Ghanshyam Patidar vs State Of Haryana

CRM-M-42272-2026 (O&M) -:1:-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
(206)
CRM-M-42272-2026 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 11.09.2026
GHANSHYAM PATIDAR
… Petitioner
Versus
STATE OF HARYANA
... Respondent
-.-
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRINDER AGGARWAL
Present:- Mr. Aditya Sanghi, Advocate along with
Mr. Rajiv Goel, Advocate;
Mr. Saurabh Sharma, Advocate
for the petitioner(s).
Mr. Tan u j Sharma, Asst. AG, Haryana.
-.-
VIRINDER AGGARWAL , J . (Oral)
1. Second petition under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023 (akin to
Section 439 Cr.P.C.), seeking grant of regular bail to petitioner-
Ghanshyam Patidar, aged 33 years, during pendency of trial in the
following FIR:-
Details
Particulars
158 dated 14.10.2025
FIR No. & Date
Sections 17(c), 29 and 27-A of the NDPS Act, 1985
Sections
Odhan, District Dabwali, Haryana
Police Station
1.1. The earlier petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed as
withdrawn vide order dated 26.05.2026.
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2. Brief facts essential for adjudication of the present bail
application are that, on 14.10.2025, co-accused Dinesh Kumar Sethia was
apprehended within the jurisdiction of Police Station Odhan and found in
conscious possession of 3 kilograms 117 grams of opium, allegedly
without any valid permit or licence, after compliance with the applicable
provisions of the NDPS Act. During investigation, he allegedly suffered a
disclosure statement dated 19.10.2025, stating that the recovered
contraband had been purchased by him from the petitioner for onward
supply to co-accused Vinod Kumar.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is
innocent and has been falsely implicated in the present case. It is
contended that the alleged recovery of 3.117 kilograms of opium was
effected from co-accused Dinesh Kumar and not from the petitioner. The
initial disclosure statement of co-accused Dinesh Kumar did not implicate
the petitioner as the supplier; it was only in a subsequent disclosure
statement that the petitioner was named, rendering his alleged involvement
a matter requiring careful scrutiny. The petitioner has remained in custody
since 23.10.2025, the challan has already been presented, and the trial is
progressing at a slow pace. It is further submitted that the delay is not
attributable to the petitioner and his continued incarceration for an
indefinite period would offend the fundamental right to personal liberty
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. On these
premises, grant of regular bail has been prayed for.
4. Learned State counsel vehemently opposes the prayer for
regular bail and submits that, having regard to the nature, gravity and
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CRM-M-42272-2026 (O&M) -:3:-
seriousness of the allegations, the quantity of the contraband involved and
the manner in which the offence is alleged to have been committed, the
petitioner does not deserve the concession of regular bail at this stage.
Dismissal of the present petition, being devoid of merit, has accordingly
been prayed for.
5. The right to a speedy trial is an integral facet of the fundamental
right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. The constitutional mandate is not confined merely to
ensuring a fair trial but also obligates the State to conclude criminal
proceedings within a reasonable time so that the process itself does not
become punitive.
6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home
Secretary, State of Bihar, 1980 (1) SCC 81 , authoritatively held that the
right to a speedy trial is an essential and integral part of Article 21, and that
any procedure which permits prolonged incarceration without expeditious
trial cannot be regarded as fair, just or reasonable. The aforesaid principles
are in consonance with the Constitution Bench decisions in A.R. Antulay v.
R.S. Nayak , 1992 (1) SCC 225 , and P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka, 2002 (4) SCC 578 , wherein it was held that the right to a
speedy trial is a fundamental right flowing from Article 21 and
constitutional courts are duty-bound to intervene wherever inordinate and
unexplained delay results in denial of substantive justice.
7. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Tapas Kumar Palit v.
State of Chhattisgarh , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322 and in Arvind Dham v.
