Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited vs State Of Nct Of Delhi
- Court
- Supreme Court
2026 INSC 1236
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).4622 OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 12440 of 2025)
EDELWEISS ASSET RECONSTRUCTION
COMPANY LIMITED ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI
& ORS. ….RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).4623 OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 13060 of 2025)
J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
3. These two appeals are directed against the
th 1
common judgment and order dated 4 August, 2025
passed by learned Single Judge of the High Court of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SONIA BHASIN
Date: 2026.11.18
15:59:44 IST
Reason:
1
For short, ‘the impugned judgment’
1
2
Delhi at New Delhi in CRL.M.C. No. 371 of 2025 and
CRL.M.C. No. 426 of 2025. By the impugned
judgment, the High Court dismissed two petitions
filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
3
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (or, Section 482 of the Code
4
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ) wherein the appellants
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sought quashing of: (i) the order dated 15 January,
2025 passed by the learned Chief Judicial
5
Magistrate, South District, Saket Courts, New Delhi
in CT Case No. 322 of 2024, titled Gurmeet Kaur Gill
v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors. , allowing an
application under Section 156(3) CrPC and directing
registration of an FIR; and (ii) the consequential FIR
th
No. 0005 of 2025 dated 16 January, 2025 registered
at Police Station Economic Offences Wing, New Delhi
for offences punishable under Sections 406, 409, 420
6
and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 .
4. The appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 4622 of
2026 is Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company
7
Limited , an asset reconstruction company registered
2
For short, ‘the High Court’
3
For short, ‘BNSS’
4
For short, ‘CrPC’
5
Hereinafter, referred to as ‘the Magistrate’
6
For short, ‘IPC’
7
Hereinafter, referred to as ‘EARC’
2
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
under Section 3 of the Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement
8
of Security Interest Act, 2002 . EARC is arrayed as
accused no. 6 in the FIR. The appellant in Criminal
9
Appeal No. 4623 of 2026 is L and T Finance Limited ,
a non-banking financial company. L&T is arrayed as
accused no. 3 in the FIR. L&T Housing Finance
Limited (accused no. 4) and L&T Infrastructure
Finance Company Limited (accused no. 5) have since
merged with L&T. Unless the context otherwise
requires, the expression “L&T” in this judgment
includes these entities and their predecessors-in-
interest.
5. The complainants are Mrs. Gurmeet Kaur Gill,
Mrs. Jesleen Kaur Papneja, Mrs. Ajit Kaur Gill and
Mr. Mohinder Pal Singh Gill, respondent nos. 3 to 6
in both appeals, and they acted throughout through
their attorney, Mr. Jagtar Singh, who is respondent
no. 2. We are informed that Mr. Mohinder Pal Singh
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Gill passed away on 29 April, 2024. Raheja
10
Developers Limited and its Chairman-cum-
8
For short, ‘SARFAESI Act’
9
Hereinafter, referred to as ‘L&T’
10
Hereinafter, referred to as ‘RDL’
3
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
Managing Director, Mr. Navin M. Raheja, are accused
nos. 1 and 2 in the FIR and proforma respondent nos.
7 and 8 in both appeals. In the appeal filed by EARC,
L&T and its group entities are respondent nos. 9 to
11. In the appeal filed by L&T, EARC is respondent
no. 9.
6. Since both appeals arise from the same FIR, the
same order of the Magistrate and a common
judgment of the High Court, and since they turn on
substantially overlapping facts and questions of law,
they were heard together and are being disposed of
by this common judgment. For convenience, we shall
refer to the parties by the descriptions noted above,
and to respondent nos. 2 to 6 collectively as “the
complainants”.
Factual Background: -
7. Before tracing how the criminal process came to
be set in motion and travelled to this Court, it is
convenient to first set out the underlying commercial
transactions.
8. The complainants owned a parcel of land
admeasuring 24.1563 acres in the revenue estates of
Villages Dhankot and Gopalpur, Sector 99A,
th
Gurugram, Haryana. On 13 August, 2012, they
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CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
entered into a Collaboration Agreement with RDL for
obtaining licences and developing the land as a group
housing project. They also executed a Power of
Attorney in favour of RDL. The arrangement was
modified by a Supplementary Collaboration
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Agreement dated 25 June, 2013, and a fresh
General Power of Attorney was executed on the same
date.
9. The Directorate of Town and Country Planning,
Haryana granted RDL, Licence No. 64 of 2013 dated
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20 July, 2013 for 10.10625 acres, and Licence No.
st
72 of 2014 dated 1 August, 2014 for an additional
2.3805 acres. The licensed area thus came to
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approximately 12.48675 acres . The balance land
measuring approximately 11.6695 acres remained
unlicensed.
nd
10. Vide letter dated 2 September, 2016, L&T
sanctioned a loan facility of Rs. 450 crores to RDL. A
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Facility Agreement followed on 15 September, 2016,
which was meant for four projects of RDL: Raheja
Vanya (Sector 99A, Gurugram), Raheja Luxury Villas
(Hamirpur, Gurugram, on land of Raheja SEZs
11
Hereinafter, referred to as ‘the Licensed Land’
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CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
Limited), Raheja Atharva and Shilas (Sector 109,
Gurugram, on land of Enkay Buildwell Private
Limited), and Project Kathputli (Patel Nagar, New
Delhi). It was secured by mortgages over all four
project lands, together with project receivables.
th
11. On 7 October, 2016, the complainants and
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RDL executed a Memorandum of Understanding ,
which superseded the earlier collaboration
agreements. It is not in dispute that the MoU
conferred on RDL, the right to develop the Licensed
Land and to market and sell the units; provided for a
non-refundable security deposit and a refundable
adjustable security deposit to be paid by RDL to the
landowners; contemplated financing of the project
and the creation of a mortgage over the Licensed
Land for that purpose.
th
12. Also, on 25 October, 2016, the complainants
executed an agreement, described as the Backup
13
Security Agreement , with RDL, Mr. Navin M.
Raheja, Raheja SEZs Limited and Enkay Buildwell
Private Limited. According to the complainants, by
virtue of Clause 2.2 of the BSA, a second charge was
12
Hereinafter, referred to as ‘the MoU’
13
Hereinafter, referred to as ‘the BSA’
6
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
created in favour of the complainants, ranking after
the lender’s first charge of up to Rs. 450 crores, over
the assets furnished as security for the loan; it
guaranteed the complainants a net minimum
revenue share of Rs. 130 crores; by Clause 9.1, the
Security Providers undertook not to create any
further encumbrance on those securities, beyond the
first charge in favour of the lender, without the
complainants’ prior written consent. Mr. Jagtar
Singh, as attorney of the complainants, also executed
a Memorandum of Entry and a Declaration-cum-
Undertaking acknowledging the mortgage of the
Licensed Land in favour of the lender.
13. In April 2018, upon RDL’s request, L&T issued
a second sanction letter enhancing the facility from
Rs. 450 crores to Rs. 620 crores. A Supplemental
th
Deed of Hypothecation dated 25 April, 2018 was
executed between L&T and RDL and its group
companies, extending the hypothecation over project
assets and receivables to cover the enhanced facility.
14. From June 2018 onwards, L&T issued no-
objection certificates to RDL for the sale of units in
the mortgaged projects. The appellants state that
these were conditional upon the sale proceeds being
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CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
deposited into the RERA-designated account. The
complainants claim that the NOCs were issued
illegally, in breach of the MoU and while RDL was in
default of its revenue-share obligations.
th
15.
On 7 December, 2018, the complainants
issued demand notices under the Insolvency and
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Bankruptcy Code, 2016 claiming their revenue
share as operational debt. They initiated proceedings
before the National Company Law Tribunal, Principal
Bench, in which they alleged a default of
approximately Rs. 9.1 to 9.7 crores. By order dated
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12 May, 2023, the NCLT dismissed those petitions,
holding that the complainants were not operational
creditors. Separately, a corporate insolvency
resolution process was initiated against RDL by order
th
dated 20 August, 2019, at the instance of
nd
homebuyers, but was set aside by the NCLAT on 22
January, 2020 in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency)
No. 864 of 2019. A fresh CIRP was initiated against
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RDL by order dated 19 November, 2024 in (IB) No.
st
239(PB)/2023. By order dated 21 November, 2024
in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 2168 of
14
For short, ‘IBC’
8
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
2024, the NCLAT confined it to the project “Raheja
Shilas (Low Rise)”.
