LIGHT HOUSE MARINE SERVICE INDIA PVT. LTD. vs CHARTERER AND PARTIES INTERESTED IN THE VESSEL MT OCEAN FAYE, IMO NO: 9321689

Court
Kerala High Court

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“C.R.”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SOUMEN SEN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SYAM KUMAR V.M.
TH
TUESDAY, THE 17 DAY OF NOVEMBER 2026 / 26TH KARTHIKA, 1948
F.A (ADMIRALTY) NO. 1 OF 2026
(ORDER DATED 05.08.2026 IN IA NO.1/2025
ARISING FROM ADML.S. NO.5 OF 2024)
APPELLANT(S)/PLAINTIFF:
LIGHT HOUSE MARINE SERVICE INDIA PVT. LTD.
RPSL NO: RPSL-CHN-043, FLAT NO: A8, DRINIVASA ARCADE, NO.1/2,
ARUNACHALAM ROAD, SALIGRAMAM, CHENNAI, TAMIL NADU,
REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR R.
SRINGARAVADIVELAN, AGED 48, S/O. S RAMALINGAM, PIN – 600093.
BY ADVS. SRI. P. VISWANATHAN (SR.)
SRI. AJITH VISWANATHAN
SRI. SHIBU JOSEPH
SMT. VRINDA BABU
SRI. SAYED MANSOOR BAFAKHY THANGAL
SRI. M. SRIRAM
RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS:
1 CHARTERER AND PARTIES INTERESTED IN THE VESSEL MT OCEAN
FAYE, IMO NO: 9321689, A VESSEL HAVING THE FLAG OF COOK
LSLANDS ALONG WITH HER HULL, TACKLE, BOATS, MACHINERY,
EQUIPMENT, APPURTENANCES AND ALL OTHER PARAPHERNALIA,
PRESENTLY AT THE PORT AND HARBOUR OF COCHIN, WITHIN
TERRITORIAL WATERS OF LNDIA AND WITHIN THE ADMIRALTY
JURISDICTION OF THIS HON'BLE COURT, REPRESENTED BY ITS
MASTER, PIN – 682003.

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2 STAR VOYAGES SHIPPING SERVICES LLC,
MOHAMMED HAMED SAIF AL RUMHI BUILDING, 902-0,
PROPERTY NO: 204-D4, DUBAI, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, PIN – 204666.
3 ONE MOON MARINE SERVICES LLC,
ADELAHMED AL WAHEDI BUILDING, AL MARARR 273-0,
PROPERTY NO.802, DUBAI, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, PIN – 202002.
4 THE DEPUTY CONSERVATOR,
COCHIN PORT TRUST, WILLINGTON LSLAND, KOCHI, PIN – 682003.
BY ADVS.
SRI.JIKKU SEBAN GEORGE
SMT.LATHA ANAND
SRI.JOY THATTIL ITTOOP
SMT.DEEPTI SUSAN GEORGE
SMT.ANJANA WILSON
SRI.SANTHOSH MATHEW (SR.)
SRI.BIJISH B.TOM
SMT.BABY SONIA
SRI.A.G.ADITYA SHENOY
SMT.NEVIS CASSANDRA L CAXTON LORETTA
SRI.GOVIND VIJAYAKUMARAN NAIR
SRI.KARUN MAHESH
SMT.AGNES SABU
SRI.K.S.ARAVIND
SMT.SREELAKSHMI SHIBU
SMT.ROSHNI MANUEL
SRI.KRISHNA KUMAR T.K.
THIS FIRST APPEAL (ADMIRALTY) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
10-11-2026, THE COURT ON 17.11.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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JUDGMENT
th
Dated this the 17 day of November, 2026
Soumen Sen, C.J.
The appeal raises an interesting point with regard to a
maritime claim and a maritime lien in respect of a vessel
which is neither a sister vessel nor a vessel in respect of
which there exists any privity of contract between the first
defendant and the plaintiff.
2. The appeal arises out of a judgment and order
passed by the learned Single Judge on an application filed
by defendant Nos.1 to 3 in the admiralty suit, seeking, inter
alia, withdrawal of the order of arrest of the vessel, a
direction for refund of the security furnished by the
applicants along with accrued interest, dismissal of the suit
on the ground that the order of arrest and invocation of the
admiralty jurisdiction were wrongful.
3. In short, it was a demurrer application
questioning the jurisdiction of the Court to try and decide

