Mini Nanda vs State Of Haryana And Others

Court
Punjab and Haryana High Court

LPA No. 301-2024 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CNR NO. PHHC010093582024
LPA No. 301-2024
JUDGMENT
RESERVED ON
JUDGMENT
PRONOUNCED
ON
OPERATIVE PART
PRONOUNCED OR FULL
UPLOADED
ON
16.10.2026 30.10.2026 FULL PRONOUNCED 31.10.2026
Mini Nanda ....Appellant.
Versus
State of Haryana and others ....Respondents
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBHAS MEHLA
Present: Mr. Ranjivan Singh, Advocate
for the appellant.
Ms. Rajni Gupta, Addl. A.G., Haryana.

ANOOP CHITKARA
1. Aggrieved by the dismissal of CWP-25221-2023 by judgment dated
15.12.2023, the employee Mini Nanda has approached this Court by way of the present
Letters Patent Appeal.
2. The appellant was appointed as Assistant Research Officer on
02.07.2014. When posted in the field, the post is designated as Assistant District
Statistical Officer (“ADSO”), and she is posted as ADSO in the office of the District
Statistical Officer, Kurukshetra. She gave birth to a baby boy on 28.08.2022 and availed
maternity leave up to 24.02.2023.
3. During the maternity leave, the appellant applied for child care leave
(“CCL”) with effect from 06.03.2023 to 01.03.2024. As this request was not granted,
she resumed her duties on 27.02.2023. After re-joining, she again sought CCL, but the
request was declined on 01.03.2023 on the ground of shortage of staff.
4. On 07.03.2023, the appellant applied once more for CCL, this time from
05.03.2023 to 14.03.2024. The department allowed CCL for one month only, i.e., from
20.03.2023 to 18.04.2023.
5. Aggrieved by the grant of CCL for a period shorter than that applied for,
the appellant filed CWP-7451-2023. During the pendency of that petition, she was
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granted CCL for a further period of three months, i.e., up to 04.09.2023. In view of this,

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CWP-7451-2023 was disposed of as not pressed by order dated 27.07.2023 (Annexure
P-6).
6. After the expiry of the CCL on 04.09.2023, the appellant applied again
for CCL (Annexure P-8). She did not, however, rejoin her duties on the expiry of the
sanctioned leave and that she remained absent from duty, without any sanction from
05.09.2023 onwards.
7. By order dated 06.10.2023 (Annexure P-12), the further request for CCL
was declined, as, owing to the shortage of staff, the department was unable to provide a
substitute. Challenging that order, the appellant filed CWP-25221-2023. The State
opposed the petition and pointed out that the appellant is the only ADSO at Kurukshetra,
and that her duties, which include the preparation of the budget, the compilation of data
and of the price index, are of direct relevance to the preparation of the budget, which
was only months away.
8. During the hearing on 14.12.2023, the department, in the presence of
both parties, agreed to grant the CCL admissible to the appellant, provided she
performed duty for one day in each week so that the work of the department did not
suffer. Learned counsel for the petitioner agreed to this arrangement, and an order dated
14.12.2023 was passed granting CCL on the condition that the appellant would perform
duty on every Tuesday. On 15.12.2023, however, learned counsel submitted that the
appellant was not agreeable to this condition and wanted CCL “in toto”, without any
condition. The learned Single Judge, finding no ground for the grant of CCL as claimed,
dismissed the petition by judgment dated 15.12.2023. Hence, this appeal.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant has a legal
right to avail CCL, and that staff shortage and administrative inconvenience cannot
constitute sufficient grounds for denying it. It is pointed out that Rule 46 of the Haryana
Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 2016 (“the Rules”) provides for CCL for a maximum
period of 730 days during the entire service, for taking care of the two eldest surviving
children below 18 years of age. It is conceded that Rule 46(2) stipulates that CCL cannot
be demanded as a matter of right and that the discretion is vested in the competent
authority; but it is argued that this discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily or in a
manner that defeats the very object of the provision. It is further argued that, although
Rule 46(11) requires the sanctioning authority to ensure that the functioning of the
office is not disrupted, the authority must still act reasonably.
10. Learned counsel further argues that if the department does not take steps
to recruit adequate staff and, on that very ground, goes on denying CCL, the purpose of
the provision, which is to enable a mother to care for her child, would stand defeated.
11. Reference is made to Kakali Ghosh v. Chief Secretary, Andaman and
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Nicobar Administration , (2014) 15 SCC 300, in which it was held that an employee’s
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LPA No. 301-2024 3
entitlement to CCL under the governing rules cannot be rejected arbitrarily and that
unjustified restrictions cannot be imposed.
12. Learned counsel for the State opposes the appeal and submits that the
grant of CCL lies in the discretion of the competent authority and that it is not an
absolute right.
13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the
record.
14. Rule 46 of the Rules deals with CCL. The provisions relevant for present
purposes read as follows:
“46. Grant of child care leave.— A competent authority may grant child
care leave to a woman Government employee subject to following
conditions:-
(1) Child care leave shall be admissible for a maximum period of 730 days
during the entire service for taking care of her two eldest surviving children
below the age of 18 years only.
(2) Child care leave shall not be demanded as a matter of right and no one
can, under any circumstances, proceed on child care leave without prior
proper sanction of the leave by the competent authority.
… … …
(9) Period of any other kind of leave already availed or the period of
unauthorized absence shall not be converted into child care leave with
retrospective effect.
… … …
(11) Child care leave will be allowed to women Government employees with
the intention to facilitate them to take care of their children at the time of
need but it does not mean that child care leave shall disrupt the functioning
of the offices/institutions/schools etc. Therefore, it shall be the duty of
sanctioning authority to keep this in view.”
15. Rule 46 thus carries two features which govern the present controversy.
First, by Rule 46(2), CCL is not a matter of right, and no employee can, under any
circumstances, proceed on CCL without prior proper sanction by the competent
authority. Second, by Rule 46(11), CCL is intended to facilitate a woman employee in
taking care of her children at the time of need, but it is not to disrupt the functioning of
the office, and the sanctioning authority is under a duty to keep this in view. The Rule,
therefore, itself embodies a balance between the personal needs of the employee and the
needs of public service.
16. Applying these provisions, the difficulty before us is the conduct of the
appellant. The CCL sanctioned to her expired on 04.09.2023. No further CCL had been
sanctioned. In the absence of such sanction, she was obliged to resume her duties on the
expiry of the sanctioned period. Instead, she remained absent from 05.09.2023 onwards,
and the absence was, therefore, unauthorised. By proceeding on leave without prior
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proper sanction, the appellant acted in direct contravention of Rule 46(2). Now, in
substance, she seeks that the period of her absence be treated as CCL. Rule 46(9)