16. Meanwhile, by two assignment agreements
th
dated 30 December, 2019, L&T Finance Limited and
L&T Infrastructure Finance Company Limited
assigned the loan account of RDL, together with the
underlying securities, to EARC.
Initiation of the Criminal Proceedings: -
th
17. On 15 June, 2022, the complainants, through
their attorney Mr. Jagtar Singh, addressed a written
complaint to the Deputy Commissioner of Police,
15
Economic Offences Wing, New Delhi arraigning
RDL, Mr. Navin M. Raheja, L&T Infrastructure
Finance Company Limited, L&T Finance Limited,
L&T Housing Finance Limited and EARC. It sought
registration of an FIR for cheating, criminal breach of
trust, criminal conspiracy and criminal intimidation,
as well as action under the Real Estate (Regulation
16
and Development) Act, 2016 . The allegations in
substance are that RDL used the Licensed Land as
cross-collateral for a loan of Rs. 450 crores for
purposes other than the construction and
15
Hereinafter, referred to as ‘EOW’
16
For short, ‘RERA’
9
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
development of the project, and L&T approved the
loan without any notice and/or consent from the
Complainants, although it was aware of the
agreements between the complainants and RDL; L&T
enhanced the facility to Rs. 620 crores behind the
back of the Complainants, despite knowing of RDL’s
defaults in paying the revenue share; L&T issued
NOCs enabling RDL to sell units in breach of the
MoU, and failed to notify RERA; L&T and RDL utilised
project receivables for repayment of the loan instead
of releasing the complainant’s revenue share, in
contravention of the MoU and the RERA Act.
18. EARC is referred to in the complaint at three
places, alleging that the loan facility was unilaterally
enhanced to Rs. 620 crores and assigned to EARC
without the complainant’s consent; that EARC, along
with L&T, colluded with RDL in the alleged round-
tripping of funds and evergreening of loans; and that
EARC extended loan facilities to RDL against
securities belonging to third parties, including the
complainants.
19. The EOW conducted a preliminary enquiry. By
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notice dated 6 October, 2022, EARC was called
upon to join the enquiry. Its authorised
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CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
representatives appeared before the Inquiry Officer
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on 15 October, 2022 and submitted written replies
th st
dated 17 October, 2022 and 21 October, 2022,
enclosing the relevant transaction documents and a
tabulated chronology. The replies emphasised that
EARC had stepped into the shoes of the original
th
lenders only on 30 December, 2019, by way of
assignment agreements, and was not a party to any
of the transactions of which the complainants were
th
aggrieved. L&T was likewise issued notices dated 6
th
October, 2022 and 4 November, 2022. Its officers
th th
appeared before the EOW on 7 October, 2022, 12
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October, 2022 and 9 November, 2022, and it also
responded with documents and a flow of events
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under cover of its letter dated 11 November, 2022.
20. Upon completion of the preliminary enquiry, the
EOW closed the complaint and informed the
th
complainants, by letter dated 29 November, 2022,
that no cognizable offence was made out on the
allegations made by them.
21. The complainants then moved an application
under Section 156(3) CrPC before the learned
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate-02, Patiala
House Courts, New Delhi, registered as Ct. Case No.
11
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
2305 of 2023. That court called for an Action Taken
17 th
Report from the police. An ATR dated 30 May,
2023 was filed by the Sub-Inspector of Section-II,
EOW. The ATR recorded the outcome of the
preliminary enquiry in the following terms:
“...during the enquiry, complainant was
examined wherein he reiterated that M/s
Raheja Developers through a well-planned
conspiracy and collusion with alleged M/s
L&T Finance Services used the licensed land
as cross collateral to avail a loan facility of Rs.
450 Crores without any notice/consent from
the complainants. During further enquiry,
alleged persons were also examined and the
documents were scrutinized/analyzed. From
the enquiry conducted, it was revealed that
complainants are landowners of land
admeasuring 24.1563 acres, situated in
Gurugram, Haryana, in 2013, the
complainant and alleged M/s Raheja
Developers Ltd mutually entered into a
Collaboration Agreement wherein alleged
developer was supposed to bear all the
expenses of LCU and procure License for the
aforesaid land. ... In order to develop the said
project, the alleged developer applied for credit
facility for which the Landowners through
their GPA/AR knowingly mortgaged their land
to secure the facility sanctioned by the lender
to the extent of sanctioned facility of Rs. 450
Crores. The said credit line was later increased
by Rs. 170 Crore to a total of Rs. 620 Crores
by the lender against the security of four
projects land and cash flow, however, the
Landowners/complainants have never
17
Hereinafter, referred to as ‘ATR’
12
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
executed the loan document for extension of
charge on their part of security/project land.
The complainants have already obtained Rs.
45 Crores from alleged developer. Moreover,
the amount disbursed by the Lender till date
out of the total sanctioned facility of Rs. 620
Crores is only 414.36 Crores. Later, during
covid phase, the alleged developer defaulted
the loan and now the payments of inventories
being sold by alleged developer qua questioned
project is being utilized as per the MOU dated
07.10.2016. The complainants have also filed
a petition before NCLT, Delhi and same is
pending sub-judice over there. No police
action was warranted in the present matter
as the matter pertains to recovery of
money of landowners. From the
preliminary enquiry conducted into the
matter, no cognizable offence was made
out. Accordingly, the complaint was
closed/filed and intimation of the same
was conveyed to the complainant. ”
[Emphasis supplied]
22. The complainants withdrew the said application
nd
on 2 January, 2024, on the ground that the court
lacked territorial jurisdiction. Liberty was granted to
the complainants to approach the court of competent
jurisdiction.
rd
23. On 23 January, 2024, the complainants filed
a fresh application under Section 156(3) CrPC before
the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South District,
Saket Courts, registered as CT Case No. 322 of 2024.
Jurisdiction was invoked on the averment that the
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CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
main accused no. 1 and 2 (that is, RDL and Mr. Navin
M. Raheja) resided within the jurisdiction of Police
Station Neb Sarai. The application prayed for a
direction to register an FIR against all six accused
under Sections 34, 120B, 406, 417, 418, 420 and
506 IPC.
24. The Magistrate called for an ATR. The ATR so
filed reiterated, in substance, the findings recorded
th th
in the ATR dated 30 May, 2023. By order dated 15
January, 2025, the Magistrate allowed the
application and directed the DCP, EOW to register an
FIR on the basis of the allegations set out in the
complaint.
25. The reasoning and the operative directions of
the order of the CJM are contained in paragraphs 5
to 11, which read thus:
“5. Arguments heard. Record perused.
6. Admittedly, accused persons are the
builders who have entered into a collaboration
agreement with complainants who are the
landowners of land admeasuring 24.1563
acres situated in Gurugram, Haryana, in 2013
wherein the alleged developers was supposed
to bear all the expenses of LCU and procure
license for the aforesaid land. The alleged
developers defaulted the loan and the
complaint discloses serious allegations
14
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
against the alleged accused persons need to be
thoroughly investigated.
7. Considering the gravity of the allegations,
the Court is of the opinion that it is expedient
to order investigation in the present matter in
exercise of the judicial power under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. The facts pleaded by
complainant are such which necessitate
intervention of State machinery in the form of
police investigation and the complainant
would not be in a position to collect evidence.
8. In view of the facts and circumstances, the
complaint discloses commission of cognizable
offences for which an FIR is warranted.
Present application under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C is allowed. DCP, EOW South is directed
convert the contents of complaint as FIR and
investigate the matter fairly.
9. Copy of this order be sent to DCP, PS EOW
for necessary intimation and compliance.
10. The application stands disposed of
accordingly.
11. Be put up on 17.01.2025 for compliance
report.”
26. Pursuant to that order, FIR No. 0005 of 2025
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was registered at PS EOW, New Delhi on 16
January, 2025, under Sections 406, 409, 420 and
st
120B IPC. The period of occurrence is shown as 1
th
August, 2012 to 15 June, 2022. The body of the FIR
th
reproduces, verbatim, the complaint dated 15 June,
2022 that had been addressed to the EOW and had
been closed after the preliminary enquiry.