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the admiralty suit filed by the plaintiff against the
applicants.
4. The learned Single Judge allowed the application,
inter alia, holding that, for a vessel to be arrested as a sister
vessel under Section 5(1)(a) of the Admiralty (Jurisdiction
and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017 (for short “the
Admiralty Act, 2017”), common ownership is required and
that common management by a ship manager is insufficient
to attract the jurisdiction of the Court. It was further held
that a maritime lien for wages under Section 9(1)(a) of the
Admiralty Act, 2017, should be in respect of the vessel
where such employment was undertaken and the claim
arose.
5. This order is under challenge in the appeal.
6. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant, at the outset, has fairly conceded that the
claim is not arising out of a maritime lien. However,
strenuous arguments have been made with the regard to

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the applicability of Section 4(1)(o) and (p) read with Section
5(2) of the Admiralty Act, 2017.
7. It is submitted that the second defendant
appointed the plaintiff as its manning agent with effect from
th
10 June 2023 based on a manning agency agreement.
According to the terms of the agreement, the wages payable
to the Officers and Ratings were to be paid by the second
defendant. It is stated that the agreement envisages that in
the event the second defendant is unable to make such
payments towards wages as aforementioned, the plaintiff
was to affect such payments on behalf of the second
defendant and the same shall be reimbursed to the plaintiff
by the second defendant at the earliest opportunity. It is
alleged that although the plaintiff paid the wages to the crew
of three vessels operated by the second defendant, namely,
MT Eastern Pearl, MT Fast Kathy, MT Sea Fidelity for the
month of June, 2023 upon the request of the second
defendant, the second defendant failed to reimburse the

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said amount to the plaintiff despite repeated demands. In
the meanwhile, financial sanctions were imposed on the
second defendant by countries including the United
Kingdom for transporting Russian Oil and to evade such
sanctions, the second defendant transferred their vessels to
the third defendant. The claim of the plaintiff is a maritime
claim under Section 4(1)(p), (o) and (w) and is also secured
by a maritime lien under Section 9(1)(a) of the Admiralty
Act, 2017.
8. In the said proceeding, a learned Single Judge
st
had passed an ex parte order of arrest dated 31 May, 2024,
against the first defendant vessel and thereafter released the
first defendant vessel upon furnishing security by order
th
dated 6 June, 2024. This order of arrest is now sought to
be vacated, along with the other reliefs as claimed in
I.A.No.1 of 2025, at the behest of respondent Nos.1 to 3.
9. The learned Senior Counsel has fairly admitted
that there is no commonality of interest between the first

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defendant and the owners or the charterer of three vessels
operated by the second defendant, in respect of which the
claim arose on account of non-payment of the wages of the
crew, as advanced by the plaintiff. However, it is contended
that by reason of Section 4(1)(o) and (p) of the Admiralty Act,
2017, a claim has arisen against the first defendant where
the second defendant was also working as its Manager. It is
further submitted that Section 5(2) of the Admiralty Act,
2017, is not limited to the vessel in respect of which the
second defendant was acting as a Manager, and that an
order of arrest can be made in respect of any other vessel for
the purpose of providing security for a maritime claim
arising under Section 4(1)(o) and (p) of the Admiralty Act,
2017.
10. The learned Senior Counsel has referred to the
manning agency agreement between the plaintiff and the
second defendant and submitted that in terms of Clause
1.3.1, a maritime claim has arisen in favour of the plaintiff,

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although admitting that there is no privity of contract
between the plaintiff and the first defendant, nor there is
any claim on account of maritime lien.
11. The learned Senior Counsel has submitted that
the test to be applied under Section 5 of the Admiralty Act,
2017, has been clearly elucidated by a learned Single Judge
of the Bombay High Court in Siem Offshore Redri AS v.
1
Altus Uber in which the learned Single Judge has drawn a
distinction between the vessels which can be classified as
the contract vessel/offending vessel, and any other vessel,
namely, the securing vessel. It is held that in an
appropriate case, the securing vessel can be arrested for the
purpose of providing security in respect of the maritime
claim of the plaintiff. The learned Senior Counsel has relied
on paragraphs 71 to 73 of the said judgment which are
reproduced below:
“71. The test under Section 5 is “whether the Court
has reason to believe”. The above documents and
1 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2730

