SOMNATH MANDAL AND ANOTHER vs STATE OF WEST BENGAL
- Court
- Calcutta High Court
1
Form No. J(1)
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Present :
The Hon’ble Justice Rajasekhar Mantha
And
The Hon’ble Justice Anuj Singh
CRA (DB) 43 of 2025
With
CRAN 1 of 2025
Somnath Mandal & Anr.
Vs.
The State of West Bengal
For the Appellant : Mr. Soumik Ganguli,
Mr. Soumyajit Das Mahapatra,
Ms. Madhurai Sinha,
Ms. Upasana Banerjee,
Mr. Bisal Roy.
For the State : Mr. Gouranga Kumar Das, A.P.P.
Mr. Soumya Raha.
Ld. Amicus Curiae : Mr. Partha Sarathi Bhattacharya .
st
Hearing concluded on : September 1 , 2026
rd
Judgment on: September 3 , 2026
2
Rajasekhar Mantha, J
1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction
dated November 28, 2024, and the order of sentence dated November
29, 2024, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bankura, in
Sessions Trial No. 01 of 2019, arising out of Sessions Case No. 308 of
2018
2. The appellants were convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (IPC) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
life, alongside a fine of ₹ 50,000/- each, and in default of payment of
fine, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for six months.
3. The appellants were also convicted under Section 341 of the IPC and
sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month, along with
a fine of ₹ 500/- each, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo
further simple imprisonment for five days.
4. All sentences were directed to run concurrently. The period of
detention undergone by the appellants during investigation, inquiry,
and trial was directed to be set off against the substantive sentences
in terms of Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
THE PROSECUTION CASE
nd
5. On July 2 , 2018, the appellants murderously assaulted the victim,
Rabindranath Mondal, in his agricultural field, PO, causing severe
injuries to which he eventually succumbed at Onda Super Speciality
Hospital at approximately 12:40 PM. The victim and his family shared
a long-standing enmity with the appellants inter-alia in connection
with construction of a road in the village, Chudamani.
3
6. On the fateful morning, PW-19 was working as an agricultural
labourer in the victim’s field from 7:00 AM to 9:00 AM. The victim had
left his home carrying a meal for PW-19. While at the field, the
appellants armed with a spade, an iron rod, a bamboo stick and a
scythe brutally assaulted him.
7. One Pratik Bajpayee telephonically informed the victim’s son (PW-13)
that the accused persons namely Gopal Mondal and his two sons,
Somnath Mondal and Raghunath Mondal had brutally assaulted his
father. PW-13 immediately relayed this information to his mother (PW-
1), who was residing with him at Beliatore, in the village. The accused
Gopal Mondal passed away prior to/during the trial, leading to the
abatement of proceedings against him.
8. Upon receiving the news, PW-1 and PW-13 rushed towards
Chudamanipur Village (where the PO is situated). En route, they
received further information that the victim had been shifted to Onda
Super Speciality Hospital, whereupon they went directly to the
hospital. However, by the time they arrived, the victim had already
succumbed to his injuries.
9. PW-1 lodged a written complaint dated July 2, 2018, at the Onda
Police Station. Consequently, Onda P.S. Case No. 73/2018 dated July
2, 2018, was registered under Sections 341, 302, and 34 of the IPC
against the named accused persons.
4
10. An inquest was conducted on the body of the deceased between 2:40
PM and 3:45 PM on the same day. The inquest report recorded that
while the victim was working in his field, he was restrained and
attacked by three co-villagers armed with a spade, an iron rod, and a
scythe, and that he subsequently died at Onda Super Speciality
Hospital.
nd
11. A post-mortem examination was conducted on July 2 , 2018. It
revealed multiple injuries that collectively caused the death of the
victim. The post-mortem doctor (PW-16) initially reserved his final
opinion on the precise cause of death pending receipt of the CFSL
report.
12. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed, and
formal charges were framed on January 5, 2019, under Sections
341/34 and 302/34 of the IPC against the accused persons, Somnath
Mondal, Raghunath Mondal, and Gopal Mondal. The trial commenced
thereafter.
THE TRIAL AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD
PW-1, Karunamoyee Mondal
13. , was the wife of the victim. She has
nd
deposed that on July 2 , 2018, between 10:00 AM and 10:30 AM, her
son Rathindranath Mondal (PW-13) received a phone call from Pratik
Bajpayee informing him that her husband was being brutally
assaulted by Gopal Mondal, Raghunath Mondal, and Somnath
Mondal. She was informed that the victim was taken to Onda
Hospital.
5
14. Upon reaching Onda Super Speciality Hospital, she found her
husband dead and learnt that he had been attacked on his way to his
agricultural field. She identified the accused persons in court and
confirmed that the written complaint was scribed on her instructions
by Ashok Mondal (who passed away prior to trial).
15. She has deposed that her son (PW-13) had previously been chased
and threatened by Raghunath and Somnath Mondal over a village
road dispute, forcing him to reside separately at Beliatore.
16. PW-2, Bachchu Singha , was a co-villager working in his field on the
fateful day. He has deposed that between 10:00 AM and 10:30 AM, he
heard the victim shouting "Bachao, Bachao"( save me) and witnessed
Gopal Mondal striking the victim with a bamboo stick, Raghunath
Mondal with a katari, and Somnath Mondal with a spade from a
distance of approximately 300 to 400 hands from his field.
17. Fearing the armed assailants, he did not intervene immediately.
Upon seeing the accused persons have fled the scene, he reached the
spot alongside Sushanta Pal (PW-3), Subhasish Horkara (PW-9), and
others before local villagers shifted the victim to the hospital. He
identified the seized blood-stained earth and straw in court and
acknowledged having made a statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. He
admitted to have omitted to name the weapons before the magistrate.
18. PW-3, Sushanta Pal, was a sharecropper ( bargadar) working in an
adjacent field. He has deposed that he saw the victim heading towards
his field for sowing around 10:00–10:30 AM. While returning after
fetching drinking water from Bagdipara (100 hands away), he
6
witnessed Raghunath assaulting the victim with a katari, Somnath
with a spade, and Gopal with a bamboo lathi while the victim cried
out for help.
19. Being petrified, he approached only after the assailants fled, at which
point he offered water to the injured victim upon his request. During
trial, he affirmed his statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
and specifically confirmed to the Court that he saw all three accused
throw down and beat the victim across his entire body.
20. PW-4, Kanai Bagdi, was a Toto driver and co-villager returning home
for lunch on the fateful day . He has deposed that he saw Somnath
Mondal, Raghunath Mondal, and Gopal Mondal restrain the victim
and assault him mercilessly before he fled the scene out of fear. He
identified the accused in court and confirmed his statement under
Section 164 Cr.P.C., clarifying during cross-examination that his
omission of Gopal Mondal’s name before the Judicial Magistrate
occurred simply because he was not specifically asked about Gopal at
that time.
21. PW-5, Bishwanath Dey, was a nephew of the deceased accused
Gopal Mondal and witness to the inquest. He has deposed that he
reached the hospital around 12:30 PM after learning of the attack and
later witnessed police officers bring appellants Somnath and
th
Raghunath Mondal to the village on July 20 , 2018.
22. He has deposed that pursuant to disclosure statements made by the
accused, they led the police team to the south-western bank of
"Kumarpukur" pond and pointed out the exact spot from where the
7
murder weapons were recovered and seized under a list he signed. He
denied defence suggestions that he was a "stock witness" merely
because he was cited as a prosecution witness in a separate,
subsequent criminal case.