15
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
th
27. L&T filed CRL.M.C. No. 371 of 2025 on 20
January, 2025, and EARC filed CRL.M.C. No. 426 of
st
2025 on 21 January, 2025 before the High Court,
invoking Section 528 BNSS praying for quashing of
th
the order dated 15 January, 2025 and the FIR No.
th
0005 of 2025 dated 16 January, 2025 registered
consequent to the above Order. The EOW filed status
reports in the proceedings before the High Court
th
including the one dated 17 February, 2025. In those
reports, the EOW emphasized that from the enquiry
conducted into the complaint, no cognizable offence
was made out. Therefore, the above complaint was
closed, while adding that the investigation of the FIR
was at a nascent stage and the quashing petitions
were opposed. Both petitions were heard analogously
and after noticing the allegations and extracting the
order passed by the learned CJM, the High Court
observed that:
“25. …a perusal of the impugned order reflects
that the learned Magistrate first took note of
the contents of the complaint filed by the
complainants, and thereafter considered the
ATR filed by the police, wherein it was opined
that the matter appeared to be of a civil
nature. After examining both, the learned
Magistrate briefly discussed the allegations
against the accused persons in paragraph 6 of
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CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
the order and concluded that the complaint
disclosed serious allegations which warranted
a thorough investigation…
26. As far as the ATR is concerned, this Court
is of the view that although it is desirable for
the Magistrate to provide reasons for not
concurring with the ATR, in the present case,
the learned Magistrate, after considering its
contents, specifically recorded that the
allegations were serious and grave in nature,
and that the matter required a fair and proper
investigation.”
28. The High Court then went on to hold that where
allegations of cheating, criminal breach of trust and
conspiracy arise out of a series of contractual
arrangements, including multiple agreements, MoU,
and further undertakings, neither the Magistrate
under Section 156(3) CrPC nor the High Court under
Section 482 CrPC could undertake a detailed
evaluation of disputed facts or a roving inquiry into
the allegations prima facie pointing towards
criminality that police investigation was crucial to
collect documents from various authorities, record
statements and test the veracity of the allegations.
29. On the contention that the dispute was civil in
nature, the High Court held that when the allegations
prima facie disclosed elements of criminality, it was
for the investigating agency to ascertain whether any
17
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
offence was made out, and that simply by the fact
that the petitioners were arraigned in the FIR would
not ipso facto imply that a chargesheet would
necessarily follow. It observed that once the
Magistrate has recorded satisfaction that a
cognizable offence is disclosed, such satisfaction is
not liable to be interfered with in exercise of inherent
powers.
30. Aggrieved by the same, EARC filed SLP (Crl.) No.
th
12440 of 2025 on 13 August, 2025, and L&T filed
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SLP (Crl.) No. 13060 of 2025 on 25 August, 2025.
th
On 29 August, 2025, this Court issued notice in
both the matters and directed stay on further
proceedings pursuant to the aforementioned FIR qua
the present appellant(s) only. The proceedings
against the other accused persons were directed to
continue.
Submissions on behalf of EARC: -
31. The learned senior counsel appearing for EARC,
advanced the following submissions:
31.1 Neither the complaint nor the FIR contains any
specific allegation of any act or omission by EARC.
The entire narrative concerns transactions of 2012 to
2018: the collaboration agreements, the sanction of
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CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
2016, the MoU, the mortgage, the BSA, the
Declaration, the enhancement of 2018 and the NOCs.
th
EARC entered the picture only on 30 December,
2019, as assignee of the loan account under a
statutory regime. It was totally unconnected with
every transaction of which the complainants are
aggrieved. Apart from a solitary, omnibus assertion
that EARC and L&T are colluding to cause round-
tripping of funds and evergreening of loans, for which
no particulars of time, place, transaction or amount
are given, the FIR attributes nothing to EARC.
31.2 The order of the Magistrate extracts the ATR but
does not record any reason for differing with it. The
only reasoning assigned by the Magistrate refers to
builders and developers who “defaulted the loan” . It
has nothing to do with EARC. A direction under
Section 156(3) CrPC must reflect what weighed with
the Magistrate. Reliance was placed on Anil Kumar
18
v. M.K. Aiyappa ; Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd.
19
v. State of Gujarat ; Priyanka Srivastava v.
20
State of U.P. ; and Dayle De'Souza v.
18
(2013) 10 SCC 705
19
(2015) 6 SCC 439
20
(2015) 6 SCC 287
19
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
21
Government of India , which emphasize the grave
consequences of setting the criminal law in motion.
31.3 A specialised wing of the police and so also,
EOW extensively examined the complainants and the
accused, scrutinised the documents and found that
no cognizable offence was disclosed. When the
Magistrate himself calls for such a report, he must
deal with it. He cannot simply refer to the same and
then reach the opposite conclusion without assigning
cogent reasons.
31.4 Cheating requires deception and dishonest
inducement at the inception of the transaction. EARC
never made any representation to the complainants,
and the complainants did not part with any property
on the faith of anything said or done by EARC. Since
EARC came into the picture only in December 2019,
it could not be clothed with any wrong doing at the
inception of transactions which stood concluded
between 2012 and 2018.
31.5 There was no entrustment of any property by
the complainants to EARC. EARC acquired the debt
21
(2021) 20 SCC 135
20
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
and the securities by assignment. Holding a mortgage
as a secured creditor is not entrustment.
31.6 The core grievance concerns revenue share, the
extent of security and the alleged breach of the MoU
and BSA. These are contractual matters. The
complainants have pursued IBC proceedings and are
parties to an arbitration. The criminal process has
been invoked to pressurise the lender and to stall
recovery. Referring to S.N. Vijayalakshmi & Ors. v.
22
State of Karnataka & Anr. , which the High Court
relied upon, it was pointed out that the judgment
requires an “overwhelming element of criminality”
before a criminal case can co-exist with civil
proceedings on the same facts. No such element
exists in the case at hand.
th
31.7 The complainant’s e-mail dated 24 August,
2022, offering to withdraw cases against all parties
with EOW, RERA, RBI and DTCP in exchange for Rs.
80 crores, shows that the criminal complaint is
nothing but a tool of recovery.
31.8 The complainants, through their own attorney,
executed the GPA, the Supplemental GPA, the
22
2025 INSC 917
21
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
Memorandum of Entry and the Declaration, creating
the mortgage over the Licensed Land. The complaints
blatantly conceal this and allege that the land was
used without any notice and/or consent. They also
conceal that the facility was secured by four distinct
project lands, not only the Licensed Land, and that
no fresh charge was created on the Licensed Land
upon enhancement. As per the MoU, the landowner’s
revenue share was subordinate to the lender’s dues.
31.9 The transactions were complete between 2016
to 2018, and the complaint was filed only in June
2022, after steps for recovery had commenced.
31.10 Section 32 of the SARFAESI Act protects
action taken in good faith by a secured creditor. In
Priyanka Srivastava (supra) , this Court cautioned
that when a party aggrieved by the action of a
financial institution covered by the SARFAESI Act
invokes Section 156(3) CrPC, the approach has to be
of more care, caution and circumspection. The
Magistrate disregarded this caution.
31.11 The case falls within categories (1), (5) and (7)
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enumerated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal .
23
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
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CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
Continuation of the FIR against an asset
reconstruction company for merely acquiring a loan
account would, it was urged, set a precedent harmful
to the statutory scheme for the resolution of non-
performing assets.
Submissions on behalf of L&T: -
32. Learned senior counsel appearing for L&T,
adopted the submissions made on behalf of EARC on
the infirmities in the order of the Magistrate, and
additionally submitted as follows:
32.1 When the police, after a preliminary enquiry,
reported that no cognizable offence is made out, the
Magistrate must engage with that report and record
why he disagrees with it.
32.2 The High Court merely endorsed the
Magistrate’s reference to the gravity of the
allegations, without itself examining whether the
ingredients of any cognizable offence were disclosed
against L&T.
