DILIP A @ JCB DILIPA vs THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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C/W CRL.P No. 14216 of 2024
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
R
TH
DATED THIS THE 7 DAY OF JULY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 748 OF 2025
C/W
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 14216 OF 2024
IN CRL.P No. 748/2025
BETWEEN:
1. DILIP A @ JCB DILIPA
S/O LATE. ANKAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,
R/O DODDAMULAGUDU VILLAGE,
BANNURU HOBLI, T.N.PURA TALUK,
MYSURU DISTRICT, PIN 571 101.
2.
ANANDA D.B@CCTV ANANDA
S/O BANDIGAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
RESIDENT OF
DODDAMULAGUDU VILLAGE,
BANNURU HOBLI,
T.N.PURA TALUK,
MYSURU DISTRICT,
PIN – 571 101.
3. RAJESH D.M. @ RAJI,
S/O MADEGOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS,
Digitally signed
by
PADMAVATHI B
K
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka
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R/O DODDAMULAGUDU VILLAGE,
BANNURU HOBLI,
T.N.PURA TALUK,
MYSURU DISTRICT,
PIN 571 101.
4. ANANDA @ MYSURAMMANA MOMMAGA,
S/O RAMEGOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS,
R/O DODDAMULAGUDU VILLAGE,
BANNURU HOBLI,
T.N.PURA TALUK,
MYSURU DISTRICT,
PIN 571 101.
5. UMESH R.K. @ BONDA,
S/O KALLEGOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
RESIDING AT RAMANDURU VILLAGE,
KIRUGAVALU HOBLI,
MALAVALLI TALUK,
MANDYA DISTRICT.
PIN 571 424.
6. CHANNAKESHAVA.C @ SANJU,
S/O CHANNEGOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
RESIDING AT RAMANDURU VILLAGE,
KIRUGAVALU HOBLI,
MALAVALLI TALUK,
MANDYA DISTRICT.
PIN 571 424.
7. CHELUVARAJU.C.S. @ ONDUVARE,
S/O LATE SANNEGOWDA,
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AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS,
R/O CHUNCHEGOWDANAKOPPALU
VILLAGE, KIRUGAVALU HOBLI,
MALAVALLI TALUK,
MANDYA DISTRICT, PIN 571 424.
8. MAHADEVASWAMY. D.R. @ KEERA,
S/O C. MADHAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS,
RESIDING AT RAMANDURU VILLAGE,
KIRUGAVALU HOBLI,
MALAVALLI TALUK,
MANDYA DISTRICT. PIN 571 424.
9. PURUSHOTHMA D.R. @ PURUSHI,
S/O K. RAMEGOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
RESIDENT OF DODDAMULAGUDU VILLAGE,
BANNURU HOBLI, T.N.PURA TALUK,
MYSURU DISTRICT,
PIN 571 101.
10. BABU. D.G.,
S/O GOVINDEGOWDA,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
R/O DODDAMULAGUDU VILLAGE,
BANNURU HOBLI, T.N.PURA TALUK,
MYSURU DISTRICT,
PIN 571 101
(THE PETITIONER NO. 5, 6, 7 AND 8
ARE IN JUDICIAL CUSTODY
PARAPPANA AGRAHARA
CENTRAL PRISON,
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BENGALURU – 560 100)
…PETITIONERS
(BY SRI N.R.KRISHNAPPA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT,
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
RD
3 FLOOR, ‘B’ BLOCK, BMTC,
SHANTHINAGAR,
TTMC, K.H.ROAD
BENGALURU – 560 027
REPRESENTED BY SPL.PP
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BENGALURU-01
…RESPONDENT
(BY SRI ARVIND KAMATH, ADDL.SOLICITOR GENERAL A/W
SRI H.R.SHOWRI, CGC)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528
BNNS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT AND
PROCEEDINGS AT ANNEXURE-B AS AGAINST ACCUSED NO.1
TO 5, 8 TO 11 AND 13 IN SPL. C.C. NO. 233 / 2018 OF THE
RESPONDENT PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE XXXII ACC AND
SJ AND SPL. JUDGE OF CBI CASES AT BENGALURU CCH-34
FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 4 OF PML
ACT AS AGAINST THESE PETITIONERS.