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particularly the failure of MEDS to even disclose the
alleged bareboat charter-party under which they
claim to be the demise charterers, is sufficient to
demonstrate prima facie that MEDS are the owners.
MEDS, however, denies that they are owners but say
that they are the demise charterers of the vessel.
This makes no difference to the arrest of defendant
vessel. Plaintiff is entitled to arrest defendant vessel
even if MEDS is the demise charterer of the vessel as
contended by them and not the owner. This appears
on a plain reading of Section 5(2) of the Admiralty
Act, 2017 read with Section 5(1)(b) of the said Act.
The powers of arrest are set out in Section 5 of the
Admiralty Act, 2017. For the purposes of plaintiff's
claim Section 5(2) of the Admiralty Act, 2017 is
relevant. Section 5(2) provides for arrest of any other
vessel in lieu of the vessel against which a maritime
claim has been made. This means that two different
vessels need to be involved to satisfy the requirement
of S. 5(2) viz.,
a. “The vessel” with respect to which the dispute
originally arose – the contract vessel or offending
vessel;
b. “any other vessel” to be arrested to secure the
claims in respect of “the vessel” - the securing
vessel.
Note:“Securing Vessel” cannot be the “Contract
vessel/offending vessel”. They are different vessels.
72. Since Section 5(2) is subject to the provisions of
sub-section (1), the relevant provisions pertaining to a
claim against a demise charterer are contained in
sub-section 5(1)(b) which provides as follows:— “the
demise charterer of the vessel at the time when the
maritime claim arose is liable for the claim and is the
demise charterer or the owner of the vessel when the
arrest is effected.”

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73. For 5(1)(b) to respond to 5(2), we must identify the
contract vessel/offending vessel and the securing
vessel which is being arrested as follows:—
a. “The Vessel” - (contract vessel/offending vessel)
(i.e. ‘SEIM MARLIN) of which the demise
charterer is MEDS at the time when the
maritime claim arose and is liable for the claim.
b. “any other vessel”- (securing vessel) (i.e. ALTUS
UBER) of which MEDS is the demise charterer
or the owner when the arrest is effected.
(emphasis supplied)
12. The learned Senior Counsel has also submitted
that the learned Single Judge could not have dismissed the
suit, as the matter did not involve a pure question of law
but also involved questions of fact. In this regard, he has
referred to Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which is reproduced as under:
Settlement of Issues and Determination of Suit on
Issues of Law or on Issues agreed upon.
2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.—(1)
Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a
preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the
provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all
issues.
(2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the

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same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or
any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of
law only, it may try that issue first if the issue relates
to—
(a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or
(b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time
being in force,
and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the
settlement of the other issues until after that issue
has been determined, and may deal with the suit in
accordance with the decision on that issue.
(emphasis supplied)
13. Per contra, Mr. Santhosh Mathew, the learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the first defendant, has
submitted that in the absence of any privity of contract and
now having conceded to the position that the plaintiff is not
making his demand or based his claim on maritime lien, the
appeal must fail. It is submitted that the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover any advances made by the plaintiff to the
second defendant for payment of wages in respect of the
crew members of the three vessels, which admittedly do not
include the vessel of the first defendant. The learned Senior

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Counsel has referred to the manning agency agreement
between the plaintiff and the defendant and submitted that
Clause 1.3.1 does not cover a situation such as the present
one and as such, reliance upon the said clause is
misplaced. The learned Senior Counsel has submitted that
an action in rem for arrest of a ship would not lie against a
vessel and a ship owned by a person who is not responsible
for payment of such dues, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme
2
Court in Sunil B. Naik v. Geowave Commande r . The
learned Senior Counsel has submitted that in the aforesaid
judgment, a clear distinction was drawn between the
beneficial ownership of a ship and the charterer of a ship.
In this regard, he has relied upon the observations of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 64 to 68 of the said
judgment, which read as follows:
“64. The successor to the 1956 Act is the Supreme Court
Act of 1981. Section21(4) of that Act of U.K. recognizes the
discussion in view of Robert Goff, J. by the following
provision:
2 (2018) 5 SCC 505