32.3 The loan of Rs. 450 crores was sanctioned on
nd
2 September, 2016, even before the MoU was
executed. It was secured by four project lands, of
which the Licensed Land formed only one
component. The complainants consented to the
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CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
mortgage of the Licensed Land through their own
attorney, by the Supplemental GPA, the
Memorandum of Entry and the Declaration. On
enhancement of the facility to Rs. 620 crores, no
additional charge was created or registered over the
Licensed Land. The Licensed Land continues to stand
as security only for the facility for which it was
originally mortgaged.
32.4 L&T is not a party to the collaboration
agreements, the MoU or the BSA. It never made any
representation to the complainants. The
complainants did not part with any property on the
faith of any representation by L&T. The complaint
itself attributes the false guarantees and assurances
to RDL. The property was admittedly entrusted by the
landowners to the developer under the development
arrangements. Holding a mortgage as security for a
loan is not entrustment within the meaning of
Section 405 IPC as observed by this Court in Anand
24
Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi) .
32.5 Far from acknowledging the BSA, L&T expressly
refused to accept its validity, and communicated so
24
(2019) 11 SCC 706
24
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
in writing to the complainant’s attorney. A party that
openly declines to be bound by an agreement cannot
be said to have deceived the other party about it.
32.6 The NOCs were conditional on the deposit of
sale proceeds into the RERA-designated account. The
obligations under RERA rest on the promoter. Any
contravention of RERA is to be addressed by the
authorities under that statute. The assignee, EARC,
th
itself complained to the Haryana RERA on 6
December, 2022 about RDL’s projects.
32.7 The FIR invokes both Sections 406/409 and
Section 420 IPC on the same set of allegations,
although criminal breach of trust presupposes lawful
entrustment while cheating presupposes dishonest
inducement from inception. Both offences cannot be
applied in tandem. Reliance was placed on Delhi
25
Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of U.P. .
32.8 The complainants’ own case, stated in the
complaint, is that they “only sought to have a simple
contractual relationship”. The complainants have
pursued IBC proceedings, which were dismissed, and
are pursuing a counter-claim in arbitration. Their e-
25
(2024) 10 SCC 690
25
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
th
mail of 24 August, 2022 sought a monetary
settlement in return for withdrawal of all
proceedings.
32.9 The allegations, even if taken at face value, do
not disclose any cognizable offence against L&T. The
proceedings are manifestly attended with an ulterior
motive and tantamount to abuse of criminal
prosecution to settle civil liabilities.
32.10 The last of the transactions relied upon was
executed in October 2016, and the enhancement
occurred in April 2018. The complainants pursued
insolvency and other fora, proposed a monetary
settlement, and invoked the criminal process years
later. No explanation has been offered for the delay.
32.11 In its rejoinder, L&T further contended that
the CJM, Saket lacked territorial jurisdiction, since
the lands are located in Gurugram, the principal
agreements were executed in Gurugram or the United
Kingdom, and the only connecting factor pleaded was
the residence of accused nos. 1 and 2.
32.12 It also contended that Section 409 IPC cannot
be invoked against a corporate entity without
identifying any individual who was entrusted with
property in a capacity enumerated in that provision.
26
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
Submissions on behalf of the complainants: -
33. Learned senior counsel appearing for the
complainants, opposed the appeals. The
submissions, as advanced orally and in the counter
affidavits and written submissions, are as follows:
33.1 The appellants have not even averred that the
complaint fails to disclose a cognizable offence. Both
courts below have found that it does.
33.2 L&T accepted the Licensed Land, owned by the
complainants, as cross-collateral for a loan to RDL
for four projects, knowing fully that RDL had no
entitlement to use it for its other projects. The
sanction letter required Project Vanya to be
mortgaged, and the Facility Agreement required the
borrower to “create and perfect” the security. These
facts clearly establish that L&T knew the project
stood on land not belonging to RDL. The
complainants were never parties to the loan.
33.3 The complainant’s attorney had objected to the
th
cross-collateralisation by communication dated 28
September, 2016. Their consent was thereafter
procured by false guarantees and assurances,
culminating in the BSA. The Declaration was
executed after the loan had already been sanctioned.
27
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
The consent was therefore obtained fraudulently, to
confirm a cross-collateralisation already in existence.
33.4 The BSA gave the complainants a second
charge over all the securities of the Security Providers
beyond the lender’s first charge of Rs. 450 crores, and
barred further encumbrance without their written
consent. L&T enhanced the facility to Rs. 620 crores
in April 2018 by the Supplemental Deed of
Hypothecation without the complainant’s consent.
This increased the encumbrance on the very
securities over which the complainants held a second
charge, and rendered that charge meaningless.
33.5 EARC received all the transaction documents
on assignment, including the BSA. Its reply to the
st
EOW dated 21 October, 2022 itself refers to the
BSA. The factum of the complainant’s legal notice
th
dated 13 August, 2019 was mentioned in the
assignment deed. EARC thereafter further enhanced
the facility to about Rs. 902 crores, as evident from
its notices under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act,
thereby further denting the complainant’s security.
33.6 The lenders continued to lend public money to
a builder that repeatedly defaulted, against which
28
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
CIRP was initiated more than once, and none of
whose projects is complete. They allowed RDL to
operate without the RERA-mandated escrow account
and to divert project receivables towards loan
repayment. They issued NOCs in breach of the MoU.
Project Vanya, like RDL’s other projects, is stalled, to
the prejudice of the complainants and of
homebuyers.
33.7 The Magistrate considered the complaint, heard
the complainants, perused the ATR, and recorded
that the allegations were grave and disclosed
cognizable offences requiring police investigation. A
Magistrate directing investigation under Section
156(3) CrPC is not required to give detailed reasons
as observed by this Court in Supreme Bhiwandi
Wada Manor Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of
26
Maharashtra .
33.8 The existence of civil, insolvency or arbitral
proceedings does not bar criminal proceedings where
the facts also disclose an offence. The arbitration was
invoked by RDL, not by the complainants, who have
merely filed a counterclaim. The insolvency petitions
26
(2021) 8 SCC 753
29
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
failed only because the complainants were held not
to be operational creditors. The suggestion that the
complainants exhausted civil remedies before
turning to the criminal law is contrary to the record.
33.9
The complainants are senior citizens residing in
the United Kingdom. One of them, Mr. Mohinder Pal
th
Singh Gill, died on 29 April, 2024 while awaiting
justice. The accused are influential and have done
everything to frustrate the process.
Submissions on behalf of the State: -
34. Learned Additional Solicitor General appearing
for the State, submitted that the FIR was registered
pursuant to a judicial direction and that the
investigation is still at a nascent stage. It was
contended that the allegations prima facie disclosed
criminality, the truth of which could be ascertained
only upon investigation, and that the FIR was not
required to contain every detail of the case. It was
further submitted that, in view of the contractual
nature of the transactions and the allegations of
misappropriation and inducement, disputed
questions of fact ought not to be examined at the pre-
investigation stage.
30
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
Discussion and Analysis: -
35. We have given our anxious consideration to the
rival submissions. The following questions arise for
our determination:
th
(i) Whether the order of the Magistrate dated 15
January, 2025 directing registration of the FIR
reflects the application of judicial mind required of a
Magistrate exercising power under Section 156(3)
CrPC, particularly when the police, after a
preliminary enquiry, had reported that no cognizable
offence was made out.
(ii) Whether the allegations in the complaint and
the FIR, even if taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety, disclose the ingredients of the
offences punishable under Sections 406, 409, 420
and 120B IPC against L&T and EARC.
(iii) Whether the alleged breaches of the MoU and
the BSA, and the alleged non-compliance with RERA,
can by themselves furnish a foundation for criminal
prosecution of the lenders, and whether, in the
totality of the circumstances, the continuation of the
criminal proceedings against the appellants amounts
to an abuse of the process of the court.
31
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
36. Before we take up these questions, we must
state the limits within which we examine them. At the
stage of quashing, the court does not weigh evidence,
determine the truth of the allegations, or adjudicate
the rights of parties under their contracts. The
question is whether the allegations, taken at face
value, disclose the essential ingredients of the
offences alleged. In undertaking that exercise, the
court reads the complaint as a whole and in its
proper context. It may take into account documents
of unimpeachable character that are admitted by the
complainant or relied upon by him, and the
attendant circumstances emerging from the record,
so long as it does not embark upon an appreciation
of disputed evidence and facts. In Iqbal alias Bala
27
v. State of U.P. , this Court held that where
proceedings are alleged to be frivolous or vexatious,
the court owes a duty to look into the attendant
circumstances and, if need be, read between the
lines.
