of Kamla
Devi, wife of Madhu Sudan, and allegedly bore the signatures of Siri Niwas,
Laxmi Devi and their three sons, besides being witnessed by Kamla Devi and
attested by Notary Bimal Kumar Banerjee (PW2).
5. It was further pleaded that Siri Niwas, who had been residing at
Calcutta, expressed his desire to settle at Bhiwani in September 2005,
whereupon the plaintiff permitted him to occupy the disputed house as a
licensee. In this regard, Siri Niwas allegedly executed an affidavit dated
09/10.09.2005 (Ex.P3), acknowledging the plaintiff's ownership and his own
permissive occupation. However, subsequently, allegedly at the instance of
Madhu Sudan, Siri Niwas started asserting ownership over the house and
threatened to alienate or demolish it. Apprehending interference with his
rights and alteration of the municipal ownership record, the plaintiff instituted
the suit seeking declaration of ownership and permanent injunction
restraining defendant No.1 from alienating or demolishing the property and
defendant No.2, Municipal Council, Bhiwani, from deleting his name from its
record.
6. Defendant No.1, Siri Niwas, contested the suit by asserting that
the house was his self-acquired property. It was pleaded that the property had
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fallen to his exclusive share under a partition deed dated 06.03.1958 (Ex.D2),
executed between him and his brothers. He categorically denied having
entered into any family settlement in 1988 or having executed Ex.P1. In
paragraph 2-A of the amended written statement, it was specifically alleged
that his signatures appeared to have been lifted from other documents with
the assistance of a computer or photocopying machine. The affidavit Ex.P3 was
also disputed.
7. During the pendency of the suit, Siri Niwas died on 10.07.2007
and Madhu Sudan was brought on record as his legal representative. The latter
also relied upon a Will dated 02.06.2006 (Ex.D1), allegedly executed by Siri
Niwas in his favour.
8. The Municipal Council, Bhiwani, separately contested the
plaintiff's claim regarding the municipal ownership entries.
Findings of the Courts below:
9. The trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary
evidence, decreed the suit on 29.02.2012. It held that the plaintiff had
satisfactorily proved the family settlement and the memorandum Ex.P1
through the testimony of PW1 Ashok Kumar, PW2 Bimal Kumar Banerjee
(notary), PW3 Prem Chand and PW7 Yashpal Chand Jain, handwriting and
fingerprint expert. The trial Court also relied upon the affidavit Ex.P3, the
arbitration award Ex.P4 and the Municipal Assessment Register Ex.P5 dated
27.05.2005. It concluded that Siri Niwas was occupying the property as a
licensee and that the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration and injunction
sought.
10. However, the First Appellate Court reversed the judgment. It held
that the plaintiff had failed to prove the execution of Ex.P1; that the disputed
house was the separate property of Siri Niwas, and that the circumstances
surrounding preparation of the memorandum rendered it doubtful. It further
held that the plaintiff had failed to establish that Siri Niwas was occupying the
property as a licensee and that the suit was not maintainable without seeking
possession.
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Rival Submissions of learned counsels
11. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that
the First Appellate Court has reversed the well-reasoned findings of the trial
Court on conjectures and surmises. It is submitted that the alleged fabrication
of Ex.P1 was never established by the defendants. Their specific plea was that
the signatures of Siri Niwas had been mechanically lifted from other
documents, whereas the First Appellate Court proceeded on an entirely
different theory that signatures had been obtained on blank stamp papers for
some other purpose.
12. It is further submitted that the execution of Ex.P1 stood
established through the direct testimony of PW3 Prem Chand, who was
himself a party to the settlement, the testimony of PW2, who attested the
document, and the opinion of PW7, handwriting expert. The First Appellate
Court discarded this evidence on immaterial discrepancies concerning the
purchase of stamp paper, the language in which the memorandum was typed
and the spacing between its contents and signatures.
