Preeti vs Sandeep Kumar

Court
Delhi High Court


* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 08.09.2026
Pronounced on: 20.11 .2026

# CNR No. DLHC010225682026
+ MAT.APP.(F.C.) 179/2026, CM APPL. 34051/2026
PREETI .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Sarojanad Jha, Mr. Suraj
Malik, Ms. Rajreeta Ghosh, Mr.
Rahul Kumar and Ms. Muskan
Saxena, Advocates.
versus

SANDEEP KUMAR .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Ajay Sharma and Mr.
Mukul Vats, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR

J U D G M E N T


1. The present appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act,
1984 has been preferred by the appellant-wife against the order dated
13.04.2026 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court,
South-West District, Dwarka, Delhi in HMA No. 23/2022 titled
“Sandeep Kumar v. Preeti”, whereby the learned Family Court
dismissed the appellant's application under Order VII Rule 11 read
with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). By the
said application, the appellant had sought rejection of the divorce
petition instituted by the respondent-husband under Section 13(1)(ia)
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and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA), on the ground that
the same was barred under Order XXIII Rule 1(4) of the CPC.
2. The principal grievance of the appellant is that, while the
application was founded solely on the bar contained in Order XXIII
Rule 1(4) of the CPC, the learned Family Court proceeded to
adjudicate the application on the principle of res judicata under
Section 11 of the CPC, without considering the applicability of Order
XXIII Rule 1(4), which was the specific ground urged by the
appellant.
3. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of the present appeal
are that the marriage between the parties was solemnized on
04.12.2014 at Village Dadri Toe, Tehsil Badli, District Jhajjar,
Haryana, according to Hindu rites and ceremonies.
4. After approximately seven years of marriage, the respondent
instituted a petition under Section 13 of the HMA, being HMA No.
16/2021 before the Principal District Judge, Family Courts,
Gurugram, seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty.
The appellant entered appearance in the said proceedings through
counsel.
5. On 21.10.2021, the respondent made a statement before the
learned Principal District Judge, Family Courts, Gurugram, stating
that he did not wish to proceed with the petition and that the same may
be dismissed as withdrawn. The petition was accordingly dismissed as
withdrawn. No liberty was sought by the respondent, nor was any
liberty granted by the Court to institute a fresh petition in terms of
Order XXIII Rule 1(3) of the CPC.
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6. Thereafter, the respondent instituted the second divorce
petition, being HMA No. 23/2022 before the Principal Judge, Family
Court, South-West District, Dwarka, Delhi, under Sections 13(1)(ia)
and 13(1)(ib) of the HMA. According to the appellant, the second
petition was founded on the same set of facts and cause of action as
the earlier petition which had been withdrawn without liberty.
7. The respondent, along with the second petition, also placed on
record the pleadings and documents pertaining to the earlier
proceedings, including the first petition, orders dated 29.09.2021 and
21.10.2021, the application for withdrawal and his statement recorded
on 21.10.2021.
8. Upon service of the second petition, the appellant filed an
application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the CPC
seeking rejection of the second petition on the ground that, in view of
the withdrawal of the first petition without permission to institute a
fresh petition, the second petition was barred under Order XXIII Rule
1(4) of the CPC. The respondent filed replies to the said application.
9. After conclusion of arguments, the appellant filed written
submissions dated 27.02.2026. It is the appellant's case that neither in
the application nor in the written submissions was any plea of res
judicata under Section 11 of the CPC raised. Nevertheless, vide the
impugned order dated 13.04.2026, the learned Family Court
considered the matter on the touchstone of res judicata and dismissed
the appellant's application without examining the bar under Order
XXIII Rule 1(4) of the CPC.
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10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellant-wife has
preferred the present appeal.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the principal
grievance of the appellant is that the learned Family Court failed to
adjudicate the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 read with
Section 151 of the CPC on the specific ground on which the same was
preferred, namely, the bar contained in Order XXIII Rule 1(4) of the
CPC. It is submitted that, instead, the learned Family Court proceeded
to examine the matter on the touchstone of res judicata under Section
11 of the CPC, although no such plea had been raised by the appellant
either in the application or in the written submissions filed before the
learned Family Court. It is, therefore, contended that the impugned
order proceeds on a ground which was not the subject matter of the
application and fails to consider the actual issue arising for
determination.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant further submits that, since the
bar under Order XXIII Rule 1(4) of the CPC was apparent from the
respondent's own pleadings and the documents filed along with the
subsequent petition, the second petition was liable to be rejected under
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. It is submitted that the learned Family
Court, instead of examining whether the subsequent petition was
maintainable in view of the statutory bar, proceeded to consider an
altogether different principle and consequently failed to adjudicate the
application on the ground on which it had been filed.
13. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant
relies upon the judgment of this Court in Nidhi Jain v. Ankit Jain ,
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2023 SCC OnLine Del 4369. In the said case also, the respondent-
husband had earlier instituted proceedings seeking dissolution of
marriage and subsequently withdrew the same unconditionally,
whereafter a fresh petition was instituted on substantially the same
cause of action. This Court held that, where the earlier petition had
been voluntarily abandoned without permission to institute a fresh
petition, the subsequent petition was barred under Order XXIII Rule
1(4) of the CPC.

14. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits
that the earlier petition was not withdrawn on merits or with an
intention to abandon the respondent's claim for dissolution of
marriage. It is submitted that, during the course of the proceedings, the
respondent was advised by his counsel that the said petition had been
instituted before a Court which did not have the appropriate territorial
jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings, as the parties had never
resided within the said jurisdiction. It is contended that the withdrawal
of the earlier petition was, therefore, necessitated solely on account of
the defect relating to territorial jurisdiction and was not an
abandonment of the respondent's substantive claim.
15. Learned counsel further submits that the fact that the earlier
petition was withdrawn without seeking formal liberty cannot, in the
circumstances of the present case, be construed so as to permanently
deprive the respondent of his right to seek dissolution of marriage
before the Court having jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings.
16. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record.
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17. Before deciding the points of objection raised by the appellant
in the present appeal, it is necessary to refer to the provision of Order
XXIII Rule 1 CPC which reads as under-
“ ORDER XXIII
Withdrawal and Adjustment of Suits
[1. Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of
claim .—(1) At any time after the institution of a suit, the
plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendants
abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim:
Provided that where the plaintiff is a minor or other
person to whom the provisions contained in rules 1 to 14
of Order XXXII extend, neither the suit nor any part of the
claim shall be abandoned without the leave of the Court.
(2) An application for leave under the proviso to sub-rule
(1) shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the next friend
and also, if the minor or such other person is represented
by a pleader, by a certificate of the pleader to the effect
that the abandonment proposed is, in his opinion, for the
benefit of the minor or such other person.
(3) Where the Court is satisfied,—
(a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or
(b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the
plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject matter of
suit or part of a claim,
it may, on such terms as it thinks fit grant the plaintiff
permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the
claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the
subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim.
(4) Where the plaintiff—
(a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1),
or
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(b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the
permission referred to in sub-rule (3), he shall be liable
for such costs as the Court may award and shall be
precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such
subject-matter or such part of the claim.
(5) Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to authorise the
Court to permit one of several plaintiffs to abandon a suit
or part of a claim under sub-rule (1), or to withdraw,
under sub-rule (3), any suit or part of a claim, without the
consent of the other plaintiff.]”
18. Further, it is necessary to bear in mind the special nature of
proceedings before the Family Court. The Family Courts Act, 1984
contemplates a less formal and more conciliatory approach in
matrimonial disputes. Section 10(3) of the Family Courts Act
empowers the Family Court to lay down its own procedure with a
view to arrive at a settlement in respect of the subject matter of the
suit or proceedings, or at the truth of the facts alleged by the one party
and denied by the other, while Section 20 of the Family Courts Act
provides an overriding effect to the provision of the Act.
19. In the present case, there is no dispute that the respondent had
earlier instituted HMA No. 16/2021 and that the said petition was
subsequently withdrawn without obtaining liberty to institute a fresh
petition. However, the mere fact of withdrawal, in the circumstances
of the present case, cannot be viewed in isolation. The application
seeking withdrawal of the earlier petition, forming part of the record,
indicates that the respondent did not intend to abandon his claim for
dissolution of marriage on merits. The earlier petition was sought to
be withdrawn on account of an objection relating to territorial
jurisdiction, the respondent having been advised that the petition had
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been instituted before a Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the
parties had not resided. At this stage, it is relevant to refer to the
relevant portion of the respondent’s application seeking withdrawal of
the earlier petition filed before the Family courts, Gurugram. The
relevant portion of the said application is reproduced as under-
“2 . That it comes to the notice of the counsel that the party
to the pe tition never reside together at Gurugram, so for