37. The application of the complainants was filed on
rd
23 January, 2024, before the BNSS came into force
27
(2023) 8 SCC 734
32
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
st
on 1 July, 2024. By virtue of Section 531(2)(a) of
BNSS, it was governed by the CrPC. Section 156
CrPC reads:
“156. Police officer's power to investigate
cognizable case. - (1) Any officer in charge of a
police station may, without the order of a
Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case
which a Court having jurisdiction over the local
area within the limits of such station would have
power to inquire into or try under the provisions
of Chapter XIII.
(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such
case shall at any stage be called in question on
the ground that the case was one which such
officer was not empowered under this section to
investigate.
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190
may order such an investigation as above-
mentioned.”
38. The word “may” in sub-section (3) signifies a
discretion, not a duty. When a complainant
approaches the Magistrate, three courses open to the
court: to direct the police to investigate under Section
156(3); to take cognizance and proceed under
Chapter XV by examining the complainant and
witnesses under Section 200 and, if necessary,
directing an inquiry or investigation under Section
202; or to decline both if no offence is disclosed.
Which course is adopted is a judicial discretion, and
it must be the product of application of judicial mind.
33
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
Parliament has since made explicit what judicial
decisions had already interpreted. Section 175(3)
BNSS, the successor provision, reads:
“(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section
210 may, after considering the application
supported by an affidavit made under sub-
section (4) of section 173, and after making
such inquiry as he thinks necessary and
submission made in this regard by the
police officer, order such an investigation
as above-mentioned. ”
39. The new provision does not apply to the order
under challenge. But it reflects the legislative intent
that, before directing investigation, the Magistrate
must consider the application on affidavit, may make
such inquiry as he thinks necessary, and must
consider the police officer’s submission.
Point (A): The Order under Section 156(3) CrPC
40. The order of the learned Magistrate having been
assailed as the very foundation of the FIR, it would
be appropriate to examine its validity at the outset,
albeit briefly. The further contention of the
appellants, that the allegations, even if accepted in
their entirety, do not disclose the commission of any
34
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
offence against them, shall be examined
independently under Points (B) and (C).
41. As regards the requirement of application of
mind by the Magistrate while passing an order under
Section 156(3) CrPC, the law is well settled. In
28
Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat , this Court
held that where jurisdiction is exercised on a
complaint filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section
200 CrPC, the Magistrate is required to apply his
mind. A caution is also provided that the Magistrate
must examine whether the averments disclose an
offence by the persons sought to be proceeded
against, particularly where the accused is a
company.
42. In Priyanka Srivastava (supra) , this Court
took note of the growing tendency to invoke Section
156(3) CrPC in a routine manner to settle scores. It
held that applications under that provision must be
supported by an affidavit, so that the applicant is
accountable, and that the Magistrate must be vigilant
about the nature of the allegations. Of particular
28
(2008) 5 SCC 668
35
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
relevance to the present case are the following
observations:
“27. Regard being had to the aforesaid
enunciation of law, it needs to be reiterated
that the learned Magistrate has to remain
vigilant with regard to the allegations made
and the nature of allegations and not to issue
directions without proper application of mind.
He has also to bear in mind that sending the
matter would be conducive to justice and then
he may pass the requisite order. ... But, the
learned Magistrate should take note of the
allegations in entirety, the date of incident and
whether any cognizable case is remotely made
out. It is also to be noted that when a borrower
of the financial institution covered under the
SARFAESI Act, invokes the jurisdiction under
Section 156(3) CrPC and also there is a
separate procedure under the Recovery of
Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions
Act, 1993, an attitude of more care, caution
and circumspection has to be adhered to.”
43. Most significantly, Anurag Bhatnagar v. State
29
(NCT of Delhi) , on which the High Court placed
heavy reliance, itself affirms that a reasoned order,
passed upon application of judicious mind, is
inherent in the exercise of power under Section
156(3) CrPC.
44. Further, on the issue of nature and weight to be
given to the ATR, undeniably, it is not a report under
29
2025 INSC 895
36
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
Section 173 CrPC, and it does not bind the
Magistrate. But it is not an empty formality either. It
informs the Magistrate of what the police have done
with the complainant’s information, and of whether,
after any preliminary enquiry, they found that the
information disclosed a cognizable offence.
45. A preliminary enquiry before registration of an
FIR is permissible in certain categories of cases. In
30
Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P. , the
Constitution Bench, while holding that registration of
an FIR is mandatory when information discloses a
cognizable offence, recognised that a preliminary
inquiry may be conducted to ascertain whether the
information reveals a cognizable offence. It identified
“commercial offences” and cases “where there is
abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal
as categories in which such an inquiry
prosecution”
may be made. The Court also clarified that the scope
of the preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity
of the information, but only to ascertain whether the
allegations genuinely reveal a cognizable offence. The
present case falls squarely within both categories. It
30
(2014) 2 SCC 1
37
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
concerns a commercial dispute arising out of land
development projects and financing arrangements,
and the complaint was lodged in 2022 in respect of
transactions which took place way back between
2012 to 2018.
46. Therefore, when the police has indisputably
conducted a preliminary enquiry of this kind,
examined the complainant and the proposed
accused, scrutinised the documents, and reported
that no cognizable offence is disclosed, the report
constitutes relevant material. The Magistrate may
disagree. The ATR does not, as the complainants
rightly say, take precedence over a judicial order. But
if the Magistrate himself has called for the report, he
must apply judicial mind to it and the consequential
order must speak why he does not accept it. The duty
to give reasons is at its highest where a judicial
authority reaches a conclusion contrary to the
material collected by the agency charged by law with
the investigation of offences, and where the final
order will trigger criminal investigation against the
persons concerned. Such reasons need not be
elaborate. But they must exist, and they must relate
to the material.
38
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
47. For the same reason, we are unable to accept
the view of the High Court that reasons for not
concurring with the ATR are merely “desirable” .
Reasons are the means by which the superior court
tests whether the discretion was exercised judicially.
An order that rejects the conclusion of the police on
a mere ipse dixit cannot be tested. It is, in substance,
an order without application of mind.
48. It is in this backdrop that the approach adopted
by the High Court also calls for examination. The
High Court, in the impugned judgment, correctly
noticed the governing principles and recognised that
an understanding of how the ingredients of the
alleged offences are prima facie made out and the
recording of reasons are necessary for a valid order
under Section 156(3) CrPC. Nonetheless, having
stated so, the High Court did not apply those
principles to the order under consideration. In
paragraph 25, it treated paragraph 6 of the CJM's
order as containing a discussion of “the allegations
against the accused persons”, overlooking the fact
that the said paragraph refers only to builders and
developers and does not deal with the role of L&T or
EARC. The High Court instead set out its own
39
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
summary of the allegations against the appellants
and, on that basis, concluded that the allegations
“prima facie disclose elements of criminality” . This
approach cannot be sustained. While examining the
legality of an order passed by the Magistrate, the High
Court could not substitute reasons which the
Magistrate himself had not recorded. In any event,
the summary of allegations contained in the High
Court’s judgment merely reproduces the case set up
by the complainants; it does not constitute an
independent examination of whether the allegations,
even if taken at their highest, satisfy the ingredients
of any offence against the appellants.
49. We, accordingly, hold on Point (A) that the order
of the learned CJM dated 15th January, 2025,
insofar as it directs registration of an FIR against L&T
and EARC, does not reflect the application of judicial
mind required in law, and that the High Court erred
in upholding it.
50. However, we may add a word of caution here.
At the stage of directing registration of an FIR against
multiple accused persons, it would be unreasonable
to expect the Magistrate to undertake a hair splitting
exercise of carving out the individual roles of the
40
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
accused. Thus, though finding the order of the
Magistrate as not satisfying all parameters required
under Section 156(3) CrPC, we are not drawing our
conclusions on the legality of the subsequent
proceedings as the same would by implication affect
the proceedings against the other accused who are
not before us. The appellants have raised much more
weighty arguments on merits of the case which we
shall be dealing in Point (B) & Point (C).