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21. (4) In the case of any such claim as is
mentioned in Section 20(2)(e) to (r), where
(a) the claim arises in connection with a ship;
and
(b) the person who would be liable on the claim
in an action in personam ("the relevant person")
was, when the cause of action arose, the owner
or charterer of, or in possession or in control of,
the ship, an action in rem may (whether or not
the claim gives rise to a maritime lien on that
ship) be brought in the High Court against -
i) that ship, if at the time when the action
is brought the relevant person is either
the beneficial owner of that ship as
respects all the shares in it or the
charterer of it under a charter by demise;
or
(ii) any other ship of which, at the time
when the action is brought, the relevant
person is the beneficial owner as respects
all the shares in it.
65. There is a clear distinction between a beneficial
ownership of a ship and the charterer of a ship.
66. In the aforesaid context, now turning to the Arrest
Convention of 1999, Article 1 specifies that the maritime
claim means a claim inter alia arising out of an agreement
relating to use or hire of "the ship." The connotation of "the
ship" would mean the 16 trawlers or the Orion Laxmi and
not the Respondent ship. Thus, there is no maritime claim
against the Respondent ship. Article 3 deals with the
exercise of rights of arrest and the eventualities are
specified thereunder. In terms of Clause (2) of Article 3
(these Articles are reproduced in paras 25 to 27 above),
the arrest is permissible of any other ship (which would
connote the Respondent ship), which, when the arrest is
effected is owned by the person who is liable for the

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maritime claim. The liability of the maritime claim is
Reflect Geophysical and not the owners of the Respondent
ship. In terms of Sub-clause (b) of Clause (2) of Article 3, a
demise charterer, time charterer or voyage charterer of
that ship is liable. The ship in question, as noticed above,
is not the Respondent but the 16 trawlers or the Orion
Laxmi. In view of the discussion aforesaid, really
speaking Reflect Geophysical cannot be said to be the
beneficial owner in the capacity of a demised charterer of
the Respondent ship. Reflect Geophysical is not the owner
of the Respondent ship and the owner cannot be made
liable for a maritime claim, which is against the trawlers
and Orion Laxmi.
67. We may also note that in the 2017 Act in India Clause
5(b) states as under:
5. Arrest of vessel in rem.--(1) The High Court may
order arrest of any vessel which is within its
jurisdiction for the purpose of providing security
against a maritime claim which is the subject of an
admiralty proceeding, where the court has reason to
believe that--
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
(b) the demise charterer of the vessel at the time
when the maritime claim arose is liable for the
claim and is the demise charterer or the owner of
the vessel when the arrest is effected; or
68. The aforesaid is in consonance with Article 3 of the
1999 Convention and, thus, must be read in that context
(incidentally the Bill was introduced on 21.11.2016 and
passed by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha on
10.3.2017 and 24.7.2017 respectively. It was published
in the Gazette on 9.8.2017 but is still not notified). The
incident in this question is, thus, prior to beginning of this
exercise. The expression "the vessel", "owner" and "demise
charterer", thus, must be read in the aforesaid context and
the maritime claims in respect of 16 trawlers and Orion

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Laxmi cannot be converted into a maritime claim against
the Respondent ship not owned by Reflect Geophysical.”
14. The learned Senior Counsel has submitted that in
the aforesaid judgment, it is categorically stated that in the
interest of international comity, though India is not a
signatory to the Convention of 1999, the principles of the
same are being followed and applied to appropriate
situations to determine whether a “maritime claim” as
understood in the international context has arisen and
whether the same warrants the arrest of the vessel in
question as per its provision.
15. The learned Senior Counsel has also referred to
the three Judge Bench decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, presided over by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of
India, in Owners and Parties Interested in M.V. Nereus
3
Progress v. Om Freight Forwarders Ltd ., wherein, in
paragraphs 31 and 32, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
explained the scope, ambit and extent of applicability of the
3 2026 SCC Online SC 2007

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said provisions concerning the arrest of a vessel, which may
be a sister vessel or a securing vessel. The said paragraphs
read as follows:
31. It may be seen that  Section 5(1)(b)  of the
Admiralty Act permits arrest of a vessel where “the
demise charterer of the vessel at the time when the
maritime claim arose is liable for such claim and is the
demise charterer or the owner of the vessel when the
arrest is effected.” Section 5(2) extends this power to
permit arrest of a sister vessel “in lieu of” the vessel
against which the maritime claim has actually arisen,
but expressly makes this power subject to the
provisions of sub-section (1). The effect of this
qualification is that the jurisdictional pre-conditions of
Section 5(1)(b) must be independently satisfied qua
the vessel sought to be arrested.
32. Applied to the case at hand, for the arrest of the
Vessel to sustain under Section 5(2) read with Section
5(1)(b), the Respondent was required to demonstrate:
(i) that Nereides was the demise charterer of the
Vessel, as distinct from M.V. Bharadwaj, at the time
the Respondent’s maritime claim arose; and (ii) that
Nereides continued to be the demise charterer of the
Vessel on 04.12.2025, the date on which the arrest
was effected.
(emphasis supplied)
16. The impugned order has to be examined in the
light of the aforesaid context and submissions made on

