STATE OF CHHATTISGARH vs SHIVAM SAHAY CHOUHAN

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CGHC010192422024 2026:CGHC:38975-DB
AFR
Digitally
signed by
ANURADHA
TIWARI
Date:
2026.09.05
11:33:48
+0530
ANURADHA
TIWARI
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WA No. 360 of 2024
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department of General
Administration, Secretariate, Mahanadi Bhawan, P.S. And Post Rakhi,
New Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)
2 - Collector And District Magistrate Korba District Korba (C.G.)
... Appellants
versus
Shivam Sahay Chouhan S/o Late Shivram Sahay Chouhan Aged About
30 Years R/o Lig - 197, Shivji Nagar, Korba, Tehsil And District Korba
(C.G.)
... Respondent
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellants : Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate
General
For Respondent : Mr. Anupam Dubey, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Judge ,
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
03.09.2026
1. Though Mr. Rajesh Roshan Singh, learned counsel, is on
adjustment till 18.09.2026, however, having regard to the fact that

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the present matter is an old one and is ripe for hearing, and
further considering that Mr. Anupam Dubey, learned counsel
appearing for the sole respondent, is from the same office and is
present before the Court, we deem it appropriate to proceed with
the hearing of the matter finally.
2. Heard Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate
General, appearing for the State/appellants, as well as Mr.
Anupam Dubey, learned counsel appearing for the sole
respondent, on I.A. No. 02, which is an application seeking
condonation of delay of 100 days in preferring the present appeal.
3. Having considered the grounds assigned in I.A. No. 02 and being
satisfied with the explanation furnished therein, the application is
allowed. Accordingly, the delay of 100 days in preferring the
present appeal is hereby condoned.
4. By way of this writ appeal, appellants have prayed for following
relief(s):-
“It is therefore most humbly and respectfully
prayed that the order dated 18/01/2024
(ANNEXURE A- 1) passed by the learned Single
Judge of this Hon'ble Court in WPS NO.
8745/2023: "Shivam Sahay Chouhan. Vs. State
of Chhattisgarh & Anr." may kindly be set aside
and consequently the instant writ appeal may
kindly be allowed, in the interests of justice. ”
5. The present intra Court appeal has been filed against the order
dated 18.01.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ
Petition (S) No.8745 of 2023 ( Shivam Sahay Chouhan v. State of

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Chhattisgarh and another ), whereby the writ petition filed by the
writ petitioner has been disposed of.
6. The material facts, as projected before the learned Single Judge,
may be noticed in brief. The writ petitioner, Shivam Sahay
Chouhan, was serving on the post of Assistant Grade-III in the
office of the Collector, District Korba. In connection with FIR
No.309/2022 registered against him for offences punishable under
Section 509(B) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 67(A) of the
Information Technology Act, 2000, he was placed under
suspension by order dated 25.03.2022 with effect from
23.03.2022. A departmental charge-sheet was thereafter served
upon him on 20.04.2022.
7. The grievance of the writ petitioner before the learned Single
Judge was that although the order of suspension had been
passed on 25.03.2022, no order extending the period of
suspension was passed by the competent authority within the
period of 90 days from the date of suspension. Subsequently,
after a lapse of more than one and a half years, the respondent
authority passed the impugned order dated 28.08.2023 extending
the period of suspension.
8. It was contended on behalf of the writ petitioner that, in view of the
law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar
Choudhary v. Union of India through its Secretary and
Another, (2015) 7 SCC 291 , and the judgment rendered by this

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Court in Kishore Kumar @ K. Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh
& Others (WPS No.9074/2023 dated 28.08.2023) , the order
extending suspension was required to be passed within 90 days
from the date of suspension. Since the same had admittedly not
been done within the stipulated period, it was urged that the
subsequent order dated 28.08.2023 extending the suspension
was unsustainable in law. The learned State counsel, before the
learned Single Judge, fairly admitted that the case of the writ
petitioner was squarely covered by the decision rendered by this
Court in Kishore Kumar (supra).
9. Upon consideration of the rival submissions and the material
available on record, the learned Single Judge held that an order
extending suspension was required to be passed within 90 days
from the date of suspension. Finding that the impugned order
dated 28.08.2023 had been passed after an inordinate delay of
more than one and a half years from the date of the original order
of suspension, the learned Single Judge, relying upon the
decision in Kishore Kumar (supra) , set aside the orders dated
25.03.2022 and 28.08.2023 and directed the respondents to
reinstate the writ petitioner in service forthwith.
10. Aggrieved thereby, the State has preferred the present intra-Court
appeal.
11. Mr. Prasun Kumar Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General
appearing for the State/appellants, would submit that the learned