23. PW-6, Manash Mondal, was a cousin of the appellants. He has
deposed that upon hearing that the victim was lying on a cot with
bleeding injuries, he rushed to the spot and learnt from Surujit Bauri
that Somnath, Gopal and Raghunath Mondal had assaulted the
victim. He subsequently assisted in transporting the injured victim to
Onda Super Speciality Hospital in a Maruti van. He admitted during
cross-examination that he was not formally interrogated by the police
nor had he previously reported the assault to any authority.
24. PW-7 was Sanjib Samanta @ Bappa . He was a co-villager. He has
deposed that upon being telephonically informed of the attack by PW-
9, he arranged for a vehicle, alerted Onda Police Station, and signed
as an inquest witness at the hospital.
25. He fully corroborated the recovery of weapons under Section 27 of
the Evidence Act, 1872, in that a katari, a bamboo stick, and a spade
were recovered from the Kumarpukur pond bank on the leading
statements of the accused persons Somnath and Raghunath Mondal
in his presence. He also confirmed the existence of a prior village road
dispute and threats issued by the accused against the victim and his
son.
8
26. PW-8, a police constable, posted at Onda P.S. He has deposed that
he accompanied SI Saiful Sheikh to Onda Super Speciality Hospital on
the day of the incident, escorted the deceased's body to the morgue for
post-mortem examination under a dead body challan, collected the
blood-stained wearing apparel of the victim, and handed it over at the
police station under a formal seizure list bearing his signature.
27. PW-9, was Subhasish Horkara . He has deposed that around 11:00
AM, while sitting on his shed’s rooftop, he noticed local girls running
in distress and followed them to find the victim lying severely injured.
The victim gave an oral dying declaration to him specifically naming
"Raghu, Gopal, and Somnath Mondal" as his assailants and pleaded
to be taken to the hospital. He detailed how he assisted in moving the
victim on a cot to Bauripara Tentultala before loading him into a
Maruti van. He witnessed the police seize blood-stained mud from the
PO, signed the seizure list, and identified the accused persons by
name in court.
28. PW-10, Alok Bauri, the driver of the Maruti Omni van, by which the
victim was taken to the hospital . He has deposed that after receiving
a phone call regarding an emergency at Churamanipur village, he
drove to the spot between 11:00 AM and 11:30 AM, found the severely
bleeding victim placed on a cot, loaded him into his vehicle, and
rushed him to Onda Super Speciality Hospital.
9
29. PW-11 was Shibdas Sutradhar . He has deposed that the police
officers arrived at the south-western bank of Kumarpukur pond with
accused Raghunath and Somnath Mondal, who recovered a katari,
spade, and bamboo stick from the water, resulting in a formal seizure
list signed by him, PW-5, PW-7, and the said accused persons.
However, during cross-examination, he claimed that the weapons
produced in court during trial did not appear to be the exact articles
that were originally recovered.
30. PW-12, Tapashi Mondal, a nurse on duty at Onda Super Speciality
Hospital. He has deposed that the victim was brought to the hospital
around 12:30 PM with profuse bleeding and succumbed to his injuries
within 10 minutes, after which she witnessed and signed the police
inquest report conducted over the dead body between 12:45 PM and
12:50 PM.
31. PW-13, Rathindranath Mondal, the son of the victim. He has
deposed regarding the underlying motive of the accused persons. He
has deposed that after an April 5, 2018 assault by the accused
persons over a village road dispute led to a criminal case and
continuous threats against the victim and family.
nd
32. He was forced to reside separately at Beliatore. On July 2 , 2018,
between 11:00 AM and 11:30 AM, he received a phone call from Pratik
Bajpayee informing him of the attack on his father, whereupon he
alerted his mother (PW-1) and rushed to Onda Super Speciality
Hospital, finding his father dead upon arrival.
10
33. PW-14, Uttam Mondal, was a police constable at the Onda P.S. He
has deposed that he accompanied the Officer-in-Charge and SI Saiful
Sheikh to Chudamanipur village around 11:00 AM on July 2, 2018,
where he was handed the written complaint given by PW-1. He went
back to Onda Police Station for registration of an FIR based on the
said complaint. He, however, did not make GD entries or endorse the
said complaint.