the petition is not possible to be decree on the legal
grounds as per section 19 of HMA.
3. That the petitioner lastly reside together with the
respondent at Najafgarh, Delhi and it is require to file the
petition under the same court of jurisdiction.
4. That the petitioner is not interested to proceed in the
above petition and like to withdraw the same for the
purpose as detailed.”
20. Pursuant to the said filing of the abovementioned application,
the statement simplicitor of the respondent herein was recorded on
21.10.2021 by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Gurugram, resulting
in passing of withdrawal order.
21. Thus, the circumstances in which the earlier petition came to be
withdrawn assume considerable significance. The withdrawal was not
occasioned by a decision of the respondent to give up his matrimonial
claim or by adjudication on the merits of the allegations forming the
basis of the divorce petition. The respondent sought to withdraw the
proceedings so as to pursue his claim before the Court having the
appropriate territorial jurisdiction.
22. In these circumstances, applying the provisions of Order XXIII
Rule 1(4) of the CPC in a manner which would completely foreclose
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the respondent from pursuing his matrimonial claim before the Court
having territorial jurisdiction would, in our view, result in the
substantive matrimonial dispute being left undecided. The
consequence would be particularly harsh where the earlier
proceedings had not progressed to any meaningful stage and there had
been no adjudication on the merits.
23. The Family Court is required to bear in mind the nature of the
proceedings before it and the legislative intent underlying the Family
Courts Act. The provisions of the CPC, where applicable, are not
intended to become an instrument for defeating substantive
matrimonial rights on technical grounds, particularly where the
circumstances demonstrate that the earlier proceeding was withdrawn
for bona fide reasons and not with an intention to abandon the
underlying claim.
24. The Supreme Court in Jet Ply Wood (P) Ltd. v. Madhukar
Nowlakha & Ors. , (2006) 3 SCC 699, although, was dealing with the
specific question of the Court’s inherent power to recall an order
permitting withdrawal of a suit, in circumstances where such
withdrawal, having been occasioned by a mistaken understanding, was
resulting in grave prejudice and injustice to the plaintiff, the
underlying principle enunciated therein is of wider application. The
Supreme Court recognized that where the procedural law is silent on a
particular aspect, the inherent powers of the Court may be invoked ex
debito justitiae to secure real and substantial justice between the
parties. The decision thus underscores the settled principle that
procedural law is a handmaid of justice and is intended to advance the
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cause of justice rather than thwart it. Therefore, while the factual and
statutory context of Jet Ply Wood (supra) may be distinct from the
present case, the underlying reasoning that a procedural requirement
ought not to be permitted to defeat substantive justice or result in
manifest injustice remains equally applicable to the present
circumstances.
25. In the case of Jet Ply Wood (supra), the Apex Court has
observed as under-
As indicated hereinbefore, the only point which
“23.
falls for our consideration in these appeals is whether
the Trial Court was entitled in law to recall the order
by which it had allowed the plaintiff to withdraw his
suit.
24.From the order of the Learned Civil Judge (Senior
Division) 9th Court at Alipore, it is clear that he had
no intention of granting any leave for filing of a fresh
suit on the same cause of action while allowing the
plaintiff to withdraw his suit. That does not, however,
mean that by passing such an order the learned court
divested itself of its inherent power to recall its said
order, which fact is also evident from the order itself
which indicates that the Court did not find any scope
to exercise its inherent powers under Section 151 of
the Code of Civil Procedure for recalling the order
passed by it earlier. In the circumstances set out in
the order of 24th September, 2004, the learned trial
court felt that no case had been made out to recall the
order which had been made at the instance of the
plaintiff himself. It was, therefore, not a question of
lack of jurisdiction but the conscious decision of the
Court not to exercise such jurisdiction in favour of the
plaintiff.
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25. The aforesaid position was reiterated by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court in his order
dated 4th February, 2005, though the language used
by him is not entirely convincing. However, the
position was clarified by the learned Judge in his
subsequent order dated 14th March, 2005, in which
reference has been made to a bench decision of the
Calcutta High Court in the case of Rameswar Sarkar
(supra) which, in our view, correctly explains the law
with regard to the inherent powers of the Court to do
justice between the parties. There is no doubt in our