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Single Judge has fallen into error in setting aside the order of
suspension dated 25.03.2022 as well as the subsequent order
dated 28.08.2023, whereby the suspension of the respondent/writ
petitioner was continued. He submits that the writ petition came to
be disposed of without affording adequate opportunity to the State
authorities to place on record their return and to demonstrate the
factual as well as statutory basis for continuance of the
suspension. According to him, had such opportunity been granted,
the appellants would have been able to bring to the notice of the
learned Single Judge the relevant provisions of Rule 9 of the
Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1966 and the circumstances which weighed with the
competent authority while continuing the respondent under
suspension. He would, therefore, contend that the impugned
order has been passed without the complete statutory scheme
governing suspension having been brought to the notice of the
learned Single Judge.
12. Learned Deputy Advocate General would further submit that the
reliance placed by the learned Single Judge upon the decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra)
and the decision of this Court in Kishore Kumar (supra) was
misplaced in the facts of the present case. Elaborating the
submission, he contends that the ratio in Ajay Kumar
Choudhary (supra) is principally to the effect that the currency of
an order of suspension should not ordinarily extend beyond three

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months where the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet has not
been served upon the delinquent employee within that period. In
the present case, however, the departmental charge-sheet was
admittedly served upon the respondent/writ petitioner on
20.04.2022, i.e. well within the period prescribed under the
applicable Rules. Once the memorandum of charges had been
served within the prescribed period, it could not, according to the
appellants, be held that the original suspension automatically
lapsed merely because a subsequent order recording continuance
of suspension was passed after 90 days. It is submitted that the
judgment in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) does not lay down
as an inflexible proposition that every order continuing
suspension, if passed beyond 90 days, would ipso facto render
both the original order of suspension and the subsequent
continuance thereof void.
13. Inviting attention to Rule 9(2-b) and Rule 9(5-A) of the Rules of
1966, learned State counsel would submit that the statutory
framework itself makes a clear distinction between a case where
the charges and accompanying documents are not issued within
the prescribed period and a case where they have already been
served upon the delinquent employee. Rule 9(5-A), according to
him, specifically provides that an order of suspension made or
deemed to have been made under the Rule shall continue to
remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the competent
authority. The provisos contemplate automatic revocation only in

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those situations where the charge-sheet and other requisite
documents are not issued within the prescribed period and the
requisite extension is also not obtained. In the case at hand, since
the departmental charge-sheet was served upon the respondent
within the prescribed period, the consequence of automatic
revocation contemplated under the provisos was never attracted.
He would, therefore, submit that the learned Single Judge ought
to have examined the effect of the aforesaid statutory provisions
before concluding that the suspension and its continuance were
rendered illegal merely because the subsequent order came to be
passed after expiry of 90 days.
14. It is further submitted that the order dated 28.08.2023 continuing
the suspension was not a mechanical or unreasoned order, but
was passed after considering the nature and gravity of the
allegations levelled against the respondent/writ petitioner,
including the criminal case registered for offences under Section
509-B of the IPC and Section 67-A of the Information Technology
Act. The competent authority, keeping in view the nature of the
alleged misconduct and its possible impact upon discipline in the
office and upon the working environment of the female
employees, considered it appropriate to continue the respondent
under suspension. Learned Deputy Advocate General would also
submit that an order of suspension passed under Rule 9 is
appealable under Rule 23 of the Rules of 1966 and, therefore, the
respondent/writ petitioner had an efficacious statutory remedy

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available to him, which he did not avail before invoking the writ
jurisdiction of this Court. According to him, no exceptional
circumstance such as want of jurisdiction or violation of the
principles of natural justice had been demonstrated so as to justify
bypassing the statutory remedy. On these grounds, it is urged that
the order dated 18.01.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge
deserves to be set aside and the writ appeal preferred by the
State deserves to be allowed.
15. On the other hand, Mr. Anupam Dubey, learned counsel
appearing for the sole respondent/writ petitioner, would oppose
the submissions advanced on behalf of the State/appellants and
submit that the learned Single Judge has committed no error in
allowing the writ petition. He would contend that the controversy is
squarely governed by the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), which has
subsequently been followed and explained by this Court in
Kishore Kumar (supra). According to him, the ratio of the
aforesaid decisions is not confined merely to the requirement of
serving the charge-sheet within the prescribed period, but also
mandates that where the charge-sheet has been served, the
competent authority is required to pass a reasoned order for
continuation of suspension within the stipulated period. In the
present case, admittedly, the respondent was suspended with
effect from 23.03.2022, whereas the order extending the
suspension was passed only on 28.08.2023, i.e. after an