34. PW-15, Dr. Moumita Kundu, was an Emergency Medical Officer at
Onda Hospital. He has deposed that the victim was brought to the
hospital at 12:30 PM in an unconscious, gasping condition with
multiple deep incised and penetrating injuries on the frontal region
and died at 12:40 PM (Exhibits 8 & 9). She proved the treatment
sheet, confirmed notifying the police, and noted during cross-
examination that while the injuries were deep and profuse, no mud or
sand was observed directly inside the wounds.
35. PW-16 was the Post-Mortem doctor . He has detailed 13 external
injuries (lacerations and abrasions across the forehead, chest, arms,
and legs) and 4 internal injuries, including a severe subarachnoid
hemorrhage across both cerebral hemispheres.
36. He has deposed that the injuries were caused by blunt force/heavy
impact and their cumulative effect caused death. The homicidal death
could not be ruled out, and noted that while he preserved the viscera,
post-mortem doctors are not authorized to send it directly to the FSL.
11
37. PW-17, Sanchita Saha, was the Judicial Magistrate. She has
deposed that she recorded statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. of
PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4. She initially deposed certain omissions made
by the said PWs in their statements to her but subsequently clarified
during trial that the witnesses had indeed broadly disclosed before her
that the accused persons murderously assaulted the victim using
weapons such as a bamboo stick, kodal, and spade.
38. PW-18, Sudhir Mondal, was a local resident. She has deposed that
he heard about the victim being assaulted by the accused persons and
noted during cross-examination that he understood the incident had
taken place near the Telipukur land belonging to the victim.
39. PW-19, Sadhan Bauri, was the agricultural labour working in the
victim's field. He confirmed working there from 7:00 AM to 9:00 AM on
the day of the incident, but resiled from his initial police statement
regarding witnessing the assault, claiming ignorance of how the victim
was killed, leading the prosecution to declare him a hostile witness.
40. PW-20, Hirak Pahari, was the OC at Onda P.S. He has deposed that
upon receiving telephonic information of the assault, he logged GD
Entry No. 61 (noted as 11:45 AM in the GD register extract) and
proceeded to Churamanipur village, where he received the written
complaint from PW-1 at the PO and dispatched it to the police station
for registration. He confirmed that the said GD entry is shown to have
registered at 11:15 A.M. in the FIR.
12
41. PW-21 was SI Binoy Mullick. He has deposed that upon receiving
the written complaint from the OC at 1:15 PM, he formally registered
Onda P.S. Case No. 73/2018 under Sections 341/302/34 IPC
(referencing GD Entry No. 64), registered UD Case No. 20/2018 upon
hospital notification, and signed as a witness when SI Saiful Sheikh
seized the victim's blood-stained clothes.
42. PW-22, SI Saiful Sheikh , was the Investigating Officer. He has
indicated the steps taken during investigation. He has deposed that
after receiving initial telephonic information and recording GD Entry
No. 61, he visited the PO, found it vacant as the victim was moved. He
proceeded to the hospital to conduct the inquest, seized blood-stained
earth from the PO, and took steps for recording Section 164
statements. He oversaw the weapon recoveries from Kumarpukur
pond, identified the seized physical evidence in court, and submitted
the charge sheet against the accused persons.
ANALYSIS OF THIS COURT
a) The PO of the crime has been substantially proved
43. Learned counsel for the appellant has first argued that the place of
occurrence of the crime is suspect. To support this, ld. counsel relied
on the evidence of PW-22 (the Investigating Officer of the case), who
deposed that none of the prosecution witnesses (PWs) stated to him
that the victim was assaulted in the agricultural field belonging to
Sudhir Mondal.
13
44. Ld. Counsel further sought to highlight an inconsistency by
comparing the omissions in the statements of other PWs with the
version given by the victim's wife (PW-1). PW-1 stated in her written
complaint that the victim was intercepted and killed near Telipukur.
