Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited, vs Parsa Kente Collieries Limited
- Court
- Supreme Court
REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 1234
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 32968 OF 2026
RAJASTHAN RAJYA VIDYUT
UTPADAN NIGAM LTD. …PETITIONER
VERSUS
PARSA KENTE COLLIERIES LIMITED …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.
1. This Special Leave Petition preferred under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India seeks to challenge the judgment of the
High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan rendered under Section
37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter
referred to as the “Act”), which had reversed the decision of the
Commercial Court rendered under Section 34 of the Act, wherein
the Commercial Court had set aside the awards made by the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RAHUL KUMAR
Date: 2026.11.17
18:15:04 IST
Reason:
Page 1 of 79
Arbitral Tribunal. Thereby, the High Court ultimately restored
the awards.
2. The learned Arbitrator made the award dated 15.01.2021
(“the Award”) and, thereafter, made an additional award dated
05.07.2021 (“the Additional Award”). On being challenged by the
Petitioner before the Commercial Court No. 1, Jaipur
Metropolitan-II, Jaipur (“the Commercial Court”) under Section
34 of the Act, 1996, both the awards were set aside by the
Commercial Court vide the order dated 20.05.2023.
3. Being aggrieved, the Respondent preferred an appeal
under Section 37 of the Act before the High Court of Judicature
for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, in D.B. Civil Miscellaneous
Appeal No. 2007 of 2023 which was allowed by judgment dated
21.05.2026 (“the impugned Judgment”). The High Court thus, in
turn, set aside the order dated 20.05.2023 passed by the
Commercial Court, thereby restoring both the Award dated
15.01.2021 and the Additional Award dated 05.07.2021.
4. In short, the Awards which were set aside by the
Commercial Court under Section 34 of the Act were fully restored
by the High Court under Section 37 of the Act. The petitioner,
Page 2 of 79
now, in this third round of judicial proceedings by invoking the
discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution, is urging this Court to interfere with the order of
the High Court and seeking to annul the arbitral Awards.
5. In undertaking this exercise, the scope of this Court to
intervene under Article 136 of the Constitution, in the backdrop
of the circumscribed nature of the jurisdiction of the Court under
Section 34 of the Act and the limited parameters under Section
37 of the Act, needs to be first appreciated.
6. It is apposite to remind ourselves that Article 136 of the
Constitution is not an integral part of the legal architecture of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and that Article 136
is a special and residuary power conferred on the Supreme Court
under the Constitution, of a purely discretionary nature to
address serious legal errors or substantial miscarriage of justice
by the judicial fora across the country. Thus, by its very nature,
an appeal/petition preferred under Article 136 before the
Supreme Court is not a matter of right of any litigant but is
subject to the discretion of the Supreme Court.
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The legal journey of an award under the Act would,
ordinarily, after traversing through the Section 34 forum,
culminate with the Section 37 forum of the Act. Thus, the legal
status of an award ought to, under normal circumstances, attain
finality at the stage of Section 37 of the Act. Hence, introducing
Article 136 of the Constitution into this legal path would be an
exception rather than the norm, keeping in mind, especially, the
trend worldwide to have minimal judicial intervention in matters
relating to arbitration.
7. This prologue must now be followed by a brief foray into
the scope of Article 136 of the Constitution in the context of
arbitration law. We thus, recall what had been observed by this
1
Court in DMRC Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express (P) Ltd. ,
in the following words:
“41. In the statutory scheme of the Arbitration Act, a
recourse to Section 37 is the only appellate remedy
available against a decision under Section 34. The
Constitution, however, provides the parties with a
remedy under Article 136 against a decision rendered
in appeal under Section 37. This is the discretionary
and exceptional jurisdiction of this Court to grant
special leave to appeal. In fact, Section 37(3) of the
Arbitration Act expressly clarifies that no second
appeal shall lie from an order passed under Section 37,
but nothing in the section takes away the constitutional
1
(2024) 6 SCC 357
Page 4 of 79
right under Article 136. Therefore, in a sense, there is
a third stage at which this Court tests the exercise of
jurisdiction by the courts acting under Section 34 and
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.
42. While adjudicating the merits of a special leave
petition and exercising its power under Article 136, this
Court must interfere sparingly and only when
exceptional circumstances exist, justifying the exercise
of this Court's discretion. [Chandi Prasad Chokhani v.
State of Bihar, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 165 : AIR 1961
SC 1708; Pritam Singh v. State, 1950 SCC 189.] The
Court must apply settled principles of judicial review
such as whether the findings of the High Court are
borne out from the record or are based on a
misappreciation of law and fact. In particular, this
Court must be slow in interfering with a judgment
delivered in exercise of powers under Section 37 unless
there is an error in exercising of the jurisdiction by the
Court under Section 37 as delineated above. Unlike the
exercise of power under Section 37, which is akin to
Section 34, this Court (under Article 136) must limit
itself to testing whether the court acting under Section
37 exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to apply the
correct tests to assail the award. ”
(emphasis added)
8. As to what the legal profiles of Sections 34 and 37 of the
Act are, this has also been discussed in DMRC Ltd. (supra) in
the preceding paragraphs by referring to the decisions in
2
Associate Builders v. DDA , Ssangyong Engineering &
2
(2015) 3 SCC 49
Page 5 of 79
Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of
3
India (NHAI) , as follows:
“ 34 . The contours of the power of the competent court
to set aside an award under Section 34 has been
explored in several decisions of this Court. In addition
to the grounds on which an arbitral award can be
assailed laid down in Section 34(2), there is another
ground for challenge against domestic awards, such
as the award in the present case. Under Section 34(2-
A) of the Arbitration Act, a domestic award may be set
aside if the Court finds that it is vitiated by “patent
illegality” appearing on the face of the award.
35. In Associate Builders v. DDA [Associate Builders v.
DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , a two-
Judge Bench of this Court held that although the
interpretation of a contract is exclusively within the
domain of the arbitrator, construction of a contract in a
manner that no fair-minded or reasonable person
would take, is impermissible. A patent illegality arises
where the arbitrator adopts a view which is not a
possible view. A view can be regarded as not even a
possible view where no reasonable body of persons
could possibly have taken it. This Court held with
reference to Sections 28(1)(a) and 28(3), that the
arbitrator must take into account the terms of the
contract and the usages of trade applicable to the
transaction. The decision or award should not be
perverse or irrational. An award is rendered perverse
or irrational where the findings are:
(i) based on no evidence;
(ii) based on irrelevant material; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence.
36. Patent illegality may also arise where the award
is in breach of the provisions of the arbitration statute,
3
(2019) 15 SCC 131
Page 6 of 79
as when for instance the award contains no reasons
at all, so as to be described as unreasoned.
37. A fundamental breach of the principles of natural
justice will result in a patent illegality, where for
instance the arbitrator has let in evidence behind the
back of a party. In the above decision, this Court in
Associate Builders v. DDA [Associate Builders v. DDA,
(2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] observed :
(SCC pp. 75 & 81, paras 31 & 42)
“31. The third juristic principle is that a decision
which is perverse or so irrational that no
reasonable person would have arrived at the
same is important and requires some degree of
explanation. It is settled law that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence, or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account
something irrelevant to the decision which it
arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision,
such decision would necessarily be perverse.
*
42.1. … 42.2. (b) A contravention of the Arbitration
Act itself would be regarded as a patent illegality
— for example if an arbitrator gives no reasons for
an award in contravention of Section 31(3) of the
Act, such award will be liable to be set aside.”
(emphasis supplied)
38 . In Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v.
NHAI [Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v.
NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 213] , a
two-Judge Bench of this Court endorsed the position in
Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015)
3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , on the scope for
interference with domestic awards, even after the
2015 Amendment : (Ssangyong Engg. & Construction
Co. case [Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v.
Page 7 of 79
NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 213] ,
SCC p. 171, paras 40-41)
“40. The change made in Section 28(3) by the
Amendment Act really follows what is stated in
paras 42.3 to 45 in Associate Builders [Associate
Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC
(Civ) 204] , namely, that the construction of the
terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to
decide, unless the arbitrator construes the
contract in a manner that no fair-minded or
reasonable person would; in short, that the
arbitrator's view is not even a possible view to
take. Also, if the arbitrator wanders outside the
contract and deals with matters not allotted to
him, he commits an error of jurisdiction. This
ground of challenge will now fall within the new
ground added under Section 34(2-A).
41. … Thus, a finding based on no evidence at all
or an award which ignores vital evidence in
arriving at its decision would be perverse and
liable to be set aside on the ground of patent
illegality. Additionally, a finding based on
documents taken behind the back of the parties
by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision
based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision
is not based on evidence led by the parties, and
therefore, would also have to be characterised as
perverse.”
(emphasis supplied)
39 . In essence, the ground of patent illegality is
available for setting aside a domestic award, if the
decision of the arbitrator is found to be perverse, or so
irrational that no reasonable person would have
arrived at it; or the construction of the contract is such
that no fair or reasonable person would take; or, that
the view of the arbitrator is not even a possible view.
[Patel Engg. Ltd. v. North Eastern Electric Power Corpn.
Ltd., (2020) 7 SCC 167 : (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 149.] A
“finding” based on no evidence at all or an award
which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision
would be perverse and liable to be set aside under the
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head of “patent illegality”. An award without reasons
would suffer from patent illegality. The arbitrator
commits a patent illegality by deciding a matter not
within his jurisdiction or violating a fundamental
principle of natural justice.
40.
A judgment setting aside or refusing to set aside
an arbitral award under Section 34 is appealable in
the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court under
Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. It has been clarified
by this Court, in a line of precedent, that the jurisdiction
under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is akin to the
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 and restricted
to the same grounds of challenge as Section 34.”
9. Recently, this Court reiterated the settled position with
regard to the limited scope of interference under Sections 34 and
37 of the Act. In Jan De Nul Dredging India (P) Ltd. v.