Directorate of Enforcement , 2026 (2) SSC(Criminal) 271 , the Court
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CRM-M-42272-2026 (O&M) -:4:-
categorically held that "the right to a speedy trial, enshrined under Article
21 of the Constitution, is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence." It was
further held that prolonged incarceration of an undertrial, without
commencement or reasonable progress of the trial, effectively converts pre-
trial detention into a form of punishment and cannot be constitutionally
sustained. The Court observed that if the State or the prosecuting agency is
unable to secure an accused's fundamental right to a speedy trial, it cannot
oppose the grant of bail merely on the ground of the seriousness of the
allegations, as Article 21 prevails over statutory restrictions where
continued incarceration becomes oppressive and unjustified.
8. This constitutional position has acquired greater significance in
prosecutions under special statutes containing restrictive bail provisions.
The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 is undoubtedly
a stringent penal statute enacted to combat the menace of illicit trafficking
in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The principle was
specifically applied to prosecutions under the NDPS Act in Mohd. Muslim
@ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi) , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 35 2 . The Apex
Court held that Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot be construed so rigidly
as to compel indefinite incarceration of an undertrial merely because the
trial has not progressed. The Court observed that a literal interpretation of
Section 37, divorced from constitutional values, would amount to
sanctioning punitive detention before conviction. It was emphatically held
that where the State is unable to conclude the trial within a reasonable
time, the rigours of Section 37 necessarily yield to the constitutional
mandate of Article 21. The Court further observed that Section 436A
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Cr.P.C. applies even to prosecutions under special statutes and constitutes
an important legislative safeguard against indefinite pre-trial detention.
9. Recently, in Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha, 2023 SCC OnLine
SC 1109 and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2024
SCC Online SC 1693 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that
prolonged incarceration militates against the most cherished fundamental
right under Article 21. The Court observed that where the accused has
remained in custody for an unduly long period and the trial is nowhere near
completion, constitutional liberty must prevail over the statutory embargo
contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Court succinctly held that
conditional liberty must override the statutory embargo when the
constitutional guarantee itself stands threatened. Similarly, the Apex Court
has recently reaffirmed these constitutional principles in .
10. Thus, the legal position that emerges from the above authorities is
that while offences under the NDPS Act are undoubtedly grave and the
statutory conditions governing bail are stringent, the constitutional
guarantee of a speedy trial under Article 21 remains paramount. Courts are
required to balance the societal interest in effective prosecution with the
individual's fundamental right to personal liberty. Prolonged incarceration
of an undertrial without meaningful progress in the trial cannot be justified
merely by invoking the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. In such
exceptional circumstances, Constitutional Courts are duty-bound to
harmonise the statutory restrictions with the fundamental right to personal
liberty and ensure that pre-trial detention does not degenerate into
punishment before adjudication of guilt. Where delay is inordinate and not
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CRM-M-42272-2026 (O&M) -:6:-
attributable to the accused, constitutional courts are empowered to grant
appropriate relief so as to prevent violation of Article 21.
11. It is equally relevant to note that while Section 37 prescribes
stringent conditions for grant of bail, the NDPS Act itself reflects the
legislative intent that such prosecutions should proceed expeditiously.
Section 36 empowers the Government to constitute Special Courts for the
very purpose of ensuring speedy trial of NDPS offences. Therefore, the
statutory scheme itself proceeds on the assumption that greater restrictions
on bail are constitutionally sustainable only when accompanied by equally
expeditious adjudication. Where the State fails to provide the infrastructure
necessary for speedy disposal, continued reliance upon Section 37 alone
would produce an unconstitutional imbalance between individual liberty
and societal interest. Delay defeats that legislative premise. If trials remain
pending for years because of systemic inadequacies, repeated
adjournments, non-production of witnesses, or institutional delays not
attributable to the accused, continued incarceration ceases to be preventive
and assumes a punitive character.
12. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal position, the
petitioner cannot be subjected to indefinite incarceration merely on account
of the alleged recovery falling within the commercial quantity category.
The object of pre-trial detention is to secure the petitioner’s presence
during trial and not to permit incarceration to assume the character of
punishment before conviction. Since investigation already stands
concluded, the petitioner has remained in custody since 23.10.2025, the
alleged contraband was recovered from co-accused Dinesh Kumar, and the
GAURAV SOROT
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CRM-M-42272-2026 (O&M) -:7:-
delay in trial is not attributable to the petitioner, his continued
incarceration, particularly when the trial is progressing at a slow pace,
would militate against the constitutional guarantee under Article 21.