IN CRL.P NO. 14216/2024
BETWEEN:
1. RAMALINGA @ BUKA
S/O GADIGEGOWDA
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AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS
RESIDING AT RAMANDURU VILLGE
KIRUGAVALU HOBLI
MALAVALLI TALUK
MANDYA DITRICT – 571 424
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI V.LAKSHMI KANTHA RAO, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
RD
3 FLOOR, B BLOCK
BMTC SHANTHI NAGAR
TTMC, K H ROAD
BENGALURU – 560 027
REPRESENTED BY
STANDING COUNCIL
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
BENGALURU – 560 001
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI ARAVIND KAMATH, ADDL.SOLICITOR GENERAL
A/W SRI SHOWRI H.R., CGC)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482(FILED U/S.528 BNSS)
CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE COMPLAINT AND FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS AT ANNEXURE B AS AGAINST THE ACCUSED
NO.12 IN SPL.C.C.NO.233/2018 OF THE RESPONDENT
PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE XXXII ACC AND SJ AND
SPL.JUDGE FOR CBI CASES AT BENGALURU (CCH-34) FOR
THE OFFENCE P/U/S 3 & 4 OF PML ACT AS AGAINST THIS
PETITIONER.
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THESE PETITIONS, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS
DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioners are before this Court calling in question
the proceedings in Spl.C.C.No.233 of 2018 registered for
offence punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘PMLA’ for short).
2. Heard Sri N. R. Krishnappa, learned counsel appearing
for petitioners in Crl.P.No.748 of 2025, Sri V. Lakshmi Kanth
Rao, learned counsel appearing for petitioner in Crl.P.No.14216
of 2024 and Sri Arvind Kamath, learned Additional Solicitor
General of India appearing for the respondent in both these
petitions.
3. Facts adumbrated are as follows:
3.1. The petitioners stood as accused in a predicate
offence, which was tried as Spl.C.C.No.123 of 2020. The
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offence alleged against these petitioners sprang in the
aftermath of demonetization. i.e., on 08-11-2016 when the
petitioners are said to have exchanged the old notes to new
notes for a premium. The facts led to the registration of a crime
in Crime No.148 of 2016 against these petitioners and the
crime resulted in a trial in Spl.C.C.No.123 of 2020 and the trial
resulted in their conviction. The petitioners have preferred an
appeal against the conviction. The same is pending adjudication
before the concerned Court. Simultaneously, on the predicate
offence being registered in Crime No.148 of 2016, the
Enforcement Directorate had registered an Enforcement Case
Information Report-ECIR No.BGZO/05/2017 for offences
punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA, which comes to
be registered as Spl.C.C.No.233 of 2018.
3.2. The petitioners, in these petitions, after getting
convicted in Spl.C.C.No.123 of 2020, have challenged the
continuance of proceedings in Spl.C.C.No.233 of 2018 before
this Court, on the score that it amounts to double jeopardy.
The co-ordinate Bench of this Court, by order dated
30-12-2024, accepting the submission of the learned counsel
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appearing for the petitioners in Crl.P.No.14216 of 2024 that it
does amount to double jeopardy, grants an interim order of
stay by the following order:
“Registry to show the name of the counsel Sri
Madukar Deshpande, the standing counsel for respondent.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
petitioner was once convicted in Special Case
No.123/2020 for the offences punishable under Sections
395, 120B, 483B, 212, and 314 of Indian Penal Code.
It is his further submission that in the same
proceeding charges were framed under Sections 3 and 4
of Prevention of Money Laundering Act.