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behalf of the parties. Before entering into the merits of the
matter, it is necessary to refer to a few provisions of the
Admiralty Act, 2017 for their proper appreciation and
understanding.
17. Admiralty jurisdiction is defined under Section
2(a) of the Admiralty Act, 2017. Section 3 confers
jurisdiction on the High Court to hear and determine
maritime claims in accordance with the provisions of the
Act. The expression ‘maritime claim’, as defined under
Section 2(f), means a claim referred to in Section 4. The
maritime claims in respect of which the High Court is
empowered to exercise its jurisdiction to hear and determine
questions against any vessel are enumerated in Section 4 (1)
(o) & (p) of the Admiralty Act, 2017, which read as follows:
“4. Maritime Claim-(1) xxxxx
xxxxxx
(o) claim by a master or member of the crew of a vessel
or their heirs and dependents for wages or any sum
due out of wages or adjudged to the due which may be
recoverable as wages or cost of repatriation or social
insurance contribution payable on their behalf or any

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amount an employer is under an obligation to pay to a
person as an employee, whether the obligation arose
out of a contract of employment or by operation of a
law (including operation of a law of any country) for
the time being in force, and includes any claim arising
under a manning and crew agreement relating to a
vessel, notwithstanding anything contained in the
provisions of sections 150 and 151 of the Merchant
Shipping Act, 1958 (44 of 1958);
(p) disbursements incurred on behalf of the vessel or
its owners.”
18. We are not referring to the other provisions of the
Admiralty Act, 2017, as the claim in the present appeal is
restricted to the aforesaid provisions. It is also not
necessary to refer to the definition of ‘maritime lien’ under
Section 2(g) of the Admiralty Act, 2017, as the appellant has
fairly conceded that the plaintiff does not have a claim
founded on a maritime lien. Even in the absence of such a
concession, it is evident from the facts that the plaintiff’s
claim does not fall within the purview of Section 9 of the
Admiralty Act, 2017.
19. Section 5 of the Admiralty Act, 2017 refers to
Arrest of vessel in rem . A ship can be arrested for the

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purpose of providing security against a maritime claim
which is the subject of an admiralty proceeding, where the
Court has reason to believe inter alia , that the claim is
against the owner, demise charterer, manager or operator of
the vessel and is secured by a maritime lien as provided in
Section 9.
20. Section 6 of the Admiralty Act, 2017, refers to
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction by High Court in
personam , in respect of any maritime claim referred to in
Clauses (a) to (w) of sub-section (1) of Section 4.
21. On a plain reading of Section 4(1)(o), it would
appear that the crew agreement must relate to the vessel on
which the crew members are presently employed and not to
any other vessel. Similarly, the disbursements incurred
must be in relation to the vessel on which such crew
members were working. The provision also covers the
owners under whom such crew members are employed. In
the instant case, admittedly, neither of these conditions are

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fulfilled.
22. We have carefully perused the plaint and find
that it has been clearly and unequivocally stated that the
claims relating to the crew members pertain to three
vessels, none of which is of defendant No. 1. There is no
averment in the plaint that the owners of the said three
vessels have any commonality of interest with Defendant
No. 1. Moreover, the owners of those vessels have not been
impleaded as parties to the suit. In our view, this
constitutes a fatal defect and leaves little room for a proper
and fair adjudication of the dispute and for the plaintiff to
succeed.
23. We now turn to Section 5(e) of the Admiralty Act,
2017. The said provision permits the arrest of a vessel in
respect of a claim, inter alia , against the Manager, provided
that such claim is secured by a maritime lien as provided
under Section 9. In view of the fact that the concept of
maritime lien has no application to the facts and

