M/S RIKHI RESORTS PVT LTD vs THE STATE OF HP AND OTHERS
- Court
- High Court of Himachal Pradesh
2026:HHC:49300
High Court of H.P.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CWP No.10130 of 2026
Date of Decision: 16.11.2026
_____________________________________________________________________
M/s Rikhi Resorts Private Limited
……...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
For the Petitioner: Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, Senior Advocate with Mr.
Janesh Gupta, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Mr. Rajan Kahol, Additional Advocate General and
Mr. R. P. Singh, Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish
Banshtu, Deputy Advocates General.
__________________________________________________________________________
(Oral)
Sandeep Sharma, J.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with order dated 2.4.2026 passed
by learned Financial Commissioner (Appeals), Himachal Pradesh, in Revision
Petition No. 152 of 2018 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh through District
Collector, Solan versus M/s Rikhi Resorts Private Limited , whereby order dated
29.8.2017 passed by learned Divisional Commissioner, Shimla Division,
Shimla, H.P. in Case No. 262 of 2015, upholding order dated 25.7.2014
passed by learned District Collector, Solan in Case No. 23/13 of 2009, came to
be reversed, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings
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filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying therein for
following main relief:
“(a) Setting aside impugned Order dated 02.04.2026 (Annexure P-12)
passed in Revision Petition No. 152 of 2018 by Learned Financial
Commissioner (Appeals), Himachal Pradesh and consequently to
restore the Order dated 25.07.2014 (Annexure P-8) passed by Learned
Collector Solan, District Solan (HP) whereby the proceedings under
Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act have been
ordered to be dropped.”
2. Quintessential facts of the case, as emerge from the pleadings
as well as material adduced on record by respective parties are that
petitioner herein was granted permission by respondent-State under
Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act') to purchase land comprising Khasra Nos. 162, 163,
166 and 167, Kita 4, measuring 05-10 bighas, situate at Village Sakori,
Tehsil Kandaghat, District Solan (hereinafter referred to as 'suit land') vide
letter No. Rev:2F(10)-167/93 dated 24.1.1994 for construction of
hotel/resort (Annexure P-2).
3. Since petitioner allegedly failed to start construction and put
the land in use within a period of two years, District Collector, Solan
initiated proceedings against it in the year 2009 for vestment, however,
afore Authority, after having heard the parties and perused record dropped
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the proceedings vide order dated 25.7.2014 passed in Case No. 23/13 of
2009 (Annexure P-8).
4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with aforesaid order passed by
learned Collector, respondent-State filed Appeal No. 262 of 2015 in the
Court of learned Divisional Commissioner, Shimla, which also came to be
dismissed vide order dated 29.8.2017 (Annexure P-10). In the aforesaid
background, respondent-State filed Revision Petition bearing No. 152 of
2018 in the Court of learned Financial Commissioner (Appeals), Himachal
Pradesh, against order dated 29.8.2017 passed by Divisional
Commissioner, Shimla, which came to be allowed vide order dated 2.4.2026
(Annexure P-12). Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with aforesaid order
passed by learned Financial Commissioner, petitioner has approached this
Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for relief as has been
reproduced hereinabove.
5. Precisely, case of the petitioner as has been highlighted in the
petition and further canvassed by Mr. Bhupinder Gupta, learned Senior
Advocate duly assisted by Mr. Janesh Gupta, Advocate representing the
petitioner, is that learned Financial Commissioner (Appeals), while passing
impugned order, has fallen in grave error inasmuch as setting aside
concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by two Courts below. While
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making this Court peruse communication dated 24 January, 1994
(Annexure P-2), whereby petitioner was accorded permission under Section
118 of the Act to purchase land, Mr. Gupta states that at no point of time
condition, if any, with regard to putting up the land in question to use
within a period of two years ever came to be communicated to the petitioner
and as such, there was no occasion, if any, for learned Financial
Commissioner to set aside the well reasoned orders passed by the Courts
subordinate to it. Mr. Gupta further states that order passed by learned
Collector as well as Divisional Commissioner clearly reveals that the
petitioner successfully proved on record that land permitted to be
purchased under Section 118 of the Act was put to use within a period of
two years from the date of grant of permission. He submits that petitioner
started the construction of hotel by constructing 350-400 meter road length
as well as some labour huts, but on account of adverse circumstances and
death of Managing Director of the project, work could not proceed further.