45. The aforesaid argument should be rejected in view of the topography
of the place of occurrence, which consists of open agricultural fields.
The PO was an agricultural field. The PWs have unanimously said the
victim was beaten in the agricultural field. Thus, the nature and name
of the PO is substantially confirmed.
46. PW-1 stated in her written complaint that the victim was intercepted
at Telipukur, which is a pond located to the south of the PO. This
written complaint thus sheds light on the nature of the PO.
47. The victim was beaten by multiple assailants, and during the course
of the assault, he may have been dragged into the field belonging to
Sudhir Mondal after intercepting the victim near Telipukur, which is
very close to the PO. Furthermore, due to a lack of clarity regarding
the exact ownership of Sudhir Mondal's field, the witnesses lacked
precision when describing the exact location of the PO.
b) Discrepancy in General Diary Entries and FIR’s Validity
48. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that while the FIR
notes General Diary Entry No. 61 is effected at 11:15 AM on July 2,
2018, the extract of the GD register produced during trial shows the
time 11:45 AM. Based on this, it is argued that the police records have
been manipulated.
14
49. The aforesaid argument stands negated by two distinct GD entries
involved in the prosecution case. The first GD Entry No. 61 recorded
the initial and unverified information regarding a violent altercation
and law-and-order disturbance at Churamanipur Village, arising from
the assault on the victim. This entry did not constitute the FIR.
50. Accordingly, the discrepancy regarding the time at which the said GD
entry was made cannot impeach the veracity of the FIR since it did not
lead to its registration. Over-emphasis on the particulars of a GD
entry, which did not culminate in an FIR, is uncalled for.
51. The FIR in question was registered pursuant to the second GD Entry
No. 64, which was effected at 1:15 PM. The said entry recorded that
the victim succumbed to his injuries at the hospital. Therefore, the
prosecution case sprung from the second GD entry in addition to the
said FIR.
52. In Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1, it
was held that the General Diary is a voluminous daily administrative
record. Thus a P.S. may not always infallibly record each preceding
and following events in connection to an FIR.
53. A GD entry is not a preface to the registration of an FIR. An FIR is
registered in a separate book called the FIR Register book. From this
perspective, the legitimacy of an FIR should not be determined with
reference to the time at which a corresponding GD entry was effected.
54. An entry in the General Diary of a police station cannot override the
actual piece of information, which resulted in an FIR.
15
55. Mere procedural or clerical errors in recording time entries in a
General Diary do not invalidate an FIR or negate the prosecution's case
unless deliberate fraud or prejudice to the accused is demonstrated.
c) Allegation of Mala Fide Prosecution and Personal Enmity
56. The appellants contended that the prosecution was motivated by
personal enmity and political rivalries, highlighting prior litigations
between the families.
57. It is a well-settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that personal
enmity is a double-edged sword. While it may provide a foundation for
false implication, it serves as an equally potent motive for committing a
crime.
58. When substantive, credible, and eye-witness evidence establishes the
commission of an offense, the underlying motive or alleged mala fides of
the informant pales into insignificance. It was held in Sheonandan
Paswan v. State of Bihar, reported in (1987) 1 SCC 288 , and in A.R.
Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, reported in (1984) 2 SCC 500 ,
a criminal trial is conducted on behalf of society to punish crimes against
the State. Once guilt is established through reliable evidence, private
malice or political vendetta cannot vitiate a justifiable prosecution.
d) Credibility of Eye-Witnesses and Section 164 Cr.P.C. Omissions
59. Learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the oral evidence of
PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4 suffer from fatal omissions when juxtaposed with
their Section 164 Cr.P.C’s statements, as pointed out by the Judicial
Magistrate (PW-17).
16
60. A Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement is not a substantive piece of evidence. It
corroborates and/or contradicts the witness during trial. Minor
variations, non-mention of exact specification of weapons, or omission of
exact time in a Section 164 statement cannot wipe out eye-witness
testimony on oath, which has withstood cross examination.