13. The prosecution seeks to further connect the petitioner through
an alleged WhatsApp chat with the co-accused, wherein the expression
“ Road Ka Raja Ki Jai ” appears. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that the said expression refers to the temple of a local deity, whereas
learned State counsel contends that it pertains to a truck being on the road.
The true purport and evidentiary significance of the said cryptic expression
are matters to be examined during trial. At this stage, the petitioner’s
alleged connection with the recovery rests principally upon the subsequent
disclosure statement of the co-accused and the aforesaid ambiguous
communication. Coupled with the petitioner’s prolonged incarceration and
the likelihood of the trial consuming considerable time, this Court is of the
considered view that further custodial detention is not warranted.
13.1. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and the applicant-
petitioner is ordered to be admitted on regular bail, subject to his furnishing
requisite bail and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial
Magistrate concerned/Illaqa Magistrate/Duty Magistrate, as the case may
be, and further subject to the following conditions:-
i. The petitioner(s) shall not, directly or indirectly, make any
inducement, threat, or promise to any person acquainted with the
facts and circumstances of the case so as to dissuade such person
from disclosing such facts before the Court or to the Investigating
Agency.
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CRM-M-42272-2026 (O&M) -:8:-
ii. The petitioner(s) shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence in
any manner whatsoever, nor shall the petitioner(s), directly or
indirectly, attempt to influence, intimidate, or contact any
prosecution witness.
iii. The petitioner(s) shall not leave the territorial limits of India
without obtaining the prior permission of the learned Trial Court.
In the event any of the petitioner(s) is in possession of a passport,
the particulars thereof shall be furnished before the Investigating
Officer as well as the learned Trial Court.
iv. Before accepting the bail and surety bonds, the learned Illaqa
Magistrate/Duty Magistrate/C.J.M. concerned shall obtain from the
petitioner(s) the permanent residential address as well as the
present correspondence address, duly supported by appropriate
documentary proof. The Investigating Officer shall verify the
correctness of the said addresses within 48 hours of the acceptance
of the bail bonds and place a verification report on record. In the
event any of the addresses is found to be false, fictitious, or
incorrect, it shall be open to the prosecution to seek cancellation of
the concession of bail in accordance with law.
v. The petitioner(s) shall furnish before the learned Trial Court, either
at the time of furnishing the bail bonds or within such period as
may be specified by the Court, the Permanent Account Number
(PAN), Aadhaar Number, particulars of all operative bank
accounts, and a declaration disclosing details of immovable
properties, if any. Any concealment of material particulars or
furnishing of false information shall constitute a valid ground for
seeking cancellation of the concession of bail in accordance with
law.
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CRM-M-42272-2026 (O&M) -:9:-
vi. The petitioner(s) shall intimate the Investigating Officer as well as
the learned Trial Court, in writing, of any change in residential
address or mobile number within seven days of such change.
vii. The petitioner(s) shall not commit any offence of a similar nature
during the pendency of the trial and shall remain present before the
learned Trial Court on each and every date fixed, unless personal
appearance is exempted in accordance with law. The petitioner(s)
shall not absent from the proceedings without obtaining prior
permission of the learned Trial Court. In the event of violation of
any of the aforesaid conditions or unauthorized absence from the
trial proceedings, it shall be open to the learned Trial Court to
proceed in accordance with law, including cancellation of the
concession of bail and issuance of appropriate coercive process,
including warrants of arrest.
14. In view of the final adjudication of the principal proceedings,
all pending miscellaneous applications, if any, arising therefrom or
ancillary thereto, shall stand disposed of accordingly, the same having
been rendered infructuous by the final determination of the substantive
proceedings. No separate or further order is warranted in respect thereof.

( VIRINDER AGGARWAL )
11.09.2026 JUDGE
Gaurav Sorot
Whether reasoned / speaking? Yes / No
Whether reportable? Yes / No
GAURAV SOROT
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