4
Tuticorin Port Trust , it was observed as follows:
“ 35 . The gist of the aforesaid decisions is that the
jurisdiction of the court under Section 37 of the Act is
akin to the jurisdiction of the court under Section 34 of
the Act, and, therefore, the scope of interference by the
court in appeal under Section 37 cannot go beyond the
grounds on which challenge can be made to the award
under Section 34 of the Act. Moreover, the courts
exercising powers under Sections 34 and 37, do not act
as a normal court, and therefore, ought not to interfere
with the arbitral award on a mere possibility of an
alternative view .
36. In other words, the scope of interference of the
court with the arbitral matters is virtually prohibited, if
not absolutely barred. The powers of the appellate
court are even more restricted than the powers
conferred by Section 34 of the Act. The appellate power
under Section 37 of the Act is exercisable only to find
4
(2026) 3 SCC 186
Page 9 of 79
out if the court exercising power under Section 34 of the
Act, has acted within its limits as prescribed
thereunder or has exceeded or failed to exercise the
power so conferred. The appellate court exercising
powers under Section 37 of the Act has no authority of
law to consider the matter in dispute before the Arbitral
Tribunal on merits so as to hold as to whether the
award of the Arbitral Tribunal is right or wrong. The
appellate court in exercise of such power cannot sit as
an ordinary court of appeal and reappraise the
evidence to record a contrary finding. The award of the
Arbitral Tribunal cannot be touched by the court unless
it is contrary to the substantive provision of law or any
provision of the Act or the terms of the agreement. ”
10. The principles that emerge from the foregoing
discussion, read with the scheme of Sections 34 and 37 of the
Act, may be summarised as follows:
(a) The power of this Court under Article 136 of the
Constitution is discretionary and is to be exercised
sparingly, only where exceptional circumstances exist,
as the award attains its finality at the Section 37 stage.
(b) A Section 34 court does not sit in appeal over the
award. An award may be set aside only on the grounds
mentioned in Section 34 of the Act. The party applying
must establish the ground on the basis of the record of
the Arbitral Tribunal.
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(c) Under Section 34(2)(a), the grounds are: incapacity
of a party; or invalidity of the arbitration agreement; or
want of proper notice or inability to present one’s case;
or an award dealing with a dispute not contemplated by,
or beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration
(where, under the proviso, only the separable part
dealing with matters not submitted may be set aside);
or a composition of the tribunal or an arbitral procedure
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or,
failing such agreement, with Part I of the Act.
(d) Under Section 34(2)(b), the grounds are: where the
court finds that the subject-matter of the dispute is not
capable of settlement by arbitration; or that the award
is in conflict with the public policy of India. By
Explanation 1, the latter is confined to an award
induced or affected by fraud or corruption or made in
violation of Section 75 or Section 81; or an award in
contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law;
or an award in conflict with the most basic notions of
morality or justice. By Explanation 2, the test of
Page 11 of 79
contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law
does not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.
(e) Under Section 34(2-A), a domestic award may also
be set aside if it is vitiated by patent illegality appearing
on the face of the award. The proviso is explicit that an
award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an
erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of
evidence.
(f) Patent illegality, as explained in Associate
Builders (supra) and Ssangyong Engg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. (supra), is made out only where
the finding is perverse, that is, based on no evidence,
based on irrelevant material, or ignoring vital evidence,
or where the tribunal’s construction of the contract is
one that no fair-minded or reasonable person would
adopt; or where the award contravenes the Act itself, as
when it is unreasoned in breach of Section 31(3), or
breaches the principles of natural justice. Construction
of the terms of the contract is primarily for the arbitral
tribunal under Section 28(3), and a plausible
Page 12 of 79
interpretation is not to be interfered with merely
because another view is possible.
(g) The appeal under Section 37(1)(c) lies against an
order setting aside or refusing to set aside an award,
and is confined to the same grounds as Section 34. The
appellate court under Section 37 only examines whether
the Section 34 court acted within the limits prescribed
or exceeded or failed to exercise its jurisdiction. It
cannot consider the dispute on merits, reappraise the
evidence or interfere on a mere possibility of an
alternative view, and its powers are, if anything, more
restricted than those under Section 34.
11. Applying these principles, the enquiry before us is
therefore confined to three questions: whether the Arbitral
Tribunal’s findings on each claim are within the bounds of a
plausible view and free from patent illegality, perversity or any
other ground under Section 34; whether the Commercial Court,
in setting aside the Awards, stayed within the limits of Section
34; and whether the High Court, in restoring it, correctly
exercised its jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act. Only if one
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of these is answered against the impugned Judgment would the
exceptional jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution be
invoked.
12. Having touched upon the broad principles of law
governing Sections 34 and 37 of the Act and the overarching
Article 136 of the Constitution, we will now consider the issues
at hand for which a brief reference to the facts of the case would
be beneficial.
BRIEF BACKGROUND FACTS
13. The Petitioner, Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam
Limited (“RVUNL”), is an undertaking of the Government of
Rajasthan and engaged in the business of generation and sale of
electricity in Rajasthan. The Respondent, Parsa Kente Collieries
Limited (“PKCL”), is a joint venture company incorporated to
develop the Parsa East and Kanta Basan (“PEKB”) coal block and
to mine, beneficiate, transport, and deliver coal therefrom to
RVUNL’s thermal power stations.
14. On 23.10.2006, RVUNL issued a Letter of Intent to
Adani Enterprises Limited (“AEL”) for development of the PEKB
Page 14 of 79
coal block. On 19/25.06.2007, the Government of India
allocated the PEKB coal block to RVUNL under the Government
Company Dispensation Route. Subsequently, AEL and RVUNL
executed a Joint Venture Agreement, pursuant to which PKCL
was incorporated to undertake development of the block.
15. For executing the aforesaid work, RVUNL and PKCL
signed a Coal Mining and Delivery Agreement (“the CMDA”) on
16.07.2008, which was followed by an Addendum dated
22.09.2010. Some of the terms of the CMDA, insofar as relevant
and material to the present proceedings, are summarised as
follows:
•
Clause 3.2.1 talks about scope of work and
provides that all expenses incurred for the Works shall
be borne by PKCL including all expenses in relation to
the cost of acquisition of land/ lease of land; fees and
arranging all clearances, reports and licenses for the
Term of the Agreement and all charges incurred for
arranging mining data, geological data and reports and
no expenses/ liabilities shall be borne/shared by
RVUNL at any stage.
•
Clause 3.2.6(f) obliges PKCL to obtain all statutory
clearances and licences for the operation of the mines.
Page 15 of 79
• Clause 3.3 provides, vide sub-clause (a) thereof,
that payments made by RVUNL for keeping the lease
valid are to the account of PKCL, and, under sub-clause
(b), where RVUNL makes payments on PKCL’s behalf, as
its agent, as required by Applicable Laws in relation to
PKCL’s scope of work, RVUNL “shall have no obligation
or liability for and will not be required to bear such
payments”.
•
Clause 3.4.1 provides that all coal blocks and coal
mined under the CMDA is RVUNL’s property, except
that coal washery rejects, capped at 29% (the “Rejects”),
belong to PKCL and are disposable by PKCL.
•
Clauses 4.3.1 to 4.3.3 classify coal into Grades A,
B and C, and provide that RVUNL shall reject coal below
a Gross Calorific Value (GCV, ADB) of 4000 Kcal/kg or
with ash content (ADB) above 34%. PKCL being obliged
to wash or beneficiate coal of a grade lower than C to
bring it within the specified parameters.
•
Clause 5.4.1 provides a formula for quality-based
adjustment of the Contract Price by reference to GCV,
ash content, moisture and size, and further provides
that the quantity of coal reduced or rejected under that
clause shall not be considered for payment of the
Contract Price.
•
Clause 6.3 provides for interest on overdue
payments at the rate of interest charged by the State
Page 16 of 79
Bank of India to RVUNL on its working-capital loans,
applicable mutatis mutandis to overdue payments from
PKCL to RVUNL.
• Clause 7.1 defines an event of “Force Majeure” as
one beyond the reasonable control of the party claiming
it, which “adversely and directly renders the
performance by the Party of whole or part of its
obligations under the Agreement impossible”, and
enumerates categories including any act, restraint or
regulation of a Governmental Authority constituting a
“Change in Law”.
•
Clause 7.3 provides that a party affected by Force
Majeure is excused from performance to the extent so
affected, and that neither party shall be liable for “any
claim for any loss, damage or compensation
whatsoever” arising from a failure so caused, subject to
provisos preserving the obligation to make payment for
performance already rendered, and clarifying that a
Force Majeure event does not relieve either party of its
obligation to comply with Applicable Laws.
•
Clause 9.2 (i) obliges PKCL to obtain, and during
the term of the CMDA to renew and maintain, all
permits, licences and approvals required under
Applicable Laws, RVUNL covenanting to take such
action as is necessary to enable this.
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• Clause 13.1 provides that PKCL shall at all times
act as, and be deemed to be, an independent contractor,
and that neither PKCL nor its employees shall act as, or
be deemed to be, agents of RVUNL.
16. On 30.05.2012, a mining lease was granted by the
Government of Chhattisgarh to RVUNL. In terms of the CMDA,
PKCL paid stamp duty and other charges for registration of the
lease. Extraction, beneficiation and dispatch of coal thus
commenced in or about February–March 2013.
17. While the mining and the supply of coal was going on as
per the CMDA, allegations came to be made about arbitrary and
illegal allocation of coal blocks in many parts of the country. This
led to a challenge of coal allocations before this Court, and this
Court, by judgment dated 25.08.2014 and order dated
24.09.2014 in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 120 of 2012 ( Manohar Lal
5
Sharma v. Principal Secretary & Others ) , cancelled the
allocation of 204 coal blocks, including the PEKB. The
cancellation of the allotment resulted in the cancellation of the
mining lease dated 30.05.2012 granted by the Government of
Chhattisgarh to RVUNL. This Court, however, allowed
5
(2014) 9 SCC 516
Page 18 of 79
continuation of coal mining till 31.03.2015. The Union
Government in the meantime promulgated the Coal Mines
(Special Provisions) Ordinance, 2014, which was replaced by the
Parliamentary enactment, Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act,
2015 (“the Coal Act”), whereby the cancelled coal blocks were to
be allocated through an auction/allotment process by the
Nominated Authority of the Ministry of Coal, Government of
India.