13. Learned counsel has further argued that the First Appellate Court
erroneously proceeded on the assumption that a family settlement could not
operate in respect of self-acquired property or in favour of a family member
having no established antecedent title. Reliance has been placed upon Kale
and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, (1976) 3 SCC 119;
Ram Charan Das v. Girja Nandini Devi and others, AIR 1966 SC 323;
Gurcharan Singh and others v. Angrez Kaur and another, (2020) 10 SCC 250;
and Thulasidhara and another v. Narayanappa and others, (2019) 6 SCC 409.
14. It is also contended that Ex.P1 merely recorded an oral family
settlement already concluded in 1988 and, therefore, did not require
compulsory registration. The subsequent conduct of the parties, particularly
the affidavit Ex.P3, the arbitration award Ex.P4 and the municipal record Ex.P5,
establishes that the settlement was acted upon.
15. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has
supported the judgment of the First Appellate Court. It is submitted that the
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disputed house had fallen to the exclusive share of Siri Niwas under the
partition deed Ex.D2 and that the plaintiff had no right by birth therein. The
alleged memorandum Ex.P1 was never genuinely executed. The circumstances
concerning its preparation, the discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses,
and the absence of satisfactory proof of the signatures justified its rejection.
16. Learned counsel has further submitted that the plaintiff
admittedly was not in actual possession of the house and that Siri Niwas had
been occupying it in his own right. Neither Ex.P3 nor Ex.P4 could
independently confer right of ownership upon the plaintiff. The findings
recorded by the First Appellate Court are findings of fact based upon
appreciation of evidence and do not warrant any interference under Section
100 CPC.
Substantial questions of law
17. Having considered the rival submissions and examined the
judgments of the Courts below, the following substantial questions of law arise
for consideration:
(i) Whether the finding of the First Appellate Court rejecting the
execution of the family settlement memorandum (Ex.P1) is vitiated by reliance
upon an unpleaded theory of fabrication, erroneous application of the burden
of proof and failure to properly appreciate material evidence?
(ii) Whether the First Appellate Court erred in law in treating the
separate ownership of Siri Niwas and the absence of an established
antecedent title in the plaintiff as impediments to a valid family settlement,
and in failing to apply the distinction between an instrument creating rights
and a memorandum recording an earlier oral arrangement?
(iii) Whether the First Appellate Court correctly applied the proviso to
Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, while considering the
maintainability of the suit, particularly in the light of the plaintiff's pleaded
case that Siri Niwas was occupying the house as a licensee?
Discussion and findings
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18. Before examining the controversy, it is necessary to bear in mind
the scope of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. Ordinarily, findings of fact
recorded by the First Appellate Court are not open to interference merely
because another view of the evidence is possible. However, where such
findings are based upon conjectures, misreading of material evidence, an
erroneous application of legal principles or a case never pleaded by the
parties, interference is permissible. Reference may be made to Santosh Hazari
v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179; H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith,
(2005) 10 SCC 243; and Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545.
19. The First Appellate Court undoubtedly possesses jurisdiction to
reappreciate the entire evidence and reverse the findings of the trial Court.
However, while doing so, it is required to consider the reasons, which
persuaded the trial Court to reach its conclusions and furnish cogent reasons
for taking a contrary view. Such reversal cannot rest upon speculative
circumstances or an affirmative factual case, which was never pleaded or
proved.
Nature of the suit property and permissibility of family settlement
20. The First Appellate Court attached considerable importance to the
partition deed dated 06.03.1958 (Ex.D2), whereunder the disputed house fell
to the share of Siri Niwas. However, the mere fact that property was allotted
to a person under a partition deed does not, by itself, determine whether it
was ancestral, coparcenary or separately owned property in his hands. Such
determination depends upon the source and character of the property prior to
partition.
21. Nevertheless, the plaintiff, who asserted the ancestral character
of the house, was required to establish the foundational facts necessary to
sustain such a claim. The mere existence of a joint Hindu family does not give
rise to a presumption that every property held by one of its members is joint
family property. The principle has been reiterated in D.S. Lakshmaiah and
another v. L. Balasubramanyam and another, (2003) 10 SCC 310.