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unexplained delay of about one and a half years. Such belated
exercise, according to learned counsel, defeats the very purpose
of the safeguards incorporated against prolonged and indefinite
suspension.
16. Learned counsel would further submit that the mere fact that the
departmental charge-sheet was served upon the respondent on
20.04.2022 cannot by itself confer an unfettered or indefinite
power upon the State to continue the suspension without periodic
review. The object underlying the judgment in Ajay Kumar
Choudhary (supra) is to ensure that suspension, which is
essentially an interim and transitory measure, does not assume
the character of a punitive measure by being continued
indefinitely. He would contend that the provisions of Rule 9 of the
Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1966, read with the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, have to be construed harmoniously, and the statutory
power of continuing suspension cannot be exercised mechanically
or after an inordinate lapse of time. In the present case, no order
of continuation was passed within 90 days, nor was any periodic
review undertaken during the intervening period. The order dated
28.08.2023 came to be passed only after the respondent was
constrained to approach this Court in W.P.(S) No.5028 of 2023
and obtain directions for consideration of his grievance. Thus, the
subsequent order, according to learned counsel, could not
retrospectively revive a suspension which had already lost its

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legal efficacy by operation of the principles laid down in the
aforesaid judgments.
17. Learned counsel would also submit that the order dated
28.08.2023 does not satisfy the requirement of a meaningful and
independent review of the necessity of continuing the respondent
under suspension. The pendency of a criminal case or the nature
of the allegations, by itself, cannot justify keeping a Government
servant under suspension for an indefinite period, particularly
when the respondent had already been granted bail and the
departmental charge-sheet had been served. It is urged that the
competent authority was required to objectively consider whether
the respondent's continued presence in the office would prejudice
the disciplinary proceedings or the criminal trial and whether he
could instead be posted to a non-sensitive post so that his
services could be utilised. The learned Single Judge, therefore,
rightly applied the settled legal position and set aside the orders
dated 25.03.2022 and 28.08.2023. Learned counsel would
accordingly submit that no interference is warranted in the intra-
Court appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed by affirming
the order passed by the learned Single Judge.
18. After considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the parties, the learned Single Judge while relying upon the
decisions rendered in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) and
Kishore Kumar (supra) has passed the impugned order, which

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reads as follows for ready reference :-
“5. Taking into the consideration the observation
made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Ajay Kumar Choudhary Vs. Union of India through
its Secretary and Another passed in Civil Appeal
No.1912 of 2015, this Court in the case of Kishore
Kumar (supra) has accordingly held as under:
“Analysing the language expressions including the
punctuation used by their Lordships, it can be
categorically stated that the main clause, being
mandatory and the two sub-clauses, distinctly
marked with the help of the punctuation semi
colon (;) and the insertion of the conjunction ‘if’ to
being with the two sub-clauses, clearly indicate
that the direction in entirety is continuous in nature
and is contained within 90 days essentially.
Therefore, it clearly shows that the currency of
suspension order should not extend beyond three
months if within this period the memorandum of
charges/charge-sheet is not served on the
delinquent officer/employee. Meaning thereby,
serving of memorandum of charges/charge-sheet
within 90 days of suspension is mandatory.
Further, it is also clear that if the memorandum of
charges/charge-sheet is served, a reasoned order
must be passed for extension of the suspension.
In view of this Court, in Ajay Kumar Choudhary
Versus Union of India through its Secretary,
(2015) 7 SCC 291, the intent of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court is clear that if the memorandum of
charges/charge-sheet is served, an order of
extension of the suspension must also be