18. In terms of the provisions of the Coal Act, the Nominated
Authority allocated the PEKB coal block to RVUNL by letter dated
24.03.2015, subsequent to which an Allotment Agreement was
executed on 26.03.2015. Section 11(1) of the Coal Act provides
that an allottee may elect to continue such contracts as were in
existence in relation to coal mining operations, which then
constitutes a novation for the residual term or residual
performance of such contract. According to PKCL, RVUNL, when
given the option by the Central Government, intimated that it
was desirous of continuing with the existing contract with PKCL,
which would include the CMDA, and a condition to that effect
was inserted in Clause 3(1)(f) of the Allotment Agreement dated
26.03.2015.
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The Board of Directors of RVUNL resolved to adopt and
continue the CMDA and the Addendum dated 22.09.2010. This
decision was communicated to PKCL by RVUNL’s letter dated
31.03.2015. PKCL conveyed its acknowledgment by its letter
dated 01.04.2015.
19. RVUNL then submitted an application to the
Government of Chhattisgarh, in accordance with the Coal Act,
for grant of a fresh mining lease for the coal block. A fresh mining
lease was thereafter executed in favour of RVUNL, and PKCL
paid the stamp duty and other charges of Rs. 83,47,64,575 for
its registration.
20. On 29.07.2016, a Supplementary Agreement was
executed between the parties under Section 11(1) of the Coal Act,
adopting and continuing the CMDA and the Addendum in their
entirety, subject to certain additional obligations undertaken by
PKCL. The following clauses of the Supplementary Agreement
are relevant:
•
Clause (j) of the Supplementary Agreement records an
indemnity by PKCL in favour of RVUNL against
liabilities relating to the furnishing and renewal of
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performance securities, and against other financial
liabilities imposed on RVUNL by a nominated or other
governmental authority, so far as covered by PKCL’s
scope of work.
•
Clause (k) of the Supplementary Agreement provides
that PKCL “shall reimburse all charges related to
furnishing and renewal of Performance Security by
RVUNL to the Ministry of Coal, GoI as per rules/policy
in force, on production of documentary evidence by
RVUNL”.
Separately, under Clause 7.1 of the Allotment Agreement
dated 26.03.2015 between RVUNL and the Nominated Authority
under the Coal Act, RVUNL furnished a performance guarantee
by way of bank guarantee(s) to the Ministry of Coal.
21. According to PKCL, though it continued to supply mine
coal in terms of the agreements between the parties, RVUNL did
not fulfil certain obligations by not making the necessary
payments and not reimbursing PKCL for the expenses incurred
by it on behalf of RVUNL on various occasions.
Page 21 of 79
22. Accordingly, PKCL invoked the arbitration clause of the
CMDA by notices issued in respect of different claims. The
disputes were adjudicated by Justice Sudhir Kumar Katriar
(Retd.), former Judge of the Patna High Court, as the Sole
Arbitrator. PKCL raised nine claims including claims for interest
and costs. By order dated 08.02.2019, the learned Arbitrator
framed the issues for adjudication. PKCL thereafter amended its
Statement of Claim, the amendment being confined to the prayer
clause.
23. The nine claims, as also set out in the Award, are as
follows:
(i) Claim No. 1 , for non-payment for supply of rejected
rakes of coal, in the sum of Rs. 71,77,82,356;
(ii) Claim No. 2 , for reimbursement of stamp duty and
other charges paid for registration of the fresh mining
lease, in the sum of Rs. 83,47,64,575;
(iii) Claim No. 3 , for short payment of interest on overdue
payments computed till 30.09.2018, in the sum of Rs.
67,27,40,731;
Page 22 of 79
(iv) Claim No. 4 , for reimbursement of legal fees and
litigation expenses said to have been incurred on RVUNL’s
behalf, in the sum of Rs. 3,75,35,000;
(v) Claim No. 5 , for recovery of bank guarantee charges,
in the sum of Rs. 58,96,93,602;
(vi) Claim No. 6 , for reimbursement of expenses incurred
on account of 267 additional project-affected families as
part of RVUNL’s resettlement and rehabilitation
obligations, in the sum of Rs. 8,01,00,000;
(vii) Claim No. 7 , for reimbursement of expenses incurred
in setting up a vocational training centre, in the sum of
Rs. 3,38,71,562;
(viii) Claim No. 8 , for reimbursement of additional cost
incurred towards acquisition of land for the coal block, in
two parts – Rs. 66.70 crore already incurred in respect of
four villages (Parsa, Kente, Salhi and Hariharpur), and a
further, contingent claim in respect of a fifth village
(Ghatbara); and
Page 23 of 79
(ix) Claim No. 9 , for interest on the sums claimed, at 24%
per annum, together with costs of arbitration.
24. On 15.01.2021, the learned Arbitrator passed the
Award.
Claims Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 were allowed in full.
Claim No. 5 was allowed in part, in the sum of Rs.
43,59,18,563, and RVUNL was directed to furnish certain
supporting documents within four weeks in respect of the
balance.
Claim No. 8, relating to the fifth village, was rejected as
premature on the footing that no acquisition proceedings had
commenced in respect of the fifth village.
Claim No. 9 was allowed in part: interest at 24% per
annum was held excessive and was declined; instead, simple
interest pendente lite, and future interest if payment was not
made within four weeks, was awarded at 11.95% per annum,
and costs of arbitration of Rs. 2,19,06,176 were awarded.
25. After the passing of the Award, PKCL filed an application
under Section 33(4) of the Act on 04.02.2021 before the learned
Page 24 of 79
Arbitrator, contending that the Award had omitted to deal with
the first part of Claim No. 8, namely, the sum of Rs. 66.70 crore
already incurred in respect of four villages, and sought an
additional award in that regard. RVUNL opposed the application,
contending that Claim No. 8 had already been adjudicated and,
since no relief was granted, it was deemed to have been rejected
and hence, no claim would lie at this stage.
26. After hearing the parties, the learned Arbitrator passed
the Additional Award on 05.07.2021, holding that the claim in
respect of the four villages had been omitted from consideration
in the Award, and allowed the claim by awarding Rs.
66,70,00,000 together with interest from the date of PKCL’s
payment to the land acquisition authorities and landholders.
27. Being aggrieved, RVUNL challenged both the Award and
the Additional Award before the Commercial Court No. 1, Jaipur
Metropolitan-II, Jaipur, under Section 34 of the Act. By order
dated 20.05.2023, the Commercial Court disposed of the said
proceedings.
The Commercial Court rejected the challenge to the
findings of the learned Arbitrator on Claim Nos. 1, 3 and 5.
Page 25 of 79
As regards Claim No. 9, the Commercial Court held the
award of interest at 11.95% to be a plausible view.
The Commercial Court set aside the findings on Claim Nos.
2, 4, 6 and 7.
The Commercial Court set aside the Additional Award on
Claim No. 8 on the ground of limitation.
After arriving at the aforementioned analysis, the
Commercial Court, holding that, as per the law then stood, it
had no power to modify the Award, allowed the application under
Section 34 of the Act and set aside in its entirety both the Award
dated 15.01.2021 and the Additional Award dated 05.07.2021.
28. Being aggrieved by the order of the Commercial Court
in setting aside the awards, PKCL preferred an appeal under
Section 37 of the Act before the Division Bench of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, which was registered
as D.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 2007 of 2023.
29. By the impugned Judgment dated 21.05.2026, the High
Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 37 of
the Act allowed PKCL’s appeal and held that the Commercial
Page 26 of 79
Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, and
consequently, set aside the order dated 20.05.2023 of the
Commercial Court, as a result of which, the Award dated
15.01.2021 and the Additional Award dated 05.07.2021 stood
restored. RVUNL, in turn, being aggrieved, has preferred the
present Special Leave Petition.
30. For ease of reference, the fate of the claims and the
amounts awarded on each claim, as recorded in the Award and
the Additional Award, the order of the Commercial Court, and
the impugned Judgment, are tabulated below:
Claim Arbitral Tribunal Commercial
High Court
Court
Claim No. 1 – on
rejected rakes of
Allowed –
Rs. 71,77,82,356
Challenge
Order of the
Commercial
Court dated
rejected
coal
20.05.2023
Claim No. 2 – on
Allowed –
Rs. 83,47,64,575
Finding of the
set aside;
Award dated
stamp duty and
other charges on
Tribunal set
aside
15.01.2021
the fresh mining
and
Additional
Award dated
lease
Claim No. 3 – on
Allowed –
Rs. 67,27,40,731
Challenge
interest on
overdue payments
rejected
05.07.2021
restored
Claim No. 4 – on
Allowed –
Rs. 3,75,35,000
Finding of the
legal fees and
litigation expenses
Tribunal set
aside on
limitation
Claim No. 5 – on
Allowed in part –
Rs. 43,59,18,563 (of
Challenge
bank guarantee
rejected
charges
Rs. 58,96,93,602);
RVUNL directed to
Page 27 of 79
furnish documents
for certain heads
Claim No. 6 – on
Allowed –
Rs. 8,01,00,000
Finding of the
267 additional
project-affected
Tribunal set
aside
families
Claim No. 7 – on
vocational training
Allowed –
Rs. 3,38,71,562
Finding of the
Tribunal set
centre
aside
Claim No. 8 – on
additional cost of
Award: claim for the
Additional
fifth village rejected
Award set
land acquisition
as premature.