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circumstances of the present case, Section 5(e) of the
Admiralty Act, 2017 is not attracted. However, the Act also
permits admiralty jurisdiction in personam , which is subject
to Section 7 and is exercisable only in respect of maritime
claims falling within clauses (a) to (w) of sub-section (1) of
Section 4. As we have held that no maritime claim arises
under clauses (o) and (p) of Section 4 of the Admiralty Act,
2017, the said provisions cannot be pressed into service.
24. It is also apposite to refer to paragraphs 49 and
50 of Sunil B. Naik (supra), wherein the issue relating to
the arrest and detention of a ship has been discussed in
detail, which read as follows:
“49. On turning to the provisions of the Convention, a
maritime claim is specified as relating to use or hire of
a ship whether contained in a charter party or
otherwise [clause (f)]. Insofar as clause (l) is concerned
they relate inter alia to services rendered to the ship.
The question, however, is – which is the ship in
question. Such an order of detention can be in respect
of a ship where there is identity of the owner against
whom the claim in personam lies and the owner of the
ship. It cannot be used to arrest a ship of a third party
or a non-owner.

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50 . As an illustrative example if we consider the
principles of a garnishee order where amounts held by
a third party on behalf of a defendant can be injuncted
or attached to satisfy the ultimate claim, which may
arise against the defendant. It is not as if somebody
else’s money is attached in pursuance to a garnishee’s
order. Similarly for a claim against the owner of the
vessel, a vessel may be detained and not that
somebody else’s vessel would be detained for the said
purpose. The crucial test would be of ownership, which
in the present case clearly does not vest with Reflect
Geophysical and the de facto ownership under their
bareboat charter cannot be equated to a de jure owner,
which is necessary for an action in personam.
4
25. In Polestar Maritime Ltd . v. M.V. Qi Lin Men ,
the Bombay High Court, on consideration of Article 3(2) of
the Arrest Convention, has been held that a ship can be
arrested in respect of a maritime claim against another ship
only in the following circumstances:
(a) The owner of both the ships is one and the
same.
(b) In case a maritime claim exists qua the owner
of a ship, which is taken on a demised charter
then the liability can be recovered by restraint of
4 2008 SCC Online Bom 1634

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the ship owned by the charterer.
(emphasis supplied)
26. In the instance case, both the conditions are not
fulfilled. In fact, the said judgment has been upheld by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunil B. Naik (supra). In the
aforesaid judgment, it is further concluded that there was
no principle or authority for proposition that a maritime
claim for unpaid charter hire in respect of a vessel ‘A’
against the hirer thereof can be enforced by arresting vessel
‘B’, which is on bareboat charter of the hirer of the former
vessel vis-a-vis vessel ‘A’.
27. The concept of Bareboat Charter has been
discussed in some detail in Sunil B. Naik (supra), in
paragraph 13, which is reproduced below:
“13. The charter party is defined as a contract by
which an entire ship, or some principal part thereof, is
let by the owner to another person for a specified time
or use. The Charter can be of two kinds - (i) Charter of
demise; and (ii) Contract of affreightment. In the

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present case, we are concerned with the charter of
demise by which the whole vessel is let to the
charterer with the transfer to him of its entire
command and possession and consequent control
over its navigation. Such a charter is called a
bareboat charter. It would be apposite at this stage to
refer to the Mark Davis' Commentary on "Bareboat
nd
Charters" 2 Edition where the nature and character
of demised charters has been explained as follows:
"A fundamental distinction is drawn under English law
between charter parties which amount to a demise or lease
of a ship, and those which do not. The former category,
known as charters by demise, operate as a lease of the ship
pursuant to which possession and control passes from the
owners to the charterers whilst the latter, primarily
comprising time and voyage charters, are in essence
contracts for the provision of services, including the use of
the chartered ship. Under a lease, it is usual for the owners
to supply their vessel "bare" of officers and crew, in which
case the arrangement may correctly be termed a "bareboat"
charter. The charterers become for the duration of the
charter the de facto "owners" of the vessel, the 2018 (5) SCC
505 master and crew act under their orders, and through
them they have possession of the ship.”
A statement of the hallmarks of a demise charter can
be found in the judgment of Evans LJ in The Giuseppe
di Vittorio [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 136 at p. 156:
“What then is the demise charter? Its hallmarks, as it
seems to me, are that the legal owner gives the
charterer sufficient of the rights of possession and