He states that since with the construction of road as well as laying of
pillars, land was put to use within stipulated time of two years, there was
no occasion for learned Financial Commissioner to pass order impugned in
the instant proceedings. He contends that failure, if any, to commence the
construction within stipulated time should be on account of conscious
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default, negligence or refusal on the part of person concerned, but where
the non compliance was for the reason beyond the control of the person in
whose favour permission was granted or due to the fact that it was
incapable or impossible of performance due to other provisions of law in
force, it is not permissible for respondent-State to order vestment and as
such, there was no occasion, if any, for learned Financial Commissioner to
order vestment in terms of provisions contained under Section 118(2) of the
Act. In support of his aforesaid submission, Mr. Gupta placed reliance
upon the judgment dated 22.8.2023 passed by this Court in CWP No. 5544
of 2020 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh versus M/s Barog Resorts
Pvt. Limited and judgment dated 26.2.2026 passed by coordinate Bench of
this Court in CWP No. 1182 of 2026 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh
versus M/s Noble House Creation Pvt. Ltd.
6. To the contrary, Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate
General, while supporting impugned order passed by learned Financial
Commissioner, submits that since orders passed by the Collector as well as
Divisional Commissioner were based upon wrong interpretation of statute
as well as facts, no illegality can be said to have been committed by learned
Financial Commissioner while setting aside the concurrent findings
recorded by two Courts below. He states that though there was no specific
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stipulation made in the permission letter with regard to use of the land
within a period of two years from the date of grant of permission, but once
statute itself provides that land ordered to be purchased in terms of Section
118 shall be put to use within a period of two years or for a further such
period not exceeding one year coupled with the fact that petitioner failed to
put the land in use for two years, learned Financial Commissioner rightly
ordered vestment of the land in question. He further states that omission, if
any, on the part of the State to make stipulation in permission letter with
regard to two years' time period is of no consequence because permission
letter cannot override provisions of the Act, which clearly provide that land
ordered to be purchased under Section 118 of the Act is required to be put
to use within a period of two years from the grant of permission. Mr. Kahol
further states that revenue authorities specifically reported that land in
question was not put to use for two years after its purchase and mere
construction of huts may not be sufficient to conclude commencement of
construction.
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the records.
8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record, this Court finds that vide communication
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dated 24 January, 1994 (Annexure P-2), permission was granted to the
petitioner for purchase of land for establishment of a resort, but there is no
condition contained in the aforesaid communication with regard to time
period. Though aforesaid letter suggests that land permitted to be
purchased under Section 118 shall be used for purpose for which
permission is accorded, but it nowhere stipulates that same is to be put to
use within a period of two years from the date of grant of permission.
9. Though Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General,
attempted to argue that since aforesaid permission was granted under
Section 118 subsection (2) of the Act, omission, if any, on the part of
authority responsible for issuing aforesaid letter to make specific mention
with regard to time frame is of no relevance, but this Court is not
persuaded to agree with him for the reason that the applicant, who had
applied for permission to purchase land under Section 118, cannot be
expected to go through the provisions of law under which permission is
granted, rather, he or she is under obligation to abide by the terms and
conditions contained in the permission letter. Once it was specifically
mentioned in the permission letter that land shall be used for purpose for
which permission is accorded, it is not understood that why specific
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condition with regard to time frame was not incorporated in the permission
letter.
10. Moreover, in the instant case, the District Collector, after
having initiated proceedings for vestment, conducted inquiry through
revenue agency and found that within a stipulated period of two years,
petitioner had put the land to use by constructing 350-400 meter road
length. Petitioner proved before aforesaid authority by leading cogent and
convincing evidence that besides having constructed 350-400 meter road
length, foundation of pillars of project was also laid, but further work could
not proceed on account of death of the Managing Director of the project.
11. Though learned Additional Advocate General, argued that as
per provisions contained under Section 118(2) of the Act, land was not put
to use for which permission was granted within stipulated time, because
permission was granted for construction of resort and mere construction of
road and huts for labour cannot be said to be commencement of work,
rather entire construction of resort should have been completed within
specified period of two years, however, this Court is not convinced with the
aforesaid submission of learned Additional Advocate General for the reason
that a resort cannot be constructed in one go, rather construction is to be
carried out in a phased manner. Petitioner with a view to construct a
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resort, first of all, constructed road and thereafter constructed huts for
labour. Apart from raising afore construction, it also laid foundation for
pillars. All the aforesaid development activities were actually towards the
construction of a resort because before undergoing aforesaid development
activities, there was no possibility for the petitioner to complete the
construction of the resort, for which the permission was granted.
12. In M/s Barog Resorts Pvt. Limited (supra), this Court had an
occasion to deal with a similar situation and this Court, having taken note
of judgment passed by Division Bench of this Court in case titled as
Ravinder Chauhan and others v. State of Himachal Pradesh and
others, AIR 1999 Himachal Pradesh 43 , held that when the statute
contemplated the failure on the part of a person who has been granted
permission to purchase, as a condition precedent for bringing into force of
the operation of vesting clause, the failure should be on account of
conscious default, negligence or refusal on the part of person concerned
and where the non compliance was for the reason beyond his control or due
to the fact that it was incapable or impossible of performance due to other
provisions of law in force, it is not permissible for respondent-State to order
vestment in terms of provisions contained under Section 118(2) of the Act.