It is his further submission that once the charges
are framed under the said Act, and if the trial was not
conducted in respect of any of the charges and trial is
concluded in respect of other offences, the accused
cannot be tried again for the offences for which charges
are already framed and trial was not conducted. He would
refer to Section 300 of Criminal Procedure Code to
substantiate his contention.
This Court has considered the contentions and
perused the records.
This Court is of the view that a prima facie case is
made out to grant interim relief.
Hence, the following:
Further proceedings in Spl. C.C. No.233/2018
pending on the file of the XXXII ACC & SJ & SPL Judge for
CBI cases at Bengaluru CCH-34 is stayed till the next date
of hearing.
List on 23.01.2025.”
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The said order is in subsistence even today.
3.3. The learned Additional Solicitor General of India,
appearing for the respondent - Enforcement Directorate,
submits that once the petitioner gets convicted in the
proceedings qua the predicate offence there cannot be an
interim order interdicting the proceedings under the PMLA.
Therefore, the matter is taken up.
4. The respective learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners in unison would submit that the proceedings under
the PMLA after the conviction amounts to double jeopardy on
the score that Section 300 of the Cr.P.C prohibits second trial
on the same offences. Learned counsel Sri N. R. Krishnappa
appearing for petitioner in Crl.P.748 of 2025 would seek to
place reliance upon the following judgments:
1. RAZORPAY SOFTWARE PRIVATE LIMITED,
ADUGODI, BANGALORE v. UNION OF INDIA
reported in 2024(4) Kar.L.J.503.
2. PREM CHAND SINGH v. STATE OF UTTAR
PRADESH reported in (2020) 3 SCC 54.
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3. T.P.GOPALAKRISHNAN v. STATE OF KERALA
reported in (2022) 14 SCC 323 .
5. Per contra , the learned Additional Solicitor General
would submit that same trial for the same offence would mean
under the same penal code - the IPC; it would not mean that a
person cannot be tried under a different statute for a different
offence. He would submit that if the submission of the
petitioners is accepted, no person can be tried under different
statutes if they are once tried under the IPC. Therefore, would
seek dismissal of the petitions.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the respective learned counsel for the
petitioners and the learned Additional Solicitor General for the
respondent and have perused the material on record.
7. The afore-narrated facts do not admit any dispute.
They are a matter of record and lie within a remarkably narrow
compass. The solitary question that needs consideration
is, whether continuation of proceedings against the
petitioners in Special C.C.No.233 of 2018 would amount
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to subjecting them to a second prosecution over the very
conviction that they have already suffered thereby
attracting the statutory and constitutional embargo
against double jeopardy . The submission that the
prosecution under the PMLA amounts to double jeopardy is
wholly misconceived and legally unsustainable. The edifice of
the petitioners’ argument rests upon Section 300 of the Cr.P.C.
It, therefore, becomes necessary to notice Section 300 of the
Cr.P.C. It reads as follows:
“ 300. Person once convicted or acquitted not
to be tried for same offence .—(1) A person who has
once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction
for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such
offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal
remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for
the same offence, nor on the same facts for any
other offence for which a different charge from the
one made against him might have been made under
sub-section (1) of Section 221, or for which he
might have been convicted under sub-section (2)
thereof.
(2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence
may be afterwards tried, with the consent of the State
Government, for any distinct offence for which a separate
charge might have been made against him at the former
trial under sub-section (1) of Section 220.
(3) A person convicted of any offence
constituted by any act causing consequences which,
together with such act, constituted a different
offence from that of which he was convicted, may
be afterwards tried for such last-mentioned
offence, if the consequences had not happened, or
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were not known to the Court to have happened, at
the time when he was convicted.
(4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence
constituted by any acts may, notwithstanding such
acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with, and
tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts
which he may have committed if the Court by which he
was first tried was not competent to try the offence with
which he is subsequently charged.
(5) A person discharged under Section 258 shall
not be tried again for the same offence except with the
consent of the Court by which he was discharged or of
any other Court to which the first-mentioned Court is
subordinate.