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22. Be that as it may, the controversy does not necessarily turn upon
whether the property was ancestral or self-acquired. Even assuming that the
house was the separate property of Siri Niwas, there was no absolute legal
prohibition against his voluntarily entering into a bona fide family arrangement
concerning the same.
23. In Kale (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that family
arrangements are governed by special equitable considerations and are
intended to preserve peace and harmony within the family. It was recognised
that even possible claims, which may not have crystallised into enforceable
legal rights, can furnish the basis for a bona fide family arrangement.
24. Similarly, in Ram Charan Das (supra) and Gurcharan Singh
(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised that a family arrangement
need not invariably proceed upon an established antecedent title in every
participant. A bona fide arrangement resolving existing or possible disputes
may be legally recognised, provided the arrangement is otherwise genuine and
satisfies the applicable legal requirements.
25. Thus, the proposition that the plaintiff could not acquire any right
under a family settlement merely because the property was separately owned
by Siri Niwas, or because the plaintiff had no established antecedent title, is
too broadly stated. The decisive question is whether Siri Niwas voluntarily
participated in a genuine family arrangement under which the disputed house
was allotted to the plaintiff.
26. Accordingly, the First Appellate Court's reasoning on the nature of
the property cannot, by itself, furnish a legally sustainable ground for rejecting
the plaintiff's claim.
Execution and genuineness of Ex.P1
27. The major controversy concerns the execution of memorandum
Ex.P1 dated 26.02.1990. The plaintiff pleaded that the family settlement had
already taken place orally in 1988 and that Ex.P1 merely recorded the
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arrangement. The trial Court accepted the document as genuine, whereas the
First Appellate Court rejected it.
28. It is important that Siri Niwas, in paragraph 2-A of his amended
written statement, specifically alleged that his signatures on Ex.P1 appeared to
have been lifted from other documents with the assistance of a computer or
photocopying machine. Thus, the affirmative case set up by him was one of
mechanical reproduction of signatures and not that he had voluntarily signed
blank stamp papers, which were subsequently misused.
29. The First Appellate Court, however, proceeded to infer that
signatures had been obtained on blank papers for some other purpose and
that the memorandum was subsequently prepared thereon. This inference
was materially different from the defence actually pleaded. There was no
corresponding plea explaining when, where, by whom or under what
circumstances Siri Niwas had allegedly signed such blank papers.
30. It is settled that parties are bound by their pleadings and that a
Court cannot ordinarily make out a new factual case for a party. In Bachhaj
Nahar v. Nilima Mandal and another, (2008) 17 SCC 491, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court reiterated the importance of pleadings in defining the
controversy between the parties.
31. The First Appellate Court was certainly entitled to examine
whether the plaintiff had proved execution of Ex.P1. However, it could not
treat an unpleaded theory of misuse of blank signed papers as an established
fact merely on the basis of spacing in the document or other surrounding
circumstances.
32. The initial burden of proving Ex.P1 rested upon the plaintiff. That
burden could be discharged through direct evidence of execution, proof of
signatures and other relevant circumstances. Once sufficient evidence of
execution was produced, the defendants were required to substantiate their
affirmative allegation of mechanical fabrication. The failure of the defendants
to prove forgery would not, by itself, establish execution, but it would be
relevant while evaluating the competing versions.
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33. In the present case, the plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and
Prem Chand, another son of Siri Niwas, as PW3. Prem Chand was an alleged
participant in the settlement and supported the plaintiff's version regarding
the arrangement and the memorandum. His evidence was material because he
was not merely a formal witness but a family member, whose own rights and
interests were involved in the arrangement.
34. The First Appellate Court noticed certain discrepancies in the
evidence of PW3 regarding the distribution of other family assets and business
interests. However, such discrepancies were required to be examined in the
context of the principal question, namely whether the family arrangement was
arrived at and whether Ex.P1 was executed by the persons whose signatures it
purported to bear.