Relevant para of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:
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“19. In the light of the above provisions of the Statute and the Rules
in force, it becomes necessary for us to consider as to whether the
plea raised on behalf of the petitioners that the vesting envisaged
under the second proviso to Clause (i) of Sub-section (2) of Section
118 of the Act is automatic and instant on the expiry of the period or
it will depend upon on further adjudication by any competent
authority before such vesting could be said to have taken place in a
particular case. Rule 38-B inserted as noticed above, with detailed
provisions in this regard, which were found finally notified on 24-3-
1993 was also earlier notified on 14-12-1992 vide notification No. 10-
5/75-Rev-B-Vol. III dated 3-11-1992. The subsequent rules provide a
guideline and assistance of the manner in which a penal provision of
the nature engrafted under the second proviso to Clause (i) of Sub-
section (2) of Section 118 of the Act has to be construed. That
becomes obvious and necessary even de hors the Rule 38-B and in
our view the said rule has been really inserted to make the provision
in the Act more reasonable, to protect the main provision in the Act
itself from being rendered vulnerable for a challenge under Article
14 of the Constitution of India. The conditions stipulated for being
satisfied in the second proviso to bring into operation the vesting
clause or the provisions of the rule itself provide ample basis and
guidance as to how the said provision has to be construed. In our
view, it is not that on the mere expiry of a period of two years, as may
be granted by the State Government or a further period not
exceeding one year that the vesting will automatically take place. The
legislative intention apparently keeping in view of the drastic and
penal nature and far reaching consequences of such vesting clause
has been thoughtfully, carefully and meticulously expressed in
engrafting a condition stipulating 'if he fails to do so', which in our
view will operate as a condition precedent for actual vesting. The
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failure on the part of the person favoured with a permission under
the provision, therefore, is the vital and pivotal fact which brings into
operation the vesting clause and consequently it is but necessary
and essential that some authority must place on record the failure on
the part of the persons, who have been favoured with the permission
after an objective consideration of the matter and such finding can
be recorded only after complying with the principles of natural
justice by giving an opportunity to the persons concerned before
condemning them. What Rule 38-B has proposed to do is nothing
but giving statutory recognition by means of prescription of a rule to
the otherwise essential, vital and necessary procedure as a measure
of safeguard to be observed in terms of the principles of natural
justice, too, before visiting a citizen with such penal and far reaching
consequences involving substantial property rights. In our view when
the statute contemplated the failure on the part of the person, who
has been granted with permission to purchase, as a condition
precedent for bringing into the force of the operation of the vesting
clause, the failure should be on account of the conscious default,
negligence or refusal on the part of the person concerned and where
the non-compliance was for reasons beyond his control or due to the
fact that it was incapable or impossible of performance due to the
operation of other provisions of law in force and that the authorities,
who accorded the permission with such conditions, which are not
capable of being complied with and performed and were equally at
fault, it is not permissible for the respondents or for that matter any
body from public including the petitioners to insist or assert that
despite the obvious and for no fault of the 6th respondent, he should
be condemned as having failed to comply with the conditions, that
which otherwise he could have complied with, and thereby take over
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his property by enforcing the vesting clause engrafted in the second
proviso.”
13. As has been discussed hereinabove, petitioner had started the
work of construction of resort well within stipulated period of two years, but
it was unable to complete the same within two years on account of death of
its Managing Director, which fact has otherwise not been disputed by
respondent-State.
14. Coordinate Bench of this Court in M/s Noble House Creation
Pvt. Ltd (supra), while taking note of judgment passed by Division Bench of
this Court in Ravinder Chauhan (supra), has held that vestment could not
be automatic and due and proper inquiry is required to be carried out. It
has further been held that words " shall put the land to use for which the
permission has been granted " are not to be interpreted myopically, rather,
intent of legislation behind Section 118(2) was to ensure that steps are
taken to put the land to use for purpose for which permission is granted
before the expiry of period prescribed in the statute. Relevant paras of the
aforesaid judgment read as under:
“15. It is a matter of fact that the world faced great recession
during the period between 2008 and 2013. This also got
reflected in fall of Indian Stock Market thereby affecting the
cash flow to the project. It is apparent from the
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communications discussed above that the developers made all
out efforts to source funding both from the Financial
Institutions as well as from the Stock Markets but due to
recession, the funding was refused to the developers which is
proved from the above communications. This fact has also
been taken into consideration by the Ld. Collector at page-20
and has observed:
"His plea that he could not start the construction due to
economic recession is too general and vague in the
absence of specific documentary evidence. There is
nothing specific on record that the respondent was
prevented from starting the construction because of
economic downturn."
