Ashok Goyal vs Ajay Gupta & Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 24.09.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 18.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010454052026
+ RC.REV. 361/2026, CM APPL. 65415/2026 (Stay), CM APPL.
65416/2026 (Ex. From filing certified copy of annexures) &
CM APPL. 65417/2026 (For calling of the Trial court record)
ASHOK GOYAL .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Gaurav Barathi, Mr. Vishal
Thakur and Mr. Devender Kr.
Gupta, Advs.
versus
AJAY GUPTA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Sonali Chopra and Ms.
Vani Bhardwaj, Advs.
# CNR No. DLHC010449422026
RC.REV. 357/2026, CAV 458/2026, CM APPL. 64611/2026
(Stay) & CM APPL. 64612/2026 (Ex. From filing certified
copies of the annexures)
RAHUL GOYAL & ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Abhimanyu Mahajan,
Senior Advocate with Mr.
Kabeer Shrivastava, Advocate
versus
AJAY GUPTA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Sonali Chopra and Ms.
Vani Bhardwaj, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
J U D G M E N T
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present Revision Petitions, filed under Section 25-B(8) of
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 1 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
1
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 , seek to assail the Order dated
24.03.2026, passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, New
2
Delhi District, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi in the Eviction
3
Petition, being RC ARC 25/2021 , titled “Ajay Gupta & Anr. v. M/s
Om Prakash Surendra Kumar”.
2. Additionally, the Revision Petition bearing No. RC.REV.
361/2026, filed on behalf of Ashok Goyal, further assails the Order
4
dated 11.07.2026 , passed by the learned ARC in the Review Petition,
5
being Misc. SCJ 78/2026 , filed by Rahul Goyal and Gaurav Goyal
against the Impugned Order.
3. By way of the Impugned Order, two distinct Applications
seeking Leave to Defend, one filed on behalf of Rahul Goyal and
Gaurav Goyal, and another filed on behalf of Ashok Goyal, were
dismissed and, consequently, an Eviction Order came to be passed
under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the DRC Act in
respect of tenanted premises, being No. E-18 (Old Municipal No.
5493), Ground and Mezzanine floors, Connaught Place, New
6
Delhi .
4. For the sake of clarity and convenience, Rahul Goyal and
Gaurav Goyal, the Petitioners in RC.REV. 357/2026, are hereinafter
referred to as “Petitioners-Rahul Goyal and Gaurav Goyal” , and
Ashok Goyal, the Petitioner in RC.REV. 361/2026, as “Petitioner-
Ashok Goyal” . Where reference is made to all of them together, they
are referred to as “the Tenants” . Ajay Gupta and Sanjay Gupta, who
1
DRC Act
2
ARC
3
Eviction Petition
4
Review Order
5
Review Application
6
Tenanted Premises
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 2 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
are Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in both the Petitions and were the
petitioners in the Eviction Petition, are referred to as “the Landlords” ,
and individually as “Respondent No. 1” and “Respondent No. 2” ,
respectively.
5. The present Petitions, arise out of the same Eviction Petition, in
respect of same Tenanted Premises and assail the same Order. They
have, with the consent of the parties, been heard together and are
being, therefore, disposed of by way of this common Judgment.
BRIEF FACTS:
Tenants
6. A single tenancy, several decades ago, in respect of the
Tenanted Premises was created in favour of a partnership firm,
namely, M/s Om Prakash Surendra Kumar. The partners of the said
firm were Om Prakash Goyal, Surendra Kumar Goyal and Vinod
Kumar Goyal.
7. Upon the demise of the original partners, the Tenanted Premises
came to be occupied by Petitioner-Ashok Goyal, son of late Surendra
Kumar Goyal, and Petitioners-Rahul Goyal and Gaurav Goyal, sons of
late Sh. Vinod Kumar Goyal. Petitioner-Ashok Goyal carries on
business from one portion of the Tenanted Premises under the name
“Ashoks” , and Petitioners-Rahul Goyal and Gaurav Goyal from the
other portion under the name “Vintage” .
Landlords
8. The Landlords claim to be the owners of the Tenanted
Premises. By a perpetual lease dated 04.01.1926, the property was
demised to M/s L. Gopinath. Under a partition decree dated
02.11.1964 passed in Suit No. 652/1964, the Tenanted Premises fell to
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 3 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
the share of the Landlords’ father, late Y.N. Gupta. Upon his demise
on 12.01.2019, the Landlords became co-owners of the Tenanted
7
Premises by virtue of his Will dated 28.01.2016 .
9. A sister of the Landlords, Anjali Vaid, has instituted a Partition
8
Suit, being CS(OS) 231/2019 , for partition of the estate of late Y.N.
Gupta, which is pending before this Court and in which the validity
of Y.N. Gupta’s Will is in issue. Anjali Vaid, vide a letter dated
9
05.04.2019 , had also addressed the Tenants, claiming a one-fifth
share in the Tenanted Premises.
Institution of Eviction Petition
10. In September 2021, the Landlords instituted the Eviction
Petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, seeking eviction of
the Tenants from the Tenanted Premises for the bona fide requirement
of Respondent No. 1.
Bona fide requirement
11. It was pleaded that Respondent No. 1, a professional golfer and
golf coach, suffering from early-stage arthritis, would be unable to
continue his coaching career for long, and therefore required the
Tenanted Premises for setting up, operating and managing a retail
superstore dealing in golfing equipment and accessories, pursuant to
an offer received by him which was to be formalised on or before
30.09.2021.
Alternative Accommodation
12. In the said Eviction Petition, the Landlords also disclosed the
other properties owned by them in Connaught Place, Delhi and stated
7
Y.N. Gupta’s Will
8
Partition Suit
9
Letter of Attornment
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 4 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
why none of them was available or suitable for the requirement
pleaded.
10
13. Properties bearing Nos. E-15, Connaught Place, New Delhi ,
11
E-19, Connaught Place, New Delhi and E-21, Connaught Place,
12
New Delhi were stated to be in the occupation of tenants protected
under the DRC Act. Property bearing No. E-16, Connaught Place,
13
New Delhi was stated to be leased to M/s Westwind Retails Pvt. Ltd.
since November 2020, while property bearing No. E-17, Connaught
14
Place, New Delhi to M/s Aditya Birla Fashion & Retail Ltd. since
March 2014.
14. Further, it was stated that property bearing No. E-20,
15
Connaught Place, New Delhi was in the occupation of M/s
Greenways and was stated to be the subject matter of a litigation.
16
Properties bearing Nos. E-40, Connaught Place, New Delhi and E-
17
41, Connaught Place, New Delhi , though lying vacant since 2013
and 2016 respectively, were stated to be accessible only through a
narrow lane at the rear of the building and after climbing two flights
of stairs, and are thus unsuitable for a retail showroom.
15. Furthermore, the properties bearing Nos. E-22, Connaught
18 19
Place, New Delhi to E-27, Connaught Place, New Delhi and E-
20
44, Connaught Place, New Delhi to E-48, Connaught Place, New
10
E-15
11
E-19
12
E-21
13
E-16
14
E-17
15
E-20
16
E-40
17
E-41
18
E-22
19
E-27
20
E-44
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 5 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
21
Delhi , were stated to be exclusive properties of Respondent No. 2
and were stated to be either tenanted or unsuitable.
Applications seeking Leave to Defend
16. Upon service of summons, the Tenants filed their respective
Applications seeking Leave to Defend on 04.10.2021, wherein they
disputed, inter alia, the Landlords’ title and the relationship of
landlord and tenant, by relying upon the Letter of Attornment of
Anjali Vaid and the pendency of the Partition Suit.
17. The Tenants also contended that the requirement pleaded was
not bona fide and had lapsed with the expiry of the offer, and that
suitable alternative accommodation, particularly property bearing No.
E-16, was available to the Landlords.
18. By Order dated 12.02.2025, the learned ARC dismissed both
the Applications seeking Leave to Defend as having been filed beyond
the prescribed period, and passed an Eviction Order.
19. However, vide an Order dated 28.03.2025, passed by this Court
in the Revision Petition, being RC.REV. 105/2025, filed by
Petitioners-Rahul Goyal and Gaurav Goyal, the said Order, dismissing
the Applications seeking Leave to Defend, was set aside with the
consent of the Landlords and the matter was remanded back to the
learned ARC for fresh consideration.
20. In pursuance thereof, arguments on the merits of the
Applications seeking Leave to Defend were heard, which concluded
on 19.01.2026, and the parties were granted liberty to file their
respective Written Submissions.
21
E-48
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 6 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
Impugned Order
21. On 24.03.2026, by way of the Impugned Order, the learned
ARC dismissed both the Applications seeking Leave to Defend. It
held, firstly, that the Tenants had raised no triable issue as to the
relationship of landlord and tenant, since the Landlords had shown a
title better than that of the Tenants and, being co-owners, were
competent to maintain the Eviction Petition. Secondly, it held that the
requirement pleaded was bona fide. Thirdly, it held that none of the
properties relied upon by the Tenants was shown to be vacant and
reasonably suitable. Accordingly, an Eviction Order was passed in
respect of the Tenanted Premises.
Review Application
22. Petitioners-Rahul Goyal and Gaurav Goyal thereafter filed an
Application seeking Review of the Impugned Order under Section 25-
B(9) of the DRC Act, in which Petitioner-Ashok Goyal was also
arrayed as a Non-Applicant.
23. By the Review Order, the learned ARC dismissed the said
Review Application, on the grounds that the contentions urged had
already been considered in the Impugned Order and that, in substance,
Petitioners-Rahul Goyal and Gaurav Goyal sought a re-appreciation
of the same, which is impermissible in Review.