minds that in the absence of a specific provision in the
Code Of Civil Procedure providing for the filing of an
application for recalling of an order permitting
withdrawal of a suit, the provisions of Section 151of
the Civil Procedure Code can be resorted to in the
interest of justice. The principle is well established
that when the Code Of Civil Procedure is silent
regarding a procedural aspect, the inherent power of
the court can come to its aid to act ex debito justitiae
for doing real and substantial justice between the
parties. This Court had occasion to observe in the
case of Manohar Lal Chopra vs. Rai Bahadur Rao
Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527, as follows:
"It is well settled that the provisions of the Code are
not exhaustive, for the simple reason that the
Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the
possible circumstances which may arise in future
litigation and consequently for providing the
procedure for them."
26. Based on the aforesaid principle, the Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in almost identical
circumstances in Rameswar Sarkar's case, allowed
the application for withdrawal of the suit in exercise
of inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, upon holding that when through
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mistake the plaintiff had withdrawn the suit, the Court
would not be powerless to set aside the order
permitting withdrawal of the suit.
27. We are of the view that the law having been
correctly stated in the aforesaid case, the learned
Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in making an
order on the same lines did not commit any error of
jurisdiction which calls for any interference in these
appeals.
28. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed, but without
any order as to costs.”
26. The object of proceedings relating to matrimonial disputes is to
ensure that the substantive rights and disputes between the parties are
adjudicated on merits and are not defeated merely on account of
procedural or technical considerations, unless the statute expressly
mandates such consequence in the facts of the case.
27. In the present case, the record indicates that, when the earlier
petition was withdrawn, notice had been issued and the
appellant/defendant had entered appearance by filing a memorandum
of appearance. The matter had not proceeded to the stage of evidence
and there had been no adjudication upon the allegations of cruelty or
desertion forming the basis of the respondent's claim. The subsequent
petition was thereafter instituted before the Court which, according to
the respondent, had the appropriate territorial jurisdiction.
28. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant on the
judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Nidhi Jain (supra) ,
is, in our view, misplaced in the facts of the present case. In Nidhi
Jain (supra) , the earlier matrimonial proceedings for divorce on the
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ground of cruelty had progressed substantially and had reached the
stage of the petitioner's evidence when the earlier petition was
withdrawn by the petitioner alleging being fed up on account of legal
battles. The factual matrix in the present case is materially different
because in the present case, the petition was withdrawn at the
threshold on account of lack of territorial jurisdiction. No petition can
progress further in a court having no jurisdiction to try the same. Its
withdrawal cannot have the effect to non-suit a petitioner whose case
is not decided on merits.
29. The ultimate object of the proceedings before the Family Court
is to adjudicate the matrimonial dispute between the parties in
accordance with law and, wherever possible, on its merits. In the
peculiar facts of the present case, we are of the view that the ends of
justice would be better served by permitting the respondent to pursue
the subsequent divorce petition before the Court having the
appropriate territorial jurisdiction, rather than terminating the
respondent's substantive claim at the threshold on account of the
manner in which the earlier petition came to be withdrawn.
30. Consequently, although the earlier petition was withdrawn
without a formal order granting liberty to institute a fresh petition, the
surrounding circumstances in which such withdrawal took place, the
stage of the proceedings at that time, and the absence of any
adjudication on merits are relevant considerations. The subsequent
petition, therefore, ought not to be rejected at the threshold in the
peculiar facts of the present case.
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31. In view of the discussion hereinabove, and having regard to the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, we do not find
any infirmity in the impugned order dated 13.04.2026 passed by the
learned Family Court warranting interference by this Court in exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction.
32. The appeal, along with all pending applications, if any, is
accordingly dismissed.

VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.

RENU BHATNAGAR, J.

NOVEMBER 20, 2026 /KZ
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