Abu Bakar And 2 Others vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of Home U.P. Lko. And 2 Others

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 7350 of 2026
Abu Bakar And 2 Others
.....Applicant(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of Home U.P.
Lko. And 2 Others
.....Opposite
Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s) : Raghav Chandra
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : G.A.
Court No. - 13
[A.F.R.]
HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.
1. Heard Sri Prashant Chandra, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Raghav
Chandra and Ms. Aiman Kulsum Rizvi Advocates, the learned Counsel
for the petitioners and Sri Mayank Sinha, the learned A.G.A. for the State.
2. By means of the present petition filed under Section 528, Bhartiya
Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’), the
petitioners have sought quashing of FIR No. 205 of 2026 lodged in Police
Station Hazratganj, Lucknow, on 24.09.2026, against the petitioners and
more than 12 unnamed persons, for offences under Sections 3(5), 191(2),
109(1), 115(2), 352, 351(3), 324 and 333 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
(hereinafter referred to as ‘BNS’).
3. The FIR alleges that the complainant (the opposite party No. 2) runs a
boutique. The petitioner No. 1 runs a butcher shop, the petitioner No. 2
runs a tailoring shop and the petitioner No. 3 runs a barber shop, and all
of them were threatening the complainant to vacate her shop. With this
object, at about 2:00 p.m. on 21.09.2026 the petitioners and more than 12
unnamed professional criminals attacked the complainant with the
intention of killing her and they damaged her shop. They abused her and
damaged the goods kept in the shop and decorative items like plant pots
etc. kept outside the shop. When the complainant raised a hue and cry and
some persons gathered there, the accused persons went away while
threatening her. The complainant called the police by dialing 112, but by
the time the police came, the accused persons had already escaped.

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4. While assailing the validity of the FIR, Sri. Prashant Chandra Senior
Advocate has submitted that on the date of the alleged incident, i.e. on
21.09.2026 itself, the petitioner No. 1 had given an application to the
Station House Officer, Police Station Hazratganj, Lucknow, stating that
while the petitioner No. 1 was working at his butcher shop at about 2:30
p.m. on 21.09.2026, Namra Alameen (the opposite party No. 2) and one
Akram, both of whom work in a cloth shop of Anees Ahmed, Advocate,
started an altercation regarding a signboard put up outside his shop. They
were bent upon committing some offence. The petitioner No. 1 gave
information of the incident to the police by dialing 112, whereupon the
police response vehicle came on the spot and called all the concerned
persons to the police station and directed them to maintain status quo .
5. The learned Counsel for petitioners has submitted that although the
petitioner no. 1 had given an information of the incident to the police on
the same day and the police had come to the spot of the incident and had
called all the concerned persons to the police station, the opposite party
No. 2 did not lodge a complaint on that day and the FIR has been lodged
after a delay of two days. He has further submitted that the FIR has been
meticulously drafted apparently by an Advocate, which gives rise to a
ground for quashing the same. He has placed reliance on the judgments of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan
: 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 and
Lal Mahmood Ali and others v. State of
: (2023) 15 SCC 488.
UP and others
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that although the
FIR alleges an attempt to kill the complainant, the complainant has not
suffered any injury. He has submitted that the absence of injury gives rise
to a ground for quashing of the FIR. In this regard, he has placed reliance
on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Jage Ram v.
State of Haryana : (2015) 11 SCC 366.
7. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has laid down the following principles regarding exercise of the
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the
inherent power under Section 482 of CrPC: -
“ 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of
law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following
categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could
be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible

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to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised
and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive
list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against
the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
8. The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the present
FIR is squarely covered by clauses 1, 3, 5 and 7 of paragraph 102 of the
judgment in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), as the allegations in the FIR,
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; that the
uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the petitioners; that the allegations made in the
FIR are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can
ever reach a just conclusion that there is a sufficient ground for
proceeding against the petitioners and that the criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide and it has been maliciously instituted
with an ulterior motive for getting vengeance on the petitioners, and with
a view to spite them due to private and personal grudges.