35. A family settlement is not necessarily invalid merely because it
does not provide an exhaustive account of every family asset or because the
witnesses are unable, after a considerable lapse of time, to recollect every
detail concerning the distribution of business interests and cash. The material
question is whether the essential transaction has been satisfactorily proved.
36. The plaintiff also examined PW2 Bimal Kumar Banerjee, who
attested Ex.P1. The First Appellate Court attached importance to the
circumstance that PW2 did not personally know all the executants and relied
upon their identification by another person. However, the memorandum was
not a document, which the law required to be compulsorily attested.
Consequently, its execution could be established through the ordinary modes
of proof under the Evidence Act, 1872.
37. The circumstance that PW2 did not personally know every
executant could affect the weight of his testimony, but it did not automatically
render the document unproved. His evidence was required to be considered
along with that of PW1, PW3 and the expert witness.
38. The plaintiff further examined PW7 Yashpal Chand Jain,
handwriting and fingerprint expert, who compared the disputed signatures
with signatures appearing on other documents attributed to Siri Niwas. The
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comparison material included documents produced through PW4 Krishan
Kumar Parsuramka, Chartered Accountant, who was associated with the
accounts and income-tax affairs of M/s Madan Mohan Trading Company.
39. The First Appellate Court discarded the expert opinion mainly
because the comparison signatures were available on documents retained by
the Chartered Accountant and because PW4 was stated not to be personally
acquainted with Siri Niwas.
40. This approach requires scrutiny. Under Sections 47 and 73 of the
Evidence Act, handwriting may be proved through persons acquainted with
the writing, through other admissible evidence and through comparison with
signatures admitted or proved to be genuine. A professional relationship may
provide a sufficient basis for identifying signatures if the witness had
personally seen the person sign. The absence of personal or social intimacy is
not, by itself, decisive.
41. The expert opinion was undoubtedly not conclusive.
Nevertheless, it constituted relevant evidence and could not be discarded
merely upon assumptions regarding the manner in which duplicate documents
were ordinarily retained in the Chartered Accountant's office. The First
Appellate Court was required to determine whether the comparison
signatures had been satisfactorily proved and thereafter evaluate the expert
opinion along with the remaining evidence.
42. The trial Court had also considered the allegation that Siri Niwas's
signatures were mechanically lifted from other documents. No expert
evidence was produced by the defendants to substantiate that specific
allegation. The absence of such evidence does not relieve the plaintiff of his
initial burden, but it weakens the affirmative defence of mechanical
fabrication once the plaintiff's evidence of execution is otherwise found
reliable.
43. The First Appellate Court also relied upon the circumstance that
the stamp paper was purchased on 13.12.1989 in the name of Kamla Devi,
whereas the memorandum was executed on 26.02.1990. However, purchase
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of stamp paper by a family member before execution of a document is not
inherently suspicious. The plaintiff's case was that the oral arrangement had
already taken place in 1988 and was subsequently recorded in writing. The
interval between purchase of stamp paper and execution of the
memorandum, without further evidence, could not justify an inference of
fabrication.
44. Likewise, the circumstance that Ex.P1 was typed in Hindi at
Kolkata could not be treated as an indication of forgery merely because Hindi
was not the official language ordinarily used there. Parties are free to prepare
private documents in a language understood or chosen by them.
45. The First Appellate Court also attached importance to the spacing
between the written contents and signatures on Ex.P1. Such spacing may be a
relevant circumstance, where misuse of signed blank papers is specifically
alleged and supported by evidence. However, in the present case, the defence
was of mechanical lifting of signatures. Without supporting evidence, the
spacing could not establish the entirely different factual proposition that
signatures had been obtained on blank stamp papers.
46. The non-participation of Gayatri Devi and the presence of
signatures of Laxmi Devi and Kamla Devi were also considered suspicious.
However, a family arrangement does not necessarily require participation of
every family member, where the rights of absent members are not being
adversely affected. The validity of an arrangement must be examined with
reference to the rights involved and the actual transaction, rather than merely
the number of persons who signed it.