61. The witnesses in this case are villagers hailing from a village. In Shivaji
Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1973) 2 SCC
793 , the evidence of villagers witnesses must be evaluated keeping in
mind their social background and perceptive habits.
62. Minor discrepancies on the fringes or non-embellished omissions, arising
out of fear, trauma, or unfamiliarity with legal procedure, cannot subvert
the core of their testimony when it bears the impress of truth.
63. PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4 gave consistent accounts of seeing the
appellants actively assaulting the unarmed victim. Their failure to
intervene is natural given that the assailants were armed with lethal
weapons (katari, spade, and lathi).
64. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the name of one
person, in addition to the other three accused persons, was taken by
PW4. We, however, have not been able to find any name of such person
taken by PW4 in addition to the other three accused persons.
65. In addition to this, the accused persons had appropriate remedies under
the CrPC by filing an application to include any other person whom they
believed had committed the crime with them or independent of them. It is
really a matter of investigation as to whether the name of the other person
17
allegedly taken by PW4 has ever surfaced during the course of
investigation.
66. In view of the overwhelming evidence on record against the three
accused persons, the said accused persons cannot take the benefit of the
fact that additionally there was a fourth person whose name has not been
charge sheeted by the police and accordingly has not been subjected to
trial.
e) The authenticity and admissibility of dying declaration given out to PW 9
67. PW-9 has deposed that the victim, while lying in a pool of blood,
explicitly named "Raghu, Gopal, and Somnath" as his assailants.
68. Section 32 of the Evidence Act has not prescribed any format let alone
any rigid format for recording a dying declaration. However, ordinarily, a
dying declaration must be recorded by a magistrate or a person of some
status. This is the rule, the exception whereof is discussed below.
69. A magistrate or a person of some status namely, a doctor, may not be
immediately available and the deceased victim may have very little time
left in this world. In such an event, the victim may inform any person
attending him the circumstances leading to his death. This is also
natural. A person, having no interest to falsely implicate the accused can
be a witness of a dying declaration.
70. In Sudhakar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2000) 6 SCC
671,
it was held that a dying declaration is admitted and read in evidence
as matter of necessity. A verbal dying declaration is also admissible. It
was held as follows:
5. Section 32 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule
of exclusion of the hearsay evidence…… Such statements are
18
admitted in evidence on the principle of necessity ……..To make
such statement as substantive evidence, the person or the agency
relying upon it is under a legal obligation to prove the making of the
statement as a fact. If it is in writing, the scribe must be produced in
the court and if it is verbal, it should be proved by examining
the person who heard the deceased making the statement .
However, in cases where the original recorded dying declaration is
proved to have been lost and not available, the prosecution is
entitled to give secondary evidence thereof.
71. In Arvind Singh v. State of Bihar, reported in (2001) 6 SCC 407, it
was held as follows:-
17. Be it noted that the dying declaration herein has not been
effected before any doctor or any independent witness but to
the mother who is said to have arrived at the place only in the
morning — the mother admittedly is an interested witness;
though that by itself would not discredit the evidence tendered
in court but the fact remains that the doctor's evidence
considering the nature of the burns posed a considerable
doubt as to whether such a statement could be made half-an-
hour before the death of the accused.
Emphasis applied
72. A dying declaration given to an independent witness is, therefore,
admissible. A dying declaration is admitted as a substantive piece of
evidence as a matter of necessity. A dying declaration cannot be rejected
on the technical grounds namely the designation of a person, who heard
the declaration, is not that of a magistrate.
73. In the present case, the villagers of the victim were trying to save his
life and took him to the hospital. The doctors at the hospital did not get
the time to record the dying declaration of the victim, since they were
busy saving the life of the victim.
74. On the other hand, the police also did not get the time to record the
dying declaration of the victim by a magistrate, in view of the fact that the
victim died before the arrival of the police at the hospital.