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passed.”
6. In Paragraph-15 of the said order this Court
further observed that :
"In conclusion, it is held that order of extension of
suspension must be passed within the period of
90 days of the suspension."
7. Thus, as observed in the case of Kishore
Kumar (supra), the order of extension of
suspension should be passed within 90 days from
the date of order of suspension. In the case in
hand, the order of extension of suspension has
been passed by the respondent authority after 90
days i.e. after more than one and a half year from
passing of order of suspension. Therefore, on this
ground only, the order dated 28.08.2023 and
25.03.2022 i.e. Annexure P1 and P2 respectively
are liable to be set aside.
8. Considering facts of the case, submission of
learned counsel for the parties, grounds raised in
writ petition, further the fact that the case of
petitioner is squarely covered with order/judgment
passed by this Court in case of Kishore Kumar
(supra), I am of the view that impugned order
dated 28.08.2023 and 25.03.2022 i.e. Annexure
P1 and P2 respectively are set aside.
9. Accordingly, present writ petition is allowed.
Concerned respondent authority is directed to
reinstate the petitioner in the services forthwith.
10. With the aforesaid observation, this writ
petition is disposed of.

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Certified copy as per rules.”
19. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have carefully
perused the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge,
the pleadings and material available on record, as also the
relevant provisions of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short, “the
Rules of 1966”). We have also given our thoughtful consideration
to the respective submissions advanced by learned counsel for
the State/appellants as well as learned counsel appearing for the
respondent/writ petitioner.
20. The controversy which arises for our consideration in the present
intra-Court appeal is in a narrow compass. The respondent/writ
petitioner was placed under suspension by order dated
25.03.2022 with effect from 23.03.2022, on account of his
detention for a period exceeding 48 hours in connection with the
criminal case registered against him. It is not in dispute that the
departmental charge-sheet was served upon the respondent on
20.04.2022.
21. It is also not in dispute that no order for continuation/extension of
suspension was passed within 90 days from the date of the order
of suspension and that the order dated 28.08.2023, whereby the
suspension was sought to be continued, came to be passed after
a lapse of more than one and a half years. The learned Single
Judge, principally relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble

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Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), as also the
subsequent decision of this Court in Kishore Kumar (supra), held
that the order of continuation of suspension was required to be
passed within 90 days and, having not been so passed, set aside
both the original order of suspension dated 25.03.2022 and the
subsequent order dated 28.08.2023.
22. In our considered view, before examining the correctness of the
conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge, it would be
appropriate to notice the statutory scheme governing suspension
under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1966. The said Rule confers power
upon the competent authority to place a Government servant
under suspension in the circumstances contemplated therein. At
the same time, the Rule itself contains safeguards concerning the
continuation of such suspension, particularly in relation to service
of the memorandum of charges and the documents
accompanying it. Rule 9(5-A) specifically provides that an order of
suspension made or deemed to have been made under the Rule
shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by
the competent authority. The statutory consequences of automatic
revocation contemplated under the provisos to the said provision
are attracted in the circumstances specifically stipulated therein,
namely, where the requisite charges and documents are not
supplied within the prescribed period and the competent authority
fails to obtain the requisite extension in accordance with Rule 9(2-
B). In the present case, the factual position is materially different

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from a case where the memorandum of charges itself was not
served within the prescribed period. Admittedly, the respondent
was served with the departmental charge-sheet on 20.04.2022,
whereas the suspension had commenced with effect from
23.03.2022. Thus, the charge-sheet was served within the period
prescribed under the Rules. Consequently, the statutory
consequence of automatic revocation on account of non-service
of the memorandum of charges within the prescribed period was
not attracted. This aspect assumes considerable significance,
because the learned Single Judge has proceeded on the premise
that once the period of 90 days expired without an order of
extension of suspension having been passed, the original order of
suspension itself stood rendered invalid, notwithstanding the
admitted fact that the departmental charge-sheet had already
been served upon the respondent within the prescribed period.
23. We are also of the considered view that the observations made by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra)
are required to be appreciated in their proper factual and legal
context. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was concerned with the
serious issue of prolonged and indefinite suspension and
observed that suspension, being essentially an interim measure,
should not be permitted to continue for an unduly long period so
as to assume the character of punishment. The Court, therefore,
observed that the currency of suspension should not extend
beyond three months if within that period the memorandum of