47. Another relevant circumstance is that Siri Niwas, who personally
disputed the execution of Ex.P1, did not enter the witness box. Although the
Court must consider the opportunity available to him before his death, his
absence meant that the specific allegation of mechanical lifting of signatures
was not substantiated by his own testimony.
48. Having considered the evidence referred to above, this Court
finds that the trial Court had accepted the execution of Ex.P1 on the
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cumulative strength of the testimony of PW1, PW2 and PW3, the expert
evidence of PW7 and the surrounding circumstances. The First Appellate Court
rejected that conclusion by attaching disproportionate importance to
collateral circumstances and by introducing an unpleaded theory regarding
signatures on blank papers.
49. The finding of the First Appellate Court regarding non-execution
of Ex.P1, therefore, cannot be treated as merely another permissible
appreciation of evidence. Its reasoning suffers from material legal infirmities
concerning the pleaded controversy, the evidentiary burden and the
assessment of the evidence supporting execution.
Whether the settlement was acted upon
50. The plaintiff also relied upon subsequent conduct of the parties to
establish that the settlement had been implemented. In this regard, Ex.P3,
Ex.P4 and Ex.P5 are very significant.
51. Ex.P3 is the affidavit allegedly executed by Siri Niwas in
September 2005. According to the plaintiff, Siri Niwas acknowledged therein
that the plaintiff was owner of the disputed house and that he himself was
occupying it as a licensee. The plaintiff examined PW5 and PW6 concerning
preparation and attestation of the affidavit, besides relying upon expert
evidence regarding signatures and thumb impressions.
52. The First Appellate Court questioned the evidentiary value of
Ex.P3 on account of alleged irregularities in its preparation and attestation.
However, the material question was whether the affidavit was executed by Siri
Niwas and whether its contents constituted an acknowledgment of the
plaintiff's ownership and the permissive character of Siri Niwas's occupation.
53. An affidavit acknowledging an existing state of affairs does not, by
itself, operate as a conveyance of immovable property. Nevertheless, where
its execution is established, the statement of its maker may constitute relevant
evidence of the transaction and the parties' understanding of their respective
rights. Ex.P3 was therefore required to be evaluated as corroborative evidence
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of the family settlement, rather than rejected merely because it was not an
independent document of title.
54. The plaintiff also relied upon the arbitration award Ex.P4, wherein
Madhu Sudan allegedly acknowledged that he had no right, title or interest in
the disputed house. It is true that Siri Niwas was not a party to those
arbitration proceedings and that the award could not independently transfer
his ownership to the plaintiff. However, Madhu Sudan's statement concerning
his own rights was relevant as an admission against him.
55. The evidentiary effect of such admission could not be ignored
merely because the award had not been made a rule of Court. The award was
not being relied upon solely as an instrument conferring title but also as
evidence of the conduct and acknowledgment of a family member, who
subsequently contested the plaintiff's claim.
56. As regards Ex.P5, the plaintiff relied upon the Municipal
Assessment Register for the year 2001-2002, wherein he was allegedly
recorded as owner and Siri Niwas as occupier. Municipal entries do not, by
themselves, confer title. However, they may constitute relevant corroborative
evidence of possession, acknowledgment and implementation of a family
arrangement.
57. The record also refers to cuttings and alterations in the municipal
entries. Consequently, Ex.P5 cannot be treated as conclusive proof of
ownership. Its evidentiary value lies in its consideration along with the other
material on record.
58. Thus, Ex.P3, Ex.P4 and Ex.P5 were not required to establish
ownership independently. Their significance lay in corroborating the plaintiff's
case that the family arrangement recorded in Ex.P1 had been acted upon. The
First Appellate Court was required to consider their cumulative evidentiary
effect.
Registration of Ex.P1
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59. The next question concerns the legal effect of the memorandum
Ex.P1. The plaintiff's consistent case was that the family settlement had
already been arrived at orally in 1988 and that Ex.P1, executed on 26.02.1990,
merely recorded the earlier arrangement.