(6) Nothing in this section shall affect the
provisions of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897
(10 of 1897) or of Section 188 of this Code.
Explanation .—The dismissal of a complaint, or the
discharge of the accused, is not an acquittal for the
purposes of this section.
Illustrations
( a ) A is tried upon a charge of theft as a servant and
acquitted. He cannot afterwards, while the acquittal
remains in force, be charged with theft as a
servant, or, upon the same facts, with theft simply
or with criminal breach of trust.
( b ) A is tried for causing grievous hurt and convicted.
The person injured afterwards dies. A may be tried
again for culpable homicide.
( c ) A is charged before the Court of Session and
convicted of the culpable homicide of B. A may not
afterwards be tried on the same facts for the
murder of B .
( d ) A is charged by a Magistrate of the first class with,
and convicted by him of, voluntarily causing hurt
to B. A may not afterwards be tried for voluntarily
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causing grievous hurt to B on the same facts,
unless this case comes within sub-section (3) of
this section.
( e ) A is charged by a Magistrate of the second class
with, and convicted by him of, theft of property
from the person of B. A may subsequently be
charged with, and tried for, robbery on the same
facts.
( f ) A , B and C are charged by a Magistrate of the first
class with, and convicted by him of, robbing D.
A , B and C may afterwards be charged with, and
tried for, dacoity on the same facts.”
Section 300 of the Cr.P.C., embodies a principle that a
person once tried and convicted or acquitted by a Court
of competent jurisdiction shall not be again put in peril
for the same offence or for another offence founded
upon identical facts where the law prohibits a second
trial. A careful reading of Section 300 supra leaves little
room for doubt that its prohibition operates where a
person is sought to be tried twice for the same offence
arising out of same set of facts. The mischief that the
provision seeks to prevent is the registration of
successive prosecutions resulting in multiple trials for
identical offences. It is, in such circumstances, the
doctrine of double jeopardy springs into operation. To
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transplant that doctrine into the proceedings under the
PMLA, which creates a distinction of the statutory
offence, is to stretch the provision far beyond the
contours delineated by the legislature. Such an
expansive interpretation cannot be countenanced .
8. Once the petitioners stand convicted in the predicate
offence, there exists no legal impediment for continuation of
the proceedings under the PMLA. Whether the assets or money
in question ultimately answer the description of “proceeds of
crime” is a matter that lies squarely within the province of the
special Court. It is an issue to be tested upon evidence in a full-
blown proceedings and not the one that can prematurely be
foreclosed in these proceedings under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C.
9. Insofar as the judgments relied on by the learned
counsel in the case of RAZORPAY SOFTWARE PRIVATE
LIMITED supra is concerned, the said judgment marches on
an altogether different factual and legal footing. That case did
not arise after a conviction in the predicate offence. The
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proceedings therein were interdicted at a nascent stage upon a
finding that a predicate offence itself failed to disclose
commission of any offence. The ratio of the said decision,
therefore, has no application to the controversy on hand.
10. Equally distinguishable are the remaining judgments
cited by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners.
Those decisions arose in circumstances where successive
prosecutions under the IPC were founded upon the same
factual substratum resulting in parallel trial for the same
offence. It was in that context, the Apex Court invoked the
mandate of Section 300 of the Cr.P.C., and the constitutional
protection under Article 20(2) to obliterate subsequent
proceedings . The facts obtaining in the case at hand bears
no resemblance to both the aforesaid cases. The
prosecution, in the case at hand, is not a second trial for
the same offence. It is a prosecution under a different
and distinct statutory regime founded upon ingredients
that are separate and independent from those
constituting the predicate offence. Therefore, the said
judgments do not lend the petitioners any assistance .
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11. To answer the pivotal question whether conviction for
predicate offence under the IPC or any scheduled offences, and
the subsequent prosecution under the PMLA would amount to
double jeopardy, it becomes necessary to advert to the
judgments rendered by Division Benches of the High Courts of
Madras and Madhya Pradesh.
11.1. The Division Bench of the High Court of Madras in
the case of C. ANANDANE v. DIRECTORATE OF
1
ENFORCEMENT, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA , while
considering whether trial for the offences under the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 and the PMLA would become double
jeopardy, has held as follows:
“…. …. ….
14. As stated earlier, the point raised by the
petitioner has been answered by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Vijay Madan Lal Choudhary's case (cited
supra) case, in the following terms:
“ 269.From the bare language of
Section 3 of the 2002 Act, it is amply
clear that the offence of money-
laundering is an independent offence
regarding the process or activity
connected with the proceeds of crime
which had been derived or obtained as a
1
2023 SCC OnLine Mad 7479
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result of criminal activity relating to or in
relation to a scheduled offence. The
process or activity can be in any form —
be it one of concealment, possession,
acquisition, use of proceeds of crime as
much as projecting it as untainted
property or claiming it to be so. Thus,
involvement in any one of such process
or activity connected with the proceeds
of crime would constitute offence of
money-laundering. This offence
otherwise has nothing to do with the
criminal activity relating to a scheduled
offence — except the proceeds of crime
derived or obtained as a result of that
crime.
270. Needless to mention that such
process or activity can be indulged in
only after the property is derived or
obtained as a result of criminal activity (a
scheduled offence). It would be an
offence of money-laundering to indulge
in or to assist or being party to the
process or activity connected with the
proceeds of crime; and such process or
activity in a given fact situation may be a
continuing offence, irrespective of the
date and time of commission of the
scheduled offence. In other words, the
criminal activity may have been committed
before the same had been notified as
scheduled offence for the purpose of the 2002
Act, but if a person has indulged in or
continues to indulge directly or indirectly in
dealing with proceeds of crime, derived or
obtained from such criminal activity even after
it has been notified as scheduled offence, may
be liable to be prosecuted for offence of
money-laundering under the 2002 Act — for
continuing to possess or conceal the proceeds
of crime (fully or in part) or retaining
possession thereof or uses it in trenches until
fully exhausted. The offence of money-
laundering is not dependent on or linked
to the date on which the scheduled
offence or if we may say so the predicate
offence has been committed. The
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relevant date is the date on which the
person indulges in the process or activity
connected with such proceeds of crime.
These ingredients are intrinsic in the original
provision (Section 3, as amended until 2013
and were in force till 31.7.2019); and the
same has been merely explained and clarified
by way of Explanation vide Finance (No. 2)
Act, 2019. Thus understood, inclusion of
Clause (ii) in Explanation inserted in 2019 is
of no consequence as it does not alter or
enlarge the scope of Section 3 at all.”
15. Therefore, the question whether the
petitioner has indulged in dealing with the proceeds of
the crime (scheduled offence) is factual and is a matter
for trial.
16. The second submission of the learned
counsel for the petitioner was that prosecuting
the petitioner for an offence under Section 3 of
the PMLA would amount to double jeopardy. As
regards the said point, we are unable to agree
with the submissions made by the learned
counsel. The offence under Section 13(1)(e) PC
Act, which is possession of disproportionate
assets, can arise even if a public servant spends
the entire money derived illegally while holding
office as a public servant. However, the
ingredients of the offence under Section 3 of the
PMLA are different. Section 3 of the PMLA reads as
follows:
3. Offence of money-laundering.—
Whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to
indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a
party or is actually involved in any process or
activity connected with the proceeds of crime
and projecting it as untainted property shall
be guilty of offence of money-laundering.
17. The ingredients of Section 3 of PMLA
would indicate that the offence under Section 3
of PMLA has nothing to do with the criminal
activity/commission of a scheduled offence. If a
person indulges or continues to indulge in
dealing with proceeds of crime, he is liable to be
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prosecuted under the PMLA. Even in the case of
holding disproportionate assets punishable under
Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, if the offender
continues to possess or conceal the proceeds of
crime, after the check period, the offence of
money laundering is made out. Therefore, the
two offences are distinct and different and it
cannot be said that the offence under PMLA is
subsumed within the PC Act.Hence, the
submission of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that prosecuting the person accused of
an offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act
and for an offence under Section 3 of PMLA
would amount to double jeopardy, is untenable. ”
11.2. A little earlier to the afore-quoted judgment of the
Division Bench of the High Court of Madras, the Division Bench
of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case of HARI
2
SHANKAR GURJAR v. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT ,
considers an identical circumstance and holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
17. The petitioner No.2 stands charged for
having committed offence of abetment punishable
under Section 109 of IPC, while in the same trial her
husband has been convicted for the offence under
Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988. The controversy in the instant
matter is not with regard to her involvement in the
offence punishable under the Prevention of Corruption
Act but raised a question whether she can be
proceeded against under the provisions of the PMLA. It
has further been argued that petitioner No. 2 was not
2
2023 SCC OnLine MP 816
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even named in the FIR registered against her husband
and there was no charge against her in the said FIR,
even then the prosecution under the PMLA has been
launched against her, which cannot be said to be in
conformity with the settled legal principles in any
manner.
18. As has been said above that the offence
under the 2002, Act deals only with laundering of
money acquired by committing a scheduled offence.
Except that it starts with an offence of
possessing, concealing, using, converting or
projecting proceeds of a scheduled crime as
untainted money, it has nothing to do with the
launch of prosecution for scheduled offence and
continuation thereof and once a case is
registered under PMLA, it is an independent
offence. Conviction for a scheduled offence is not
a prerequisite for prosecution under the PMLA .
Since there is plenty of evidence to prima facie show
involvement of petitioner No. 2 in assisting her
husband to conceal, convert or to project proceeds of a
scheduled crime as assets earned or acquired through
valid and legal means. In this case, there is even more
evidence to show her indulgence in the crime. Her
husband has been convicted for a scheduled offence in
the same trial and she herself has been convicted for
abetment of such offence. When there is a
conviction for a scheduled offence, no doubt
remains that there exist prima facie case to
prosecute her under Section 3 of the PMLA which
is punishable under Section 4 thereof.
19. It is true that there is no mention of any
scheduled offence in the conviction order of petitioner
No. 2 and she has been awarded punishment only
under Section 109 IPC, but the offence of abetment
created under the second clause of Section 107
requires that there must be some act or illegal
omission. Abetment alone or in itself has no meaning
unless it is related to some act. Abetment is always of
some action. This is the reason why no separate
punishment has been provided for abetment in Section
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109 of the Indian Penal Code, rather it has been said
that the punishment for abetment shall be the same as
is provided for the offence which has been abetted. A
charge under Sections 107/109 should, therefore, be
in combination with or along with some other
substantive offence committed in consequence of
abetment.
20. In the present case, the husband of
petitioner no. 2 has been prosecuted for amassing
disproportionate assets. He had been prosecuted for
that offence under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the
PC Act. It is alleged that she knowingly assisted in
activities connected with the proceeds of scheduled
crime committed by her husband. She assisted her
husband by concealment, possession, use etc. of
tainted money and also by claiming it as untainted
property and thus, abetted the offence punishable
under section 13(1)(e) r/w 13(2) of the PC Act. They
have been prosecuted, convicted and sentenced for
amassing disproportionate property as well as abetting
the offence of amassing disproportionate property.
There cannot be any dispute that amassing
disproportionate property as punishable under section
13(1)(e) of the PC act is a scheduled offence under the
PMLA. Thus, she had abetted a scheduled offence
and has been convicted accordingly with the aid
and assistance of section 109 of the Indian Penal
Code. Therefore, even if there is no mention of
Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act in her conviction
order, still it cannot be said that she has not
committed or has not been punished for a
scheduled offence. Since, the offence under
Section 109 IPC cannot be read or punished in
isolation or independently, merely on the basis of
omission to mention S.13(1)(e) in her conviction
or sentence order, it cannot be said that she has
not committed any offence scheduled in
paragraph 8 of part ‘A’ of the ‘Schedule’
appended to the PMLA.