LPA No. 301-2024 4
expressly bars the conversion of a period of unauthorised absence into CCL with
retrospective effect. Had there been a genuine emergency, it was open to the appellant to
seek such other leave as was admissible to her under the Rules; but, having remained
absent on her own, she cannot ask that the absence be regularised as CCL.
17. We are conscious of the submission that a department cannot defeat the
benefit of CCL by pleading staff shortage indefinitely. In the abstract, the submission
has some force. On the facts of this case, however, it is not borne out. The department
did not shut its door on the appellant. It granted her CCL for one month and, thereafter,
for a further three months. The appellant is the only ADSO at Kurukshetra, with no
substitute available, and her duties are linked to the preparation of the budget and the
compilation of data on which financial decisions for the public depend.
18. Child care leave is a beneficial provision, and it has to be applied with
sensitivity to the needs of working mothers. At the same time, a public servant holds her
post in trust for the public. She draws her salary from the public exchequer, and the
discharge of her duties is not a matter between her and her employer alone, but affects
the public at large. The benefit of CCL, therefore, has to be balanced against the duty
owed to the office, and that balance has been consciously struck by Rule 46(2) and Rule
46(11). Leave granted to take care of a child cannot be turned into a right to absent
oneself at will, and a claim to the benefit cannot be pressed in disregard of the
exigencies of the service.
19. The balance between personal and professional obligations is exemplified
1
by our constitutional and national traditions. Mahatma Gandhi, replying to an invitation
to state the basis of a charter of human rights, wrote that he had learnt from his “illiterate
but wise mother” that all rights to be deserved and preserved came from duty well done,
and he urged that the discussion begin with a charter of duties.
20. The Constitution, by Article 51A(j), calls upon every citizen to strive
towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity.
21. The Court’s approach to a claim for CCL must, therefore, be a
compassionate one, and we have approached it as such. Compassion, however, cannot
be stretched to the point of permitting an employee to abdicate her duties under the garb
of an application for child care leave, when public interest is contingent upon the
discharge of those duties. An employee owes a duty towards the nation and a
commitment to her work. A claim that places the personal interest above the duty of the
office, to the detriment of public work, cannot be countenanced, and ultimately it does
not serve even the interest of the child, who is the beneficiary of a society whose
institutions function.
22. For the reasons recorded above, the learned Single Judge has correctly
appreciated Rule 46, the unauthorised absence of the appellant, the single-cadre nature
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1
https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000211747

LPA No. 301-2024 5
of her post, the absence of any substitute. We find no illegality, perversity or
jurisdictional error in the impugned judgment which would warrant interference in this
appeal.
23. In view of the above, the present Letters Patent Appeal is devoid of merit
and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
(ANOOP CHITKARA)
JUDGE
(SUBHAS MEHLA)
JUDGE
30.10.2026
Jyoti-II
Whether speaking/reasoned YES
Whether reportable YES
JYOTI
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integrity of this order/judgment.