Additional Award:
Rs. 66,70,00,000 for
aside on
limitation
the four villages,
with interest
Claim No. 9 – on
interest and costs
Interest at 24%
declined; simple
interest at 11.95%
per annum; costs of
Interest at
11.95% held
to be a
plausible view
Rs. 2,19,06,176
OUR ANALYSIS
31. The impugned Judgment passed by the High Court in
exercise of Section 37 of the Act arises out of the order of the
Commercial Court passed under Section 34 of the Act, which
examined the Award and the Additional Award on a claim-by-
claim basis. The Commercial Court set aside both the awards in
their entirety on the ground that it lacks power to modify the
award. The High Court, in turn, held that the Commercial Court
had exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act and
accordingly set aside the order of the Commercial Court. The
Page 28 of 79
Petitioner, however, contends that the High Court had done so
by a single, omnibus finding, without testing the claims
individually and without examining whether the findings of the
Commercial Court had disclosed an error of jurisdiction and/or
suffered from patent illegality or perversity.
In this background, we propose to examine each of the nine
claims separately, as to whether the Commercial Court was
correct in allowing or rejecting the claims in exercise of its power
under Section 34 of the Act and whether the High Court in turn,
in exercise of power under Section 37, was right in setting aside
the order of the Commercial Court and in upholding the awards.
32. Before doing so, we must deal with the question of
cross-objection, as raised by the RVUNL, since it affects how
Claim Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 9 are to be considered. The issue at hand
is that RVUNL filed no appeal under Section 37 of the Act, as it
was not aggrieved by the setting aside of the awards by the
Commercial Court, and no cross-objection was filed in PKCL’s
appeal. The question is whether RVUNL could still press its
objections to Claim Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 9 before the High Court. The
Commercial Court had decided those four claims in PKCL’s
Page 29 of 79
favour, but it had set aside the whole Award on RVUNL’s own
Section 34 application. The impugned Judgment does not
specifically deal with this issue clearly.
33. It was submitted on behalf of RVUNL that, since the
Commercial Court had set aside the Awards in their entirety on
RVUNL’s own application under Section 34 of the Act, there was
no requirement, nor occasion, for RVUNL to pursue an appeal
under Section 37 of the Act or to file a cross-objection in PKCL’s
appeal, and that RVUNL was entitled to press its objections to
those four claims without a cross-objection, in terms of Order
XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Reference was
made to the orders of the High Court dated 22.04.2026.
34. By the order dated 22.04.2026, the High Court recorded
that, in view of Rattanindia Power Limited v. Maharashtra
6
State Electricity Distribution Company Limited , it was
prima facie inclined to accept the contention of RVUNL that it
may be entitled to address the issues which had been allowed in
favour of PKCL. However, in view of Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG
6
2025 INSC 1502
Page 30 of 79
7
Novasoft Technologies Ltd. , the said order was recalled by the
High Court.
35. However, we do not consider it necessary to answer this
question in the present case as the petitioner had addressed this
Court exhaustively on every issue that arose before the
Commercial Court and the High Court, including the objections
of RVUNL to Claim Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 9, on their merits.
36. Accordingly, we proceed to examine the issues at hand
in the light of the legal principles as discussed above.
37. CLAIM NO. 1 – REJECTION OF RAKES OF COAL
37A. Claim No. 1 is for payment of Rs. 71,77,82,356 for
rakes of coal delivered to RVUNL’s thermal power stations
between May 2016 and July 2018, which RVUNL rejected on
quality parameters. The question is whether, having regard to
Clauses 3.4.1, 4.3.3 and 5.4.1 of the CMDA mentioned in
paragraph 15 above, PKCL was entitled to be paid for the rakes
so rejected.
7
(2025) 7 SCC 1
Page 31 of 79
37B. Finding of the Arbitral Tribunal :
The learned Arbitrator held as follows:
(a) RVUNL consumed the entire coal before receipt of the
analysis reports, which deprived PKCL of the
opportunity to improve its quality, as is implicit in
Clause 4.3.3. Further, RVUNL itself said it had no
space to stack the rakes pending the receipt of the
test results, and by its conduct, as in the words of the
arbitrator:
“ 98 . …. has rendered the entire mechanism for testing
of samples and granting an opportunity to the claimant
to improve the quality of coal in case of an adverse
result totally redundant and otiose ”.
(b) Applying the doctrine of contra proferentem, the
Tribunal held that if the agreement is ambiguous on
whether the allegedly rejected rakes could be consumed
without paying for the mining and delivery of that coal, the
ambiguity is resolved against the party who drafted the
agreement, namely RVUNL.
(c) RVUNL neither pleaded nor proved any loss, and its
witness admitted there was no loss of generation of power;
Page 32 of 79
payment could be claimed as a pass-through expense
under Section 62 of the Electricity Act, 2003, and Section
70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (“the Contract Act”)
applied, as the delivery was not gratuitous.
(d) Clause 5.4.1 will apply only if the coal is rejected. Coal
accepted and consumed is to be considered for the
monthly weighted average price, and hence Claim No. 1
was allowed for Rs. 71,77,82,356.
37C. Finding of the Commercial Court :
The Commercial Court upheld the Tribunal’s finding on
Claim No. 1. Although the Commercial Court observed that the
Tribunal’s “opportunity to improve quality” reasoning was
outside the terms of the CMDA and therefore, patently illegal, it
went on to hold that the Tribunal’s core reasoning was a
plausible view. That the Tribunal’s use of contra proferentem
against RVUNL was plausible, although RVUNL foresaw
difficulties in stacking the coal, it took no remedial steps. It held
that the Tribunal was right to place the onus of proving the
rejection reports on RVUNL, whose officers who authored the
reports were not examined.
Page 33 of 79
37D. Finding of the High Court :
The High Court under Section 37 of the Act set aside the
decision of the Commercial Court, noting that it exceeded its
jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act.
37E. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner before this
Court :
Clauses 4.3.3 and 5.4.1 impose an absolute bar on
payment for coal rejected on quality parameters. Clause 3.4.1
vests title to such coal in RVUNL, and the finding that RVUNL’s
consumption of the coal pending analysis reports amounted to
an implied waiver rewrites the bargain recorded in the CMDA. It
was submitted that neither the Award nor the Commercial Court
discloses the rate or formula applied to arrive at the sum
awarded, which is contrary to Section 31(3) of the Act requiring
an award to state the reasons on which it is based, and a
contravention thereof amounts to patent illegality as held in
Associate Builders (supra). It was further submitted that the
Commercial Court sustained the claim only on the footing that
the Arbitrator’s view on Sections 70 and 73 of the Contract Act
was possible, whereas Section 70 cannot apply where Clause
Page 34 of 79
5.4.1 exhaustively governs the matter [ Mahanagar Telephone
8
Nigam Ltd. v. Tata Communications Ltd ].
37F. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent before this
Court :
That PKCL supplied the coal, and RVUNL consumed the
same. RVUNL has neither pleaded nor proved that it suffered
any loss on account of the deficiency in quality of the coal. That
RVUNL deviated from the contractual methodology for quality
determination which required joint inspection within the
thermal power station premises. Further, RVUNL failed to
establish functional laboratories within the premises. The CMDA
does not contemplate about the situation of consumption of coal
which are later declared rejected. According to PKCL, rejected
rakes are its property under Clause 3.4.1 of the CMDA. The
Tribunal gave reasons for holding that consumption without
payment for the same was incorrect, as well as for arriving at the
quantification. Lastly, there are concurrent findings in favour of
PKCL.
8
(2019) 5 SCC 341
Page 35 of 79
37G. Our analysis :
The Tribunal did not hold that RVUNL had no right to
reject coal on quality. It held that RVUNL, having consumed the
coal before receipt of the analysis reports, was deemed to have
accepted it, and that Clause 5.4.1 applies only to coal that is
rejected and not consumed. That is a construction of the CMDA
which is a possible view, and the Commercial Court itself held
the Tribunal’s views on contra proferentem, on the burden of
proof and on Sections 70 and 73 of the Contract Act to be
plausible. The finding that RVUNL failed to prove the analysis
reports and suffered no loss rests on the evidence of its own
witness, and re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible under
Section 34 and certainly not under Section 37 of the Act.
For these reasons, having examined the objections of
RVUNL to Claim No. 1, we see no reason to hold that the finding
by the Tribunal, nor the view taken by the Commercial Court
suffers from any patent illegality appearing on the face of the
Award. Hence, the decision of the High Court to uphold the
Award cannot be faulted with.
Page 36 of 79
38. CLAIM NO. 2 – STAMP DUTY AND OTHER CHARGES
FOR REGISTRATION OF THE FRESH MINING LEASE
38A. Claim No. 2 is for reimbursement of Rs. 83,47,64,575
paid by PKCL as stamp duty and other charges for registration
of the fresh mining lease executed after the cancellation of the
allotment of the coal block by the judgment of this Court dated
25.08.2014 and its re-allocation to RVUNL. The question is
whether, having regard to Clauses 3.2.1, 3.3, 7.1 and 7.3 of the
CMDA, Clause (j) of the Supplementary Agreement and Section
11(1) of the Coal Act, the liability rested on RVUNL or PKCL.
38B. Finding of the Arbitral Tribunal :
The learned Arbitrator held as follows:
(a) It was admitted by both parties that cancellation and
re-allotment of the mine was never in their contemplation,
that the CMDA provides for change in law through its
“force majeure” clause, and that RVUNL’s counsel “agreed
that change of law will include a judgment of the courts”.
The events “have fundamentally altered the basis on
which the contract had been executed”.
Page 37 of 79
(b) The Tribunal held that the event under clause 7.1 must
be beyond control and “should adversely and directly
render the performance” of the whole or part of the
agreement impossible.