…. …. ….
23. The ld. Sr. counsel for the petitioner referred
to para 31 & 33 of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary
(supra) , and submitted that the trial Court has
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considered entire property of the petitioner as
‘proceeds of crime’ which is not proper, but since this is
a disputed question of fact and has to be decided by
the trial Court following the due process of law and is
not going to affect the legality or validity of the order
under consideration as even a single instance or
property is sufficient to prosecute the petitioner under
the PMLA, we are not inclined to assess or to hold an
inquiry to find out as to which or how many properties
are ‘proceeds of crime’ making the petitioner liable to
be prosecuted for the charge framed against her.
24.The plea of double jeopardy has also
been taken as petitioner No.2 has already been
convicted for the offence under Section 109 of
IPC for the same set of evidence. However, in the
present situation, the doctrine of double
jeopardy is not applicable as the person is being
tried under the scheme of PMLA and not under
the Penal Code/PC Act. For this, reliance can be
placed on the decisions in Leo Roy vs.
Superintendent District Jail AIR 1958 SC 119,
Assistant Collector of Customs vs L.R. Malwani
(1969) 2 SCR 438, Kalawati vs State of H.P. AIR
1953 SC 13, State of Rajasthan vs Hat Singh AIR
2003 SC 791, O.P. Dahiya vs Union of India
(2003) 1 SCC 122, Mohd. Ali vs Sri Ram Swarup
AIR 1965 All 161, Jitendra Panchal vs Narcotics
Control Bureau (2009) 3 SCC 57 and Monica Bedi
vs State of A.P. (2011) 1 SCC 284.
25.Double Jeopardy is often confused with
double punishment. There is a vast difference
between the two. Double punishment may arise
when a person is convicted for two or more
offences charged in one indictment however; the
question of double jeopardy arises only when a
second trial is sought on a subsequent
indictment following a conviction or acquittal on
an earlier indictment. This doctrine is certainly
not a protection to the individual from peril of
second sentence or punishment, nor to the
service of a sentence for one offence, but is a
protection against double jeopardy for the same
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offence that is, against a second trial for the
same offence .”
(Emphasis supplied at each instance)
The Division Bench of the High Court of Madras after an
exhaustive survey of the law declared by the Apex Court in
VIJAY MADAN LAL CHOUDHARY emphatically holds that
ingredients constituting an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA
are wholly distinct from those constituting the scheduled
offences. The two offences, though factually interconnected,
are legally distinct and one cannot be subsumed within the
other. The plea of double jeopardy was therefore, rejected by
the High Court of Madras.
12. The Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh echoes the very same principle. It has held that
prosecution under PMLA is neither dependent upon nor eclipsed
by the prosecution for the scheduled offence. The offence
under the PMLA derives its existence from the laundering
of proceeds of crime. Though emanating from the
commission of predicate offence, when an accused is
convicted for the scheduled offence/predicate offence,
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the subsequent prosecution under PMLA does not
amount to a second trial for the same offence .
13. In the teeth of the judgments rendered by the
Division Benches of the High Courts of Madras and Madhya
Pradesh to which I am in respectful agreement of, the
doctrine of double jeopardy does not cast its protective
mantle over the petitioners in the facts of the present
case. The prosecution under the PMLA is neither the
second trial for the same offence nor constitutional
transgression. It is a prosecution of an independent
statutory offence, in which the petitioners have to come
out clean in a full blown proceedings before the special
Court, as the prohibition under Section 300 of the Cr.P.C
extends only to a second trial for the same offence and
not to a prosecution for a distinct offence under another
enactment .
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14. The petitions bereft of legal merit, deserve to be
rejected and are accordingly dismissed.
Interim order, of any kind operating, shall stand
dissolved.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
BKP
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 68