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charges/charge-sheet is not served upon the delinquent
employee. The emphasis of the judgment was thus substantially
upon preventing continuation of suspension in a case where even
disciplinary charges had not been served within stipulated period.
24. It is equally important, however, that the judgment in Ajay Kumar
Choudhary (supra) cannot be read in isolation from the statutory
rules applicable to the Government servant concerned. The said
decision cannot be understood as laying down an absolute
proposition that, irrespective of the governing service rules and
irrespective of the fact that the charge-sheet has already been
served within the prescribed period, the original order of
suspension would automatically stand extinguished merely upon
expiry of 90 days unless a separate order of extension is passed
within those very 90 days. Such an interpretation, in our
considered opinion, would amount to reading into the statutory
rule something which is not expressly provided therein.
25. In this connection, Rule 9(5-A) of the Rules of 1966 assumes
significance. The said provision expressly stipulates that an order
of suspension shall continue to remain in force until it is modified
or revoked by the competent authority, subject to the
consequences specifically provided in the provisos thereto. The
Rule does not, in terms, prescribe that in every case where the
charge-sheet has been served within the prescribed period, the
competent authority must necessarily pass an order of extension

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of suspension within 90 days and that failure to do so would
automatically terminate the original order of suspension. The
learned Single Judge, while relying upon the decision in Kishore
Kumar (supra), has treated the period of 90 days as an absolute
statutory cut-off for the continuance of every order of suspension.
In our considered view, such an interpretation does not take into
account the precise language and scheme of Rule 9 of the Rules
of 1966.
26. The distinction between the initial validity of an order of
suspension and the subsequent administrative decision regarding
its continuance also cannot be lost sight of. The fact that an
authority may have failed to pass an order of continuation within a
particular period may certainly invite judicial scrutiny as to whether
the suspension is being continued mechanically, whether the
authority has periodically reviewed the necessity of suspension,
and whether the continuation has become punitive in nature.
However, such lapse, by itself, cannot be treated as automatically
obliterating the original order of suspension unless such
consequence necessarily follows from the statutory provision or
binding judicial precedent applicable to the case.
27. In the present matter, the respondent's suspension was initially
ordered on account of his detention for more than 48 hours in
connection with a criminal case. The departmental charge-sheet
was thereafter served upon him within the period contemplated by

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the Rules. The subsequent order dated 28.08.2023 was passed
by the competent authority taking into consideration the nature
and gravity of the allegations against the respondent and the
circumstances which, according to the authority, warranted his
continued absence from the office. The said order, therefore,
could not have been brushed aside merely on the ground that it
was passed after expiry of 90 days, without examining the
statutory source of power and the reasons recorded by the
competent authority for continuation of suspension.
28. We may hasten to add that the power to continue an employee
under suspension is undoubtedly not an unbridled power. The
competent authority is required to exercise such power
reasonably, fairly and upon consideration of relevant
circumstances. Prolonged suspension cannot be permitted to
become a substitute for punishment, nor can a Government
servant be kept away from duty for an indefinite period without
periodic consideration of the necessity of such continuation. The
principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay
Kumar Choudhary (supra) are undoubtedly relevant while
examining the validity and necessity of prolonged suspension.
Nevertheless, those principles have to operate within, and in
harmony with, the statutory framework governing the service
conditions of the concerned Government servant.
29. In the present case, however, the learned Single Judge has not

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undertaken such an examination. The impugned order proceeds
principally on the proposition that since the order dated
28.08.2023 was passed after expiry of 90 days, both the original
order of suspension dated 25.03.2022 and the subsequent order
dated 28.08.2023 were liable to be set aside. There is no detailed
examination in the impugned order of the effect of Rule 9(5-A),
the circumstances in which the original suspension was ordered,
the fact that the departmental charge-sheet had admittedly been
served within the prescribed period, or the reasons recorded by
the competent authority while passing the order dated
28.08.2023. In our considered view, these aspects were germane
to the determination of the controversy.
30. We are, therefore, unable to sustain the conclusion of the learned
Single Judge that the original order of suspension automatically
became non-est merely because an order of continuation was not
passed within 90 days. The proposition that every order of
suspension necessarily comes to an end upon expiry of 90 days,
even where the charge-sheet has been duly served within the
period prescribed by the Rules, cannot be accepted as an
absolute proposition of law. Such an interpretation would render
the substantive provision contained in Rule 9(5-A), which
contemplates continuance of suspension until modification or
revocation by the competent authority, substantially otiose.
31. At the same time, we make it clear that our conclusion should not