Point (B): Whether the ingredients of the offences
are disclosed against the appellants
51. In Bhajan Lal (supra) , this Court enumerated,
by way of illustration, the categories of cases in which
the High Court may exercise its powers under Article
226 or Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of process
or to secure the ends of justice. The first, third, fifth
and seventh categories are directly relevant here:
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.
...
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
41
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
...
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
...
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.”
52. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India
31
Ltd . , this Court summarised the principles. A
complaint may be quashed where the allegations,
taken at face value and accepted in their entirety, do
not prima facie constitute any offence. For this
purpose, the complaint is to be examined as a whole,
without examining the merits of the allegations. The
complaint need not reproduce the legal ingredients
verbatim. But quashing is warranted where the
complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which
31
(2006) 6 SCC 736
42
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
are absolutely necessary for making out the
offence/s.
53. For ready reference, Sections 405, 406 and 409
IPC are reproduced hereunder:
“405. Criminal breach of trust.- Whoever,
being in any manner entrusted with property,
or with any dominion over property,
dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his
own use that property, or dishonestly uses or
disposes of that property in violation of any
direction of law prescribing the mode in which
such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal
contract, express or implied, which he has
made touching the discharge of such trust, or
wilfully suffers any other person so to do,
commits ‘criminal breach of trust’.”
“406. Punishment for criminal breach of
trust.- Whoever commits criminal breach of
trust shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend
to three years, or with fine, or with both.”
“409. Criminal breach of trust by public
servant, or by banker, merchant or agent.-
Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with
property, or with any dominion over property
in his capacity of a public servant or in the way
of his business as a banker, merchant, factor,
broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal
breach of trust in respect of that property,
shall be punished with imprisonment for life,
or with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine.”
43
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
54. The ingredients of criminal breach of trust are
well defined. In Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha
32
Seetharam , this Court distilled them as follows:
“i) A person should have been entrusted with
property, or entrusted with dominion over
property;
ii) That person should dishonestly
misappropriate or convert to their own use
that property, or dishonestly use or dispose of
that property or wilfully suffer any other
person to do so; and
iii) That such misappropriation, conversion,
use or disposal should be in violation of any
direction of law prescribing the mode in which
such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal
contract which the person has made, touching
the discharge of such trust.”
55. In Prof. R.K. Vijayasarathy (supra), this Court
emphasised that entrustment is a sine qua non for
the offence. In Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. (supra),
this Court reiterated that without entrustment of
property, or of dominion over property, there can be
no criminal breach of trust. The expression
“entrusted” connotes that the property is handed over
to, or placed under the dominion of, the accused for
a purpose. The person who hands it over reposes
confidence in the recipient. The recipient holds the
32
(2019) 16 SCC 739
44
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
property, or deals with it, subject to that purpose,
and does not hold it as his own.
56. Section 409 is an aggravated form of the offence.
In addition to the ingredients of Section 405, it
requires that the entrustment be “in his capacity of a
public servant or in the way of his business as a
banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent” .
The aggravation lies in the breach of a trust reposed
in the accused by reason of that particular capacity.
57. We shall now proceed to examine whether the
complaint discloses any entrustment of property by
the complainants to L&T. The property of the
complainants alleged to be involved is the Licensed
Land. The complaint does not allege that the Licensed
Land, or any interest in it, was ever placed in the
possession or under the dominion of L&T for any
purpose of the complainants. The position of EARC,
which acquired the debt by assignment in 2019,
stands on an even stronger footing.
58. Since entrustment is absent, Sections 406 and
409 IPC are not attracted. The additional ingredient
of Section 409, entrustment “in the way of [the
accused’s] business as a banker”, is a fortiori absent.
A lender advancing a loan against security does not
45
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
receive the security “in trust”. The relationship
between a lender and a borrower, or between a lender
and a third-party security provider, is that of creditor
and debtor, not of trustee and beneficiary. There is
another reason why Section 409 IPC cannot be
invoked. The aggravation in that provision rests on
entrustment received “in the way of his business as a
banker” , that is, property placed with the banker in
that capacity, such as a deposit or property held for
a customer. A lender that takes a mortgage to secure
repayment of its own loan does not receive the
mortgaged property in that capacity; it holds the
security for itself. Moreover, while a company can be
prosecuted for offences requiring mens rea , the guilty
mind is attributed to it through the individuals who
control its affairs. The complaint does not identify
any officer of L&T or EARC to whom any property was
entrusted or who dishonestly dealt with it. It charges
Section 409 IPC against two corporate lenders on the
strength of a generic allegation of collusion. Section
409 IPC is, therefore, not attracted against either
appellant.
59. Having concluded so, we shall now proceed to
consider whether the ingredients of the offence of
46
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
cheating is made out against the appellant from the
allegations set out in the complaint.
60. For the sake of completeness, Sections 415 and
420 IPC, which are relevant to the controversy, are
reproduced hereunder:
“415. Cheating.- Whoever, by deceiving any
person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces
the person so deceived to deliver any property
to any person, or to consent that any person
shall retain any property, or intentionally
induces the person so deceived to do or omit
to do anything which he would not do or omit
if he were not so deceived, and which act or
omission causes or is likely to cause damage
or harm to that person in body, mind,
reputation or property, is said to 'cheat'.”
“420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing
delivery of property.- Whoever cheats and
thereby dishonestly induces the person
deceived to deliver any property to any person,
or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any
part of a valuable security, or anything which
is signed or sealed, and which is capable of
being converted into a valuable security, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
61. The essential ingredients of the charge of
cheating are deception of a person, and fraudulent or
dishonest inducement of that person, by reason of
the deception, to deliver property, to consent to the
retention of property, or to do or omit to do something
47
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
which he would not otherwise have done. For
invocation of Section 420 IPC, there must in addition
be a dishonest inducement to deliver property or to
make, alter or destroy a valuable security. The
deception must be practised by the accused, and the
dishonest intention must exist at the time of the
inducement. In Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v.
33
State of Bihar , this Court held:
“15. In determining the question it has to be
kept in mind that the distinction between
mere breach of contract and the offence of
cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the
intention of the accused at the time of
inducement which may be judged by his
subsequent conduct but for this subsequent
conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of
contract cannot give rise to criminal
prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or
dishonest intention is shown right at the
beginning of the transaction, that is the time
when the offence is said to have been
committed. Therefore it is the intention which
is the gist of the offence. To hold a person
guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that
he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at
the time of making the promise. From his mere
failure to keep up promise subsequently such
a culpable intention right at the beginning,
that is, when he made the promise cannot be
presumed.”
33
(2000) 4 SCC 168
48
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
62. Applying these principles to the facts of the
present case, manifestly the complaint does not
disclose the commission of an offence of cheating by
L&T. The allegation of cheating necessarily requires
deception and dishonest or fraudulent inducement,
that too at the inception of the transaction, resulting
in the person deceived doing or omitting to do
something which he would not otherwise have done
or omitted to do. The allegations in the present case,
even if taken at their highest, do not satisfy these
requirements insofar as L&T is concerned.
63. At the outset, the complaint does not attribute
to L&T any representation, oral or written, made to
the complainants, much less a false representation.
Even if it is assumed, as alleged, that L&T suggested
changes to the draft MoU, that would at best show its
awareness of the arrangement between RDL and the
landowners; it does not amount to a representation
made by L&T to the complainants. The loan was
nd
sanctioned to RDL on 2 September, 2016, whereas
the MoU between the complainants and RDL was
th
executed subsequently on 7 October, 2016. The
complainants’ contractual relationship throughout
was with RDL. In the absence of any representation
49
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
by L&T to the complainants, the foundational
requirement of deception by L&T is itself absent.
64. This is also borne out by the complainants’ own
case, which attributes the alleged inducement to
RDL. The FIR itself states that “Accused No. 1, RDL,
procured consent of the Complainants based on false
guarantees and assurances given by it to the
Complainants” . Whatever may be the merit of such
allegations against RDL, on which we express no
opinion, they do not give rise to even a barest
suggestion that L&T deceived or induced the
complainants.