Present Petition
24. Aggrieved thereby, Petitioners-Rahul Goyal and Gaurav Goyal
have preferred RC.REV. 357/2026 against the Impugned Order, and
Petitioner-Ashok Goyal has preferred RC.REV. 361/2026 against both
the Impugned Order and the Review Order.
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 7 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS-RAHUL
GOYAL AND GAURAV GOYAL:
25. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Petitioners-
Rahul Goyal and Gaurav Goyal would contend that the learned ARC
erred in adjudicating the Eviction Petition on merits, despite material
indicating that one of the co-owners of the Tenanted Premises was
opposed to the eviction of the Tenants. It would, therefore, be
submitted that the Landlords could not have maintained the Eviction
Petition.
26. In this regard, reliance would be placed upon the Letter of
Attornment, whereby Anjali Vaid asserted a one-fifth share in the
Tenanted Premises, sought payment of rent and called upon the
Tenants not to alter its nature, possession or title without her written
consent. It would be submitted that the said Letter evinces her
opposition to any change in the existing arrangement and,
consequently, to the eviction of the Tenants.
27. Learned Senior Counsel would place reliance upon the
Judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in India Umbrella
22
Manufacturing Co. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla , particularly
Paragraph No. 6 thereof, to submit that although a co-owner may
institute eviction proceedings on behalf of the other co-owners, their
consent is presumed only in the absence of material indicating
disagreement. It would be contended that the Letter of Attornment
constitutes such material and displaces the presumption of consent.
The learned ARC, according to learned Senior Counsel, failed to
examine the effect of the said communication upon the Landlords’
22
(2004) 3 SCC 178
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 8 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
entitlement to maintain the Eviction Petition.
28. It would next be contended that the Landlords failed to disclose
material proceedings concerning the Tenanted Premises, particularly
the Partition Suit, instituted by Anjali Vaid, in which the genuineness
of Y.N. Gupta’s Will, forming the basis of the Landlords’ claim, is
under challenge. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the non-
disclosure assumes significance in view of the uncertainty
surrounding the devolution of the estate of late Sh. Y.N. Gupta and the
possibility that the Tenanted Premises may ultimately not fall to the
share of the Landlords. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that the
learned ARC erred in concluding, in Paragraph No. 42 of the
Impugned Order, that the alleged non-disclosure did not give rise to
any triable issue.
29. On the aspect of bona fide requirement, learned Senior Counsel
would submit that the need projected for Respondent No. 1 was
founded upon an unnamed and undated offer allegedly received from
an undisclosed retailer, which, as stated in the Eviction Petition itself,
was to be formalised on or before 30.09.2021. It would be contended
that the said offer had expired even before the period for filing the
Applications seeking Leave to Defend had elapsed, and the
requirement founded thereon could not be said to have subsisted when
the Eviction Petition was adjudicated.
30. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that the medical
record relied upon by Respondent No. 1 in support of his alleged
condition of arthritis was dated March 2022 and was placed on record
only along with the Reply to the Applications seeking Leave to
Defend. According to learned Senior Counsel, material which came
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 9 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
into existence subsequent to the institution of the Eviction Petition
could not substantiate the factual foundation of the requirement as
originally pleaded.
31. Learned Senior Counsel would also rely upon the Judgement of
23
this Court in Ved Prakash v. Gay Dry Cleaners , particularly
Paragraph Nos. 37 and 38, to contend that the Landlords’ conduct in
dealing with their other commercial properties was a relevant
consideration in examining the bona fides of the pleaded requirement.
It would be submitted that where other premises have been let out or
otherwise dealt with shortly before the institution of eviction
proceedings, the failure to furnish a satisfactory explanation may cast
doubt upon the genuineness of the requirement. The learned ARC,
therefore, ought to have examined the circumstances surrounding the
availability and utilisation of the other properties. The said Paragraphs
of Ved Prakash (supra) read as under:
“ 37. Thus, it is a matter of record that the sole ground for filing the
eviction petition with regard to the tenanted premises was that the
same was required for the office of the son of Petitioner, Mr
Jatinder Atri, who was working on the first floor of Property No.
439, admeasuring approximately 22 m, and since the same was
situated on the first floor, he was not able to generate good income.
The learned counsel for the Petitioner had argued that the learned
ARC erred in observing that the said requirement was not bona
fide, as the Petitioner in his cross-examination or otherwise was
not able to demonstrate as to when the need for the Petitioner's son
had arisen prior to filing of the petition. It was contended that the
eviction petition is always filed in praesenti, and therefore there
was no requirement for the Petitioner to demonstrate as to when
the need for his son's office to be on the ground floor had arisen.
38. There is no doubt that the eviction petition is filed
in praesenti and the need for bona fide requirement can arise at any
stage before filing of the eviction petition, however, once a specific
stand has been taken by the Petitioner for the purposes of filing of
the eviction petition under Section 14(1) (e) of the DRC Act, then
the burden to prove the same would fall upon the Petitioner. It had
23
2026 SCC OnLine Del 1528
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 10 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
come on record that the Petitioner's son, Mr Jatinder Atri, for
whose benefit the tenanted premises was sought, had been engaged
in the profession of property dealing since the year 2011-2012. It is
also matter of record that he has been running his office from
Property No. 439, First Floor, Masjid Moth, New Delhi, since the
very inception of his business, till the filing of the present petition.
In these circumstances, it was incumbent upon the Petitioner to
show that the ground for which eviction was sought was a genuine
one.”
32. In this context, learned Senior Counsel would contend that the
Landlords had several reasonably suitable alternative accommodations
available to them, including properties bearing Nos. E-15, E-16, E-17,
E-19, E-21, E-22 to E-27, E-40, E-41 and E-44 to E-48. It would be
submitted that the learned ARC failed to adequately examine the
availability and suitability of these properties and accepted the
explanations furnished by the Landlords without proper scrutiny.
Reliance would also be placed upon the Judgement of this Court in
24
Smt. Renu Mehta v. Sh. Pritam Singh through LRs , particularly
Paragraph Nos. 25 to 28, to submit that the existence of other
premises, the circumstances surrounding their non-disclosure and their
suitability for the requirement pleaded are relevant considerations at
the stage of determining whether a triable issue arises. The said
paragraphs of Renu Mehta (supra) read as under:
“ 25. It is also material that the learned ARC has not returned any
final finding that the Petitioners do in fact have reasonably suitable
alternate accommodation or that their requirement is not bona fide ;
it is only held that these questions require examination on the basis
of evidence and, consequently, that the Respondent ought to be
afforded an opportunity to establish the defence raised by him.
26. Therefore, at the stage of considering an application seeking
leave to defend under Section 25-B of the DRC Act, the learned
Rent Controller is not required to finally adjudicate upon the
competing claims of the parties. The relevant consideration is
whether the facts and material placed by the tenant disclose such a
24
2026:DHC:6503
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 11 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
defence as would, if established, disentitle the landlord from
obtaining an order of eviction.
27. In the present case, the Respondent has specifically pointed out
the existence of three other shops, which the Petitioners initially
denied and subsequently admitted their ownership. The question of
the suitability of those premises for the proposed garment
showroom remains open. The question as to whether the
requirement pleaded is bona fide or merely a desire also arises from
the circumstances noticed by the learned ARC.
28. Consequently, this Court, exercising limited revisional
jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, is unable to
find any perversity or material irregularity in the approach adopted
by the learned ARC in concluding that the aforesaid aspects raise
triable issues. Instead, the learned ARC has considered the
pleadings, the subsequent admission regarding the other shops and
the nature of the requirement pleaded, and has thereafter exercised
its discretion to grant leave to defend.”
33. Learned Senior Counsel would place particular emphasis upon
property bearing No. E-16, Connaught Place, which is situated in
close proximity to the Tenanted Premises. It would be submitted that,
as recorded in the Order dated 03.08.2018, passed in RC No. 21/2018,
the property comprised three portions, one of which was recovered
from M/s Rajendra & Co. on the ground of the bona fide requirement
of late Y.N. Gupta. Possession of the said portion came to the
Landlords’ family between 2019 and 2020. However, instead of
utilising the recovered premises for the purpose for which eviction had
been sought, the Landlords allegedly let out E-16 to M/s Westwind
Retails Pvt. Ltd. under a Lease Agreement dated 25.11.2020, within
the period of three years contemplated under Section 19 of the DRC
Act and without obtaining the permission of the Rent Controller.
34. It would further be contended that at least a part of E-16
continued to remain available to the Landlords when the present
Eviction Petition was instituted. Relying upon Ved Prakash (supra) ,
learned Senior Counsel would submit that the Landlords were
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 12 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
required to explain the subsequent utilisation of premises recovered on
the ground of bona fide requirement. The learned ARC, however,
failed to examine either the division of E-16 into three portions or the
implications of the statutory restriction under Section 19 of the DRC
Act.
35. On the aforesaid grounds, learned Senior Counsel would submit
that the objections raised by the Petitioners, whether considered
individually or cumulatively, disclosed triable issues warranting grant
of Leave to Defend. It would be contended that the learned ARC
failed to properly appreciate the material bearing upon the
genuineness of the pleaded requirement and the availability of
reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.
36. No other submissions were advanced on behalf of the learned
senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners-Rahul Goyal and
Gaurav Goyal.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER-ASHOK GOYAL:
37. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of Petitioner-Ashok Goyal
would adopt the submissions advanced on behalf of Petitioners-Rahul
Goyal and Gaurav Goyal. In addition, the Impugned Order is assailed
on three grounds, viz., first, non-disclosure of material civil
proceedings; second, failure to properly examine the availability and
subsequent letting of property bearing No. E-16, Connaught Place;
and third, omission to consider the stand taken by Respondent No. 2
in earlier eviction proceedings concerning the availability of the
Tenanted Premises.