20
be understood as granting the State an unfettered authority to
continue suspension indefinitely. The competent authority is
bound to periodically consider whether continuation of suspension
is necessary and justified having regard to the nature of the
allegations, the stage of the disciplinary proceedings or criminal
case, the possibility of the employee interfering with the
proceedings or influencing witnesses, the nature of duties
assigned to him, and the possibility of his being posted to a non-
sensitive post. Suspension cannot be permitted to operate as a
punitive measure merely because a criminal case or departmental
proceeding remains pending.
32. The respondent/writ petitioner had also relied upon the decision of
this Court in Kishore Kumar (supra). However, in our considered
opinion, the observations made therein cannot be mechanically
applied without examining the precise statutory provisions
applicable to the employee and the factual circumstances of the
case. To the extent the said decision has been understood as
laying down an absolute proposition that an order of suspension
must, in every circumstance and irrespective of the language of
the applicable statutory rules, be extended within 90 days, we are
of the view that such interpretation requires reconsideration in the
light of the statutory scheme of Rule 9 of the Rules of 1966.
33. There is yet another aspect which assumes significance. The
order dated 28.08.2023 is an order passed by the competent

21
authority subsequent to the service of the departmental charge-
sheet and records the reasons which weighed with the authority in
continuing the suspension. The validity of such an order has to be
tested on the touchstone of the statutory power, the relevant
circumstances and the principles governing judicial review of
administrative action. The Court, while exercising jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution, does not ordinarily substitute
its own satisfaction for that of the competent disciplinary authority
in a matter concerning the necessity of suspension, unless the
order is shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, without jurisdiction,
based on irrelevant considerations or otherwise contrary to law.
34. We are conscious of the fact that the respondent/writ petitioner
had approached this Court earlier seeking consideration of his
grievance regarding revocation of suspension and that the
subsequent order dated 28.08.2023 was passed thereafter.
However, that circumstance, by itself, would not render the
subsequent order void. At the highest, it would require the
competent authority's decision to be examined to ascertain
whether there was due application of mind and whether the
continuation of suspension was justified on relevant
considerations. The learned Single Judge, instead of undertaking
that exercise, has treated the expiry of 90 days as conclusively
terminating the suspension.
35. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered

22
opinion that the learned Single Judge erred in law in setting aside
the original order of suspension dated 25.03.2022 solely on the
ground that the subsequent order dated 28.08.2023 was passed
beyond 90 days. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be
sustained to that extent. The order dated 28.08.2023 also could
not have been quashed merely on the ground of the date on
which it was passed, without examining its validity in the context
of Rule 9 of the Rules of 1966 and the reasons recorded therein.
36. Consequently, the order dated 18.01.2024 passed by the learned
Single Judge in Writ Petition (S) No.8745 of 2023 is set aside.
The writ petition filed by the respondent/writ petitioner shall stand
dismissed. The orders dated 25.03.2022 and 28.08.2023 shall not
stand quashed on the ground that the order of continuation of
suspension was passed beyond the period of 90 days.
37. However, having regard to the fact that the respondent has
remained under suspension for a considerable period, we deem it
appropriate to observe that the competent authority shall
undertake a fresh and meaningful review of the necessity of
continuing the respondent under suspension, keeping in view the
principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay
Kumar Choudhary (supra) and the statutory provisions
governing suspension. Such consideration shall be undertaken
objectively and independently, without being influenced merely by
the fact that the present appeal has been allowed. If the

23
competent authority is of the view that the respondent's continued
suspension is no longer necessary, it shall be open to the
competent authority to revoke the suspension or to consider
posting him against a suitable non-sensitive post, in accordance
with law.
38. It is clarified that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits
of the criminal case or the departmental proceedings pending
against the respondent. Nothing contained in this judgment shall
be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the
allegations levelled against him. The disciplinary/criminal
proceedings shall proceed independently and in accordance with
law.
39. In the result, the writ appeal is allowed . The order dated
18.01.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition
(S) No.8745 of 2023 is hereby set aside and the writ petition
stands dismissed. The orders dated 25.03.2022 and 28.08.2023
shall stand subject to the competent authority undertaking a fresh
review of the continuance of suspension in accordance with law
and in the light of the observations made hereinabove.
40. There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha )
Judge Chief Justice
Anu

24
Head-Note
Mere failure to pass an order of continuation within 90 days does not, by
itself, invalidate the order of suspension under Rule 9 of the Rules of
1966, where the departmental charge-sheet has been served upon the
delinquent employee within the said period. However, prolonged
suspension cannot be continued mechanically and must remain subject
to periodic and meaningful review by the competent authority.