60. In Kale (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a family
arrangement may be oral and that a memorandum prepared subsequently
merely to record an already completed arrangement does not necessarily
require registration. However, where the written instrument itself creates or
extinguishes rights in immovable property, registration may be compulsory
under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908.
61. The distinction is between a document, which is itself the
operative source of rights and one which merely records an antecedent
transaction. The nomenclature of the document is not decisive; its substance
and the circumstances of its execution must be considered.
62. In Thulasidhara (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated
the distinction between an instrument effecting a partition and a
memorandum recording an earlier oral family arrangement. Similarly,
Gurcharan Singh (supra) recognises the broad principles governing bona fide
family settlements.
63. In the present case, the plaintiff has specifically pleaded that an
oral family settlement was arrived at in the year 1988, which was subsequently
recorded in the memorandum dated 26.02.1990 (Ex.P1). Significantly, a
perusal of Ex.P1 reveals that it expressly records that the family settlement
had taken place about two years earlier. This recital lends support to the
plaintiff's pleaded case that the family arrangement had already been
concluded in or around 1988 and that Ex.P1 was subsequently prepared to
record the same. The distinction assumes considerable legal significance, as a
memorandum merely recording an antecedent oral family settlement, without
itself creating or extinguishing rights in immovable property, does not require
compulsory registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. The
principle stands authoritatively settled in Kale and others v. Deputy Director
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of Consolidation and others, (1976) 3 SCC 119. Thus, the mere fact that Ex.P1
concerns immovable property would not render it inadmissible for want of
registration.
64. The First Appellate Court, however, did not examine the
significance of the aforesaid recital that the family settlement had taken place
about two years before the execution of Ex.P1. Having disbelieved the
execution of the memorandum, it proceeded without independently
considering whether Ex.P1 was an instrument creating rights for the First time
or merely a written record of an already completed oral arrangement. The
recital contained in Ex.P1, read with the plaintiff's pleadings and evidence
concerning the settlement, was a material circumstance requiring
consideration. The First Appellate Court's failure to examine this aspect in the
light of the settled principles governing family arrangements constitutes a
material omission in its reasoning.
65. Consequently, the plaintiff's claim could not be rejected on the
assumption that the family arrangement was legally ineffective merely
because the property was separately owned by Siri Niwas or because the
subsequent memorandum was unregistered.
Possession and maintainability of the suit
66. The First Appellate Court also held that the suit was not
maintainable as Siri Niwas was admittedly occupying the disputed house and
the plaintiff had not sought the relief of possession. This conclusion, however,
overlooks the distinction between physical occupation of a property in an
independent capacity and permissive occupation on behalf of its owner.
67. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, enables a person
entitled to a legal character or a right as to property to seek a declaration
against a person denying or interested in denying such right. Its proviso bars
the grant of a mere declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further
relief, omits to do so. However, the applicability of the proviso necessarily
depends upon the nature of the plaintiff's right, the character of the
defendant's possession and the consequential relief which the plaintiff was
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legally required to seek. In Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs
and others, (2008) 4 SCC 594 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the
circumstances in which a suit for injunction simpliciter, declaration with
injunction, or declaration with possession would be maintainable.
68. In the present case, the plaintiff never admitted that Siri Niwas
was occupying the disputed house in his own right or in a capacity adverse to
the plaintiff's ownership. On the contrary, his specific case was that, pursuant
to the family settlement, he had become owner of the house and had
subsequently permitted his father to reside therein as a licensee in September
2005, out of natural love and affection. The affidavit Ex.P3, executed by Siri
Niwas, acknowledging the plaintiff's ownership and his own permissive
occupation, lends material corroboration to this assertion. Once the family
settlement and the acknowledgment contained in Ex.P3 are accepted as
proved, the occupation of Siri Niwas cannot be treated as independent or
hostile merely because he was physically residing in the premises.