It appears that at the stage of the case before the District
Collector, the appellant could only produce the copies of
reports of the Stock Market as well as communications on e-
mail with the Stock Market to prove his point, however, he did
not produce any communication from the banks refusing the
grant of loan to him. He later obtained the copies of
communications sent to him by the banks and submitted the
same at the stage of arguments which go to prove that he not
only approached the banks and Stock Market but did it well in
time i.e. in the year 2009-10 immediately after getting
approval from the State and within the specified period of two
years. The refusal on the part of the financing agencies has
clearly been on account of recession.
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16. It may also be appropriate to summarize as to what the
appellant has done so far and what else he could have done.
What he had done:-
Signed M.O.Us for architectural designs and
construction of the project;
Approached banks and Stock Market for loans and
share capital;
Constructed 1.5 km. road;
What else could have been done:
Informing the Govt. and obtaining extension;
Obtaining necessary permissions under various law. (It
has been pleaded that TCP permission was Annexure R-
18).
Getting the land partitioned (though the process seems
to have been initiated but was not taken to a logical
end).”
In view of the concurrent findings of facts returned by the two
revenue authorities below which do not call for any interference, it
was justly concluded that the default on the part of the respondent
could not be held to be conscious negligence so as to order vestment
of the land in the State. Reliance upon Ravinder Chauhan and
others versus State of H.P AIR 1999 HP 43 was justly placed for
holding that merely because respondent could not start the actual
construction of the resort within two years from the date of execution
of the sale deed for which he was granted permission under Section
118 of the Act would not result in automatic vestment of the land in
the State. Here it would also be pertinent to take note of M/s
Springdale Resorts and Villas Pvt. Ltd. versus State High Court
of Himachal Pradesh and Others (CWP No.3363/2025, decided
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on 26.09.2025) wherein while relying upon Ravinder Chauhan, it
was observed that the words “shall put the land to such use for
which the permission has been granted” are not to be interpreted
myopically. Period of two years prescribed in the Statute cannot be
construed in myopic manner so as to mean that everything with
regard to the project has to be completed before the expiry of the
period. The intent of legislation behind Section 118(2) was to ensure
that steps are taken to put the land to use for the purpose for which
the permission is granted before the expiry of the period prescribed
in the Statute. The Court also took judicial notice of the fact that
various permissions are granted under Section 118 of the Act for big
and small projects by the State Government. For coming up of these
projects, many further permissions/approvals/ sanction are required
from several departments/ authorities. Various other formalities are
also needed to be completed. The actual construction work can start
only after all the permissions are in place in favour of the proponent.
Therefore, if the words “shall put the land to such use for which
permission has been granted” are given strict interpretation i.e. the
entire project activities shall have to be completed from A to Z within
the period mentioned in the second proviso to Section 118(2) of the
Act, in such scenario majority of the projects would fall in the trap
paving way for vestment of the land in State. Therefore, only
meaningful interpretation can be given to these words. That
beneficiary of the permission has to demonstrate taking cogent and
meaningful steps for putting the land to use for the purpose for
which the permission was granted and if this test is satisfied, the
same has to be construed and read that the permission holder has
put the land to such use for which the permission was granted. In
the instant case, the respondent has taken steps for putting the land
to use. It is not the case of the petitioner that respondent had
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diverted the land for any other use. The mechanical order passed by
the District Collector ordering vesting of respondent’s land in the
State on the ground of it having failed to construct resort within
period of two years was rightly set-aside by the higher authorities. As
observed earlier, two authorities below on the basis of facts have
concurrently held that respondent cannot be held guilty of conscious
default, negligence by correctly applying the principles laid down in
Ravinder Chauhan. The impugned orders therefore do not call for
any interference. Petition is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous
application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.”
15. During proceedings of the case, learned counsel representing
the petitioner apprised this Court that substantial work has been already
done on the site and entire work can be completed within a period of one
and a half year.
16. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made hereinabove
as well as law taken into consideration, this Court finds merit in the
present petition and accordingly, same is allowed. Impugned order dated
2.4.2026 passed by learned Financial Commissioner (Appeals) is quashed
and set aside and petitioner is permitted to complete the construction
within a period of one and a half year from the date of passing instant
order, failing which property otherwise ordered to be purchased in terms of
Section 118(2) will vest in the State of Himachal Pradesh.
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In the aforesaid terms, present petition is disposed of along with
pending applications, if any.
November 16, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma),
(manjit) Judge
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