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control which enable the transaction to be regarded as
a letting – a lease, or demise, in real property terms –
of the ship. Closely allied to this is the fact that the
charterer becomes the employer of the master and
crew. Both aspects are combined in the common
description of a 'bareboat' lease or hire arrangement.”
As indicated, charter parties which do not amount to
a demise or lease of a ship (Including time charters
and voyage charters) are classified in English law as
contracts of affreightment, pursuant to which the
owners agree to carry goods by sea in return for a
sum of money. Although the charterers have a right
as against the owners to have their goods carried on
the vessel, the ownership and the possession of the
ship remains with the owners through the master and
crew who remain their servants.
Whether or not a charter party amounts to a demise
charter depends in every case upon the precise terms
of the charter, taking the instrument as a whole. The
test has been summarized as follows:
"The question depends, where other things are not in
the way, upon this: whether the owner has by the
charter, where there is a charter, parted with the
whole possession and control of the ship, and to this
extent, that he has given to the charterer a power and
right independent of him, and without reference to him
to do what he pleases with regard to the captain, the

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crew, and the management and employment of the
ship. That has been called a letter or demise of the
ship. The right expression is that it is a parting with
the whole possession and control of the ship."
Thus, although time charters almost always contain
words such as "let", "hire", "delivery" and "redelivery",
the use of such words are inapt in such a context,
and are not in any sense to be regarded as
conclusive, when determining the nature of the
charter.
In Sea and Land Securities v. William Dickinson
MacKinnon LJ traced the origin of these words to
demise charters, and at page 163 emphasised the
difference between demise and time charters thus:
" there is all the difference between hiring a boat in
which to row yourself about, in which case the boat is
handed over to you, and contracting with a man on
the beach that he shall take you for a row, in which
case he merely renders services in rowing you
about."”
28. In Owners and Parties Interested in M.V.
Nereus Progress (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
considered the termination of the contract qua the statutory
requirement of arrest. Section 5(2), permits arrest of another

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vessel in lieu of the vessel against which the maritime claim
has arisen, subject to the requirements of Section 5(1). The
Court, therefore, held that Section 5(2) cannot be treated as
a standalone provision and an independent source of arrest
under admiralty jurisdiction unconnected with Section 5(1).
The statutory conditions under Section 5(1)(b) must be
independently satisfied in relation to the vessel sought to be
arrested. This provision in the facts of that case would
require Om Freight to establish, among other things, that
Nereides was the demise charterer of Nereus Progress when
the maritime claim arose and it continued to be the demise
charterer of that vessel on the date of arrest.
29. The question whether termination remained
incomplete until physical repossession is not the issue here.
30. The appellant has not contended that the vessel
in question was taken on a demised charter or existence of
any bareboat charter – party agreement.

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31. It is relevant to note that the judgments/
decisions relied upon by the appellant to make home its
contentions are all relating to demise charters/bareboat
charters. The appellant is neither a bareboat charterer nor a
demise charterer and is only a manning agent or crew
supplier who claims to have entered into an agreement to
supply crew to the vessels managed by the second
defendant. A manning agent who has a contractual
arrangement with Ship’s Manager does not stand on similar
footing as a demise charter or bareboat charter qua the
owner of the vessel. He is far distanced from the shipowner
and his vessel and cannot, in law, aspire to arrest the vessel
for his disputes and claims with the Ship’s Manager.
32. The crucial test of ownership has not been
established in the instant case against respondent No.1. In
our considered opinion, the learned Single Judge is justified
in allowing the interlocutory application. Moreover, for the

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High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 5(2) in
respect of any other vessel, there must be a prima facie
satisfaction of an existence of a commonality of interest
between the shipowners and a clear intention to defraud the
creditor. In an appropriate case, the Court may also apply
the principle of lifting the corporate veil to ascertain the real
owners of the vessel and fasten liability under Section 5(2)
of the Admiralty Act, 2017. To avoid prolixity, it is not
necessary for us to again refer to some facts which would
justify the aforesaid conclusion, as the relevant facts have
already been elaborately discussed.
F.A.(Admiralty) fails and it is dismissed.
Sd/-
Soumen Sen
Chief Justice
Sd/-
Syam Kumar V.M.
Judge
ds/uu

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APPENDIX OF F.A (ADMIRALTY) NO. 1 OF 2026
APPELLANT’S ANNEXURES:-
ANNEXURE A1 TRUE PRINTOUT OF SHOWING THE STATUS OF THE
1ST DEFENDANT VESSEL INCLUDING THE
SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON THE SAME BY VARIOUS
COUNTRIES AS ON 24-11-2025 OBTAINED FROM
OFFICIAL WEBSITE WAR SANCTIONS OF THE
UKRAINE GOVERNMENT, ALONG WITH SECTION 63B
CERTIFICATION