69. It is well settled that a licensee occupies immovable property with
the permission of the licensor and does not, merely by such occupation,
acquire any estate or interest therein. The possession of a licensee, so long as
it retains its permissive character, is referable to the title of the licensor.
70. Consequently, where the plaintiff asserts ownership and
possession through a licensee, the mere physical occupation of the latter does
not necessarily oblige the plaintiff to seek recovery of possession. The First
Appellate Court, therefore, erred in treating the admitted residence of Siri
Niwas in the house as sufficient, by itself, to attract the proviso to Section 34
of the Specific Relief Act.
71. The First Appellate Court's conclusion regarding the absence of a
licence was substantially founded upon its rejection of Ex.P1 and Ex.P3.
However, as discussed hereinabove, the finding regarding Ex.P1 suffers from
material legal infirmities, while Ex.P3 constitutes relevant corroborative
evidence concerning the nature of Siri Niwas's occupation. The question of
possession could not have been determined independently of these
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documents and the surrounding circumstances. The subsequent denial of the
plaintiff's title by Siri Niwas did not, by itself, establish that his original entry
into the house was in an independent proprietary capacity.
72. It is also relevant that Siri Niwas died on 10.07.2007 during the
pendency of the suit. A personal licence ordinarily comes to an end upon the
death of the licensee, though its termination does not necessarily establish
that actual possession has been delivered to the licensor. The proceedings
subsequently initiated under Section 145 Cr.P.C., wherein Madhu Sudan
asserted possession, were preventive in nature and could not determine the
parties' civil rights or title. Nor could the mere initiation of such proceedings
retrospectively alter the character of Siri Niwas's occupation at the time of
institution of the suit. Any subsequent independent occupation asserted by
Madhu Sudan would have to be established on its own facts and could not be
presumed merely from the existence of those proceedings.
73. In the circumstances, the First Appellate Court was not justified in
dismissing the suit merely because Siri Niwas had been residing in the disputed
house and the plaintiff had not sought possession. The plaintiff had specifically
sought a declaration of ownership along with consequential permanent
injunction, and the maintainability of those reliefs was required to be
examined in the light of the pleaded and proved permissive character of Siri
Niwas's occupation. The finding of the First Appellate Court that the suit was
barred by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, therefore, cannot
be sustained. The third substantial question of law is answered accordingly in
favour of the appellant.
Conclusion
74. The foregoing discussion reveals that the First Appellate Court
reversed the well-reasoned findings of the trial Court primarily on conjectures
and an unpleaded theory that signatures had been obtained on blank papers,
whereas the specific defence of Siri Niwas was that his signatures had been
mechanically lifted from other documents. The trial Court had accepted the
execution of Ex.P1 on the strength of the testimony of PW1 to PW3, expert
evidence of PW7 and corroborative documents Ex.P3 to Ex.P5. The defendants
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failed to substantiate their allegation of fabrication. Significantly, Ex.P1 itself
records that the family settlement had taken place about two years earlier,
supporting the plaintiff's plea of an antecedent oral arrangement which, if
merely recorded subsequently, did not require compulsory registration in view
of Kale (supra). The separate ownership of Siri Niwas also did not preclude a
bona fide family settlement.
75. The First Appellate Court further erred in treating the physical
occupation of Siri Niwas as sufficient to defeat the suit, without properly
considering the plaintiff's plea and evidence regarding his permissive
occupation as a licensee. The impugned findings, being founded upon an
erroneous application of law and disregard of material evidence, are not
sustainable even within the limited scope of Section 100 CPC. Accordingly, the
substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the appellant.
76. Consequently, the present appeal is allowed. The judgment and
decree dated 08.01.2013 passed by the learned Additional District Judge,
Bhiwani, are set aside, and the judgment and decree dated 29.02.2012 passed
by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bhiwani, are restored. The parties
shall bear their own costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. Records of the Courts below be
returned.
21.11.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA)
Yogesh JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
Uploaded on: 21.11.2026
YOGESH MEHTA
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