19
75. Therefore, in the present case, the dying declaration given by the victim
to PW-9 cannot be brushed aside. It should be read against the innocence
of the appellants. This cannot be construed as extra-judicial evidence, in
view of the fact that the victim has voluntarily related and described the
acts of the accused against him to PW 9.
f) Validity of Disclosure Statements and recoveries under Section 27 of IEA, 1872.
76. Learned Counsel for the appellant has argued the recovery of the
weapons of offence, katari, spade, bamboo stick from Kumarpukur pond
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872, is suspect since PW-11, a
witness to the said recovery, has resiled on weapon identification, and the
pond was accessible to the public and close to PW-2’s field.
77. The evidence of PW-5 and PW-7 has established that the appellants
Somnath Mondal and Raghunath Mondal led the police team to the
specific south-western submerged corner of Kumarpukur pond and
pointed out the exact spot from where the weapons were retrieved.
78. PW-11 stumbled in identifying the said weapons during trial. The same
however, does not dilute the clear, corroborated evidence of PW-5, PW-7,
and IO PW-22, who confirmed the recovery and proved the seizure list.
79. PW-11 could not recall the description of the weapons recovered. The
said weapons are ordinarily available in every Indian household. The said
weapons lack any distinctive feature that a human mind would distinctly
remember.
80. If Susanta Pal, PW 2, had kept the said weapons in the said pond, the
accused persons would not have had knowledge of the area where the
weapons were kept.
20
81. Ld. Counsel for the appellant has argued that recovery of the alleged
murden weapons is hit by Section 27 since the recovery is not supported
by any memorandum of statement of the accused. In this regard, reliance
is placed on the decision reported in Boby v. State of Kerala, reported
(2023) 15 SCC 760.
82. In paragraph number 34 of Boby decision (supra) the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that the memo of statement of the accused was a
fabricated document. Despite having held such, the trial court went on to
rely on the said memo to read the mental awareness of the accused in the
commission of the crime.
83. In Boby decision (supra) , the case of the prosecution was based on the
last-seen theory and the circumstantial evidence against the accused.
Therefore, the recovery of the weapon was to be read strictly. In a case
based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution carries a slightly
higher burden to join all the dots and prove the case. Therefore, the
recovery of the weapon at the instance of the accused has to follow a
stricter rigor of law as compared to a case based on direct eye witness
account.
84. In the present case, however, as held above, the eyewitness accounts of
the PWs are consistent, clear, and credible. In paragraph nos. 24 & 30
Perumal Raja @ Perumal v. State, Rep. by Inspector Of Police,
reported in 2024 INSC 13 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the
application of Section 27 of IEA, 1872, should be pragmatically applied
and it should not be put in a straitjacket formula. Thus, it not mandatory
21
that in each case, a recovery under Section 27 has to be supported by a
memo of statement of the accused.
85. In the present case, the prosecution witnesses have seen the accused
persons showing to the police the pond from where the weapons were
recovered. Their evidence of witnessing the conduct of the accused
persons pointing out the place to the Police where the weapons were kept,
has assumed the force of direct evidence as regards the recovery of the
weapon. Therefore, in absence of a memorandum of the statement of the
accused, the recovery made under Section 27 cannot be faulted. It should
be read against the accused.
g) Medical Evidence vs. Ocular Testimony
86. The appellants have argued that while the witnesses alleged the use of
sharp weapons katari, and spade, the post-mortem report (PW-16) listed
lacerations and abrasions typical of blunt force trauma, creating an
irreconcilable conflict between medical and ocular evidence.
87. This argument is legally and factually untenable. The post-mortem
report reveals widespread, severe physical damage: 13 external
lacerations/abrasions and severe internal brain haemorrhaging
(subarachnoid hemorrhage). A spade or heavy billhook, when struck with
flat surfaces or heavy blunt force during a dynamic struggle, inflicts
severe lacerations, blunt force crush injuries, and tissue tearing identical
to those found by PW-16.