38. On the first ground, learned counsel would submit that the
Landlords failed to disclose the pendency of the Partition Suit, being
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 13 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
CS(OS) No. 231/2019, instituted by their sister, Anjali Vaid, seeking
partition of the estate of late Y.N. Gupta, including the Tenanted
Premises. The validity of the Y.N. Gupta’s Will, upon which the
Landlords’ claim rests, is itself in issue in those proceedings.
39. It would further be submitted that the Landlords also failed to
25
disclose the pendency of the Suit, being CS No. 124/2015 , titled
“Y.N. Gupta v. Meenakshi Gupta” , concerning the challenge to and
modification of the Partition Decree dated 02.11.1964, which forms
the basis of their claim to the property.
40. Learned counsel for the Petitioner-Ashok Goyal would submit
that both proceedings directly concern the devolution of the Tenanted
Premises and the very foundation of the Landlords’ asserted title.
Their non-disclosure was, therefore, a material omission which ought
to have been considered while examining the Landlords’ entitlement
to maintain the Eviction Petition. It would be contended that the
Impugned Order fails to deal with this objection.
41. Adopting the submission advanced by the learned Senior
Counsel for the Petitioners-Rahul Goyal and Gaurav Goyal on the
aspect of the alternative accommodation of E-16, learned counsel for
the Petitioner-Ashok Goyal, elaborating thereon, would submit that a
portion of E-16 had been recovered from M/s Rajendra & Co. on the
ground of the bona fide requirement of late Sh. Y.N. Gupta. Following
his demise, possession of the said portion was obtained by his legal
heirs by January 2020, well before the institution of the present
Eviction Petition. However, the property was subsequently let out to
M/s Westwinds Retails Pvt. Ltd. under a Lease Agreement dated
25
Suit for Modification of the Partition Decree
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 14 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
25.11.2020. It would be contended that the Landlords were required to
explain the subsequent letting, particularly since no permission under
Section 19 of the DRC Act for re-letting the portion recovered from
M/s Rajendra & Co. was either sought or disclosed.
42. Learned counsel would therefore submit that the learned ARC
considered the issue only from the standpoint of whether E-16 was
lying vacant when the Eviction Petition was instituted, without
examining its prior availability to the Landlords and the circumstances
in which it was subsequently let out. It would be submitted that the
subsequent letting did not, by itself, answer the objection; rather, the
manner in which the Landlords had dealt with the property,
particularly in the absence of any explanation or disclosed permission
under Section 19 of the DRC Act, was a material circumstance
warranting consideration while deciding the Applications seeking
Leave to Defend.
43. The third ground concerns the stand taken by Respondent No. 2
in the proceedings arising out of RC/ARC No. 10/2022, titled “Sanjay
Gupta v. M/s Diamond Exports” . Learned counsel would submit that,
in those proceedings, Respondent No. 2 had relied upon the pendency
of the Partition Suit and the disputes concerning the jointly owned
properties to contend that such properties, including E-18, were not
available to him for his bona fide requirement. It would be submitted
that in Paragraph No. 37 of the Order dated 05.07.2024 passed therein,
the learned ARC had considered the properties jointly owned by the
Landlords, namely, properties bearing Nos. E-15 to E-21 and E-40 and
E-41, Connaught Place, and held that they could not be considered as
suitable alternative accommodation, having regard to the pending
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 15 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
Partition Suit instituted by Anjali Vaid.
44. Learned counsel would contend that the Landlords could not
adopt inconsistent positions in respect of the same properties in
different proceedings. Having relied upon the pending Partition Suit to
contend that the jointly owned properties, including E-18, were not
available to Respondent No. 2 in the earlier proceedings, they could
not seek eviction from E-18 in the present proceedings on the footing
that the Tenanted Premises were immediately required for their bona
fide use.
45. Learned counsel would further submit that the said Order dated
05.07.2024 was formally taken on record by the learned ARC vide
Order dated 12.11.2025, upon an Application filed by Petitioner-
Ashok Goyal and that the said Order was also specifically relied upon
in the Additional Written Submissions dated 11.03.2026.
Nevertheless, the Impugned Order does not advert to the said Order or
deal with the objection founded upon the stand taken by Respondent
No. 2 in those proceedings. It would, therefore, be contended that the
learned ARC failed to consider material placed on record and a
specific submission advanced on behalf of Petitioner-Ashok Goyal.
46. In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel would
pray that the Impugned Order and the Review Order be set aside and
that Petitioner-Ashok Goyal be granted Leave to Defend. No other
submissions were advanced by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of Petitioner-Ashok Goyal.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE LANDLORDS:
47. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Landlords would
support the Impugned Order as well as the Review Order, and submit
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RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 16 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
that the objections now sought to be urged by the Tenants had been
duly considered by the learned ARC, both while deciding the
Applications seeking Leave to Defend and while dealing with the
subsequent Review Application. It would be contended that the
Tenants are, in substance, seeking a re-appreciation of the very same
objections, which does not furnish any ground for interference under
the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction exercisable by this Court.
48. With respect to the bona fide requirement, learned counsel
would submit that, as specifically pleaded in Paragraph 18(a) of the
Eviction Petition, Respondent No. 1 requires the Tenanted Premises
for setting up, operating and managing a retail store dealing in golfing
equipment and accessories. The objection that the offer received by
Respondent No. 1 had expired was specifically dealt with in
Paragraph 31 of the Impugned Order. It was held that the DRC Act
does not require a landlord to disclose the precise nature of the
business proposed to be undertaken, nor can a landlord be bound to
commence the very business indicated in the Eviction Petition. The
choice of business to be undertaken from the premises, it is submitted,
remains within the landlord’s prerogative. Learned counsel would,
therefore, contend that the expiry of the purported offer does not, by
itself, render the pleaded requirement mala fide .
49. On the objection founded upon the Letter of Attornment issued
by Anjali Vaid, learned counsel would submit that the same was duly
considered in Paragraph No. 22 of the Impugned Order. It was
observed that, even if the Will dated 28.01.2016 were to be
disregarded and the claim of Smt. Anjali Vaid to a one-fifth share
were accepted, the Landlords, being sons and Class-I legal heirs of
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RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 17 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
late Y.N. Gupta, would nevertheless be co-owners of the Tenanted
Premises. It is further submitted that the law does not require all co-
owners to join in an Eviction Petition, and that even one co-owner is
competent to maintain proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC
Act.
50. Learned counsel would further draw attention to Paragraph Nos.
15 and 16 of the Review Order, wherein the learned ARC specifically
revisited the objections concerning the pending Partition Suit and the
letter of Anjali Vaid. It was observed that the Tenants had not
disputed their status as tenants, whereas the Landlords had produced
material demonstrating a title better than that of the Tenants; they
were not required to establish absolute ownership. It was further
noticed that Smt. Anjali Vaid had herself never entered appearance or
raised any objection to the Eviction Petition before the learned ARC.
The Tenants, on the one hand, relied upon her letter to contend that
she objected to the eviction, while, on the other, disputed the very
landlord-tenant relationship which the said letter acknowledged. The
learned ARC, therefore, rejected the contention as an inconsistent
stand, observing that any inter se dispute between the co-owners was a
matter for them to resolve and did not concern the Tenants. Learned
counsel would submit that these findings adequately answer the
objection regarding the alleged absence of consent of one of the co-
owners.
51. As regards the allegation of concealment of material
proceedings, learned counsel would submit that the objection was
considered in Paragraph No. 42 of the Impugned Order and was again
examined in Paragraph Nos. 17 and 18 of the Review Order. The
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 18 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
learned ARC had noted that the Landlords had disclosed the
properties owned by them and that no available alternative
accommodation had been concealed. It was further observed that the
Tenants had not demonstrated any specific prejudice occasioned by
the alleged non-disclosure. The learned ARC, therefore, concluded
that the objection, in the absence of any concealed suitable alternative
accommodation or demonstrated prejudice, did not give rise to a
triable issue. Learned counsel would submit that the mere pendency of
proceedings concerning the estate of late Y.N. Gupta, without
anything further to demonstrate how the same disentitled the
Landlords from maintaining the Eviction Petition, could not warrant
grant of Leave to Defend.
52. With respect to the objection concerning property bearing No.
E-16, learned counsel would submit that the issue of its availability
had been considered in Paragraph Nos. 33 and 34 of the Impugned
Order and was also specifically revisited in Paragraph Nos. 13 and 14
of the Review Order. It was observed that, although the Tenants had
referred to the division of E-16 into three portions and its subsequent
letting to M/s Westwind Retails Pvt. Ltd., they had not placed any
material with their Applications seeking Leave to Defend to show that
any of the said portions was lying vacant and available for the
Landlords’ use. The burden, it is submitted, was upon the Tenants to
establish not merely the existence of the property, but also its
availability and suitability for the requirement pleaded. Learned
counsel would, therefore, contend that the allegation regarding the
subsequent letting of E-16, without material demonstrating that any
portion thereof was available for the Landlords’ use, did not disclose a
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 19 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
triable issue.
53. Lastly, dealing with the reliance placed upon the Order dated
05.07.2024 passed in RC ARC 10/2022, learned counsel would
submit that the said objection was specifically considered in
Paragraph No. 19 of the Review Order. It was observed that property
bearing No. E-18, being in the occupation of the present Tenants,
could not have been regarded as vacant and available to Respondent
No. 2 for his bona fide requirement in the earlier eviction proceedings.
The circumstance that Respondent No. 2 had relied upon the pendency
of the Partition Suit in those proceedings, therefore, did not amount to
taking an inconsistent position in the present case, where eviction was
sought from the very premises occupied by the Tenants. Learned
counsel would submit that the doctrine of approbation and reprobation
had no application in the facts of the case.
54. Learned counsel would accordingly submit that the Impugned
Order reflects due consideration of the objections raised by the
Tenants, and that the Review Order further demonstrates that none of
the grounds urged disclosed an error warranting review. It is,
therefore, prayed that both Revision Petitions be dismissed.
55. No other submissions were advanced by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the Landlords.
ANALYSIS:
56. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the parties, and with their able assistance, perused the material
available on record.
57. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the ensuing discussion
is arranged under separate headings corresponding to the principal
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 20 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
discussion thereunder. The said headings are merely intended to
facilitate the orderly appreciation of the reasoning and are not to be
construed as creating isolated compartments between the issues. The
Judgment is to be read as a whole, and the findings recorded under
each heading shall be understood in the context of, and in conjunction
with, the findings and reasoning contained in the other parts of the
Judgment.
Limited Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction
58. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Tenants, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
59. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
26
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
27 28
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua ,
has consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
60. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
29
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
30
Grover .
61. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
26
(1998) 8 SCC 119
27
(2014) 9 SCC 78
28
(2022) 6 SCC 30
29
2024:DHC:9322
30
2025:DHC:11285
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 21 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
62. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra) , a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra) ,
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 22 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
63. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
64. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Tenants against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
Consolidated Grounds of Challenge for Determination
65. At this juncture, this Court deems it apposite to first distil the
grounds of challenge urged on behalf of the Tenants for proper
consideration and adjudication of both the Petitions. They may be
enumerated as follows: (i) the maintainability of the Eviction Petition
in the light of the letter dated 05.04.2019 issued by Smt. Anjali Vaid;
(ii) the alleged non-disclosure of CS(OS) 231/2019 and CS No.
124/2015; (iii) the availability of alternative accommodation, with
particular reference to property bearing No. E-16, Connaught Place;
(iv) the bona fide requirement pleaded by the Landlords; (v) the
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 23 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
alleged inconsistency in the stand taken by Respondent No. 2 in RC
ARC. 10/2022, and the alleged non-consideration of the Order dated
05.07.2024 passed therein; and (vi) the challenge to the Review Order.
66. The aforesaid grounds, though interrelated in certain respects,
arise from distinct factual and legal considerations. This Court shall,
therefore, examine them in the sequence set out hereinabove, having
regard to the rival submissions, the material placed on record and the
reasoning adopted by the learned ARC. The first issue which merits
consideration is whether the letter dated 05.04.2019 issued by Smt.
Anjali Vaid, and the pending Partition Suit, have any bearing on the
maintainability of the Eviction Petition or the Landlords’ entitlement
to seek eviction of the Tenants.
Landlord–Tenant Relationship: Effect of the Letter of Attornment
and the pending Partition Suit
67. The first ground of challenge proceeds on the premise that the
Landlords could not have maintained the Eviction Petition without the
consent of Anjali Vaid, who claims a one-fifth share in the estate of
late Y.N. Gupta. The contention is sought to be fortified by reliance
upon the Letter of Attornment, addressed by Anjali Vaid to the
Tenants, and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in India
Umbrella Manufacturing Co. (supra) , particularly Paragraph No. 6
thereof, which reads as under:
“ 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties we are satisfied
that the appeals are liable to be dismissed. It is well settled that one
of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the
property generally owned by the co-owners. (See Sri Ram Pasricha
v. Jagannath and Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai, SCC para 25.) This
principle is based on the doctrine of agency. One co-owner filing a
suit for eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his
own right and as an agent of the other co-owners. The consent of
other co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 24 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit
was filed in spite of their disagreement. In the present case, the suit
was filed by both the co-owners. One of the co-owners cannot
withdraw his consent midway the suit so as to prejudice the other
co-owner. The suit once filed, the rights of the parties stand
crystallised on the date of the suit and the entitlement of the co-
owners to seek ejectment must be adjudged by reference to the date
of institution of the suit; the only exception being when by virtue of
a subsequent event the entitlement of the body of co-owners to
eject the tenant comes to an end by act of parties or by operation of
law.”
(Emphasis supplied)
68. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that, while one co-
owner is competent to institute eviction proceedings, the consent of
the other co-owners is ordinarily presumed, unless it is demonstrated
that they were not agreeable to the eviction and that the proceedings
were instituted notwithstanding such disagreement. The question,
therefore, is not whether the presumption of consent is rebuttable; it
undoubtedly is.
69. The question is whether the material placed by the Tenants, i.e. ,
the Letter of Attornment, in the present case, is sufficient to
demonstrate the kind of disagreement contemplated in India
Umbrella Manufacturing Co. (supra) hereinabove.
70. A perusal of the said Letter of Attornment makes it manifest
that it merely asserts a claim to a one-fifth share in the property, seeks
payment of rent and calls upon the Tenants not to change or alter the
nature, possession or title of the premises without the written consent
of Anjali Vaid. It does not, however, contain an express objection to
the institution of eviction proceedings, nor does it state that the
Tenants must continue in occupation or that the tenancy is not to be
terminated. A direction against changing or altering the nature,
possession or title of the premises cannot, without more, be equated
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 25 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
with an unequivocal refusal to consent to eviction proceedings
instituted by the other co-owners.
71. The learned ARC, in the Impugned Order, examined the Letter
of Attornment principally from the standpoint of the Landlords’ title.
It held that the Tenants, while disputing the title of the Landlords,
could not simultaneously rely upon the claim of Anjali Vaid founded
upon the alleged invalidity of the Will, and that, even if the Will were
to be ignored and her claim to a one-fifth share accepted, the
Landlords would nevertheless remain co-owners competent to
maintain the Eviction Petition. The relevant portion of the Impugned
Order read as under:
20) Here, it is also relevant to note that at one end, respondents are
claiming that petitioners are the not the owners/landlords but at the
same time, contending that petitioner’s sister Anjali Veid is also
claiming to be owner to the extent of 1/5th share as the Will of Y N
Gupta is invalid. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the
respondents being tenants have no locus to challenge the Will of
successor of erstwhile landlord. It is important to bear in mind the
principle laid down in the case of Sh. Bharat Bhushan Vs. Arti
Teckchandani 2008 (153) DLT 247 which is as follows:-
“The concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation
governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act, has to be
distinguished from the one in a title suit. If the premises
was let out by a person and after his death, the premises
has come in the hands of beneficiary under a Will, the
tenant has no right to challenge the title of such a
beneficiary. If on the death of the original owner, the
tenant has any doubt as to who was the owner of the
premises, he is supposed to file an interpleader suit
impleading all the legal heirs of the deceased and ask the
Court to decide as to who shall be the landlord/owner
after the death of the original owner. Where no
interpleader suit is filed by the tenant and the tenant
continues in possession after death of the original owner
without demur and without raising an objection against
the person, who claims to have inherited the property
under the Will, he later on cannot challenge the
ownership of such a person. It is not the domain of the
tenant to challenge the Will of the deceased landlord. If
a landlord is able to show that there is a testament in
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 26 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
his/her favour, he/she is deemed to have discharged
his/her burden of proving the ownership under the Act.
If the tenant takes a frivolous objection about ownership,
such an objection cannot be entertained unless the
tenant comes forward as to who was the landlord/owner
of the premises and to whom he has been paying rent
after the death of the original owner.
21) In the light of aforesaid observations in Bharat Bhushan
(supra) , admittedly, since no inter-pleader suit is stated to have
been filed by the respondents in this regard, respondents have no
locus to challenge the title of petitioners On the other hand,
petitioners have filed copy of perpetual lease deed dated
04.01.1926 in favour of their predecessors-in-interest, copy of
partition decree in suit no. 652/1964, copy of plaint filed by their
father Y.N. Gupta in suit no. 652/1964 as well as Will of Y.N.
Gupta to show that their status in the premises is that of an
owner/landlord. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that the petitioners
have filed various rent receipts as well as copy of letter dated
01.12.1990 issued by the then partners of M/s Om Prakash Surinder
Kumar along with cheque bearing no. 851983 qua tender of rent in
support of its pleadings qua landlord-tenant relationship whereas
the respondents have made bald denials and no specific averment
has been made to whom the rent is being paid if not the children of
Y.N. Gupta (father of the petitioners). Therefore, considering the
said circumstances as no interpleader suit is stated to have been
filed by the respondents nor any specific averment made that who
other than Y N Gupta or his legal heirs is the landlord, it is
apparent that the denial of the rent receipts has been done solely for
the purpose for raising a contention without any basis in this
regard. Here, I also find it pertinent to refer to the decision of the
Hon'ble High Court passed in the case of Mohd. Naseer Vs.
Mohd. Zaheer and Anr. RC Rev. No. 267/2016 dated
03.11.2016 wherein it is held that mere raising of baseless
contentions against the landlord cannot be a ground for being
granted leave to defend. Even otherwise, attornment in favour of
the landlord is unnecessary to confer validity to the transfer of the
landlord's rights and there is no such statutory
requirement. Reference may be made to the case of Hajee K.
Assainar vs. Chacku Joseph AIR 1984 Ker 113.
22) Moreover, even if the said Will is ignored and the contention of
the respondent with respect to the letter issued by Anjali Vaid
(sister of the petitioners) conceded, it is pertinent to note that she is
only claiming herself to be co-owner to the extent of 1/5th share.
Further, even if, for the sake of arguments, it is admitted that Y N
Gupta died intestate, still petitioners, being his sons, are class-I
heirs and would be the co-owners of the premises along with their
sisters and mother. It is trite to state that even a co-owner can file
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 27 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
an eviction petition against the tenant and all the co-owners are not
required to be joined as a party.
(Emphasis supplied)
72. It is true that the Impugned Order does not separately examine
the contention that the Letter of Attornment displaced the presumption
of consent. Such an omission would, however, warrant interference
only if the plea, taken at its highest, disclosed facts which, if proved,
would disentitle the Landlords from obtaining an order of eviction.
Tested thus, the plea does not disclose a triable issue.
73. The Letter of Attornment is dated 05.04.2019, more than two
years before the institution of the Eviction Petition, and is addressed
to the occupants of the Tenanted Premises, not to the co-owners. It
does not, in terms, disclose any disagreement with the institution of
eviction proceedings. Nor has any subsequent communication,
proceeding or other material been pointed out to demonstrate that Smt.
Anjali Vaid had, at any stage, opposed the eviction of the Tenants,
though she was always at liberty to do so. Her assertion of a share in
the estate, and her insistence upon protection of her alleged
proprietary interest, cannot by themselves be treated as proof that she
was unwilling to have the Tenanted Premises recovered by the other
co-owners for their bona fide requirement. The factual foundation
necessary to displace the presumption recognised in India Umbrella
Manufacturing Co. (supra) was, therefore, never laid.
74. There is an additional aspect. The learned ARC did not rest its
conclusion merely upon the existence of the Y.N. Gupta’s Will. In
Paragraph No. 22 of the Impugned Order, the learned ARC expressly
considered the objection even on the assumption that the said Will
were to be ignored and the claim of Anjali Vaid to a one-fifth share
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 28 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
were to be accepted. The aforesaid approach is consistent with the
settled distinction between the standard of ownership required in an
eviction proceeding under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act and the
adjudication of absolute title in a civil suit.
75. The Landlords were required to establish a title better than that
of the Tenants; they were not required to establish an indefeasible or
exclusive title to the Tenanted Premises. The material placed on
record, including the perpetual lease deed dated 04.01.1926, the
Partition Decree dated 02.11.1964, the Will dated 28.01.2016 and the
rent-related documents, was considered by the learned ARC while
examining the relationship between the parties. The Tenants, on the
other hand, did not identify any person other than late Sh. Y.N. Gupta
or his legal heirs to whom rent was payable, nor did they establish that
the Landlords lacked a title superior to their own.
Pendency of Civil Proceedings
76. Adverting to the second ground of challenge, the objection
founded upon the non-disclosure of the Partition Suit, being CS(OS)
231/2019 and Suit for Modification of the Partition Decree, being CS
No. 124/2015, titled “Y.N. Gupta v. Meenakshi Gupta” , must also be
considered in this context. The Tenants contend that these proceedings
have a bearing upon the foundation of the Landlords’ title and that
their non-disclosure ought, in itself, to have resulted in grant of Leave
to Defend. The learned ARC dealt with the objection in Paragraph No.
42 of the Impugned Order. The relevant portion of the Impugned
Order reads as under:
“ 42) Another contention pressed on behalf of the respondents is
that the petitioners have failed to disclose about other cases in
terms of Chapter XXII of the Delhi High Court Rules, whereby a
landlord is required to disclose about all the cases against the same
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 29 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
tenant as well as all the cases regarding the various portions of the
same subject premises. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf
of the petitioner that the petitioners have mentioned all the
properties of the petitioners and have not concealed about any
alternative accommodation and therefore, the said contention is not
sufficient for grant of leave to defend. In this regard, it is pertinent
to note that in the case of Nalini Kant Gupta Vs. Lajja Gupta,
2017 SCC Delhi 10247 , it was held that petition for eviction for
self requirement cannot be dismissed on the ground of suppression
once the tenant has had full opportunity to contest the same . Even
though the said observations were made in the case of a matter
which had gone to trial but in the present matter, since no specific
prejudice can be said to have been suffered by the tenant and it is
not the case where any available alternative accommodation has
been concealed by the petitioners, the said ground by itself is not
sufficient for the grant of leave to defend application. Thus, no
triable issue arises on the basis of said contention.”
(Emphasis supplied)
77. It is true that disclosure of material proceedings and relevant
facts assumes particular significance in proceedings under Section
14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the DRC Act, where the matter is
initially decided on the basis of affidavits and the opportunity to lead
evidence is not available as a matter of course. However, the
consequence of an alleged non-disclosure cannot be considered in the
abstract. The materiality of the omitted fact, and its bearing upon the
statutory ingredients of the eviction petition, must necessarily be
examined.
78. In the present case, the pendency of the said proceedings does
not, by itself, demonstrate that the Landlords lack a title better than
that of the Tenants or that the Eviction Petition is not maintainable.
The challenge to the Will and the disputes concerning the Partition
Decree are matters between the persons claiming through late Y.N.
Gupta. They do not displace the material relied upon by the Landlords
to establish their status as co-owners and successors-in-interest of the
erstwhile landlord. As already noticed, even if the challenge to the
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BHATIA
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Will were to succeed, the Landlords would remain co-owners.
79. The apprehension that the Tenanted Premises may ultimately
not fall to the share of the Landlords is equally of no avail. As held in
India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. (supra) , the entitlement of the
co-owners to seek ejectment is to be adjudged by reference to the date
of institution of the proceedings. The possibility of a future partition
among the co-owners cannot, therefore, disclose a triable issue at this
stage.
80. It is also pertinent to note that the pendency of Partition Suit
and the Letter of Attornment were themselves pleaded by the Tenants
in their Applications seeking Leave to Defend, along with the order
framing issues in the said suit. Both were thus squarely before the
learned ARC when the Applications were decided. The alleged non-
disclosure, therefore, did not deprive either the Tenants or the learned
ARC of any material fact.
81. Insofar as Suit for Modification of the Partition Decree is
concerned, it finds no mention in either of the Applications seeking
Leave to Defend. The objection was raised for the first time in the
written submissions, on the basis of a reference made in the
Landlords’ own reply. Even if it is taken at its highest, a proceeding
concerning the Modification of Partition Decree stands on no different
footing from the Partition Suit, for the reasons noted above.
82. Lastly, as rightly noticed by the learned ARC, the Tenants have
not shown that the alleged non-disclosure resulted in the concealment
of any vacant and reasonably suitable alternative accommodation, or
that it caused them any prejudice. Though Paragraph No. 42 of the
Impugned Order does not refer to each proceeding by name, it deals
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with the objection of non-disclosure in its entirety, and the reasons it
gives are discernible and sustainable. Whether a different view could
have been taken on the effect of the non-disclosure is not the test in
the present proceedings. The second ground of challenge is,
accordingly, rejected.
Availability of Alternative Accommodation
83. The third ground of challenge is that the Landlords had several
reasonably suitable alternative accommodations available to them, and
that the learned ARC dealt with the objection cursorily. Since the
Tenants rely upon the circumstances relating to property bearing No.
E-16 both to establish the availability of alternative accommodation
and to impeach the bona fides of the requirement, it is considered
appropriate to examine this ground first.
84. Before examining the properties relied upon, it is necessary to
recall the standard laid down by this Court in Lalta Prasad Gupta Vs.
31
Sita Ram , which was relied upon by the learned ARC in Paragraph
No. 34 of the Impugned Order, which reads as under:
“ 34) It is trite to state that the burden is upon the tenant to show
that other alternative suitable accommodation is available with
landlord and how the said premises were suitable for the pleaded
requirement. Reference is made to the judgment of the Hon’ble
High Court of Delhi in the case of Lalta Prasad Gupta Vs. Sita
Ram, 2017 SCC Online Del 13026, wherein it was held as under
:-
“ 18. Thus, if the tenant seeks leave to defend
controverting the requirement pleaded by landlord on the
ground of the landlord, though at the time of requirement
having alternate premises, having not used the same and
instead having commercially exploited the same, the
tenant must plead (a) the particulars of such premises; (b)
the right/title of the landlord to the same; (c) that the said
premises were vacant and available for use at the time of
pleaded requirement of landlord; (d) how the said
31
2017 SCC Online Del 13026
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BHATIA
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premises were suitable for the pleaded requirement; and
(e) how the landlord has deprived himself thereof i.e. by
sale or letting and support the said pleas with material on
the basis whereof such pleas will be proved .
(Emphasis supplied)
85. A perusal of the Eviction Petition reflects that the Landlords
disclosed every property owned by them and stated why each was
neither available nor suitable for the requirement pleaded. The learned
ARC examined the properties relied upon by the Tenants in Paragraph
Nos. 33 to 38 of the Impugned Order, the relevant portions of which
read as under:
“ 33) It is also contended that the petitioner has various alternative
accommodations for his projected bona fide need and therefore,
there is no necessity for the petitioner no.1 for the tenanted
premises in question. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that as far
as the contention of the respondents is concerned with respect to
properties bearing no. E-15, E-16, E-17, E-19, E-21, the petitioners
have stated that the said properties are in the occupation of tenants.