65. The allegations that L&T extended the loan
against the mandate, guidelines, and requirement of
procedure for grant of high value loan and continued
lending despite the borrower's alleged default also do
not disclose the offence of cheating, much less
cheating the complaints. Whether the credit
decisions of a regulated lender were consistent with
applicable prudential norms is a matter which may
fall for consideration by the concerned regulator.
Imprudent lending, even if assumed, may expose the
lender to financial loss or regulatory consequences; it
does not, without anything more, constitute cheating
50
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
of a third party who was neither the borrower nor
induced by the lender to part with any property or
alter his position.
66. The role of EARC is even more remote in the
transactions. EARC acquired the loan account of RDL
and the underlying securities by assignment
th
agreements dated 30 December, 2019. An asset
reconstruction company is expressly empowered to
acquire financial assets under Section 5 of the
SARFAESI Act. The following acts, of which the
complainants complain, had all been completed
th
before 30 December, 2019:
• the sanction of the loan;
• the alleged use of the Licensed Land as cross-
collateral;
• the MoU and the alleged involvement of the
lender in its drafting;
• the BSA and the alleged procurement of consent
by false assurances;
• the Declaration;
• the enhancement of April 2018;
• the issuance of NOCs from June 2018.
67. EARC was a stranger to all of them. It could not
have entertained any intention, dishonest or
otherwise, at the inception of transactions to which it
51
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
was not a party and of contracts in which it had no
existence as a counterparty. Nor could the
complainants have been induced by EARC to do
anything in relation to them.
68.
We may also notice that the FIR invokes both
Section 406/409 and Section 420 IPC on the same
set of facts. In Delhi Race Club ( supra ), this Court
explained that cheating requires a dishonest
intention at the very inception, when the false
representation is made, whereas criminal breach of
trust presupposes a lawful entrustment, with the
dishonest intention arising later. The Court
deprecated the mechanical registration of FIRs under
both provisions on a mere allegation of some
dishonesty or fraud, without any proper application
of mind.
69. We need not rest our conclusion on this ground
alone, since the complaint fails to disclose either
offence on a bare reading. So far as the appellants
are concerned, nevertheless, the indiscriminate
invocation of mutually inconsistent offences, without
any attempt to identify which facts constitute
entrustment and inducement, is itself an indication
52
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
that the complaint seeks to give criminal colour to a
commercial grievance.
70. Resultantly, on Point (B), we can safely
conclude, that the allegations in the complaint and
the FIR, even if taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety, do not disclose the essential
ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections
406, 409, 420 and 120B IPC against L&T or EARC.
Point (C): RERA violations, breach of contract,
and abuse of the criminal process
71. A substantial part of the complaint is devoted to
alleged contraventions of RERA. The complaint
alleges that the project was run without an escrow or
separate account, that receivables were diverted to
repay the loan and to fund other projects, that NOCs
were issued enabling sales, and that the lenders
failed to notify RERA. It asserts that the lenders are
liable to be prosecuted for contravention and
violation of RERA Act. The High Court, in the
impugned judgment, included these allegations
among those that, in its view, prima facie disclosed
elements of criminality. We are unable to agree.
53
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
72. RERA is a regulatory statute enacted to regulate
and promote the real estate sector, and to protect the
interests of allottees. The obligations it imposes, so
far as presently relevant, are obligations of the
promoter . Section 4(2)(l)(D) requires the promoter to
declare, on affidavit, that seventy per cent of the
amounts realised from allottees for a project shall be
deposited in a separate account with a scheduled
bank, to be used only for the cost of construction and
land of that project. Section 11 sets out the functions
and duties of the promoter. The statute provides its
own regulatory machinery for enforcement.
73. Section 79 bars the jurisdiction of civil courts in
respect of matters which the Authority, the
adjudicating officer or the Appellate Tribunal is
empowered to determine. Section 80 provides:
“80. Cognizance of offences.- (1) No court shall
take cognizance of any offence punishable
under this Act or the rules or regulations made
thereunder save on a complaint in writing
made by the Authority or by any officer of the
Authority duly authorised by it for this
purpose.
(2) No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan
Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first
class shall try any offence punishable under
this Act.”
54
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
74. Sections 79 and 80 thus demarcate the
jurisdiction of civil courts and criminal courts in
matters arising under RERA and provide a specific
statutory mechanism for cognizance of offences
under the Act and adjudication of disputes.
75. As to the NOCs, the complaint itself does not
allege that any sale of a unit was made in a manner
that deprived the complainants of property entrusted
to the lender. The grievance of the complainants is
that the sales occurred while RDL was in default of
the complainants’ revenue share. The appellants’
case is that the NOCs were conditional upon deposit
of the sale proceeds into the RERA-designated
account. Whether that condition was complied with
by the promoter is, again, a matter between the
promoter, the allottees and the regulator. Whether
the sales breached the MoU is a matter between RDL
and the complainants.
76. The complainants placed considerable reliance
on the orders of this Court in Himanshu Singh v.
34 th
Union of India , including the order dated 29
April, 2025 directing the Central Bureau of
34
SLP (C) No. 7649 of 2023
55
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
Investigation to register preliminary enquiries into
the nexus between certain builders and banks in the
National Capital Region. Those proceedings arise
from grievances of homebuyers who availed housing
loans under subvention schemes, in terms of which
the banks disbursed loan amounts directly to
builders and then pursued the homebuyers for
instalments after the builders defaulted. This Court,
in the exercise of its jurisdiction in those proceedings,
considering the peculiar facts, directed enquiries by
a central agency into specific patterns that had
emerged on the record of that case. Nothing in those
orders lays down that every lender to a real estate
developer is, by reason of the developer’s default,
exposed to criminal prosecution at the instance of
any party aggrieved against the developer. Nor do
they relieve a complainant of the obligation to
disclose the ingredients of the alleged offences. The
present case does not directly involve transactions
relating to homebuyers, subvention schemes or
tripartite agreements. It involves a dispute between
landowners and the developer over revenue share
and the priority of security, in which the lenders are
56
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
sought to be drawn in. Therefore, reliance on the
orders in Himanshu Singh (supra) is misplaced.
77. Having examined the allegations in the
complaint in the context of the ingredients of the
offences alleged against the appellants, we now turn
to the nature and character of the underlying
dispute. This assumes significance because the
criminal process cannot be permitted to become a
means of giving a criminal colour to a dispute which,
in substance, is civil or commercial in nature. This
Court has, time and again, drawn attention to the
tendency of the litigants to convert purely civil or
commercial disputes into criminal cases. In Indian
Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. (supra) , this
Court deprecated the use of criminal proceedings as
a means of exerting pressure for settlement of
disputes which do not involve any criminal offence.
35
Likewise, in G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. , this
Court sounded concern and indicated that the
jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC must be
exercised to prevent a matter which is essentially civil
in nature from being given a cloak of criminality.
35
(2000) 2 SCC 636
57
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
78. In S.N. Vijayalakshmi (supra) , this Court
clarified that the mere existence of civil proceedings
does not bar criminal proceedings where the
allegations independently disclose an element of
criminality. At the same time, where such element is
absent, continuation of criminal proceedings in
respect of the same dispute would amount to an
abuse of the process of the court. The High Court,
however, understood this decision as supporting the
registration of the FIR and the investigative process.
In our view, the decision lends no such support. It
permits the coexistence of civil and criminal
proceedings only where the allegations disclose a
tangible element of criminality. In the absence of
such element, the criminal proceedings cannot be
permitted to continue.
79. In Punjab National Bank v. Surendra Prasad
36
Sinha , this Court, while quashing a complaint filed
against a bank and its officers for the alleged offence
of criminal breach of trust, observed that the judicial
process should not be used as an instrument of
oppression or needless harassment. It was held that
36
AIR 1992 SC 1815
58
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
the Magistrate has a duty to see whether the persons
named as accused can be held legally responsible for
the offence alleged, and only then should the criminal
law be set in motion. These allegations are
conspicuously missing in the present case, insofar as
the appellants are concerned.