88. Injury No. 14 (bruise on the right forearm) directly reflects a defensive
wound sustained while the victim tried to shield himself. Injury No. 17
(subarachnoid hemorrhage) reflects high-energy blunt impact trauma to
22
the head, consistent with being struck violently with a bamboo stick and
heavy agricultural tools.
89. Ocular evidence prevails over medical opinion unless the medical
evidence completely rules out the physical possibility of the injury
occurring in the manner alleged. In the present case, PW-16 explicitly
stated that homicidal death could not be ruled out and that the
cumulative effect of all injuries caused the death. The medical findings
fully align with a heavy, multi-assailant blunt-and-sharp
h) Absence of Mud Traces on Clothes/Wounds
90. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the absence of mud
on the victim's lungi or wounds negates the prosecution case that the
assault occurred in an agricultural field.
91. The evidence on record has establishes that after the assault, the victim
was moved by co-villagers onto a cot, wrapped in bedding, and
transported via a Maruti van. Naturally, loose soil and surface mud were
rubbed off during handling, wiping, and shifting. This minor observation
does not displace the blood-stained earth seized directly from the PO
under a proved seizure list.
92. The immediate reaction of the eye-witnesses (PW-2, PW-3, PW-4), the
victim's cries for help ("Bachao, Bachao"), and his immediate statement
to PW-9 naming his assailants form part of the same transaction. This
immediate, untainted chain of events is admissible as res gestae and
provides strong spontaneous corroboration to the prosecution case.
93. The evidence proves beyond doubt that all three accused arrived
together armed with deadly weapons, conjointly launched a fatal assault
23
on a defenceless victim, and fled the scene together. This shared physical
action and pre-arranged plan fully satisfy the requirements of Section 34
IPC, making each appellant liable for the ultimate outcome—the murder
of Rabindranath Mondal.
94. In Goverdhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in 2025
INSC 47 , it was held as follows:-
It is also to be noted that the law does not contemplate stitching the
pieces of evidence in a watertight manner, for the standard of proof in
a criminal case is not proof beyond all doubts but only beyond
reasonable doubt.
95. The prosecution is not required to meet hyper-technical or impossible
standards of perfection. The evidentiary chain presented by the
prosecution in this case is complete, coherent, and establishes guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSIONs
96. The evidence on record establishes an unbroken chain of events and
direct eye-witness accounts that completely exclude any hypothesis of
innocence of the appellants:
A. Long-standing enmity and ongoing litigation regarding a village
road established a clear motive.
B. PW-13 was forced to reside away from the village due to
continuous threats from the appellants.
C. The victim went to his field carrying meals for his labourer
(PW-19), establishing his natural presence at the PO.
24
D. Independent eye-witnesses (PW-2, PW-3, PW-4) working in
nearby fields saw the appellants assault the victim with
weapons.
E. The victim made a prompt, untainted oral dying declaration to
PW-9 naming the appellants.
F. The medical evidence (PW-15 and PW-16) confirms severe,
cumulative fatal injuries consistent with the weapons used.
G. The weapons of offense were recovered pursuant to disclosure
statements made by the appellants under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act.
97. In view of the detailed discussion above, this Court finds no infirmity,
illegality, or perversity in the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence passed by the learned Trial Court.1
98. Consequently, the present appeal fails and is hereby dismissed along
with all connected applications, if any. The judgment of conviction dated
November 28, 2024, and the order of sentence dated November 29,
2024, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bankura, in Sessions Trial
No. 01 of 2019 are hereby affirmed.
99. The appellants, if on bail, are directed to surrender forthwith before
the learned Sessions Judge, Bankura, to serve out their remaining
sentences.
25
100. Let a copy of this judgment along with the Lower Court Records be
transmitted to the learned trial court forthwith for information and
necessary compliance.
Rajasekhar Mantha, J. )
I agree.
( Anuj Singh, J. )