(c) PKCL had adopted the CMDA under Section 11 of the
Coal Act only “for the residual term and residual
obligations”; RVUNL itself so described it in its Board
decision of 30.03.2015 and letter of 31.03.2015; and in
the Supplementary Agreement RVUNL put the bank
guarantee charges on PKCL but not stamp duty and other
charges, which is a “clear and evident indication of the
intention of the parties” that stamp duty and other
charges are not covered by the Supplementary Agreement.
(d) The stamp duty was in the nature of capital
expenditure already incurred by PKCL in 2012, and it
would be “contrary to the contractual terms but also
inequitable” to make it bear the liability a second time.
Accordingly, the Tribunal awarded Rs. 83,47,64,575 to the
claimant.
Page 38 of 79
38C. Finding of the Commercial Court:
The Commercial Court under Clause 7.1 treated “and” in
“adversely and directly” as a co-ordinating conjunction joining
the two, so “adversely” cannot be read in isolation. It held that
the Tribunal interpreted the clause only on the basis of “adverse
impact” and did not consider whether the cancellation rendered
performance “adversely and directly” impossible. The
cancellation “may be adverse to the economic interest of the
claimant but it will not “directly” render the performance of
contract wholly or partly impossible”, and reading “adversely”
in isolation from “directly” is a patent illegality. Thus, the
Commercial Court set aside the finding of the Tribunal in favour
of the claimant on claim no. 2.
38D. Finding of the High Court:
The High Court recorded RVUNL’s submission on
“change in law” and held that the Arbitrator, though did not
explicitly examine the word “directly”, did examine the effect of
subsequent legislative changes on the operation of the CMDA
itself and therefore, the said view cannot be said to be patently
Page 39 of 79
illegal and no grounds to interfere with the said interpretation
arise.
38E. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner before this
Court:
The Petitioner submitted that the cost of obtaining and
renewing the mining lease is the Respondent PKCL’s own
responsibility under the CMDA. It relied on Clauses 3.2.1,
3.2.2(e), 3.2.6(f), 3.3(a) and (b) and 9.2, and said the cost cannot
be shifted to RVUNL under “force majeure” or “change in law”.
Further, even if a court judgment is a change in law, Clause 7.1
still requires an event beyond the party’s reasonable control that
“adversely and directly” renders performance impossible. That in
any event, Clause 7.3 excuses performance only to the extent
affected and bars any claim for loss or compensation. Clause 7.2
puts the burden of establishing a “force majeure” on the claiming
party, and Clause 7 has no mechanism for reimbursing costs
occasioned by a “force majeure” event. Lastly, the supplementary
agreement provides that the CMDA and the Addendum are
adopted and continued in their entirety, with additional
obligations of PKCL only.
Page 40 of 79
38F. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent before this
Court:
Respondent, on the other hand, submitted that RVUNL
admitted before the Arbitrator, as recorded at paragraph 148 of
the Award, that the judgment of this Court in Manohar Lal
Sharma (supra) is a “change in law” within Definitions Clause
1.1. Further, that this Court has held, between the same parties
under the same CMDA, in Parsa Kente Collieries Ltd. v.
9
RVUNL , that a claim arising from “force majeure” is
maintainable under Clause 7.1; and that other events, such as
delay in forest clearance and in the railway siding, had earlier
been treated as “force majeure” under the same CMDA.
Additionally, after reallocation, the Supplementary Agreement
under Section 11(1) of the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act,
2015 listed the residual obligations. Stamp duty had already
been paid in May 2012, and the Supplementary Agreement does
not list additional stamp duty among those obligations.
9
(2019) 7 SCC 236
Page 41 of 79
38G. Our analysis :
(i) The Arbitrator’s finding rests on three foundations: (a)
that the cancellation and re-allotment altered the
fundamental basis of the CMDA and was an adverse event
under Clause 7.1; (b) that PKCL had adopted the CMDA
only for the residual obligations, with no obligation placed
on it for the charges on the fresh lease; and (c) that the
stamp duty was a one-time expenditure already incurred
once by PKCL. The Commercial Court interfered chiefly
because the Arbitrator read “adversely” in isolation from
“directly”.
(ii) The Arbitrator set out Clause 7.1 in full, noticed the
requirement of “adversely and directly”, and held with
reasons that the continued allocation of the mine was a
fundamental basis of the CMDA, that its cancellation
removed that basis, and that the restoration brought new
costs for which the contract had no mechanism to deal.
Whether that is the only possible construction is not the
question, but whether it is a construction that no fair-
minded person could take. Therefore, in substituting its
Page 42 of 79
own construction of Clause 7.1, the Commercial Court
exceeded its jurisdiction.
(iii) Having examined the findings of the learned
Arbitrator on Claim No. 2, we see no perversity in the
findings of the learned Arbitrator as would have warranted
interference by the Commercial Court by preferring a
construction of a clause over that of the Arbitral Tribunal.
The High Court had committed no error in upholding the
award of the Arbitral Tribunal allowing the claim.
39. CLAIM NO. 3 – INTEREST ON OVERDUE PAYMENTS
39A. Claim No. 3 is for Rs. 67,27,40,731, being short payment
of interest on overdue payments till 30.09.2018. Delay in
payments and the liability to pay interest under Clause 6.3 of
the CMDA were not in dispute; the dispute was as to the rate.
39B. Finding of the Arbitral Tribunal :
The learned Arbitrator held that the present dispute is limited
in scope to the applicable interest rate on overdue payments.
That RVUNL has not denied the pending payments or overdue
payments and has also not denied its obligation to pay interest.
Page 43 of 79
39C. Finding of the Commercial Court :
The Commercial Court upheld the finding of the Tribunal. It
was held that, though the issue of limitation was not taken by
RVUNL, the Tribunal and the court could look into it, but RVUNL
was not able to show what was that payment which was pending
beyond three years. Further, the obligation to pay interest was
not denied by RVUNL and the Arbitral Tribunal is correct in its
approach of basing the rate on the rates in RVUNL’s other
financial documents.
39D. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner before this
Court:
It was submitted that interest on overdue payments is
governed by Clause 6.3(i) of the CMDA. That clause fixes the rate
at the prevailing lending rate of interest charged by SBI to
RVUNL for RVUNL’s working capital loans. Interest accrues only
from the twenty-third day of delay, after a fifteen-day period and
a further seven-day grace period. It was submitted that the
Arbitral Tribunal recorded that the rate contemplated by the
contract was “ not being available on record ”. For that reason, it
took a broad average of the rates being charged by the State
Page 44 of 79
Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur (SBBJ), a different bank, and fixed
interest at 11.95% per annum. The Tribunal’s own finding that
this rate was not proved is therefore a finding that the claim
under Clause 6.3(i) was not established on the evidence the
clause itself requires. An award computed by averaging the rates
of a different bank is not a construction of Clause 6.3(i). It
substitutes a rate the clause does not provide for the one it does.
It is submitted in any case that Claim No. 3 depends on the other
claims and would not survive standalone if the other claims are
not accepted.
39E. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent before this
Court:
RVUNL never disputed that it owes interest on delayed
payments. That the dispute is only about the rate. That the
Tribunal found SBBJ to be a subsidiary or associate of SBI, and
found that RVUNL took its working capital loans from SBBJ. On
that view, 11.95% is the rate the contract points to.
39F. Our analysis:
(i) The Arbitrator recorded that RVUNL did not deny
the overdue payments or its obligation to pay interest, and
Page 45 of 79
that Clause 6.3 could not be applied literally as RVUNL
had no working-capital loan from the State Bank of India;
the Tribunal therefore took the rates actually paid by
RVUNL to other banks, which averaged about 11.95%.
The Commercial Court, while not disturbing the
finding of the Arbitral Tribunal, recorded that RVUNL did
not identify any payment pending beyond three years, and
no material has been shown to the contrary.
(ii) Having examined the challenge of RVUNL to Claim
No. 3, as no perversity or patent illegality is discernible, in
the concurrent finding on this claim first by the Tribunal,
which was upheld by the Commercial Court and not
disturbed by the High Court, we see no reason to interfere
with the same.
40. CLAIM NO. 4 – REIMBURSEMENT OF LEGAL FEES
AND LITIGATION EXPENSES
40A. Claim No. 4 is for Rs. 3,75,35,000, said to have been
paid by PKCL on behalf of RVUNL as legal fees in litigation. Two
questions arise here: whether the claim is barred by limitation,
Page 46 of 79
and, if not, whether the liability for these expenses was RVUNL’s,
having regard to Clauses 3.2.1, 3.3, 9.2 and 13.1 of the CMDA
and Section 230 of the Contract Act.
40B. Finding of the Arbitral Tribunal:
The learned Arbitrator held as follows:
On the issue of limitation, it was held that RVUNL, though
initially denied liability by its letter of 20.07.2016, had later
called for and received documents in support of the claim. On
account of inaction, PKCL invoked arbitration by notice dated
06.12.2017 and RVUNL, by letter dated 21.12.2017, said the
claim was being re-examined, and that action on the notice
would follow only after the re-examination of the claim, which
continued till February 2018, and the claim was rejected only on
19.02.2018. It is the refusal of payment which constitutes the
starting point of limitation, and PKCL invoked arbitration
immediately by notice dated 18.04.2018.
On merits, RVUNL’s authorised officers signed the
Vakalatnamas, pleadings and affidavits, and the advocates’ bills
were in RVUNL’s name. RVUNL pleaded and proved no deficiency
on PKCL’s part. PKCL operated the mine as the agent of RVUNL,
Page 47 of 79
and reliance on Section 230 of the Contract Act is the correct
,
proposition of law. Further under Clause 9.2, maintenance of
permits was RVUNL’s responsibility, and on a commercial
reading of Clause 3.2.1, undertaking litigation or defending the
same will not come within the scope of work of the claimant.
Accordingly, Rs. 3,75,35,000 was awarded.
40C. Finding of the Commercial Court :
The Commercial Court observed from PKCL’s pleadings that
the last payment cheque is dated 19.08.2014, RVUNL denied
liability on 30.09.2016, and PKCL invoked arbitration on
06.12.2017. RVUNL’s letter is dated 21.12.2017 with respect to
examination of the claim, and RVUNL denied liability on
19.02.2018. Relying on Section 21 of the Act and State of Goa
10
v. Praveen Enterprises , it held that the Limitation Act will be
applicable to the arbitration and, for the same, an arbitration
shall be deemed to have commenced on the date on which a
request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received.
Therefore, the cause of action started on 19.08.2014, so
limitation expired on 18.08.2017. The notice of 06.12.2017 was
10
(2012) 12 SCC 581
Page 48 of 79
therefore barred by limitation. It was held that in none of the
letters exchanged between the parties did RVUNL acknowledge
the debt or liability. Although the Tribunal’s view under Section
230 of the Contract Act “may be a plausible view”, it set the
finding aside on the issue of limitation.
40D. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner before this
Court:
That Clause 13.1 makes PKCL at all times an
independent contractor and not an agent. Clause 3.2.1 provides
that all expenses for the Works are borne solely by PKCL, with
no expenses or liabilities to be borne or shared by the Petitioner
at any stage. On this score, the cost of defending the clearances
and licences obtained by the Respondent for its own mining
operations is therefore not a liability the CMDA places on the
Petitioner. On the issue of limitation, it was submitted that the
last payment was made on 19.08.2014 and limitation expired on
18.08.2017, whereas the arbitration was invoked on
06.12.2017, and that in none of the letters did the Petitioner
acknowledge the debt or liability.
Page 49 of 79
40E. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent before this
Court:
On limitation, it is submitted that the Tribunal rightly
concluded that although the last payment was made in August
2014, the cause of action for invoking arbitration under Article
137 of the Limitation Act arose only when RVUNL explicitly
denied the claim on 19 February, 2018. That RVUNL had asked
for details of the payments in July 2016 for the stated purpose
of processing the claim, thereby acknowledging its existence,
and that as late as December 2017 RVUNL told PKCL it was
reconsidering the claim. The Tribunal therefore correctly applied
the principle that under Article 137 of the Limitation Act,
limitation begins only when there is both an assertion and an
explicit denial.
On Clauses 13.1 and 3.2.1, the Respondent submitted
that the argument that all litigation expenses are PKCL’s liability
is factually and legally untenable. The evidence showed that
RVUNL’s authorised officers signed the Vakalatnamas, pleadings
and affidavits in those proceedings. Bills were raised in RVUNL’s
Page 50 of 79
name and forwarded to PKCL for payment, and the CMDA has
no provision fastening the liability to defend litigation on PKCL.
40F. Our analysis :
(i) The Arbitral Tribunal allowed the Claim No. 4 by holding
in favour of the claimant both on the ground of limitation
as well as on merit of the claim:
As regards limitation, the Arbitral Tribunal, after a
thorough examination of the relevant dates of the claims
and denial of claims, made observations in para 206 of the
Award as follows:
“……….. When on account of inaction on the part of
the respondent, the claimant invoked arbitration on
th
this issue by their notice dated 6 December 2017, the
st
respondent by their letter dated 21 December 2017
apprised the claimant, that the claim of reimbursement
of legal fees is being re-examined by them and that any
th
action in furtherance to the notice dated 6 December,
2017 would be undertaken only after such re-
examination. The re-examination of the claim on this
account continued till February 2018. It was only on
th
19 February 2018 that the respondent rejected the
claim. The period of limitation will commence only
when the claim has been rejected and the present
claim petition is thus within the period of limitation.”
As regards the merit of the claim, the Arbitral
Tribunal, after examining in detail the relevant
Page 51 of 79
materials before it, and also relying on Section 230 of
the Contract Act allowed the claim.
(ii) On the other hand, on the issue of limitation, the
Commercial Court went into detail by reappreciating the
evidence and took a contrary view that merely because
there was an exchange of communication between parties,
it cannot extend the period of limitation by relying on the
decision in Geo Miller and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman
11
RVUNL . The Commercial Court held that the Arbitral
Tribunal ignored vital evidence and proposition of law in
arriving at a conclusion which amounts to a patent
illegality and goes to the root of the matter, though on
merit the Commercial Court held that the view of the
Arbitral Tribunal based on Section 230 of the Contract Act
may be a “plausible view”. Thus, only on the ground of
limitation, the Commercial Court set aside the Tribunal’s
finding on Claim No. 4.
(iii) Having examined the reasoning given by the
learned Arbitrator on Claim No. 4 and also the grounds on
11
(2020) 14 SCC 643
Page 52 of 79
which the Commercial Court reversed the decision of the
Arbitral Tribunal, it is clear that the Commercial Court
acted in a manner which went beyond the scope of Section
34 of the Act as if it was sitting on appeal on facts and law.
The reason given by the learned Arbitrator, as extracted
above, in our opinion, cannot be said to be perverse or
patently illegal, keeping in mind the proviso to sub-section
(2A) of Section 34 of the Act, which provides that an award
shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an
erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of
evidence.
We, thus, see no perversity or patent illegality in
the reasoned findings of the learned Arbitrator, which
could have warranted interference by the Commercial
Court.
41. CLAIM NO. 5 – BANK GUARANTEE CHARGES
41A. Claim No. 5 is for Rs. 58,96,93,602, being the amounts
which RVUNL deducted from payments due to PKCL under
heads said to relate to charges on the bank guarantees furnished
by RVUNL to the Ministry of Coal. The question is the scope of
Page 53 of 79
Clause (k) of the Supplementary Agreement, discussed in
paragraph 20 above, under which PKCL “shall reimburse all
charges related to furnishing and renewal of Performance
Security” on production of documentary evidence by RVUNL.
41B. Finding of the Arbitral Tribunal:
The Tribunal held that PKCL must pay the charges for
furnishing and renewing the performance bank guarantee, but
only when RVUNL furnishes documentary evidence, since it is
only then that the obligation of the claimant to reimburse the
respondent arises. It held that the words “all charges” in Clause
(k) cannot bring within it any amount paid to any other party.
Interest on margin money, interest on bank guarantee and the
payment to the State Government to stand as guarantor were
therefore not charges for furnishing the guarantee. The Tribunal
awarded Rs. 43,59,18,563 to the claimant and RVUNL was
directed to furnish the documents within four weeks and to
adjust any excess deduction.
41C. Finding of the Commercial Court:
The Commercial Court held, in substance, that the
Tribunal interpreted Clause ‘(k)’ of the Supplementary
Page 54 of 79
Agreement and even if a different interpretation is also possible,
the same is not within the scope of Section 34 of the Act. Further,
there is no perversity or patent illegality in the finding of the
Arbitral Tribunal on this issue.
41D. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner before this
Court:
The Arbitral Tribunal held that the words “ all charges ” can
only mean an amount charged by the bank for furnishing the
guarantee and any amount paid to the third party falls outside
the clause. However, it was submitted that Clause (k) of the
Supplementary Agreement is to be construed by reference to the
subject matter, namely charges “related to” furnishing and
renewal of the performance security, which is an expression of
wide meaning and not by reference to identity of the payee.
Reference was made to Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of
12
India ; State of Rajasthan v. Nav Bharat Construction
13
Co. . Further, under Clause (j), the indemnity against financial
12
(1988) 2 SCC 299
13
(2006) 1 SCC 86
Page 55 of 79
liabilities imposed by a governmental authority was not referred
to by the Arbitrator, the Commercial Court or the High Court.
41E. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent before this
Court:
PKCL supported the findings of the Tribunal. It was
further submitted that despite repeated requests, RVUNL failed
to produce any documentary evidence of the charges it said it
had incurred. The Respondent submitted that RVUNL’s
argument that the Tribunal did not refer to Clause (j) of the
Supplementary Agreement must be rejected, as no pleading or
argument on Clause (j) was advanced before the Tribunal, and
RVUNL is setting up a new case in the SLP.
41F. Our analysis :
Having examined the finding relating to Claim No. 5, we see
no patent illegality or perversity in the concurrent findings by
the Tribunal and the Commercial Court, and hence there is no
reason to interfere with the Award on this claim. RVUNL also
cannot set up a new case before this Court, which was not there
before the Tribunal.
Page 56 of 79
42. CLAIM NOS. 6 AND 7 – ADDITIONAL PROJECT-
AFFECTED FAMILIES AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING CENTRE
42A. The issues:
Claim No. 6 is for Rs. 8,01,00,000 incurred by PKCL on
267 project-affected families (“PAFs”) in addition to the 458
PAFs as was contemplated in the MoU entered into between
RVUNL and the Collector.
Claim No. 7 is for Rs. 3,38,71,562 spent by PKCL in setting
up a Vocational Training Centre required by the Forest
Clearance in pursuance of the Ministry of Environment and
Forests notification of 04.01.2011, which post-dates the CMDA.
The question in both the claims is whether the expense
fell within PKCL’s scope of work under Clauses 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and
9.2 of the CMDA, or is reimbursable by RVUNL as an incident of
a change in law.
42B. Finding of the Arbitral Tribunal:
On Claim No. 6, the learned Arbitrator held in substance
that PKCL’s obligation was only with regard to the figures as had
Page 57 of 79
been detailed at the initial stage of the agreement, meaning relief
to 458 families was a part of the one-time obligation of PKCL,
and any later change will definitely fall within the category of the
change of law and legal provisions as per the contract, entitling
PKCL to reimbursement. Further, requiring PKCL to rehabilitate
the additional 267 families cannot be said to be a part of the
scope of work under clause 3.2.1 or clause 3.2.2. Moreover, this
additional obligation did not find mention in the supplementary
agreement.
On Claim No. 7, the learned Arbitrator held in substance
that the requirement of a vocational training centre was not one
of the requirements for grant of the requisite permissions. The
said condition has only been inserted in the year 2011, much
after the issuance of the notification for acquisition of land in the
year 2009 and much after the parties had executed the CMDA.