80. Applying these principles to the present case,
the nature of the dispute becomes apparent from the
complainants’ own pleadings. Their grievance, as set
out in the FIR, is essentially that they have not
received the revenue share allegedly payable to them
under the MoU and that their contractual rights
under the MoU and the BSA have been brought
under dispute. They have themselves quantified the
revenue share allegedly due to them at Rs. 17.7
crores. The substance of the grievance, therefore,
concerns non-payment of the revenue share, alleged
breaches of contractual covenants and the alleged
erosion of their contractual second charge.
81. The course adopted by the complainants
thereafter reinforces the concern raised in G. Sagar
Suri ( supra ). They issued legal notices between 2019
and 2021 seeking remedial and corrective measures
under the MoU; pursued insolvency proceedings
59
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
against RDL in respect of their revenue share; they
have filed a counter-claim in the arbitration invoked
under the collaboration agreements; and contested
the SARFAESI proceedings on the very ground that
the Licensed Land secured only Rs. 450 crores and
that they held a second charge. Thus, the very
grievances which form the basis of the criminal
complaint have been and are being actively pursued
before civil, arbitral, insolvency and statutory
forums.
82. The subsequent conduct of the complainants
th
also assumes significance. By an e-mail dated 24
August, 2022, they offered to withdraw the litigation
against RDL, L&T and EARC upon payment of Rs. 80
crores against the amount claimed by them. The
proposal also contemplated termination of the second
charge security documentation. There is nothing
improper in parties to a commercial dispute
attempting to settle their differences by mutual
understanding. However, the proposal to withdraw
the criminal complaint upon payment of a specified
sum depicts a conduct which bears upon the true
nature of the grievance.
60
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
83. We are conscious that the existence of a civil
remedy, or even its invocation, cannot by itself
furnish a ground for quashing criminal proceedings
where the allegations otherwise disclose the
commission of an offence. We also take note of the
submission that the arbitration was invoked by RDL
and that the insolvency proceedings did not fail upon
an adjudication of the complainants’ claim on merits.
These considerations, however, do not alter the
position obtaining in the present case. The core
question is not merely whether civil remedies exist or
have been availed, but whether the allegations
disclose the commission of any offence against the
appellants. As already discussed, they do not. The
fact that the complainants have simultaneously
pursued their contractual and statutory remedies in
several forums, therefore, assumes significance in
determining the character of the dispute and the
manner in which the criminal process has been
invoked.
84. The chronology of events furnishes an
additional circumstance which cannot be
disregarded. The transactions forming the foundation
of the complaint date back to September 2016,
61
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
October 2016, October 2017, April 2018 and
December 2019. The complainants objected to the
enhancement of the facility in May 2018 and
commenced issuing legal notices from August 2019
onwards. The complaint before the EOW was lodged
only in June 2022, followed by the applications under
Section 156(3) CrPC in 2023 and 2024. These
proceedings were initiated after the EOW had closed
the complaint and after the secured creditor had
commenced enforcement proceedings under the
SARFAESI Act. While delay, by itself, cannot furnish
a ground for quashing, unexplained delay assumes
relevance where the allegations are otherwise
predominantly civil in character and the subsequent
sequence of events indicates an attempt to invoke the
criminal process in relation to existing commercial
disputes. The significance of the delay is further
heightened in the present case by the fact that the
EOW had already undertaken a preliminary enquiry
and recorded its conclusions that the matter
pertained to recovery of money and that no
cognizable offence was made out.
85. On a conspectus of the aforesaid
circumstances, the alleged breaches of the MoU and
62
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
the BSA are, at their highest, disputes primarily
arising out of the contractual relationship between
the complainants and RDL with no perceptible role of
the appellants herein. The alleged non-compliance
with RERA is a regulatory matter falling within the
statutory framework governing the disputes. As
noted above, the absence of the foundational facts
constituting ingredients of the alleged offences fails
to make out any criminal offence against the
appellants. When this is considered alongside the
civil, insolvency, arbitral and statutory proceedings
already pursued by the complainants and the
unexplained delay, the continuation of the
investigation against the appellants would amount to
an abuse of the process of the court. The present case
therefore warrants exercise of the power to quash the
proceedings in terms of the principles enunciated in
Bhajan Lal (supra).
Conclusion and Directions
86. To summarise our conclusions:
th
(i) The order of the CJM dated 15 January, 2025,
insofar as it directs registration of an FIR against L&T
and EARC, does not reflect the application of judicial
63
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
mind required of a Magistrate exercising power under
Section 156(3) CrPC. It overrides, without assigning
any reason, the conclusion of the investigating
agency in the ATR that no cognizable offence was
disclosed. Where a Magistrate has called for an ATR
and the police, after a preliminary enquiry, reported
that no cognizable offence is made out, the Magistrate
is not bound by that report. But if he disagrees, his
order must indicate, however briefly, the reasons for
the same. That is a requirement of law, not merely a
matter of desirability.
(ii) The allegations in the complaint and the FIR,
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not disclose against L&T or EARC the
essential ingredients of the offences of criminal
breach of trust (Sections 405, 406 and 409 IPC),
cheating (Sections 415 and 420 IPC), or of criminal
conspiracy (Section 120B IPC). There is no
entrustment of the complainant’s property to either
appellant, no misrepresentation, fraud or deception
by either appellant inducing the complainants to
deliver property or to act to their detriment, and no
fact from which an agreement to commit an offence
64
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
could be inferred. EARC, which entered the picture
th
only on 30 December, 2019, was a stranger to every
transaction complained of.
(iii) Alleged contraventions of RERA, which are
primarily obligations of the promoter enforceable
through the regulatory machinery of that Act and
prosecutable only on a complaint by the Authority
under Section 80, by themselves neither give rise to
nor can they sustain prosecution for offences under
the IPC. In particular, they cannot be made the
foundation of a prosecution of a lender who is not the
regulated entity, in the absence of the specific
ingredients of the offence/s defined in IPC. The
alleged breaches of the MoU and the BSA are civil
wrongs, if at all, to the extent of the appellants.
(iv) The dispute is, in substance, a commercial
dispute between the landowners and their developer
concerning revenue share and the priority of security,
in which the lenders are sought to be implicated with
the obvious objective of exerting pressure to settle the
monetary demands of the complainants. The
complainants have already invoked insolvency,
arbitral and statutory remedies for achieving the
65
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
same. Their own complaint states that all they
wanted was the sale proceeds against their rights in
the land, and they offered to withdraw the criminal
complaint in return for a quantified sum of money.
Continuation of the FIR against the appellants in
these circumstances amounts to a gross abuse of the
process of the court.
(v) The High Court erred in upholding the order of the
CJM and in declining to quash the FIR against the
appellants.
87. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed, and we
direct as follows:
th
(a) The common judgment and order dated 4
August, 2025 passed by the High Court of Delhi in
CRL.M.C. No. 371 of 2025 and CRL.M.C. No. 426 of
2025 is set aside.
th
(b) The order dated 15 January, 2025 passed by the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South District,
Saket Courts, New Delhi in CT Case No. 322 of 2024
is set aside, insofar as it directs registration of an FIR
and investigation against the appellants, namely L&T
and EARC.
66
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
th
(c) FIR No. 0005 of 2025 dated 16 January, 2025
registered at Police Station Economic Offences Wing,
New Delhi, under Sections 406, 409, 420 and 120B
IPC, and all proceedings arising therefrom, are
quashed insofar as they relate to the appellants, their
officers and employees.
88. We make it clear as follows:
(a) This judgment is confined to the appellants.
Nothing in it shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the allegations against RDL, Mr. Navin M.
Raheja or any other person(s), who are not before us.
th
In terms of the order dated 29 August, 2025, the
proceedings against the other accused have
continued, and they shall proceed in accordance with
law, uninfluenced by any observation made in this
judgment.
(b) The observations in this judgment are confined to
the question whether the criminal proceedings
against the appellants should continue. They shall
not be construed as an expression of opinion on the
rights, claims and interests of the other parties,
which shall be decided by the competent forums in
67
CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 4622/2026 with connected matter
accordance with law, uninfluenced by anything
stated herein.
(c) The complainants shall be at liberty to pursue
such civil, arbitral and statutory remedies as may be
available to them in law, including any remedy
against the appellants in respect of their claimed
security interest.
89.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
….……………………J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
...…………………….J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 29, 2026.
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