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9. Immediately after laying down the guidelines for exercising the
inherent powers, the Hon’ble Supreme Court added a word of caution in
the following paragraph of Bhajan Lal (supra): -
“ 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of
quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly
and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that
the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the
FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers
do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according
to its whim or caprice.”
10. In : (2020) 4 SCC 162,
Google India (P) Ltd. v. Visaka Industries
the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the expression ‘rarest of rare cases’
occurring in Bhajan Lal (Supra), by stating that “ The expression “rarest of
rare cases” is not used in the sense in which it is used with reference to
punishment for offences under Section 302 IPC, but to emphasise that the
power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR or criminal proceedings
should be used sparingly and with circumspection .”
11. In , (2021) 9 SCC 35, it was held that:
Kaptan Singh v. State of U.P.
-
“ exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash the
proceedings is an exception and not a rule. It is further observed that
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C. though wide is to be
exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution, only when such
exercise is justified by tests specifically laid down in the section
itself. It is further observed that appreciation of evidence is not
permissible at the stage of quashing of proceedings in exercise of
powers under Section 482 CrPC .”
12. In CBI v. Aryan Singh : (2023) 18 SCC 399, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that as per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising
the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct
the mini trial.
13. However, when we examine the FIR allegations in light of the
aforesaid principles laid down by Hon’ble the Supreme Court, the FIR
alleges that all the accused persons entered the complainant’s shop with
an evil intention and they abused, threatened and attacked her. They
damaged valuable goods in the shop. The FIR further states that the
complainant has a video proof of the violent incident available with her.
14. Having gone through the aforesaid allegations leveled in the FIR, it
cannot be said that the allegations leveled in the FIR, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the petitioners. It is not

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a case where the allegations leveled in the FIR, if the same remain
uncontroverted, do not disclose the commission of any offence and make
out a case against the petitioners. It is also not the case that the allegations
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is a sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused, as the FIR specifically states that the
complainant has a video proof of the incident.
15. So far as the ground contained para 102(7) of Bhajan Lal, i.e., the
criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where
the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge, is concerned, the learned counsel for the
petitioners has placed reliance on a complaint given by the petitioner No.1
to the police on 21.09.2026. He had also lodged a complaint on integrated
grievance redressal system (IGRS) of the U.P. Government, wherein he
alleged that the complainant (opposite party No. 2) and Akram, who work
on the cloth shop of Anees Ahmad, started an altercation because of a
sign-board put on the shop of the petitioner No. 1 one and they hurled
dirty abuses and threatened him. This complaint was registered under the
category “gunda gardi/gunda tax vasulna”.
16. From the aforesaid complaint, it appears that some incident had taken
place amongst the parties on 21.09.2026. Which of the party was the
aggressor and who committed what acts during the incident, cannot be
examined by this Court while examining the validity of the F.I.R. and it is
better to leave it open to be done by the investigating officer during
investigation. The allegations leveled in the F.I.R., taken on their face
value, certainly disclose commission of offences and warrant
investigation into correctness of the allegation.
17. So far as the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that
the complainant has not suffered any injury in the incident, Section 109
BNS reads as follows: -
“ (1) Whoever does any act with such
109. Attempt to murder. -
intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by
that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt
is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable
either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is
hereinbefore mentioned.
(2) When any person offending under sub-section (1) is under
sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be
punished with death or with imprisonment for life, which shall mean

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the remainder of that person's natural life.
Illustrations
(a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such
circumstances that, if death ensued, A would be guilty of murder. A
is liable to punishment under this section.
(b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender
years, exposes it in a desert place. A has committed the offence
defined by this section, though the death of the child does not ensue.
(c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet
committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the
offence defined in this section, and, if by such firing he wounds Z, he
is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of sub-section
(1).
(d) A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes
the same with food which remains in A's keeping; A has not yet
committed the offence defined in this section. A places the food on
Z's table or delivers it to Z's servants to place it on Z's table. A has
committed the offence defined in this section.”
18. A bare perusal of the aforesaid statutory provision makes it manifest
that it provides for a sentence of imprisonment for life in cases were hurt
is caused and in other cases, i.e., where no hurt is caused, a sentence of
imprisonment upto 10 years is provided. Therefore, the language of the
statute makes it clear that injury is not a sine qua non for the offence of
attempt to murder.
19. Sri. Prashant Chandra has placed reliance on the following passage
from the judgment in the case of Jage Ram v. State of Haryana (supra):
“ For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, the
12.
prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and
(ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution
that the accused had attempted to commit the murder of the
prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to
commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section
307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death
should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually
caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the
intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from
other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered
from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words
used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the
accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the
nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc.”
20. Firstly, it is to be noted that the aforesaid judgment was given in an
appeal filed against an order passed by the High Court confirming the
conviction of the appellants made by the trial Court after a full-fledged
trial and not while examining the validity of an F.I.R. before trial.