The imposition of the said conditions by a statutory authority
falls within the category of “change of law”. An additional
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condition imposed later by a statutory authority will constitute
a change in law and not part of the obligation under the CMDA.
42C. Finding of the Commercial Court:
The Commercial Court took up Claims 6 and 7 together.
On Claim No. 6, it held in substance that under Clause 3.2.1
read with Clause 3.2.2(2), PKCL had to obtain clearances
including rehabilitation and resettlement. The parties had to
perform these obligations even if any changes occur in any law
as per the definition of “applicable laws”. That the present case
did not come under the event of “force majeure” and so the
claimant was not relieved of its obligation.
On Claim No. 7, the Commercial Court held that under
Clause 9.2, the maintenance of all permits etc. is also the
obligation of the claimant and the applicant has also to take
such necessary action. It cannot be said that the maintenance
was the sole responsibility of RVUNL. Accordingly, it set aside
the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal.
Page 59 of 79
42D. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner before this
Court :
That Clauses 13.1 and 3.2.1 apply to both claims as they
do to Claim No. 4. Under Clause 13.1, PKCL is at all times an
independent contractor and not an agent. Under Clause 3.2.1,
all expenses for the Works are borne solely by PKCL, with no
expenses or liabilities to be borne or shared by the Petitioner at
any stage. Under Clause 9.2, PKCL covenants to obtain, renew
and maintain all permits, licences and approvals required under
applicable laws. RVUNL relied on the Commercial Court’s
findings.
42E. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent before this
Court :
On Claim No. 6, it was submitted that at the bidding stage,
the environmental impact assessment report prepared under
RVUNL’s instructions identified only 458 PAFs under the
prevailing State policy, in which eligibility was determined by the
date of the Section 4 notice under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894. PKCL’s bid and CMDA obligations were framed on those
Page 60 of 79
458 families alone. The cut-off date was later changed from
22.10.2009 to 31.12.2012 by a Gram Panchayat resolution, so
that 267 more families became eligible. This was a “change in
law” covered by Clause 7.1(A)(ii)(a) as a political “force majeure”
event. Further, Clause 3.2.1 does not apply to “force majeure”
situations. Lastly, RVUNL never disputed before the Tribunal,
the Section 34 Court or this Court that the change in eligibility
criteria was a “change in law”. Its argument on the CA
certificates is a new case in the SLP, because it has never
disputed the quantum or that PKCL incurred the expense. For
this, the Respondent relied on Ramesh Kumar Jain v.
14
BALCO .
On Claim No. 7, the Respondent submitted that RVUNL’s
argument mirrors its argument on Claim No. 6, relying on
Clauses 3.2.1 and 9.2. The obligation to set up vocational
training centres arose under the MoEF notification of
04.01.2011, introduced well after the CMDA and PKCL’s
application to acquire the land. It imposed a new and unforeseen
burden and is a “change in law” falling within Clause 7.1(A)(ii)(a).
14
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2857
Page 61 of 79
The Respondent submitted that RVUNL has never disputed that
the notification was a “change in law”, and that Clause 7.1
overrides Clause 3.2.1 in such cases. It added that the issue is
Parsa Kente Collieries
settled by this Court’s decision in
(supra), that “force majeure” claims are maintainable under
Clause 7.1 and the affected party is entitled to compensation.
42F. Our analysis:
The Arbitrator’s finding on Claim No. 6 does not depend on
“force majeure”. It rests on the construction of PKCL’s scope of
work. PKCL’s obligation was limited to the 458 families recorded
in the Environmental Impact Assessment Report on which
RVUNL obtained clearance. The additional 267 families arose
from a Gram Panchayat resolution after the signing of the
CMDA, which RVUNL, the party to the MoU, did not challenge.
That is a possible view of the interpretation of the contract, and
we cannot say that the Arbitrator wandered outside it.
On Claim No. 7, the Arbitrator found that the condition
was inserted in 2011, after the acquisition notification of 2009
and the CMDA, by a statutory authority. It was not in existence
Page 62 of 79
when approval was applied for and therefore, fell within “change
in law,” PKCL’s obligation being limited to the expense of
conditions as on the date of the CMDA. That is a construction of
the scope of work under the CMDA, and it is a possible view
taken by the Arbitrator.
Having examined the findings of the learned Arbitrator on
Claim Nos. 6 and 7, we see no perversity or patent illegality in
the findings of the learned Arbitrator, being possible views. The
Commercial Court, thus, went beyond the scope of Section 34 of
the Act.
43. CLAIM NO. 8 – ADDITIONAL COST OF LAND
ACQUISITION AND THE ADDITIONAL AWARD
43A. The issue:
Claim No. 8 is for reimbursement of additional cost of
land acquisition said to have resulted from the 2010 amendment
to the Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy of Chhattisgarh,
2007. It was in two parts: Rs. 66.70 crore already incurred in
four villages (Parsa, Kente, Salhi and Hariharpur), and a
declaration for future additional cost for a fifth village, Ghatbara,
Page 63 of 79
where acquisition had not commenced. The Award rejected the
fifth-village claim as premature. On PKCL’s application under
Section 33(4) of the Act, the Additional Award allowed Rs. 66.70
crore with interest. The questions are whether the Additional
Award is without jurisdiction because the Arbitrator was functus
officio, and whether the claim is barred by limitation, on which
ground the Commercial Court set the Additional Award aside.
43B. Finding of the Arbitral Tribunal:
The Tribunal held that Section 33(4) of the Act covers a
case where the Tribunal does not render any finding on any of
the claims. A relief not granted is deemed rejected only where
the issue was considered, and in the present case, this aspect
had escaped adjudication entirely. On merit, it was held that the
Rehabilitation Policy of 2007, issued under authority conferred
on the State Government, is a “law” and its 2010 amendment is
a “change in law”. Therefore, the reasoning with respect to
“change in law” as per the provisions of the CMDA on Claims 6
and 7 will equally apply to Claim No. 8. Further, as the issue of
whether government notifications and statutory circulars will
constitute a “change in law” stands concluded in the award, the
Page 64 of 79
said decision would be binding in subsequent proceedings such
as under Section 33(4) of the Act. Accordingly, the claim of Rs.
66.70 crore was awarded with 11.95% interest.
43C. Finding of the Commercial Court:
The Commercial Court held that the Arbitral Tribunal did
not deal with the issue of limitation in the Additional Award even
though it had observed that absence of pleading as to limitation
is not fatal and the same could be considered by the Tribunal. It
held that the claim is for reimbursement of payments made in
2011-12. If the last payment is taken as 31.03.2012, the notice
of invocation was given after 6 years and 7 months, while the
period of limitation for this type of claim is provided as 3 years.
It held that the Tribunal did not delve into the facts and law
related to the bar of limitation. Therefore, it concluded that the
Additional Award is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.
43D. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner before this
Court :
That the claim was rightly barred by limitation. It is also
submitted that the Additional Award could not have been made,
because the Arbitral Tribunal had by then become functus officio .
Page 65 of 79
The fifth-village part of Claim No. 8 was rejected as premature in
the main Award. Having rejected that claim, the Tribunal could
not, on an application under Section 33(4) of the Act, revisit the
four-villages part of the very same claim. Section 33(4) of the Act
permits an additional award only for a claim omitted from the
award, and a claim considered and refused is not a claim
omitted. On limitation, the Petitioner relied on the Commercial
Court’s finding that the Tribunal, though it had held under
Claim No. 4 that limitation may be considered though not
pleaded, did not deal with that aspect in the Additional Award.
43E. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent before this
Court :
That the first part of Claim No. 8 (Rs. 66.70 crore for the
four villages) was never dealt with in the Award, which addressed
only the fifth village; hence, an application under Section 33 (4)
was the correct remedy. For the same, reference was made to
Gayatri Balasamy (supra) , McDermott International Inc. v.
15
Burn Standard Co. Ltd. ; NHAI v. Trichy Thanjavur
16
Expressway Ltd . On limitation, it was submitted that RVUNL
15
(2006) 11 SCC 181
16
2023 SCC OnLine Del 5183
Page 66 of 79
never raised it before the Arbitrator or in its Section 34
pleadings, its stand before the Tribunal being that claim was
premature, and that a plea not raised before the Tribunal cannot
be raised for the first time under Section 34 of the Act.
43F. Our analysis:
As to the first objection, the Arbitrator, who authored both
the awards, recorded that the claim of Rs. 66.70 crore had
escaped adjudication entirely, and rejected the plea of deemed
rejection on the reasoning that it applies only where the issue
was considered. We find no infirmity in this view.
As to limitation, no plea of limitation is recorded in the
Additional Award. The Commercial Court itself computed the
period from 31.03.2012. Whether time ran from payment or from
a later demand and refusal depends on facts and
correspondence. It is well settled that a plea of limitation cannot
be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from facts, as
in every case the starting point of limitation has to be ascertained
based on the peculiar facts obtaining. A plea of limitation is a
mixed question of fact and law. In the present case, the plea of
limitation was not raised before the Tribunal and, having not
Page 67 of 79
been raised, it was not examined by the Tribunal. Hence, in
absence of appropriate facts and pleadings, it could not have
been considered by the Commercial Court, and proceed to set
aside the Tribunal’s award on the ground that the Tribunal had
not considered the issue of limitation. Further, a plea not raised
before the Tribunal ought not to have been considered by the
Commercial Court in the challenge under Section 34 of the Act.
We are thus of the view that the Additional Award cannot be said
to be vitiated by patent illegality merely because it is silent on
limitation, a plea which was not raised before the Arbitral
Tribunal. The reason given by the Commercial Court in setting
aside the Additional Award on the ground that the Tribunal did
not go into the question of the limitation cannot be said to be
proper in law and within the scope of Section 34 of the Act.
On merits, the Additional Award rests on the reasoning of
the Award on Claims 6 and 7, and on RVUNL’s acceptance of the
quantum and payment in its Statement of Defence. These are
findings on the construction of the CMDA and the record.
Having examined the findings of the learned Arbitrator on
Claim No. 8 in the Additional Award, we see no perversity in the
Page 68 of 79
findings of the learned Arbitrator as to have warranted
interference by the Commercial Court under Section 34 of the
Act.
44. CLAIM NO. 9 – INTEREST AND COSTS
44A. The issue:
Claim No. 9 is for interest at 24% per annum on the awarded
amounts and for costs of arbitration.
44B. Finding of the Arbitral Tribunal :
The learned Arbitrator held that both the parties agreed that
interest is in the discretion of the Tribunal; the claim of 24% per
annum “is excessive and cannot be granted”. PKCL, having itself
claimed 11.95% on overdue payments, was granted simple
interest pendente lite at 11.95% per annum from the filing of the
Statement of Claim to the Award, and, if payment was not made
within four weeks, at the same rate till payment is made.
Page 69 of 79
44C. Finding of the Commercial Court :
The Commercial Court held that there is no dispute that the
award of interest is in the discretion of the Arbitral Tribunal.
Therefore, the rate of interest awarded is a plausible view.
44D. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner before this
Court :
It was submitted that the interest under this head is not an
independent claim but a consequence of claims allowed and
amounts awarded. Further, as per the Tribunal’s own reasoning,
interest is compensation for being kept out of money a party is
entitled to; therefore, if the principal claim does not survive, the
interest would also not survive.
44E. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent before this
Court :
That the award of interest is within the discretion of the
Tribunal. That the rate of 11.95% was based on the contractual
Page 70 of 79
benchmark and no patent illegality was found by the Section 34
court as well.
44F. Our analysis :
The Arbitrator exercised the discretion, which both parties
accepted can be done while awarding interest, which awarded
simple interest at 11.95%, the rate PKCL itself claimed on
overdue payments. The Commercial Court held this a plausible
view. No submission or material has been placed before us to
show that it is contrary to the CMDA or the Act, or perverse.
Interest and costs being consequential on claims upheld by us,
we see no reason to interfere with the Award on Claim No. 9,
which was upheld by the Commercial Court and stands restored
by the High Court.
45. SEVERABILITY OF THE AWARD AND THE PRAYER FOR
REMAND
45A. Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner before this
Court :
That Gayatri Balasamy (supra) permits severance only of
separable portions that are not intertwined with the invalid ones.
Page 71 of 79
It therefore required a claim-by-claim inquiry into which
portions were invalid and whether they could be separated from
the rest, or a remand of the matter to the Commercial Court for
that purpose, as no such exercise was undertaken. The High
Court examined only Claim 2, and it did not examine Claims 4,
6, 7 and 8, nor separability in respect of any claim. It restored
both the Awards in full. It has been submitted that once the
Awards were set aside entirely by the Commercial Court, the
findings on Claims 1, 3, 5 and 9 had no operative effect, so the
Petitioner had no occasion to file a cross-objection. Those
findings have become operative against it for the first time under
the impugned Judgment. The Petitioner has thus lost the chance
to show that the valid and invalid portions are intertwined,
which is the very exercise Gayatri Balasamy (supra)
contemplates. Claims 1, 3, 5 and 9 were never set aside, so the
question of severance did not arise for them. Without prejudice,
even if the Petitioner’s challenge to Claims 1, 3, 5 and 9 were
foreclosed for want of a cross-objection, that would not make an
Award that cannot be severed severable.
Page 72 of 79
45B. Submissions on behalf of the Respondent before this
Court :
It was submitted that it was settled, even before Gayatri
17
Balasamy , that Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem , does
not prohibit the partial setting aside of an award, relying on
NHAI v. Trichy Thanjavur Expressway Ltd. (supra); Union of
18
India v. Alcon Builders and Engineer Pvt. Ltd . , NHAI v.
19
Additional Commissioner, Nagpur , and Navayuga
20
Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Union of India , Gayatri Balasamy
(supra) merely reiterated this settled position, and a judgment
which clarifies the law applies retrospectively. Further, the
claims were the subject of separate notices of arbitration, each
disclosing a distinct cause of action, consolidated only for
convenience of adjudication, and were accordingly severable.
45C. Our analysis :
The settled principle is that the authority to sever an
invalid portion of an award from a valid portion arises for
consideration only if some part of the award is found to be
17
(2021) 9 SCC 1
18
2023 SCC OnLine Del 160
19
2022 SCC OnLine Bom 1688
20
2021 SCC OnLine Ker 5197
Page 73 of 79
invalid. The Petitioner’s submissions that the Award is
practically inseparable, and its alternative prayer that the matter
be remanded to the Commercial Court for a claim-wise
severability exercise, are premised on the invalidity of Claim Nos.
2, 4, 6, 7 and 8. We have examined each of the nine claims and
the Additional Award, in the manner set out above, and in
respect of each of them we have recorded that we see no reason
to interfere with the Award or the Additional Award. Where the
Commercial Court had upheld the findings of the Arbitral
Tribunal, we have given our reasons for finding that there is no
reason to interfere, and where the Commercial Court had set
aside the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal, we have found no
perversity in those findings of the Tribunal. No part of the Award
or the Additional Award having been found to be invalid, the
question whether the valid and invalid portions are severable,
and the alternative prayer for remand, do not arise.
The submission that the impugned Judgment disposed of
the appeal on a single, omnibus finding without a claim-wise
examination, and did not address the specific objections of the
Petitioner, has been met by the claim-wise examination
undertaken by us as above, in which the objections of the
Page 74 of 79
Petitioner to each claim, as pressed before us, have been
considered on their merits by applying the well-settled legal
principles governing Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act.
CONCLUSION
46 . In the result, our conclusions on the individual claims
considered by the Arbitral Tribunal and courts under Sections
34 and 37 of the Act are as under:
(i) As regards Claim Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 9, which were allowed
by the Arbitral Tribunal and in respect of which the
Commercial Court found no ground to interfere, after
hearing the parties and on examining the reasons given by
the Arbitral Tribunal as well as the Commercial Court, we
see no ground to interfere with the Award on these claims
for the reasons discussed above. Consequently, the
impugned Judgment of the High Court does not warrant
any interference.
(ii) As regards Claim Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8 in respect of
which the Commercial Court had set aside the findings of
the Arbitral Tribunal, after having examined the findings
Page 75 of 79
of the learned Arbitrator and also the reasons given by the
Commercial Court, we see no patent illegality or perversity
in the findings of the learned Arbitrator as discussed
above. The Commercial Court erred in setting aside the
findings of the Tribunal on Claims Nos. 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8.
For the same reason, the impugned Judgment of the High
Court does not warrant any interference.
47. It is to be noted that the exercise we have undertaken
in the preceding parts, of examining the analysis of each claim
by the Arbitral Tribunal and then by the Commercial Court, was
not a review on merits. It was a limited exercise to satisfy
ourselves that neither forum deviated from the established legal
principles governing the scope of examining an arbitral award
under Section 34 of the Act. We have therefore asked only
whether the Arbitral Tribunal’s findings rest on a plausible
interpretation of the Coal Mining and Delivery Agreement and
the Supplementary Agreement, whether they are supported by
the material before it, and whether there was any patent illegality
or perversity in the findings by the Arbitral Tribunal, whether
the Tribunal strayed from the terms of CMDA and the
Supplementary Agreement and whether the Commercial Court,
Page 76 of 79
in setting aside the Award on Claims 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8, stayed
within the confines of Section 34 of the Act.
48. We have not asked whether we would have reached the
same conclusion on the same material. On close and minute
scrutiny, some of the Arbitral Tribunal’s findings may admit of
another plausible view. Others may appear to rest on an
incorrect appreciation of the facts or even an erroneous
application of the law. That, however, is not the test under
Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
as delineated above.
49. The limits within which a court may examine an arbitral
award are well settled. The proviso to sub-section (2A) of Section
34 of the Act provides that an award shall not be set aside merely
on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by
reappreciation of evidence. Patent illegality, on which a domestic
award may be set aside, is an illegality that goes to the root of
the matter and appears on the face of the award. It does not
extend to an error in appreciating evidence, or to a construction
of the contract merely because the court could have construed
it differently. An award is perverse only when a finding is based
Page 77 of 79
on no evidence, or are based on irrelevant material, or that the
Tribunal ignored vital evidence. The Arbitral Tribunal is the final
arbiter of the facts, and the construction of the contractual terms
is primarily its domain. Where the interpretation adopted is a
possible and plausible one, the court cannot substitute its own
interpretation, however persuasive the alternative reading may
be. The Section 37 court is, moreover, confined to the grounds
available under Section 34 of the Act and cannot undertake an
independent assessment of the merits of the award. Taking a
holistic view, we find that both the Awards, read as a whole, do
not suffer from patent illegality, perversity or any other ground
that would justify these being set aside under Section 34 of the
Act. This accords with the consistent approach of this Court,
which has emphasised the restricted scope of interference with
arbitral awards, so that the autonomy and finality of arbitration
are respected, and the process of scrutiny is not turned into an
ordinary appeal on facts and law. Having found that the Arbitral
Tribunal has not deviated from the established principles in a
manner warranting interference, we decline to interfere with the
impugned Judgment of the High Court which has upheld the
Awards.
Page 78 of 79
50. The High Court, by the impugned Judgment, set aside the
order of the Commercial Court dated 20.05.2023 and restored
the Award dated 15.01.2021 and the Additional Award dated
05.07.2021. We find no ground, within the limited scope of
Article 136 of the Constitution, to interfere with the impugned
Judgment and hence, we see no reason to entertain and admit
the Special Leave Petition. The only logical consequence is that
the Special Leave Petition is liable to be dismissed and is,
accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
..….……………………………..J.
(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)
………………………………………………J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 16, 2026
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