No contrary material has been placed on record by the respondents
to show that the said accommodations were lying vacant at the
time of petition and therefore, available for the bona fide need of
the petitioners. With respect to E-16, respondents themselves have
pleaded that it was in three parts and has been let out in November
2020. With respect to E-20, petitioner has stated that the said
property is occupation of M/s Greenways and also subject matter
of litigation. Nothing has been placed on record by the respondents
to show that any of said accommodations are lying vacant and
therefore, available to the petitioner no.1.
xxx xxx xxx
35) Moreover, petitioner himself has disclosed about the said
accommodations in the eviction petition which reflects that there
was no concealment on the part of petitioner in this regard. In the
absence of any cogent material, no triable issue arises in this
regard.
xxx xxx xxx
37) With respect to aforesaid properties i.e. E-22 to E-27 and E-44
to E-48, petitioners have pleaded that except premises bearing no.
E-22, part of E-44 and E-27/4 i.e. open courtyard with one tin-
shed; the remaining properties are in occupation of tenants. No
cogent material has been placed on record by the respondents to
show that the said premises are lying vacant and therefore,
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BHATIA
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available to the petitioners for a triable issue to arise. Further, the
petitioners have categorically pleaded that the same are exclusive
properties of petitioner no.2. Nothing has been brought on record
to even prima facie show that petitioner no.1 is also the owner of
the said premises. In the case of Saroj Khemka Vs. Indu
Sharma, 2000 (2) RCJ 363, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court held
that the person who is residing abroad, must be allowed to stay in
his own house even if he wants to spend few weeks or months in
India and cannot be expected to adjust with his relative. Therefore,
even for few weeks or months, a landlord was not expected to
adjust in the property of his relative whereas in the present case,
the bona fide requirement is continuous for a business/retail store
to be run. Hence, in the said circumstance, petitioner no.1 cannot
be expected to adjust in the properties of his brother/petitioner
no.2, in which he has no share, when in comparison, he is the co-
owner of the tenanted premises in question. Thus, no triable issue
arises in this regard as well .
xxx xxx xxx
38) Next, it is contended that petitioner no.1 is the co-owner of E-
40 and E-41 and had the need been bona fide, the petitioner would
have utilized the same as the said premises are lying vacant for the
past many years. It is trite to state that it is the prerogative of the
landlord to determine which premises best suits his requirements.
Further, the Hon’ble Superior Courts have repeatedly held that the
Courts are not to sit in the armchair of the landlord and dictate as
to how the available property of the landlord is to be best utilized
by him. The landlord is the absolute owner of his property and is
the best person to decide which property is to be utilized in what
way. The respondent cannot dictate as to how the landlord is to
utilize his property. The landlord possesses the prerogative to
determine their specific requirements, exercising full autonomy in
this regard. It is not within the purview of the courts to impose
directives on the landlord regarding the nature or quality of their
chosen usage of the tenanted premises. Therefore, the courts
refrain from prescribing any standard or guidelines for the
landlord's choices (residential or commercial). Reliance is placed
upon the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case of
Praveen & Anr. Vs. Mulak Raj & Ors. RC Rev. 417/2016 in
this regard. Further, petitioners have categorically pleaded that the
said properties can be accessed through a narrow lane/alley way
situated at the rear end of the building and then after climbing two
flights of stairs up to a common entrance and therefore, are not
suitable for the bona fide requirement of the petitioner for running
the retail showroom. It is pertinent to note the judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen
Maheshwari (2010) 1 SCC 503, where it was held that it is not for
the Courts to say that the landlord should shift to the first floor or
any higher floor as it is well known that shops and businesses are
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BHATIA
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usually conducted on the ground floor, because the customers can
reach there easily. It was reiterated that the Court cannot dictate to
the landlord which floor he should use for his business and that is
for the landlord himself to decide. Hence, the said contention also
does not amount to any triable issue as it is for the landlord to
decide which premises are suitable and not for the court to sit in
armchair of the landlord and dictate as to how the available
property of landlord is best utilized by him.”
(Emphasis supplied)
86. Insofar as properties bearing Nos. E-15, E-17, E-19 and E-21
are concerned, the Landlords pleaded that they are in the occupation
of other tenants. Property bearing No. E-20 was pleaded to be in the
occupation of M/s Greenways and the subject matter of litigation. The
Tenants did not dispute that these properties were tenanted. They
contended only that the Landlords had not furnished particulars of the
tenancies, and that an adverse inference ought, therefore, to be drawn.
Such a plea does not meet the requirement, laid down in Lalta Prasad
Gupta (supra) , that the tenant must plead, and support with material,
the fact that the premises were vacant and available at the time of the
pleaded requirement. The learned ARC was, therefore, justified in
holding that no triable issue arose in respect of these properties.
87. As regards properties bearing Nos. E-22 to E-27 and E-44 to E-
48, the Landlords categorically pleaded that they are the exclusive
properties of Respondent No. 2, in which Respondent No. 1, whose
requirement is pleaded, has no share. Nothing was placed on record by
the Tenants to even prima facie show otherwise. Respondent No. 1
cannot be required to meet his requirement from the properties of his
brother.
88. Further, apart from properties bearing Nos. E-22, E-27/4 and
part of E-44, which the Landlords themselves disclosed as not being
in the occupation of tenants, the Applications seeking Leave to
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BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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Defend do not furnish any particulars of the remaining properties in
this group. The objection in respect of them is, therefore, a bare
assertion.
89. As regards properties bearing Nos. E-40 and E-41, the
Landlords pleaded that they are accessible only through a narrow lane
at the rear of the building and after climbing two flights of stairs, and
are thus unsuitable for a retail showroom. The Tenants contend that
customers of a golf store would not be deterred by stairs. However,
the choice of the premises which best suit the landlord’s requirement
is the landlord’s. It is trite law that the tenant cannot dictate to the
landlord how his property is to be utilised. The same reasoning applies
to the contention that space on the first floor could be used for the
requirement.
90. This brings this Court to property bearing No. E-16, on which
particular emphasis was placed by both the Petitioners. Their case is
as follows. As recorded in the Order dated 03.08.2018 passed in RC
No. 21/2018, E-16 comprised about 1,737 sq. ft. on the ground floor
and about 1,460 sq. ft. on the mezzanine floor, divided into three
portions. A portion of about 825 sq. ft. was recovered from M/s
Rajendra & Co. on the ground of the bona fide requirement of late
Y.N. Gupta. The entire property, of about 3,300 sq. ft., was thereafter
let out to M/s Westwind Retails Pvt. Ltd. by the Lease Agreement
dated 25.11.2020. It is contended that this letting was made without
the permission of the Rent Controller under Section 19 of the DRC
Act, and that the learned ARC examined E-16 only from the
standpoint of whether it was vacant, and not from the standpoint of its
availability to, and utilisation by, the Landlords.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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91. However, a perusal of the Impugned Order makes it manifest
that the learned ARC, in Paragraph No. 40, the learned ARC dealt
with the letting of E-16 prior to the institution of the Eviction Petition.
The same read as under:
“ 40) With respect to the contention that petitioners have let out
various premises, including E-16 after getting them vacated, at
huge rentals in November 2020, it is pertinent to note that the
eviction petition in the present matter was filed on 30.09.2021. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the case of Shyam Sunder
Ahuja Vs. Sushil Kumar, 2017 SCC Online Del 10624, wherein
the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi has held that the plea that the
landlord has sold some property or let out some property is not a
ground to deny the order of the eviction to the landlord. The
relevant extract is reproduced here under :-
“16. Not only so, the petitioner/tenant also did not state
that there was no change in the requirement of the
respondent/landlord since then. Merely taking a plea
that the respondent/landlord has in the past sold some
property or let out some property has in Narender
Kumar Shah Proprietor Jay Bharat Steels Vs. Malti
Narang 2014 SCC Online Del 3839 and Anil Kumar
Bagania Vs. Shiv Rani 2014 SCC Online Del 6645 been
held to be not a ground for denying order of eviction to
landlord on the ground of self requirement of
premises.”
(Emphasis supplied)
92. This aforesaid reasoning of the learned ARC cannot be faulted.
It is not in dispute that, on the date of institution of the Eviction
Petition, E-16 was in the occupation of a lessee under the Lease
Agreement dated 25.11.2020. It was, therefore, neither vacant nor
available to the Landlords when the requirement of Respondent No. 1
arose. The requirement pleaded in the present proceedings arose in
2021, with the offer received by Respondent No. 1. There is nothing
on record to suggest that this requirement existed when E-16 was let
out, so that the Landlords could be said to have deprived themselves
of available accommodation in order to manufacture a need for the
Tenanted Premises. The essential requirement laid down in Lalta
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BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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Prasad Gupta (supra) , namely that the premises be vacant and
available at the time of the pleaded requirement and that the landlord
have deprived himself of them, is thus not satisfied.
93. The contention founded upon Section 19 of the DRC Act does
not advance the case of the Tenants either. To begin with, the plea
finds no place in either of the Applications seeking Leave to Defend,
and was raised for the first time in the written submissions. Even if it
is taken at its highest, Section 19 of the DRC Act confers a remedy
upon the tenant who was dispossessed under an order of eviction, in
the event the landlord fails to occupy the premises or re-lets them
within the prescribed period. Whether such a remedy was available to
M/s Rajendra & Co. is not a question that arises in the present
proceedings. It does not render E-16 available to the Landlords in
2021, nor does it bear upon the requirement of Respondent No. 1.
94. Further, the requirement on the basis of which the portion of E-
16 was recovered was that of late Y.N. Gupta himself, who sought
additional office space being wheelchair-bound. As is evident from
the record, possession of that portion was taken by his legal heirs after
his demise on 12.01.2019. As explained by the Landlords in their
reply, the said portion was kept vacant after his demise, and the entire
property was thereafter let out in November 2020, during the
pendency of partition Suit, with the net rental income being shared
among all the legal heirs of late Sh. Y.N. Gupta. The subsequent
letting of E-16 by his legal heirs, after the person whose requirement
had been pleaded had passed away, cannot by itself establish that the
distinct requirement now pleaded by Respondent No. 1 is not bona
fide.