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Secondly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the aforesaid case that
the prosecution has to establish - (i) the intention to commit murder and
(ii) the act done by the accused. The Court has to gather the intention of
the accused from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used,
words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the
accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused, and the nature of
injury and severity of the blows given, etc. That stage is yet to arrive and
this Court has no reason to believe that the trial Court will not the
aforesaid aspects of the matter, in case the allegations are established in
investigation, a charge-sheet is filed and the trial Court takes coginzance
of the offences.
21. The learned counsel for the petitioners has laid much emphasis on the
following observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Mahmood Ali (supra): -
“ At this stage, we would like to observe something important.
11.
Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings
quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are
manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the
court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more
closely.
We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed
12.
against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal
vengeance etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very
well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant
would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are
such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the
alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to
look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not.
In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to
13.
look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the
record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be,
with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines.
The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC
or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the
stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall
circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as
well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take
for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered
over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances
the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby
attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or
personal grudge as alleged.”

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22. These observations were made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court after
recording in para 10 that ‘the entire case put up by the first information,
on the face of it, appears to be concocted and fabricated’.
23. In : (2003) 12 SCC
Parasa Raja Manikyala Rao v. State of A.P.
306, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: -
“ 7. … To imprint the fact situation of one decided case upon another
or observations made in the peculiar facts of a given case to any or
every other case notwithstanding the dissimilarity in effect and the
distinctive features, is legally impermissible.
*
Each case, more particularly a criminal case, depends on its own
9.
facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not
enough to warrant like treatment because a significant detail may
alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the
temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the
colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide,
therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad
resemblance to another case is not at all decisive...”
24. The observations made in Mahmood Ali (supra) were in light of the
peculiar facts of that case, wherein the FIR allegations were that the
informant was an illiterate person, he was employed by the accused
persons and taking advantage of his helplessness, an accused had obtained
his signatures on some blank papers and later he kept on compelling him
to sign other papers and blank cheques without his consent and without
bringing anything to his notice in regard to the cheques, bank papers, etc.,
and he was fraudulently appointed as a Director of a company. However,
upon coming to know about the fake appointment, he resigned from the
directorship of the company. The informant had also alleged that he was
forced to work in the office of the accused persons virtually as a hostage
and threats were administered to kill him and the accused persons were
involved in illegal mining, etc., and were exploiting poor persons. Among
other things, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took into consideration the fact
that the FIR in question had been lodged after a period of 14 years from
the alleged illegal acts of the appellants. The FIR did not disclose any
specific date or time of the alleged offence. The FIR did not disclose any
ingredient to constitute the offence alleged. Accordingly, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, considering the entire circumstances, particularly the
registration of multiple FIRs, came to a conclusion that the issue of
wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge was clearly
attracted on the record and the entire case put up by the informant on the
face of it was held to be concocted and fabricated.
25. In the present case, the FIR has been lodged after a delay of merely

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two days, as against the delay of 14 years in the case of Mehmood Ali
(supra). The FIR mentions a specific date and time of the incident, which
was not there in the case of Mahmood Ali (supra). In Mahmood Ali
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to a conclusion that there were
multiple FIRs, whereas it is not the case here. One more thing which
distinguishes the present case from the case of Mahmood Ali (supra) is
that in that case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had come to a conclusion
that the FIR did not disclose any ingredients to constitute the offences as
alleged, whereas in the present case, the ingredients of the FIR, as have
been noted above, clearly make out commission of offences, and in case
the same remain uncontroverted, at least a prima facie case of trial is
made out.
26. I am of the considered view that the aforesaid differences in the facts
of the present case and the facts of the case in Mahmood Ali (supra)
clearly make the observations made in Mohammad Ali in light of the
peculiar facts of that case, inapplicable to the facts of the present case.
27. The contents of the impugned FIR, taken on their face value, disclose
commission of cognizable offences, the allegations warrant an
investigation to examine their genuineness and, therefore, no ground for
quashing of the FIR is made out. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am
of the considered view that the petition lacks merit and the same is hereby
dismissed .
October 26, 2026
A.Nigam
(Subhash Vidyarthi,J.)

Whether the judgment is speaking: Yes.
Whether the judgment is reportable: Yes.
.
(Subhash Vidyarthi,J.)
Digitally signed by :-
ANUJ NIGAM
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench