Sh. Rishabh Jain vs Mridula Goel

$~16
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 01.09.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010303742026
+ RC.REV. 222/2026, CM APPL. 44231/2026 (Ex.) & CM
APPL. 44232/2026 (Stay)

SH. RISHABH JAIN .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Govind Narayan Kaushik,
Ms. Sheetal Raghuvanshi, Mr.
Prabhat Goswami, Ms.
Priyanshi Kaushik and Ms.
Garvita Kaushik, Advocates.
versus

MRIDULA GOEL .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Subhash chand and
Ms. Pooja, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (Oral)
1. The present Petition has been filed under Section 25-B(8) of the
1
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 , challenging the Order dated
2
21.04.2026 , passed by the learned CCJ-cum-ARC, Central
3
District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi , in Eviction Petition being RC-
4
ARC 261/2021 , titled “Mridula Goel v. Surender Kumar Jain (Since
Deceased) through LR Sh. Rishabh Jain” , whereby the learned ARC
has rejected the leave to defend application and passed an order of

1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Order
3
learned ARC
4
Eviction Petition
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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eviction in favour of the Respondent and as against the Petitioner
herein.
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner confines
his challenge in the present Petition to the alleged non-existence of the
landlord-tenant relationship between the parties.
3. He submits that, in fact, the Petitioner herein had become the
owner of the shop measuring 12’ x 14’ approximately situated on
the ground floor of property bearing No. 111-D, Kamla Nagar,
5
Delhi – 110007 by virtue of adverse possession and, consequently,
the Respondent could not claim to be the landlord thereof.
4. He submits that the Petitioner had categorically denied the
existence of any landlord-tenant relationship between the parties and
therefore, the question of there being any rent receipt or other
document evidencing payment of rent does not arise.
5. On the aforesaid basis, he submits that the very relationship of
landlord and tenant, which constitutes a foundational requirement for
maintaining the eviction proceedings, was disputed and ought to have
been appropriately considered before passing the Impugned Order and
accordingly, the said Order is erroneous in nature and should be set
aside.
6. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent submits that the submissions advanced by learned counsel
for the Petitioner are the very contentions which were raised before
the learned ARC and have already been duly considered and dealt
with by the learned ARC before passing the Impugned Order.
7. He further submits that, in exercise of its limited revisional

5
Subject Premises
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BHATIA
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jurisdiction, this Court cannot undertake a re-appreciation of the
evidence or substitute its own view for the findings returned by the
learned ARC and, therefore, the Impugned Order does not warrant any
interference by this Court.
8. This Court has heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
parties at length, and, with their able assistance, perused the relevant
documents as also the Impugned Order.
9. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
10. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
6
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
7 8
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
11. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
9
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
10
Grover .
12. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while

6
(1998) 8 SCC 119
7
(2014) 9 SCC 78
8
(2022) 6 SCC 30
9
2024:DHC:9322
10
2025:DHC:11285
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BHATIA
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elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”

13. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
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BHATIA
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absence of adjudication warranting interference.
14. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
15. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
16. In order to appreciate the challenge raised by the Petitioner, it
would be appropriate to examine the findings returned by the learned
ARC. The relevant observations of the learned ARC in the Impugned
Order are extracted hereinbelow:
“ A. LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP/OWNERSHIP:-
9. With respect to the first ingredient, it is well-settled that for
the purposes of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, a landlord is not
required to establish absolute ownership in the manner
contemplated under the Transfer of Property Act. It is sufficient for
the landlord to demonstrate that their title is superior to that of the
tenant. In Shanti Sharma & Ors. v. Ved Prabha & Ors. , (1987) 4
SCC 193, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the term “owner”
in this context is to be understood vis-à-vis the tenant, meaning
thereby that the landlord must show himself to be “something more
than the tenant.” Reliance may also be placed on Rajender Kumar
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BHATIA
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Sharma & Ors. v. Leela Wati & Ors. , 155 (2008) DLT 383,
wherein the same principle was reiterated.
10. In the present case, the petitioner is claiming to be a
coowner, to the extent of 1/6th share, of the entire demised
premises. In support of the said submission, a registered sale deed
dated 07.12.2003 executed between Sh. Gian Chand Goel and the
petitioner has been filed on record (see page No. 14 to 24 of the
documents annexed with the petition) .
11. With respect to the entire chain of title, it has been
submitted that initially, the entire suit property was purchased by
Late Sh. Panna Lal Goel by virtue of a registered sale deed dated
23.07.1954. Thereafter, by virtue of the Will dated 13.07.1968, he
bequeathed the entire property in favour of his 06 sons in equal
proportion (after the death of his wife). Sh. Gian Chand Goel is one
of the sons of Late Sh. Panna Lal Goel, and he sold his share to the
petitioner by virtue of the registered sale deed dated 07.12.2003, as
mentioned above. It has been further submitted that the petitioner
was duly substituted as defendant No. 1 in place of Mr. Gian
Chand Goel by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the partition
suit bearing No. CS (OS) 2477/2014 (see page No. 31 and 32 of
the documents annexed with the petition) . Lastly, order dated
09.01.2019, passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in CS (OS)
2477/2014, has been placed on record as per which the suit was
decreed declaring the 06 sons of Late Sh. Panna Lal as the owners
of 1/6th share in the demised premises (see page No. 25 to 30 of
the documents annexed with the petition) .
12. The petitioner has placed on record counterfoil of rent
receipt dated 18.11.2006 which reflects the name of the tenant as
Mr. Gora Lal Jain (see page No. 33 of the documents annexed with
the petition) . It is pertinent to note that Late Sh. Gora Lal Jain was
the father of the respondent. The respondent has not denied the
signatures on the said counterfoil of rent receipt anywhere in the
leave to defend application.
13. The respondent has submitted that he is the owner of the
demised premises on the basis of adverse possession (see
paragraph No. 8 of the affidavit filed with the leave to defend
application) . However, the said plea of adverse possession is a bald
plea. It is settled law that in order to take the plea of adverse
possession, three ingredients must co-exist, i.e., (i) adequate in
continuity; (ii) adequate in publicity; and (iii) adverse to a
competitor in denial of title and his knowledge (see Ravinder Kaur
Grewal v. Manjeet Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729; Kamaljit Singh v.
Protiva Pandey, (2024) SCC OnLine Del 8848). To substantiate, in
order to demonstrate adverse possession, the concerned party must
establish the date on which it came into possession, nature, factum
and duration of possession, and when the possession came to the
knowledge of the true owner. In the present case, the respondent
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BHATIA
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has not even identified the true owner against whom he is claiming
the said adverse possession. Therefore, in absence of the same,
without the hostile declaration of his title vis-a-vis the original
owner, the claim for adverse possession would fail, and it would
only be categorized as permissive possession of the tenanted
premises.
17. Further, the respondent has placed on record electricity bill
and property tax receipts to support his contention of ownership.
However, it is settled law that electricity bill and property tax
receipts are not title documents. On the other hand, as noted above,
the petitioner has specifically filed on record the registered sale
deed, by virtue of which she purchased 1/6th share in the demised
premises and became a co-owner. It is a settled position of law that
attornment follows automatically upon the execution of a
registered sale deed. Further, it is a settled position of law that a co-
owner can maintain an eviction petition on their own and the
consent of other co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown
that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant
( India Umbrella Mfg. Co. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla , (2004) 3
SCC 178; Col. Inderjeet Singh v. Mr. Vikram Singh , 194 (2012)
DLT 209; Yashpal v. Chaman Lal Sachdeva , 129 (2006) DLT
200).
16. Therefore, by virtue of the sale deed on record, coupled
with the orders passed in the partition suit, the petitioner has been
able to show a better title than that of the respondent. Further, the
petitioner has also been able to show landlord-tenant relationship
between the father of the respondent and the petitioner’s
predecessor by virtue of the rent receipt on record.
15. Accordingly, based on the above, no triable issue exists
regarding the landlord-tenant relationship/ownership between
the parties. ”
(emphasis supplied)

17. A perusal of the aforesaid findings would reveal that the learned
ARC has considered the plea of ownership by way of adverse
possession in the context of the material placed on record. The
Petitioner had merely asserted adverse possession without disclosing
the date from which such possession was claimed to have become
hostile, the person against whom such possession was asserted, or the
circumstances in which the possession became adverse to the true
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BHATIA
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owner. The learned ARC has therefore found the said plea to be a bald
assertion, unsupported by the necessary foundational facts.
18. Further, it was also noticed that the counterfoil of the rent
receipt dated 18.11.2006 records the name of the Petitioner's father as
the tenant and, significantly, the Petitioner did not raise any explicit
objection, either with regard to the signatures appearing thereon or
otherwise in respect of the said rent receipt.
19. The learned ARC has considered this material along with the
registered sale deed dated 07.12.2003 and the orders passed in the
partition proceedings recognising the Respondent's share in the
Subject Premises. The conclusion that the Respondent had
demonstrated a title superior to that asserted by the Petitioner and that
a landlord-tenant relationship existed between the parties, therefore,
cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity.
20. It is noticed that these very contentions have already been
sought to be raised before the learned ARC and they have already
accorded consideration.
21. The documents relied upon by the Petitioner, before the learned
ARC, namely , the electricity bill and property tax receipts, also do not
advance his case, particularly when such documents, in themselves, do
not constitute documents of title. Therefore, the learned ARC was
justified in considering the same in the context of the registered title
document relied upon by the Respondent and the material evidencing
the tenancy of the Petitioner's predecessor.
22. In these circumstances, the challenge raised before this Court
essentially seeks a re-appreciation of the material which has already
been considered by the learned ARC. Such an exercise would
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BHATIA
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necessarily require this Court to substitute its own assessment for the
findings returned in the Impugned Order, which, as discussed
hereinabove, is not within the scope of the limited revisional
jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
23. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no merit in
the present Petition, and therefore, the same stands dismissed.
24. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.



HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
SEPTEMBER 01, 2026/tk/jk

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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