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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95. The assertion, made for the first time in the present Petitions,
that possession of the said portion was obtained between November
2019 and 29.01.2020, when the execution proceedings were recorded
as satisfied, is not borne out by any material that was before the
learned ARC. The written submissions filed on behalf of the Tenants
before the learned ARC themselves stated that the date of possession
was not specified. Within the limited revisional jurisdiction of this
Court, a fresh factual foundation cannot be laid for the first time in
revision.
96. The decision in Renu Mehta (supra) , relied upon to contend
that the existence of other premises, the circumstances of their non-
disclosure and their suitability are relevant considerations, does not
assist the Tenants. In the present case, there was no non-disclosure.
Every property owned by the Landlords was disclosed in the Eviction
Petition, with the reasons for its non-availability or unsuitability, and
each property relied upon by the Tenants was considered by the
learned ARC. In Renu Mehta (supra) , this Court, in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction, declined to interfere with an order granting
leave to defend where the landlord had initially denied and
subsequently admitted ownership of other premises, and their
suitability remained an open question. The decision thus turned upon
the deference owed to the learned ARC's assessment within the
limited revisional jurisdiction, and upon facts which have no parallel
in the present case. The third ground of challenge is, accordingly,
rejected.
Bona fide requirement
97. The fourth ground of challenge concerns the bona fide
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BHATIA
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requirement pleaded by the Landlords. As pleaded in Paragraph No.
18(a) of the Eviction Petition, Respondent No. 1, a professional golfer
and golf coach suffering from early-stage arthritis, required the
Tenanted Premises to set up, operate and manage a retail store dealing
in golfing equipment and accessories. The Tenants contend that the
requirement was founded upon an unnamed offer that was to be
formalised on or before 30.09.2021, and that the requirement lapsed
with the expiry of that date. However, a perusal of the Impugned
Order would show that the learned ARC dealt with this contention in
Paragraph Nos. 29 and 31 of the Impugned Order, which read as
under:
“ 29) Petitioners have averred that the tenanted premises is required
for the bona fide need of petitioner no.1 for the purpose of setting
up, operating and managing a retail superstore dealing in world-
class golfing equipment and accessories. However, it is contented
on behalf of the respondents that the need is not bona fide and the
same has been concocted. It is contended that no documents have
been filed that the petitioner no.1 is suffering from arthritis or that
he is a professional golfer. It is also stated that the offer of opening
of retail shop was to be formalized on or before 30.09.2021 and the
said time period has already lapsed. But the Hon’ble Supreme
court in Baldev Singh Bajwa vs Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC
778 has held that whenever a landlord seeks eviction of the tenant
for bonafide need, the controller shall presume the need as genuine
and bonafide. Additionally, the burden to refute the said
presumption squarely lies on the tenant and mere assertion on the
part of tenant is insufficient. Hence, mere assertion of the
respondent in this regard does not amount to any triable issue.
Further, in this regard, the provision of Section 19 (2) of DRC Act
is to be emphasized which protects a tenant in case the landlord
recovers possession of any premises and the premises are not
occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the
premises are held within two months of obtaining such possession
or having obtained the possession, the same are re-let to any other
person within three years from the date of obtaining the possession.
xxx xxx xxx
31) As far as the claim is concerned that the said offer of opening
of retail store has already expired, it is pertinent to note that that
the DRC act is silent about any requirement of the landlord for
giving details/divulging anything qua the nature/purpose of the
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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proposed business. Hence, the landlord is not required to disclose
the exact nature of use of premises in eviction petition. Reliance in
this regard is placed upon the decision of Hon’ble Delhi High
Court in H S Banka vs Mohan Lal 2025 SCC Online Del 6372.
Even otherwise, in the case of Raj Kumar Khaitan & Ors. Vs.
Bibi Zubaid Khatun & Ors, AIR 1995 SC 576 , it was held by
Hon’ble Supreme Court that even if the nature of business would
have been indicated, nobody could bind the landlords to start the
same business in the premises after it was vacated . Thus, it is the
prerogative of the landlord to determine which business he intends
to start and whether the tenanted premises is suitable or not for said
purpose. Thus, the said contention is also devoid of merits. ”
(Emphasis supplied)
98. This Court finds no infirmity in the aforesaid reasoning. The
requirement pleaded is that of Respondent No. 1 to establish a
business of his own from the Tenanted Premises. The offer received
by him was only the occasion for, and the proposed mode of, carrying
on that business. It was not the requirement itself. A landlord is not
bound to disclose the precise nature of the business he proposes to
carry on, and, even where the nature of the business is indicated, he
cannot be bound to commence that very business once the premises
are vacated. The lapse of the date by which a particular arrangement
was to be formalised does not, therefore, establish that the requirement
of Respondent No. 1 to carry on a business from the Tenanted
Premises has ceased to exist, nor have the Tenants disclosed any fact
to show that it has.
99. The contention founded upon the medical record of Respondent
No. 1 being dated March 2022 stands on no better footing. The
condition of Respondent No. 1 was pleaded in the Eviction Petition
itself, supported by an affidavit, and the medical record was placed on
record with the reply in answer to the Tenants’ denial. That a
prescription bears a date later than the institution of the Eviction
Petition does not suggest that the condition pleaded did not exist when
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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the petition was filed. In any event, the condition of Respondent No. 1
was pleaded only as the reason why he wishes to turn from coaching
to business.
100. Reliance is also placed upon Ved Prakash (supra) to contend
that the bona fides of the requirement are to be examined in the light
of the Landlords’ conduct concerning their other properties,
particularly the letting of E-16 in November 2020. That decision,
however, arose from a revision preferred by a landlord against the
dismissal of his eviction petition after a full trial. The landlord therein
had not disclosed his other properties in the eviction petition, the
requirement of his son had admittedly existed for several years, and he
failed, upon evidence, to furnish any satisfactory explanation for
having let out or sold other premises shortly before instituting the
proceedings.
101. The present case stands on an altogether different footing. The
letting of E-16 was disclosed in the Eviction Petition itself. The
Landlords further explained, in their reply, that late Y.N. Gupta passed
away before possession of the portion recovered from M/s Rajendra &
Co. could be taken, that his requirement did not survive him, and that
the entire property was thereafter let out in November 2020, during
the pendency of the Partition Suit, with the net rental income being
distributed among all five legal heirs of late Sh. Y.N. Gupta, including
Anjali Vaid, under the supervision of this Court. The Orders dated
17.02.2020 and 16.03.2020 passed in the said suit, on which the
Tenants themselves rely, concern the letting of E-16 and the
accounting and distribution of the rental income therefrom. The letting
of E-16 was, therefore, satisfactorily explained, and nothing on record
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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suggests that it was a step towards creating the requirement now
pleaded.
102. The plea that a landlord has, in the past, let out some other
property is not, by itself, a ground to deny an order of eviction. The
decision in Ved Prakash (supra) is, therefore, of no assistance to the
Tenants.
103. In view of the foregoing discussion on the aspect of the bona
fide requirement, the fourth ground of challenge is, accordingly,
rejected.
RC ARC 10/2022 and the Alleged Inconsistency in the Landlords’
Stand
104. The fifth objection, advanced principally on behalf of
Petitioner-Ashok Goyal, is founded upon the Order dated 05.07.2024
passed in RC ARC 10/2022, titled “Sanjay Gupta v. M/s Diamond
Exports” , which was a distinct eviction petition, instituted by
Respondent No. 2 alone on 18.04.2022, in respect of property bearing
No. E-44, on the ground of his own bona fide requirement.
105. By the said Order, the learned ARC allowed the Application
seeking Leave to Defend filed by the tenant therein. However, while
dealing with the plea of alternative accommodation, the learned ARC,
in Paragraph No. 37, recorded as under:
“ 37. In light of the aforesaid, it is held that the properties jointly
owned by the petitioner along with his brother Mr. Ajay Gupta i.e.
properties bearing number E-15 to E-21 & E-40 & 41, E Block
Connaught Place cannot be considered as alternate suitable
accommodation. Furthermore, one of the sisters of the petitioner
namely Mrs. Anjeli has filed a Civil Suit before the Hon'ble High
Court of Delhi seeking, inter alia, the partition of the said
properties. The aforesaid properties form subject matter of the said
Suit which is presently pending adjudication before the Hon'ble
High Court of Delhi and accordingly, the aforesaid properties are
not readily available with the petitioner for his own use due to
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
which the same cannot be considered as alternate suitable
accommodation for the purpose of instant petition.”
106. It is contended that, the Landlords having successfully
maintained in those proceedings that the jointly owned properties,
including E-18, were not available to Respondent No. 2 on account of
the pending Partition Suit, they cannot now seek eviction from E-18
on the footing that it is required for the bona fide use of Respondent
No. 1, and are thereby approbating and reprobating. It is further
contended that, though the said Order was on record, the Impugned
Order does not advert to it.
107. At the outset, it bears notice that this objection does not find
place in either of the Applications seeking Leave to Defend, and it
could not have. Those Applications were filed on 04.10.2021, whereas
RC ARC No. 10/2022 was instituted only on 18.04.2022, and the
Order relied upon came to be passed on 05.07.2024. The Order was
brought on record by Petitioner-Ashok Goyal by way of an
Application, which was allowed by the learned ARC by Order dated
12.11.2025, the Landlords having raised no objection, and the
objection founded upon it was urged in the Additional Written
Submissions dated 11.03.2026. The said Order was thus a part of the
record before the learned ARC when the Impugned Order came to be
passed.
108. It is equally correct that the Impugned Order does not advert to
the Order dated 05.07.2024, nor to the objection founded upon it. The
objection did not, however, go unanswered before the learned ARC.
Petitioners-Rahul Goyal and Gaurav Goyal raised it in their Review
Application, and the learned ARC considered and rejected it in
Paragraph No. 19 of the Review Order, which is itself under challenge
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 44 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
in RC.REV. 361/2026. The relevant portion reads as under:
“…for an accommodation to be considered as suitable alternative
accommodation, the same must be vacant and available to the
landlord for the projected bonafide need. Admittedly, the tenanted
premises i.e. E-18, is occupied by the applicants and therefore, the
present eviction petition has been filed. Hence, the said tenanted
premises could not have been said to be vacant and available for
the projected bonafide requirement in eviction petition bearing no.
RC ARC no. 10/22 filed by petitioner no. 2 against another tenant.”
109. Nonetheless, since the Impugned Order is to be tested on its
own reasons, the question that arises is whether the omission of the
learned ARC to advert to the Order dated 05.07.2024 renders the
Impugned Order unsustainable. The omission to consider a plea or a
piece of material would vitiate an order rejecting leave to defend only
if the plea, taken at its highest, disclosed facts which, if proved, would
disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction within the
meaning of Section 25-B(5) of the DRC Act. If it does not, the
omission is of no consequence, and cannot be characterised as a
jurisdictional error, perversity or an error apparent on the face of the
record, so as to warrant interference under the proviso to Section 25-
B(8) of the DRC Act.
110. Tested on that touchstone, the said objection does not disclose
any triable issue. The question before the learned ARC in RC ARC
No. 10/2022 was whether Respondent No. 2 had any reasonably
suitable alternative accommodation available to him for his own
requirement. Paragraph No. 37 of the Order dated 05.07.2024
answered that question by holding that the properties jointly owned by
Respondent No. 2 with Respondent No. 1 could not be treated as such
accommodation. The question in the present proceedings is entirely
different. It is whether the co-owners of the Tenanted Premises are
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 45 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
entitled to recover it from the Tenants for the bona fide requirement of
one of them, namely Respondent No. 1.
111. A finding that jointly owned properties were not available to
one co-owner as alternative accommodation for his individual
requirement is in no manner inconsistent with the entitlement of the
co-owners to seek recovery of one such property from its tenants.
Indeed, E-18 could never have been available to Respondent No. 2 as
vacant accommodation in those proceedings, for the simple reason
that it was, and continues to be, in the occupation of the Tenants
herein. The non-availability of a property which is in the occupation
of a tenant is precisely the reason why its recovery is sought. It
furnishes no ground to resist that recovery.
112. Further, the requirements pleaded in the two proceedings are of
two different persons. In RC ARC 10/2022, the requirement was that
of Respondent No. 2, while in the present proceedings it is that of
Respondent No. 1. The approach in Paragraph No. 37 of the Order
dated 05.07.2024, that one co-owner cannot be compelled to meet his
individual requirement from jointly owned properties which are the
subject matter of a pending partition, is, in fact, the mirror image of
the reasoning in Paragraph No. 37 of the Impugned Order. There, the
learned ARC held that Respondent No. 1 cannot be expected to adjust
in the exclusive properties of Respondent No. 2. Both rest on the same
principle, that the requirement of each landlord is to be assessed with
reference to the accommodation available to him, and neither is
inconsistent with the other.
113. It must also be noticed that the doctrine of approbation and
reprobation precludes a party from taking two inconsistent stands in
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 46 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
respect of the same subject matter, so as to take the benefit of one and
avoid the burden of the other. That is not the case here. The present
Eviction Petition was instituted in September 2021, prior to the
institution of RC ARC 10/2022 itself. What the Tenants rely upon is
not a pleading by which the Landlords sought to resist the present
proceedings. It is a finding recorded by the learned ARC in an
independent proceeding, in the course of an order which, in any event,
allowed the leave to defend sought by the tenant therein. The finding
does not amount to a declaration that the Landlords are incapable of
seeking eviction from E-18. Nor does it operate as an adjudication
upon the bona fide requirement pleaded in the present proceedings.
114. Since the objection founded upon the Order dated 05.07.2024,
taken at its highest, does not disclose any fact would disentitle the
Landlords from obtaining an order of eviction, the omission of the
learned ARC to advert to it in the Impugned Order does not result in
any failure of justice. It cannot be said to render the Impugned Order
perverse, arbitrary or otherwise unsustainable in law. The objection is,
accordingly, rejected.
Challenge to the Review Order
115. The remaining challenge to the Review Order is substantially a
reiteration of the objections already raised against the Impugned
Order. The learned ARC, in the Review Order, considered the
contentions concerning E-16 in Paragraph Nos. 13 and 14; the
pending Partition Suit, the letter of Smt. Anjali Vaid and the objection
to the Landlords’ status as co-owners in Paragraph Nos. 15 and 16; the
alleged non-disclosure of proceedings in Paragraph Nos. 17 and 18;
and the reliance upon RC/ARC No. 10/2022 in Paragraph No. 19. The
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 47 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
objection concerning the expiry of the offer and the subsequent
medical documents was also considered in Paragraph Nos. 20 and 21.
116. The Review Order records that the objections had been
considered in the Impugned Order and that the Tenants were, in
substance, seeking a reconsideration of the findings returned on those
objections. The learned ARC declined to convert the review
jurisdiction into an appellate remedy. This approach cannot be faulted.
The power of review under Section 25-B(9) of the DRC Act, read
with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC, is confined to the grounds
recognised therein. It does not permit a fresh adjudication of the
merits merely because a party considers the conclusions erroneous or
seeks a different appreciation of the material.
117. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the present Court is
exercising revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-B(8)
of the DRC Act. The question is whether the learned ARC, while
deciding the Applications seeking Leave to Defend, failed to consider
a material defence, applied an erroneous legal standard or arrived at a
conclusion which is so unreasonable as to warrant interference. The
Court is not required to undertake a fresh trial on affidavits or to
reassess each document in isolation. The Impugned Order
demonstrates that the objections raised by the Tenants were noticed
and dealt with, and, to the extent that any plea was not separately
addressed, this Court has found that it does not, even at its highest,
disclose a triable issue. The fact that the Tenants seek a different
conclusion on the same material does not, by itself, furnish a ground
for interference.
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 48 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
CONCLUSION:
118. The Court is conscious that the threshold for grant of Leave to
Defend is not one of final proof. The tenant is not required to establish
the defence conclusively at that stage. The enquiry, nevertheless, is
whether the facts and material placed on record disclose a defence
which, if established, would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an
order of eviction. A plea which is merely speculative, or which does
not have a bearing upon the statutory ingredients of Section 14(1)(e)
of the DRC Act, would not warrant a trial merely because it has been
articulated in the Application seeking Leave to Defend.
119. In the present case, the objection concerning the consent of
Anjali Vaid is not supported by material demonstrating her
disagreement with the institution of eviction proceedings. The
pendency of the civil proceedings concerning the estate of late Y.N.
Gupta does not, in the absence of any order restraining the Landlords
or material displacing their better title vis-à-vis the Tenants, render the
Eviction Petition non-maintainable. The expiry of the particular
commercial offer does not extinguish the underlying requirement
pleaded by Respondent No. 1. The subsequent medical record, by
itself, does not establish that the pleaded condition or requirement was
fabricated. The properties identified as alternative accommodation
have been considered by the learned ARC, and the Tenants have not
placed material demonstrating that any of them, including E-16, was
vacant and reasonably suitable for the requirement at the relevant
time. The objection founded upon RC ARC No. 10/2022, though not
adverted to in the Impugned Order, does not, even at its highest,
disclose any inconsistency, having regard to the distinct questions and
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 49 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
the distinct requirements arising in the two proceedings.
120. The authorities relied upon by the Tenants do not lead to a
contrary conclusion. India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. (supra) does
not assist them in the absence of material establishing actual
disagreement by the other co-owner. Ved Prakash (supra) arose from
a decision rendered after trial, where the landlord had neither
disclosed his other properties nor satisfactorily explained their letting
or sale, circumstances which are not present in the matter at hand.
Renu Mehta (supra) concerned alternative premises whose ownership
was initially denied and subsequently admitted, with their suitability
remaining unresolved; the present case does not disclose a comparable
factual situation. The principles laid down in these decisions have
been kept in view, but their application does not warrant a different
result on the facts and material placed before the learned ARC.
121. On an overall consideration of the Impugned Order and the
Review Order, this Court finds that the learned ARC has considered
the material objections raised by the Tenants and returned findings
supported by the record.
122. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no
jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity or error apparent
on the face of the record in the Impugned Order or the Review Order,
warranting interference in the limited revisional jurisdiction vested in
this Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
DECISION:
123. Accordingly, the present Petitions, RC.REV. 357/2026 and
RC.REV. 361/2026, being sans merit, are dismissed. The Impugned
Order dated 24.03.2026 and the Review Order dated 11.07.2026 are
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 50 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04
upheld.
124. The present Petitions, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stand disposed of in the aforementioned terms.
125. There shall be no Order as to the Costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
NOVEMBER 18, 2026/ DJ
Signature Not Verified
RC.REV. 361/2026 & RC.REV. 357/2026 Page 51 of 51
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:19.11.2026
15:46:04